0:00:02 > 0:00:04Ulster Bank - bailed out by taxpayers,
0:00:04 > 0:00:09now accused of pushing some businesses into bankruptcy
0:00:09 > 0:00:11to boost the bank's balance sheet.
0:00:11 > 0:00:15If the Ulster Bank had been prepared to work with the business,
0:00:15 > 0:00:17those jobs could have been saved.
0:00:17 > 0:00:21It was as if we had been attacked in our sleep.
0:00:21 > 0:00:24A Government-commissioned report also claims the bank pushed
0:00:24 > 0:00:28viable businesses to the wall for its own profit.
0:00:28 > 0:00:31It's ingrained in us to trust the bank and, I think,
0:00:31 > 0:00:33that's where people have gone wrong.
0:00:33 > 0:00:38An insider claims that a division of the RBS Group, Ulster Bank's parent company,
0:00:38 > 0:00:42targeted some businesses that could have survived.
0:00:42 > 0:00:46I was directed to destroy viable businesses by the bank.
0:00:46 > 0:00:50That was my job. I was told to do so.
0:00:50 > 0:00:51Ulster Bank denied the allegations,
0:00:51 > 0:00:57but questions persist about how the bank treated some business customers.
0:01:19 > 0:01:23The fall-out from Northern Ireland's toxic debt crisis.
0:01:23 > 0:01:26This is the company's offices here.
0:01:26 > 0:01:29Downpatrick-based building company Polly Bros Ltd
0:01:29 > 0:01:33went into administration in late 2009.
0:01:33 > 0:01:38The construction company was started by my father in 1957.
0:01:38 > 0:01:42I took over the business in the mid-'80s
0:01:42 > 0:01:44and grew the business from there.
0:01:44 > 0:01:48And, at one stage, it employed about 120 people.
0:01:48 > 0:01:51What was your business ethos in terms of Polly Brothers?
0:01:51 > 0:01:56My bankers, the Ulster Bank, always said I was a conservative customer.
0:01:56 > 0:02:00If I wanted to buy a piece of land, I had the money to buy it,
0:02:00 > 0:02:02I didn't need to go near the bank.
0:02:02 > 0:02:04During the boom years,
0:02:04 > 0:02:08according to Brian Polly, Ulster Bank was keen to lend to him.
0:02:08 > 0:02:12The bank were very happy to lend me large sums of money,
0:02:12 > 0:02:15but I was very apprehensive.
0:02:15 > 0:02:20There were two sets in particular that the bank wanted me to buy.
0:02:20 > 0:02:24They rang me up and asked me, "Come in on Monday morning, the deeds are here,
0:02:24 > 0:02:26"and the money is here for you."
0:02:26 > 0:02:29I said, "Boys, I'm not interested in buying that.
0:02:29 > 0:02:31"I'm not interested. I have enough."
0:02:31 > 0:02:35Brian Polly did, however, borrow from the bank.
0:02:35 > 0:02:39I bought a site in a prime location in Belfast.
0:02:40 > 0:02:45They lent me the money and then they got it revalued again after I bought it
0:02:45 > 0:02:50and they said there was plenty of equity in it, let's go again.
0:02:50 > 0:02:51In 2006,
0:02:51 > 0:02:56Brian Polly's company had loans of £6 million from Ulster Bank.
0:02:58 > 0:03:02Ulster Bank has for decades been among Northern Ireland's leading business banks.
0:03:03 > 0:03:08In 2000, it became part of the Royal Bank of Scotland, RBS.
0:03:09 > 0:03:14In the boom years, the bank, like others, went on a lending binge.
0:03:14 > 0:03:21In 2007, Ulster Bank had a loan book across the island of £55 billion.
0:03:21 > 0:03:26Ulster Bank was infected by the same culture as RBS,
0:03:26 > 0:03:32which was that RBS basically kept on betting on future growth in the economy.
0:03:32 > 0:03:35And Ulster Bank, in the same way, bet on an assumption
0:03:35 > 0:03:39that you would have constant growth in property prices, both north and south.
0:03:42 > 0:03:47It was a huge bet brought down in part by a global financial crisis.
0:03:49 > 0:03:52This is a once-in-a-half-century,
0:03:52 > 0:03:55probably once-in-a-century type of event.
0:03:55 > 0:03:57They can't close the markets like that!
0:03:57 > 0:04:01By 2008, collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers
0:04:01 > 0:04:04triggered global financial turmoil.
0:04:04 > 0:04:08Weeks into the crisis, RBS, Ulster Bank's parent company,
0:04:08 > 0:04:11came within hours of running out of money.
0:04:13 > 0:04:15The end of an era for British banking.
0:04:15 > 0:04:19Some of the biggest names go cap in hand to the Government.
0:04:19 > 0:04:21A £37 billion Government bailout
0:04:21 > 0:04:25saved Ulster Bank's parent company, RBS,
0:04:25 > 0:04:28along with HBOS and Lloyds TSB, from collapse.
0:04:28 > 0:04:33The move made Ulster Bank 81% taxpayer owned.
0:04:34 > 0:04:38For Brian Polly, it seemed, at first, nothing much had changed.
0:04:38 > 0:04:41They were ringing me up, trying to get me to come to the Christmas party
0:04:41 > 0:04:45after being bailed out by the UK taxpayer.
0:04:47 > 0:04:50I point blankly refused to go. It wasn't what I stood for.
0:04:51 > 0:04:57You cannot be bailed out by people on the street and then it's party time. No.
0:05:00 > 0:05:02But the party was over.
0:05:02 > 0:05:05Property values began to slide.
0:05:07 > 0:05:10Ulster Bank was, like most UK banks,
0:05:10 > 0:05:12extremely exposed to the property market.
0:05:12 > 0:05:16And when the property market fell and fell dramatically,
0:05:16 > 0:05:21it had a lot of loans which were bad, in essence.
0:05:21 > 0:05:26A bad loan is when the value of the firm, or the company that has borrowed,
0:05:26 > 0:05:29is actually less than the value of the loan.
0:05:31 > 0:05:33Property prices fell by about 50%.
0:05:33 > 0:05:37That meant that anyone who borrowed money with conditions attached to it,
0:05:37 > 0:05:41in terms of the loan being immediately repayable
0:05:41 > 0:05:44once the property prices fell, that meant they were stuffed, basically.
0:05:46 > 0:05:51The small print was about to become a big deal.
0:05:51 > 0:05:55Once the value of the underlying property, the securing the loan,
0:05:55 > 0:05:59falls below a certain value, then the banks essentially can do what they want.
0:05:59 > 0:06:03They own that business, in essence.
0:06:03 > 0:06:07And so they essentially can transfer money between different accounts.
0:06:07 > 0:06:13They essentially can put very strict conditions on what the actual business can do.
0:06:13 > 0:06:15With so much bad debt on its books,
0:06:15 > 0:06:20Ulster Bank was under pressure to get as much of its money back as possible.
0:06:20 > 0:06:23It started by slimming down its loan book.
0:06:24 > 0:06:30The practice of removing a bad debt from a bank's books is not unusual
0:06:30 > 0:06:32and Ulster Bank has a division to deal with loans
0:06:32 > 0:06:35that are going bad, or seen as risky.
0:06:35 > 0:06:39It is called GRG - the Global Restructuring Group.
0:06:39 > 0:06:46In January 2009, Brian Polly was introduced to Ulster Bank's GRG division.
0:06:46 > 0:06:50The executive out of the Ulster Bank, he said, "We are just putting you
0:06:50 > 0:06:53"into GR...it's only a short-term arrangement.
0:06:53 > 0:06:55"We think the business is just a wee bit sick.
0:06:55 > 0:07:02"It's like a wee bit of special care and you'll come out again in a month, two months' time."
0:07:02 > 0:07:06GRG is supposed to get businesses back in shape
0:07:06 > 0:07:11and, at the same time, protect the bank's position by minimising further losses.
0:07:11 > 0:07:16But Brian Polly claims pressures imposed by GRG
0:07:16 > 0:07:19tipped his company into insolvency.
0:07:19 > 0:07:23There was an arrangement there that every time there was a house completed,
0:07:23 > 0:07:25the bank got such a percentage per house
0:07:25 > 0:07:33and that the remaining moneys would be left in the account to further progress the work in progress.
0:07:33 > 0:07:35But the bank just started taking all the money.
0:07:35 > 0:07:41There was a considerable sum of money that came in one Friday evening of almost £400,000.
0:07:41 > 0:07:45I checked the internet banking on the Friday evening, the money was there.
0:07:45 > 0:07:51I went into my office as usual at 6.30 on the Monday morning, everything was there.
0:07:51 > 0:07:54Before I left, whenever I went in to make sure the money was there,
0:07:54 > 0:07:59the money was gone. 400. Almost 400K was taken out of the account.
0:07:59 > 0:08:02I was absolutely flabbergasted.
0:08:02 > 0:08:05Flabbergasted. Could not...
0:08:05 > 0:08:08The stress of that there is absolutely unbelievable.
0:08:08 > 0:08:14It meant that it sort of very much tipped the business towards the edge.
0:08:14 > 0:08:20Obviously, the creditors - that was the creditors' money, the suppliers,
0:08:20 > 0:08:24people who had done work on that particular contract.
0:08:24 > 0:08:27It took the thing into a negative state.
0:08:31 > 0:08:34By the end of nine months in GRG,
0:08:34 > 0:08:38Brian Polly's company was no longer in a position to pay its bills.
0:08:38 > 0:08:42Ulster Bank told Spotlight that, following multiple petitions by creditors,
0:08:42 > 0:08:45the company was placed into administration.
0:08:46 > 0:08:49I put proposals to the bank on a work-out situation.
0:08:49 > 0:08:52I had employed professional people to help me do that.
0:08:52 > 0:08:56Er, the bank just wasn't prepared to listen.
0:08:56 > 0:09:00Brian Polly is convinced that he had a worthwhile business.
0:09:00 > 0:09:03This here was another design-and-build scheme.
0:09:03 > 0:09:07We built, I think, 270 houses there.
0:09:07 > 0:09:11But that didn't matter to anyone. It didn't matter.
0:09:11 > 0:09:15There were 45 people directly employed. They lost their jobs.
0:09:15 > 0:09:19If the Ulster Bank had been prepared to work with the business,
0:09:19 > 0:09:21those jobs could have been saved.
0:09:21 > 0:09:25Because I had a number of design-and-build schemes lined up.
0:09:25 > 0:09:28Brian Polly wanted to trade his way out of trouble,
0:09:28 > 0:09:32but, in the wake of its bailout, the bank had a mandate
0:09:32 > 0:09:36to rebalance its books and address so-called bad loans -
0:09:36 > 0:09:41liabilities that were now underwritten by taxpayers.
0:09:41 > 0:09:44What effect has the loss of your business had on you?
0:09:44 > 0:09:49It is like letting off a hand grenade in the middle of you. You are completely devastated.
0:09:49 > 0:09:55I sometimes think, "Was it all my fault?"
0:09:55 > 0:09:59How come I've ended up here after working so hard?
0:10:01 > 0:10:04Another casualty of the downturn was Michael Taggart,
0:10:04 > 0:10:09whose firm Taggart Holdings collapsed in 2008.
0:10:09 > 0:10:12He also alleges that the actions of Ulster Bank
0:10:12 > 0:10:17contributed to the failure of his construction and property development company.
0:10:18 > 0:10:25In June 2007, Ulster Bank refused to pay cheques made out by the company.
0:10:25 > 0:10:30The cheques were stopped out of the blue. There was no warning.
0:10:30 > 0:10:33There were no e-mails, there wasn't anything.
0:10:33 > 0:10:37It was as if we had been attacked in our sleep.
0:10:37 > 0:10:40The bank claims that a Taggart company had breached
0:10:40 > 0:10:44the terms of a loan agreement, but Michael Taggart disputes this.
0:10:44 > 0:10:49Our business was sitting with in excess of 20 million on deposit.
0:10:49 > 0:10:53We had about £650 million of assets.
0:10:53 > 0:10:56We had £250 million of borrowing.
0:10:56 > 0:11:00The Ulster Bank had less than 10% of that borrowing.
0:11:00 > 0:11:07Michael Taggart alleges that Ulster Bank's actions immediately damaged his company's credibility.
0:11:07 > 0:11:11Months later, the value of his company's assets decreased rapidly
0:11:11 > 0:11:14when the property market crashed.
0:11:14 > 0:11:18You understand that when you took those loans from the bank,
0:11:18 > 0:11:23that there was a small print that they could call in those loans?
0:11:23 > 0:11:26I wish they had called in the loans in June '07, because, if they had,
0:11:26 > 0:11:29we could have paid them. That is what I wanted to do.
0:11:29 > 0:11:33But they led us to believe we don't need to do that.
0:11:33 > 0:11:36That was the mistake I made, that I did believe them.
0:11:38 > 0:11:41Ulster Bank declined to comment because of an ongoing legal case
0:11:41 > 0:11:45between Michael, his brother John and the bank.
0:11:46 > 0:11:49It is a big task to take on a bank,
0:11:49 > 0:11:53which is why most people roll over and say, "OK, do what you want."
0:11:53 > 0:11:55I do what I believe in.
0:11:55 > 0:11:59Part of their legal case is centred on personal guarantees
0:11:59 > 0:12:02for borrowings by Taggart Holdings.
0:12:02 > 0:12:05It wasn't good enough that they destroyed the business, then they
0:12:05 > 0:12:10had to try to take us out personally and completely finish the job.
0:12:10 > 0:12:14It is nothing more than blood sport. It is just blood sport.
0:12:14 > 0:12:17Several business owners contacted Spotlight,
0:12:17 > 0:12:21alleging that Ulster Bank's GRG division pushed their business
0:12:21 > 0:12:25to the brink of bankruptcy and, in some cases, into insolvency.
0:12:25 > 0:12:30They all spoke of the enormous strain being put on them, but would not go public
0:12:30 > 0:12:33because, they said, they are scared of the bank.
0:12:34 > 0:12:37Spotlight wanted to speak to Ulster Bank's chief executive
0:12:37 > 0:12:41about the bank's treatment of business customers.
0:12:41 > 0:12:45It is Jennifer O'Leary here again, from BBC Spotlight.
0:12:45 > 0:12:49I am aware you have previously indicated there is nobody from Ulster Bank,
0:12:49 > 0:12:52including the chief executive, Jim Brown, available to interview.
0:12:52 > 0:12:55If you could get back to me, I'd be very grateful.
0:12:55 > 0:12:59We first asked Ulster Bank for an interview five weeks ago now.
0:12:59 > 0:13:01And at different times making the programme,
0:13:01 > 0:13:05we've asked the bank to consider putting a spokesperson,
0:13:05 > 0:13:08if not the chief executive, forward to speak to us.
0:13:08 > 0:13:09But they declined to do so.
0:13:09 > 0:13:13They did provide statements through their lawyers, in which they say
0:13:13 > 0:13:18treating all customers fairly is at the core of what they do.
0:13:18 > 0:13:20It's a consistent message.
0:13:20 > 0:13:25In 2010, Henry Elvin, the bank's then head of business banking
0:13:25 > 0:13:31told a Stormont committee that Ulster Bank was on the side of its business customers.
0:13:31 > 0:13:35I sat in a meeting this morning where we had ten difficult customers.
0:13:35 > 0:13:36If we wanted to be difficult,
0:13:36 > 0:13:40we would have put receivers into half those customers. We didn't.
0:13:40 > 0:13:45So the banks, and I can only speak for Ulster Bank, and the other guys can speak,
0:13:45 > 0:13:48the banks are giving these guys every chance.
0:13:48 > 0:13:54But RBS and Ulster Bank's treatment of business customers is under scrutiny.
0:13:54 > 0:14:00Sports car manufacturer Lawrence Tomlinson was a Government adviser when he was commissioned last year
0:14:00 > 0:14:04by Business Secretary Vince Cable to write a report on bank lending.
0:14:06 > 0:14:11His report made a number of damning allegations about GRG.
0:14:11 > 0:14:13It was really shocking.
0:14:13 > 0:14:16In fact, some of the first cases that came to me
0:14:16 > 0:14:17were actually from Ulster Bank.
0:14:17 > 0:14:22Businesses saying, "Not can we not get access to finance,
0:14:22 > 0:14:27"but our finances are being taken away from us and we are being distressed
0:14:27 > 0:14:32"and we are losing jobs and we are being shut down by this GRG."
0:14:32 > 0:14:37The Ulster Bank customers who spoke to Spotlight on camera
0:14:37 > 0:14:40did not make contact with Lawrence Tomlinson ahead of his report.
0:14:40 > 0:14:47In it, he accused the bank of forcing some good and viable businesses to collapse,
0:14:47 > 0:14:50so as to make more profit.
0:14:50 > 0:14:54Businesses that had a future were put into this business support unit,
0:14:54 > 0:14:59called GRG, on the pretence that they would be helped.
0:14:59 > 0:15:04There were really huge fees charged immediately.
0:15:04 > 0:15:07Their facilities were shrunken.
0:15:07 > 0:15:10They caused distressed.
0:15:10 > 0:15:15They had some kind of independent business review that cost them a lot of money.
0:15:15 > 0:15:20It seems, in these instances, that GRG has acted just to be a profit centre
0:15:20 > 0:15:24and make as much money for the bank as possible.
0:15:24 > 0:15:26The Tomlinson Report also claimed
0:15:26 > 0:15:32there were instances of businesses having their assets revalued without consultation
0:15:32 > 0:15:36and then being told they were in breach of their loan conditions,
0:15:36 > 0:15:40which triggered the bank calling in personal guarantees.
0:15:40 > 0:15:43Personal guarantees could be their family home,
0:15:43 > 0:15:46it could be agricultural land.
0:15:46 > 0:15:48Once the loan covenants are breached,
0:15:48 > 0:15:52then the bank can move against and call in the personal guarantee.
0:15:52 > 0:15:56What GRG did, allegedly, and there is a lot of evidence behind this,
0:15:56 > 0:15:58is that GRG said if it liked the assets,
0:15:58 > 0:16:01it would take over the assets through a complex process
0:16:01 > 0:16:04by putting the company into administration.
0:16:04 > 0:16:06And that is where we have the serious problems with GRG.
0:16:06 > 0:16:09That's particularly affected Northern Ireland,
0:16:09 > 0:16:12with a lot of Ulster Bank customers having their assets recovered
0:16:12 > 0:16:14through this rather painful process.
0:16:15 > 0:16:21Ulster Bank called in Brian Polly's personal guarantees in 2010.
0:16:21 > 0:16:26I had a farm here that I particularly enjoyed at the weekends, you know.
0:16:26 > 0:16:28I always loved walking over my farm at the weekend
0:16:28 > 0:16:33and they got it. The first thing I knew about my farm being up for sale
0:16:33 > 0:16:37was there was a signpost put at the end of the road and it was a shock.
0:16:39 > 0:16:44Strangers came round to look around the farm and I was absolutely devastated.
0:16:44 > 0:16:47I had invested in five houses for my kids.
0:16:47 > 0:16:50But, er, the bank got them all.
0:16:54 > 0:16:59They probably saw it as a soft company to go after, you know, and grab the assets.
0:17:00 > 0:17:04We would have liked to have interviewed the bank about these claims.
0:17:07 > 0:17:11We have, however, made contact with an RBS insider.
0:17:11 > 0:17:14He worked for a number of years in a GRG division,
0:17:14 > 0:17:17although not with Ulster Bank clients.
0:17:17 > 0:17:20I'm on my way to meet with the insider who's agreed
0:17:20 > 0:17:23to speak to Spotlight on the basis of anonymity.
0:17:25 > 0:17:28He did not deal with businesses in Northern Ireland,
0:17:28 > 0:17:33but he says he has first-hand experience of working in GRG at RBS,
0:17:33 > 0:17:36Ulster Bank's parent company.
0:17:36 > 0:17:42GRG was a global division which takes care of all subsidiary RBS banks.
0:17:42 > 0:17:49Is GRG the same in how it operates in Belfast, London, Dublin or Edinburgh?
0:17:49 > 0:17:52Yes. Every different bank within the UK,
0:17:52 > 0:17:55Northern Ireland, Ireland, it's all done exactly the same.
0:17:55 > 0:18:03Our main remit was to collect as much money as possible from clients to help the bank.
0:18:03 > 0:18:07The insider says that GRG staff intercepted payments
0:18:07 > 0:18:10being made to companies regardless of the consequences.
0:18:10 > 0:18:13We would always watch the accounts.
0:18:13 > 0:18:15It would be on our screens all the time.
0:18:15 > 0:18:17Several different clients.
0:18:17 > 0:18:20We'd see interactions between them and their customers,
0:18:20 > 0:18:27or their creditors and, often, we would siphon that money off to our account and call it a debt.
0:18:30 > 0:18:34I remember a senior manager in our team was doing a transaction like that,
0:18:34 > 0:18:38and he was working with another colleague from a few desks down,
0:18:38 > 0:18:40and he stood up and punched the air
0:18:40 > 0:18:44and said something along the lines of, "Fantastic, we have it!"
0:18:46 > 0:18:49The money had come in and it was grabbed, so to speak.
0:18:51 > 0:18:56Any cash that we can possibly get our hands on to make our position better,
0:18:56 > 0:18:57we would get our hands on it.
0:18:57 > 0:18:59Even if that cash had been set aside
0:18:59 > 0:19:03and you had been told by the businesses?
0:19:03 > 0:19:05They say, "That money is to pay revenue."
0:19:05 > 0:19:08It didn't matter. We were the bankers.
0:19:08 > 0:19:11But you were the bank that was saved by taxpayers.
0:19:11 > 0:19:14To be frank, most people don't even care about that,
0:19:14 > 0:19:17they're bankers before they're members of the UK.
0:19:18 > 0:19:22Of course, it was one of GRG's jobs to minimise losses
0:19:22 > 0:19:26for the now majority taxpayer-owned bank.
0:19:26 > 0:19:32However, the insider claims that profit took priority over small firms that had a future.
0:19:33 > 0:19:37Did you, as part of your role in GRG,
0:19:37 > 0:19:41did you deliberately push businesses into insolvency?
0:19:41 > 0:19:46Yes. I was directed to destroy viable businesses by the bank
0:19:46 > 0:19:50and that was my job. I was told to do so.
0:19:50 > 0:19:53You're appraised on how much fees you brought in every week
0:19:53 > 0:19:57and, of course, you were bought a beer by one of your managers for a job well done.
0:19:57 > 0:20:02The insider did not deal with the Ulster Bank customers who spoke to Spotlight,
0:20:02 > 0:20:08but he says there was an awareness of the stress some customers in GRG were under.
0:20:08 > 0:20:10People were crying.
0:20:10 > 0:20:16They were pleading with us to put the money back into the account, or stop taking the fees out.
0:20:16 > 0:20:18They'd ask us not to target their business,
0:20:18 > 0:20:22which is essentially what we were doing, unfortunately.
0:20:23 > 0:20:26If the business had a large number of concrete assets we'd want,
0:20:26 > 0:20:29we'd simply shove the business into an insolvency position.
0:20:29 > 0:20:35Did you deliberately target businesses that were asset-heavy?
0:20:35 > 0:20:36Yes.
0:20:36 > 0:20:41If we had those businesses and assets, say houses, properties,
0:20:41 > 0:20:46cars, or anything, we could then sell those onwards to make a profit.
0:20:46 > 0:20:50RBS and Ulster Bank have a dedicated property division.
0:20:50 > 0:20:53It's called West Register.
0:20:53 > 0:20:55The Tomlinson Report raised the concern
0:20:55 > 0:21:00that some businesses in GRG subsequently had their assets sold
0:21:00 > 0:21:04to West Register at a discounted price.
0:21:04 > 0:21:08The customers are being dealt with by GRG on one set of desks,
0:21:08 > 0:21:12and then the property ends up being owned by West Register.
0:21:12 > 0:21:16If you were a customer who goes into GRG,
0:21:16 > 0:21:19are you getting the best value for your property,
0:21:19 > 0:21:23if it's bought by the bank who is putting you in distress?
0:21:24 > 0:21:28The GRG insider claims that he worked closely
0:21:28 > 0:21:32with his colleagues in West Register, the bank's property unit.
0:21:33 > 0:21:36We sat 30ft away from them.
0:21:36 > 0:21:42We could yell out to West Register to come down and look at a case, if we wanted them to.
0:21:42 > 0:21:46You would usually pick up a case file and walk down to West Register,
0:21:46 > 0:21:51or they could come and see you under the guise of making it more secure for the bank.
0:21:52 > 0:21:57The chief executive of RBS, Ulster Bank's owners, admitted
0:21:57 > 0:22:01that the reputation of the bailed-out bank had been seriously damaged
0:22:01 > 0:22:07by the allegation that it deliberately wrecked small firms in the pursuit of profit.
0:22:07 > 0:22:10He said there was no evidence to back up that claim.
0:22:10 > 0:22:14But, nonetheless, the bank hired the law firm Clifford Chance
0:22:14 > 0:22:18to investigate the claims made in the Tomlinson Report.
0:22:18 > 0:22:23The review covered RBS in Britain and Ulster Bank in Northern Ireland.
0:22:23 > 0:22:27The Clifford Chance report supported the bank's contention
0:22:27 > 0:22:31that they hadn't deliberately targeted or wrecked small businesses for profit.
0:22:32 > 0:22:35Indeed, the report went further.
0:22:35 > 0:22:40The Clifford Chance report found there was no evidence of fraudulent activity,
0:22:40 > 0:22:45but Lawrence Tomlinson said his report never accused the bank of fraud.
0:22:45 > 0:22:48He said a number of the Clifford Chance findings
0:22:48 > 0:22:51tallied with the central themes of his report.
0:22:51 > 0:22:54For example, the lack of transparency over fees
0:22:54 > 0:22:57and the need for an improved business culture in GRG.
0:23:02 > 0:23:05The City of London is home to the lobby group Bully Banks.
0:23:05 > 0:23:11Their spokesperson, Jeremy Roe, is highly critical of the Clifford Chance investigation.
0:23:12 > 0:23:17You have a bank instruct a solicitor,
0:23:17 > 0:23:20who it frequently instructs on other matters,
0:23:20 > 0:23:25to carry out an investigation into its practices.
0:23:25 > 0:23:28The report, I think, could have been written by a bank, actually.
0:23:28 > 0:23:31It's got that sort of feel to it.
0:23:31 > 0:23:36It doesn't appear to be an incisive investigative report.
0:23:36 > 0:23:39Ulster Bank told Spotlight that Clifford Chance were instructed
0:23:39 > 0:23:43to report on an independent and objective basis
0:23:43 > 0:23:48and the review was led by a team that had no previous dealings with GRG matters.
0:23:50 > 0:23:54But RBS and Ulster Bank's GRG division remain in the spotlight.
0:23:56 > 0:24:00GRG's activities are still the subject of an ongoing review
0:24:00 > 0:24:02with a financial regulator.
0:24:02 > 0:24:08The Financial Conduct Authority, based here in London, has appointed two outside firms
0:24:08 > 0:24:14to investigate RBS's treatment of business customers in financial difficulty.
0:24:15 > 0:24:19The Bank of England told Spotlight that it is also working
0:24:19 > 0:24:23with the FCA to examine the details of the report.
0:24:23 > 0:24:25I've had over 1,000 businesses contact me.
0:24:25 > 0:24:28I've no idea how many cases there could be,
0:24:28 > 0:24:34but it is a really considerable number of cases that the FCA are investigating now.
0:24:37 > 0:24:41Meanwhile, the Serious Fraud Office told Spotlight
0:24:41 > 0:24:43that they continue to monitor developments.
0:24:43 > 0:24:47So criminal proceedings cannot be ruled out.
0:24:47 > 0:24:54RBS recently announced plans to sell off its controversial West Register property portfolio.
0:24:54 > 0:24:58Explaining the move, the bank said there was a damaging perception
0:24:58 > 0:25:00that the bank had a conflict of interest
0:25:00 > 0:25:04when it purchased a property as part of a restructuring process.
0:25:04 > 0:25:09Ulster Bank told us that West Register in Northern Ireland
0:25:09 > 0:25:15holds properties that were previously owned by 14 Ulster Bank NI customers.
0:25:15 > 0:25:18The bank said that, in many cases, the properties were marketed openly
0:25:18 > 0:25:22and that West Register was the highest bidder.
0:25:22 > 0:25:29But Ulster Bank declined to confirm whether or not the properties had been part of businesses
0:25:29 > 0:25:33previously in the global restructuring group GRG.
0:25:33 > 0:25:37Spotlight asked Ulster Bank if it was concerned
0:25:37 > 0:25:41about any possible conflicts of interest, given that we know
0:25:41 > 0:25:49of two bank executives who are also the directors of private property companies in Northern Ireland.
0:25:49 > 0:25:52Ulster Bank told us, as well, that all conflicts are managed
0:25:52 > 0:25:56in accordance with its existing code of conduct.
0:25:56 > 0:25:59We asked the bank for a copy of that code of conduct,
0:25:59 > 0:26:03but, instead, the bank simply referred us to previous statements
0:26:03 > 0:26:06in which it had already made that point.
0:26:07 > 0:26:10But Jeremy Roe says the situation is of concern.
0:26:12 > 0:26:19Would I, as an employee of RBS, conduct myself as a director of a third-party company? No.
0:26:19 > 0:26:25Would I allow anybody who worked for me, if I was a senior manager with RBS, to do that? No.
0:26:25 > 0:26:30Ulster Bank told Spotlight they continue to strongly refute
0:26:30 > 0:26:33the accusations made by Lawrence Tomlinson.
0:26:33 > 0:26:36The bank's chief executive, Jim Brown, recently made the same point
0:26:36 > 0:26:38to Stormont's Finance Committee.
0:26:38 > 0:26:41Mr Tomlinson hasn't contacted me.
0:26:41 > 0:26:44He has not written to me, nor phoned me.
0:26:44 > 0:26:49He hasn't sent any evidence around any cases regarding Ulster Bank.
0:26:49 > 0:26:53I think Ulster Bank's denial of anything being wrong
0:26:53 > 0:26:58is just ostrich-like in sticking their head in the sand.
0:26:58 > 0:27:03I'm happy to meet Jim Brown. I'm happy to discuss the cases that are specific to him.
0:27:03 > 0:27:07Responsibility for banking is not devolved to Stormont.
0:27:07 > 0:27:10Westminster's Northern Ireland Affairs Committee
0:27:10 > 0:27:14is conducting an inquiry into the banking system here.
0:27:14 > 0:27:17Remember, Ulster Bank aren't answerable to anybody here.
0:27:17 > 0:27:20The first time Ulster Bank really had to answer questions on any of this
0:27:20 > 0:27:22was when it came before the Select Committee.
0:27:22 > 0:27:26It effectively got away in the breeze, able to hide under the coat tails of RBS,
0:27:26 > 0:27:30when RBS were being investigated for the greater problems that they had created.
0:27:32 > 0:27:35Despite their ongoing legal case,
0:27:35 > 0:27:40the Taggart brothers have, in recent months, raised money from private investors.
0:27:40 > 0:27:42This site is outside Limavady.
0:27:42 > 0:27:46We are going to build out the site.
0:27:46 > 0:27:50This is the first development since 2008 that we have been involved in.
0:27:50 > 0:27:53How does it feel being back on sites?
0:27:53 > 0:27:55It feels great getting back at it
0:27:55 > 0:28:00and we have every intention of keeping going and being as successful as we ever were.
0:28:01 > 0:28:04Four years on and Brian Polly's company is still being run
0:28:04 > 0:28:08by administrators appointed by the bank.
0:28:08 > 0:28:10Most companies are wounded up after six weeks.
0:28:10 > 0:28:14Four years later, my business is still going.
0:28:14 > 0:28:16I find that incredible.
0:28:16 > 0:28:19Brian is dealing with the personal impact of bankruptcy.
0:28:19 > 0:28:22It's very humiliating, you know.
0:28:22 > 0:28:26I was an extremely proud man. I loved to pay my people on time, you know.
0:28:26 > 0:28:32It was... If you don't have honour and integrity in business, you have nothing.
0:28:32 > 0:28:37Despite the setbacks, Brian is determined to get back in business.
0:28:37 > 0:28:39There is light at the end of the tunnel.
0:28:39 > 0:28:45I look forward to the day - back in business again
0:28:45 > 0:28:47and doing what I do best.
0:28:47 > 0:28:52Ulster Bank recently posted its first quarterly profit in five years.
0:28:52 > 0:28:56Its owners, RBS, have also returned to profit.
0:28:56 > 0:29:01But the insider alleges the upturn has come at a cost to some.
0:29:02 > 0:29:08There are many businesspeople who did not come out of the GRG process
0:29:08 > 0:29:11and they blame themselves for what happened to their businesses.
0:29:11 > 0:29:15The majority of them, they became, unfortunately,
0:29:15 > 0:29:20a casualty of war in our bid to make the bank more liquid.
0:29:20 > 0:29:26I think that if you put RBS and Ulster Bank and GRG and West Register together,
0:29:26 > 0:29:31this represents the worst banking scandal, within the UK, of all the banking scandals.
0:29:33 > 0:29:39Ulster Bank was bailed out by taxpayers because it was part of a group that was too big to fail.
0:29:39 > 0:29:42Now it stands accused of failing some of its customers
0:29:42 > 0:29:47and the question remains - was Ulster Bank's approach prudent,
0:29:47 > 0:29:51or predatory in the pursuit of profit?