:00:31. > :00:32.Several months ago, I was contacted by a man who said
:00:33. > :00:41.The details, he said, would take me into a world
:00:42. > :00:54.For months now, I've been in contact with a man referred to in this
:00:55. > :01:05.Our meetings have always been discreet and carefully planned.
:01:06. > :01:08.Because Martin was a spy who brought Special Branch deep
:01:09. > :01:22.The IRA has issued a statement announcing what it calls a complete
:01:23. > :01:27.The IRA's guns were officially silent ? but a secret
:01:28. > :01:40.Around this time, Martin, an IRA and Sinn Fein member,
:01:41. > :01:48.says he contacted the RUC's confidential telephone service.
:01:49. > :01:50.He's agreed to exclusively tell his story to Spotlight
:01:51. > :01:59.He can't be identified because he fears for his safety.
:02:00. > :02:06.I did it to prevent another outbreak of violence along the lines we've
:02:07. > :02:15.Don't want to go back there and because of that, any
:02:16. > :02:19.3,000 people killed - one life saved it would
:02:20. > :02:27.A meeting was arranged and that was the start of regular
:02:28. > :02:36.Usually the means of arranging a meeting were a phone
:02:37. > :02:44.they would suggest a rendezvous point to which I would drive
:02:45. > :02:49.to and then I would park the car and go somewhere with them
:02:50. > :02:58.in their car and basically that is the way it happened all the time.
:02:59. > :03:00.Few agents within the IRA have ever stepped forward to tell
:03:01. > :03:12.In 2006, Denis Donaldson, a former senior Sinn Fein official
:03:13. > :03:14.was murdered just months after admitting that he had been
:03:15. > :03:26.I was recruited in the 1980s after a particularly,
:03:27. > :03:30.after compromising myself during a vulnerable time in my life.
:03:31. > :03:39.Since then, I have worked for British intelligence and the
:03:40. > :03:44.Denis Donaldson's confession went beyond the personal.
:03:45. > :03:47.His admission went to the heart of the secret intelligence war
:03:48. > :03:54.Tonight, we examine the influence well-placed agents, like Donaldson,
:03:55. > :04:00.We reveal what he did not tell his spy masters.
:04:01. > :04:07.And new allegations as to who sanctioned his murder.
:04:08. > :04:11.In talking to Special Branch, Martin was following in a long line
:04:12. > :04:16.of informers and agents within the Republican movement.
:04:17. > :04:20.For decades, the IRA dumped the bodies of suspected
:04:21. > :04:33.The body was found in the back of a Peugeot 305 van.
:04:34. > :04:35.In 1987, Belfast taxi driver Charlie McIlmurray was murdered
:04:36. > :04:45.They'd claimed he'd been a paid RUC informer since his
:04:46. > :04:48.His local priest said the IRA had made itself
:04:49. > :04:55.If Charlie McIlmurray had been abducted by the security forces
:04:56. > :04:58.and left dead with a hood over his head and his hands bound,
:04:59. > :05:00.there would have been a mighty hue and cry.
:05:01. > :05:03.The criticism was met with a defence of the IRA's
:05:04. > :05:12.I think Mr McIlmurray, like anyone else living in west
:05:13. > :05:17.Belfast, knows that the consequence for informing is death.
:05:18. > :05:19.During the conflict, the IRA murdered over 60 people
:05:20. > :05:21.it accused of secretly working for the Army, the RUC
:05:22. > :05:34.IRA claimed he had been an informer since 1981...
:05:35. > :05:40.Claimed he had been passing information to the police...
:05:41. > :05:44.This morning, he was found dead here...
:05:45. > :05:46.The IRA claimed she had been working as an informer
:05:47. > :05:50.By 1997, some may have thought an IRA ceasefire ruled out any
:05:51. > :05:53.But Martin and his handlers were fully aware of
:05:54. > :06:06.My handlers would have given me good advice and a bit of training
:06:07. > :06:08.but it's just basically, be very careful with yourself and how
:06:09. > :06:15.I would have been nervous driving to public places for fear someone
:06:16. > :06:18.would see me there and wondering what I was doing well away
:06:19. > :06:23.from the normal places I would go to and that would perhaps make them
:06:24. > :06:37.I was always very cautious and strict about security. The places we
:06:38. > :06:42.would've met at would've been picked.
:06:43. > :06:51.For decades, agents and informers undermined the IRA from the inside.
:06:52. > :06:56.But the scale of infiltration has rarely been acknowledged.
:06:57. > :07:00.In 2008, Denis Bradley and other members of the commission
:07:01. > :07:03.on the past travelled to London to examine an archive of classified
:07:04. > :07:13.It's an archive of most of the, of our Troubles, particularly
:07:14. > :07:22.And it's an archive also of that world of intelligence
:07:23. > :07:24.and who was running intelligence and who were the informers,
:07:25. > :07:27.and who was in charge of it, and so forth.
:07:28. > :07:29.At any one time, the security services were running
:07:30. > :07:35.At any one time, throughout the Troubles.
:07:36. > :07:38.Now, that's a lot of people within a small community of people.
:07:39. > :07:45.In fact, security sources have told Spotlight that the figure of 800
:07:46. > :07:48.is an underestimate, and is closer to the total number
:07:49. > :07:55.of Special Branch informers and agents in Belfast alone.
:07:56. > :07:58.The overall assumptions is that loyalism was easy.
:07:59. > :08:01.That, you know, the loyalists kind of signed up, that there
:08:02. > :08:11.What was surprising is that there appears to have been,
:08:12. > :08:15.actually, a very large number of people who were informants.
:08:16. > :08:18.Were being paid, or were giving information, erm,
:08:19. > :08:27.And that the infiltration in the republican and the IRA,
:08:28. > :08:34.was much greater than most of us had known.
:08:35. > :08:41.Despite its tight cell structure, informers were rife within the IRA.
:08:42. > :08:48.I do think that Sinn Fein, the IRA, created a myth.
:08:49. > :08:51.That they were a group of people who were Republicans,
:08:52. > :08:55.different from anybody else, they were a group unto themselves.
:08:56. > :09:00.They were people with human flesh, with weaknesses,
:09:01. > :09:02.and I think that the intelligence service has used those weaknesses...
:09:03. > :09:04.now, looking back to, to a degree greater than,
:09:05. > :09:14.Agents and informers provided a window into the IRA's internal
:09:15. > :09:25.It, too, for decades was using intelligence to gain
:09:26. > :09:30.As part of its counterintelligence strategy, the IRA targeted
:09:31. > :09:31.and blackmailed people in positions of authority
:09:32. > :09:45.We did see indicators at times, as it were,
:09:46. > :09:48.of individuals coming under pressure to pass on information or attempts
:09:49. > :09:52.Those that we did identify most within the civil service,
:09:53. > :09:56.the Prison Service, the police service, the military even,
:09:57. > :09:59.as I say, those people were all taken out of
:10:00. > :10:11.Some were dismissed, others were, a limited number may be went forward
:10:12. > :10:14.for prosecution but sometimes you, by prosecuting, then educate
:10:15. > :10:17.the opposition too much as to what you know about them
:10:18. > :10:20.and those people were quietly side lined and put into different
:10:21. > :10:26.positions and jobs or else out of the job all together.
:10:27. > :10:29.In the shadow of the peace process, the IRA's intelligence gathering
:10:30. > :10:39.capabilities came under the spotlight.
:10:40. > :10:41.A case in the late 1990s gave Special Branch an insight
:10:42. > :10:48.into a particular IRA intelligence gathering strategy ? the use
:10:49. > :10:52.of so called "clean skins" - persons with no apparent
:10:53. > :10:53.militant Republican connections recruited to collect
:10:54. > :11:06.In 1998, a young school teacher was convicted of spying for the IRA.
:11:07. > :11:09.Rosa McLaughlin was just one part of a much bigger IRA spy-ring that
:11:10. > :11:21.targeted key RUC personnel and police stations.
:11:22. > :11:25.But she wasn't known to the police - until she was spotted in the company
:11:26. > :11:32.Bobby Storey is one of the most prominent individuals
:11:33. > :11:36.At a protest against Gerry Adams's arrest two years ago,
:11:37. > :11:38.he paraphrased the Sinn Fein president's famous remark
:11:39. > :11:46.We have a message for the British Government,
:11:47. > :11:49.for the Irish Government, for the cabal that is out there,
:11:50. > :12:10.In 1979, he was arrested in London for trying to break out the previous
:12:11. > :12:15.leader from prison. He was of the -- sentenced to 18 years after a gun
:12:16. > :12:21.attack on two British soldiers. He was credited for playing a crucial
:12:22. > :12:27.role in the 1983 present escape. After his final release from jail in
:12:28. > :12:35.1998, he became the IRA's Director of intelligence.
:12:36. > :12:37.Known as 'Big Bobby', his activities and associations
:12:38. > :12:40.were of huge interest to Special Branch.
:12:41. > :12:46.Martin was one of those they used to spy on his activities.
:12:47. > :12:49.What did you understand Bobby Storey's role was at that time
:12:50. > :12:55.Oh, I knew what his role was - his role was director
:12:56. > :13:00.In Northern Ireland, Martin says he was always
:13:01. > :13:03.looking over his shoulder, and to minimise
:13:04. > :13:05.the risk of exposure, he says he was often debriefed
:13:06. > :13:13.Procedure would be that you would fly out to one
:13:14. > :13:17.They would ring you and they would talk you into,
:13:18. > :13:24.say central London, for example, you would get another phone call
:13:25. > :13:35.to say, now I want you to go over and buy a paper.
:13:36. > :13:38.And then when you got to that point you would notice a Special Branch
:13:39. > :13:42.officer on the side of the road and he would tell you to follow him
:13:43. > :13:47.He would walk you into some hotel and walk you into some room
:13:48. > :13:51.where Special Branch were waiting for me.
:13:52. > :13:53.At this stage, Martin was no longer an informer -
:13:54. > :14:01.in a passive sense - he was now an agent.
:14:02. > :14:04.He targeted specific individuals at the request of his handlers
:14:05. > :14:13.Special Branch would always have half a dozen points to give me
:14:14. > :14:15.whenever I would meet them, and these would have
:14:16. > :14:26.You know, had I seen them, was I speaking to them,
:14:27. > :14:28.what was I saying - that type of thing.
:14:29. > :14:31.I would be fortunate enough to talk, to bump into the right people,
:14:32. > :14:35.Denis Donaldson was also in the so-called inner circle.
:14:36. > :14:40.Denis was a warm and friendly person, he was cheery.
:14:41. > :14:46.He was very loyal and very trusting and very intelligent person.
:14:47. > :14:48.Denis Donaldson earned his IRA credentials in 1970
:14:49. > :14:56.during the so-called Battle of St Matthews in the Short Strand,
:14:57. > :15:09.regarded as the IRA's first major engagement of the conflict.
:15:10. > :15:12.He was interned along with figures like Gerry Adams and Bobby Sands.
:15:13. > :15:14.He later served time for IRA bombing offences and spoke
:15:15. > :15:16.about his experiences in this 1977 documentary.
:15:17. > :15:19.It's a political war and the men are political prisoners,
:15:20. > :15:23.Any of them that are in there are guilty.
:15:24. > :15:25.They are in there because of their actions,
:15:26. > :15:31.What does any young man who is 16, 17, or 18 know?
:15:32. > :15:39.They don't normally read as a pastime, but whenever they come
:15:40. > :15:42.into prison it encourages them to read, probably because there
:15:43. > :15:48.Obviously, they come under the influences of others
:15:49. > :15:58.who are probably more aware of, if you like, the political causes.
:15:59. > :16:02.Donaldson went on to travel the world for the IRA - he built up
:16:03. > :16:06.links with foreign revolutionary groups which could supply the IRA
:16:07. > :16:14.In the late 1980s, he was dispatched to New York to work with
:16:15. > :16:23.A leading member in the American group Noraid, which raises money
:16:24. > :16:26.for Irish Republican causes, has been arrested and flown out
:16:27. > :16:34.Noraid's former publicity director says he suspected Donaldson was not
:16:35. > :16:42.He would answer the phone, use his own name, and talk
:16:43. > :16:47.Would attract attention from the FBI or from anybody who might be
:16:48. > :16:56.I complained a number of times to high ranking people in Ireland
:16:57. > :16:58.and was told, try to get along with him.
:16:59. > :17:01.Denis has impeccable army credentials.
:17:02. > :17:09.And the more things I told about him, they were, look,
:17:10. > :17:11.you have to work with him, trust him, for our sake,
:17:12. > :17:13.for Ireland's sake, for the movement's sake,
:17:14. > :17:15.try and get along with him and work with him.
:17:16. > :17:19.Denis Donaldson later established a US branch
:17:20. > :17:23.of the fundraising group Friends of Sinn Fein.
:17:24. > :17:26.Sinn Fein's new office in Washington will consolidate their presence
:17:27. > :17:31.here and act as a launching pad for their political advancement.
:17:32. > :17:35.On his return to Belfast, he worked closely with senior IRA
:17:36. > :17:42.A party insider told Spotlight that he was a fixer - someone
:17:43. > :17:51.He also actively recruited on behalf of the IRA.
:17:52. > :17:56.And all the time, he was also an agent of British intelligence.
:17:57. > :17:59.Denis Donaldson was an agent of influence.
:18:00. > :18:04.His key value as an agent was not the secrets he disclosed,
:18:05. > :18:06.but the subtle influence he could bring to bear when key
:18:07. > :18:17.decisions were being taken by those at the top of the IRA and Sinn Fein.
:18:18. > :18:20.And agents of influence were among the most valuable assets of
:18:21. > :18:28.The IRA was broken up into about nine different
:18:29. > :18:36.So agents had to be selected and, if possible, placed or manipulated
:18:37. > :18:41.into certain positions and allowed to develop and grow.
:18:42. > :18:46.A well-placed and long-term agent could silently damage the IRA
:18:47. > :18:53.If you looked upon agents and those, there's sort of a cancer within.
:18:54. > :19:06.They can, they can sort of infect, as I say, other parts of the system.
:19:07. > :19:12.Long-term agents of influence, like Donaldson,
:19:13. > :19:14.were the state's foot soldiers in a counter-insurgency strategy
:19:15. > :19:23.that some believe contributed to the strategic defeat of the IRA.
:19:24. > :19:31.The intelligence world played an immense part in bringing
:19:32. > :19:33.about, shall we say, a realisation within the Provisional
:19:34. > :19:36.IRA that they had passed the post in terms of the armed conflict.
:19:37. > :19:42.The war we lost was the propaganda war.
:19:43. > :19:51.The propaganda side, we lost in the sense that a lot
:19:52. > :19:52.of what is mythology now about, you know,
:19:53. > :19:59.But there are many who believe that it was a dirty war,
:20:00. > :20:02.it happened in the shadows and it contains many more secrets
:20:03. > :20:10.Well, it happened in the shadows, but we operated as a police force
:20:11. > :20:16.If there had have been a dirty war, then ask
:20:17. > :20:19.yourself a simple question - if you're fighting a dirty war
:20:20. > :20:22.with no restrictions, who would you be tackling?
:20:23. > :20:24.The entire Provisional Army council basically came
:20:25. > :20:33.But as a counterintelligence strategy, was it important
:20:34. > :20:36.that the Army council and its membership, although fluid,
:20:37. > :20:40.remained generally intact so that those individuals or people
:20:41. > :20:43.close to those individuals could be
:20:44. > :20:54.When that sort of certainty was there in relation to it.
:20:55. > :20:57.The Army council was made up of people who, shall we say,
:20:58. > :20:59.of varying ability, or varying influence.
:21:00. > :21:03.And once you knew those abilities and influences,
:21:04. > :21:07.then obviously you're quite right, those that sort of moved
:21:08. > :21:13.in their midst or, as I say, attended to their needs,
:21:14. > :21:18.or were able to sort of make commentary in their presence -
:21:19. > :21:23.all those things have a collective influence over a period of time.
:21:24. > :21:31.They encouraged ideas that were, shall we say, more of
:21:32. > :21:39.a political desire as opposed to a military desire.
:21:40. > :21:45.For decades, the RUC Special Branch, the Army, the security services,
:21:46. > :21:49.as well as the Gardai, and at times the FBI,
:21:50. > :21:52.all ran agents within the IRA and the Republican
:21:53. > :21:59.Security sources have told Spotlight that, by 1994, a majority
:22:00. > :22:04.of the seven-person IRA Army Council were effectively compromised
:22:05. > :22:10.because of their proximity to high-level agents.
:22:11. > :22:16.The Army Council's decisions were, they said, influenced by IRA
:22:17. > :22:24.insiders who were also secret agents of the state.
:22:25. > :22:26.Lord Alex Carlile most recently served as the Government's
:22:27. > :22:29.independent reviewer of national security arrangements
:22:30. > :22:38.It's very common for good security services and good police on special
:22:39. > :22:43.operations to achieve high levels of infiltration.
:22:44. > :22:47.I wasn't surprised at the level and success
:22:48. > :22:55.We have been able to move to constitutionalism in a shorter
:22:56. > :23:00.time than I expected when I first became involved in these issues
:23:01. > :23:04.in '01 as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.
:23:05. > :23:07.I think Northern Ireland represents a political success.
:23:08. > :23:11.I think the effectiveness of the intelligence services may
:23:12. > :23:19.have been a factor in moving former terrorists to a constitutional path.
:23:20. > :23:21.Lord Carlile also encountered Denis Donaldson,
:23:22. > :23:25.who was then Sinn Fein's Head of Administration in Stormont.
:23:26. > :23:29.I first met Denis Donaldson when he was effectively the manager
:23:30. > :23:32.of the Sinn Fein parliamentary office in Stormont.
:23:33. > :23:39.I visited him, I had a conversation with him and he helped me with one
:23:40. > :23:42.or two journeys that I made in Northern Ireland in my role
:23:43. > :23:44.of Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.
:23:45. > :23:51.I didn't know that he had any other role.
:23:52. > :24:00.He says he had no idea that Donaldson, like him,
:24:01. > :24:08.you about anybody being an informer, they would never tell
:24:09. > :24:13.you anything about that, that's how they operate.
:24:14. > :24:22.You'll never know who the other informers are.
:24:23. > :24:24.Denis Donaldson was paid to betray the Republican movement - but he
:24:25. > :24:31.He did not tell them about a chef he befriended in New York
:24:32. > :24:33.and helped move to Belfast, Larry Zaitschek.
:24:34. > :24:37.Larry had worked in some of New York's best restaurants.
:24:38. > :24:40.In Belfast, he ended up working in the canteen of
:24:41. > :24:45.Spotlight understands that Denis Donaldson encouraged him
:24:46. > :24:58.In Castlereagh, the man who became known as Larry the Chef
:24:59. > :25:00.was so popular that he catered for parties at the homes
:25:01. > :25:06.He also used the gym in Castlereagh, close
:25:07. > :25:16.At times he even used the photocopier in that office.
:25:17. > :25:21.2-20 was a hub for Special Branch operations - a round-the-clock
:25:22. > :25:32.On St Patrick's night 2002, three intruders raided
:25:33. > :25:50.Dozens of highly sensitive documents were stolen -
:25:51. > :25:52.including the codenames of paramilitary agents,
:25:53. > :25:59.their handlers, as well as a Persons of Interest register.
:26:00. > :26:02.Castlereagh Police Station was sealed off all day after last
:26:03. > :26:10.Alan McQuillan was then an Assistant Chief Constable.
:26:11. > :26:13.It's hard to understand the blow this was, how bad it was,
:26:14. > :26:18.Not only that we'd been burgled, but Special Branch had been burgled.
:26:19. > :26:20.Pretty soon it became clear who was involved.
:26:21. > :26:24.We had various sources reporting, and as a result of the information
:26:25. > :26:29.that was coming in to us, we knew with absolute clarity
:26:30. > :26:39.Bobby Storey, the IRA's Director of Intelligence, was identified
:26:40. > :26:41.by police as the so-called mastermind behind
:26:42. > :26:53.Larry the Chef, police believed, was the IRA's inside man.
:26:54. > :26:56.They had spent a huge amount of time developing this over
:26:57. > :27:00.a period of time, you know, with the chef, getting the chef
:27:01. > :27:03.in, and he was allowed to bring guests into the premises,
:27:04. > :27:07.and we believe that he arrived at the premises with people who were
:27:08. > :27:13.Larry Zaitschek had returned to New York.
:27:14. > :27:17.But investigators uncovered what they believed was evidence
:27:18. > :27:23.connecting him to an IRA Intelligence Gathering Unit.
:27:24. > :27:29.The PSNI began to make a case for extradition.
:27:30. > :27:34.In New York, Larry Zaitschek always protested his innocence.
:27:35. > :27:38.I was falsely accused of taking part in the break-in in Castlereagh.
:27:39. > :27:40.The break-in took place at the office that housed
:27:41. > :27:42.the Special Branches 24hr hotline for the informers
:27:43. > :27:47.It was a highly political act and one that had absolutely
:27:48. > :27:51.So I have become the PSNI's scapegoat for their
:27:52. > :27:57.Special Branch uncovered Donaldson's connection to the American chef
:27:58. > :28:01.after the break-in - their agent was the very man who had
:28:02. > :28:11.brought Larry Zaitschek to Belfast in the first place.
:28:12. > :28:13.It cast doubts on Donaldson's reliability and whose agenda
:28:14. > :28:20.he was ultimately working for - his spy masters or the IRA.
:28:21. > :28:24.Larry Zaitschek wasn't the only secret Donaldson kept
:28:25. > :28:30.He knew about an IRA spy-ring at the heart of Government -
:28:31. > :28:33.but for reasons that remain unexplained, he again failed
:28:34. > :28:43.However, Special Branch had another agent who did.
:28:44. > :28:46.The most striking information, out of all the information that
:28:47. > :28:54.I would have got from Denis Donaldson, was
:28:55. > :28:56.in connection with the so-called Stormontgate spy ring.
:28:57. > :28:59.As a member of Sinn Fein, I would meet Denis from time to time
:29:00. > :29:03.and during those conversations, Denis let the cat out of the bag,
:29:04. > :29:06.so to speak, and he told me about the documentation
:29:07. > :29:12.Denis told me that they were stealing sensitive documents
:29:13. > :29:15.from the NIO office at Stormont and that it had been
:29:16. > :29:22.He didn't specify what kind of material they were taking.
:29:23. > :29:26.All I know was what he said was that they were taking
:29:27. > :29:37.Crucially, it was Martin who told his handlers about an IRA
:29:38. > :29:47.The common belief is that Denis Donaldson gave Special Branch
:29:48. > :29:50.the information about the spy ring up at Stormont.
:29:51. > :29:58.I was the person that tipped the police off about
:29:59. > :30:05.Can you recall the reaction of your handlers when you told them
:30:06. > :30:15.They got very excited from being laid back and dead casual,
:30:16. > :30:22.all of a sudden when I mentioned that and got very enlivened
:30:23. > :30:25.and excited about it, and that was that.
:30:26. > :30:30.That was the start of finding out more that was the start
:30:31. > :30:34.of concentrating on one subject from then on.
:30:35. > :30:39.For the next twelve months, I seemed to work entirely on that and nothing
:30:40. > :30:43.else but that subject, and what was happening in Stormont.
:30:44. > :30:47.Based on source information, the police began a major
:30:48. > :30:54.investigation into an IRA intelligence gathering operation.
:30:55. > :30:57.We had identified that there was a major spy-ring.
:30:58. > :30:59.And we had identified that they had managed to penetrate
:31:00. > :31:05.Um, various other Government agencies and bodies
:31:06. > :31:15.They were stealing large amounts of information.
:31:16. > :31:18.Um, to catch them with that information and to bring
:31:19. > :31:22.as many of them to court as we could.
:31:23. > :31:23.Particularly the director and controller of
:31:24. > :31:29.Bobby Storey was the main target of a major covert
:31:30. > :31:34.surveillance operation - codenamed Operation Torsion.
:31:35. > :31:38.Special Branch and MI5 bugged a laptop computer and a rucksack ?
:31:39. > :31:46.and tracked both as they were moved between IRA safe houses.
:31:47. > :31:48.We were throwing everything we had at this.
:31:49. > :31:56.Um, I mean, we knew, for example, that they had stolen the entire HR
:31:57. > :32:01.So, there were 3,000 prison officers and they'd got their names
:32:02. > :32:06.We knew that they had other documents.
:32:07. > :32:10.We didn't know the full scale and scope of it.
:32:11. > :32:12.For months, Special Branch and MI5 were watching and listening
:32:13. > :32:22.to the IRA - and receiving updates from their inside man.
:32:23. > :32:26.I reported regularly over months and I know why
:32:27. > :32:34.they waited so long ? one, hopefully to catch those involved
:32:35. > :32:37.red-handed, but more importantly they wanted to arrest Bobby Storey
:32:38. > :32:39.in the act of carrying some of the stolen documentation.
:32:40. > :32:41.By early October, the PSNI were on the brink
:32:42. > :32:51.Whose call was it to move at the particular time
:32:52. > :32:57.Having looked at everything and said, "No, we can't
:32:58. > :33:04.I then went and saw the Chief Constable and I explained
:33:05. > :33:08.to him where we were and what we were going to do, and the possible
:33:09. > :33:14.And Hugh's position was quite simple.
:33:15. > :33:16.This is going to have big political ramifications.
:33:17. > :33:36.Hours before the raids, Martin says he met his handlers.
:33:37. > :33:39.The night before the police raided the homes of Denis Donaldson
:33:40. > :33:42.and others and Stormont, I met my handlers, just to confirm
:33:43. > :33:51.Donaldson was on the brink of arrest ? something that
:33:52. > :33:53.could jeopardise his status as an agent.
:33:54. > :34:00.But Spotlight understands that he was now considered
:34:01. > :34:03.to be a 'rogue' agent - he had not told his handlers about
:34:04. > :34:06.the spy-ring ? and the relationship was about to be terminated.
:34:07. > :34:09.At first light, the PSNI made their move.
:34:10. > :34:12.The rucksack, which had been bugged, led the police to
:34:13. > :34:24.The satchel was in his house was the target.
:34:25. > :34:29.Unfortunately for Denis, he was holding the parcel when we moved.
:34:30. > :34:35.Computer disks the PSNI had expected to find were missing.
:34:36. > :34:38.And a decision was then made to search Donaldson's
:34:39. > :34:42.I phoned Hugh and said, "Look, this is the situation.
:34:43. > :34:46."We have to search the office at Stormont.
:34:47. > :34:50."I am going to instruct them to do that as a gold commander.
:34:51. > :35:04."We do what we have to do but we'll do ? let's do it lowkey."
:35:05. > :35:07.So I went back and sent out a message to them to say, right,
:35:08. > :35:10.I need this done in a very low key way.
:35:11. > :35:13.I want some non-uniform officers to go up and search the office,
:35:14. > :35:15.and I wanted them on this basis so we do the minimum
:35:16. > :35:23.The search at Stormont was anything but low-key.
:35:24. > :35:31.This is a Sinn Fein minister and these are the police who have
:35:32. > :35:33.just finished raiding her party's offices at parliament buildings.
:35:34. > :35:40.I had forgotten that the only search trained officers
:35:41. > :35:44.Another commander in Belfast said, I can't do this because it's
:35:45. > :35:56.So he sent uniform officers to do the search.
:35:57. > :35:59.And I didn't find out about that until it was too late.
:36:00. > :36:01.I feel bad about that because I should have
:36:02. > :36:15.The so-called Stormontgate scandal ultimately changed the course
:36:16. > :36:18.of politics in Northern Ireland when, just a week later,
:36:19. > :36:26.the Assembly was suspended and direct rule re-imposed.
:36:27. > :36:29.Sam Pollock, a former chief executive of the Police Ombudsman,
:36:30. > :36:31.is one of many who believe that the raids were
:36:32. > :36:37.deliberately calculated to collapse the institutions.
:36:38. > :36:44.The timing of Stormontgate, the encouragement, the advice,
:36:45. > :36:46.and the civil service, erm, Northern Ireland Office,
:36:47. > :36:58.Trimble had, in a sense, passed his 'sell by' date.
:36:59. > :37:04.And senior civil servants were being encouraged to
:37:05. > :37:07.quote/unquote "bring the DUP and Sinn Fein in from the cold".
:37:08. > :37:09.But Alan McMullan insists that the police operation was not
:37:10. > :37:16.I was quite aware that this, that it was likely that this might
:37:17. > :37:18.precipitate a collapse of the Assembly because that
:37:19. > :37:22.would be the impact of it on unionist politics.
:37:23. > :37:24.But the line that we'd agreed was, look,
:37:25. > :37:27.There's serious unlawful activity going on here.
:37:28. > :37:34.We're going to address it, and as I said, Hugh was very firm
:37:35. > :37:37.that the politics aren't a matter for us.
:37:38. > :37:49.The material recovered gave the PSNI a remarkable insight into the IRA.
:37:50. > :37:51.You had a huge mix of documents here.
:37:52. > :37:54.You had Government documents that had been stolen by the IRA.
:37:55. > :37:56.You had material generated inside the IRA, their
:37:57. > :38:03.They required all their intelligence units in the different areas
:38:04. > :38:06.in Northern Ireland to type up a report every month
:38:07. > :38:11.and send it in to the centre, summarising what they'd been doing.
:38:12. > :38:15.And these were all kept in a folder in the rucksack.
:38:16. > :38:18.So you pull out a little folder in relation to say, Fermanagh,
:38:19. > :38:22.and there was all the things they'd been doing for the last 12 months,
:38:23. > :38:26.It was shocking in terms of the scale and extent
:38:27. > :38:30.The haul included a map and codes of the entire
:38:31. > :38:34.security system at the Northern Ireland Office.
:38:35. > :38:45.Personal - including sexual - details about Unionist politicians.
:38:46. > :38:50.The IRA's own documents showed that it had its own live network
:38:51. > :38:54.of so-called friendlies - people working in a wide range
:38:55. > :38:56.of Government departments and public bodies, all feeding back information
:38:57. > :39:06.I do recall being briefed that this had caused absolute consternation
:39:07. > :39:08.within the whole Republican movement.
:39:09. > :39:13.I mean, we came within an ace of arresting exactly who we wanted to.
:39:14. > :39:16.We didn't quite get there, but it was very shocking
:39:17. > :39:26.Denis Donaldson and his son-in-law Ciaran Kearney were
:39:27. > :39:33.However, the target of the operation, Bobby Storey,
:39:34. > :39:42.You have to play a long game in these things.
:39:43. > :39:51.It's not just about prosecuting people - it's about stopping
:39:52. > :39:56.In a solicitor's statement, Bobby Storey refuted
:39:57. > :39:57.all the allegations in this programme.
:39:58. > :40:00.Denis Donaldson, Ciaran Kearney, and another man were later charged
:40:01. > :40:03.with having documents likely to be of use to terrorists.
:40:04. > :40:10.Gerry Adams and supporters gathered outside the court.
:40:11. > :40:13.I'm sure that, in the fullness of time, when all the dust
:40:14. > :40:15.settles down, that Denis Donaldson will walk free.
:40:16. > :40:20.Gerry Adams' prediction proved correct.
:40:21. > :40:21.In late 2005, the so-called Stormontgate case collapsed.
:40:22. > :40:23.Ciaran Kearney, Denis Donaldson and another man
:40:24. > :40:36.Full disclosure in court would have compromised Denis Donaldson.
:40:37. > :40:39.Spotlight understands that the case collapsed in order to keep his role
:40:40. > :40:57.But Donaldson gave nothing away and stuck to the Sinn Fein party line.
:40:58. > :41:00.We were looking forward to a trial because, we were confident
:41:01. > :41:03.from the outset that even if the case had gone to a full
:41:04. > :41:05.trial, we would have been found not guilty.
:41:06. > :41:08.Would you be happy to come back here and work after what happened?
:41:09. > :41:11.I'd work anywhere that the party asked me to work, doesn't matter
:41:12. > :41:16.whether it's Stormont or the Falls Road Sinn Fein office.
:41:17. > :41:21.But Donaldson's secrets were about to be his downfall.
:41:22. > :41:24.The next evening, uniformed PSNI officers visited Donaldson's home
:41:25. > :41:25.to deliver a threat notification message -
:41:26. > :41:34.It reportedly stated that members of the media believed
:41:35. > :41:44.The police had a statutory duty to report such a threat.
:41:45. > :41:47.In this case, they also had a duty of care towards their agent.
:41:48. > :41:50.It must have been very difficult for the, erm, police,
:41:51. > :41:54.or the security services to know what to do.
:41:55. > :41:57.In any situation where there's a risk to an informer being exposed
:41:58. > :42:00.then the police would be very proactive in moving that person
:42:01. > :42:02.to secure to a safe place probably out the jurisdiction,
:42:03. > :42:16.and giving them lifelong protection and support.
:42:17. > :42:26.I would have apprehensions as to how quickly they cut
:42:27. > :42:31.clean from Dennis and left him in a situation that was
:42:32. > :42:43.He was completely vulnerable from whatever, it doesn't
:42:44. > :42:52.matter who killed him, and it was almost predictable.
:42:53. > :42:54.The Police Ombudsman is reinvestigating a number of issues
:42:55. > :42:57.relating to Denis Donaldson's case ? including the background
:42:58. > :43:00.to the threat message and how he was warned that his cover
:43:01. > :43:14.We simply don't know and may never know why he didn't seek
:43:15. > :43:22.Instead he turned to the republican movement ? the people he had
:43:23. > :43:31.In a meeting two days later at this Sinn Fein office,
:43:32. > :43:36.he was asked directly if he was an agent of the State.
:43:37. > :43:38.Gerry Adams was in the same building that day.
:43:39. > :43:41.The Donaldson meeting had been arranged at the request of the IRA,
:43:42. > :43:43.which planned to interrogate him at another location
:43:44. > :43:53.Four days later, Gerry Adams publicly announced that Donaldson
:43:54. > :44:00.He described the revelation as a scoop.
:44:01. > :44:09.You'll know that our party has expelled Denis Donaldson,
:44:10. > :44:12.who's a long standing member, after we uncovered and he admitted
:44:13. > :44:25.that he was working as a British agent.
:44:26. > :44:29.The Sinn Fein President continued to deny there had ever been
:44:30. > :44:36.There was no Sinn Fein spy-ring at Stormont.
:44:37. > :44:38.And then when we saw different people being arrested and charged,
:44:39. > :44:41.I certainly instinctively knew that there was somebody wrong
:44:42. > :44:47.Hours later, Denis Donaldson, accompanied by his solicitor,
:44:48. > :45:05.I worked as a Sinn Fein Assembly group administrator in parliament
:45:06. > :45:08.buildings at the time of the PSNI raid on the Sinn Fein offices
:45:09. > :45:10.in October 2002, the so-called Stormontgate affair.
:45:11. > :45:21.Denis Donaldson, Martin says, had signed his own death warrant.
:45:22. > :45:25.As soon as he uttered the words, I knew that he would be killed
:45:26. > :45:27.because that's the only, that's the only sentence or penalty
:45:28. > :45:40.Donaldson also denied there had ever been an IRA spy-ring.
:45:41. > :45:44.I was not involved in any Republican spy-ring at Stormont.
:45:45. > :45:48.The so-called Stormontgate affair was a scam and a fiction,
:45:49. > :45:51.it never existed, it was created by Special Branch.
:45:52. > :46:00.I deeply regret my activities with British intelligence
:46:01. > :46:05.I apologise to anyone who has suffered as a result
:46:06. > :46:08.of my activities, as well to my former comrades and especially
:46:09. > :46:11.to my family who've become victims in all of this.
:46:12. > :46:12.Donaldson's statement sent shockwaves throughout
:46:13. > :46:19.Even Martin, his IRA and Sinn Fein colleague
:46:20. > :46:23.and fellow State agent, was taken aback.
:46:24. > :46:29.Denis would have been one of the least people you'd ever
:46:30. > :46:33.I don't know any informer that was ever spared,
:46:34. > :46:36.they were all executed and I think regardless of whatever speculation
:46:37. > :46:41.you might have heard about Denis, they always intended to kill him
:46:42. > :46:44.and for what he'd done and to set an example to other informers
:46:45. > :46:58.Denis Donaldson moved to Donegal, where he continued to be debriefed
:46:59. > :47:02.by Republicans about his role as an agent.
:47:03. > :47:05.He never returned to Belfast, despite public assurances
:47:06. > :47:14.from senior Republicans that he was safe to do so.
:47:15. > :47:17.He can do whatever he wants, frankly, and that's something
:47:18. > :47:29.But Donaldson's admission had angered many within the IRA ?
:47:30. > :47:41.Donaldson helped to set up Sinn Fein structures in South Armagh.
:47:42. > :47:44.At times, he was also an intermediary between IRA leaders
:47:45. > :47:46.there and the Republican leadership in Belfast.
:47:47. > :47:51.Few outsiders were ever trusted by the IRA in South Armagh.
:47:52. > :47:56.But Donaldson was on the word of senior Republicans in Belfast.
:47:57. > :48:00.Sources told Spotlight that, following Donaldson's admission
:48:01. > :48:05.that he was a British agent, the IRA in South Armagh began
:48:06. > :48:10.to blame him for operations that had been compromised.
:48:11. > :48:14.It's claimed that they also suspected that he had planted
:48:15. > :48:17.a number of covert listening devices that they had uncovered
:48:18. > :48:25.Both Republican and security sources told us that the IRA in South Armagh
:48:26. > :48:30.was pushing for action against Donaldson.
:48:31. > :48:36.In Donegal, Donaldson was living on borrowed time.
:48:37. > :48:40.For almost three months, Donaldson remained
:48:41. > :48:45.Until the Sunday World journalist Hugh Jordan tracked him down to this
:48:46. > :48:50.cottage and secretly recorded their conversation.
:48:51. > :48:53.I was thinking that the press conference in Dublin was so short
:48:54. > :49:08.that you never got a chance to say too much.
:49:09. > :49:12.Well what holds for the future for you now then?
:49:13. > :49:17.How did you find out that Denis Donaldson was
:49:18. > :49:21.I met a man in Belfast, who I knew for many years.
:49:22. > :49:26.No, it was - it wasn't, it was, erm...
:49:27. > :49:29.A man with a very Republican ideas I drove from Gweedore down
:49:30. > :49:33.to Glenties and was snooping around, not really getting very far.
:49:34. > :49:38.And I was sitting reading the Irish Times in my car,
:49:39. > :49:42.and I suddenly glanced up, and down the main street
:49:43. > :49:45.in Glenties was Denis Donaldson, crossing the road.
:49:46. > :49:52.Denis Donaldson told Hugh Jordan that now his whereabouts were known,
:49:53. > :50:02.Well, I'll not be staying here too long now.
:50:03. > :50:11.Hugh Jordan was accused of setting Donaldson up for murder.
:50:12. > :50:15.The responsibility for Denis Donaldson's death
:50:16. > :50:18.lies solely with the people who pulled the trigger
:50:19. > :50:25.Do you think that your article may have focused the minds
:50:26. > :50:31.The article may just have been the catalyst that
:50:32. > :50:39.Looking back, I think his fate was sealed.
:50:40. > :50:45.It was a question of when were they going to do it.
:50:46. > :50:51.Two weeks later, Donaldson was murdered.
:50:52. > :51:00.Sinn Fein official Denis Donaldson, has been found shot dead
:51:01. > :51:05.In a statement days later, the IRA denied any involvement.
:51:06. > :51:08.But security sources told Spotlight that intelligence received,
:51:09. > :51:11.after Donaldson's murder, from covert surveillance and agents
:51:12. > :51:34.Spotlight understands that the South Armagh IRA
:51:35. > :51:35.Thomas "Slab" Murphy insisted that
:51:36. > :51:42.And that the IRA in south Armagh commissioned the operation that led
:51:43. > :51:46.What's less clear, according to sources, is who carried out
:51:47. > :51:47.the operation that resulted in his death.
:51:48. > :51:50.Martin says he also told his Special Branch handlers what he had
:51:51. > :52:11.Not too long after Denis was murdered, I was told
:52:12. > :52:16.the IRA had killed Denis not anybody else.
:52:17. > :52:18.I gave that information to the Special Branch.
:52:19. > :52:19.What was your handler's reaction to that information?
:52:20. > :52:23.They were just totally mute, there wasn't any acknowledgement
:52:24. > :52:26.of what I'd said, subject was changed to something else.
:52:27. > :52:43.they and the whole status quo had seen Denis' death as internal
:52:44. > :52:45.housekeeping, and they were happy enough to put up with that.
:52:46. > :52:49.I believe that they acted on some information and didn't act on other
:52:50. > :52:51.information because it was too politically sensitive to do so.
:52:52. > :52:58.Martin believes that the shooting of Denis Donaldson was sanctioned
:52:59. > :53:03.by the man at the top of the Republican movement - Gerry Adams.
:53:04. > :53:08.Spotlight understands that by 2006 Gerry Adams had stepped aside
:53:09. > :53:16.But Martin claims that Adams was consulted on all matters.
:53:17. > :53:19.I know from my experience in the IRA that murders have to be
:53:20. > :53:23.They have to be given approval by the leadership of the IRA,
:53:24. > :53:26.the political leadership of the IRA and the military
:53:27. > :53:32.Who are you specifically referring to?
:53:33. > :53:38.In a statement, Gerry Adams' solicitor said his client
:53:39. > :53:42.had no knowledge of - and no involvement whatsoever -
:53:43. > :53:51.He added his client categorically denies he was consulted
:53:52. > :53:53.about what he describes as an alleged IRA Army Council
:53:54. > :54:00.decision, or that he had the final say on what had been sanctioned.
:54:01. > :54:03.In 2009, the dissident Republican group the Real IRA
:54:04. > :54:06.claimed responsibility for Donaldson's murder.
:54:07. > :54:14.But Martin is dismissive of the claim.
:54:15. > :54:20.I believe the Real IRA, who claimed it three years later,
:54:21. > :54:31.and repair a tarnished image which has evolved.
:54:32. > :54:35.Denis Donaldson's death is the subject of an ongoing murder
:54:36. > :54:40.In July, a 74-year-old man was charged with withholding
:54:41. > :54:53.information in connection with his murder.
:54:54. > :54:56.Spotlight understands that the Garda investigation is focused
:54:57. > :55:00.on a separate individual, originally from County Donegal, now
:55:01. > :55:04.based outside the Republic, who has been described as sympathetic
:55:05. > :55:14.14 years on, no-one has ever been prosecuted for the break-in
:55:15. > :55:19.The case against Larry Zaitschek, accused of involvement,
:55:20. > :55:26.He continues to strongly deny his involvement
:55:27. > :55:42.We chased bout traced Larry to his own restaurant business. He declined
:55:43. > :55:46.to be interviewed on camera. He said what had happened
:55:47. > :55:49.was a long time ago and he has He says he stopped working
:55:50. > :55:54.for Special Branch in the years I stopped because I didn't feel
:55:55. > :55:59.there was anything left They were quite happy about that
:56:00. > :56:11.and thanked me for years of service. I've absolutely no regrets
:56:12. > :56:13.about my time working as an agent Denis Donaldson took his secrets
:56:14. > :56:23.about his double life to his grave. A journal that he was encouraged
:56:24. > :56:28.to write by Republicans as part of his debriefing process
:56:29. > :56:32.is being retained by Gardai. Spotlight understands that Donaldson
:56:33. > :56:37.wrote about himself and others - as well as what he did
:56:38. > :56:40.as an IRA man and as an agent Spotlight also understands that
:56:41. > :56:47.relevant information from Donaldson's private journal has
:56:48. > :56:51.been made available to the Police Ombudsman's
:56:52. > :56:54.investigators. Their report is expected to be
:56:55. > :57:01.published later this year. Denis Donaldson openly
:57:02. > :57:05.admitted his role as an agent. But the identities of other
:57:06. > :57:09.Republican informers and agents during the decades of conflict
:57:10. > :57:16.remain highly classified. Denis Bradley says that full
:57:17. > :57:18.disclosure would come at cost too When I and others were involved
:57:19. > :57:28.in doing the past, there was strong representation that all these files
:57:29. > :57:35.should be thrown open. It's an argument we
:57:36. > :57:37.heard and rejected. We think that the hurt
:57:38. > :57:40.of that is too great, and that it should not be inflicted
:57:41. > :57:42.on this society. You're talking about
:57:43. > :57:44.a lot of families. And you bring more and more,
:57:45. > :57:47.more and more pain Britain's counterterrorism
:57:48. > :57:49.strategy in Northern Ireland was so successful, some say,
:57:50. > :57:53.that it forced the IRA In a sense, the intelligence war
:57:54. > :58:03.brought the protagonists They applied all the technology
:58:04. > :58:08.that was at their disposal. They gave it, as they would see
:58:09. > :58:22.it, their best shot. And I think that realisation
:58:23. > :58:26.came home to the IRA leadership in the late
:58:27. > :58:28.70s, early 80s. So the security side won,
:58:29. > :58:30.in that respect. Thereafter, politics,
:58:31. > :58:31.in a sense, took over. Informers and agents not only
:58:32. > :58:34.betrayed the IRA's secrets, but some were used, over decades,
:58:35. > :58:37.to influence its strategy For Republicans, the scale
:58:38. > :58:43.of infiltration within the IRA Was the IRA rendered
:58:44. > :58:50.ineffectual by many of its own? Members who were also informers
:58:51. > :58:54.and agents of the state? Did the secret intelligence war
:58:55. > :58:59.force the IRA to renounce violence? Did spies within its own ranks bring
:59:00. > :59:05.the IRA in from the cold?