15/03/2016 House of Commons


15/03/2016

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Myers. -- Mars. I received an update that a signal has been received and

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we can successfully say that the launch has been a success. Thank

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you. Order! We come now to the urgent question. Mr Hilary Benn.

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Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. To ask the Secretary of State for

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Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the

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announcement by Russia that it is redeploying the main part of its

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force from Syria, and the implications of this for the peace

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process? We have of course seen the media reports of Russian withdrawal

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of forces, including this morning that the first group of Russian

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planes have left the airbase to return to Russia. However, I should

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tell the House that none of the members of the International Syria

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support group, as far as I have been able to determine, had any advance

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notice of this Russian announcement, and we are yet to see any detailed

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plans behind Russia's announcement yesterday. We do not yet have any

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independent evidence to verify Russia's claims that military

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withdrawals have already begun. We are monitoring developments closely.

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It would be important to judge Russia by its actions. It is worth

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remembering that Russia announced withdrawal of forces in the Ukraine,

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which later turned out to be routine rotation of forces. So if there's

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announcement represents a genuine decision by Russia to continue to

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de-escalate the military conflict, to ensure compliance with the

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Association of hostilities, and to encourage the Syrian regime and to

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participate in peace negotiations in good faith, then it would be

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welcome. Now is the time for all parties to focus on political

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negotiations, which resumed yesterday in Geneva. Because only a

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political transition away from Asad's rolled to a Government

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representative of all Syrians will deliver the peace that Syrians are

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desperately need. It will give us a Government in Damascus able to focus

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on defeating terrorism and rebuilding Syria. There can be no

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peace in Syria while Asad remains in power. Russia has unique influence

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to help make these negotiations succeed, and we sincerely hope that

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they will use it. Since it came into force on the 27th of February, the

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cessation of hostilities has resulted in a significant reduction

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in violence in Syria. However, there have been a significant number of

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reports of violations, including the continued use of barrel bombs, which

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we have been discussing with our partners in the ceasefire task force

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in Geneva. We have serious concerns that the Assad regime has been using

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the cessation of hostilities to pursue its military objectives and

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that it is not serious about political negotiations. Swift action

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to address these violations is therefore vital to reduce the

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violence and show the Syrian people, including the Syrian opposition,

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that both Russia and the Assad regime are abiding by the terms of

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the cessation of hostilities. Failure to do so threatened the

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prospects for big continued political negotiations. We look to

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rush up as guarantor with the regime and its backers to use its unique

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influence to use compliance and to make very clear to the Assad regime

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that their expectations, that they must negotiate in good faith. After

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investing so much an aside, Mr must show the world that he can exercise

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control over his protege. At the same time, we called for a complete

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and unfettered humanitarian access across Syria, and an end to all

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violations of international humanitarian law in accordance with

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the security council resolution. We are relieved that desperately needed

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aid convoys are now arriving in some besieged areas in Syria, including

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some of those named in the Munich ISG agreement. It is imperative that

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this continues, that in particular access is provided to the town has

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not seen any aid yet. We must sustain humanitarian access across

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Syria. Mr Speaker, no one would be more delighted than me if after five

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months of relentless bombing Russia is genuinely winding down its

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military support to the brutal Assad regime. But, as in all matters

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related to Russia, it is the actions, rather than the words, that

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count. We should be watching carefully over the coming days to

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see if the potential promise of this announcement turns into reality. And

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very grateful to the Foreign Secretary for that reply. The

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conflict in Syria has now raged for five years. Half the population have

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fled their homes and neighbouring countries have borne the brunt of

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the refugee crisis and according to the Syrian Observatory, over 360

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thousand people have lost their lives, mostly at the hands of

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President Assad. In the past six months, Russian districts alone have

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killed 1700 civilians. The withdrawal of Russian forces will be

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cautiously welcomed by all of us, but I agree with the Foreign

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Secretary that it needs to be carried through, in particular if it

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is going to be support the ceasefire. The secretary has told

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the House that he has not received any direct information about the

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likely timescale and extent of the withdrawal. Could he however comment

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on the statement reported and attributed to a Russian defence

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Minister, who said that Russian forces will continue to attack

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so-called terrorists, a term that they have used in the past to cover

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its tracks and the Syrian opposition? Can he tell has what

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discussions he has had about the Russian Foreign Minister about this?

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How might this change the type of missions that the RAF and others in

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the anti Dyas coalition and taking in Syria? Given the latest extent of

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the ceasefire, what action is the British Government and other

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Government is proposing to take about this? Does he agree that a

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full withdrawal would improve the confidence of opposition forces

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within the ceasefire and help to ensure that their book is

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participation in the process. What does he think will be the impact of

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the ceasefire and the withdrawal of the international community to

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safely provide the humanitarian aid he has referred to, in particular to

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the towns and areas that have been besieged, given the continuing

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concerns that the international committee have expressed. Potential

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war crimes committed by to the council this week, what does he

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think about any war crimes being committed to the courts? Finally,

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what discussions has he had with other members of the International

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Syria support group about the prospects for the latest round of

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peace talks taking place in Geneva? Does he agree with me that both

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Russia and Syria needs to ensure that all issues are on the table if

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the Syrian people are to seek peace and stability finally returned to

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their war-torn country? I'm grateful to the right honourable gentleman,

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and as he rightly says, it is now five years since this terrible civil

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War began and he set out absolutely correctly the scale of attrition

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that the Syrian people have faced in that time. He referred to the

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remarks attributed to the defence Minister of Russia saying that

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Russia would continue to attack terrorists. This is exactly the

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formula that the Russians have used in the past when attacking the

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moderate opposition. They have always asserted that they only

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conduct air strikes against terrorists, so it's not terribly

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reassuring that if you hours after the announcement of a withdrawal of

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their military forces, the defence minister as saying that they will

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continue to attack terrorists. He asked me about discussions with the

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Foreign Minister of Russia. I have had no such discussions since the

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announcement was made, although I have spoken to American colleagues

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to assess what information they have. The UK mission in Syria will

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not change as a result of withdrawal of Russian forces. UK air strikes

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are primarily targeted against, exclusively targeted against the

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east of the country. They will continue to be so targeted. He asked

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about the latest assessment of the ceasefire. We held a meeting in

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Paris on Sunday, in which we reviewed the situation on the

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ground. The reality is that after a lull in the level of air strikes

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immediately after the cessation of hostilities, they have grown

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steadily and on March the 10th, we assessed Russian air strike threat

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the same level as priest as priest decision of hostilities.

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If Russia carries out a full withdrawal of its forces which I

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don't think is what even the Russian announcement is suggesting, but if

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it were to carry out a full withdrawal of forces, that would

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certainly change the balance of power and military advantage on the

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ground in a very significant way. With regard to access for

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humanitarian aid, it is not the Russians that have been impeding

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access for humanitarian aid, but the Syrian regime. Therefore the

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question is around how much leveraged the Russians have over the

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regime, and how much they are prepared to exercise, and one could

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speculate about whether this announcement is in fact an exercise

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by Russia in reminding the regime of its position as a client operating

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at Russia's will. On the International Criminal Court the two

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major impediments, the first is that Syria is not a signatory to the ICC

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Convention, the second is that of course Russia holds a veto in the

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Security Council. So whilst we all seek to bring those responsible for

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the terrible crimes committed in Syria to justice, I would advise the

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right honourable gentleman not to hold his breath just for this

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moment. Finally, the eye S SG hasn't met in ISSG format recently, but we

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have had opportunities to talk about the agenda for the peace talks at

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Geneva, we are very satisfied with the approach taken, it is a very

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sensible approach which recognises that bluntly as soon as we get to

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the difficult subjects, the talks may run into extreme difficulty, and

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therefore seeks to begin by discussing some rather less

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controversial subjects to try to at least generate some momentum before

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we come to the rather more difficult issues. But I have to say again that

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the sticking point is transition. We are clear, resolutions of the ISSG

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are clear, that the way forward has to be through a transitional regime.

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Which moves us from the current position with Assad in power to a

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new position with Assad out of power. The Russians, the Syrians,

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the Iranians, still do not accept that principle, and unless and until

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it is accepted, the talks going on in Geneva may linger for a while but

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they will not ultimately be able to make significant progress.

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Does the Foreign Secretary agree in so far as he refers to Russia

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sending him a message to -- a message to Assad that this is

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potentially helpful as far as the peace process is concerned by

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ensuring that Assad doesn't overplay his hand in the peace talks? But the

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actual threat to the peace process comes from across the border in

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Turkey, which is no longer led by a constructive and rational partner in

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the process, and the actions of the president should be giving all of us

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the gravest concern as he presides over a disintegrating democracy and

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a war on part of his own people. It is possible that the Russian

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announcement is intended as a message to the Assad regime. Don't

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overplay your hand, get to the negotiating table and engage. It is

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also possible that it is intended as a message to the moderate opposition

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that if they do what is expected of them, because it has not been that

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easy to persuade them to attend the Geneva talks when Russian bombs are

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still raining down on their positions, then that is all

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positive. But unfortunately none of us knows what the intent of Mr Putin

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is when he carries out any action, which is why he is a very difficult

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partner in any situation. On the question of Turkey, I would just say

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this. Turkey remains an important Nato ally, and a vital security

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partner for the UK. And I think when we look at events in Turkey, whilst

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he can refer as he did to recent legislative changes and actions of

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the administration, we should also acknowledge the terrible challenge

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that the Turkish people are facing from terrorism, with multiple deaths

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on the attack on Sunday in Ankara, hundreds of security force members

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killed over the last nine months, 100 or so, many more than 100

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civilians also dead. So we have got to understand the challenge that

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Turkey faces, and I would assert as we do in relation to every country,

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the right of the Turkish people and the Turkish Government to defend

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themselves against attack, when they face this kind of terrorist attack.

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It is almost five years to the day since the uprising against a side.

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11 million displaced, 80% of severe's children damaged by the

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civil conflict. -- Syria's children. When we debated this two weeks ago

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there was scepticism across the chamber about the ceasefire,

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although there have been significant breaches it has resulted in a huge

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elimination of violence. It is the only ceasefire we have got. -- and

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mean you should -- diminishing. Is it not the most credible explanation

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for the Russian announcement, is that it is going to pressurise Assad

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into taking a more flexible attack -- approach in the peace talks? And

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if that is the case, it would be better if the Foreign Secretary had

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the welcome and then the caveats, since it is not only the only

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ceasefire we have got, it is also the only peace process we have got.

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I think we all start out with hope and we end up with experience, and

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in dealing with Russia I think putting the caveat first is probably

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always sensible. It is a credible interpretation of what Mr Putin has

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done, but unfortunately, unlike almost every other party with which

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we work in these situations, we have no insight at all into Russia's

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strategy, Russia's thinking, tactics, so we are left guessing.

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And here we are 24 hours later, none of us including the Americans, who

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Russia apparently craves a bilateral partnership with over Syria, having

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any insight into what the purpose of this move is.

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Can I invite my right honourable friend to admit that we have

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probably be -- been unwise to become hooked on the simplest at notion

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that the removal of Assad is a prerequisite for any solution at all

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in Syria's is it not the case that even with this change in Russian

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tactics, any progress towards peace is bound to retain any messy

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elements within it? What is the Foreign Secretary think this

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supposedly it from it for all the Syrian people is actually going to

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come from? I can't agree, -- we assert that the removal of a side is

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a prerequisite for peace, that is not a moral judgment -- Assad.

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Somebody who has killed 360,000 of his people.

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We also want a reconciliation between the different factions in

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Syria, and those fighting against the regime are not going to lay down

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their arms, they are not going to lay down their arms, unless and

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until they are given an assurance that Bashar al-Assad will not be

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part of the future in Syria, and yes of course it will be messy. And of

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course he is right that there will be many stumbling blocks along the

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way. But it is possible to envisage a transition which will see the

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infrastructure of the state remain in place, but replace Bashar

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al-Assad himself with another figure, possibly from within the

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Alawite community as a head of a transitional administration.

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The Foreign Secretary is quite right to treat this Russian announcement

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along with all Russian announcements with extreme caution. But if this

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does turn out to be positive, would that not vindicate the robust

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approach that Britain and the European Union have taken towards

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President Putin, and vindicate the decision taken by this House to

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extend the highly successful IVF mission in Iraq, to Syria?

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-- aria. I'm convinced myself that President Putin only recognises

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strength. Everything is black and white, you are either standing up to

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him or you have caved in. The action that the European Union took in

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imposing sanctions against Russia over Ukraine surprised the Russians,

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we know that, they didn't expect that the EU would be able to

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establish unanimity to do this. It is so -- it surprised them even more

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that we have managed to renew those distinctions twice and we are coming

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up to the point that we will renew them again, -- sanctions. It has

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surprised the Russians that the Coalition has held together in

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respect of the battle against. Sticking to our guns, working with

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the Russians where they are prepared to align with our objectives, and

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being clear about our requirement of the Russians to comply with their

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obligations under international law. That is the right way to proceed, I

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don't think that seeking concessions to or favours from Mr Putin is a way

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forward, it simply doesn't work like that.

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In these very early days of the ceasefire and the talks in Geneva,

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would my right honourable friend agree that in cautiously welcoming

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this reported withdrawal of Russian troops we should not lose sight of

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the need for the ongoing humanitarian aid to make sure it is

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delivered to those in Syria and the region who need it, and to securing

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a peaceful, long-term political solution to this problem.

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The two reasons why the humanitarian aid has to go on being delivered,

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and getting into parts it hasn't yet reached, first the obvious reason

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that people on the ground desperately need it, but also to

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enable the opposition who are at Geneva to stay there and carry on

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talking. They are finding it very hard to maintain their legitimacy,

:21:46.:21:50.

their credibility, with their supporters on the ground, if no

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humanitarian aid is getting through and regime bombs, Russian bombs are

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still falling on them. The Foreign Secretary said he has

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not talked to Mr Lavrov. Why is that? Again, experience. I

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haven't tried, and I have no doubt that I could predict quite confident

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leave the outcome of a call to Foreign Minister Lavrov. I have had

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many calls with him on the course of our regular meetings over Syria

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related events, none of them fruitful.

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It is depressing to calculate the sum total of human misery that has

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resulted from Russia's intervention in this bloody civil war. Which has

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gone right from vetoing attempts by countries to get an early resolution

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to Assad and a transition Government in the early days, right through to,

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as one NGO put it to me, the bombing of a hospital for time by Russian

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planes. Can I reemphasise by asking my right honourable friend to treat

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with huge caution this move, and hold Russia responsible for any war

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crimes they have risen -- committed? My honourable friend reminds of

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cosmopolitan fact, somebody goes in -- an important fact, somebody

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starts bombing civilian populations and destroy hospitals and schools.

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If they do decide five months later that they have done enough, let us

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not give them too much praise. It is a bit like, you know, did you stop

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beating his wife? The fact they are there in the first place is

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something we have to continually protest about, and we shouldn't give

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them any credit for St Brelade withdrawing from these illegal

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activities. -- simply withdrawing. Despite

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Russia's announcement many countries remain fully committed to military

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action in Syria, we have seen an escalation over five years of the

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humanitarian crisis and the refugee crisis across Europe. Can the

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Secretary of State tell the House, what proportion of Government

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spending relating to the crisis has been spent on military action? As

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compared to the provision of humanitarian aid. And building a

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long-term peace solution for the people of Syria.

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I can't give the lady the precise figures, but we have contributed

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over ?1.1 billion of humanitarian aid to Syria and the neighbouring

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countries to is support displaced persons and refugees. Military

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operation, which has been running in Syria since the boat of this House a

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mere month ago -- the vote. I am quite certain it will be in the

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double figures of millions. Given Russia's past history in the last 30

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years of changing horses at the last moment, would he now be advising

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President Assad to double his bodyguard? Well, the relationship

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between President Assad and President Putin is a subject of

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great speculation among colleagues on the ISS G circuit. I am clear

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that the situation is the same as it has always been. President Putin

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could have ended all this years ago I a single phone call to President

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Assad, offering him some fraternal advice about his future health and

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well-being. Thank you, Mr Speaker. I agree with the Foreign Secretary

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that we should be cautious about these latest developments, but can I

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ask him whether he thinks that Assad is in a stronger position now than

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he was six months ago? In military terms, certainly. The Russian

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intervention has prevented the collapse of regime forces, restored

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morale among regime forces, allowed the regime to take ground,

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consolidate decisions, move forces around in a strategically

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significant way in the country, and has damaged and demoralised

:26:23.:26:26.

opposition groups. There is no doubt at all about that. The question of

:26:27.:26:30.

course, if there is a genuine withdrawal of Russian air cover, how

:26:31.:26:37.

long that improvement can be sustained, because we know that the

:26:38.:26:40.

Syrian regime forces are fundamentally hollowed out after

:26:41.:26:47.

five years of civil war. Without the Russians there to stiffen the spine,

:26:48.:26:50.

it is not clear how long they would be able to maintain the initiative.

:26:51.:26:56.

Assuming that the Russian withdrawal does take place, I and there is no

:26:57.:27:01.

certainty in fact, will be UK air forces be taking over Russian

:27:02.:27:08.

targets against Daesh, with the intensity of the arguments against

:27:09.:27:17.

Daesh is not Russian withdrawal? I can't comment about what will drive

:27:18.:27:21.

US and UK targeting decisions. What I can say is that the Russian air

:27:22.:27:26.

force operates largely within a part of Syria which is heavily protected

:27:27.:27:31.

by the Syrian integrated air defence system. The Russians are able to

:27:32.:27:35.

apply there because they are operating in a permissive

:27:36.:27:39.

environment for them, not least because Russian technicians

:27:40.:27:41.

controlled the Syrian defence system. It would not be the same

:27:42.:27:47.

situation for US, UK and other coalition partners. I don't think

:27:48.:27:50.

there can be an assumption that Western members of the coalition

:27:51.:27:54.

would be able to take over all of the targeting activity against Daesh

:27:55.:28:00.

that is currently being taken out by the Russians. Whilst acknowledging

:28:01.:28:03.

that Assad is principally to blame for the submission of his own

:28:04.:28:07.

citizens, and therefore the departure of the Russians is

:28:08.:28:12.

unlikely to have an effect on the humanitarian aid system, does the

:28:13.:28:16.

Foreign Secretary envisage any new initiatives to ensure that aid does

:28:17.:28:19.

reach the parts of Syria that are currently being stars? The situation

:28:20.:28:25.

on humanitarian aid is that it is there. It is ready to move. The

:28:26.:28:30.

world food programme has got the resources it needs, the food and

:28:31.:28:36.

other medical supplies ready to go. The issue is simply access,

:28:37.:28:41.

principally that is an issue of regime obstruction. In some places,

:28:42.:28:45.

it has been overcome. In other places, it is still a problem. This

:28:46.:28:52.

is something that UN people are working on day and night on the

:28:53.:28:55.

ground to try and resolve. It is literally progressing through one

:28:56.:28:58.

checkpoint and then trying to negotiate through the next

:28:59.:29:04.

checkpoint. Following on from the question from my honourable friends

:29:05.:29:09.

from Huntington, the Kremlin say that the Russian presence in Syria

:29:10.:29:13.

is to counter terrorism, but there are no terrorism groups with fighter

:29:14.:29:20.

jets. Is it not the case that if Russia are serious about

:29:21.:29:22.

de-escalating the situation and moving towards a peaceful solution,

:29:23.:29:29.

that they will also withdraw the S 400 system? I think our

:29:30.:29:36.

understanding is that the S 400 system was probably deployed in

:29:37.:29:40.

order to protect the Russian installation, so it was part of the

:29:41.:29:45.

protective bubble that the Russians delivered into Syria around their

:29:46.:29:50.

own installations to their bases and a naval port. We will obviously have

:29:51.:29:56.

to wait and see the extent, if any, of the withdrawal that has been

:29:57.:29:58.

announced, and whether it includes those weapons. In seeking further

:29:59.:30:06.

clarity on this deeply cynical announcement, can he or his US

:30:07.:30:11.

allies clarify that the Russians Government has set out any

:30:12.:30:14.

conditions linked to their withdrawal that will negatively

:30:15.:30:16.

impact on the political negotiations. Given the tens of

:30:17.:30:24.

thousands of vulnerable Syrians that exists up and down the country,

:30:25.:30:30.

should we be looking at a bombing zone, particularly along the border

:30:31.:30:33.

of Turkey. As far as we're aware, there is conditionality appointed

:30:34.:30:42.

with it. It was a unilateral action announced by Russia, so the

:30:43.:30:47.

withdrawal is a unilateral action. No negotiations or conditionality.

:30:48.:30:52.

She me about no bombing zones. The problem with a no bombing zone is

:30:53.:30:58.

essentially the point I have just made to my honourable friends, that

:30:59.:31:06.

Syria has a very capable ground to air integrated defence Systems,

:31:07.:31:10.

which makes it difficult for anybody's invoiced in a

:31:11.:31:13.

non-permissive environment to enforce such a no bombing zone. --

:31:14.:31:24.

enforce. It is possible to enforce a no bombing zone around Syria, but

:31:25.:31:30.

they would be complex issues involved. It has been raised and

:31:31.:31:37.

discussed, but so far volunteers to police such a no bombing zone have

:31:38.:31:43.

not been rushing forward. The Foreign Secretary referred to Iran

:31:44.:31:49.

earlier. People know that the two regional powers of Iran and Saudi

:31:50.:31:55.

Arabia have vastly contradictory views of Syria, and in particular

:31:56.:32:00.

the future of president Assad. We'll use has good offices to make sure

:32:01.:32:04.

that these two countries get around the table to negotiate like we saw

:32:05.:32:08.

in Vienna? Until there is greater dialogue between these two powers,

:32:09.:32:11.

they will continue to be the tensions that we have seen over the

:32:12.:32:15.

last five years will stop he is right that Iran and Saudi Arabia

:32:16.:32:22.

have fundamentally different views about the future trajectory of

:32:23.:32:26.

Syria, but they are both part of the ISS G. They both did come to the

:32:27.:32:31.

table in Vienna and sit there for two days, or wherever it was, and

:32:32.:32:36.

talked to each other, and they are still both showing up to regular

:32:37.:32:40.

ISSG meetings. It doesn't mean they agree with each other, but it is

:32:41.:32:44.

progress, that they are at least sitting around the same table. Thank

:32:45.:32:51.

you. The Foreign Secretary has mentioned the humanitarian convoys

:32:52.:32:54.

on the ground in Syria. More of them are getting through, but it is

:32:55.:33:01.

nowhere near the access the United Nations would need. What is the

:33:02.:33:05.

Foreign Secretary's assessment of how this latest Russian announcement

:33:06.:33:08.

may give further opportunities to put pressure on the Syrian regime

:33:09.:33:14.

itself to allow more aid through? As I have already said, I don't think

:33:15.:33:20.

that even if the Russians do withdraw forces, I don't think

:33:21.:33:23.

that'll make any direct impact the ability of human supplies to get in.

:33:24.:33:31.

Obviously, the things that almost assist the humanitarian supplies is

:33:32.:33:35.

the continuation of a cessation of hostilities. What actually happens

:33:36.:33:38.

on the ground next will depend on how any Russian withdrawal takes

:33:39.:33:45.

place, over what time period, and how the regime 's response to that.

:33:46.:33:51.

The cynic may suggest that the Syrian regime may have use the last

:33:52.:33:59.

two weeks to prepare for this moment. Perhaps the Syrian regime

:34:00.:34:02.

did know it was coming and perhaps they are prepared for it. The

:34:03.:34:10.

intervention by Russia in Syria was a surprise to the west. This

:34:11.:34:14.

withdrawal, if it is genuine, is also a surprise. Russia's

:34:15.:34:19.

interventions have been unhelpful but influential. Can he advise me

:34:20.:34:25.

what steps we can and are taking with our allies to stop Russia

:34:26.:34:31.

setting the agenda in Syria? It is a good question. It very difficult one

:34:32.:34:37.

to answer. The fact is, that all the other partners, the Western partners

:34:38.:34:46.

in this enterprise play by the rules of the international system. They

:34:47.:34:52.

are transparent about their intentions. We had a debate in this

:34:53.:34:56.

Parliament, a discussion that went on for a couple of years, before we

:34:57.:35:02.

got to the point of deciding to engage in air strikes in Syria. The

:35:03.:35:07.

entire world knew about the debate in the UK and where is the fault

:35:08.:35:11.

lines were in that debate. Unfortunately, Russia is a state in

:35:12.:35:15.

which all power is concentrated in the hands of one man. Decisions are

:35:16.:35:25.

made apparently arbitrarily, without any advance signalling, and as we

:35:26.:35:29.

are now seeing, they can be and made just as quickly. This is not a

:35:30.:35:35.

recipe for enhancing stability and predictability and the international

:35:36.:35:39.

scene. It makes the world a more dangerous place, not a less

:35:40.:35:43.

dangerous place. The Foreign Secretary is right not to spin

:35:44.:35:50.

Putin's announcement, but to wait for the evidence. If however it does

:35:51.:35:55.

serve to recondition some of Assad's assumptions about the negotiations,

:35:56.:35:58.

and if it does mean that elements in the opposition feel a bit more

:35:59.:36:02.

encouraged about the worth of their purpose in the negotiations, we

:36:03.:36:06.

should also be looking at it as an opportunity to make the dialogue

:36:07.:36:14.

more inclusive, not least for women. Our intention is that the dialogue

:36:15.:36:21.

showed the inclusive, representative of all faith groups, all ethnicities

:36:22.:36:27.

within the Syria, and also representative of civil society,

:36:28.:36:30.

including, of course, women. We shouldn't forget that before this

:36:31.:36:37.

horror started, Syria was in, bizarrely, one of the most liberal

:36:38.:36:44.

countries in terms of tolerance of religious minorities, tolerance of

:36:45.:36:48.

secular behaviour, the role of women, participation of women in

:36:49.:36:53.

society and the professions and employment. That is something that

:36:54.:36:56.

we would certainly need to get back to you, as Syria Read normalises in

:36:57.:37:07.

the future. Would he agree with me that one of the greatest problems we

:37:08.:37:11.

face in this situation, we have no real idea of the military resources

:37:12.:37:18.

that Russia put into Syria, so have no idea whether they have really

:37:19.:37:24.

withdrawn from Syria. Have you taken this into account in the coming

:37:25.:37:28.

months? I'm not sure I entirely agree. I think we have quite a

:37:29.:37:32.

reasonable assessment of the military resource that Russia has in

:37:33.:37:40.

Syria and we will be able to now monitor whether that resource is

:37:41.:37:43.

being genuinely withdrawn, or simply rotated. Given that Daesh has not

:37:44.:37:52.

been the main focus of Russian air strikes, to what extent does my

:37:53.:37:57.

friends think that the Russians would advocate a petition of Syria?

:37:58.:38:05.

It's a subject of speculation, whether the immediate objective of

:38:06.:38:11.

the Assad regime and indeed of the Russians is to carve out some kind

:38:12.:38:17.

of mini state in the north-west of Syria, but, as I have said many

:38:18.:38:22.

times this morning, because we have no dialogue about these things,

:38:23.:38:25.

because Russia is completely and transparent about its motives and

:38:26.:38:36.

its plans, we can only speculate. For any peaceful transition in

:38:37.:38:40.

Syria, along with the Russian withdrawal, Iran would also need to

:38:41.:38:46.

withdraw its militia, military personnel, military advisers, which

:38:47.:38:48.

had been supporting the brutal Assad regime. Do we have any news on that?

:38:49.:39:00.

Well, our views are that my honourable friend is right. Clearly,

:39:01.:39:03.

for there to be a sustainable peace in Syria, the militias and the

:39:04.:39:09.

Iranian sponsors and advisers will have to be stood down, just as the

:39:10.:39:14.

Russians will have two withdraw their forces. But we have no

:39:15.:39:19.

indication yet that we are going to see a matching announcement from

:39:20.:39:25.

withdrawal of Iranians back to withdrawal of Iranians back to

:39:26.:39:32.

forces from Syria. Given the experience we had in Crimea and

:39:33.:39:36.

eastern Ukraine, when forces that looked like Russian forces were and

:39:37.:39:40.

like Russian forces and behaved like them arrived and then disavowed,

:39:41.:39:44.

what confidence do we have that this will be a genuine withdrawal and we

:39:45.:39:48.

won't see forces carrying a Russian flag disappeared, only to be replace

:39:49.:39:51.

on the ground by first-ever suspiciously like them?

:39:52.:39:56.

What we are primarily talking about here is a forces, and that trick is

:39:57.:40:03.

a little more difficult to perform when we are talking about advanced

:40:04.:40:08.

strike aircraft. But we can't roll out the possibility of Russian

:40:09.:40:13.

sponsored irregular forces playing some future role in this conflict.

:40:14.:40:16.

-- ruler. Before we come to points of order

:40:17.:40:23.

only to make a short statement which I hope will help the hosts in the

:40:24.:40:27.

matter to come. Owing to a printing error, and incorrect version of the

:40:28.:40:32.

programme motion has been printed on the order paper. The collection will

:40:33.:40:40.

be in the vote office and online shortly. -- correction. The

:40:41.:40:45.

significant difference is that two days are proposed for consideration

:40:46.:40:49.

and third Reading, rather than the one day referred to incorrectly on

:40:50.:40:55.

the order paper. -- third reading. And the motion will be moved in this

:40:56.:41:00.

correct form after second reading. My understanding is that two days we

:41:01.:41:05.

wanted by all parties, so they should I think be rejoicing about

:41:06.:41:14.

this matter. It wasn't a point of order, it was a

:41:15.:41:19.

statement at the right honourable gentleman's usually got points of

:41:20.:41:22.

order before breakfast, lunch and dinner so I am happy to hear his

:41:23.:41:28.

point of order. His statement that the two days was

:41:29.:41:34.

agreed by all parties is actually agreed by the frontbenchers. Many of

:41:35.:41:38.

us believe that this enormous constitutional Bill about privacy

:41:39.:41:44.

and security requires four days, that is at least a dozen major

:41:45.:41:47.

things that need to be dealt with, and we will not be able to do it in

:41:48.:41:54.

committee. I ask him actually, can he give his advice to us as front

:41:55.:41:58.

bench -- backbenchers, how do we get this Bill debated properly? I

:41:59.:42:09.

respect the right honourable gentleman's sincerity, and what is

:42:10.:42:13.

wanted by the frontbenchers is not necessarily the same as what is

:42:14.:42:18.

wanted by the back. I have no control over the programme motion.

:42:19.:42:22.

And that is a matter for the House. All I can say is that if there is

:42:23.:42:29.

very strong cross-party feeling, I have a sense that ministers will

:42:30.:42:34.

inevitably be on the roof and -- receiving end of it. And having got

:42:35.:42:39.

the list in front of me is the right honourable gentleman is subtly in

:42:40.:42:43.

the process advertising his own interest in being called to speak, I

:42:44.:42:45.

think his effort has been successful. Part of order, Mr Andrew

:42:46.:42:56.

Griffiths. A few moments ago amongst all the excitement of hearing what

:42:57.:43:01.

the Government were doing to support the pubs industry, and in event

:43:02.:43:05.

today forgot to draw the House's attention to my register of

:43:06.:43:13.

interests. -- inadvertently. Good I rectify the mistake? He has found

:43:14.:43:18.

his own salvation. I am deeply indebted to him, as of course is the

:43:19.:43:25.

House. On March the 8th, the Member for Birmingham Yardley made a very

:43:26.:43:29.

powerful speech in this chamber which you yourself described as

:43:30.:43:34.

moving. And the most striking part of that speech is when she read out

:43:35.:43:38.

a list of the names of women who have died in the past year as a

:43:39.:43:44.

result of domestic violence. In 2009, after lists of those who had

:43:45.:43:51.

fallen in Iraq and Afghanistan had been read in this chamber,

:43:52.:43:55.

prohibition was introduced from the chair saying that no longer would

:43:56.:44:00.

members be allowed to read out lists of the fallen, and we are now in the

:44:01.:44:05.

strange permission where it is permissible to read at those who

:44:06.:44:09.

have died as a result of domestic violence, but prohibited to read out

:44:10.:44:12.

the lists of those who have fallen in the service of this country.

:44:13.:44:17.

Could you reflect on this, and introduce perhaps a rule that would

:44:18.:44:20.

allow members to make the speeches they decide to make rather than the

:44:21.:44:28.

limited by conditions laid out by the chair? I thank the honourable

:44:29.:44:33.

gentleman for his point of order, and for his characteristic courtesy

:44:34.:44:37.

in giving the advance notice of it. I appreciate that the honourable

:44:38.:44:41.

member feels that there is inconsistency between the latitude

:44:42.:44:45.

allowed by the chair to the honourable lady, the Member for

:44:46.:44:49.

Birmingham Yardley, in the debate to mark International women's's day,

:44:50.:44:52.

and earlier rulings from the chair on his own attempts to read out the

:44:53.:44:56.

names of members of the Armed Forces who had died in operations overseas.

:44:57.:45:00.

These are matters of judgment for the chair. And my immediate response

:45:01.:45:06.

to him, I am happy to reflect upon it further, is that they are I think

:45:07.:45:12.

best approached on a case-by-case basis. My concern is that there

:45:13.:45:19.

should be reasonable -- reasonableness and balance in this

:45:20.:45:24.

-- these matters. I don't think the House would receive it well if list

:45:25.:45:34.

reading became a very regular phenomenon. Or indeed if I may say

:45:35.:45:43.

so, a repetitive campaign tool. However, I simply say to the

:45:44.:45:46.

honourable gentleman that it is open to members to seek my thoughts in

:45:47.:45:54.

advance on these matters, if they have such an intention in mind. And

:45:55.:46:01.

I think I will if I may leave it there for today, I appreciate his

:46:02.:46:04.

sincerity and I hope he appreciates mine. If there are no further points

:46:05.:46:11.

of order, we come now to the ten minute rule motion. Caroline Flint.

:46:12.:46:18.

I beg to move that need be given to bringing in a Bill to reply --

:46:19.:46:22.

require certain multinationals to include within the annual financial

:46:23.:46:26.

reporting specified information prepared in accordance with the

:46:27.:46:29.

organisation for economic cooperation on a country by country

:46:30.:46:35.

basis and for connected purposes. My thanks for the opportunity to

:46:36.:46:39.

prevent -- present this modest Bill, which seeks to move in tackling tax

:46:40.:46:44.

avoidance but takes it one step further. One small step for this

:46:45.:46:48.

House, but the results of which will be a huge step forward for those who

:46:49.:46:53.

believe in tax justice, fairness and transparency in the UK and globally.

:46:54.:46:59.

My Bill will ensure the important -- that important information about

:47:00.:47:04.

large companies is published by a -- companies house. Information that by

:47:05.:47:10.

UK law, such companies will have two provide to HMIC from the first

:47:11.:47:15.

January this year. I'm delighted my Bill has received cross-party

:47:16.:47:19.

support and is being backed by the tax Justice network, Oxfam,

:47:20.:47:24.

Christian Aid and others. We all shared concerns that the way in

:47:25.:47:27.

which multinational companies shift profits to low tax dominions,

:47:28.:47:33.

sometimes even when the employees there are zero. The headlines caused

:47:34.:47:39.

by the recent Google tax deal reflected public consternation. How

:47:40.:47:42.

could a company with thousands of UK employees, five offices, a new ?1

:47:43.:47:47.

billion headquarters to be built near King's Cross with the UK only

:47:48.:47:52.

second to the US in terms of revenues, only pay up ?130 million

:47:53.:47:57.

in tax after six years of investigation into a tax period of

:47:58.:48:03.

ten years? Bear in mind their global revenues for 2015 were $74 billion.

:48:04.:48:08.

With my colleagues on the Public Accounts Committee, we questioned

:48:09.:48:12.

both Google and HMIC. But we are still unclear as to whether the

:48:13.:48:19.

hundred 30 -- ?130 -- 100 ?30 million represented a good deal. I

:48:20.:48:22.

understand the protection of tax Prevacid, especially when it comes

:48:23.:48:26.

to individuals. But we live in a world where multinationals you

:48:27.:48:31.

transfer pricing and shell companies to shift profits from one country to

:48:32.:48:38.

another. -- tax provision. Isn't it extraordinary that in 2010 Bermuda

:48:39.:48:42.

had total reported corporate profits that were the equivalent of 1643% of

:48:43.:48:49.

their actual GDP? Could that be because Bermuda has a zero rate of

:48:50.:48:55.

corporation tax? Isn't it extraordinary that sales staff for

:48:56.:48:59.

Google in the UK sell an advert to a company in the UK, yet the

:49:00.:49:04.

transaction is confirmed online via Ireland, where the prevailing

:49:05.:49:14.

corporate tax rate is 12.5% as opposed to 20% in the UK? This

:49:15.:49:17.

problem is not confined to Google or online businesses. Coffey chains,

:49:18.:49:19.

oil companies, drinks companies, pharmaceuticals, what they all have

:49:20.:49:22.

in common is that they are multinationals. The back -- the

:49:23.:49:26.

impact of entirely lawful manipulation of different countries

:49:27.:49:30.

proposed tax rules is that countries find the tax base is undermined and

:49:31.:49:35.

profits are shifted not through any real economic activity but through

:49:36.:49:38.

arbitrary internal charges between different units of the same company.

:49:39.:49:48.

The impact is to create unfair competition providing a competitive

:49:49.:49:51.

advantage over say, a domestic UK rival paying 20% tax on its profits.

:49:52.:49:56.

It is these strange arrangements that enabled Facebook to pay just

:49:57.:50:03.

?4377 in corporation tax in 2014. The same year it paid 35mm pounds in

:50:04.:50:11.

bonuses to UK-based staff. That is a very, very strange form of

:50:12.:50:17.

performance pay. AstraZeneca paid no corporation tax in 2014, 2015, yet

:50:18.:50:24.

2014 was a remarkable year for them according to its CEO. It had full

:50:25.:50:30.

year revenues of over $26 billion. Vodafone, British American Tobacco,

:50:31.:50:34.

the list of corporate giants with like UK tax bills goes on. I fully

:50:35.:50:39.

support the Chancellor's legislation to require financial reporting to

:50:40.:50:43.

HMIC from UK-based multinationals with revenues in excess of

:50:44.:50:47.

approximately ?600 million, and UK units of such companies, whether

:50:48.:50:52.

parent company is based in a country which does not yet agreed to country

:50:53.:50:56.

by country reporting. This reporting in accordance to OECD guidelines

:50:57.:51:02.

would include showing for each tax jurisdiction in which they do

:51:03.:51:06.

business, the amount of revenue, profit before income tax and income

:51:07.:51:11.

tax paid and approved. And their total employment capital of retained

:51:12.:51:14.

earnings and tangible assets. They would also be required to identify

:51:15.:51:19.

each entity within the group doing business in a particular tax

:51:20.:51:23.

jurisdiction, and provide an indication of business activities

:51:24.:51:26.

within a selection of broad areas which each entity is engaged in. The

:51:27.:51:31.

Government's proposals would make about 400 companies share some or

:51:32.:51:36.

all of its -- their activities worth world from -- worldwide, but we can

:51:37.:51:47.

do more. By requiring this information to be published, not

:51:48.:51:49.

only will HMIC see the bigger picture so will we. Publication is

:51:50.:51:51.

one way to ensure that these companies explain their tax planning

:51:52.:51:53.

but also restore the tarnished reputations. I believe it would

:51:54.:51:57.

deter companies from using tax havens and shell companies, sent a

:51:58.:52:05.

strong signal to developing countries. Charities say that

:52:06.:52:14.

developing countries lose more in potential revenue each year owing to

:52:15.:52:17.

corporate tax dodging than the amount given annually in overseas

:52:18.:52:21.

aid by all richer countries. That made me stop and think. Stop and

:52:22.:52:28.

think about how much more we could do to enable developing countries to

:52:29.:52:32.

prosper and be more self-sufficient through measures such as my Bill. Ed

:52:33.:52:38.

is vital for pro-relations, but just as important is a hand-out, -- hand

:52:39.:52:44.

up, not just a hand-out. That will not happen unless we force this

:52:45.:52:47.

companies to come clean. I looked the Chancellor for support with my

:52:48.:52:52.

Bill, and I may be onto a winner when the budget is announced

:52:53.:52:56.

tomorrow. I reminded the Chancellor in the letter that this Bill is in

:52:57.:52:59.

keeping with his own sentiments, when in February he told an

:53:00.:53:03.

international meeting of finance ministers, "I think we should be

:53:04.:53:07.

moving to more public, country by country reporting, this is something

:53:08.:53:11.

the UK will seek to promote internationally." I agree, but I say

:53:12.:53:17.

to the Chancellor, why wait? The tide is turning against secrecy,

:53:18.:53:21.

with business led organisations encouraging firms to be open about

:53:22.:53:25.

their taxes and not to use tax havens. It's immoral's budget or the

:53:26.:53:29.

Finance Bill that follows, the Government can adopt this measure

:53:30.:53:33.

and be in front of the pack. -- in tomorrow's budget. We all want

:53:34.:53:40.

successful companies in the UK, as do our constituents. But we want

:53:41.:53:44.

them to pay fair tax. Too many multinational companies seem to be

:53:45.:53:48.

choosing the tax they want to pay, rather than paying the tax they

:53:49.:53:53.

should pay, by a complicated international arrangement. The

:53:54.:53:57.

winners from public reporting are the Government, HMIC, those

:53:58.:54:00.

businesses and taxpayers who have already paid fair taxes, and

:54:01.:54:04.

developing countries who are losing out. But multinationals should not

:54:05.:54:09.

see this as a threat, but as an opportunity to

:54:10.:54:26.

restore the reputation of their brand. They can be winners as well.

:54:27.:54:30.

My Bill has received support from right honourable and honourable

:54:31.:54:32.

members across the House, I am so delighted to have received support

:54:33.:54:34.

from ten of my colleagues reflecting all the political parties on the

:54:35.:54:36.

Public Accounts Committee. Members from five separate parties have

:54:37.:54:39.

agreed to sponsor the Bill. And I thank them for that. It is time for

:54:40.:54:41.

multinational corporations to come clean and play fair with Government

:54:42.:54:44.

and the public. And we can start with the UK. In the interests of

:54:45.:54:48.

social justice, fairness and yes, it -- good business, I commend the Bill

:54:49.:54:55.

to the House. Vote-macro As many as are of the

:54:56.:54:57.

opinion, say "aye". To the contrary, "no".

:54:58.:55:04.

I think the ayes have it. Who will repair -- prepare and bring in the

:55:05.:55:09.

Bill. Karen Smith, Anne-Marie Trevelyan,

:55:10.:55:14.

Nigel Mills, Dame Margaret Hodge, Stephen Kinnock, Jeremy Lefroy,

:55:15.:55:17.

Doctor Philippa Whitford, Mark Durkan and myself.

:55:18.:55:36.

Multinational Eterprises financial transparency. Friday, 22nd of April.

:55:37.:56:15.

Clark will now read the orders. Investigated powers. How he received

:56:16.:56:24.

a communication from the government, about the interception of

:56:25.:56:28.

Communications department, under those bill, if the government

:56:29.:56:31.

decides to intercept the communications of members of

:56:32.:56:34.

Parliament, they have got to consult the Prime Minister, is it not wise

:56:35.:56:46.

we consider you as well? You have to ensure the independence of this

:56:47.:56:49.

Parliament, it is surely not correct that one part of the executive

:56:50.:56:56.

should and does it communications, and the head should authorise?

:56:57.:57:04.

Nobody should be judged, in his or her own course. I am here merely to

:57:05.:57:19.

serve. It is good, of the honourable gentleman, to put me for this

:57:20.:57:22.

voluntarily rule. Those should be the judge. But I do note the

:57:23.:57:32.

substantive point, and if you sure that the Home Secretary will have

:57:33.:57:39.

heard what he has to say. If she does not respond to his point, he

:57:40.:57:43.

will probably make it again, and again, and conceivably, again. To

:57:44.:57:49.

move the second reading, the Home Secretary. Thank you Mr Speaker. Mr

:57:50.:58:00.

Speaker, before I began, members of the house will be aware of the death

:58:01.:58:12.

of a prison officer attacked ten days ago in east Belfast. The

:58:13.:58:16.

deepest sympathies, to his friends, family and colleagues. Consolidating

:58:17.:58:24.

the country's investigative powers, inner wheel all that will stand the

:58:25.:58:29.

test of time. Over the last two years, detailed analysis of those

:58:30.:58:34.

investigatory powers,, consultation with law enforcement, intelligence

:58:35.:58:40.

agencies, and industry. And following the publication of the

:58:41.:58:44.

draft last autumn, scrutiny by a joint committee of both Houses of

:58:45.:58:50.

Parliament, and the science and technology committee. I want to

:58:51.:58:56.

begin by placing an Rickard, my gratitude to the cheer people of

:58:57.:59:08.

those committees, and noble lord Murphy, for the work that those

:59:09.:59:12.

members have undertaken. The scrutiny has helped to improve the

:59:13.:59:17.

bill, reflecting the majority of recommendations. The revised bill is

:59:18.:59:29.

clearer. It includes stronger privacy, bolstering protection, and

:59:30.:59:34.

prevents agencies from asking foreign agencies to intercept

:59:35.:59:41.

communications, unless the other one and approved by the Secretary of

:59:42.:59:46.

State. It reduces the amount of ten, in which urgent warrants must be

:59:47.:59:54.

reviewed, from five to three. And it strengthens the perils of the

:59:55.:59:56.

Commissioner. Alongside introduction of the bill, also records of

:59:57.:00:01.

practice, so that they could be reviewed. Under this bill... The

:00:02.:00:17.

present system, to be reduced to one, can the Secretary of State

:00:18.:00:21.

convince the house, it is in the interests of freedom and democracy,

:00:22.:00:24.

that we reduce the number of commissioners? I have to say to the

:00:25.:00:34.

honourable gentleman, one person overseeing the commission, they will

:00:35.:00:40.

have an dobbing a number of judicial commissioners. Extensive expedience,

:00:41.:00:49.

undertaking tasks, the question of the new process of authorisation.

:00:50.:00:59.

Also, undertaking the inspection and review of the operation of the

:01:00.:01:04.

agencies. In the way the three have so far. This is actually going to

:01:05.:01:11.

enhance the oversight. Mr Speaker, the scrutiny that this bill has

:01:12.:01:15.

undergone, builds upon the previous work of the Intelligence and

:01:16.:01:19.

Security Committee, the independent enquiry, into the practices,

:01:20.:01:26.

convened by the Royal United services, and carried out by David

:01:27.:01:33.

Allison QC. All the reviews made clear, that legislation made clear

:01:34.:01:38.

the of communications needed to be consolidated and made clear. Taken

:01:39.:01:44.

together, the scrutiny that this has received could be without

:01:45.:01:49.

precedence. Three reports informed the drafting. The committees then

:01:50.:01:56.

scrutinise that, I now that precedes, for proper consideration

:01:57.:02:05.

by both Houses of Parliament. This bill will provide world leading

:02:06.:02:12.

information. It is going to provide unparalleled openness, treat the

:02:13.:02:18.

stronger safeguards and establish a rigorous oversight fishing. The data

:02:19.:02:29.

prevention act, which it intends to replace, contains a sunset clause,

:02:30.:02:32.

requiring us to pass legislation by the end of 2016. This is the team

:02:33.:02:40.

table set by Parliament. And threats we face mean we have to. Terrorists

:02:41.:02:48.

are operating online, with the region that has never existed

:02:49.:02:53.

before. They will continue to do so, so long as it gives them a perceived

:02:54.:02:58.

advantage. We must ensure that those charged with keeping us safe are

:02:59.:03:05.

able to keep his. This will provide the intelligence agencies with the

:03:06.:03:10.

peril that they need, and it will ensure that they can continue the

:03:11.:03:15.

tremendous work that so often goes unreported. To protect the people of

:03:16.:03:20.

this country, from those who mean heart. -- harm. The Intelligence and

:03:21.:03:30.

Security Committee concluded that privacy protection should form the

:03:31.:03:37.

backbone of the legislation, that is indeed the case. It's strictly

:03:38.:03:41.

limits the public authorities can use these investigatory powers, has

:03:42.:03:49.

the sort, and sets it in more detail the safeguards that are to the

:03:50.:03:56.

material obtained. Bill starts with an assumption of privacy, and

:03:57.:04:00.

communication, part one provides an offence for unlawful interception,

:04:01.:04:09.

it can be resulting in a custodial sentence. Recklessly obtaining

:04:10.:04:13.

communication data, without lawful organisation. Misuse of these

:04:14.:04:19.

powers, by police, and other authorities would be the penalties.

:04:20.:04:28.

And it abolishes the powers, to obtain communications data. Public

:04:29.:04:30.

authorities would in future only be able to obtain the minute you

:04:31.:04:41.

through the powers, in this Bill. Can I thank the Home Secretary. We

:04:42.:04:44.

know that their internet service providers are vulnerable, to

:04:45.:04:55.

hacking. Some newspapers, not adverse to passing brown envelopes.

:04:56.:05:00.

Is the Home Secretary satisfied that this can prevent, that hacking,

:05:01.:05:07.

access to an individual's personal information? In relation to the

:05:08.:05:15.

investigatory powers,, it sets out enhanced safeguards, for those

:05:16.:05:24.

arrangements. As the honourable gentleman will know, issues of

:05:25.:05:27.

inappropriate access to information have been a matter of court cases.

:05:28.:05:32.

It is tightly correct that these matters are being accessed

:05:33.:05:35.

criminally, that should be good with. What I have just set out, new

:05:36.:05:42.

offences with this. Dealing with questions, or people obtaining

:05:43.:05:47.

knowingly or recklessly, communications data. She will know

:05:48.:06:00.

that I am a supporter of this. But does she have my concerns, looking

:06:01.:06:04.

at international human rights, Imogen European crevasses, --

:06:05.:06:14.

emerging European privacy laws, even if this bill became an act of

:06:15.:06:18.

Parliament, could she foresee any problems, internationally? The

:06:19.:06:30.

honourable gentleman raises an important point. Many of the

:06:31.:06:35.

internet service providers, based in other countries. One of the other

:06:36.:06:42.

issues that we have been continuing to progress, discussions with the

:06:43.:06:47.

United States authorities, about the Christian under which circumstances

:06:48.:06:49.

it is possible to ensure that warrants issued there, can be

:06:50.:06:55.

exercised across the United States. We are always have had territorial

:06:56.:07:00.

jurisdiction, the previously pro-government that introduced the

:07:01.:07:07.

legislation also establish that jurisdiction. It has never been

:07:08.:07:10.

tested but we have that discussion with the united states. The Home

:07:11.:07:17.

Secretary recently met with my constituents. Barry. 14-year-old

:07:18.:07:28.

son, groomed online then murdered. Could the Home Secretary explain how

:07:29.:07:37.

the bill would help prevent any similar cases? Absolutely tragic

:07:38.:07:46.

case. I know the enormous distress that was caused. Not just by the

:07:47.:07:57.

grooming. But other actions, that have taken place and is. What we are

:07:58.:08:04.

doing with them this legislation, I think is ensuring that the

:08:05.:08:09.

authorities, more enforcement, the police, will have powers to be able

:08:10.:08:15.

to better investigate those sort of incidents. Sadly, the incident that

:08:16.:08:28.

led to that date. Restricting the use of powers outside of the

:08:29.:08:31.

legislation, for equipment interference. The police or

:08:32.:08:36.

intelligence agencies, wishing to interfere with the smartphone, to

:08:37.:08:40.

obtain vital evidence, I warrant would be required. And it also

:08:41.:08:46.

responds to the recommendations of the Intelligence and Security

:08:47.:08:53.

Committee, placing a statutory suspension, for other countries to

:08:54.:08:55.

intercept communications of somebody and United Kingdom. No suggestion

:08:56.:08:59.

that the agencies could use international relationships to avoid

:09:00.:09:05.

the safeguards. And for the avoidance of doubt, to answer some

:09:06.:09:12.

questions, I cultivate the territorial jurisdiction, I meant

:09:13.:09:14.

extraterritorial destruction. The house is going to know that the

:09:15.:09:19.

interception of community should, listening to a telephone, is one of

:09:20.:09:25.

the most sensitive and intrusive capabilities available to more

:09:26.:09:30.

enforcement. It is also one of the most valuable. Over the past

:09:31.:09:34.

decades, interception has played a part in every top piracy, --

:09:35.:09:47.

priortity MI5 cases. In the interests of national security,

:09:48.:09:50.

economic well-being the United Kingdom. Authorising warrants is one

:09:51.:09:59.

of the most important means, by which the secretaries can hold

:10:00.:10:03.

law-enforcement to account for their actions. We had accountable to the

:10:04.:10:08.

host, through elected representatives to the public. But

:10:09.:10:12.

part two is going to introduce an important new safeguards. As

:10:13.:10:16.

Secretary of State, they will need to be satisfied that the activity is

:10:17.:10:22.

proportionate. But in future, it cannot be issued until a decision to

:10:23.:10:25.

issue it has been formally approved by the judicial Commissioner. This

:10:26.:10:32.

will place a double what, organisation, preserving the vital

:10:33.:10:35.

element of democratic accountability, but introduce

:10:36.:10:37.

independent judicial authorisation. I am grateful to the honourable

:10:38.:10:47.

lady. She may have seen a letter in today's Guardian from a number of

:10:48.:10:52.

lawyers, which suggested that this legislation was intended to give

:10:53.:10:56.

generalised access to electronic communications content. Which she

:10:57.:10:59.

agree that that is the very thing which this Bill does not actually do

:11:00.:11:05.

at all? And that the double lock mechanism is there as an assurance

:11:06.:11:11.

that it doesn't happen. My right honourable friend is right, the

:11:12.:11:14.

point about this Bill is that it will only be possible to access, to

:11:15.:11:20.

intercept communications, under this dual authority, this double lock

:11:21.:11:24.

that has been put into place, and it is not the case that the authorities

:11:25.:11:28.

are looking for a generalised access to the contents of communications. I

:11:29.:11:33.

thank my right honourable friend for bringing that to the attention of

:11:34.:11:39.

the House. I will give way to my right honourable friend. As she

:11:40.:11:46.

quite rightly says, should -- this is an important power but also a

:11:47.:11:52.

very sensitive one. She exercised it about two and a thousand times a

:11:53.:11:56.

year, about ten times a working day. How long does she take typically

:11:57.:12:04.

over one of these decisions? It is impossible to put a time on it

:12:05.:12:08.

because each decision differs. The amount of information that's

:12:09.:12:12.

available, the type of case, the extent to which it we refer -- may

:12:13.:12:17.

refer to a matter already being considered, so the amount of time

:12:18.:12:20.

and give to each case is the amount of time necessary to make the right

:12:21.:12:31.

judgment each case. -- to each case. There have also been cases where

:12:32.:12:38.

police misconduct is alleged and intercept has been used, and

:12:39.:12:41.

subsequently it has been hard to use that in the -- evidence in front of

:12:42.:12:47.

a jury, particularly one in a coroner's court. Does she envisage

:12:48.:12:51.

any change in relation to that, is she minded to put that on the face

:12:52.:12:57.

of the legislation? He has raised an important point, he will be aware of

:12:58.:13:00.

one particular case in recent years where this has been the case,

:13:01.:13:05.

whether question of the admissibility of evidence at an

:13:06.:13:09.

inquest has been an issue. This is a matter we are not putting on the

:13:10.:13:13.

face of this Bill, it is a matter that was explored previously when

:13:14.:13:16.

the closed material proceedings were in certain cases, but we are looking

:13:17.:13:23.

actively at whether there are other means in which we can ensure that

:13:24.:13:27.

the appropriate information is available when those sorts of cases

:13:28.:13:34.

are being considered. And someone who also has signed thousands of

:13:35.:13:37.

these warrants, I think I would have welcomed this judicial commissioner

:13:38.:13:43.

having a look as well, and I congratulate my right honourable

:13:44.:13:45.

friend on making this very significant came -- change. Does she

:13:46.:13:51.

recall in the Bill, which additional commissioner who will only have the

:13:52.:13:54.

powers to act in the same way that a judge might act in a case of

:13:55.:14:00.

judicial review? Which means only overruling her if she is behaving in

:14:01.:14:04.

some completely unreasonable way. Does she think that is necessary,

:14:05.:14:08.

and should not accept that might be some value if age additional

:14:09.:14:10.

commissioner disagrees with her in at least having a discussion which

:14:11.:14:18.

covers broader principles of judgment and doesn't just base it on

:14:19.:14:21.

the fact that she is somehow behaving in a way no reasonable man

:14:22.:14:27.

or woman otherwise would. My right honourable friend, with a degree of

:14:28.:14:31.

prescience, has referred to the next issue I was going to address. I was

:14:32.:14:35.

going to point out that I know that some honourable and right honourable

:14:36.:14:38.

members had scrutinised the language in the Bill and had raised exactly

:14:39.:14:43.

this issue. I want to be clear about this. Under the Bill it will be for

:14:44.:14:47.

the traditional commissioner to decide the nature and extent of the

:14:48.:14:51.

scrutiny that he or she wishes to apply. And crucially I think I can

:14:52.:14:55.

reassure honourable and right honourable members that

:14:56.:14:57.

commissioners will have access to all of the material that was put the

:14:58.:15:02.

Secretary of State. So the traditional commissioner will not

:15:03.:15:05.

just be looking at the process but will actually be able to look at the

:15:06.:15:09.

excessive -- proportionality of the warrant being proposed. I would like

:15:10.:15:17.

to make a little progress... A little supplementary, if I may? It

:15:18.:15:23.

is more than my life's worth not to give way to for my cube -- Home

:15:24.:15:27.

Secretary! Sometimes the information is very simple, very limited. Will

:15:28.:15:33.

the traditional commissioner have the ability to ask for more

:15:34.:15:39.

information which has not gone before the Home Secretary, if he or

:15:40.:15:43.

she, the Jewish additional commissioner really wishes to know a

:15:44.:15:47.

bit more about this one, to check what has been put towards -- for the

:15:48.:15:53.

Home Secretary? -- traditional commissioner. It is important that

:15:54.:15:57.

the Secretary of State of age additional commissioner make

:15:58.:16:01.

decisions on the basis of the same information being available. If the

:16:02.:16:07.

traditional commissioner decides there is not sufficient information,

:16:08.:16:10.

he or she would refuse that warrant. It would be open to the Secretary of

:16:11.:16:15.

State to appeal to the investigatory Powers commissioner to look at that

:16:16.:16:18.

particular one again, or it might be if it had been refused in that

:16:19.:16:22.

circumstance that actually the Secretary of State would say

:16:23.:16:28.

themselves, take the warrant back, put more information back and

:16:29.:16:34.

resubmit that warrant. I will give way to the Scottish national

:16:35.:16:43.

spokesman. On a point of clarification, regarding the letter

:16:44.:16:46.

to the Guardian, is the honourable lady aware that what this letter is

:16:47.:16:49.

taking issue with is bulk interception warrants and bulk

:16:50.:16:54.

equipment interference warrants, which even the ISC said should be

:16:55.:17:00.

removed from the Bill? I will come onto the issue of mock warrants, but

:17:01.:17:04.

what was clear from the committee reports that came forward was that

:17:05.:17:09.

the powers that are in this Bill are necessary. The ISC raised a question

:17:10.:17:14.

the bulky equipment interception warrants. The Government has been

:17:15.:17:18.

able to produce further information on all bog cases, following that. We

:17:19.:17:22.

published some case studies, examples of how these powers would

:17:23.:17:28.

be used. -- bulk cases. I will give way to the honourable lady.

:17:29.:17:34.

Can I take her to the other end of the telescope on this matter,

:17:35.:17:37.

because one of the concerns people have about a generalised access

:17:38.:17:41.

point is not with the warrants, but with the notion that you can

:17:42.:17:46.

separate out contact and content. But the idea that there would be

:17:47.:17:52.

access to content date -- contact -- contact data, which would be blurred

:17:53.:17:56.

with content data online. Does she accept there is a challenge Re:

:17:57.:18:01.

separating contact and content data. It is not the same as a phone record

:18:02.:18:04.

when you look at somebody's intimate correspondence.

:18:05.:18:11.

I know this issue was -- Internet correspondence.

:18:12.:18:14.

I know this issue was raised, and has been raised in relation to the

:18:15.:18:19.

Internet connection records power. But it is absolutely possible, and

:18:20.:18:23.

we have been talking at length with the companies, to be able to

:18:24.:18:27.

separate in Internet connection records for example the device or a

:18:28.:18:32.

website that a particular device has accessed, and not then go into the

:18:33.:18:36.

content of whatever it is that is being looked at in relation to that.

:18:37.:18:40.

It is very important that I make that clear, because when -- we're

:18:41.:18:46.

not talking about looking at people's Web browsing history,

:18:47.:18:50.

simply that initial of contact. Can I also say in relation to the

:18:51.:18:56.

authorisation process we have been discussing in relation to questions

:18:57.:19:01.

raised by my right honourable and learned member for Rushcliffe, but I

:19:02.:19:05.

welcome the joint committees clear endorsement of the double knock

:19:06.:19:10.

regime. And I have to say to members of this House that those who think

:19:11.:19:13.

that the senior division should -- judiciary will simply rubber-stamp

:19:14.:19:19.

decisions, have simply never with protest judges. The provisions have

:19:20.:19:27.

also been tightened in response to pre-legislative scrutiny, in

:19:28.:19:32.

response -- in regard to urgent warrants. If I may make a little

:19:33.:19:37.

more progress. In urgent circumstances such as a fast-moving

:19:38.:19:42.

kidnap investigation, a warrant can still come into force as soon as the

:19:43.:19:48.

Secretary of State has authorised it, but if this -- commissioner

:19:49.:19:54.

disagrees with the Secretary's decision, he can agree that all

:19:55.:19:59.

material will be destroyed. The Bill also provides sufficient safeguards

:20:00.:20:03.

for parliamentarians and lawyers' communications. In any case where it

:20:04.:20:06.

is proposed to intercept parliamentarians' communications,

:20:07.:20:10.

the Prime Minister would be consulted. As for legally privileged

:20:11.:20:18.

communications, it can also -- only be accessed in specific situations.

:20:19.:20:27.

Such as in the context of the loss of life. But of course members of

:20:28.:20:31.

Parliament should not be above the law, and the procedure would ensure

:20:32.:20:37.

that members -- we all recognise that. But in some of the most dodgy

:20:38.:20:42.

regimes of which I was of course is not one, governments do intercept

:20:43.:20:47.

communications of members of Parliament, so surely an extra

:20:48.:20:50.

safeguard to be absolutely assured would be that the Speaker looked at

:20:51.:20:56.

this as well. Why not? I heard his exchange with the Mr Speaker

:20:57.:21:01.

earlier. I think the important extra safeguard being put in, there are

:21:02.:21:08.

two, the first is on the face of the Bill that the Prime Minister will be

:21:09.:21:10.

consulted, but also it has that double knock authorisation, so it is

:21:11.:21:15.

the case that in future interception of anybody's warrant, including

:21:16.:21:23.

members of parliament, should that be the case, will not just be

:21:24.:21:28.

subject to the determination of a democratically elected individual

:21:29.:21:31.

but will also be subject to the independent decision of the

:21:32.:21:33.

judiciary, through the judicial commissioners. I think that is an

:21:34.:21:42.

important safeguard. She was right to point to the patchy relationship

:21:43.:21:47.

between the judiciary and governments of all colours, but I

:21:48.:21:50.

think the Bill strikes the right balance. It strikes me as being

:21:51.:21:55.

absolutely imperative, somebody who is democratically accountable this

:21:56.:22:00.

House in the country, has almost the first say on whether these things

:22:01.:22:04.

are going to be done. Perfectly right for a judge properly trained

:22:05.:22:07.

to have an overdue asthma overview of it, -- but if we were to lose

:22:08.:22:17.

this provision, that would be a retrograde step. I think we have got

:22:18.:22:22.

the balance right, many people have said just have judicial

:22:23.:22:25.

authorisation, some believe it should just be Secretary of State

:22:26.:22:29.

authorisation. I think having the two we get that Democratic began --

:22:30.:22:37.

accountability. I will make some progress if I may, my honourable

:22:38.:22:42.

friend may try again but I will make some progress because I wanted to

:22:43.:22:47.

know to communications data. That is the who, when, where, and how of a

:22:48.:22:54.

communication. Such communications data is vital to investigations

:22:55.:22:57.

carried out by the police and security agencies. It has been used

:22:58.:23:02.

and 95% of all organised crime prosecutions by the CPO, it is used

:23:03.:23:07.

to investigate, understand and disrupt terrorist prompts -- plots,

:23:08.:23:10.

it has played a part in the investigation of some very serious

:23:11.:23:14.

crime cases, it can tie suspects and victims to a crime scene, proved or

:23:15.:23:19.

disproved alibis, and it can help to locate a missing child or adult.

:23:20.:23:23.

Part three and four of the Bill will therefore proved -- preserve this

:23:24.:23:28.

power for the police and security agencies, but also provide strong

:23:29.:23:33.

privacy safeguards. Requests for communications data will require the

:23:34.:23:36.

approval of an independent designated senior officer. In

:23:37.:23:43.

addition, requests by local authorities also require

:23:44.:23:46.

authorisation by a magistrate, and requests by any public authority,

:23:47.:23:50.

including the security and intelligence agencies, to identify a

:23:51.:23:55.

journalist's source, will require the authorisation knowledge

:23:56.:24:02.

additional commissioner. It doesn't make sense that were communication

:24:03.:24:07.

takes place using social media communications applications, those

:24:08.:24:10.

communications are currently out of reach. In respect of our -- online

:24:11.:24:15.

child sexual exploitation, the absence of these records often makes

:24:16.:24:20.

it impossible to identify abusers. Such an approach defies logic and

:24:21.:24:24.

ignores the realities of today's digital age. So the only new power

:24:25.:24:28.

in the Bill is the ability to acquire communications services

:24:29.:24:32.

providers to retain Internet service connection records. I want to be

:24:33.:24:40.

quite clear and reiterate what I said earlier, the Internet

:24:41.:24:43.

connection records do not provide access to a person's full web

:24:44.:24:49.

browsing history. It is a record of what Internet services, a device or

:24:50.:24:54.

a person has connected to, not every web page they have visited. I am

:24:55.:24:57.

pleased that the joint committee agreed with the Government on the

:24:58.:25:01.

necessity of this power and concluded that on balance, there is

:25:02.:25:04.

a case for Internet connection records as an important tool for law

:25:05.:25:05.

enforcement. Is a indeed, the committee went

:25:06.:25:21.

further, and said law enforcement should be able to investigate for a

:25:22.:25:25.

wider range of purposes, that reflects the recommendations. I

:25:26.:25:33.

generally don't much -- give way to the honourable gentleman. The joint

:25:34.:25:40.

committee also wanted clarification, on what those records were, and I

:25:41.:25:45.

would welcome the Home Secretary's students, that the capability was

:25:46.:25:49.

available for the retention of those records. At at whose course? We have

:25:50.:25:58.

clarified definitions, that was a point that was clarified not only by

:25:59.:26:02.

the committee, but the science and technology committee. Also, add

:26:03.:26:07.

looking at this particular issue, we have spent a long time, and continue

:26:08.:26:11.

to spend a long time, discussing with the companies who will

:26:12.:26:16.

potentially be subject to such notices, the technicalities. But

:26:17.:26:20.

different companies operate in different ways, I reiterate the

:26:21.:26:24.

point that I have made previously, that the government will reimburse

:26:25.:26:29.

the operational cost that these companies will be subject to. As has

:26:30.:26:37.

been cynically deviously. -- said previously. It is important, because

:26:38.:26:45.

I support the Home Secretary's objectives, but then fell is going

:26:46.:26:52.

to cost about 180 million. As she satisfied, that that would cover the

:26:53.:26:57.

cost of implementation of such that skill? -- scale? The raised that

:26:58.:27:13.

with me. We have been discussing in detail, issues about the technical

:27:14.:27:18.

arrangements, for intimate detection to lawful record, but also that the

:27:19.:27:24.

costs that the government is going to be prepared, as it is just now,

:27:25.:27:33.

to provide for those costs. The Home Secretary has been very generous. We

:27:34.:27:37.

welcome the improvements that have been made, but I hope the Home

:27:38.:27:43.

Secretary received my letter, the concerns, because we think that the

:27:44.:27:47.

technology capability notices, remain an earlier of uncertainty. --

:27:48.:27:54.

area. Despite the commitments that have been made from the dispatch

:27:55.:27:58.

box, we need long-term certainty, regarding reimbursement of costs.

:27:59.:28:03.

This would be central to the loving the court heard and legislation, fit

:28:04.:28:13.

for a fast moving area of the economy. We need the still with as

:28:14.:28:19.

quickly as possible. Can I reiterate, to my honourable friend,

:28:20.:28:29.

100% of the compliance costs will be met by the government. She has asked

:28:30.:28:33.

me to provide a long-term commitment, we have been clearer in

:28:34.:28:37.

terms of the legislation, but it is not possible for one government to

:28:38.:28:47.

buy into the hands of any future government. In addition, alongside

:28:48.:28:53.

the codes of practice, I have at the request of the joint committee,

:28:54.:29:00.

published by comparison, those set out by Denmark. And I have held

:29:01.:29:07.

discussions, with united States communication providers, and we will

:29:08.:29:11.

continue to work closely with them as we implement this. As a guarantee

:29:12.:29:15.

of this, we have included a commitment that the Home Secretary

:29:16.:29:18.

will report to Parliament on how the bill has been operating after six

:29:19.:29:23.

years, if Parliament agrees it is the intention that the joint

:29:24.:29:26.

committee of both houses will be formed after five years of the bill

:29:27.:29:32.

receiving joint ascent, we can inform the Home Secretary's report.

:29:33.:29:40.

Part five deals with increment. Such as computers, smartphones. I'm

:29:41.:29:48.

bringing existing powers, and responding to the recommendations

:29:49.:29:53.

made by David Anderson QC. It makes the use subject to the use of

:29:54.:29:57.

warrants, approved by the judicial Commissioner. Honourable member is

:29:58.:30:02.

well-known that not only are these available to more enforcement, but

:30:03.:30:05.

vital to so much work. This capability is also used in

:30:06.:30:14.

exceptional circumstances, most typically to identify missing

:30:15.:30:25.

people. For example, when a child goes missing, and parents know the

:30:26.:30:27.

passwords to social media, they should be able to use that. It makes

:30:28.:30:31.

clear that they can be used to save lives. Nevertheless, intrusive, and

:30:32.:30:38.

it must be limited. In future, all of this will require the approval of

:30:39.:30:54.

the judicial Commissioner. Equipment interference wants me only be of

:30:55.:30:58.

documentation service providers with the agreement of the Secretary of

:30:59.:31:03.

State. Alongside these codes of practice, in response to

:31:04.:31:06.

recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee, we published

:31:07.:31:13.

a case, about how it can be used, and is more necessary than ever

:31:14.:31:18.

before. Of course, limits to how much can be said about these

:31:19.:31:23.

capabilities, without having an advantage given to criminals. For

:31:24.:31:27.

that reason, intelligence agencies have provided more detail on this,

:31:28.:31:36.

to the committee. Bulk powers are vital. They have played a

:31:37.:31:44.

significant part in every major counterterrorism event, in each of

:31:45.:31:51.

the seven plots stopped since November 20 14. Detecting 95% of

:31:52.:31:58.

cyber attacks, identified by GCHQ. And they have enabled over 90% of

:31:59.:32:04.

the targeted military operations, during the campaign in the south of

:32:05.:32:12.

Afghanistan. Part six places these powers on a clear footing. In

:32:13.:32:22.

future, bulk warrants will need to be issued by double lock. And it

:32:23.:32:26.

would need to be for operational purposes, and an independent judge.

:32:27.:32:43.

Although all liberal members will the Home Secretary agree, it is not

:32:44.:32:50.

in fact prevent parliamentarians, Skip top by collection provisions,

:32:51.:32:54.

or with communications data, or at internet connection records, that

:32:55.:32:57.

could lead to result was being identified. A variety of responses

:32:58.:33:05.

that I would give. She needs to know, that predominantly, bulk

:33:06.:33:15.

powers, used for foreign usage. In the use of bulk powers, still that

:33:16.:33:28.

doubletalk authorisation. It is subject to the same case, the

:33:29.:33:36.

proportionality. Mr Speaker, part seven applies the same safeguards.

:33:37.:33:41.

Information of this tape is already used by the security and

:33:42.:33:44.

intelligence agencies, to keep us safe, and could be required under

:33:45.:33:50.

existing powers, but it uses the seat detections, so that it is

:33:51.:33:55.

always subject to strong safeguards, irrespective of how was required. I

:33:56.:34:00.

have said that the privacy safeguards are part of this, and the

:34:01.:34:04.

guarantors will be adhered to, the new investigatory Commissioner. The

:34:05.:34:14.

Commissioner, who will hold, or her field judicial office, will oversee

:34:15.:34:18.

a new body, bringing together existing responsibilities, the

:34:19.:34:22.

interception of communication, and the Chief surveillance Commissioner.

:34:23.:34:27.

The new powers Commissioner will be given an enhanced budget, and a

:34:28.:34:31.

dedicated staff of inspectors, as well as technical experts and

:34:32.:34:36.

independent advisers. They will have access to the agencies, and remit to

:34:37.:34:41.

provide Parliament and the public with meaningful the assurance about

:34:42.:34:46.

how it has been used. When somebody has suffered, as a result of serious

:34:47.:34:54.

error, they can inform the victim, without the need to consult the

:34:55.:35:00.

tribunal. It can award compensation, take other action and fuse

:35:01.:35:07.

appropriate. I turn to part nine. That provides for request to be made

:35:08.:35:13.

to internet service providers, for technical capabilities in order to

:35:14.:35:17.

give warrants, and maintain the ability to provide communications,

:35:18.:35:23.

let me be clear, this provision only maintains the status quo. It allows

:35:24.:35:30.

law enforcement and security agencies to ask companies, to remove

:35:31.:35:35.

encryption, that has been applied for on the behalf. It could not be

:35:36.:35:43.

used to ask companies to do anything it is not reasonably practical for

:35:44.:35:48.

them to do. Finally, alongside the bill, we have taken for the

:35:49.:35:54.

recommendation made to develop an international framework, so that

:35:55.:36:05.

international companies can do so, and we are in discussion. It is

:36:06.:36:08.

drafted to accommodate any such agreement, any company call

:36:09.:36:13.

operating, would not be subject to enforcement action through the

:36:14.:36:18.

courts. Mr Speaker, this bill provides unparalleled transparency,

:36:19.:36:26.

on the most robust safeguards, but it will also provide law enforcement

:36:27.:36:30.

and intelligence agencies with the powers that they need to keep us

:36:31.:36:35.

safe. Because it is important, it has been subject to unprecedented

:36:36.:36:39.

levels of scrutiny, it has resulted in a bill that protects privacy and

:36:40.:36:45.

security. It is truly world leading. I look forward to the revised bill,

:36:46.:36:50.

receiving cheerful consideration, and I commend it to the house. The

:36:51.:36:58.

question, the Bill be read a second time. Andy Burnham. I echo the

:36:59.:37:10.

condolences, paid to the police officer, who lost his life on his

:37:11.:37:15.

duties. Let me start with the principle, that I think we have

:37:16.:37:20.

broad agreement. From those ventures, to these, from the party

:37:21.:37:24.

to the security services, we have a consensus that the country needs to

:37:25.:37:31.

update its laws in this area. If the police and security services are to

:37:32.:37:34.

be given these powers, broad agreement that those powers be

:37:35.:37:39.

balanced, with stronger safeguards for the public that previously

:37:40.:37:42.

existed. That seems a good platform from which to start. This bill is

:37:43.:37:53.

commonly seen, through the prism of terrorism, bucket is much more, if

:37:54.:38:01.

you were the parents of a missing child, you would want the police to

:38:02.:38:04.

have access to all the information to bring them to safety. This is

:38:05.:38:14.

about the ability to locate missing children, preventing extremists,

:38:15.:38:24.

creating hatred, and though defending the liberties that we all

:38:25.:38:30.

enjoy. But we are some way, from finding a consensus, in the form

:38:31.:38:35.

that this legislation should take. The months after I was elected, two

:38:36.:38:46.

planes flew into the WTC in New York. 15 years since, we have always

:38:47.:38:52.

been engaged in a frantic search, the right balance between privacy,

:38:53.:38:57.

and collective security. As of yet, we have not managed to find out. The

:38:58.:39:13.

arguments in this bill, the last Parliament, loom over the debate

:39:14.:39:19.

today, as does the stand-off between Apple and the FBI. That is an

:39:20.:39:25.

unhelpful backdrop to this debate, it suggests that it is in

:39:26.:39:30.

reconcilable, a question of either or, choosing one or the other. I do

:39:31.:39:36.

not fully that is the case. We all have an interest in maximising

:39:37.:39:40.

individual privacy, and collective security. At the House of Commons,

:39:41.:39:46.

the objective should be to give constituents both. Finding that

:39:47.:39:51.

balance, it should be the task over the next nine months. The simple

:39:52.:40:03.

fact, Britain needs a new law in this area. A great opposition, risks

:40:04.:40:10.

sinking this, leaving the interim laws in place. To go along with

:40:11.:40:15.

that, abdicate responsibility to the police, security services and most

:40:16.:40:19.

importantly the public. I am not prepared to do that. Just as

:40:20.:40:22.

importantly, it would leave the public with weaker safeguards, and I

:40:23.:40:24.

am not prepared to do that. He rightly says that this bill will

:40:25.:40:36.

help fight terrorism. Will he join me in welcoming these powers to

:40:37.:40:41.

fight cyber crime and financial crime and join me to vote for it? I

:40:42.:40:47.

won't be joining him in the lobby tonight because I don't believe the

:40:48.:40:50.

bill is acceptable in its current form, as I will go on to explain. As

:40:51.:40:56.

he will have heard from my opening remarks, I have broad agreement with

:40:57.:41:01.

the objectives of the government and I do not seek to play politics with

:41:02.:41:06.

the bill or drag it down and I hope you will find some assurance in

:41:07.:41:15.

those words. I am grateful. His position doesn't sound particularly

:41:16.:41:18.

persuasive or tenable cobber certainly to those outside this

:41:19.:41:22.

place. I wonder what he thinks about the message it sends, from the

:41:23.:41:30.

supposedly government in waiting, that instead of thrashing out the

:41:31.:41:34.

detail when the bill goes to report, by abstaining this evening the

:41:35.:41:38.

message will be clear of what the Labour Party things on this

:41:39.:41:43.

important issue. I disappear entirely -- disagree. We will not

:41:44.:41:47.

oppose it, we will be responsible. I recognise that the country needs a

:41:48.:41:53.

new law but I also think that the government will is not yet worthy of

:41:54.:42:00.

the support, because there are significant weaknesses in the bill.

:42:01.:42:05.

I am not prepared, I am sorry, to go through the lobby tonight and give

:42:06.:42:10.

his government a blank cheque. I want to see changes in the Bill, to

:42:11.:42:14.

strengthen the bill, and when they listen they will earn our support

:42:15.:42:20.

and that seems to me to be into highly appropriate and responsible

:42:21.:42:25.

for an opposition party. The higher degree of consensus we can establish

:42:26.:42:28.

behind the bill, the more we will create the right climate in the

:42:29.:42:33.

country for its introduction. As the Home Secretary said, possibly create

:42:34.:42:37.

a template that can be copied around the world, advancing the cause of

:42:38.:42:42.

human rights in the 21st-century. The prize is great and that is why I

:42:43.:42:47.

ask this side to work constructively towards it and why I will repeat

:42:48.:42:53.

today that I don't think our mission is helped by misrepresentation. In

:42:54.:42:58.

my view it is lazy to label this bill a snooper's charter or a plan

:42:59.:43:05.

for mass surveillance. Worse, it is insulting to people who work in the

:43:06.:43:08.

police and security services. It implies they choose to do the jobs

:43:09.:43:12.

they do because they are busybodies who like to spy on the public rather

:43:13.:43:18.

than serve the public. I don't accept that characterisation, it is

:43:19.:43:23.

fair and it do ministry -- diminishes the difficult work they

:43:24.:43:29.

do to keep us safe. I will give way. Thank you. Will he agree that the

:43:30.:43:34.

three independent reviewers all agreed that our services

:43:35.:43:39.

categorically don't carry out mass surveillance and work within the

:43:40.:43:43.

boundaries of the legislation. I agree, and the idea that they might

:43:44.:43:48.

do, that they have time to do that is fanciable -- fanciful. They go to

:43:49.:43:53.

the people that they need to be concerned about and that is why I

:43:54.:43:57.

reject the characterisation often placed on this legislation. What

:43:58.:44:05.

does he make on the United Nations special member for privacy, who last

:44:06.:44:10.

week criticised the bill, saying authorising this interception would

:44:11.:44:16.

legitimise mass surveillance? We need to explore the plans in detail

:44:17.:44:20.

as part of this bill. As I said, I don't accept that this is a plan for

:44:21.:44:25.

mass surveillance but we need to work harder in the next nine months

:44:26.:44:29.

to take those concerns are away. In a moment. With all of the concerns,

:44:30.:44:36.

all of the points I have made, I have to say that there are concerns

:44:37.:44:40.

that people have about this bill that are well founded. There is a

:44:41.:44:46.

genuine worry, we just heard it, that providing for the accumulation

:44:47.:44:50.

of large amounts of personal data presents risks to people's privacy

:44:51.:44:56.

and online security. In a moment. There is a more specific worry, that

:44:57.:45:02.

investigatory powers can be of -- abused and in fact have been in the

:45:03.:45:07.

past. In recent years they have been revelations about how bereaved

:45:08.:45:11.

families, Justice campaigners, environmental campaigners,

:45:12.:45:15.

journalists and trade unionists have all been subject to inappropriate

:45:16.:45:20.

police investigation. What justification could there ever have

:45:21.:45:24.

been for the Metropolitan Police to put the noble Baroness Lawrence and

:45:25.:45:29.

her family under surveillance? Although it has not been proven, I

:45:30.:45:34.

know the Hillsborough strongly suspect that the same was done to

:45:35.:45:38.

them. I give way to the honourable gentleman. I thank him. A lot of the

:45:39.:45:46.

debate has been about looking into people's files. This should be about

:45:47.:45:50.

victims, it should be about children who have been victims of crime. Has

:45:51.:45:55.

he had any representations from most charities that wrecked -- represent

:45:56.:45:59.

victims of crime and children's charities? I have had them, the

:46:00.:46:06.

government has had them. This is about more than terrorism, it is

:46:07.:46:11.

about giving the police and security services the tools they need to keep

:46:12.:46:15.

us safe in the 21st-century. That is why I am not playing politics with

:46:16.:46:22.

this bill. I actually take quite a careful and considered approach. But

:46:23.:46:26.

the government has not yet done enough to earn my support. I have a

:46:27.:46:31.

lot of respect for the honourable gentleman. Can I congratulate him on

:46:32.:46:36.

what he said about rejecting the conspiracy theories about this being

:46:37.:46:42.

a snooper's charter. A second reading of the bill is when you

:46:43.:46:46.

agree or disagree with the principle of the bill. He has said he agrees

:46:47.:46:50.

with the principle and there are many behind him, or in the Labour

:46:51.:46:56.

Party, who agree with that. Surely the opportunity today is to vote for

:46:57.:47:00.

the principal Bill at second reading and then scrutinise it upstairs. The

:47:01.:47:04.

right thing would be to support the government tonight. I will let him

:47:05.:47:10.

form his own view on the right parliamentary tactics but I will be

:47:11.:47:14.

deciding that position and I say to him that I don't think I will be

:47:15.:47:17.

serving the public simply to give the government a blank check this

:47:18.:47:24.

evening. It is my job, wait a second, my job to hold them to

:47:25.:47:31.

account, to protect the public as best I can through this bill, and I

:47:32.:47:36.

am approaching the job of Her Majesty's opposition with the utmost

:47:37.:47:44.

responsibility. Alongside bereaved families there have been cases of

:47:45.:47:49.

journalists claiming material was inappropriately seized from them,

:47:50.:47:53.

most recently in connection with the Plebgate affair. Last year a senior

:47:54.:48:00.

police officer turned whistle-blower came to an event in Parliament and

:48:01.:48:04.

said that he and a colleague had been involved in supplying

:48:05.:48:08.

information that led to the blacklisting of construction

:48:09.:48:13.

workers. For those who claim that these fears are exaggerated, I would

:48:14.:48:16.

refer them to the biggest unresolved case of this kind, the 1972 National

:48:17.:48:24.

building workers' strike and the convictions of 24 pickets known as

:48:25.:48:30.

the Shrewsbury 24. It is widely believed that their prosecution was

:48:31.:48:33.

politically orchestrated with the help of the police and the security

:48:34.:48:38.

services. I will give way to somebody, my honourable friend who

:48:39.:48:42.

knows a great deal and has been a champion of those fighting for

:48:43.:48:48.

justice. I thank him and he mentions the Shrewsbury pickets, a stark

:48:49.:48:52.

example of the misuse and abuse of state power, so therefore does he

:48:53.:48:58.

agree that it is essential that there are the strongest possible

:48:59.:49:01.

safeguards within the bill that would specifically make sure that

:49:02.:49:07.

such historic injustices can never happen again, such as the

:49:08.:49:12.

politically motivated incarceration of pickets in 1972? He puts it very

:49:13.:49:20.

well and that is why fears about legislation of this kind, indeed on

:49:21.:49:24.

these benches, because we know the truth of what happened, even though

:49:25.:49:28.

it is not widely known by the public, because we have seen

:49:29.:49:33.

documents in relation to it. I have here a memo from the security

:49:34.:49:37.

services to a senior Foreign Office official. It is headed, secret, and

:49:38.:49:46.

it talks about the preparation of a TV programme that went out about the

:49:47.:49:50.

trial of the Shrewsbury pickets. At the top it says, we had a discreet

:49:51.:49:54.

but considerable hand in this programme. That is from the security

:49:55.:50:00.

services, so why wouldn't people on these benches fear the handing of

:50:01.:50:05.

more power to the police and security services without there

:50:06.:50:11.

being adequate safeguards? I am grateful. Before the honourable

:50:12.:50:14.

member for wreaking intervenes, everything is being done perfectly

:50:15.:50:23.

right but I advise the House that 48 backbenchers wish to contribute.

:50:24.:50:27.

Those who have the floor or seek the floor might wish to take account of

:50:28.:50:35.

that. I will be brief, but the Shadow Home Secretary is right to

:50:36.:50:39.

point out where abuses have taken place but does he also recognise

:50:40.:50:46.

that in this bill is a new offence of misusing communications data,

:50:47.:50:50.

something he should welcome? I am going to come onto that very point,

:50:51.:50:54.

but these are not historical matters because the convictions still stand

:50:55.:51:00.

today. What I would say to him, and I pay tribute to his government,

:51:01.:51:03.

because they have a good record on this, but we need to go further in

:51:04.:51:08.

giving the full truth about some of the darkest chapters in our past so

:51:09.:51:14.

we can learn from them and build the right safeguards into this

:51:15.:51:17.

legislation. This bill will have failed unless it entirely rules out

:51:18.:51:21.

the possibility that abuses of the kind I have mentioned could ever

:51:22.:51:25.

happen again and that is the clear test I am setting for this bill but

:51:26.:51:30.

also why I welcome the principle of it. It leaves behind the murky world

:51:31.:51:36.

of policing in the 1970s, 80s and 90s and creates the possibility of

:51:37.:51:42.

having an open framework that includes much improved safeguards

:51:43.:51:48.

for ordinary people. We are far from that goal yet. It is clear that the

:51:49.:51:51.

Home Secretary has been listening and has responded to the reports of

:51:52.:51:56.

the three parliamentary committees but of the 122 recommendations in

:51:57.:52:00.

the three reports the government has reflect dead less than half of them

:52:01.:52:06.

in this revised bill. I say to the Home Secretary she will need to be

:52:07.:52:10.

prepared to listen more and make further significant changes to the

:52:11.:52:14.

bill if she is to achieve her goal of getting it onto the statute book

:52:15.:52:20.

by December. Today I take the House through six specific concerns. The

:52:21.:52:24.

first is on privacy. As I said at the beginning, people have a right

:52:25.:52:28.

to want to maximise their personal privacy. Given the worries people

:52:29.:52:33.

have about the misuse of data, the intelligence and to committee was

:52:34.:52:38.

surely right to put privacy concerns at the heart of this bill.

:52:39.:52:42.

Presumption of Agassi would provide the basis from which exceptional

:52:43.:52:47.

powers are drawn. -- the presumption of privacy. It would ensure clarity

:52:48.:52:56.

that any intrusions into it would require exceptional justification.

:52:57.:53:01.

The Home Secretary said that privacy was hard-wired into the bill. I find

:53:02.:53:05.

it hard to accept that statement from the changes that have been

:53:06.:53:11.

made. I see them as more cosmetic changes and they have not directly

:53:12.:53:14.

answered the concerns of the committee. I asked the government to

:53:15.:53:20.

reflect further and include much stronger, overwrite Ching privacy

:53:21.:53:25.

requirement as requested by the Intelligence and Security Committee.

:53:26.:53:30.

Also on privacy, we do not yet believe the government has gone far

:53:31.:53:34.

enough to protect the role of sensitive professions. The committee

:53:35.:53:38.

noted that the safeguards for some professions must be provided right

:53:39.:53:43.

across the bill Mamat what investigative repower is being used.

:53:44.:53:47.

It is hard to see how that is being achieved at the moment. On MPs and

:53:48.:53:53.

other elected representatives, there is a question as to why the bill

:53:54.:53:56.

stops short of requiring the Prime Minister to rip -- to approve a

:53:57.:54:02.

warrant and only be consulted upon one. It could be -- strengthened

:54:03.:54:08.

there. On legal privilege, the Law Society have said they previewed --

:54:09.:54:11.

please do see the government has abolished legal and professional or

:54:12.:54:14.

village they say it should be on the face of the bill, not just in the

:54:15.:54:16.

codes. -- professional privilege. Relations between Members of

:54:17.:54:35.

Parliament and whistle-blower out -- whistle-blowers, mammals of

:54:36.:54:42.

Parliament and each other, they should all be protected. -- Members

:54:43.:54:48.

of Parliament. It does need to be strengthened in respect of Prime

:54:49.:54:51.

Minister real approval but also in the way he describes, to give

:54:52.:54:56.

people, our constituents, that extra trust that if they come to speak to

:54:57.:55:01.

us in our surgery they will be speaking to us and nobody else. I

:55:02.:55:03.

give way. Matters of acute public concern,

:55:04.:55:17.

whistle-blowers, does he think that one member of the government should

:55:18.:55:24.

authorise that, and it should be revealed to the Prime Minister,

:55:25.:55:31.

effectively his own court? It is at least arguable, some of scrutiny? I

:55:32.:55:38.

think the Home Secretary indicated, there would be, because the decision

:55:39.:55:45.

of the Home Secretary would also be applicable to the double lock. My

:55:46.:55:50.

point, why should the Prime Minister only be consulted as part of that

:55:51.:55:58.

process? It seems to me, a role for the Prime Minister to be approving.

:55:59.:56:05.

Also, I question about journalists, and the National union believes it

:56:06.:56:11.

has been weakening, clause 66 out the revelation of the process, with

:56:12.:56:19.

regards to sources, and given the degree of trust that people need,

:56:20.:56:33.

given that importance to democracy, to win the trust and support and

:56:34.:56:41.

also the use of communications data, and internet connection records, to

:56:42.:56:45.

intercept the equivalent interviewed inside the other. It is a real

:56:46.:56:51.

concern, that the thresholds are either too, low, or too vague. The

:56:52.:57:02.

Home Secretary, has previously described ICRs, as the phone bill,

:57:03.:57:09.

that is the detection and prevention of any crime. But the joint

:57:10.:57:14.

committee noted that is not a helpful description, ICRs will

:57:15.:57:19.

reveal much more than an itemised telephone bill, revealing places

:57:20.:57:26.

that people have visited. So the question, is it acceptable for this

:57:27.:57:31.

level of personal information to be accessed, in relation to any crime,

:57:32.:57:39.

anti-social behaviour, and motoring offences. I do not think so. And I

:57:40.:57:52.

think a higher hurdle is needed. This is a critical question that the

:57:53.:57:55.

government have to respond for. People believe that if ICRs become

:57:56.:58:01.

sufficient, then it could be the potential for this to be must used.

:58:02.:58:12.

They have two set stricter tests, for prevention of seedy as crimes,

:58:13.:58:21.

missing people. That should be the case, and the other end of the

:58:22.:58:24.

skill, the justification for using the most intrusive powers, national

:58:25.:58:31.

security or economic well-being. I understand the need for operational

:58:32.:58:34.

flexibility, but a long-standing concern that those tests are too

:58:35.:58:41.

broad. Our feeling that national security has been used, to cover a

:58:42.:58:47.

multitude of sins. And official papers, from that building work

:58:48.:58:56.

straight, in 1972, still papers with field. How could that be justified?

:58:57.:59:05.

Clearly, a point that is being brought up about proportionality.

:59:06.:59:11.

Slightly odd. The bill itself mentions proportionality. It seems

:59:12.:59:21.

odd. It is actually in the bill. I do not believe that it is. National

:59:22.:59:36.

security, very broad term. It is not defined. Activities carried out in

:59:37.:59:41.

the past, under the banner of national security. He would struggle

:59:42.:59:46.

to justify as such. The problem with the economic well-being test, a

:59:47.:59:52.

potentially opens up a much wider range of activities, it must only be

:59:53.:00:02.

relevant, to national security. Just relevant, to national security. It

:00:03.:00:09.

begs the question. What extra questions is the government want to

:00:10.:00:15.

cover? It mentions a cyber attack, on London, surely that would be

:00:16.:00:19.

covered anyway by National security. I put suggestions to the Home

:00:20.:00:24.

Secretary. She accepts the joint committee invitation to define

:00:25.:00:32.

national security, more explicitly, and secondly, if she were to do

:00:33.:00:40.

that, the economic well-being test could be dropped altogether. That

:00:41.:00:45.

means, now targeting of law-abiding trade unionist Ivory have seen in

:00:46.:00:52.

the past. And ICRs themselves. The content, and the use. Suggesting,

:00:53.:01:10.

that a judicial commissioner would, permit a politically motivated and

:01:11.:01:20.

on trade union? I would gladly share papers I have of historic

:01:21.:01:23.

injustices. Those convictions still stand. I also said earlier...

:01:24.:01:34.

Revelations, that information supplied, to blacklist people in the

:01:35.:01:38.

construction industry, came from the police and the security services. I

:01:39.:01:49.

welcome the move. To codify all of this in law. But we do not want to

:01:50.:01:54.

leave anything in doubt. Why should the most intrusive warrants, the

:01:55.:01:59.

used on the taste of economic well-being? What does that mean? It

:02:00.:02:04.

is national security alone that should intrude. I have been

:02:05.:02:13.

listening carefully to my response, can I just push them, on the point

:02:14.:02:18.

that was raised. I think this is very important. We are inserting the

:02:19.:02:22.

judicial authorisation, of warrants, I did not think that any member of

:02:23.:02:29.

this house should question their independence, it seems that the

:02:30.:02:32.

right honourable gentleman is doing that. Good he is not doing that? Not

:02:33.:02:44.

in any way. It is wrong to imply that I was. I am talking about the

:02:45.:02:53.

grooms, one which her bill gives the police and security services, the

:02:54.:02:56.

ability to put forward applications for once. If members would listen, I

:02:57.:03:06.

am saying, those grounds should be as tightly defined as possible. I do

:03:07.:03:10.

not think it helps, as she is proposing they can be brought

:03:11.:03:15.

forward on proposals of genital economic well-being, because in the

:03:16.:03:19.

past her party has taken a different opinion on that from a loss. It

:03:20.:03:26.

opens away the range of potential cases, subject to the most intrusive

:03:27.:03:33.

warrants. Fair and well made. I question to him, why did this not

:03:34.:03:43.

occur to him on the 4th of November? He stood and said, having listened

:03:44.:03:47.

carefully to the Home Secretary, I believe she has responded to

:03:48.:03:51.

legitimate concerns, and got the balance correct. What has changed?

:03:52.:03:56.

Has he been listening? I began by saying the very same thing. But I

:03:57.:04:03.

think they are entitled, am I not, to raise some specific concerns,

:04:04.:04:12.

with wording in the bill. And economic well-being. I believe that

:04:13.:04:16.

could potentially come under that banner. I am telling the party

:04:17.:04:21.

opposite, if they want my help, we need to get that definition correct.

:04:22.:04:30.

Reassure the public. Is it not so, that millions of trade unionist 's

:04:31.:04:34.

and many of my constituents, genuinely concerned about the

:04:35.:04:45.

stretch of these powers, trying to bring those safeguards for work, it

:04:46.:04:50.

is important that you scrutinise, so people have confidence in this? Puts

:04:51.:05:04.

it very well. Trade unions and other campaigners have been subject to

:05:05.:05:08.

inappropriate use of investigatory powers. If the party officer does

:05:09.:05:14.

not understand that, they need to get the full truth. Have a different

:05:15.:05:25.

feeling about legislation, they would probably find that they could

:05:26.:05:31.

reassure people, and bring about a higher degree, of public support. I

:05:32.:05:37.

am going to make progress. I was talking about ICRs. It is the worst

:05:38.:05:49.

domains, visited, but not URLs. Not internet browsing history, just the

:05:50.:05:54.

front door, but not where people went inside. That will provide

:05:55.:05:59.

reassurance to people who think something more extensive. But the

:06:00.:06:06.

definition remains extremely vague. I do not say anything to prevent

:06:07.:06:09.

ICRs becoming more intrusive, as technology evolves. The code of

:06:10.:06:14.

practice gives an illustration of what will be included, but does not

:06:15.:06:20.

build confidence. Mr Speaker, I think it would help if the

:06:21.:06:26.

government laid down I restricted definition, what could be included,

:06:27.:06:34.

on the ICRs, on the face of this. Specifically, domains but not URLs.

:06:35.:06:39.

The confusion is unhelpful, and it needs to be cleared up. It also sets

:06:40.:06:47.

out far too wide a range of public bodies, able to access. It seems

:06:48.:06:54.

that the net is far too wide. The Food Standards Agency, and the

:06:55.:07:01.

Gambling Commission, to access somebody's record? Suspicion of

:07:02.:07:08.

serious criminality, for the food chain, and the betting syndicate,

:07:09.:07:12.

that would be better revealed to the police. We all want to see a much

:07:13.:07:17.

reduced lost, until this part of the bill becomes acceptable. Bulk

:07:18.:07:28.

powers. On this point of the ICRs, not only the keys that they are

:07:29.:07:38.

poorly defined, but even in terms of a narrow approach, the government is

:07:39.:07:43.

still proposing the retention of every website, visited by every

:07:44.:07:50.

citizen, stored for 12 months. That principle is a very extensive power

:07:51.:07:56.

given to the government. I would agree with the right honourable

:07:57.:07:59.

gentleman. And if that was to be published, I think it would review

:08:00.:08:02.

more about somebody, than an itemised telephone bill. That is

:08:03.:08:08.

what the Home Secretary began by saying, that the same, it would

:08:09.:08:13.

review what about somebody. To give indication, I would say that it is

:08:14.:08:16.

not necessarily the one that information, it is to raise the

:08:17.:08:20.

threshold, through which those records can be accessed. To make it

:08:21.:08:26.

a test of serious crime, rather than any. I do not think that is

:08:27.:08:33.

acceptable, to have information available for low-level offences. I

:08:34.:08:38.

hope he would support me on that. It is also a fact that criminals,

:08:39.:08:46.

terrorists, operating would use of righty of means, to cover the

:08:47.:08:54.

tracks. I accept the argument me, that bulk form can be the only way

:08:55.:09:00.

to identify those who pose a risk to the public. But some of it takes

:09:01.:09:06.

investigatory work to new territory. Large quantities of new information,

:09:07.:09:10.

from ordinary people, it prevents privacy concerns, and wants to need

:09:11.:09:15.

fathers to be as targeted as possible. The case for these was

:09:16.:09:21.

published, alongside the government, but it has failed to convince

:09:22.:09:25.

everybody. And it is for the government still to convince people

:09:26.:09:32.

that these powers are needed. I am sorry to backtrack. I have just

:09:33.:09:40.

looked up the provision, in relation to economic well-being. It is

:09:41.:09:43.

qualified. It not only reveals to the economic well-being, tied to the

:09:44.:09:53.

interests of national security, relevant and economic well-being of

:09:54.:09:56.

the United Kingdom, so as those are also relevant to the interests of

:09:57.:10:02.

national security. National security element. And it is also qualified,

:10:03.:10:10.

subsection five, referring to it only being implemented, when it is

:10:11.:10:13.

considered necessary for the process of gathering evidence, using legal

:10:14.:10:17.

proceedings in relation to information relating to axe, outside

:10:18.:10:24.

the British Islands. It is a limited situation, and as a barrister, who

:10:25.:10:30.

has presented a number of cases before judges, I think judges are

:10:31.:10:37.

today looking at legislation, to consider these principles, perfectly

:10:38.:10:38.

adequate. I thank her for the Lord tutorial

:10:39.:10:48.

and I would say that maybe it is a point more for committee then second

:10:49.:10:53.

reading. However, I did referred to the point she had made. The economic

:10:54.:11:00.

well-being test is relevant to national security, it doesn't say

:11:01.:11:07.

directly linked. Pupils face but I am sure I speak for everybody on

:11:08.:11:11.

these benches when I say there is no room for ambiguity. -- she pulls a

:11:12.:11:18.

face. They need to be absolutely clear about what they mean because

:11:19.:11:23.

we have seen trade unionists targeted in the past on similar

:11:24.:11:26.

justifications and we on these benches are not going to allow it to

:11:27.:11:33.

happen in the future. He is looking to ask the Home Secretary to draft a

:11:34.:11:37.

law that will include every provision, every change in

:11:38.:11:41.

technology, in crime, in threat, over the next 50 or a hundred years.

:11:42.:11:46.

The Home Secretary can't do that, which is why she has put in a system

:11:47.:11:52.

of oversight, of proportionality and judicial checks and balances to give

:11:53.:12:04.

the flexibility necessary for our nation to have security in a

:12:05.:12:07.

changing world. I disagree. I am making a legitimate point that I

:12:08.:12:13.

feel strongly about. I believe serious crime and national security

:12:14.:12:18.

should be the strictly limited grounds on which the most intrusive

:12:19.:12:22.

warrants are applied for and I would hope, in the spirit I have applied

:12:23.:12:27.

today, he will approach it in a similar spirit and take away the

:12:28.:12:31.

concern I have raised and understand why people here feel so strongly

:12:32.:12:37.

about it. To pick up on the point made by the honourable and landed

:12:38.:12:41.

Lady opposite, she talked about barristers presenting cases to

:12:42.:12:45.

judges. Will the honourable member agree that under the double lock

:12:46.:12:52.

section of this bill there will we know James Sayer and no proposer, it

:12:53.:13:07.

will just be a... No gainsayer. There were very important concerns

:13:08.:13:10.

raised about scope, oversight and indeed the more generic class

:13:11.:13:16.

warrants. I don't believe they have been adequately answered. One of the

:13:17.:13:19.

recommendations of the Joint Committee was that the government

:13:20.:13:23.

should establish an independent review of all of the Balcombe powers

:13:24.:13:28.

set out in the bill. Given the complexity of this, I think the

:13:29.:13:32.

House would then fit from such a review so I specifically ask of the

:13:33.:13:38.

Home Secretary that she does commission an independent review to

:13:39.:13:41.

conclude in time for report and third reading on bulk powers. Our

:13:42.:13:48.

fifth concern is judicial oversight. This was one of our earliest demands

:13:49.:13:53.

on the bill. The government has given significant ground and the

:13:54.:13:56.

bill is stronger as a result. We believe it could yet be stronger.

:13:57.:14:02.

Currently the bill says that when deciding to approve a warrant a

:14:03.:14:05.

commissioner should apply the same runcible is as would be applied by a

:14:06.:14:10.

court on application for a judicial review. -- same principle. I have

:14:11.:14:16.

said that this could mean a narrower test rather than -- which does not

:14:17.:14:23.

look at the actual merits of an application. I was listening

:14:24.:14:28.

carefully to her earlier and I thought I heard her provide

:14:29.:14:33.

reassurance that a much broader consideration could be brought by a

:14:34.:14:36.

judicial commission and I hope that is the case. If it is, why not

:14:37.:14:41.

delete the judicial review clause from the bill to make it absolutely

:14:42.:14:46.

clear that this is not just a double lock, this is an equal lock, where

:14:47.:14:50.

the judicial commissioner has the same ability to look at the entire

:14:51.:14:56.

merits of the case? Our sixth and final concern is about misuse of the

:14:57.:15:01.

powers. I accept the concerns of the Police Federation that they need to

:15:02.:15:05.

be safeguards for the collection of data in a lawful manner but I agree

:15:06.:15:08.

with them that it needs to be clearer about the deliberate misuse

:15:09.:15:15.

of powers, relating both to the obtaining of data and any use to

:15:16.:15:20.

which it is subsequently put. Both should be a criminal offence and

:15:21.:15:24.

that would provide an extra safeguard for the public. I have set

:15:25.:15:29.

out six substantive issues that must in my view be addressed. Given the

:15:30.:15:34.

seriousness of these concerns, people have questioned why we are

:15:35.:15:36.

not voting with the government tonight. We not voting with or

:15:37.:15:42.

against. The answer is, we need new legislation but this ill is not yet

:15:43.:15:49.

good enough and that is why we have set the tests that we have. Simply

:15:50.:15:52.

to block this legislation would in my view be responsible, it would

:15:53.:16:00.

leave the police and security services in limbo and make their job

:16:01.:16:04.

harder. We must give them the tools they need to do the job but if we

:16:05.:16:08.

don't put new legislation on the statute book I believe we will leave

:16:09.:16:13.

the public exposed to greater risk because they won't have the

:16:14.:16:17.

safeguards in this bill. Let me be clear, there is no blank check here

:16:18.:16:21.

for the government, we will not be voting for the bill because it is

:16:22.:16:25.

some way from being good enough and if the government fails to respond

:16:26.:16:30.

adequately to our concerns then I give notice that we will withdraw

:16:31.:16:34.

our support for the timetabling of this bill. The public interest lies

:16:35.:16:40.

in getting this right and not sacrificing quality to meet the

:16:41.:16:44.

deadline. The time has come for this House to lay politics aside and find

:16:45.:16:50.

that point of balance between privacy and security in the digital

:16:51.:16:55.

age that can command broad public support. We on these benches have

:16:56.:17:00.

worked hard to uncover the truth about some of the dark chapters in

:17:01.:17:05.

our past, precisely so we can learn from them and make this country

:17:06.:17:10.

fairer for those coming after us. I want to build that helps the

:17:11.:17:14.

authorities do their job but protects ordinary people from

:17:15.:17:17.

intrusion and abuse from those in power. I want Britain to be a

:17:18.:17:22.

country that gives people privacy and collective security. Our shared

:17:23.:17:27.

goal should be a bill that enhances security and democracy and with

:17:28.:17:31.

goodwill on both sides I believe that is in our grasp. In light of

:17:32.:17:37.

the extensive interest in this debate we shall need to begin with a

:17:38.:17:42.

limit on backbench speeches of eight minutes. I give notice that almost

:17:43.:17:47.

inevitably that limit will have to fall. I begin by calling the chair

:17:48.:17:53.

of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the Member for

:17:54.:17:59.

Beaconsfield, Mr Dominic Grieve. I am grateful for the opportunity to

:18:00.:18:03.

participate in the debate and I want to summarise the views of the

:18:04.:18:06.

Intelligence and Security Committee in relation to the legislation. We

:18:07.:18:12.

published two reports on the matter and in addition, since we published

:18:13.:18:16.

the second, the government and the agencies have provided us with

:18:17.:18:19.

further evidence so I want to update the House. The present committee and

:18:20.:18:24.

its predecessor are satisfied the government is justified in coming to

:18:25.:18:28.

Parliament to seek in broad terms the powers the bill contains. None

:18:29.:18:34.

of the categories of powers in the bill, including the principle of

:18:35.:18:38.

having powers of bulk collection of data, which have given rise to so

:18:39.:18:45.

much controversy, are either unnecessary or disproportionate to

:18:46.:18:49.

what we need to protect ourselves. I go back to my intervention, that it

:18:50.:18:55.

seems to me that certain individuals in this debate are labouring under a

:18:56.:18:59.

false understanding of what the legislation is really about. We also

:19:00.:19:03.

welcome the fact that the government has sorted this bill to provide much

:19:04.:19:07.

greater transparency than previously. It is worth repeating

:19:08.:19:15.

that Ripper was often income principle. The basic problem we face

:19:16.:19:20.

is that by its nature the secret work of the agencies can't be

:19:21.:19:24.

revealed in its detail without damaging or endangering their

:19:25.:19:28.

capabilities. This requires a short is that the powers they have at a

:19:29.:19:35.

contrast as far as any potential misuse is concerned. -- they have is

:19:36.:19:47.

taken on trust. It is noteworthy that except in a few exceptions all

:19:48.:19:55.

of these bodies have consistently given the investigatory powers given

:19:56.:19:58.

by the agencies are clean bill of health. In my own role, I can say

:19:59.:20:10.

that the agencies operate to high ethical standards, scrupulous in

:20:11.:20:13.

confining their powers to legitimate purposes. I think it is very well

:20:14.:20:20.

put into their DNA, as the previous head of GCHQ said, if he asked his

:20:21.:20:24.

staff to do something unethical they would simply refuse. But that

:20:25.:20:29.

environment produces its own problem. For those of us in the

:20:30.:20:34.

bubble, our experience of the nature of the agencies' role makes us

:20:35.:20:38.

complacent about the legitimate concerns of those outside it. Our

:20:39.:20:48.

knowledge of our Power never having been used should not stop us from

:20:49.:20:57.

controlling its potential abilities. It is important that we should

:20:58.:21:01.

provide safeguards against such slippage. The recommendations we

:21:02.:21:08.

made were intended to improve the legislation by trying to provide

:21:09.:21:13.

that greater clarity, transparency and increase safeguards where we

:21:14.:21:17.

thought possible. We are pleased that the government responded to

:21:18.:21:23.

nine of our 22 recommendations, including three key ones. We

:21:24.:21:26.

particularly welcome the provisions on safeguards to legal and

:21:27.:21:33.

professional privilege but I suspect the matter can be looked at further

:21:34.:21:37.

as the bill goes through committee. A number of our recommendations were

:21:38.:21:42.

not excepted. We were disappointed that the bill doesn't include a

:21:43.:21:48.

clear statement on overwriting privacy legislation. We except the

:21:49.:21:52.

bill have safeguards we think they are piecemeal, so we think it is a

:21:53.:21:58.

missed opportunity of providing that public assurance, even if the

:21:59.:22:01.

practical nature of it wouldn't make a great deal of difference. The same

:22:02.:22:07.

point applies to putting all of the powers and operations in one place.

:22:08.:22:12.

The government has chosen to leave some powers elsewhere, we believe it

:22:13.:22:16.

would have been helpful to put them all in this bill. There were three

:22:17.:22:20.

significant issues. The first was our concerned that the procedures

:22:21.:22:26.

for the examination of communications data were

:22:27.:22:27.

inconsistent in respect of safeguards for the UK. There are

:22:28.:22:32.

different routes brought obtaining such material and generally speaking

:22:33.:22:37.

law enforcement agencies will accept it by a particular request to a

:22:38.:22:44.

communication service provider. They can also be obtained by a GCHQ

:22:45.:22:50.

interception capability as a by-product and in those

:22:51.:22:53.

circumstances, although there are many safeguards about examining

:22:54.:22:57.

content, there are not the same safeguards introspective the data on

:22:58.:23:02.

its own. We thought that was inconsistent and might be changed.

:23:03.:23:06.

The government has responded he had had -- help believe that it is

:23:07.:23:08.

concerned it would make the burden to owners -- to onerous on

:23:09.:23:17.

ministers. We think that matter can be addressed and we hope it can be

:23:18.:23:20.

looked at again in the course of the passage of the bill. I give way.

:23:21.:23:27.

Does he think by increasing the independence of judicial oversight

:23:28.:23:30.

so the judges are much more clearly able to refuse a warrant, and that

:23:31.:23:37.

might also -- increased public acceptance of these measures? This

:23:38.:23:42.

is an area that doesn't currently have warranty, it has a specific

:23:43.:23:46.

authorisation, and that is what we were looking for but we will listen

:23:47.:23:50.

closely to what the government says about the problems that might pose.

:23:51.:23:56.

The second issue concerns the way the capability is -- used, not in

:23:57.:24:04.

the need for it. In particular we were not provided with evidence that

:24:05.:24:08.

explained the need for this power as opposed to a targeted thematic

:24:09.:24:12.

power. Following publication of our report we have friends -- then

:24:13.:24:19.

received evidence from the agencies as to why they need warrants to

:24:20.:24:24.

remain in the bill. They have made a persuasive case on this. More

:24:25.:24:29.

importantly, the committee has been provided with reassurance that

:24:30.:24:32.

information obtained by these means will be treated in exactly the same

:24:33.:24:36.

way with exactly the same controls as with data acquired under

:24:37.:24:42.

interception warrants. The committee therefore is broadly content that

:24:43.:24:45.

there is a valid case for this power to remain in the bill. Just as with

:24:46.:24:50.

intercept warrants, we would wish to see the safeguards and warrants

:24:51.:24:55.

operated with detail and we hope to do that in the near future. Thirdly

:24:56.:24:59.

we expressed concern about the process for authorising and

:25:00.:25:03.

obtaining bulk of personal data sets. It is undoubted -- undoubtedly

:25:04.:25:08.

necessary that the agencies have the ability to obtain these because they

:25:09.:25:13.

can be vital in identifying subjects of interest, but they largely

:25:14.:25:17.

contain private information on large numbers of people of no relevant or

:25:18.:25:20.

legitimate interest in identifying subjects of interest, but they

:25:21.:25:22.

largely contain private information on large numbers of people of no

:25:23.:25:24.

relevant or legitimate interest to the agencies at all.

:25:25.:25:30.

There is a concern and I have had many e-mails on this subject at the

:25:31.:25:36.

net is being drawn to widely in respect of agencies like the Food

:25:37.:25:41.

Standards Agency and the gambling commission and others that this

:25:42.:25:43.

information could be misused and that is the kind of perception that

:25:44.:25:50.

out there people do care about. I understand the honourable ladies

:25:51.:25:53.

concern and that could be looked at. I have to say from what we saw the

:25:54.:25:57.

agencies who do have access to this, we do not think Thatcher problem

:25:58.:26:01.

should arise but it is a matter that the Home Secretary will wish to

:26:02.:26:05.

respond to include course. Intrusive nurse needs to be considered as part

:26:06.:26:10.

of the authorisation process and this was why we recommended it would

:26:11.:26:16.

be done far better if class -based authorisations were removed from the

:26:17.:26:18.

Bill and the requirement made that Mrs should authorise the retention

:26:19.:26:24.

of each dataset. The government came back and suggested that should be

:26:25.:26:29.

too onerous for ministers to do but we would suggest it could be met to

:26:30.:26:34.

increasing the role of commissioners in renewing these orders and

:26:35.:26:37.

amending the duration of the laws right stations which could be longer

:26:38.:26:43.

than they are present -- authorisations. The point we were

:26:44.:26:50.

driving at is it is right that ministers were constantly cited as

:26:51.:26:54.

to what datasets were being obtained and we had an anxiety that in the

:26:55.:26:57.

form of authorisation we have at present that might not always

:26:58.:27:02.

happen. The committee is also raised a number of more minor concerns.

:27:03.:27:05.

They are all set out in our report. They can be returned to a report of

:27:06.:27:11.

the cannot be resolved in committee. I apologised that the time available

:27:12.:27:15.

I can go through them all year. Some of them we are very pleased about.

:27:16.:27:18.

Very pleased that decree with urgent warrants now being approved within

:27:19.:27:22.

three days rather than the five days originally approved. The same can be

:27:23.:27:36.

said of clause 134. There were however two more matters of concern.

:27:37.:27:40.

We were troubled that we have not yet seen the actual list of

:27:41.:27:43.

operational purposes which must underpin any draft or quadrant. It

:27:44.:27:48.

goes to the very heart of this legislation. We have seen examples

:27:49.:27:54.

which appear in Tywi Valley that we hope and expect the full list to be

:27:55.:28:01.

supplied was before the Bill has completed its journey. The committee

:28:02.:28:06.

should be able to refer any concern it has on the use of our

:28:07.:28:09.

investigatory power to the investigatory Powers Tribunal on

:28:10.:28:13.

behalf of Parliament. That would help to provide reassurance that

:28:14.:28:16.

there was a mechanism though and just buy the complaint to do this.

:28:17.:28:21.

Mr Speaker, the bills argue capable of further improvement but the

:28:22.:28:24.

garment has listened, I will certainly be supporting the garment

:28:25.:28:28.

on second reading. It is undoubtedly needed on the grounds of

:28:29.:28:30.

national-security. It is well-intentioned but I said -- trust

:28:31.:28:35.

that we should also be able to insure it fulfils the equally

:28:36.:28:38.

important role of being an upholder of our freedom and liberty. Before I

:28:39.:28:44.

begin on behalf of the Scottish National party I would like to

:28:45.:28:47.

associate myself with the comments of the Home Secretary and the Shadow

:28:48.:28:50.

Home Secretary regarding the death of the prison officer in Northern

:28:51.:28:54.

Ireland and to extend the heartfelt condolences and sympathies of my

:28:55.:28:58.

party to his family, colleagues and friends. The Scottish National party

:28:59.:29:05.

joins with MPs from all parties in this house who have grave concerns

:29:06.:29:10.

about many aspects of this bill. We do not doubt that the law needs a

:29:11.:29:15.

thorough overhaul and we welcome the attempts to consolidate a number of

:29:16.:29:19.

statutes in order to have a modern and comp offensive law. We also

:29:20.:29:23.

recognise that security services and the police require adequate powers

:29:24.:29:26.

to fight terrorism and serious crime. However such powers must

:29:27.:29:32.

always be shown to be necessary, proportionate and in accordance with

:29:33.:29:36.

the law. In particular, such powers must not impinge unduly on the right

:29:37.:29:41.

to privacy or the security of private data and we feel that many

:29:42.:29:46.

of the powers in this bill do not at this stage pass those tests. For

:29:47.:29:51.

that reason in its current form the Scottish National party cannot give

:29:52.:29:56.

Hezbollah. Or. We intended to join forces with others in this house to

:29:57.:30:02.

have this bill as extensively amended as possible. Today we shall

:30:03.:30:05.

be abstaining but if the bill is not amended to our satisfaction we

:30:06.:30:09.

reserve the right to vote against it at a later stage. The bill is a

:30:10.:30:15.

rushed job in my opinion coming on the back of a draft bill which did

:30:16.:30:18.

not go far enough to protect certain liberties and lacked clarity. In

:30:19.:30:24.

very recent weeks three Parliamentary committees have

:30:25.:30:25.

expressed significant misgivings about many aspects of the draft Bill

:30:26.:30:29.

and made very extensive recommendations for its revise all.

:30:30.:30:33.

The Bill was published barely true winks after the ink was dry on the

:30:34.:30:39.

last report. We believe there has been insufficient time for the

:30:40.:30:43.

garment go back to the drawing board and rewrite the draft bill to deal

:30:44.:30:46.

adequately with the concerns expressed by those three

:30:47.:30:51.

Parliamentary committees. We were very concerned like other members in

:30:52.:30:53.

this house to read last week that the United Nations special report on

:30:54.:30:59.

the right to privacy concluded that other proposals in this bill fail

:31:00.:31:03.

the benchmarks set in recent judgments of the European Court of

:31:04.:31:06.

Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. Members opposite me

:31:07.:31:11.

scoff but I invite them to read his report carefully, it contains a

:31:12.:31:13.

careful excavation of recent case law and should not lightly

:31:14.:31:16.

dismissed. The benchmarks of these recent cases provide surveillance

:31:17.:31:21.

should be targeted and it should be targeted by means of warrants which

:31:22.:31:24.

are focused on specific and raise reasonable suspicion yet under this

:31:25.:31:31.

bill targeted interception warrants may apply to groups of persons or

:31:32.:31:34.

more than one organisation or more than one premises. These bulk

:31:35.:31:39.

interception warrants lack specification and there is no

:31:40.:31:44.

requirement for reasonable suspicion, thus giving licence was

:31:45.:31:47.

backlit if surveillance. The Shadow Home Secretary should questioned

:31:48.:31:53.

whether we should be using the term mass surveillance but I wonder

:31:54.:31:59.

whether the accurate term should be suspicion with surveillance and that

:32:00.:32:01.

is a concern for civil liberties. Another aspect of the Bill is that

:32:02.:32:07.

in relation to the National Security Council, an actual threat to

:32:08.:32:10.

national security is not required and that concerns. The powers in the

:32:11.:32:14.

Bill to retain Internet connection records and the bulk powers go

:32:15.:32:18.

beyond what is currently offer right in other Western democracies and

:32:19.:32:24.

thus could set a dangerous president and a bad example internationally.

:32:25.:32:28.

The only other Western democracy which has authorised the retention

:32:29.:32:31.

of materials similar to Internet connection records is Denmark and

:32:32.:32:35.

they have subsequently abandoned their experiment having found it did

:32:36.:32:41.

not yield significant benefits for enforcement. I see the Home

:32:42.:32:43.

Secretary looking at me and I'm sure the she will argue there are

:32:44.:32:47.

differences between her proposed scheme and the Denmark scheme. But

:32:48.:32:50.

the devil is in the Peter Lambert listening we will need to look very

:32:51.:32:53.

carefully in committee. The United States of America are rolling back

:32:54.:33:01.

from data collection having found it to be in some cases unconstitutional

:33:02.:33:05.

and of questionable value in fighting terrorism. So it is for

:33:06.:33:09.

this government to justify weight alone requires to go such further

:33:10.:33:14.

than the government in Western democracies. I do not believe such

:33:15.:33:23.

operational cases that have been produced, they are more anecdotal

:33:24.:33:29.

and hypothetical in nature. I give way to the honourable lady. If the

:33:30.:33:35.

honourable lady thinks that it is important to look at international

:33:36.:33:41.

comparisons, would she agree with me that the judicial authorisation

:33:42.:33:44.

procedure that the honourable Secretary of State is proposing goes

:33:45.:33:48.

further than other examples in Europe for example in Germany and

:33:49.:33:55.

the Netherlands and in France? We need to compare apples with apples

:33:56.:33:58.

and oranges with oranges. A more correct comparison is with

:33:59.:34:02.

jurisdictions such as Canada and America which are more similar in

:34:03.:34:07.

system to ours. I'll come back to that one I get to the issue of

:34:08.:34:14.

authorisation. Everyone in this house I am sure once to get the

:34:15.:34:18.

balance right between protecting civil liberties and giving the

:34:19.:34:22.

security services and the police the necessary and proportionate powers

:34:23.:34:24.

to fight serious crime and terrorism. However we believe in the

:34:25.:34:28.

SNP at present that the government 's attempt has not got a balance

:34:29.:34:31.

right. And we are looking forward to working with other parliamentarians

:34:32.:34:35.

to try and get that important balance right. But we are worried

:34:36.:34:39.

that the government is not giving suspicion -- sufficient right for

:34:40.:34:46.

the Bill. The Bill is enormous. The 14 Home Office documents concerning

:34:47.:34:49.

the Bill which were released to the parliament on the 1st of March

:34:50.:34:54.

extend to 1182 pages. That is almost trebled the amount of material

:34:55.:34:57.

released to the draft bill last November. And there is a suspicion

:34:58.:35:00.

that the amount of material being policed in large tranches coupled to

:35:01.:35:05.

relatively short timescales within which to consider and amend

:35:06.:35:08.

proposals is an indication that the government does not really want the

:35:09.:35:12.

Parliamentary scrutiny of this and we're determined to do our best to

:35:13.:35:16.

make sure that there is sufficient Parliamentary scrutiny. Yes, I will

:35:17.:35:21.

give way. Can I be absolutely clear about this? I have been in this

:35:22.:35:24.

house long enough to see bills go through the house where codes of

:35:25.:35:29.

practice should sit alongside the bill. And parliamentarians have

:35:30.:35:32.

complained when government has failed to bring codes of practice to

:35:33.:35:35.

the house at the very first age of the debate. This government has

:35:36.:35:38.

brought those codes of practice to the house before secondary grading,

:35:39.:35:43.

more than several days before secondary gain, precisely so that

:35:44.:35:47.

members of this house have an opportunity to see them and consider

:35:48.:35:49.

them alongside consideration for Bill. But the Home Secretary missed

:35:50.:35:56.

and stands my complaint. It is not the fact that the material has been

:35:57.:36:00.

produced, it is the fact that the material has been produced with a

:36:01.:36:03.

timescale following thereon that is not sufficient for us to scrutinise

:36:04.:36:07.

it properly. That is my complaint. I am going to make something

:36:08.:36:11.

absolutely crystal clear before I go any further. And it is this. The

:36:12.:36:16.

Scottish National party will not be morally blackmailed or bullied by

:36:17.:36:23.

members of sit into blind support for a bill of dubious legality in

:36:24.:36:26.

some respects and which seeks powers which go beyond other Western

:36:27.:36:31.

democracies. We are not going to tolerate any suggestion that by

:36:32.:36:35.

seeking proper scrutiny of the Bill and full justification for the

:36:36.:36:40.

far-reaching powers, we are being soft on terrorism and serious crime.

:36:41.:36:44.

And I would associate myself with the other main opposition party in

:36:45.:36:48.

that respect. And I would also like to give you an example of why you

:36:49.:36:52.

can be assured that the SNP is not soft on terrorism more serious

:36:53.:36:55.

crime. We have been in government in Scotland for nine years and we have

:36:56.:36:58.

shown ourselves to be a responsible government. Whilst issues of

:36:59.:37:02.

national security are reserved, we have always cooperated closely with

:37:03.:37:06.

the UK Government for example when Glasgow Airport was attacked by

:37:07.:37:11.

terrorists in 2007. Our record in fighting crime in Scotland is second

:37:12.:37:14.

to none. The Scottish Government has got recorded crime down to 41 year

:37:15.:37:19.

low and we are committed to aggressive justice policy. We will

:37:20.:37:23.

not stand accused of being soft on serious crime or terrorism because

:37:24.:37:29.

it is simply not a fair statement. We confidently expect to be devising

:37:30.:37:33.

a security policy of an independent Scotland and it will be a response

:37:34.:37:36.

was guilty policy which will seek to work closely with near neighbours on

:37:37.:37:40.

this Eli -- these islands but will also look to international models

:37:41.:37:43.

from international democracies and strive to have a policy which takes

:37:44.:37:49.

proper recognises of international human rights laws and the rule of

:37:50.:37:53.

law. That is all we are about in our opposition and scrutiny of this

:37:54.:37:57.

bill. And the concerns which we share about the concerns are not

:37:58.:38:01.

just our concerns, they are shared by the party sitting round the and

:38:02.:38:04.

many of the members opposite. They are shared by many of the members of

:38:05.:38:10.

three Parliamentary midis, they are shared by NGOs, the technical

:38:11.:38:12.

sector, eminent legal commentators, over 200 senior lawyers sign that

:38:13.:38:17.

letter in the Guardian today. They are shared by can indication service

:38:18.:38:23.

providers and they are shared by the UN special report Iran privacy.

:38:24.:38:27.

Somebody shouts confidently from the others Oliver Howes at the 200

:38:28.:38:32.

lawyers + the letter in the Guardian are wrong. I suspect he had a look

:38:33.:38:47.

at the list of names but sign that. Just the clarifications over the

:38:48.:38:51.

honourable lady does not be seen to be speaking for my own party, would

:38:52.:38:59.

she accept that the balances which the Secretary of State has outlined

:39:00.:39:02.

in the bill today by a large are supported by people in Northern

:39:03.:39:05.

Ireland simply because we have gone through the experience of terrorism

:39:06.:39:11.

and know how important these kind of safeguards are for the general

:39:12.:39:17.

public? I would always listen very carefully to what the honourable

:39:18.:39:18.

gentleman is saying. apologise if I included him in a

:39:19.:39:31.

sweeping statement but I do not agree that the judgment have got the

:39:32.:39:36.

balance right. The point I'm seeking to make it is the job of responsible

:39:37.:39:41.

opposition to oppose responsibly and to scrutinise but also to article

:39:42.:39:47.

eight and inform public concerns and the public are concerned about this

:39:48.:39:49.

and there is greater published origin but this bill than perhaps

:39:50.:39:55.

there was last time round and I noticed that a survey of the public

:39:56.:39:58.

commission by open exchange found that only 12% of the public believe

:39:59.:40:02.

that the Home Secretary has adequately explain the impact of the

:40:03.:40:06.

Bill to the UK public and present a balanced arguing for its

:40:07.:40:08.

introduction. I suspect that is possibly a little bit unfair pinning

:40:09.:40:12.

it all on the Home Secretary because it is the responsible job all of us

:40:13.:40:15.

in this house to inform our constituents about this bill and

:40:16.:40:16.

where it is going. I will make some progress for some

:40:17.:40:29.

time being if you don't mind. I mentioned the letter to the

:40:30.:40:37.

Guardian. I am conscious that the right honourable gentleman the

:40:38.:40:41.

Attorney General has made his position clear but I respectfully

:40:42.:40:46.

disagree with him. The letter to the Guardian from the lawyers focused

:40:47.:40:49.

initially on the problem of bulk intercept. Even the interception of

:40:50.:40:56.

Communications office, the independent watchdog, has said that

:40:57.:41:02.

bulk intercept provides, I quote, generalised initial intercept. That

:41:03.:41:06.

is the issue here, it is the generality that the lawyers are

:41:07.:41:10.

worried about, the lack of focus and specificity. I am grateful. I take

:41:11.:41:20.

the letter seriously because I regard it as a serious matter. If

:41:21.:41:26.

indeed what was happening was what was set out in the first objection

:41:27.:41:30.

by those writing it it would be a very serious matter in Bede, namely

:41:31.:41:35.

that this House was sanctioning a system by which there was

:41:36.:41:40.

generalised access to electronic communications in bulk. -- serious

:41:41.:41:43.

matter in Bede. That is not actually what goes on and if one looks at the

:41:44.:41:50.

bill clearly it is clear that that shouldn't be able to go on and we

:41:51.:41:54.

would prevent it from happening if there were any possible risk of it.

:41:55.:42:00.

We have been around this issue on many occasions and this is why, I

:42:01.:42:04.

think, there is a difficulty of communication and understanding of

:42:05.:42:08.

something that is fundamental to the way the agencies go about this work.

:42:09.:42:15.

I can only reiterate that I and many others, including over 200 lawyers

:42:16.:42:20.

who signed this letter, disagreed with him on this point. One of the

:42:21.:42:26.

things that this issue illustrates is the importance of having very

:42:27.:42:32.

focused language in bills dealing with such major matters of

:42:33.:42:36.

constitutional importance, rather than having vague language that is

:42:37.:42:40.

not properly understood and can at a later date be twisted by those it

:42:41.:42:47.

suits to expand powers. That has happened in the past. I think we

:42:48.:42:55.

should not dismiss too lightly the importance of the notion of the rule

:42:56.:43:00.

of law overarching this bill. If the government really wants this

:43:01.:43:04.

legislation to be world leading then it can't have legislation that

:43:05.:43:08.

potentially violates international standards. As things stand the UK is

:43:09.:43:14.

still bound by the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. There

:43:15.:43:20.

are no proposals to withdraw from the fundamental human rights. We

:43:21.:43:24.

await the proposals by the repeal of the Human Rights Act but the

:43:25.:43:27.

government have been moving to reassure us that we will not be with

:43:28.:43:37.

drawing from the court of Europe. Many people believe, many

:43:38.:43:41.

distinguished lawyers, that if the bill is not significantly amended

:43:42.:43:45.

then all of the UK will be on a collision course with those European

:43:46.:43:52.

courts. An unamended bill could result in expensive litigation. It

:43:53.:43:57.

could require Parliament to revise the law again in the future and this

:43:58.:44:02.

should not be, provided we make sure that the law meets international

:44:03.:44:08.

standards. I hear members asking, which parts? I will come to that.

:44:09.:44:16.

Make intervention, don't be so rude. I would suggest that honourable

:44:17.:44:22.

members opposite read the report that has come from the United

:44:23.:44:27.

Nations report on privacy and consider the law here. They may

:44:28.:44:32.

prefer to follow in the footsteps of Russia, which last December allowed

:44:33.:44:37.

a law allowing its Constitutional court to decide whether to comply

:44:38.:44:41.

with international courts but I would suggest Russia is not the best

:44:42.:44:48.

role model for the UK. I want to challenge the premise that the more

:44:49.:44:53.

privacy we sacrifice the more security we gain. This is not backed

:44:54.:44:57.

up by the evidence. Some of the committees in this House have heard

:44:58.:45:03.

evidence that swamping analysts with data can perhaps impede

:45:04.:45:06.

investigation, because they are unable to find the needles in the

:45:07.:45:11.

haystack of information. What we should be doing is looking at how to

:45:12.:45:15.

increase security in an intelligent way and not blanket security Britain

:45:16.:45:24.

men. The Home Office -- security retaining. The Home Office added one

:45:25.:45:31.

word to the start of the bill as pertains to privacy but they have

:45:32.:45:36.

not added any details or principles about overwriting principles of

:45:37.:45:41.

privacy and I think their response to the Intelligence and Security

:45:42.:45:45.

Committee seems somewhat cynical. I indicated that there are number of

:45:46.:45:50.

aspects of the bilby SNP are concerned about. Time doesn't permit

:45:51.:45:54.

to tackle all of them but there are four in particular and I endeavour

:45:55.:45:59.

to keep my comments to a minimum bearing in mind I speak for the

:46:00.:46:07.

third party in the House. The legal thresholds for surveillance, the

:46:08.:46:10.

authorisation process, which the Shadow Home Secretary has talked

:46:11.:46:13.

about, and the provision for collection of internet communication

:46:14.:46:21.

records, and bulk powers. The legal thresholds for surveillance,

:46:22.:46:24.

essentially what the government wants to do is really just wait for

:46:25.:46:31.

Ripper's grounds, and we maintain they are unnecessarily broad and

:46:32.:46:37.

vague. That is not just the concern of the SNP. The Joint Committee that

:46:38.:46:41.

looked at this draft bill recommended that the bill should

:46:42.:46:46.

include definitions of national security and economic well-being.

:46:47.:46:51.

That has not been done. The Intelligence and Security Committee

:46:52.:46:53.

recommended that economic well-being should be subsumed within a national

:46:54.:46:59.

security definition and they said it is unnecessarily confusing and

:47:00.:47:01.

complicated. These recommendations have been dismissed and the court

:47:02.:47:08.

powers remain undefined and in my opinion dangerously flexible. On the

:47:09.:47:14.

point of authorisation of warrants, we welcome the move towards greater

:47:15.:47:18.

judicial involvement and we acknowledge that the government has

:47:19.:47:22.

moved quite a long way towards the double lock but we would like to see

:47:23.:47:28.

an equal lock, like the Shadow Home Secretary. Judicial review is not

:47:29.:47:35.

the same as judicial authorisation. It provides the illusion of judicial

:47:36.:47:40.

overview. I want to give concrete examples of that. The caselaw of the

:47:41.:47:46.

United Kingdom Supreme Court shows that in civil proceedings which

:47:47.:47:50.

don't relate to deprivation of liberty a less intense standard of

:47:51.:47:55.

judicial is applied, more reasonable last than strictness city, and that

:47:56.:48:00.

is why many fear this is what will happen if the bill is passed on

:48:01.:48:07.

amending for -- unamended. -- reasonableness. Will she accept that

:48:08.:48:15.

she is simply wrong on this point? The evidence to the Joint Committee,

:48:16.:48:20.

of which I was a member come from Sir Stanley Banton, senior judicial

:48:21.:48:27.

commissioner, and Lord Judge, senior surveillance Commissioner, were

:48:28.:48:31.

clear that this had no place in this context. The wording is important,

:48:32.:48:40.

involving necessity and proportionality. I think she is

:48:41.:48:47.

cherry picking her way through the evidence that was heard. There was

:48:48.:48:52.

evidence contrary to the position she has stated. There is debate

:48:53.:48:57.

about this point, I accept, but the side of the debate I take is that

:48:58.:49:02.

the review on traditional -- judicial review principles don't go

:49:03.:49:08.

far enough. Why not have one stage judicial authorisation? It is the

:49:09.:49:13.

norm in comparative jurisdictions, like as the states, Canada. Judicial

:49:14.:49:20.

overview would encourage cooperation from US technology firms. I also

:49:21.:49:28.

think there is a practical point. A 2-stage progress. Practically there

:49:29.:49:37.

is a huge volume of surveillance warrants and it looks like there

:49:38.:49:40.

will be an awful lot more as a result of this ill and it is

:49:41.:49:44.

unsuitable for a small number of Cabinet ministers to deal with that.

:49:45.:49:48.

I want to deal with something else that I think is a false premise that

:49:49.:49:53.

is often put forward to justify ministerial involvement in the

:49:54.:49:57.

issuance of warrants. Some people seek to argue that ministers are

:49:58.:50:01.

democratically accountable, politically accountable for

:50:02.:50:03.

surveillance warrants to this House, but I think that is misconceived.

:50:04.:50:08.

Ministers are not really democratically accountable for their

:50:09.:50:11.

role in issuing warrants because firstly the disclosure of the

:50:12.:50:15.

existent of a warrant is criminalised and would remain so

:50:16.:50:23.

under this bill. All of us no that requests for information concerning

:50:24.:50:26.

such matters in this House are routinely carried with claims about

:50:27.:50:30.

national security. I don't accept that ministers are practically,

:50:31.:50:33.

politically or democratically accountable to this House in regard

:50:34.:50:37.

to the issuance of warrants. Coming back to the jurisprudence of the

:50:38.:50:41.

Strasberg court, it has been made clear that it is important to have

:50:42.:50:47.

effective supervision by an independent judiciary and we want

:50:48.:50:57.

the double lock standard. Moving to Internet connection records, we

:50:58.:51:00.

agree with many others that the case the collecting these Internet

:51:01.:51:03.

connection records, including its claimed benefit from law

:51:04.:51:08.

enforcement, is flawed. It is not just my say-so. There are many

:51:09.:51:13.

concerns across the industry am a people who understand the

:51:14.:51:15.

technicalities far better than I do have explained the problems. The

:51:16.:51:24.

telephone and the Internet is not like the telephone system. The

:51:25.:51:29.

Internet connection can't be compared to a telephone bill. The

:51:30.:51:38.

phone system consists of a set of records and if we are collecting

:51:39.:51:42.

records of the phone system we can see that A called B and at what time

:51:43.:51:48.

and the gyration of the call. The Internet is more like a mailbox that

:51:49.:51:52.

Kalex packet of information and takes them from a to B. -- collects

:51:53.:52:03.

packets. If you go onto the Facebook messenger service, it won't show who

:52:04.:52:10.

you communicated with because that relates to a higher or lower level

:52:11.:52:16.

of packets. It won't show the when, where and who that the government

:52:17.:52:20.

say they want and they already get from phone records. What Internet

:52:21.:52:25.

records will show is a detailed record of all of our Internet

:52:26.:52:30.

connections for every person in the UK, a 12 month log of websites

:52:31.:52:35.

visited, communication software used, system updates downloaded,

:52:36.:52:40.

desktop widgets, every mobile app used and many other devices, baby

:52:41.:52:49.

monitors, game consoles. That is quite fantastically intrusive and as

:52:50.:52:54.

one of the honourable members for the Labour Party made the point

:52:55.:53:00.

earlier, many public authorities will have access to these records,

:53:01.:53:05.

including HMRC and the DWP and can access them without a warrant. Do

:53:06.:53:10.

you really want to go that far? There are no other comparable

:53:11.:53:13.

countries that have gone as far. David Andersson QC noted that such

:53:14.:53:23.

procedures or obligations are not considered politically conceivable

:53:24.:53:28.

in Germany, Canada or the USA so he said caution is in order. That deals

:53:29.:53:36.

with Internet connection records. Coming to bulk powers. I have made

:53:37.:53:44.

the point that even the interception of communication Commissioner 's

:53:45.:53:47.

office says that bulk provides at the outset generalised intercept. We

:53:48.:53:53.

only became aware of these interception programmes when they

:53:54.:54:00.

were exposed by Edward Snowden. Whatever you think of those

:54:01.:54:03.

exposures, at that time we became aware of them. This House has never

:54:04.:54:08.

before debated on all voted on bulk powers so we are being asked to do

:54:09.:54:12.

something very novel and challenging and we have to do it properly. The

:54:13.:54:20.

power to intercept in bulk in the past was inferred from a vaguely

:54:21.:54:25.

worded paper and that illustrates the danger of vaguely worded

:54:26.:54:32.

legislation. Targeting bulk warrants in the telecommunications system,

:54:33.:54:39.

our entire population, it is a radical departure from the common

:54:40.:54:44.

law and human rights law but this is the approach that will be taken. In

:54:45.:54:47.

many respects it is the most worrying part of the bill and the

:54:48.:54:51.

part of the build that the UN said it was most concerned about. It is

:54:52.:54:58.

very respectful of the tradition of the UK and makes some very good

:54:59.:55:03.

point. It says it would appear that the serious and possibly unintended

:55:04.:55:06.

consequences of legitimising bulk interception are not being fully

:55:07.:55:10.

appreciated by the UK Government. Airing in mind the huge influence

:55:11.:55:15.

that the UK legislation still has in over 25% of the UN member states as

:55:16.:55:22.

well as the UK's proud tradition as a democracy, one of the founders of

:55:23.:55:27.

human rights bodies such as the Council of Europe. The reporter

:55:28.:55:31.

encourages the UK Government to take this golden opportunity to set a

:55:32.:55:36.

good example and step act from taking disproportionate measures

:55:37.:55:39.

which may have negative ramifications far beyond the shores

:55:40.:55:44.

of the UK. It invites the UK Government to show greater

:55:45.:55:47.

commitment to protecting the fundamental rights to privacy that

:55:48.:55:52.

its own citizens and others and desist from setting a bad example by

:55:53.:55:57.

imposing measures, particularly bulk interception and bulk packing, which

:55:58.:56:03.

failed the standards of several Parliamentary committees and run

:56:04.:56:07.

counter to the most recent judgments of the European Court of Justice and

:56:08.:56:10.

of human rights and undermine the spirit of the right to privacy.

:56:11.:56:32.

So, to conclude, Mr Speaker,... To conclude... I think she has made a

:56:33.:56:49.

very good speech this afternoon and I think we should be working a

:56:50.:56:52.

little harder on that side of the house to reach out and build

:56:53.:56:56.

consensus but can I just invite her before she finishes to say whether

:56:57.:57:01.

she will be supporting our call in committee to make Internet

:57:02.:57:03.

connection records only accessible through I'll warrant based on

:57:04.:57:08.

serious crime not any crime to give protection and also for a clear

:57:09.:57:14.

definition of national-security question those are both issues which

:57:15.:57:17.

we will work together with the Labour Party on. They have already

:57:18.:57:21.

indicated that we intend to amend the bill extensively in committee.

:57:22.:57:25.

We are very concerned about Internet connection records. We will look

:57:26.:57:33.

seriously at proposals put forward by the parties and work together on

:57:34.:57:37.

that and what I was gone to say in conclusion, Mr Speaker, was that the

:57:38.:57:42.

SNP is in favour of targeted surveillance and we welcome the

:57:43.:57:46.

double lock on the judicial authorisation and an improvement but

:57:47.:57:49.

we do not think it goes far enough. Our concern is quite clearly that

:57:50.:57:54.

many of the powers sought in this bill are of dubious legality and go

:57:55.:57:57.

further than other Western democracies without sufficient

:57:58.:58:03.

justification and it is fraught that reason in its current form we cannot

:58:04.:58:06.

give the bill are current support. We will work with others to amend

:58:07.:58:11.

the bill is extensively. Today we shall abstain but if the bill is not

:58:12.:58:14.

amended to our satisfaction we reserve the right to vote it down at

:58:15.:58:23.

a later stage. Mr Speaker, I think that is one of the most, Dave and

:58:24.:58:27.

partisan speeches I have heard from a member of this house supporting an

:58:28.:58:34.

abstention on the second reading of the bill for a very long time. And I

:58:35.:58:40.

would urge the honourable lady and her Scottish National colleagues to

:58:41.:58:43.

calm down a bit and accept that everybody is agreeing this is a

:58:44.:58:47.

huge, hence if Bill. Its terms are quite often obscure. It is -- it

:58:48.:58:54.

needs to have issues further addressed on committee and at later

:58:55.:58:59.

stages. I think it is quite useful in this house to accept despite her

:59:00.:59:04.

excellent speech, I have nothing against party time politics on the

:59:05.:59:08.

right occasions, that there is an almost universal consensus in this

:59:09.:59:14.

house at the moment and I am glad to say, about the principles that we

:59:15.:59:17.

ought to be adopting and as I think the standards of liberal democracy

:59:18.:59:22.

in this country are not too bad at the moment, we need a piece of

:59:23.:59:25.

legislation which enshrines for the future in case eventually... The

:59:26.:59:34.

principles are that we do wish to give the strong as possible support

:59:35.:59:39.

to our intelligence policing authorities, to defend the national

:59:40.:59:45.

interest and to defend our citizens from very real dangers in the modern

:59:46.:59:50.

world and we must not left behind and I want our intelligence services

:59:51.:59:53.

and the police services when they are dealing with terrorists, when

:59:54.:59:58.

they are dealing with serious organised crime, drug trafficking,

:59:59.:00:05.

human trafficking, and so on, child abuse, as people have said, I want

:00:06.:00:10.

them to be as tough as anybody else's intelligence police services.

:00:11.:00:13.

I want them to be as effective as they possibly can be and are

:00:14.:00:19.

successful in avoiding risk, that is absolutely essential. Spies,

:00:20.:00:26.

intelligence services, have had to do slightly odd things ever since

:00:27.:00:29.

they first emerged on the scene, ever since they started steaming

:00:30.:00:36.

open envelopes and started making interceptions of telephone calls.

:00:37.:00:40.

But we must not be left behind by technology and we must not let

:00:41.:00:45.

behind by modern society and the spies have got to act the same way

:00:46.:00:49.

towards the Internet anyway they would act in towards envelopes in

:00:50.:00:53.

the post for the last 200 years. I hope we are all agreed on that. I

:00:54.:00:57.

hope we also accept that it does pose a dilemma for a liberal

:00:58.:01:01.

democracy like our own because we have got a do this as well and as

:01:02.:01:08.

toughly as anybody on the world at the highest ethical standards at the

:01:09.:01:11.

same time not come from rising our underlying values the reason we want

:01:12.:01:15.

are pleased to be so effective is we have we hope we hired -- the highest

:01:16.:01:20.

standards of human rights, the highest regard for the rule of law,

:01:21.:01:23.

democratic accountability and the thing we have maybe neglected most

:01:24.:01:29.

in modern times, privacy, privacy of the individual. And we have recent

:01:30.:01:34.

example is not in this area but of the abuse of the sea by the press

:01:35.:01:40.

and others which we are only too well aware and our citizens expect

:01:41.:01:44.

that there previously should only be intruded on any right cases. The

:01:45.:01:48.

real heart of the test is to get the balance right which we all talk

:01:49.:01:50.

about getting the balance right is the proportionality of very

:01:51.:01:56.

intrusive powers which should only ever be used when the serious

:01:57.:02:04.

national interest is threatened. Our security is at stake. And that... I

:02:05.:02:17.

am sorry but if you have a matter of national-security and an acute

:02:18.:02:21.

national crisis and the Home Secretary feels it is necessary to

:02:22.:02:26.

authorise some snooping for want of a better word if you like, I am

:02:27.:02:33.

sorry to use that word, the Home Secretary said earlier don't worry

:02:34.:02:39.

the judge will authorise a door review it. And the Prime Minister

:02:40.:02:45.

will consider it also. As... Judges are very resource of it either they

:02:46.:02:49.

do not understand acute critical sensitivities. Should not somebody

:02:50.:02:52.

like Speaker have some sort of oversight protect these very

:02:53.:02:56.

valuable communications? I do not think I am persuaded. Do not totally

:02:57.:03:02.

reject my honourable friend 's case actually because I was about to go

:03:03.:03:06.

on and say we must realise are dangers in a democratic society via

:03:07.:03:10.

our constantly vigilant about some future administration none that I

:03:11.:03:12.

have ever experienced in opposition or in government actually abusing

:03:13.:03:18.

this. There are Western democracies I think some things have happened in

:03:19.:03:21.

America at times which would not approve of year where political

:03:22.:03:27.

opponents, political rivals, have actually found the intelligence

:03:28.:03:29.

services and other sources are being used against them. My honourable

:03:30.:03:36.

friend recklessly suggested France. That would not surprise me. And the

:03:37.:03:42.

modern politics, the tent and to do that is actually quite strong. The

:03:43.:03:46.

other reason for actually insisting at this legislation is as tight as

:03:47.:03:51.

we can make it is because it is all too easy to get accustomed to these

:03:52.:03:55.

things. I have been Home Secretary and you are overwhelmed with

:03:56.:03:58.

applications for warrants. The middle of the night doing a red box

:03:59.:04:04.

and contrary to popular belief, I was conscientious about my red

:04:05.:04:08.

boxes. You have got a very short time in which to make decisions

:04:09.:04:11.

about things. There are vast number is of them. I used to make a point

:04:12.:04:15.

of actually challenging one just to find out some more detail that

:04:16.:04:19.

anybody was giving me in what came through. The volume is massive

:04:20.:04:25.

compared with that I experience. That shows there is a danger in the

:04:26.:04:31.

intervening 20 years the world has changed, so profoundly, so that I

:04:32.:04:34.

suspect she has a vastly more of these cases to consider than I had.

:04:35.:04:42.

I suspect some of them are much more difficult difficult matters of

:04:43.:04:44.

judgment by most of the ones that I've faced and I found some even in

:04:45.:04:47.

those days when we were less concerned about these concerns I

:04:48.:04:51.

suspect that there were some pretty surprise in applications being made

:04:52.:04:55.

if you actually went into what it was about. It is too easy even for

:04:56.:04:58.

the best people in the intelligence services and I... I am sorry. It is

:04:59.:05:08.

too easy for those in the intelligence service to get used to

:05:09.:05:13.

this kind of power. It is too tempting to want to use them against

:05:14.:05:17.

people who are causing trouble by making complaints or making leaks

:05:18.:05:22.

and there have been examples of that and therefore that is what this bill

:05:23.:05:29.

is about. Having said that, what my right honourable friend has brought

:05:30.:05:33.

forward as a bill that makes the biggest advance forward that I can

:05:34.:05:36.

remember for a generation of introducing this principle of

:05:37.:05:42.

judicial involvement and judicial oversight for which I have the

:05:43.:05:47.

highest possible respect and it is a quite dramatic change. We have also

:05:48.:05:53.

strengthened the intelligence and Security committee 's powers and I

:05:54.:05:56.

hope my right honourable friend will make the fullest use of those. But

:05:57.:06:00.

Freddie is always faced with the problem it cannot have a debating

:06:01.:06:05.

public, most of what is ever had done in private. We do need to get

:06:06.:06:11.

this bill right and most of the points are not the big wide partisan

:06:12.:06:15.

points but I was talking about a moment ago. They are actually in the

:06:16.:06:20.

detail, the devil is in the detail and actually there are some quite

:06:21.:06:22.

important points where we should still be questioning. There is a

:06:23.:06:28.

vast amount of activity under the general title of economic

:06:29.:06:31.

well-being, I have known some very odd things happening under that

:06:32.:06:39.

head, national security can easily get conflated with the policy of the

:06:40.:06:44.

government of the day and I do not know quite how you get the

:06:45.:06:47.

definition right but it is no good just dismissing that point. Most of

:06:48.:06:52.

my points are committee points. Several have been raised already. I

:06:53.:06:57.

did not know that the judge had given his opinion to the select

:06:58.:06:59.

committee that the Wednesbury test of reasonable lasso not provoke it.

:07:00.:07:04.

He has an old opponent of mine in love courts I am an up-to-date and

:07:05.:07:12.

extinct lawyer and he is a very distinguished and very recent riot.

:07:13.:07:18.

As a movie if the judge things the Home Secretary is not following the

:07:19.:07:22.

legal principles, but it is question is a judgment and abortion ideas are

:07:23.:07:26.

most important of all to worry much most. But it is the one I feel more

:07:27.:07:33.

strongly about. It was raised by the Shadow Home Secretary today. I am

:07:34.:07:39.

worried by part three of the bill. The whole debate is conducted on the

:07:40.:07:42.

basis we should all live fearful in our beds, this is dealing with

:07:43.:07:48.

terrorism, this is dealing with child abusers, this is dealing with

:07:49.:07:52.

human traffickers, actually vast numbers of people are getting

:07:53.:07:57.

powers, part three all kinds of curious public bodies, every local

:07:58.:08:03.

authority, county and district, where one official can get the

:08:04.:08:07.

approval of one magistrate and access to huge amounts of

:08:08.:08:09.

information. There is too much already. I'd doubt the wisdom of

:08:10.:08:14.

that. I think we shall find other points that should be corrected the

:08:15.:08:16.

process of this bill through this house. I associate myself with the

:08:17.:08:22.

remarks of the Home Secretary earlier and others of heartfelt

:08:23.:08:26.

condolences to the family and friends of the prison officer who

:08:27.:08:29.

tragically lost his life in Northern Ireland. Mr Speaker, I will start

:08:30.:08:33.

with the positive. Of course, I acknowledge and my colleagues

:08:34.:08:37.

acknowledge this bill rubs and is progress in some very important

:08:38.:08:40.

respects. It is far more competence of an area the previous piece of

:08:41.:08:46.

legislation. Uncovers power is an avowed. It contains improvements in

:08:47.:08:49.

accountability and it is said compared to its previous best jazz

:08:50.:08:54.

predecessor eases -- easier to understand. However as the Home

:08:55.:08:58.

Secretary who has just departed will know, she and I disgusted yesterday.

:08:59.:09:03.

I am not a supporter of this bill, not for technical reasons but for

:09:04.:09:05.

reasons principle which I will come to. We feel her department has not

:09:06.:09:11.

responded in full to the criticism of the three Parliamentary

:09:12.:09:13.

committees and it is therefore not yet in a fit state. There are many

:09:14.:09:17.

problems that I would like to highlight to in particular. First as

:09:18.:09:23.

the former Attorney General said, intelligence and security committee

:09:24.:09:27.

was heavily critical of the way in which privacy protections were at

:09:28.:09:32.

Titley -- article eight in the draft Bill. In responding to to the IFC 's

:09:33.:09:37.

request for a new section dedicated holy to privacy the government has

:09:38.:09:42.

in effect done little more than change one word in a title. They

:09:43.:09:48.

have demonstrated precisely the point that the committee made one

:09:49.:09:50.

needed describe the privacy protections in the bill as an

:09:51.:09:56.

add-on. I share the committees concerns. The powers authorised by

:09:57.:09:59.

this bill are formidable and capable of misuse. In the absence of a

:10:00.:10:04.

written causation it is only the subjective tests of necessity and

:10:05.:10:09.

proportionality that stand in the way that misuse. Bill should be far,

:10:10.:10:15.

far more exquisite than it currently is that these powers are the

:10:16.:10:19.

exception from standing principles of prisoners see and must never

:10:20.:10:20.

become the norm. The Home Office appears to be

:10:21.:10:30.

institutionally insensitive to the importance which should be attached

:10:31.:10:35.

to privacy. A department that cared about privacy would offer more than

:10:36.:10:40.

a one word response to the Intelligence and Security Committee.

:10:41.:10:43.

It would not have quietly shelved the privacy and Civil Liberties

:10:44.:10:48.

board which this House voted to establish just last year. It would

:10:49.:10:56.

have examined more proportionate alternatives to storing every click

:10:57.:11:00.

on every device of every citizen instead of leaping to the most

:11:01.:11:04.

intrusive solution available. I will give way. What would he say about

:11:05.:11:11.

the privacy of a victim of child abuse who was unable to find the

:11:12.:11:20.

perpetrator of a crime because of the restrictions he wants to put on

:11:21.:11:26.

this Bill? The greatest tools to go after such perpetrators are to match

:11:27.:11:30.

the devices they use through IP addresses to them. That is why we

:11:31.:11:35.

passed legislation which has been challenged in court by members of

:11:36.:11:41.

this House and why in my view there are much more effective ways of

:11:42.:11:46.

achieving that objective than this great dragnet approach being ad --

:11:47.:11:52.

advocated in this bill. Internet connection records, these are my

:11:53.:12:01.

principal concern. We have been here so many times before, 2008, 2009,

:12:02.:12:09.

2012. I can't think of another proposal in Whitehall that has been

:12:10.:12:14.

so consistently champion, not by the police and intelligence services,

:12:15.:12:19.

whose expertise I admire as anybody else, but by the Home Office,

:12:20.:12:23.

despite failing to convince successive governments. That is not

:12:24.:12:28.

wave -- the way that policy should be made. The Home Office said that

:12:29.:12:37.

ICRs are significantly different from memos. The only difference I

:12:38.:12:42.

can see is some restrictions on the purposes for which data can be

:12:43.:12:45.

accessed, although I know some of them have been relaxed in clause 54

:12:46.:12:51.

of this draft. In terms of collection and retention the scheme

:12:52.:12:55.

is the same. The name might be different but the scheme is the

:12:56.:13:00.

same, service providers will be required to keep records of every

:13:01.:13:04.

communication that takes place on their networks and potentially every

:13:05.:13:08.

click where there is an exchange of data between your device and a

:13:09.:13:13.

remote server. It is the Groveland of the days of steaming open

:13:14.:13:18.

letters, somebody keeping the front of every envelope in the country in

:13:19.:13:24.

some great warehouse being stored for 12 months. -- it is the

:13:25.:13:30.

equivalent of the days. The implication is that the government

:13:31.:13:34.

believes as a matter of principle that every innocent act of

:13:35.:13:40.

communication online must leave a trace the future possible

:13:41.:13:44.

interrogation by the state. No other country in the world feels the need

:13:45.:13:50.

to do this apart from Russia. Denmark tried something similar but

:13:51.:13:55.

abandoned it because the authorities were drowned in useless data, as

:13:56.:14:00.

they would have drowned in useless envelopes many years ago. Australia

:14:01.:14:06.

considered it but the police said it was disproportionate. Many European

:14:07.:14:13.

countries have gone the other way, ruling pushing data retention powers

:14:14.:14:16.

following the ruling of the European Court of Justice. -- relinquishing

:14:17.:14:24.

data retention. The Home Office has produced a so-called case for

:14:25.:14:30.

tracking Internet records but I would request that students of

:14:31.:14:34.

politics and government would do well to study it. It is a model in

:14:35.:14:39.

retrofitting evidence to a predetermined policy. Naturally it

:14:40.:14:43.

sets out how this data could be useful to the police and

:14:44.:14:48.

intelligence agencies. What it doesn't do and should is start from

:14:49.:14:54.

the operation room, where lack of data is obstructing criminal

:14:55.:14:56.

investigations, and explore different options for meeting that

:14:57.:15:00.

need while balancing security and privacy. It is simply false to claim

:15:01.:15:06.

that the dragnet approach is the only way to provide the government

:15:07.:15:10.

with better tools to go after criminals, go after terrorists

:15:11.:15:16.

online. We could incentivise companies to move to the new

:15:17.:15:20.

industry standard for IP addresses at a much faster rate. It might

:15:21.:15:25.

sound technical but it is important because it would at a stroke go a

:15:26.:15:29.

long way to solving the key problem of how to tie IP addresses to

:15:30.:15:39.

suspects. During my time in government I saw little sign that

:15:40.:15:44.

the Home Office had devoted any serious consideration to

:15:45.:15:49.

alternatives to ICRs. This is because it isn't a case of evidence

:15:50.:15:54.

-based policy, it is a case of policy -based evidence. On top of

:15:55.:15:59.

this we still don't know how it would work or be defined, the

:16:00.:16:03.

Internet Service Providers Association have stated in their

:16:04.:16:07.

briefing for this debate, in its attempts to future proof the bill

:16:08.:16:11.

The Home Office has opted to define many of the key areas in such a way

:16:12.:16:17.

that our members still find it difficult to understand what the

:16:18.:16:20.

vocations will be for them. The costs of ICRs are still unclear. The

:16:21.:16:26.

government estimate is just over ?170 million over ten years. The

:16:27.:16:31.

same Internet service providers Association said the figure is not

:16:32.:16:35.

one they recognise and BT say the cost will be significantly higher.

:16:36.:16:39.

Internet connection records are at the heart of the bill, not just a

:16:40.:16:45.

technicality but they are the principal heart of what information

:16:46.:16:49.

is stored from all of us for long periods by the government in our

:16:50.:16:54.

name. This dragnet approach will put us out of step with the

:16:55.:16:58.

international community. There are practical problems with the proposal

:16:59.:17:01.

and the terms used are still unclear. I would urge members on all

:17:02.:17:06.

sides of the House to properly scrutinised this far reaching and

:17:07.:17:10.

poorly evidenced proposal and withhold Parliamentary consent for

:17:11.:17:14.

such a sweeping power until the questions I and others have raised

:17:15.:17:21.

are properly addressed. Any bill that fundamentally affects B Aleix

:17:22.:17:26.

and ship between the citizen and the state is bound to be controversial.

:17:27.:17:44.

-- affect the relationship. Although Article eight interferes with the

:17:45.:17:52.

rights to be protected by it, Parliament has a particular duty to

:17:53.:17:55.

examine -- examine closely legislation of this sort which is

:17:56.:18:04.

the -- to make sure that the Lord and -- the agencies are not asking

:18:05.:18:11.

for too much. We hear the words necessity and proportionality

:18:12.:18:13.

frequently in this bill and that is not an accident. Much of what was

:18:14.:18:19.

said today will have been said in previous debates and that

:18:20.:18:24.

legislation will be incorporated into this bill. We have had to adapt

:18:25.:18:29.

bills to cope with the ability of those who wish to do us harm more

:18:30.:18:38.

quickly and effectively and to avoid being able to intervene -- into fear

:18:39.:18:45.

with the citizen. As far ago as the 14th century Parliament outlawed

:18:46.:18:50.

eavesdropping but in recent years the intrusion into the private lives

:18:51.:18:53.

of others by the use of illegal listening devices, the human airport

:18:54.:19:02.

electronic devices, has been a topic for debate. -- the human ear or

:19:03.:19:07.

electronic devices. Nobody doubts that the agencies need to intercept

:19:08.:19:14.

crime and terrorism. The threat to our country and its interests is as

:19:15.:19:19.

serious as it has been since the Second World War and the capacity of

:19:20.:19:29.

the criminal underworld or national enemies to traffic in people or do

:19:30.:19:36.

other things has been hugely increased. So much of what we have

:19:37.:19:47.

to content with now is unseen, unheard, instantaneous and

:19:48.:19:50.

undetectable. It gets more and more difficult to stay ahead of criminal

:19:51.:19:54.

gangs and terrorists who have access to sophisticated systems that can be

:19:55.:19:59.

today -- operated from an iPhone anywhere in the world. Does he agree

:20:00.:20:07.

that to help the police and security services transfer what they do in

:20:08.:20:13.

the physical world to the digital world they need help and we are

:20:14.:20:17.

asking them to do that with one hand tied behind their back. I do agree.

:20:18.:20:26.

I wholeheartedly support the aims and policy behind the bill. What is

:20:27.:20:30.

proposed in terms of enabling the state to intercept communications or

:20:31.:20:35.

interfere with equipment in a way that without this legislation would

:20:36.:20:38.

be unlawful is sensible. The requirement for the Secretary of

:20:39.:20:41.

State to issue warrants that have to be approved by the judiciary with

:20:42.:20:49.

regard to the collection and retention of communications data are

:20:50.:20:53.

rightly in the bill. The ability to acquire bulk data is necessary, the

:20:54.:21:00.

checks and balances referred to in schedule four are right, scheduled

:21:01.:21:07.

-- subject to further consideration. All of this and more are justified

:21:08.:21:11.

and defensible in the interest of protecting us from harm but there is

:21:12.:21:17.

no room for complacency that what is set out in the bill is the perfect

:21:18.:21:22.

answer to a difficult set of problems, most obviously defined as

:21:23.:21:26.

the border between public protection and excessive state power. In my

:21:27.:21:29.

time as a law officer from time to time I had to deal with the security

:21:30.:21:34.

services and law enforcement agencies and without being accused

:21:35.:21:40.

by hope of Anju naivete my experience was that they were

:21:41.:21:44.

scrupulous to a bay the will of Parliament and the law. From the top

:21:45.:21:47.

down there was a genuine desire to do not only what was right and seek

:21:48.:21:52.

clarification where the law was capable of being misconstrued so

:21:53.:21:55.

that they did not stray across the line between what was possible and

:21:56.:22:01.

what was lawful. I am sure that those entrusted with the work

:22:02.:22:04.

described by this will will conduct themselves within the law and that

:22:05.:22:07.

if errors are made it will not be from want of trying to keep on the

:22:08.:22:13.

right side of the law. The number of intercepts warranted every year by

:22:14.:22:17.

Secretary of State may not be many compared to the billions of e-mails

:22:18.:22:20.

sent, mobile calls or Internet searches every year. Secretaries of

:22:21.:22:30.

State will collectively issue fewer than 5000 every year but if the law

:22:31.:22:35.

is to be obeyed everyone must be considered by the Secretary of State

:22:36.:22:40.

or a Scottish minister. Every application will have to be given

:22:41.:22:49.

for a warrant for intercepting the time it needs. The current holders

:22:50.:23:01.

of these offices are hard-working minister is capable of reading the

:23:02.:23:06.

closely argued brief late at night after a long day of working in their

:23:07.:23:09.

departments either in Parliament or travelling here or overseas but even

:23:10.:23:14.

if I have overestimated the number of applications they will receive I

:23:15.:23:18.

am reasonably sure they will be considering several every day, much

:23:19.:23:23.

reinforced by what my honourable friend had to say a moment or go --

:23:24.:23:30.

or so ago. Some applications will be more straightforward than others but

:23:31.:23:34.

I don't expect that even the easier cases it will be a case of skim

:23:35.:23:39.

reading the application and initialling it. Each application

:23:40.:23:43.

must be fully argued on its own facts and considered personally --

:23:44.:23:47.

personally by the Secretary of State. I hope the tale will be gone

:23:48.:23:55.

into about why the warrant is necessary, not least is it will have

:23:56.:23:59.

to be carefully reviewed by ay judicial commissioner. This is even

:24:00.:24:03.

more true in urgent cases where it follows the issuing of a warrant or

:24:04.:24:08.

involves legal privilege under clause 20 five. My concerns about

:24:09.:24:12.

the practicalities of this are added to when one considers the point

:24:13.:24:18.

raised by my honourable friend, because they are likely to be

:24:19.:24:23.

numbered in the hundreds of files every year and they are to be

:24:24.:24:27.

authorised by what to my eyes look like a middle ranking police

:24:28.:24:31.

officers and other officials. As one can see from schedule four, these

:24:32.:24:41.

are inspectors and superintendence and others of that rank. Some of

:24:42.:24:47.

them would be part timers. I need to be sure that the necessity or

:24:48.:24:51.

expedience of every case will not outweigh the need for formality and

:24:52.:24:54.

proper scrutiny of every application. If we are to have

:24:55.:24:59.

complete confidence in the vetting system, I urge the Minister on the

:25:00.:25:02.

front bench and the rest of the government to think very carefully

:25:03.:25:08.

about these aspects of this process. Finally, clause 222 requires the

:25:09.:25:14.

Secretary of State to rip -- prepare a report after five and half years

:25:15.:25:19.

of the passing of the act. On any view, that is too long. I suggest it

:25:20.:25:23.

should be done after two years and if the government refuses to reduce

:25:24.:25:28.

that I hope the Member for Beckham feels and the ISC as well as Mr

:25:29.:25:33.

David Anderson, the independent reviewer, will produce -- who

:25:34.:25:35.

produced an invaluable report last summer kill --, will want to do so

:25:36.:25:38.

themselves. There's often a comment made about

:25:39.:25:49.

how long political events go one because not everybody has said

:25:50.:25:53.

everything that been said. I want to speak of a member of the science and

:25:54.:26:00.

technology select committee, Parliament's geek squad, and raise a

:26:01.:26:04.

third set of concerns about this set of legislation. Members have talked

:26:05.:26:09.

about questions of proportionality and concerns about the balance

:26:10.:26:15.

between security and liberty. The challenges of extra generous

:26:16.:26:17.

directional legislation and whether we in a global world can make

:26:18.:26:22.

national laws that make sense. I want to add concerns about the

:26:23.:26:26.

technical aspects of this legislation and whether it will

:26:27.:26:31.

work. Whether this is legislation for digital natives comfortable with

:26:32.:26:36.

the world or whether it has been defined by digital refugees who run

:26:37.:26:40.

away from the reality of modern technical advances. All of us have

:26:41.:26:46.

had the experience of trying to explain to a person under the age of

:26:47.:26:51.

20 we were not able to Google our homework when we were at school.

:26:52.:26:55.

Many may have jumpers older than the internet. It has fundamentally

:26:56.:27:01.

changed our lives. A third of divorcees contain references to

:27:02.:27:05.

Facebook which only came into our lives in 2007 but has transformed

:27:06.:27:14.

that most personal of relationship. When we think about legislation that

:27:15.:27:18.

takes account of these modern technologies it must be legislation

:27:19.:27:23.

that understands those technologies and the consequences of the changes

:27:24.:27:26.

in the law we are talking about making. When we are the committee

:27:27.:27:30.

looked at the question of surveillance and internet connection

:27:31.:27:36.

records concerns arose. Particularly the idea of a dragon it could be

:27:37.:27:43.

brought together to bring together internet connection records for

:27:44.:27:48.

everything go member of the population for 12 months and what

:27:49.:27:53.

that might entail. There is a fundamental challenge between the

:27:54.:27:58.

idea it is possible to separate out somebody's contact online from their

:27:59.:28:02.

content. It is a definition many companies have raised a concern with

:28:03.:28:07.

and this legislation has not completely grappled with it. The

:28:08.:28:13.

legislation makes a distinction between IP addresses and people

:28:14.:28:17.

knowing who you have contacted and what it called anything else that

:28:18.:28:21.

might reasonably be expected to give the meaning of the communication. A

:28:22.:28:26.

definition that makes sense when we talk about phone records but that

:28:27.:28:30.

has to talk about the world to come not the one before. If I send a

:28:31.:28:34.

message through Outlook you do not have to know the content to know it

:28:35.:28:39.

is a message to request a meeting with somebody. When we talk about a

:28:40.:28:45.

website someone has visited, that talks about content, for example if

:28:46.:28:55.

it was an alcohol website it brings contents definition. We need to

:28:56.:29:01.

challenge these definitions so we need a much tighter definition of

:29:02.:29:05.

what it means to have an internet connection record and what will be

:29:06.:29:10.

held on aggregate. It is something that all three committees have

:29:11.:29:14.

called for. It is not something we are stealing from the government

:29:15.:29:20.

about understanding that in this modern world the distinction between

:29:21.:29:24.

content and contact is not a viable one. It needs to be much tighter in

:29:25.:29:28.

this legislation because if not the question about who can access that

:29:29.:29:33.

information leads into can access the meaning of those content

:29:34.:29:41.

combinations. Those labourers questions will only become more

:29:42.:29:45.

stark. I can see a few digital refugees querying what the internet

:29:46.:29:50.

of things and, it is the growing number of physical things connected

:29:51.:29:54.

online. I was given a coffee maker that I can set of using my mobile

:29:55.:29:59.

phone. It is wonderful to be able to sit in bed and order several cups of

:30:00.:30:06.

coffee. We have air bikes in cars online, burglar alarms online,

:30:07.:30:12.

people may sit there and electricity online, forms of contact that are

:30:13.:30:22.

accessible through digital media. All of that form of contact is

:30:23.:30:26.

potentially information that could be created in an internet

:30:27.:30:30.

communication record, information that could potentially be very

:30:31.:30:35.

useful in an investigation. If you looked at somebody's electricity

:30:36.:30:42.

use... Isn't the point with the internet connection record you are

:30:43.:30:47.

looking for a past history for a future crime? Is it not relevant if

:30:48.:30:52.

you're investigating a child abuser or terrorist to see their past

:30:53.:30:57.

records and if they have accessed sites with relevant material, which

:30:58.:31:03.

you would be able to see from the contact information? I am not sure

:31:04.:31:06.

of the point he is making because nobody is suggesting you would not

:31:07.:31:12.

want to access this information but to separate out contact from content

:31:13.:31:16.

is much more difficult than the Home Secretary is suggesting so we need

:31:17.:31:22.

much more honesty about the powers they are proposing that our police

:31:23.:31:25.

and investigatory authorities may have. If you can get information

:31:26.:31:30.

about my electricity meter, if you want to look at the contact between

:31:31.:31:36.

me and my electricity meter, if I was doing it a lot you might wonder

:31:37.:31:40.

what I was doing in my home that requires a lot of heat, drug

:31:41.:31:44.

enforcement agencies may look at that. That brings with it content

:31:45.:31:49.

about what you are doing. It does not mean we do not need methods for

:31:50.:31:56.

accessing that. What is missing is an honesty about the technical

:31:57.:31:59.

complications that will come with that. We need to be able to address

:32:00.:32:09.

this. Perhaps I can reassure her the Home Secretary emphasised that we

:32:10.:32:13.

continue to have discussion with the providers for the reason she has

:32:14.:32:17.

described. It is essential that what we oblige them to do they can do.

:32:18.:32:23.

The member for Sheffield Hallam gave the game away and said that the bid

:32:24.:32:28.

tiddly overtime security services and the police have requested the

:32:29.:32:31.

ability to do this work and the simple reason is they need to in the

:32:32.:32:38.

interests of protecting us all. I am grateful to him for acknowledging

:32:39.:32:42.

that the idea that one can always separate out contact from content

:32:43.:32:47.

data is not viable so we need a much more honest debate about who will be

:32:48.:32:52.

able to access that information and under what circumstances and that is

:32:53.:32:55.

something I hope to see in the committee stage because the fact we

:32:56.:33:00.

cannot justify to our constituents that their content data may be

:33:01.:33:04.

accessed however inadvertently is something we have to address. The

:33:05.:33:12.

question about honesty about encryption, concerns about the bill

:33:13.:33:17.

and how it might affect encryption, that many of the technology

:33:18.:33:22.

companies are very concerned about. The bill talks about giving the

:33:23.:33:25.

Secretary of State the power to serve technical capability of

:33:26.:33:29.

disease and being able to require companies to remove their electronic

:33:30.:33:33.

protection but the clarity about what that means that what protection

:33:34.:33:37.

there is in terms of encryption technology themselves and what that

:33:38.:33:41.

might mean for other consumers of services is not clear that as a

:33:42.:33:47.

concern for many. We know encryption is a vital part of security for

:33:48.:33:55.

services. Ashley Madison, talk talk, hospitals did not have security

:33:56.:33:59.

measures in place. We are talking about whether and not the government

:34:00.:34:02.

is going to require those companies to in those bags or opportunities

:34:03.:34:08.

for accessing information. We have to see stronger scrutiny of what

:34:09.:34:12.

that encryption process means because of we are looking at

:34:13.:34:17.

removing some of those encryption requirements that creates a security

:34:18.:34:21.

risk and we have to be honest with the public that that is the choice

:34:22.:34:27.

this government is making. Security of data. This government in 2009

:34:28.:34:33.

dropped about turning back the surveillance state but in this

:34:34.:34:36.

legislation they are privatising the databases they said they did not

:34:37.:34:43.

want seeing developed. It is not clear about the security of this

:34:44.:34:47.

data. We know that having to hold everybody's internet records for a

:34:48.:34:53.

year will be honeypots to hackers unless security processes are in

:34:54.:34:58.

place. The fact the government has not clarified who will pay for the

:34:59.:35:02.

security, what a reasonable cost is, how disputes will be, leaves open a

:35:03.:35:09.

gap that not only hackers but consumers will be interested in as

:35:10.:35:13.

well. The government has to be clear about how would make sure it

:35:14.:35:17.

protects consumers from having information hacked as a result of

:35:18.:35:20.

requiring these companies to gather this data. Similar concerns about

:35:21.:35:25.

bulk interference and the encouragement data. There are

:35:26.:35:31.

questions about the proportionality of this legislation. Questions about

:35:32.:35:36.

the judicial extent of this legislation and overseas. Concerns

:35:37.:35:42.

about the technology. We have to be able to answer questions on all

:35:43.:35:45.

three of these to be satisfied this is appropriate for the 21st-century.

:35:46.:35:50.

I hope to see amendments that will address these issues within

:35:51.:35:59.

committee. I know that many members share this view. To felt act on any

:36:00.:36:05.

one of these compromises the other three because if we do not work with

:36:06.:36:10.

our overseas partners and get the technology right we could create

:36:11.:36:14.

more problems in the future. I hope that the ministers will listen to

:36:15.:36:19.

those concerns and recognise the spirit of what they said about

:36:20.:36:22.

holding back the surveillance state but I hope they will be digital

:36:23.:36:35.

natives and not digital refugees. Interesting comments. The Home

:36:36.:36:42.

Secretary and the shadow secretary both quite correctly begun by paying

:36:43.:36:47.

tribute to the prison officer from Northern Ireland who died today

:36:48.:36:55.

after a play attack on March four. -- currently. The European

:36:56.:37:00.

convention on human rights, the right to life, everyone's right to

:37:01.:37:05.

live show be protected by law, I respect the difficulties ministers

:37:06.:37:09.

have had drafting this bill and bringing together the conflicts of

:37:10.:37:14.

liberty and security and I understand there are calls to

:37:15.:37:17.

improve scrutiny associated with greater powers. However we must take

:37:18.:37:23.

care to avoid damaging the effectiveness of operational

:37:24.:37:25.

decision making that protects our citizens. Effective operations

:37:26.:37:30.

require agility in the face of ruthless opponents. After a decision

:37:31.:37:36.

has been made I am in favour of a more rigorous and rapid review

:37:37.:37:42.

process. I regarded signing warrants as a key responsibility when I took

:37:43.:37:47.

over as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Sadly there were

:37:48.:37:52.

elements that would not accept the settlement and were determined to

:37:53.:37:57.

pursue their aims by terrorism. We are equipped agencies at

:37:58.:38:00.

considerable public expense and I was aware are security services

:38:01.:38:06.

could only operate if decisions were made from the top facing a

:38:07.:38:11.

deterioration in the security situation. I was always to be

:38:12.:38:16.

disturbed at any time if an urgent decision was required. The vast

:38:17.:38:21.

majority of warrants were signed in regular slots built into my diary. I

:38:22.:38:26.

was occasionally walk up and asked to make a decision. The proposal to

:38:27.:38:33.

have a dual Lock involving endorsement by a commissioner will

:38:34.:38:37.

bring an element of delay to effective operational decisions. Our

:38:38.:38:42.

calls for more scrutiny of these vital decisions I understand but

:38:43.:38:50.

only a democratically elected Secretary of State should make such

:38:51.:38:55.

decisions. During my time I had real respect... Would he agree that the

:38:56.:39:04.

definition of urgent needs to be one for the minister and not for the

:39:05.:39:08.

judge and therefore they should be no possibility for latent

:39:09.:39:11.

application of judicial review reviewing what is or what is not

:39:12.:39:17.

urgent? Yes, I endorse the whole decision should be in the hands of

:39:18.:39:21.

the democratically elected member of state responsible here and by all

:39:22.:39:25.

means have the most rigorous review after words by a learned judge. I am

:39:26.:39:32.

listening and I did similar things as a minister. Isn't it the case

:39:33.:39:41.

that politicians' minds will always turn to what will happen if I do not

:39:42.:39:49.

sign this? Isn't that judicial check a helpful double lock on that so

:39:50.:39:53.

that the politician does not feel worried that sell your to agree

:39:54.:39:57.

might lead to public embarrassment in the future? No.

:39:58.:40:07.

The politician's responsibility is to report to this House and the

:40:08.:40:12.

politician should be responsible for these very difficult decisions.

:40:13.:40:15.

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