Admiral James Stavridis - Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe HARDtalk

Welcome to HARDtalk. World leaders at the G20 Summit in Turkey have

said efforts to combat terrorism must be intensified after the tragic

events in Paris, which were the latest in a series of horrific

attacks claimed by the so-called Islamic State. Indeed, on Sunday,

France launched massive airstrikes on ISIS strongholds in Syria. My

guess is retired Nato Supreme Allied Commander, James Stavridis, who

believes there should be meaningful action on a significant scale by

Nato. But are there not limits to what military operations can achieve

in fighting terror? Admiral James Stavridis in

Massachusetts, welcome to HARDtalk. Are the attacks in Paris a game

changer for the international community? I think they are, and we

have to acknowledge it is really not just Paris, it of course began with

the downing of the Russian aircraft than cost more lives than thus far

have been costing Paris, almost immediately followed by the horrific

bombing in Beirut, and now the Paris attacks. Put those together, 1000

dead, over 5000 seriously injured, and on a population adjustment basis

this is an 9/11 level event. President Hollande says there will

be a war without mercy. David Cameron, it has become more clear

that our safety and security depends on the grading and ultimately

destroying ISIS. We will be safer right across Europe if we destroy

this death cult once and for all. Frankly, we have been here before,

haven't we? We have heard these kinds of statements since September

11, and yet the attacks keep coming. Indeed they do, although I

would point out that it is all a matter of case-by-case, and I think

when you look at the Islamic State it is not just the events in the

past three weeks, it is the horrific pattern of selling women and

children into slavery, of torture, of the heading, it really is at a

different level than what we have seen from any terrorist

organisation. Secondly, they are making a huge amount of money doing

it, so they are extremely well-financed. Thirdly, they are

experts at branding, recruiting, proselytising, it is a different

level of threat. It demands a response. What is the level of

threat in your view? You could argue that these actions we have seen,

particularly in Paris, whereby innocent, unarmed civilians are

targeted in this way, is it in some sense an act of desperation? I do

not think so at all, I think it is a building crescendo of activity,

which will get larger and larger, and frankly, as we look at the

potential of the time for the US of weapons of mass destruction, we

ought to be very concerned. We see Lucy Reni for sale in Eastern

European markets, picture that in the hands of the Islamic State. It

is often said, why did Al Qaeda kill all those people on 9/11, and the

answer is because they did not have the means to kill more -- loose

uranium. President Obama has said that they have made progress in

reducing the amount of territory that the so-called Islamic State

hold in both Syria and Iraq, and indeed in the past couple of days we

have seen Kurdish forces retake Sinjar in northern Iraq, although

Rucker, up a mirror in Syria, and Mosul in Iraq are still in the hands

of Islamic State. -- Raqqa, Palmira. They haven't made it to

Damascus or Beirut, but on the other hand what has grown as their

capability to reach across international borders and

boundaries. The President is correct in saying they have been contained

territorially, but I think their capability unfortunately is growing.

And you want to see Nato play a much more active role, to take over the

US coalition bombing operations, and perhaps up to 15,000 Nato troops on

the ground, but does Nato have the political will to do all of that?

One influential voice in this debate, Professor Michael Clarke,

thinks that there isn't. I do, and I would point to historical precedent.

If we go back to the 1990s, Nato found a political will to go into

the Balkans, a situation not terribly different from what we see

in Syria today. Huge numbers killed, 8000 people killed in

Srebrenica, millions pushed across borders, an area of Europe that was

breaking apart. Not unlike Syria. Nato put 60,000 troops in,

Afghanistan after 9/11, Nato was there with 140,000 troops. I think

the political will will come as a result of the horrific behaviour of

the Islamic State. We didn't see any indication of Article five, in which

an attack on one Nato member is an attack on all, after the London

transport bombings in 2005, or the Madrid train bombings in 2004. It

has only been applied once in Nato's history, and that was after

the 9/11 attacks. It is not necessarily true that it will be

that simple to get Nato to take over these operations. I agree, I think

that in the coming week or two, we will start probably not with an

immediate conversation about Article five, but with an Article four

consultation, which is when a particular member nation comes to

that council and asks for a consultation, a conversation about

events. That would be the key to driving toward an Article five

declaration. I would say there is a slightly better than even chance at

this point that events will push us towards an Article five. Certainly

the way President Hollande and the PM of Great Britain are speaking, as

well as the American President, would give me the sense that we will

probably end up Article five, but perhaps not. If we don't this will

become another coalition of the willing activity as opposed to an

official Nato operation. Let's fast forward and imagine that perhaps we

have had Article five, what kind of Nato operation are you actually

advocating? Morte intensified air strikes? We have seen that in the

past year they haven't had that much impact on the ground. What kind of

combat troops are you talking about the go into Syria and Iraq? Spell at

40 think would work. I think we would need to add a significant

component of special Ops troops immediately to go on the ground.

This could come from all of the Nato nations working through the Nato

special operations headquarters, which is located in Belgium and has

global capabilities. Secondly, we could ramp up the intelligence

collection and intelligence sharing. Burt, we would increase our presence

in the cyber world, using all of our Nato members who have that

capability. Fourth, we would increase the bombing campaign.

Believe me, adding all of Nato's capabilities to what is already in

place would be a significant increase. This, we would move to

train the Kurdish forces. Thereof 150,000 Peshmerga operating in the

North. We would re-energise the training programme with the Iraqi

security forces, recognising the frustrations and failures there.

Ultimately, when you put Peshmerga from the North, Iraqi security

forces from the south, you have a significant capability to

co-ordinate with the bombing campaign. Seventh, I would say that

Turkey's army, the seventh-largest in Nato, would to step up. I would

say about 15,000 Nato troops, excluding Turkey, which I would hope

would have a larger land contribution to make. I think when

you put all that together you have the means to take on the Islamic

State in a significant way. You mentioned special operations from

Nato, but look at the fuss we have had already, the mere 50 that the US

has sent in, one example, saying they were not authorised by

Congress. Criticisms that America could be dragged into Syria because

of the deployment of 50 special operations forces. You are

advocating that Nato's biggest army, the US, should be thinking of

sending many more. You can find different voices on all sites of

this debate, and recently we heard Senator John McCain, the chairman of

the Senate armed services committee, one of the most powerful voices in

the Senate, talking about the need for a much larger force the nine

advocating. You will find others who have immense Middle East fatigue

after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the tragic events

of the last three weeks, I think the movement is towards a more activist

role in the region. President Obama, of course, a very influential voice

if not the most influential voice, he has said if 50,000 troops were

sent into Syria, what would happen if there was an attack in Yemen or

Libya? I think as I mentioned earlier each of these are

case-by-case set of decisions for our leaders. I think that the

Islamic State has managed to vault themselves to the top of the greasy

pole of enemies that we face. Each of the other cases we mention would

have to be examined. By the way, it is not just Nato, we need Russia

involved in this, the Sunni Arabs, and I'm confident that over time we

will see a confluence of all those powers working together, just as

happened in the Balkans. Putting to one side the fact that Russia has

been engaged in bombing operations in Syria on behalf of the President

Bashar Al-Assad, leading to the indiscriminate killing of

civilians. I am not saying they are targeting civilians, but their

operations have inevitably meant that civilians have been killed,

that is one point. A former American Ambassador to Nato also says that

some would worry that too much cooperation with Russia would be at

the expense of Ukraine. Are we to forget all that business over

Crimea? No, the world is compensated place, but the essence of leadership

is prioritise in challenges. -- prioritising. I think Islamic State

is at the top of the list at the moment. I for one would say that we

should get the Russians involved in the military hard power campaign

against the Islamic State. The Bashar Al-Assad situation must and

ultimately will be sold in the political, diplomatic way. That

effort is under way, as you know, in talks in Vienna. I think over time

we will see a political diplomatic solution on that site. On the side

of attacking Islamic State, I think we can, will ensure that all operate

together against them. That is the point, will everyone operate against

them in this coalition of the willing, Nato, and Saudi Arabia,

Turkey. Saudi Arabia is implacably opposed to Bashar Al-Assad, will

they really come in with this coalition where you put the fight

against Bashar Al-Assad on the back burner it was you deem that Islamic

State is the bigger enemy? Two months ago I would have said

probably not. Today I would say they probably will. Simply because of the

changing perceptions of the scale and capability of the Islamic State.

I agree with you, it is going to be a close call for the Turks, it will

be a close call for the Saudis, but I think our position, the US, Great

Britain, Nato, is to try to prioritise, go after the Islamic

State first and pursue the diplomatic political solution to the

Assad regime and the civil war broadly, we will have to try to pick

our way through some very tricky choices, but that is how I would

score it from where we sit right now.

Tricky choice, Nicolas Henin, a French journalist who had been held

hostage by Islamic States said Islamic State have killed hundreds

of people, and Bashar al-Assad's forces 250,000 dead, one way or

another. The numbers are far greater. So the point I am putting

to you is, are you getting exercised by Islamic State because the

hundreds they have killed have include Europeans whereas the

quarter million killed by Bashar al-Assad are by and large Syrians?

No, I think both are horrific challenges and I think the Assad

regime is utterly illegal, and I hope that Bashar al-Assad ends his

days like the loss of each from Serbia in a jail cell in The Hague

-- Milosevic. But the real threat at the moment is the potential on the

side of the Islamic State. And of course it is not just their killing

of Christians and NATO members and Europeans, it is also blowing up

Russians as well as the Hezbollah in Beirut. It is unacceptable behaviour

across the spectrum and the potential on that side of the

equation, I think, is worse. In terms of Assad, again, I think that

is going to be a political, diplomatic settlement just because,

as you raise, Zeinab, of the implacable support that Russia has

afforded to them. The reality is we are going to have to settle that

diplomatically. But if, indirectly by focusing on Islamic State at the

expense of Assad, I put you a quote by a leading French security expert

which you that the more you support Bashar al-Assad, the more you are

getting on the wrong side of the Sunnis and giving them one option

only, to support Isil. So actually a strategy could backfire because you

could actually get more recruits were Islamic State. -- your

strategy. Indeed, that would be a possibility. However, I would argue

that the way in which we are pursuing the diplomatic, political

solution on the Assad side of the equation, which is creating a big

tent, ringing the Saudis, the Russians, the Americans, NATO

players including the Iranians, into that conversation, at this point is

the best bet of settling it -- bringing. Let's face the fact,

Zeinab, that the overlay on all of this is the Sunni-Shia situation,

reminiscent of the wars in Europe which killed a quarter of the

population. So there is an enormous strategic challenge that has to be

resolved within the region. The flashpoint at the moment is that

Syria. We have a very dangerous entity in the Islamic State. We

should destroy it, then we can solve the larger construct of civil war in

Syria. Although of course the Islamic State are Sunnis, and as you

point out they are killing lots of Sunnis including the Kurds, who are

Sunnis themselves. But just looking at the impact of military

intervention, it can be counter productive for a different reason

and actually encourage acts of terror. For example before mom

London Mayor Ken Livingstone, who was mayor during the bombings, has

expressed a view held by others that some European Muslims are actually

encouraged to carry out attacks in Europe when they see what they see

as western interventions in Muslim lands. They often cite that is a

reason as to why they are carrying out these attacks. So that is

another very difficult side-effect of the kind of strategy you are

advocating. Indeed it is. And here I point you to a marvellous book that

really unpacks that idea, it is called the Accidental guerrilla. And

it further makes the point that even when we conduct the attacks in these

Islamic states, for every terrorist that we kill we create three or four

more of the Accidental Guerillas who decide to become terrorists. It is a

terrible and difficult part of the equation. And that is why hard power

is necessary but it is not sufficient. We need to use the hard

power to go after it a group like the Islamic State. The long game is

on the soft power side, what some have called Smart Power, finding the

balance between hard and soft. That is education, jobs, integration,

assimilation, cultural understanding. All of those are

important in the long game but at the moment we are in the short game

and that is why we need to apply hard power to the Islamic State. So

the implication of what you say, then, is that part of the reason why

we are seeing attacks in Europe and possibly even in France is as a

result of a sense of alienation and a sense of economic deprivation or

exclusion on the part of some of these young men who turn to these

ghastly acts of terror. There is no question, that is a part of it.

Another part of it is the interpretation of part of the

Islamic faith by some radicalised elements. Another part of it is

economic deprivation. Another part of it is the recent wars in the

Middle East. All of those things I think are contributory. All of those

things need to be addressed. And they are being addressed in many

different fora. But since we are here today to talk about the Islamic

State, unfortunately we are going to need an application of lethal hard

power against them. There is no compromise, there is no sense that

we can create a soft power solution to the Islamic State. But the long

game of soft power, bringing all of the remedies to the issues we just

discussed, Zeinab, that together I think will solve this problem as

best we can. Are you not putting perhaps too much emphasis, Admiral,

on what hard power can achieve. When we look at some of the operatives of

Islamic states, these young men who are European nationals, these men

who go and fight in Syria and then come back, that is not about hard

power, that is about good human intelligence, about good border

control, cyber... Making sure you've got good regulation of what's being

said on internet and that kind of thing. And that is not, you know,

putting your tanks on the lawn, is? No, and I would argue again, the

long game here involves all the things you just discussed.

Intelligence, surveillance, cyber, a la -- our ability to integrate, all

of those things are important but occasionally there comes a time when

you need to fire a bullet. And I think we are at that time in regard

to the Islamic State. We do need to do the other things, but we need to

pick up the focus of the Islamic State as well. And if you do achieve

would you say that you want... To destroy, degrade Islamic State, are

you not... You know, is it possible that something else will emerge,

re-emerge? You know, we have had Al Qaeda, then we have had Islamic

State, they will just be something else that comes up in time? I think

that is a possibility, and that is why, as we were just discussing, the

long game of all the other things we have talked about as important. But

lets look at the Libyan operation, which appeared and felt very

successful in the territory. We applied hard power. We saved the

population from Colonel Gaddafi. But then the State has since fallen into

chaos, and is followed up with both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State there

as well. The lesson is, we can't simply go in, apply hard power and

then abruptly leave. We need to play the long game. That is being

involved economically, diplomatically, politically, and

that is very challenging in this part of the world. But I think that

we start with a hard power, and then we followed the long game with the

soft power. It is our best set of opportunities. Admiral James

Stavridis, you have been a military man for all of your life, and you

have served in most of the world's trouble hotspots, Afghanistan, you

name it. But you yourself have said you cannot deliver security through

the barrel of a gun. You have been talking now about how you need hard

power as well as soft power, Smart Power, a mix of the two. Now you

have retired, you are teaching at university in Massachusetts. But

when you reflect on your career and what military power can actually

achieve, here we are talking about Syria. There's got to be a political

solution in the end, talk to Bashar al-Assad, negotiate, whatever that

turns out to be in the end. Do you now think to yourself hmm, I might

have done better if I had been a politician or a diplomat, rather

than a military man? No, I have never felt I would be better as a

politician. But I'd like to think of myself as a military man who

understands the importance of diplomacy and development alongside

defence. And if we look at places like the Balkans, like Colombia in

South America, and we see that we have been able to meld those three

things together, defence, development, economic aid, and

diplomacy, that is where we will be the most effective. Unfortunately at

this moment in time with the Islamic State, we need that hard power

instrument. But the bigger game, the long game, really is to bring those

three things together. And that, to the degree I have had an impact in

my life and career, I hope that is what people will remember. Admiral

James Stavridis, thank you very much indeed for coming on HARDtalk.