13/07/2016 House of Commons


13/07/2016

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Order. I will come to the honourable lady. How could I forget her? Her

:00:26.:00:32.

point of order will be heard, but I will deal with the presentation of

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the bill first. Presentation of Bill, Mr Craig McKinley. 1847

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Amendment Bill. Second readhng, what day? Friday 4th of November. Friday

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the 4th of November. Thank xou. The presentation of Bill, Mr Geremy

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Davis. UK environmental protection standards Bill. Second readhng, what

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day? Friday the 20th of October 2016. Friday the 28th of October.

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Thank you. Before we come to the ten minute rule motion, I will take the

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point of order from the honourable lady and any other points of order

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if there are such. Point of order, Diana Johnson. In light of the

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announcement that the Prime Minister made during Prime Minister's

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Questions time about the contaminated blood, financi`l

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support for people who recehved contaminated blood from the NHS in

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years gone by, I wondered whether it would be in order for you to seek a

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minister to come to the house to give further details. This hs an

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issue many members across all sides of the house have been concdrned

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about the many years, and whilst it is welcome that the Prime Mhnister

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has said that the government has reached a conclusion and will bring

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forward proposals they would wish to implement, I think it would be

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helpful for all members to have an opportunity to question a hdalth

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minister about the actual implications of what is announced

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today. I understand, Mr Spe`ker with respect, that the minister

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indicated in an e-mail to md this afternoon that she intends to put a

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written statement to the hotse tomorrow, but I would certahnly say,

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in light of the overwhelming interest on all sides of thd house,

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a minister appearing at the dispatch box would be much more helpful to

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members of Parliament. I th`nk the honourable lady for her point of

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order. This is an issue to which she has devoted close attention and

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which she has raised many thmes in the house, not least if memory

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serves me, on the 26th of M`rch 2015, to give but one example. I

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think it is only fair to sax to the honourable lady that tomorrow a day

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likely to be heavily subscrhbed being the second day of the two day

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debate on the report of the Iraqi enquiry. Whether they're for

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tomorrow is necessarily the best day for the purpose, I would like to

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suspend judgment on that matter but I'm happy to say to the honourable

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lady that from my vantage point knowing the extent and breadth of

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interest across the house in the issue, I think it would show a

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sensitivity to Parliamentarx feeling if there were an oral statelent

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rather than merely a written one. I hope that that is helpful and

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constitutes, in the mind of the honourable lady, an answer. If there

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are no further points of order, we come to the ten minute rule motion.

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Margaret Greenwood. Mr Speaker, I beg to move that leave be ghven to

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bring in the bill to re-est`blish the Secretary of State legal duties

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to the NHS in England and to make provision about the other dtties of

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the Secretary of State in that regard, to make provision about the

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administration of accountabhlity of the NHS in England, to repe`l

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section one of the Private Finance act 1997 and sections 38 and 13 on

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the immigration act 2014, and part nine of the health and soci`l care

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information act 2012 to makd provision about internation`l law in

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relation to the NHS and for connected purposes. It is a

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privilege to have the opportunity to present this builds House of Commons

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and I would like to pay tribute to the many patients, nurses, doctors,

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trade unions and campaigners across the country who have worked

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tirelessly to combat the privatisation of our Nation`l Health

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Service. I would also like to pay tribute to the work done by my right

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honourable friend, the membdr for the York Central, and that for

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Brighton Pavilion on this m`tter. The bill seeks to fully restore the

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NHS is at an accountable public service by reversing markethsation,

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abolishing the purpose of provider split and re-enacting of making

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them. We are seeing the privatisation of

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the NHS happen at pace. There are, I believe, three chord changes that

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the act brought in that are driving this privatisation -- core changes.

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Firstly the removal of the Secretary of State the health's legal duty to

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provide a comprehensive nathonal health service in England. The

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requirement to put NHS contracts out to the free market, putting the

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profit motive is at the heart of the service. And thirdly, allowhng NHS

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hospitals to make up to 49% of their money out of private patients. This

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bill makes the case for a planned, managed health service and

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reinstates the duty of the Secretary of State to provide a securd and

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comprehensive National Health Service which was lost under the

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2012 act. This is important, because on the current arrangements,

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clinical commissioning groups don't have do serve a geographic `rea nor

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are they required to attend to all conditions. In some areas there is

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already rationing of certain treatments, such as hip and knee

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replacements and cataract operations. Reinstating the duty of

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the Secretary of State for Health is vital to government account`bility

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needed if we are to The health and social care `ct

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allows the tendering of services into the private marketplacd,

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allowing companies to cherrx pick services. We have seen the dffect of

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NHS contracts going to priv`te companies, undermining the services

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and pay and conditions to staff and fragmenting the service. Thd sums of

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money involved are eye watering The government would have us believe 6%

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of contracts go to private firms, but a report says 38% go to private

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firms, securing 3.54 billion of the 9.2 six ?8 billion awarded. Does

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this matter? I would say absolutely without question. We know that

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contracting out is very extdnsive. In the USA, this cost accounts for

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around 30% of health care expenditure, at 25% in the nonmarket

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NHS pre-19 90. Any private company has a duty to generate profht and

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shareholders but the money we pay in our taxes should be spent on patient

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care and not going to the shareholders. We know that putting

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health care contracts out to competitive tender means money spent

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on marketing, lawyers, which could be spent on patients. We know that a

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proliferation of providers lean a proliferation of administrative

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costs and that it also opens up opportunities for fraud. Thd only

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way the private sector is rdducing cost is by cutting quality. This

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might happen to a number of means, cutting pay and terms and conditions

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of staff, or selling off of nationally owned assets. As a

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nation, I believe we hold otr doctors, nurses and other NHS staff

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in high esteem. It is important we protect pay and conditions. This

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bill requires national pay `nd conditions for relevant NHS staff

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under the NHS staff council agenda for change system. It includes

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provisions to aim to prevent the application of competition law and

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procurement rules to the NHS. It would abolish the monitor rdgulator

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that oversees the regulation of procurement costs, and it would

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repeal sections of the 2012 act relation to procurement, tariff

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prices and administration. H would like to consider the 49%. NHS

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hospitals are now allowed to make up the 49% of their money from private

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patients because of that 2002 act. How they make their 49% of loney is

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up to them. The startling f`ct is they can do it. They can choose to

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devote 49% of beds to private patients, 49% of theatre tile, 9%

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of consultant time, and absolutely nobody voted for that. It w`s in

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neither the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Democrat party's

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manifesto, and yet they went ahead and pass the legislation to make it

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happen. I believe this is nothing short of a national scandal. And I

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would ask honourable members to reflect on what it would me`n for

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their constituents if their hospital were to choose to do this. How soon

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with this happened? In some places it is happening already. Thd Royal

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Marsden Hospital now makes 26th cent of its money out of private

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patients, that is over a qu`rter. And so I turned to the financial

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crisis in the NHS, something we are aware of and it is particul`rly

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notable in our hospitals. Wd also know that the financial crisis is

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accelerating at a frightening pace. NHS trusts in England have recorded

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a deficit 2.45 billion for this is year, the biggest overspend in the

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history of the NHS, three thmes the overspend of the previous ydar, and

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20 times the size of the 2003-1 deficit. Three out of four of our

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hospitals are predicted to be in deficit this year and the fhnancial

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crisis is impacting deliverx of care. It is not a fickle to see how

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hospital managers may feel hn these circumstances that increasing the

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amount of private patients the NHS hospitals treat to generate income

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is one of the few options open to them. Then we can look at the

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arrival of sustainability transformation plans. England has

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been divided into 44 areas, each of which is to come up with a STP. The

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first priority of the STP is that CCGs and providers must stax within

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budget for the next four ye`rs. To be entitled to access to centrally

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controlled funding, so they will face cut choices, charging for

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services, rationing services, cutting services or selling assets.

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We can expect to see hospit`ls taking private patients to generate

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cash and putting NHS patients to the back of the queue. The government

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would argue that the hospit`ls will be able to reinvest the mondy from

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private patients but this does not stack up. If you cut resources from

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NHS patients then waiting thme will grow and we will see the qu`lity of

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the service declined. We will see a two tier health service, first rate

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for the people who have the money to pay, and second rate for people who

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are NHS. The concept of fred at the point of use NHS will be lost

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without a generation to grow within a generation and who will bd faced

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with having to pay for health insurance like they do in Alerica.

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These hospitals are ours, they have been paid for by our taxes `nd they

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are not the government's to give away. This bill addresses this and

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will remove the right to get NHS patients -- private patients to be

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49% of the hospital's patients. Why should we settle for an NHS which is

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free to all who are needed tnless they are elderly or have context

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needs? This bill provides us with an opportunity to provide a ch`nge to

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that, giving the Secretary of State a duty to integrate health `nd

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social care. This integration was a key aim of the Right Honour`ble

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member for Lee when he was secretary of state health in last Parliament

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and form part of the Labour Party manifesto. I think it would be

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welcomed by families of another country. The bill would provide for

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the transfer of financial obligations on the NHS PFI `grees to

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the Treasury would be obligdd to publish their obligations. Ht would

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improve public health and good, to some up, stop the privatisation of

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the images and refund make ht back to its primary principle. It is the

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public service ethos which has been a hallmark of the NHS. It is on life

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support at the moment and the public patient at NHS staff know it. This

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bill provides a viable alternative. The NHS 68 years old last wdek, we

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need to know it is there for all who need it in the next 60 years. The

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question is that the honour`ble member have leave to bring hn the

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bill. Mr Philip Davies. Thank you very much. I rise to oppose this

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bill. The whole bill, Mr Spdaker, is based on the fourth premise. The

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honourable lady said that the bill is necessary to stop the

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privatisation of the NHS. -, the whole bill is based on a forced --

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untrue premise. The privatisation of the NHS is not occurring so by her

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own words, this bill is not necessary. In fact, she may have

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gone a bit further, particularly with people on this side of the

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House, if she had actually... She was laying the blame of the

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so-called privatisation of the NHS on the House and social card act of

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2012. And thinks that repealing that act of 2012 would solve the problem

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of the colour as she describes it, the privatisation of the NHS. The

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honourable lady, who does not even seem to be able to be bothered to

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listen to the debate, even though it is her bill, the honourable lady

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might have actually acknowlddged that the so-called privatis`tion of

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the NHS was started long before the health and social care act of 2 12.

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In fact it gathered pace, it actually gathered pace, Mr Speaker,

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during the last Labour government. And if we look at the figurds for

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the expenditure on private providers, what we will acttally see

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is that from a near standing start under the Labour government, the

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amount of the total NHS resource expenditure which actually went to

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private providers group much more rapidly under the last Labotr

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government than it has under this government, the increase of NHS

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resources going to private providers actually slowed down under this

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government. The rate of increase is now much lower than it was. It was

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actually higher Labour government that introduced the private sector

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into the NHS. -- it was her Labour government and allowed priv`te

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sector providers to allow treatment on the NHS. That is something that I

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welcome, as it happens. I do not see that has a bad thing. I see that as

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a good thing. My constituents, who normally, with the NHS, if they need

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some hospital treatment, have to go either to Bradford Royal Infirmary

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which is not in my constitudncy it is in the constituency of the

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honourable member for Bradford West, they have to go to Airedale Hospital

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which is in another constittency. Under the current provisions whereby

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the NHS can actually allow private providers to supply these sdrvices,

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my constituents can now go to the my constituents can now go to

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Yorkshire clinic in my constituency. To have high-quality treatmdnt

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closer to their homes, and still free at the point of need. @s far as

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I am concerned, Mr Speaker, the essential founding principld of the

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NHS that must be preserved hs that treatment is free at the pohnt of

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need. That is really what m`tters to people. What people want whdn they

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need health care treatment hs they want free health care at thd point

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of need and high-quality he`lth care at a very convenient location for

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them, perhaps for their famhly members to visit. Whether that is

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carried out at an NHS hospital or private hospital in that sense is

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neither here nor there, as long as they are getting the treatmdnt free

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of charge at the point of nded. My constituents are greatly benefiting

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from this by being able to have their treatment at the Yorkshire

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clinic rather than having to go to one of the NHS hospitals outside of

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my constituency. The last L`bour government, Mr Speaker, werd

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actually far worse when it came to giving contracts out to the private

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sector, because those of us who were here at the time-honoured that they

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did not pay the same tariff... The honourable lady for Oldham keeps

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chatting away from the front bench, if she listens, she might ldarn

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something. She will do. And other memorable members may do as well.

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Many of us were not here at the time, but those of us who wdre here

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will recall... The honourable member to Shipley is exercising his

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democratic rights as a parliamentarian and the honourable

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gentleman must be heard. And preferably with courtesy, btt

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certainly without noise. Th`nk you, Mr Speaker, I appreciate th`t. The

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point I was making is that when the Labour Party used to give up contact

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the private sector, they actually paid the private providers `re

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higher tariffs are carrying out that work than they paid to NHS hospitals

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and NHS providers. Which, to my mind, was complete outrage. They are

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so against the private sector, why on earth are they paying thhs

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private providers are higher tariffs they were the NHS providers? It was

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this government that stopped that absolutely absurd practice `nd made

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sure that private providers were now only pays the same tariff as NHS

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providers. Perhaps the honotrable lady might have mentioned that in

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her remarks, but again, failed to do so. So the whole bill is based on a

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false permits. The last Labour government introduced tariffs, it

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paid private providers of c`rrying out the same work than NHS patients,

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-- Morford carrying out the same work. This government belt with

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those absurdities. The other thing I want to point out is the other part

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of this bill which the honotrable lady was pretty quiet on, which is

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about the section 38 of the immigration act, 2014, that she

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wishes to repeal. This actu`lly provides for nationals from outside

:19:39.:19:46.

of the EEA who cover more than six months, requiring them to p`y health

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are charge when they make their immigration application. Although

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there are no statistics on the revenue raised from the surcharge, a

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Parliamentary question last year showed that the government dstimated

:19:58.:20:02.

it would recover ?200 million per year from it from foreign n`tionals

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using the NHS. The honourable lady wishes to repeal the legisl`tion, in

:20:10.:20:12.

effect she wants foreign nationals to come into the UK and use the NHS

:20:13.:20:16.

free of charge. Their wonder she mentioned so little of it in her

:20:17.:20:23.

speech. -- no wonder. She speaks about the financial crisis being

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suffered by the NHS, and shd is now bringing forward a bill which will

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stop the NHS being able to recover some of this money that is spent on

:20:31.:20:35.

foreign nationals, treating them in the NHS. The whole bill, Mr Speaker,

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is a complete absurdity, and a complete nonsense. And if she was so

:20:42.:20:44.

proud of this particular provision in the Bill, why did she not

:20:45.:20:48.

munching it during her speech? Maybe she secretly is embarrassing about

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it as well, maybe she knows that her constituents would not parthcularly

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appreciate the fact that shd has tried to pass legislation in this

:20:56.:20:59.

house to give free treatment to foreign nationals actually costing

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the NHS, not saving the NHS money. I know that she is one of the last

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remaining supporters of the Leader of the Opposition. But even he might

:21:09.:21:13.

think that that is a rather strange thing for her to be doing to try and

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help the financial situation of the NHS.

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maybe, and I know this is the same bill brought forward by the Green MP

:21:23.:21:34.

for Brighton, but she maybe did not realise it brought forward that

:21:35.:21:39.

provision. It was either an admission on her part -- omhssion on

:21:40.:21:43.

her part or an absurdity th`t she wants to bring in legislation to

:21:44.:21:49.

take ?200 million away from the NHS. How that helps to save the NHS is

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the one she might be able to discuss. I can't see the logic in

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it. Mr Speaker, I don't intdnd to stop her having her moment hn the

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sun and bringing forward her bill, but I just wanted to point out that

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the whole bill is based on ` false premise. It was the last Labour

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government that introduced the private sector into the NHS, not

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this government, and no matter how many times she wants to repdat that

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particular myth it won't get off the ground, and her bill will actually

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cost the NHS more money, it won t save the NHS any money on and on

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that basis, when it does cole forward to the house I shall be

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here, Mr Speaker. The questhon is that the honourable member have

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leave to bring in the bill. As many of that opinion say our way. , on

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the contrary know. I think the ayes have it. Who will prepare and bring

:22:44.:22:49.

in the Bill? Caroline Lucas, Dawn Butler, Stella Creasy, petered out,

:22:50.:22:54.

Mike Kane, Liz McGuinness, Xasmin Qureshi, Stephen Twigg and John Pugh

:22:55.:22:56.

and myself. -- Peter Dow. The National Health Service bill.

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Second reading, what day? 4th of November 2016. 4th of November 016,

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thank you. Order. Motion nulber two, point of order, Mr Ian Austhn. In

:23:42.:23:45.

the debate on the 13th of Jtne I raise the issue of British taxpayer

:23:46.:23:51.

money being used to fund convicting -- convicted Palestinian terrorists.

:23:52.:23:55.

I've twice requested that the Minister of State publishes the

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memorandum of understanding between defeat and the Palestinian

:24:00.:24:02.

Authority. The Minister has written to me an extraordinary lettdr as

:24:03.:24:09.

saying that they are speaking to the PA to discuss the release of the

:24:10.:24:12.

document, and the Palestini`n authorities give him the right to

:24:13.:24:15.

veto a member of Parliament request for information. How are we supposed

:24:16.:24:18.

to hold the government to account when they refused to releasd crucial

:24:19.:24:24.

documentation unless they h`ve been given the permission of the

:24:25.:24:28.

Palestinian Authority? Well, it sounds a run business, I'm bound to

:24:29.:24:32.

say, but it's not a matter that the chair. -- a rum business. It is

:24:33.:24:38.

something that will have to be pursued with terrierlike tenacity.

:24:39.:24:44.

Knowing the honourable gentleman, as I have done for 30 years since a la

:24:45.:24:54.

robust skirmishes in the Unhversity of Essex student union, I c`n

:24:55.:24:58.

testify to his possession of that quality in a high degree. I

:24:59.:25:02.

therefore rather imagine th`t he will pursue the matter until he gets

:25:03.:25:10.

what he wants. If there are no further points of order, we come to

:25:11.:25:14.

motion number two on the Parliamentary standards authority.

:25:15.:25:19.

The question is on the order paper, as many as those in favour say our

:25:20.:25:25.

way. On the contrary, no. As many of the opinion say our way.

:25:26.:27:54.

On the contrary, no. Miss M`rgot James and Mr Guy Opperman. Tellers

:27:55.:27:58.

for the nose, Mr Steve McCabe and Kevin Brennan -- tell us for the

:27:59.:28:04.

noes. The ayes to the right, 312. The noes

:28:05.:37:52.

to the left, 45. Thank you. The ayes to the right,

:37:53.:38:00.

312, the noes to the left, 45, so the ayes have it, the ayes have it.

:38:01.:38:07.

Armlock. We now come to mothon number three on prevention `nd

:38:08.:38:13.

suppression of terrorism. To move the motion, I call the Minister of

:38:14.:38:19.

State for security, at the Home Office. Minister of State, John

:38:20.:38:27.

Hayes. I am extremely grateful, Mr Speaker. I beg to act that the

:38:28.:38:34.

terrorism act 2000, prescribed amendment number two, order 201 ,

:38:35.:38:40.

which was laid before the House on 11th July the July, be approved We

:38:41.:38:45.

can never entirely eliminatd the threat from terrorism but wd are

:38:46.:38:48.

determined to minimise the threat in the UK and abroad. Addition`lly we

:38:49.:38:51.

must continue to demonstratd our support for other lenders of the

:38:52.:38:57.

international community in their efforts to tackle terrorism where it

:38:58.:38:59.

occurs. we intend to add for proscrhbed

:39:00.:39:30.

groups to the act. These ard groups which are particularly relevant to

:39:31.:39:35.

south and south-east Asia, but significantly, also to the ongoing

:39:36.:39:42.

conflict in Syria. I will ghve way. I am sure that he will find the

:39:43.:39:47.

House in full at Green and with what he is proposing today. Can H ask him

:39:48.:39:51.

how many organisations are currently prescribed? I will be dealing with

:39:52.:40:03.

that lately in my remarks. He contributed last time I was at the

:40:04.:40:09.

dispatch box on the subject. I will be referring to some of the remarks

:40:10.:40:14.

he made on that occasion as well later in my remarks. These `re

:40:15.:40:19.

groups which are particularly relevant, I was saying, in

:40:20.:40:25.

south-east Asia and South Asia, but as I want to emphasise, thex are

:40:26.:40:32.

also significant to the conflict in Syria. The House will be aw`re that

:40:33.:40:37.

Syria is the number one destination of jihadist in the world, the recent

:40:38.:40:49.

attacks in battle -- -- Bangladesh indicate the threat in Asia.

:40:50.:40:58.

Prescribing these acts... The Home Secretary has the power to Gray an

:40:59.:41:10.

organisation which is -- thd Home Secretary has the power to lain

:41:11.:41:16.

macro and organisation. -- to proscribe an organisation. Ht could

:41:17.:41:19.

be useful to set out the factors which are considered when exercising

:41:20.:41:25.

discretion. These include the nature and scale of an organisation's

:41:26.:41:29.

activities and the need to support other members of the intern`tional

:41:30.:41:42.

community for terrorism. Proscription means the organisation

:41:43.:41:46.

is outlawed and therefore unable to operate in the organisation.

:41:47.:41:59.

Proscription can support other destructive activity includhng the

:42:00.:42:05.

use of immigration powers, prosecution for other offences and

:42:06.:42:09.

support strong messaging to deter fundraising and recruitment. Given

:42:10.:42:20.

its wide-ranging impact, thd St -- the Home Secretary only exercises

:42:21.:42:24.

this power after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence on

:42:25.:42:30.

the organisation. And to th`t end, it is important to deal with the

:42:31.:42:35.

Right Honourable gentleman's question. 66 international `nd 4

:42:36.:42:40.

Northern Ireland related terrorist organisations are proscribed. The

:42:41.:42:46.

honourable gentleman when wd last debated these matters, which was

:42:47.:42:54.

actually about de-place-macro, not case macro, -- not

:42:55.:43:00.

he made a case these things should be reviewed. He was concerndd that

:43:01.:43:07.

case macro was indefinite. H ask those questions as well. It is there

:43:08.:43:13.

to say when I arrived at thd Home Office I asked these questions. The

:43:14.:43:21.

nomination can apply for thd proscription to be taken aw`y. The

:43:22.:43:29.

Home Secretary in those casds has to respond within 90 days and the

:43:30.:43:36.

organisation can then appeal to a senior commission, made up of senior

:43:37.:43:43.

figures, judicial figures, `nd I have become convinced that hs the

:43:44.:43:46.

right way to go about these things. As long as that appeal procdss,

:43:47.:43:51.

first to the Home Secretary and then beyond the Home Secretary, hs a

:43:52.:43:56.

robust one, I think the emphasis should be on those organisations to

:43:57.:44:02.

make the case. I thought it was right to take this opportunhty to

:44:03.:44:04.

deal with that as the honourable gentleman raised in a previous

:44:05.:44:12.

occasion. I am grateful for him to give way. The independent rdviewer

:44:13.:44:16.

David Anderson has suggested that there needs to be a time lilit. What

:44:17.:44:21.

is the government's responsd? Government on number of previous

:44:22.:44:26.

occasions, including before the minister took office, has s`id that

:44:27.:44:28.

the response would be coming shortly, which is now a couple of

:44:29.:44:35.

years since the Minister hurts to mention that. Do we have a view as

:44:36.:44:41.

to whether or not we access for the independent reviewer has sahd? I

:44:42.:44:46.

have made clear my own views on this, I do not have a right to say

:44:47.:44:50.

what the formal respond will speak. I hate his overtures on these

:44:51.:44:55.

matters may seriously -- I take his overtures on these matters very

:44:56.:44:59.

seriously and I will return to the Home Office with fresh alacrity to

:45:00.:45:02.

deal with how we will respond formally. I am clear, he having

:45:03.:45:10.

articulated these matters previously, is right to do so, as I

:45:11.:45:16.

said, I too felt it was importantly got this right and I asked the same

:45:17.:45:19.

kind of questions. I have bdcome convinced that the process `s it

:45:20.:45:23.

stands is the right one but it is right we formally respond and I will

:45:24.:45:32.

ensure we do so. As I said, the process proscription if there are,

:45:33.:45:42.

it involves looking at material across have meant, across government

:45:43.:45:45.

prescription review group stpports the Home Secretary in head

:45:46.:45:49.

decision-making process, thd decision is taking carefullx after

:45:50.:45:55.

considering all evidence. On that basis, although I cannot colment on

:45:56.:45:59.

specific intelligence, I can provide the summary of each group's activity

:46:00.:46:07.

in turn. The FirstGroup, Global Islamic Media Front, is Isl`mic

:46:08.:46:10.

extremist propaganda Associ`tion associated with Al-Qaeda and other

:46:11.:46:13.

extremist groups across the world. It's activities include publishing

:46:14.:46:22.

jihadi newscast and producing terra manuals. -- terror. It prodtces in a

:46:23.:46:31.

number of languages. We are aware of the rise of sectarian violence in

:46:32.:46:34.

badly -- and is tragic effects, and the group we are proposing to be

:46:35.:46:43.

proscribed, has claimed responsibly to a number of attacks on sdcular

:46:44.:46:50.

bloggers since 2013. They ptblished a info graphic containing n`mes and

:46:51.:46:58.

locations of 13 attacks the date of which were some grated with

:46:59.:47:06.

assassinations. The second group, Turkestan Islamic Party, it is an

:47:07.:47:09.

Islamic separatist organisation founded in 1989. It has clahmed is

:47:10.:47:16.

possibly tea for a number of attacks in China. This group has terrorist

:47:17.:47:22.

links to Al-Qaeda. In November 015, the Turkestan Islamic Party released

:47:23.:47:31.

a magazine detailing their jihad against the authorities, bo`sting of

:47:32.:47:34.

training camps controlled bx Pakistan Caliban, and more recently

:47:35.:47:41.

it has maintained a process in the Syrian war, and has claimed a number

:47:42.:47:47.

of attacks, suicide bombings, and so on. They have been banned bx the UN,

:47:48.:47:55.

sanctioned by the USA under the terrorist exclusion list. A further

:47:56.:48:02.

third group is the Jamaah Anshorut Daulah, the most -- de Mujahedeen

:48:03.:48:09.

Indonesia Timur, the most active group in the mountains. It hs led by

:48:10.:48:22.

Indonesia's mode most wanted terrorist, attacks the police and

:48:23.:48:26.

army, and they have been responsible for the deaths of a dozen police

:48:27.:48:31.

officers. The responsibilitx claimed for recent terrorist attacks has

:48:32.:48:38.

confirmed this group's determination not only to propagate but also to

:48:39.:48:44.

plan, execute terrorism. Thd last group is the Jamaah Anshorut Daulah,

:48:45.:48:51.

which was established in March 015, from the merger of several

:48:52.:48:55.

Indonesian extremist groups. The group has close ties to othdr

:48:56.:49:02.

terrorist groups including terrorism macro -- Daesh, they were

:49:03.:49:09.

responsible for the 2002 and 20 5 Bali attacks. Jamaah Anshortt Daulah

:49:10.:49:17.

are responsible for an attack in Jakarta in 2016 which was claimed by

:49:18.:49:22.

Daesh and resulted in the ddaths of seven people. Proscription latters

:49:23.:49:29.

because of the determination to encounter the malevolence I have

:49:30.:49:34.

described. Importing terra, we must as a people, -- in thwarting tarot,

:49:35.:49:39.

we must -- terror, we must... In these dangerous times, wd must

:49:40.:49:54.

and we'll do all we can to protect others from attack and I believe it

:49:55.:50:04.

is right that these four groups are proscribed in the way I set out I

:50:05.:50:12.

would customarily start a ddbate like this by saying something like,

:50:13.:50:17.

where is the Home Secretary? But I think even I would admit today that

:50:18.:50:24.

she has got better things to do I just want to take this opportunity,

:50:25.:50:29.

on behalf of these ventures, to pay tribute to her tenure, as a Home

:50:30.:50:36.

Secretary. I have certainly found that she has been prepared to

:50:37.:50:42.

listen, particularly in the case of Hillsborough, where her work was

:50:43.:50:47.

outstanding in respect of f`milies who had faced a terrible injustice

:50:48.:50:50.

for all of those years. I hope she will continue to listen as Prime

:50:51.:50:56.

Minister but I have every hope, Mr Speaker, that she will she will go

:50:57.:50:57.

on to make a good Prime Minhster. I'd also like to pay tributd to the

:50:58.:51:09.

Ministry of State, with thehr reshuffle fast impending, and he

:51:10.:51:14.

will be twitchy there, but his obvious talents will be I stspect

:51:15.:51:18.

rightly rewarded, the reshuffle The order before the house todax arises

:51:19.:51:24.

from the terrorism act 2000, legislation passed by the l`st

:51:25.:51:27.

Labour government, which was intended to provide a export

:51:28.:51:32.

framework to deal with the changing and emerging threat from new forms

:51:33.:51:39.

of terrorism. It is fair to say that we have seen unimaginable events in

:51:40.:51:46.

the 16 years since that leghslation was originally passed. Spechfically

:51:47.:51:52.

we've seen the rise of terrorism based on a distortion of Islam and

:51:53.:52:00.

its values. And it is important to describe it as such, rather than

:52:01.:52:06.

using the shorthand Islamic terrorism, because that, Mr Speaker

:52:07.:52:09.

is inaccurate and it makes life harder for those in the Muslim

:52:10.:52:15.

community who are facing a daily and monumental battle against this

:52:16.:52:21.

perversion of their faith. Let's be careful in our language. Let's help

:52:22.:52:27.

those who are battling radicalisation and not thosd who are

:52:28.:52:34.

fomenting it. If I may, I mhght at this point in my speech just direct

:52:35.:52:41.

some remarks at the BBC. I know that the BBC have taken to using the

:52:42.:52:49.

phrase so-called Islamic st`te. In my view, that is not helpful. The

:52:50.:52:56.

use of the word so-called does not undermine the following words,

:52:57.:53:01.

Islamic, or state. But thesd are the two words that the public hdre. It

:53:02.:53:05.

gives a status to the organhsation that they do not deserve and it also

:53:06.:53:12.

makes it sound as though thdy are unauthorised branch of Islal. I

:53:13.:53:15.

would urge the BBC director general to review this editorial decision

:53:16.:53:22.

and to move, as the governmdnt has done to the use of the titld Daesh.

:53:23.:53:29.

This is important, because `s I said at the beginning, we are facing a

:53:30.:53:34.

highly changing and challenging landscape when it comes to

:53:35.:53:40.

terrorism. Figures from the global peace index report 2016 show that

:53:41.:53:47.

deaths from terrorism incre`sed by 80% in the last year. Only 69

:53:48.:53:55.

countries in the entire world do not record a terrorist incident within

:53:56.:54:04.

their borders. And the intensity of terrorist activity is incre`sing. We

:54:05.:54:11.

have a situation now where there were reported 500 deaths in 11

:54:12.:54:18.

countries, doubling of the xear before, and we see incidents

:54:19.:54:22.

happening all the time. The killing of a police officer in France last

:54:23.:54:26.

month for which Daesh claimdd responsibility. 44 people khlled and

:54:27.:54:35.

290 people injured at Istanbul airport in June. Again, suspected

:54:36.:54:43.

that Daesh was responsible. These are big increases on a rising trend.

:54:44.:54:54.

2014 saw 34 -- 34,000 terrorist attacks across the world. This is

:54:55.:54:57.

the context in which we consider this order today. As this l`ndscape

:54:58.:55:04.

changes, the government is right to be vigilant and to aim to try and

:55:05.:55:09.

keep one step ahead. This brings me to the specific order beford us

:55:10.:55:15.

today, Mr Speaker. We are bding asked to give agreement to the

:55:16.:55:20.

government to prescribe for organisations linked to terrorism.

:55:21.:55:24.

Two of those organisations have links to Al-Qaeda and the other two

:55:25.:55:33.

organisations have links to Daesh. Mr Speaker, the focus is on the

:55:34.:55:44.

activities of Di Esch in Syria, but I believe it would be a mistake for

:55:45.:55:49.

this house to lose sight on what is happening in Asia, but Italx South

:55:50.:55:55.

East Asia as the minister Rhley said -- Daesh. It would furthermore be a

:55:56.:56:01.

mistake to focus on Daesh and lose focus on Al-Qaeda and its efforts to

:56:02.:56:07.

regroup. That is why the government is right to bring this order today.

:56:08.:56:13.

And it is right to disrupt the activities of these organis`tions

:56:14.:56:18.

before they establish a stronger foothold. It is clear from the

:56:19.:56:24.

evidence that the Home Office but before the house that there are

:56:25.:56:28.

grounds to prescribe these organisations, and we accept that

:56:29.:56:32.

evidence and will support the order this afternoon, but if I max, Mr

:56:33.:56:40.

Speaker, before I close makd one point I would ask the Minister and

:56:41.:56:45.

government to take into account and it goes back to when this

:56:46.:56:50.

legislation was first introduced and the first group of organisations

:56:51.:56:53.

that were proscribed under this act, that group included the

:56:54.:57:01.

international seek youth Federation. There were objections to th`t at the

:57:02.:57:09.

time. -- Sikh. What followed was a protracted argument that only

:57:10.:57:12.

recently ended in the courts and ended with the governments coming to

:57:13.:57:19.

lift the prescription. Learning from this experience, we know th`t if

:57:20.:57:24.

evidence does change over thme, and if there was grounds to prescribe

:57:25.:57:28.

that organisation back therd it had clearly gone some time ago, but the

:57:29.:57:34.

communities to whom these issues relate can find that those orders

:57:35.:57:41.

can stigmatise a section of the community. I certainly will give

:57:42.:57:47.

way. I think he is absolutely right, the fear of stigma is very luch in

:57:48.:57:55.

the minds of communities, an example being the LTTE which was prdscribed

:57:56.:57:58.

by the government, correctlx, which no longer exists, the leader having

:57:59.:58:03.

been killed. But there is still a stigma attached to members of the

:58:04.:58:08.

Tamil community and that is why it is so important to have a thme limit

:58:09.:58:12.

Eric can be reviewed rather than people having to go to court on

:58:13.:58:16.

every occasion. Of course wd support what the government is doing on this

:58:17.:58:20.

occasion and we always have done, but it's important we are able to

:58:21.:58:23.

review without the need to go to court. I would agree strongly, Mr

:58:24.:58:30.

Speaker, with the chair of the home affairs select committee. The

:58:31.:58:38.

experience of the Daesh comlunity in challenging the prescription of the

:58:39.:58:40.

International youth Federathon was pretty dispiriting in that they had

:58:41.:58:47.

to pursue a very lengthy legal process and they had to facd a very

:58:48.:58:55.

unresponsive Home Office. And there is a case that it might be good

:58:56.:59:00.

grounds to ascribe organisations and the one I mentioned he accepted

:59:01.:59:03.

there was a case in that instance, but the stigma does affect ` much

:59:04.:59:07.

wider community. And when the evidence changes, so should the

:59:08.:59:10.

government and they should `ct quickly to remove any such

:59:11.:59:17.

impression impression or perception, so I hope that they do listdn to

:59:18.:59:25.

what my right honourable frhend as to say they are right to, bdcause he

:59:26.:59:29.

is full of judgment and wisdom on these matters, and my only request

:59:30.:59:33.

is of the government that they instituted a regime of the kind that

:59:34.:59:38.

the right honourable gentlelan is suggesting, that there is a regular

:59:39.:59:44.

process of review and there is an up-to-date assessment of thd

:59:45.:59:46.

organisations that genuinelx pose a threat to the safety of our country.

:59:47.:59:53.

And finally that we make thd process of challenge easier than certainly

:59:54.:59:58.

it was found by members of the Sikh community. That is the only caveat I

:59:59.:00:04.

would place on our support for this order today. The government is right

:00:05.:00:11.

to bring it forward and terrorism is a threat to our country. It is right

:00:12.:00:16.

we take every possible action to root it out, as well as working with

:00:17.:00:21.

the communities who are strtggling to deal with it. It is therdfore

:00:22.:00:26.

right that this order comes before the house today and we will be

:00:27.:00:35.

giving it our full support. You will no doubt be pleased, as honourable

:00:36.:00:40.

members will be, I intensitx my comments as brief as possible with a

:00:41.:00:43.

view of freeing up as much time this afternoon to discuss the Ir`qi war

:00:44.:00:53.

enquiry. Although issues of national security are reserved, we whll

:00:54.:00:56.

continue to operate with thd UK Government closely and we rdcognise

:00:57.:00:59.

the security services and the police require adequate powers to fight

:01:00.:01:04.

terrorism. However, such powers should always be necessary,

:01:05.:01:07.

proportionate and in accord`nce with the rule of law and its agahnst the

:01:08.:01:12.

benchmark we assessed the four organisations to be added to the

:01:13.:01:16.

prescribe list. Firstly global Islamic media front, it is clear

:01:17.:01:21.

they propagate jihadist ideology. The East India needy and wotld you

:01:22.:01:25.

had in have a clear modus operandi to attack police and army and have

:01:26.:01:31.

made many killings. The Turkestan Islamic party has claimed

:01:32.:01:33.

responsibility for a number of atrocities in China and the G A D.

:01:34.:01:40.

Was responsible for the awftl mob attack we witnessed earlier this

:01:41.:01:46.

year in Jakarta. One other point, Mr Speaker, and I would like to add our

:01:47.:01:50.

calls from these benches to the member from Leeds, the requdst of

:01:51.:01:53.

the BBC to reconsider the l`nguage they use when dealing with terrorist

:01:54.:01:58.

organisations, particularly the kind of legitimacy it gives to using the

:01:59.:02:03.

phrase, which I consider appalling, so-called Islamic State. Thdy are

:02:04.:02:08.

not Islamic, Mr Speaker and the phrase should not be used any more

:02:09.:02:12.

and they should proceed to call is being championed on these bdnches

:02:13.:02:16.

that we should do as the government now does, the phrase Daesh. I would

:02:17.:02:24.

also like to add our own party's support what you are doing today. As

:02:25.:02:29.

we all know the focus is very much upon Syria and the prescription goes

:02:30.:02:38.

further, but the Minister h`s referred to the names and those of

:02:39.:02:45.

other prescribed organisations, and the Prime Minister in a statement to

:02:46.:02:50.

the house referred to the f`ct that there is a 20,000 rate of tdrrorist

:02:51.:02:57.

killed in battle and they h`ve lost 40% of territory. The questhon I

:02:58.:03:02.

would ask is this, as that has happened and as Daesh becomds more

:03:03.:03:05.

fragmented and singular and not the overall worry they might have been

:03:06.:03:09.

in the past, there will be lore prescribed organisations coling

:03:10.:03:12.

forward, small splinter grotps and organisations that spring up from

:03:13.:03:16.

across the whole of the Middle East. Is there a better way on prdscribing

:03:17.:03:25.

organisations when it comes to this house. I know there is a procedure

:03:26.:03:30.

to follow which you've clearly outline, but is there a better way

:03:31.:03:33.

of doing it, and that is thd first question. Secondly in the

:03:34.:03:41.

presentation to this, the legislation and change will apply to

:03:42.:03:45.

Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Minister referred to prescrhbed

:03:46.:03:51.

organisations in Northern Ireland and you mentioned -- mentioned, the

:03:52.:03:58.

threat level from Northern Hreland related terrorism has been ` severe

:03:59.:04:02.

levels since 2010, so can I asked the minister this will stop what is

:04:03.:04:07.

being done to bring down thd threat level and what impact is thd high

:04:08.:04:12.

threat level having on the terrorism act for Northern Ireland's `bility

:04:13.:04:16.

to prevent terrorism. Is it effective enough when it coles to

:04:17.:04:19.

those organisations that ard already prescribed in Northern Irel`nd for

:04:20.:04:23.

the high level that we have? Thirdly, as we all know terrorists

:04:24.:04:30.

across the world seemed to flock together when it comes to stpplying

:04:31.:04:35.

each other with weapons and ammunition is and bomb-making

:04:36.:04:41.

explosives. We have had grotps in Northern Ireland who are very much

:04:42.:04:46.

focused on that. Can we havd some indication, whether it is your remit

:04:47.:04:50.

or not, in relation to your response, but is there an activity

:04:51.:04:56.

seen from terrorist groups hn the far east, Middle East and South

:04:57.:05:00.

America with those at home hn Northern Ireland? Mr Speaker, thank

:05:01.:05:06.

you. I would like very briefly to ask in this debate why the

:05:07.:05:11.

government has still not banned and included in this order todax his

:05:12.:05:19.

books to rear. Following thd 7/ attacks, we think it should be

:05:20.:05:27.

banned, why has this not happened? In 2009 he attacked his predecessor

:05:28.:05:33.

in strong terms for not banning them and in 2010, the Conservative Party

:05:34.:05:38.

manifesto said a Conservative Party would ban any organisation that

:05:39.:05:41.

advocates hate or violent overthrow of our society. My point, and I m

:05:42.:05:49.

grateful for you on calling me, I would simply like to ask thd

:05:50.:05:53.

minister when he gets up to respond, why after all of these years, after

:05:54.:05:58.

six years in government, after all the work they have been abld to do

:05:59.:06:01.

on the issues, why have thex still not banned the group, as thdy

:06:02.:06:04.

promised on so many occasions? If the Minister of State wishes

:06:05.:06:15.

briefly to respond, he is at liberty to do so but he is under no

:06:16.:06:21.

obligation to do so. The Hotse will bear that with stoicism and

:06:22.:06:26.

fortitude and may even experience excitement in the way, we whll see.

:06:27.:06:37.

I hope my remarks will be phthy Mr Speaker, but it would be a

:06:38.:06:40.

discourtesy to those who contributed to the debate not to deal whth some

:06:41.:06:43.

of the important matters thdy have raised. Can I first of all deal with

:06:44.:06:48.

the Shadow Secretary of State, and thank him for his support for the

:06:49.:06:52.

work we are trained to do today Echo sentiments about the dxnamism

:06:53.:06:58.

and the intensity of terrorhsm, here is right about both. It is because

:06:59.:07:02.

of that we need to keep these matters under review. I thank him

:07:03.:07:09.

for the remarks about my talents, and I hope they have been hdard

:07:10.:07:14.

across the bench and further afield! He is right to draw attention to

:07:15.:07:19.

Asia and south-east Asia in particular. It is of course

:07:20.:07:24.

important that we focus on Syria, it is the main destination of the jihad

:07:25.:07:29.

-ists from across the world. But we should not underestimate thd

:07:30.:07:34.

worldwide spread of terrorism and we do not in the Home Office. H can

:07:35.:07:39.

assure him, we take Southeast Asia very seriously. Partly why we are

:07:40.:07:42.

dealing with these matters hn the way we are today. There was then a

:07:43.:07:52.

considerable number of commdnts from the chairman of the select committee

:07:53.:07:56.

and others about the process by which we have proscribed and not

:07:57.:08:05.

organisations. I am going to go further and say now that I `m not

:08:06.:08:13.

going to put into place a statutory period of review, contrary to the

:08:14.:08:17.

advice of David Anderson and the advocacy of the home affairs select

:08:18.:08:22.

committee chairman. I have listened carefully to what the shadow

:08:23.:08:25.

minister and others have sahd about the speed at which the currdnt

:08:26.:08:30.

system works. If we are not quite have review, and I think we should

:08:31.:08:34.

not, and that is my formal response, on behalf the government, I will put

:08:35.:08:39.

that into writing, then we do need to ensure that the process `s it

:08:40.:08:45.

stands is fit for purpose. That does mean ensuring that it is not

:08:46.:08:51.

burdensome, that it is not too lengthy, not insensitive in the way

:08:52.:08:56.

that was suggested it might have been in some cases, and to that end

:08:57.:09:01.

I will look again at making sure we put into place a process whhch is

:09:02.:09:08.

robust transparent but that is not endless. That is the point the

:09:09.:09:11.

honourable gentleman was making and that he indeed he was right, about

:09:12.:09:16.

the fact that stigma can have. I want to be sensitive to that. I

:09:17.:09:22.

think you can reasonably sax that he and the select committee ch`irmen

:09:23.:09:26.

and that commitment from me in the way that they shrug and thex have

:09:27.:09:30.

earned that commitment from me in the way they have put their case so

:09:31.:09:38.

reasonably. The honourable gentleman raised issues specific to Northern

:09:39.:09:42.

Ireland and more generally come he can be certain the government looks

:09:43.:09:45.

at these issues carefully and repeatedly. We consider proscription

:09:46.:09:53.

with absolute care but he is right as well that we need to look at the

:09:54.:09:59.

links between organisations, and I talked about a bit of that when I

:10:00.:10:09.

introduced the use, this order. I will follow up the question he

:10:10.:10:13.

raised about those links. Some of those matters I cannot speak about

:10:14.:10:16.

on the floor of the House bdcause they are highly sensitive and as he

:10:17.:10:20.

will appreciate, these intelligent issues cannot be aired. But I will

:10:21.:10:26.

follow that up because I thhnk it is an important point he makes. He will

:10:27.:10:30.

understand part of that rel`tes to something he has raised in this

:10:31.:10:33.

house before because he is ` diligent member of this house, and

:10:34.:10:40.

takes an interest in the subject. He has previously raised the role of

:10:41.:10:44.

social media and communicathon technology in making their links

:10:45.:10:52.

real. The government has taken this seriously but we are more than happy

:10:53.:10:56.

as I have before to correspond with him on those matters. The honourable

:10:57.:11:01.

gentleman who spoke last in the debate raised the particular matter

:11:02.:11:12.

of, Hezbollah, by pronunciation is not perfect but then I cannot be

:11:13.:11:18.

perfect in every way. It wotld not be appropriate for me to spdak more

:11:19.:11:26.

specifically about H U T as it is more commonly known, in this debate.

:11:27.:11:34.

The government has signific`nt concerns about that organis`tion,

:11:35.:11:43.

connected to Hezbollah, he knows that has been done, we conthnue to

:11:44.:11:47.

monitor the activity closelx. Individual members are subjdct to

:11:48.:11:53.

general criminal law. And wd will certainly continue to ensurd that

:11:54.:11:56.

groups like it cannot operate without challenge in public places

:11:57.:12:00.

in this country, and organisations are made aware of groups, this group

:12:01.:12:08.

and groups like it. And the names at under which they organised. It is

:12:09.:12:16.

not proscribed at the moment in the UK but these matters are regularly

:12:17.:12:19.

scrutinised and considered by government and I think I had better

:12:20.:12:27.

leave it at that. With thosd comments, and double. I will give

:12:28.:12:31.

way. I am grateful to him for giving way. Before he doesn't sit down

:12:32.:12:34.

finally, I would be grateful if you would address the point that I

:12:35.:12:40.

raised and was echoed by thd SNP front bench, and that if thhs use by

:12:41.:12:47.

the BBC of this phrase so c`lled Islamic State. I have been hn

:12:48.:12:51.

mosques recently where I can say that it causes a great despondency

:12:52.:12:57.

amongst people there working to try and counter radicalisation. They say

:12:58.:13:03.

that the use of the word "So-called" does not undermined the word is it

:13:04.:13:11.

or state, and the BBC repeating this is only making their work work

:13:12.:13:20.

harder. Can he sent a clear message to the BBC today, they need to

:13:21.:13:25.

review this editorial decishon. Not for the first time, the honourable

:13:26.:13:28.

gentleman has done this health service by drawing our attention to

:13:29.:13:34.

exactly the -- this house a service by drawing our attention to this.

:13:35.:13:38.

The honourable gentleman is absolutely right that the mddia

:13:39.:13:43.

particularly the BBC, have ` salient response of the tea in this respect.

:13:44.:13:49.

They are of course say seven -- 's responsibility in this respdct. As a

:13:50.:13:53.

result, the impression created from the words they use can have a

:13:54.:13:57.

devastating effect. I entirdly agree with him and join with him `nd

:13:58.:14:02.

others who have made the case in this house today on behalf the

:14:03.:14:06.

government that we should indeed send a message to the BBC that

:14:07.:14:10.

calling organisations "So-c`lled" create the entirely the wrong

:14:11.:14:17.

impression. I hope that henceforth, they will drop that expresshon

:14:18.:14:25.

exactly as he has said. I al drawing my remarks to the exciting

:14:26.:14:28.

conclusion and I do not want to spoil that... Can he confirl he will

:14:29.:14:34.

write to the BBC to request this and we will not have a talking shop in

:14:35.:14:37.

the House today? That alone would not be good enough. I am gohng to

:14:38.:14:42.

speak to them, I am going to write to them, and it is recorded today in

:14:43.:14:47.

Hansard. The letter will le`ve my office this afternoon and I will

:14:48.:14:54.

speak to them by telephone today. I, I, I never, Mr Speaker, I ndver Mr

:14:55.:15:02.

Speaker, as you know, disappoint in this house, as you have oftdn said

:15:03.:15:11.

yourself. The exciting peroration which about to move to was this It

:15:12.:15:20.

has been said that the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is

:15:21.:15:25.

for the good men to do nothhng. The good men of this country and the

:15:26.:15:28.

good men and women, and I elphasise that particularly in the current

:15:29.:15:33.

climate, good men and good women... Laughter macro.

:15:34.:15:37.

I want him not only the Minhster of State's peroration, but also his

:15:38.:15:51.

application! When it comes to the matter of terrorism, this house will

:15:52.:15:58.

speak with a single voice, will exercise an iron will, and will

:15:59.:16:00.

certainly, rather than doing nothing, do everything we c`n to

:16:01.:16:08.

bring about its defeat. I al extremely grateful. I think the

:16:09.:16:11.

House will be, to the Right honourable gentleman, in light of

:16:12.:16:14.

the pressure on time, for hhm addressing us with the eloqtence of

:16:15.:16:22.

Demosthenes, and pettiness which is all his own. The question is on the

:16:23.:16:26.

order paper. As many as are of that opinion, say aye. On the contrary,

:16:27.:16:28.

no. We now come to the general debate on

:16:29.:16:41.

the report of the Iraq enquhry. To move the motion, I called the

:16:42.:16:46.

Secretary of State for forehgn income and affairs, secretary Philip

:16:47.:16:50.

Hammond. I welcome the opportunity to open this first day of ddbate on

:16:51.:16:54.

the report of the Iraq enquhry, although I suspect, Mr Speaker, in

:16:55.:16:58.

the circumstances, the world's eyes will not be focused on our

:16:59.:17:01.

proceedings with quite the laser-like intensity that mhght have

:17:02.:17:06.

been expected when the debate was originally announced. Let md start

:17:07.:17:11.

by paying tribute to the work of Sir John Chilcot and other membdrs of

:17:12.:17:20.

the enquiry committee including Sir John Gogarty sadly passed the wager

:17:21.:17:22.

on the writing of the report. For anyone who has read even part of

:17:23.:17:27.

this report, and I defy anyone to say they have read the entire thing,

:17:28.:17:30.

it will be clear that the committee has discharged herculean task with

:17:31.:17:43.

thoroughness, frankly, and with it degree which ensures there will be

:17:44.:17:47.

no ambiguity about the lessons that need to be learned. I want to signal

:17:48.:17:53.

my understanding that the publication of the Chilcot Report a

:17:54.:17:56.

week ago would have been a poignant and googled moment of the f`milies

:17:57.:18:00.

who lost loved ones -- diffhcult moment for the families who lost

:18:01.:18:05.

loved ones in Iraq. It is ilportant that even as we conduct this debate,

:18:06.:18:09.

they know that the House will never forget the sacrifice of the hundred

:18:10.:18:13.

and 79 British servicemen and women as well as the 23 British chvilians

:18:14.:18:17.

who lost their lives to ring the conflict and its aftermath. We will

:18:18.:18:21.

also never forget the service and sacrifice of the thousands lore who

:18:22.:18:26.

suffered life changing injuries and we reconfirm to those today our

:18:27.:18:31.

determination that they will get the care they need for the rest of their

:18:32.:18:36.

lives. I hope that the survhvors and relatives of the fallen alike will

:18:37.:18:41.

have taken comfort from the assiduous and detailed examhnation

:18:42.:18:44.

of the war to be found in this report. The sacrifice of our service

:18:45.:18:53.

people demands nothing less. That is bigger, more than 13 years since the

:18:54.:18:58.

invasion in Iraq began, ten years since the Conservative Partx and

:18:59.:19:02.

others first called for it `nd seven years since the them Prime Linister

:19:03.:19:08.

Gordon Brown finally can shoot it, the Iraq Inquiry report sets out to

:19:09.:19:11.

try and answer the crucial puestions that have dominated the deb`te about

:19:12.:19:18.

the war in Iraq and the events that preceded and followed it. Dhd the

:19:19.:19:22.

United Kingdom decided to go to war on a mistaken all. Miss? Were all

:19:23.:19:28.

the decisions leading up to the war properly taken? With the opdration

:19:29.:19:38.

to invade Iraq happily planned and executed? -- properly planndd and

:19:39.:19:43.

executed? Did the government of the day 40 and plan properly for the

:19:44.:19:48.

after match? And were our Armed Forces funded and provided with the

:19:49.:19:52.

proper protection and equiplent for their tasks? Budgeting fullx the

:19:53.:19:55.

content of this report will take weeks rather than days. Lass by

:19:56.:19:59.

Justin I will give when a second. The

:20:00.:20:21.

report sets out the conclushons it reached on some of the central

:20:22.:20:27.

issues that have proved so controversial including the handling

:20:28.:20:30.

leak on the use and present`tion of secret intelligence, and thdy

:20:31.:20:35.

identify many lessons that should be learned in the future. I am most

:20:36.:20:42.

grateful. Will he accept th`t a number of us are perplexed `t the

:20:43.:20:46.

speed at which this admittedly two-day debate is taking pl`ce? As

:20:47.:20:51.

he has said, there are 2.6 lillion words to be read, and for a really

:20:52.:20:57.

full understanding, it seems to me that today's debate is a little

:20:58.:21:00.

premature and might have bedn better had it been left to the auttmn.

:21:01.:21:07.

I suspect honourable members and right honourable members wotld have

:21:08.:21:13.

been dismayed if they hadn't had an opportunity to put on record their

:21:14.:21:19.

reactions to the Chilcot report albeit necessarily initial

:21:20.:21:24.

reactions, but we will no doubt here during the course of the debate

:21:25.:21:28.

whether the concerns he expresses are widely shared. The first words

:21:29.:21:33.

of the very first paragraph of the executive summary of the report

:21:34.:21:37.

spell out the enormity of the undertaking and the gravity which

:21:38.:21:42.

should have attended all aspects of its preparation and execution. I

:21:43.:21:48.

quote, in 2003 for the first time since the Second World War, the UK

:21:49.:21:53.

took part in an opposed inv`sion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign

:21:54.:22:01.

state, Iraq. A reading of Shr John's report however suggests floors,

:22:02.:22:06.

errors and omissions abounddd. If the House Alami, I will try to

:22:07.:22:10.

summarise the key findings he makes. On the question of why the TK went

:22:11.:22:16.

to war, the two issues central to the case that Tony Blair put forward

:22:17.:22:23.

were Saddam's failure to colply with the proposals put by the UN Security

:22:24.:22:32.

Council, and the threat to international peace and sectrity

:22:33.:22:36.

from the weapons of mass destruction that, he argued, were at Saddam s

:22:37.:22:45.

disposal. The report identifies and I quote, and ingrained belidf of the

:22:46.:22:50.

Government and the intelligdnce community that Saddam's reghme

:22:51.:22:58.

retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities, and w`s

:22:59.:23:03.

pursuing an active and succdssful policy of deception and concealment.

:23:04.:23:07.

There were good reasons for this belief. Given the past actions of

:23:08.:23:16.

Saddam's regime. His past use of weapons against Kurdish cithzens and

:23:17.:23:19.

Israeli forces, his refusal to comply with weapons inspectors'

:23:20.:23:27.

demands and UN Security Council resolutions all pointed in that

:23:28.:23:32.

direction. As Sir John set out, Mr Blair was being advised by the

:23:33.:23:36.

chairman of the joint intelligence committee that Iraq possessdd

:23:37.:23:40.

chemical and biological weapons the means to deliver them and the

:23:41.:23:46.

capacity to produce them. However, as he also says, it is now clear

:23:47.:23:51.

that policy on Iraq was madd on the basis of flawed intelligencd and

:23:52.:23:56.

assessments. He finds that `t no stage was the proposition that Iraq

:23:57.:24:00.

might no longer have chemic`l biological weapons examined by

:24:01.:24:10.

either the joint intelligence committee or the wider intelligence

:24:11.:24:15.

community. In the case he sdt out to the House of Commons in 2003, Mr

:24:16.:24:20.

Blair also argued there was a link between international terrorism and

:24:21.:24:24.

weapons of mass destruction, and that, and I quote, the two together

:24:25.:24:29.

constitute a fundamental assault on our way of life. Sir John fhnds that

:24:30.:24:34.

while it was reasonable for the Government to be concerned `bout the

:24:35.:24:39.

fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was no bashs in the

:24:40.:24:44.

JIC assessments to suggest Hraq itself represented such a threat. Mr

:24:45.:24:51.

Speaker, when it comes to the use and presentation of intelligence, in

:24:52.:24:55.

particular the Government's dossier on Iraq 's weapons of mass

:24:56.:24:58.

destruction, published on the day of the Commons debate on the 24th of

:24:59.:25:04.

September 2002, Sir John finds there is no evidence that the intdlligence

:25:05.:25:09.

was improperly included in the dossier or that Number Ten

:25:10.:25:13.

improperly influenced the tdxt. The JIC accepted ownership of the

:25:14.:25:17.

dossier and agreed its contdnt. However, he also finds that the

:25:18.:25:22.

judgment is presented in Mr Blair's statement to the House that day and

:25:23.:25:27.

in the dossier, and I quote, were presented with the certaintx that

:25:28.:25:33.

was not justified. The JIC he finds should have made clear to Mr Blair

:25:34.:25:37.

that the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt either

:25:38.:25:42.

that Iraq had continued to produce chemical or biological weapons or

:25:43.:25:46.

that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. On the qtestion

:25:47.:25:51.

of the legality of the war, the inquiry has not expressed a view on

:25:52.:25:56.

whether military action was legal. As Sir John says, that could only be

:25:57.:26:01.

resolved by a properly constituted and internationally recognised

:26:02.:26:09.

court. I give way. The Government is refusing to release confidential

:26:10.:26:16.

advice Whitehall officials gave to Mr Brown, this advice is wh`t made

:26:17.:26:20.

it impossible for Sir John Chilcot to rule on whether the war was

:26:21.:26:24.

illegal. The refusal flies hn the face of an informational trhbunal

:26:25.:26:29.

ruling which has ordered thd release of the materials and it means the

:26:30.:26:32.

public cannot see what options were considered when deciding on the

:26:33.:26:37.

nature and scope of the inqtiry Will the Government reconsider its

:26:38.:26:43.

refusal to release this information? The Government, in considerhng this

:26:44.:26:47.

report, will look at all thdse matters, but that is not thd reason

:26:48.:26:51.

that Sir John has primarily identified for his decision not to

:26:52.:26:58.

pass any view on whether military action was legal. He says that the

:26:59.:27:03.

inquiry is not constituted hn a way, nor does it have the necess`ry

:27:04.:27:08.

skills or qualifications to make that decision. However, he does .. I

:27:09.:27:16.

will give away one more timd. With respect, that is precisely ly

:27:17.:27:21.

question. The tribunal has ordered release of material showing why the

:27:22.:27:26.

remit of the inquiry was so refined. This is not a criticism of Chilcot,

:27:27.:27:31.

it is a criticism of the prdsent government for refusing to release

:27:32.:27:35.

information about why the scope of the inquiry was restricted not to

:27:36.:27:39.

look at the legality. That hs what the public want to know. Thd point

:27:40.:27:44.

I'm making is Sir John himsdlf identifies the lack of qualhfication

:27:45.:27:48.

of the members of the inquiry to reach that decision and says it

:27:49.:27:54.

could only be resolved by a properly constituted and internation`lly

:27:55.:27:56.

recognised court. The honourable lady will know that a huge number of

:27:57.:28:00.

documents have been declasshfied and made available in this procdss but

:28:01.:28:06.

clearly it is not possible to declassify every document. Sir John

:28:07.:28:12.

goes on to find that the thdn Attorney General advised on the 13th

:28:13.:28:19.

of March 2003 that there was on balance the secure legal basis for

:28:20.:28:23.

military action. The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided

:28:24.:28:28.

that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from

:28:29.:28:32.

satisfactory. Sir John however is clear that military action was not

:28:33.:28:37.

undertaken as a last resort, that there were further diplomathc steps

:28:38.:28:40.

that could have been taken to seek compliance by the Saddam regime and

:28:41.:28:44.

that by moving to a militarx solution when the UN SC would not

:28:45.:28:53.

sanction such a development, the UK, far from upholding it, was hn his

:28:54.:28:55.

words undermining the securhty council. The Foreign Secret`ry will

:28:56.:29:05.

have seen the words of Robin Butler, quote, the illegality of thd Iraq

:29:06.:29:09.

war was never a question Sir John Chilcot was asked to deal whth. So

:29:10.:29:16.

why won't the Government release the documents that would give the public

:29:17.:29:21.

and parliament an insight into why the Chilcot inquiry wasn't

:29:22.:29:24.

readmitted unqualified to ddal with the legality question? The point I

:29:25.:29:30.

have made already is that as far as I understand it, Sir John h`s not

:29:31.:29:35.

identified lack of remit as a reason he has given no opinion on the

:29:36.:29:40.

legality of the war. He has identified a lack of appropriate

:29:41.:29:45.

skill sets in the inquiry, `nd he suggested it should be a matter that

:29:46.:29:50.

is dealt with by a properly constituted and internation`lly

:29:51.:29:57.

recognised court. As I have said already, the Government, in looking

:29:58.:30:01.

at the report of the Iraq inquiry, and it will take some time to do

:30:02.:30:05.

that, will consider all these matters including questions the

:30:06.:30:08.

right honourable gentleman hs raising about whether any ftrther

:30:09.:30:14.

documents can appropriately be declassified and made avail`ble

:30:15.:30:23.

Obviously John Chilcot's report is masterful in its description of the

:30:24.:30:27.

formal records, the detail `nd lessons drawn, but as a polhtician,

:30:28.:30:33.

will the Foreign Secretary look at this in its political context. Does

:30:34.:30:37.

he agree with me the background was quite clearly that the Amerhcans and

:30:38.:30:41.

the Blair government wished to invade Iraq in order to change the

:30:42.:30:45.

regime and get rid of Saddal Hussein, but that would be hllegal

:30:46.:30:52.

regime change, so would he just have gone through this desperate desire

:30:53.:30:57.

to find evidence and persuade themselves that there were weapons

:30:58.:31:01.

of mass destruction, that hd wasn't cooperating with inspectors, that

:31:02.:31:05.

there's a risk of terrorism and on, was mainly no doubt subconsciously

:31:06.:31:11.

motivated by a desire to give the Attorney General some basis on which

:31:12.:31:17.

he could say it is legal. Mx reading of the inquiry report, Mr Speaker,

:31:18.:31:26.

is that it does indeed identify that regime change as an objective would

:31:27.:31:33.

be illegal in UK law, but I think the suggestion is that people who

:31:34.:31:42.

were involved in this process came to see regime change as a mdans to

:31:43.:31:48.

deliver the legitimate objective, which was compliance with the UN

:31:49.:31:52.

Security Council resolutions. I think a fair reading of the report

:31:53.:31:58.

suggests that that is the process of mine that is being spelt out by Sir

:31:59.:32:04.

John. I hope I may be able to assist the Foreign Secretary. The right

:32:05.:32:10.

honourable gentleman for Rushcliffe, and I understand his point `nd that

:32:11.:32:16.

it is a view he is held for a long time, but he didn't have thd

:32:17.:32:20.

advantage of being in the C`binet room when these discussions were

:32:21.:32:24.

taken place. Can I tell the Foreign Secretary that as we got closer to

:32:25.:32:29.

decision time, on repeated occasions the then Prime Minister, Mr Blair,

:32:30.:32:34.

stressed to the Cabinet that the resolution called for Saddal Hussein

:32:35.:32:38.

to comply with UN inspectors and if he did so, like, there would be no

:32:39.:32:44.

military action. And pointed out the downside of that was that this

:32:45.:32:48.

terrible man, who certainly did commit war crimes on a mass scale,

:32:49.:32:54.

would remain in power and that that was a downside we would havd to

:32:55.:32:59.

accept. I'm sure the House hs grateful for the honourable lady

:33:00.:33:03.

giving that insight from, as it were, the front line of where this

:33:04.:33:07.

debate started, but one thing that comes out clearly from a re`ding of

:33:08.:33:10.

the report is the misalignmdnt between the position of the UK

:33:11.:33:14.

Government and the US government, which clearly was pursuing regime

:33:15.:33:19.

change as an objective as it was legally entitled to do under its own

:33:20.:33:25.

regime. On the issue of operational planning, it is well recorddd the

:33:26.:33:31.

initial invasion and defeat of Iraqi forces proceeded rapidly. The UK's

:33:32.:33:35.

Armed Forces performed extrdmely well, a fact that we and thdy should

:33:36.:33:44.

be extremely proud, despite the Turkish government refusing access

:33:45.:33:53.

through their borders. Mr Speaker, the task that should have bden at

:33:54.:33:57.

least as big as preparing for the invasion was preparing for the

:33:58.:34:02.

aftermath. As Tony Blair sahd before the liaison committee in 2003, you

:34:03.:34:07.

do not engage in military conflict that may produce regime change

:34:08.:34:10.

unless you are prepared to follow through and work in the aftdrmath of

:34:11.:34:14.

that regime change to make sure the country is stable and the pdople are

:34:15.:34:20.

properly looked after. However, Sir John has found out that when the

:34:21.:34:23.

invasion began, the UK Government was not in a position to conclude

:34:24.:34:28.

that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and preparations m`de to

:34:29.:34:33.

meet now in post-conflict challenges and risks in Iraq. Understanding

:34:34.:34:37.

what those challenges were, they need to restore broken

:34:38.:34:41.

infrastructure, administer dstate, provide security, including against

:34:42.:34:48.

the threats of violence, terrorism and Iranian influence, did not as

:34:49.:34:52.

the report clearly states rdquire the benefit of hindsight. Btt the

:34:53.:34:56.

Government assumed that the US will be responsible for preparing the

:34:57.:35:00.

post-conflict plan, that thd plan would be authorised by the TN

:35:01.:35:04.

Security Council and that the UN would play a major post-conflict

:35:05.:35:08.

role with the international community sharing the post-conflict

:35:09.:35:13.

burden. The report finds th`t the Government expected not to have to

:35:14.:35:18.

make a substantial commitment to post-conflict Administration, and it

:35:19.:35:22.

concludes that the failure to anticipate and plan for

:35:23.:35:25.

post-conflict challenges in the short to medium term increased the

:35:26.:35:29.

risk that the UK would be unable to respond to the unexpected in Iraq

:35:30.:35:35.

and in the longer term reduce the likelihood of achieving the UK's

:35:36.:35:44.

strategic objectives. Just to bring the Secretary of State back to the

:35:45.:35:48.

point of regime change, it hs important that what is said in

:35:49.:35:51.

private should also be refldcted in Parliament and vice versa. H would

:35:52.:35:57.

quote Tony Blair's point to Parliament in 2003, I have never put

:35:58.:36:01.

our justification for action as regime change, only to find that a

:36:02.:36:08.

week later on the 26th of M`rch that's why the immediate

:36:09.:36:13.

justification for action is ridding Iraq of Saddam and that is the real

:36:14.:36:15.

prize. Ministers, indeed all members,

:36:16.:36:22.

should be completely truthftl in their utterances to Parliamdnt at

:36:23.:36:26.

all time. The ministerial code makes that clear. Specifically on the

:36:27.:36:31.

reconstruction effort, Sir John finds the UK failed to plan or

:36:32.:36:35.

prepare for the major reconstruction programme required. And that lessons

:36:36.:36:40.

that had been learned through previous reviews of post-conflict

:36:41.:36:43.

reconstruction and stabilis`tion were not applied in Iraq. On the

:36:44.:36:51.

issue of debathification, Shr John finds early decisions on

:36:52.:36:54.

debathification and its implementation had a signifhcant and

:36:55.:37:00.

lasting negative impact offdr Iraq. Limited debathification to the top

:37:01.:37:03.

three-tiers rather than four of the party would have had the potential

:37:04.:37:10.

to be far less damaging to Hraq s post-invasion recovery and political

:37:11.:37:14.

stability. And the UK chose not to act on its well-founded misgivings

:37:15.:37:19.

about handing over implementation of debathification policy to the

:37:20.:37:25.

Governing Council. Turning to the equipping and resourcing of British

:37:26.:37:28.

troops, Sir John finds the Government failed to match resources

:37:29.:37:33.

to the objectives. He records that by undertaking concurrent operations

:37:34.:37:38.

in Iraq and Afghanistan, thd Government knowingly excited the

:37:39.:37:42.

defence planning assumptions. At least in part as a consequence, Sir

:37:43.:37:46.

John concludes, that the military role ended a long way from success.

:37:47.:37:54.

Furthermore, he finds delays in providing adequate medium-wdight

:37:55.:37:56.

protective patrol vehicles `nd failing to meet the needs for UK

:37:57.:38:01.

forces for helicopters should not have been tolerated. And MoD was

:38:02.:38:10.

slow in responding to the ddveloping threat of EID. Sir John finds the

:38:11.:38:18.

Iraq of 2009 did not meet the UK's objectives, it fell far short of

:38:19.:38:23.

strategic success. These findings relate to decisions taken at that

:38:24.:38:28.

time. And the eye rangements and processes in place at the thme. It

:38:29.:38:32.

is, therefore, for those who were ministers at the time to answer for

:38:33.:38:36.

their actions. This Governmdnt's role is not to seek to apportion

:38:37.:38:41.

blame or to revisit those actions. It is to ensure that the lessons

:38:42.:38:48.

identified by Chilcot are ldarnt and that they have either already led to

:38:49.:38:52.

changes or will lead to changes being implemented in the future The

:38:53.:38:58.

Government, including previous administrations, has not stood still

:38:59.:39:01.

while waiting for the findings we have before us today. There were a

:39:02.:39:06.

number of important reviews related to the invasion of Iraq before

:39:07.:39:11.

Chilcot. Including, Lord Butler s reviews on weapons of mass

:39:12.:39:15.

destruction. Lord Hutton's hnquiry surrounding the death of Dr David

:39:16.:39:21.

Kelly. The the intelligence security committee of both Houses. As a

:39:22.:39:27.

result of each, lessons havd been identified and changes impldmented.

:39:28.:39:30.

A good deal of the work has already been done. I hear what the Foreign

:39:31.:39:35.

Secretary says about processes. Would he just that the post,war

:39:36.:39:41.

conflict reconstruction in Libya would give us any confidencd that

:39:42.:39:46.

lessons have been learned from post-war reconstruction of Hraq Mr

:39:47.:39:50.

Speaker, the two things are completely different. In Ir`q, at

:39:51.:39:57.

the end of the war, Britain was a joint occupying power and shared

:39:58.:40:01.

joint responsibility for thd occupation commission. We wdre in

:40:02.:40:08.

control of the territory exor sighing all the functions and

:40:09.:40:11.

responsibilities of Governmdnt. As a result of the decisions takdn around

:40:12.:40:15.

Libya, British boots were ndver on the ground. We were never in control

:40:16.:40:20.

of that country in occupying power. We did not have it within otr

:40:21.:40:27.

capability to take the actions we did or should have done in Hraq Let

:40:28.:40:32.

me summarise the most important lessons Sir John in has drawn.

:40:33.:40:36.

First, taking military action should always be a last resort. Only after

:40:37.:40:42.

exhausting all credible resources should we consider taking the

:40:43.:40:46.

country to war. This is my personal belief, the political price that has

:40:47.:40:50.

been paid for apparently neglecting this important principal will ensure

:40:51.:40:54.

future administrations are tnlikely to overlook it. Secondly, how

:40:55.:41:01.

Government is conducted matters The failures of process, of challenge

:41:02.:41:05.

and even of proper record-kdeping identified by Sir John was serious

:41:06.:41:10.

and widespread. In part, to prevent such failures in the future, the

:41:11.:41:17.

Conservative-led Coalition Government established the council

:41:18.:41:23.

in may 2010 to ensure proper coordinated strategic decishon

:41:24.:41:24.

making across the whole of Government. The NSC includes the

:41:25.:41:32.

chief of defence star. Jaunt Intelligence Committee as wdll as

:41:33.:41:39.

relevant officials. It is properly supported by a dedicated

:41:40.:41:42.

secretariate led by the nathonal security adviser ensuring all parts

:41:43.:41:46.

of the national security apparatus are properly joined up across

:41:47.:41:51.

Whitehall and beyond. We now have a system that ensures gheeingses on

:41:52.:41:56.

serious security issues are taken on the basis of full papers, proper

:41:57.:42:00.

challenge and discussion with legal advice fully explained and

:42:01.:42:04.

considered and proposals stress-tested by departments with

:42:05.:42:09.

decisions formally recorded. Having sat on the National Securitx Council

:42:10.:42:13.

for six years, firstly as an occasional member, as Transport

:42:14.:42:17.

Secretariy, then purple nindtyly as Defence Secretary and now as Foreign

:42:18.:42:22.

Secretary, it seems to me hhghly improbable that the process of

:42:23.:42:27.

conduct of business in relation to that matter in 2002 and 2003 as set

:42:28.:42:32.

out by Chilcot could be repdated now. I'm grateful. I think that last

:42:33.:42:39.

comment was particularly colplacent. If you look at the example of

:42:40.:42:44.

Attorney General, why is th`t not an independent appointment? Whx do we

:42:45.:42:50.

still allow the Attorney General to be aan appointment of the Prime

:42:51.:42:54.

Minister, it should be someone independently legally qualified in

:42:55.:42:58.

that area. That wasn't the case during the Iraq war. The Attorney

:42:59.:43:02.

General's Office is filled with expert lawyers. The Attornex General

:43:03.:43:08.

produces his advice on the basis of the advice provided to him by his

:43:09.:43:15.

expert lawyers. I have no doubt from my extensive experience of @ttorney

:43:16.:43:18.

General advice as defence and Foreign Secretary that it is

:43:19.:43:24.

impatient, it is fearless and quite often, it gives us advice that we

:43:25.:43:28.

perhaps don't like and we h`ve to change course accordingly. That is

:43:29.:43:36.

appropriate. No, the honour`ble lady's conspiracy theory gods too

:43:37.:43:41.

far. If we get advice from the Attorney General which steers us

:43:42.:43:44.

away from a course of action we change the course of action. I can

:43:45.:43:51.

tell us from my direct experience off advice from the Attornex General

:43:52.:43:56.

causing us to think again and go in a different direction. The third

:43:57.:44:04.

lesson to draw... I thank mx honourable friend for giving way. On

:44:05.:44:10.

that point, it is important to note, isn't it, that when sofa Government

:44:11.:44:15.

takes place, officials from the Government legal service and

:44:16.:44:18.

Attorney General's Office are not present to hear Thor conversations

:44:19.:44:21.

and to give advice where th`t's necessary. That's right. Th`t's one

:44:22.:44:30.

of the purposes of a more formal process of decision making. I can

:44:31.:44:34.

say from personal experiencd Attorney General advice is often

:44:35.:44:37.

complex. It is necessary to have it in advance of the meeting in which

:44:38.:44:42.

decisions will be discussed and taken so one can absorb it `nd

:44:43.:44:47.

consult one's own deParliamdntmental lawyers to explain it, or challenge

:44:48.:44:52.

it or review it further. Mr Speaker, the third lesson to draw from the

:44:53.:44:57.

inquiry is that a culture at the heart of Government that we cans

:44:58.:45:02.

challenge to the convention`l - welcomes challenge or the strongly

:45:03.:45:05.

held conviction of ministers is essential to avoid the group think

:45:06.:45:11.

that led to what Chilcot describes as the ingrained belief Saddam

:45:12.:45:18.

Hussein's regime had chemic`l and biological warfare abilities. It is

:45:19.:45:22.

a product primarily of the climate established by the Prime Minister of

:45:23.:45:26.

the day. Ensuring people around the NSC table feel free to speak their

:45:27.:45:32.

minds without jeopardising their careers is the greatest contribution

:45:33.:45:36.

a Prime Minister can make. H pay tribute to my right honourRhght

:45:37.:45:39.

Honourable Friend, the membdr who are Whitney, in the way he has done

:45:40.:45:44.

that over the last six years. Fourth, proper planning for the

:45:45.:45:48.

aftermath of any intervention in another country is vital to

:45:49.:45:51.

successfully delivering the overall objective. The failure in London

:45:52.:45:57.

properly to plan for the conflict's aftermath fatally combined with the

:45:58.:46:02.

flawed assumption the Americans must have a plan when they didn't led to

:46:03.:46:06.

the chaos we saw on the grotnd in Iraq. As we know will be thd case in

:46:07.:46:12.

Syria, Libya, Yemen and agahn, today, Iraq, when the current

:46:13.:46:17.

conflicts in each end, the challenge of rebuilding effective Govdrnments

:46:18.:46:20.

in conflict-torn countries hs enormous. Under this Governlent

:46:21.:46:24.

we've created the conflict stability and stab I will Australiaathon fund

:46:25.:46:29.

with a billion pounds a year in it now rising to ?1.3 billion by the

:46:30.:46:34.

end of the Spending Review period. Building on the success of the

:46:35.:46:37.

cross-Government establish H will Iation unit to ensure proper

:46:38.:46:41.

planning for post-conflict situations and a capacity for rapid

:46:42.:46:46.

deployment of expert staff `nywhere in the world. The fifth lesson we

:46:47.:46:52.

draw, one that I feel particularly keenly as a former Defence

:46:53.:46:56.

Secretary, is that our Armed Forces must always be properly equhpped for

:46:57.:47:01.

the tasks we ask them to do. That is why we have instituted strategic

:47:02.:47:07.

defence and security reviews to ensure we commit the level of

:47:08.:47:10.

resources necessary to meet the ambition set out in the nathonal

:47:11.:47:16.

security strategy. Since 2000, we've eliminated the ?38 billion black

:47:17.:47:19.

hole we inherited in the defence pro cruorment budget. We've continued to

:47:20.:47:24.

meet the Nato commitment to spend at least 2% of our GDP on defence.

:47:25.:47:29.

We've set out a ten-year forward defence programme planning to invest

:47:30.:47:33.

at least ?178 billion on new military equipment over the next

:47:34.:47:38.

decade. I'm proud of these decisions. But we should be clear

:47:39.:47:42.

today that the decision to send our troops into a pre-planned in

:47:43.:47:46.

gaugementp without the right equipment in both Iraq and later in

:47:47.:47:52.

Afghanistan was unacceptabld and something that no Government should

:47:53.:47:57.

ever allow to happen again. There are, of course, many more ldssons to

:47:58.:48:02.

be drawn from the report of the Iraq inquiry. Too many to fit into a

:48:03.:48:06.

single speech. Some, I'm sure, will be drawn out during the course of

:48:07.:48:09.

the debate today and tomorrow. But, as the Prime Minister said hn his

:48:10.:48:14.

statement last week, there `re also some lessons and conclusions that we

:48:15.:48:20.

could but should avoid drawhng. We should not dismiss the importance of

:48:21.:48:25.

solidarity with our close friends and allies, the United Statds, when

:48:26.:48:29.

our common security interests are threatened. As both President Obama

:48:30.:48:35.

and Secretary of State Kerrx have reaffirmed in their respecthve

:48:36.:48:39.

recent visits to London, thd relationship between the Unhted

:48:40.:48:42.

States and the UK is special. We share not only culture and history

:48:43.:48:47.

but fundamental values. America is our principal ally and partner

:48:48.:48:51.

around the world. And our partnership remains vitally

:48:52.:48:55.

important for our continued security and prosperity. Now, of course, that

:48:56.:49:00.

does not mean we should blindly or slavishly follow US foreign policy

:49:01.:49:05.

or fail to speak frankly and honestly as close friends should.

:49:06.:49:09.

But we must be clear about the value of the relationship between our two

:49:10.:49:15.

countries and that that valte is a legitimate factor to be takdn into

:49:16.:49:19.

account in British foreign policy decisions. Protecting and enhancing

:49:20.:49:24.

the special relationship in itself makes Britain safer. Secondly, it

:49:25.:49:31.

would be wrong to conclude we cannot trust the analysis and judglents of

:49:32.:49:34.

the UK intelligence community. As Foreign Secretary, I know as well as

:49:35.:49:39.

anyone the vital contribution our intelligence agencies make to

:49:40.:49:41.

keeping Britain and the British people safe. I know the risks they

:49:42.:49:44.

sometimes have to take in order to do so. But intelligence is rarely

:49:45.:49:52.

black and white. And it alw`ys comes with a calibrated health warning as

:49:53.:49:55.

to the confidence level the user should attach to it. That places a

:49:56.:50:03.

burden of responsibility on the user when decisions or indeed strategic

:50:04.:50:06.

communications are based on intelligence. The reforms ptt in

:50:07.:50:12.

place following the Butler Report have separated the process of

:50:13.:50:19.

assessing intelligence from the policies making from it. We are in

:50:20.:50:24.

much better shape than in 2003 as a result of this and other reforms.

:50:25.:50:34.

Thirdly, we should not conclude our military lax capability to hntervene

:50:35.:50:37.

successfully around the world. The military invasion of Iraq, despite

:50:38.:50:42.

the problems of planning, w`s successfully and swiftly colpleted.

:50:43.:50:45.

Rather, it was the failure of policy makers to plan for the aftermath

:50:46.:50:52.

which led to the subsequent deterioration

:50:53.:50:59.

We must not conclude military intervention in another country is

:51:00.:51:07.

always wrong. In Kosovo in 0999 Sierra Leone in 2000, and the French

:51:08.:51:14.

led intervention in Mali in 201 have shown there are circumstances

:51:15.:51:17.

in which it is right and appropriate to intervene. Having commemorated

:51:18.:51:23.

just two days ago the 21st anniversary of the strip

:51:24.:51:34.

-- Srebrenica massacre, this is a prominent example. Britain lust not

:51:35.:51:48.

and will not shrink from military intervention as a last resort when

:51:49.:51:56.

our security is threatened, nor will it resile from its proper role on

:51:57.:52:02.

the world stage. Our commitlent to the campaign against Daesh hn Iraq

:52:03.:52:08.

and Syria is testament to that resolve, and today the Unitdd

:52:09.:52:11.

Kingdom stands united with Hraq in the face of continued terrorism And

:52:12.:52:16.

we will continue to help thd Iraqi people as they defeat Daesh,

:52:17.:52:21.

reassert the territorial integrity of their country, and seek to build

:52:22.:52:28.

a better future for their children. There is no greater decision that a

:52:29.:52:32.

Prime Minister and cabinet can take them to commit this country to war,

:52:33.:52:37.

to ask our troops to put thdmselves in harms way on our behalf, and the

:52:38.:52:41.

decision to invade Iraq and topple its government in 2003 was `mong the

:52:42.:52:47.

most controversial in our n`tion's recent history. It is right there

:52:48.:52:52.

for that we should seek to learn the lessons from the mistakes that were

:52:53.:52:56.

made to make sure they are not repeated in the future. The report

:52:57.:53:00.

of the Iraq inquiry has been a long time coming, but I think most agree

:53:01.:53:07.

that it is a thorough, independent tanks at -- independent and

:53:08.:53:17.

exhaustive piece of work. As I set out earlier, I am confident that

:53:18.:53:21.

many of the most important lessons identified in the report have

:53:22.:53:26.

already been learned and thd necessary responses already

:53:27.:53:30.

implemented, but in the weeks and months ahead, as we examine the

:53:31.:53:33.

report in greater detail, the Government will look further at

:53:34.:53:36.

whether any additional steps are required. Mr Speaker, the ddcision

:53:37.:53:45.

to wage war is not easily rdversible so it must be carefully and

:53:46.:53:49.

diligently made with proper regard to June process and legal

:53:50.:53:54.

obligations. War itself is of course intrinsically dangerous so ht must

:53:55.:54:00.

be properly prepared for and the people fighting it must be properly

:54:01.:54:04.

equipped and protected, and the aftermath of war is unpredictable

:54:05.:54:08.

but usually ugly so it must be meticulously planned for and

:54:09.:54:14.

systematically executed. But subject to these conditions, we shotld be

:54:15.:54:18.

clear as a nation that we whll not resile from the use of military

:54:19.:54:24.

force to protect our security where all other options have faildd. Sir

:54:25.:54:29.

John has done the nation a great service in pointing the way to

:54:30.:54:34.

ensure the proper, safe and legal use of military force. The rest is

:54:35.:54:43.

up to us. The question is that this House is considered the report of

:54:44.:54:49.

the Iraq inquiry. I call thd Shadow Secretary of State, Emily

:54:50.:54:53.

Thornberry. If this is the Foreign Secretary's last appearance at the

:54:54.:54:57.

dispatch box in his current role, he has made a typically serious and

:54:58.:55:05.

thoughtful speech for his f`rewell. We must reflect seriously and

:55:06.:55:08.

thoughtfully on the Chilcot report, and for the Labour Party a duty to

:55:09.:55:12.

apologise for the mistakes lade to all of the families of the British

:55:13.:55:17.

servicemen and women and civilian personnel who lost their lives, to

:55:18.:55:21.

all of those who suffered lhfe changing injuries, and some hundreds

:55:22.:55:24.

of thousands of Iraqi civilhans who have died and are still dying today.

:55:25.:55:29.

The Leader of the Opposition has rightly done that. But if there is

:55:30.:55:34.

one grave danger we face, it is to assume the lessons of Chilcot have

:55:35.:55:38.

been learned and I listened carefully to what the Secretary of

:55:39.:55:41.

State said about this, and H am concerned at some of the st`tements

:55:42.:55:47.

he has made. Because it concerns me that what one has to draw from that

:55:48.:55:51.

is that he's assuming the mhstakes made in Iraq couldn't be made again,

:55:52.:55:57.

indeed listening to the Prile Minister's statement last wdek, he

:55:58.:56:02.

seemed to pick out the same five lessons as examples today bx the

:56:03.:56:06.

Secretary of State. And agahn said that he felt the lessons have been

:56:07.:56:11.

learned. He seemed to be saxing the actions that have already bden taken

:56:12.:56:16.

such as setting up the national Security Council or creating the

:56:17.:56:19.

conflict and stability fund had effectively fixed the kind of

:56:20.:56:23.

problems that arose as a result of the Iraq war. Perhaps you would

:56:24.:56:28.

allow me to read out what I said, I'm confident that many of the most

:56:29.:56:32.

important lessons identified in the report have already been le`rned and

:56:33.:56:36.

the necessary responses alrdady implemented, but in the weeks and

:56:37.:56:40.

months ahead, the Government will look further at whether any

:56:41.:56:45.

additional steps are requirdd. I'm grateful to the honourable gentleman

:56:46.:56:49.

because I think the emphasis is important that I do believe there

:56:50.:56:52.

are further lessons that nedd to be learned. I will not be spending any

:56:53.:57:00.

particular time repeating f`ctual findings Chilcot made because I

:57:01.:57:05.

think we need to be looking at the lessons and making sure that we do

:57:06.:57:11.

not make any of those mistakes again. The Secretary of State for

:57:12.:57:14.

Defence will speak later about operational lessons that thd

:57:15.:57:18.

military must learn, but it seems to me that there are more than the five

:57:19.:57:21.

lessons that ministers have been outlining so far. So in the time

:57:22.:57:27.

available to me, I would like to outline some of the things H believe

:57:28.:57:34.

jump out of the report. It seems to me that we have been continting to

:57:35.:57:37.

make mistakes and we have bden making those mistakes during the

:57:38.:57:44.

current Prime Minister's tile in office. Turning to flawed

:57:45.:57:48.

intelligence, while Chilcot finds there was no deliberate attdmpt made

:57:49.:57:52.

to mislead people, the intelligence on which the war was based was

:57:53.:57:56.

clearly flawed and did not justify the certainty which was att`ched to

:57:57.:58:01.

it by the Government, so has that lesson been learned? Last ydar the

:58:02.:58:06.

Government asked this House to authorise military action in Syria,

:58:07.:58:10.

in contrast to Iraq in 2003 the military action was not to hnclude

:58:11.:58:18.

the deployment of ground troops Can I ask my right honourable friend

:58:19.:58:25.

whether she is aware of an `ttempt to call a contempt motion for the

:58:26.:58:30.

House to consider against Tony Blair, and does she agree whth me

:58:31.:58:35.

that whatever else is in thd Chilcot report, it does not give grounds for

:58:36.:58:42.

such a motion? I think this is a serious point and one that H hope

:58:43.:58:49.

members will consider. In mx view, the question is whether or not the

:58:50.:58:54.

House was deliberately misldd and Chilcot has said that althotgh the

:58:55.:58:58.

intelligence may have been flawed and therefore the House was misled,

:58:59.:59:03.

he didn't conclude the Housd had been deliberately misled. In my

:59:04.:59:08.

opinion therefore, if this House was to try to make any findings as to

:59:09.:59:13.

facts, and therefore to act on findings as to fact, they would be

:59:14.:59:18.

moving away from previous thmes when this instrument has been usdd,

:59:19.:59:23.

because in previous times when it has been used there has been a

:59:24.:59:26.

finding of facts upon which the House has been able to act. Either

:59:27.:59:32.

someone has been found guilty or admitted offences. There has been no

:59:33.:59:36.

admission of deliberately mhsleading this House, therefore if thhs House

:59:37.:59:41.

was to attempt to make a factual finding, in my view it would be a

:59:42.:59:46.

kangaroo court. In my view ht would not be allowing the person `ccused

:59:47.:59:52.

to be able to represent thelselves and it would fly in the facd of the

:59:53.:59:56.

established principles of jtstice that we have in this countrx and for

:59:57.:00:02.

those on this site particul`rly interested in the Human Rights Act,

:00:03.:00:06.

particularly clause six, thd right to a fair trial. I'm grateftl to the

:00:07.:00:13.

right honourable lady. It dhd seem to me to be somewhat strangd that

:00:14.:00:18.

members of this House, some members who have proclaimed quite rhghtly

:00:19.:00:22.

the importance of the Europdan Convention on human rights `nd I

:00:23.:00:25.

need to adhere to do should suggest a process which cannot meet article

:00:26.:00:35.

six requirements. I always get very worried when I agree so thoroughly

:00:36.:00:39.

with the right honourable gdntleman but I do find myself agreeing with

:00:40.:00:48.

him on many occasions. I he`r people saying you lawyers are all the same,

:00:49.:00:52.

but when it comes to certain principles we do agree and they cut

:00:53.:00:57.

through. Our concern is to dnsure our colleagues who are not lawyers

:00:58.:01:01.

understand these basic principles as well. Shouldn't she be worrhed about

:01:02.:01:08.

disagreeing with her own le`der and his comments on these matters just

:01:09.:01:14.

at the weekend? My question to the honourable lady, has she actually

:01:15.:01:18.

read the Private notes that the former Prime Minister sent the

:01:19.:01:22.

president of the USA and colpared them with his public parlialentary

:01:23.:01:29.

reports, and does she find these things consistent? The notes and the

:01:30.:01:37.

statements were considered by Chilcot over a long period of time,

:01:38.:01:44.

I feel the report and the pdrson writing it was a man of gre`t

:01:45.:01:49.

standing and the report verx fair one and I'm not going to sax any

:01:50.:01:53.

more than that. My view is there are plenty of lessons to learned from

:01:54.:02:00.

this report, and in my view the lessons go much further than simply

:02:01.:02:03.

focusing on one individual `nd what may have happened many years ago.

:02:04.:02:10.

What is important in my view is what is happening now, and to make sure

:02:11.:02:14.

the Government makes correct decisions before intervening in

:02:15.:02:17.

other people's countries and losing of others. Is it the right

:02:18.:02:24.

honourable lady's position that someone can only be found in

:02:25.:02:29.

contempt of this House if they admit that contempt? No, what I'm saying

:02:30.:02:37.

to this House is that there should be standards that we have always

:02:38.:02:43.

upheld. For example, Warren Hastings may have been tried by this House

:02:44.:02:48.

200 years ago but he was trhed by judges, represented, given `n

:02:49.:02:51.

opportunity to come along and say what he said, and I don't think that

:02:52.:02:57.

for us to draw conclusions hn a way that Chilcot was not able to without

:02:58.:03:02.

the person involved, having an opportunity to speak or be

:03:03.:03:07.

represented... I'm sorry, all right one more. In that case, can she say

:03:08.:03:16.

which court called the Primd Minister be tried on? Their

:03:17.:03:24.

respective nation, I apprechate about what may or may not h`ppen to

:03:25.:03:29.

the former Prime Minister. This is not within my brief today speaking

:03:30.:03:33.

as the Shadow Foreign Secretary and attempting to draw the lessons from

:03:34.:03:38.

Chilcot. My own view is that it is important I address that thhs

:03:39.:03:41.

afternoon in the time avail`ble to me and leave it to others to take

:03:42.:03:46.

such legal action as they think is appropriate, and it will be for them

:03:47.:03:51.

to take it to the proper cotrts But I don't think we can constitute

:03:52.:03:55.

ourselves as a proper court within the great traditions of our country.

:03:56.:04:02.

I can't remember where I was. The last year, the Government asked this

:04:03.:04:06.

House to authorise military action in Syria, and in contrast to Iraq

:04:07.:04:11.

the deployment of ground troops was ruled out, and that meant a reliance

:04:12.:04:16.

on local forces instead. I was talking about flawed intellhgence,

:04:17.:04:21.

because we were told at that stage there were 70,000 moderate rebels in

:04:22.:04:25.

Syria, ripples that would hdlp defeat Daesh which in turn would

:04:26.:04:31.

force Assad to step down. M`ny were sceptical about that 70,000 figure,

:04:32.:04:38.

but the 70,000 figure was produced by the joint intelligence committee

:04:39.:04:41.

and the Government declined to say which groups were included hn that

:04:42.:04:47.

figure, where they were, wh`t the definition of moderate was, or how

:04:48.:04:50.

we could be sure these rebels were signed up to the coalition's

:04:51.:04:55.

military strategy or how thdy would get to the battlefield. All of those

:04:56.:05:00.

questions mattered and as the Government itself acknowledged, no

:05:01.:05:05.

military strategy could succeed without forces on the ground. Time

:05:06.:05:10.

will tell whether those 70,000 moderate Sunni rebels existdd and

:05:11.:05:14.

whether they are in a posithon to be able to fight the battles which it

:05:15.:05:18.

was claimed they were going to be able to do, but I have to s`y that

:05:19.:05:23.

it seems to me that there is a parallel to be drawn between the

:05:24.:05:27.

intelligence relied on in rdlation to the 70,000 figure and fl`wed

:05:28.:05:32.

intelligence that has been relied on in the past. It is important to

:05:33.:05:36.

learn a lesson from Iraq 12 years earlier. Serious questions have been

:05:37.:05:40.

raised about intelligence which underpins decisions we make to take

:05:41.:05:46.

military action, and in my view once again Parliament has simply been

:05:47.:05:50.

asked to take on trust what the Government says about intelligence.

:05:51.:05:55.

There are further issues - the lack of ability to challenge intdrnally.

:05:56.:06:01.

Chilcot made clear that civhl servants and Cabinet members lacked

:06:02.:06:06.

the opportunity and information or encouragement to challenge the case

:06:07.:06:10.

being made to them. The Prile Minister says his national Security

:06:11.:06:14.

Council has fixed that. If that is right, why is it that the joint

:06:15.:06:19.

committee on National Securhty strategy says that the NSC has so

:06:20.:06:24.

far proved itself to be, and I quote, a reactive body rathdr than a

:06:25.:06:29.

strategic one which seems to have lost an opportunity.

:06:30.:06:34.

The NSC certainly did not challenge the short-sighted and highlx damage

:06:35.:06:42.

it caused to our Armed Forcds in the last Parliament despite the huge

:06:43.:06:48.

unjust I'vifiable misgivings of senior military figures abott their

:06:49.:06:52.

impact on our defence capabhlities. Nor is there evidence of thd NSC to

:06:53.:06:59.

challenge the inadequate pl`nning in the aftermath of Libya. Ulthmately,

:07:00.:07:04.

while making progress in sm`ll ways, the NSC failed to address the

:07:05.:07:07.

fundamental problem which is this. There is a culture in Whitehall I

:07:08.:07:15.

still believe, of Averill optimistic group think which exposure to

:07:16.:07:17.

independent views could help to us challenge. It is not good enough to

:07:18.:07:24.

say it has been fixed. It h`s not. If the NSC... The honourabld

:07:25.:07:30.

gentleman Sis how do I know? I'm giving the honourable gentldman how

:07:31.:07:36.

I know theres. Because of the result of decisions, I have more I will go

:07:37.:07:41.

into during this speech. Thd honourable lady is completely wrong

:07:42.:07:50.

in her analysis of how the NSC approach the the review in 2010 I

:07:51.:07:55.

was one of the members of the National Security Council. We spent

:07:56.:08:00.

weeks reading the advice. In the light of situation the country found

:08:01.:08:05.

itself in and a ?38 billion black hole in the defence budget we made

:08:06.:08:08.

our decisions. The idea somd expertise was lacking beford the

:08:09.:08:13.

National Security Council is the that time is completely wrong It is

:08:14.:08:20.

certainly my view, I only spent six months doing defence, though I spent

:08:21.:08:24.

a great deal immersing myself on it I don't just rely on my own views as

:08:25.:08:32.

to what a disaster the first strategic defence roof coalhtion

:08:33.:08:35.

spray deuce. There were senhor military figures in this cotntry and

:08:36.:08:39.

amongst our allies who were very concerned about what the cuts to the

:08:40.:08:45.

military budget was doing to our capability. The second Strategic

:08:46.:08:51.

Defence Review spent a great deal of time patching up the holes from the

:08:52.:08:57.

first review. Once again, she is wrong. At the table for the first

:08:58.:09:02.

security and defence review were the most senior military offici`ls and

:09:03.:09:05.

soldier in the country. Thex were part of the discussion. Thex were

:09:06.:09:11.

not locked out. The honourable gentleman has had his opportunity to

:09:12.:09:14.

put his views on the record. I'm sure he will speak later. It is my

:09:15.:09:19.

view that if it has been fixed in the way in which the right

:09:20.:09:24.

honourable gentleman, the Sdcretary of State for foreign affairs has

:09:25.:09:26.

stated, we would not be getting ourselves into a position where we

:09:27.:09:32.

swing backwards and forwards in our military budget. We spend the next

:09:33.:09:40.

time trying to patch it up. As one of the defence ministers at the

:09:41.:09:45.

time, may I say it was the lost unpleasant experience as a

:09:46.:09:48.

Conservative having to make cuts in our Armed Forces. But the truth was

:09:49.:09:54.

that the budget deficit of ?156 billion which we inherited was

:09:55.:09:57.

itself a threat to our national security and we had to take action.

:09:58.:10:01.

Sadly, defence had had to t`ke some of those cuts. Where would the right

:10:02.:10:06.

honourable lady have made the cuts if not in defence? I think we are

:10:07.:10:10.

moving a long way to the lessons that need to be drawn from Chilcot.

:10:11.:10:14.

If I may, I will return to ly speech. The honourable gentleman and

:10:15.:10:17.

I have discussed defence on many occasions. I always enjoy the

:10:18.:10:21.

discussions I have with him. I'll be quite happy to take this at another

:10:22.:10:28.

time. I don't want to spend the entire afternoon discussing defence,

:10:29.:10:36.

much Asim tempted to. If thd NSC had brought in outside perspectdrs from

:10:37.:10:40.

time to time it clearly hasn't done so enough to deal with the

:10:41.:10:43.

underlying problem. There w`s another issue which I think comes

:10:44.:10:47.

out in Chilcot. I don't think it has been fixed. The lack of challenge in

:10:48.:10:54.

Parliament. The other potential source, challenge to the Government

:10:55.:10:58.

was our Parliament. Whilst there were vigorous debates in thhs House,

:10:59.:11:03.

those debates and the 217 MPs who voted that the case had not been

:11:04.:11:08.

made were ultimately not enough to stop the march to war. I was not in

:11:09.:11:12.

the House myself. I was on the demonstrations. Although thdre were

:11:13.:11:16.

more Labour MPs who voted against the war than MPs from any other

:11:17.:11:20.

political party there were not sufficient numbers in order to be

:11:21.:11:23.

able to stop it. Have we moved on since then? If we look at 2013 vote

:11:24.:11:29.

against taking military acthon in Syria, many people have said that

:11:30.:11:34.

was a watershed moment. It cemented convention whatever the views of the

:11:35.:11:39.

executive, it is this House that has the final say and asked to `pprove a

:11:40.:11:43.

broad mandate for the use of military force where there hs no

:11:44.:11:47.

coherent strategy, no clear objectives and long-term pl`n. It

:11:48.:11:51.

was all too reminiscent to the approach to Iraq in my view. Members

:11:52.:11:58.

of all sides of the House hdld a healthy degree of scepticisl. At the

:11:59.:12:04.

same time, the House exercised a healthy degree of scepticisl. They

:12:05.:12:08.

were right to do so. However, at the same time, the Government's

:12:09.:12:11.

increasingly taken advantagd of loopholes in the existing convention

:12:12.:12:15.

to intervene in more conflicts with less oversight. It has developed a

:12:16.:12:19.

military capability in cyberspace which they refuse to say in what

:12:20.:12:24.

circumstances it might be used or when Parliament might be informed.

:12:25.:12:28.

Increased investment no drones and special forces at a time whdn there

:12:29.:12:31.

has been so much cuts to other parts of the Armed Forces. It has shown a

:12:32.:12:36.

willingness to use both as `ence moo of intervening in conflicts. The UK

:12:37.:12:43.

is not a party in quasi-conventional roles. In doing so, the Govdrnment

:12:44.:12:48.

seeks to bypass not just parliamentary support of thdse

:12:49.:12:50.

interventions but any form of parliamentary oversight as well The

:12:51.:12:54.

development of... If I may finish this point... The development of

:12:55.:13:01.

hybrid warfare, in my view, demands new mechanisms to ensure th`t the

:13:02.:13:05.

executive is held to account. All parties on both sides of thd House

:13:06.:13:09.

should be working on how we develop these new mechanisms in orddr to

:13:10.:13:12.

ensure the executive is held to account. Hybrid warfare, we all

:13:13.:13:19.

know, ask likely to be the future. Would she not acknowledge there is

:13:20.:13:23.

at least an argument using the Sis tomb it secure a parliament`ry

:13:24.:13:27.

majority for a pre-determindd war, rather than empowering the House of

:13:28.:13:32.

Commons it emass could you lates it. It prevents backbenchers from

:13:33.:13:35.

holding the Government to account. Would she not be in favour of

:13:36.:13:39.

bringing forward a UK war powers act to get round that difficultx? There

:13:40.:13:43.

has been a continuing debatd about this. I think there is, so long as

:13:44.:13:50.

we can be confident that a decision made in this House will not then

:13:51.:13:56.

need to be taken off to the courts and the judges eventually m`ke a

:13:57.:14:01.

decision about whether we wd go to war or not, which I would s`y is

:14:02.:14:06.

entirely inappropriate. We can ensure we keep control of

:14:07.:14:11.

legislation and it ensures Parliament, when it is posshble

:14:12.:14:18.

will come to in order for us to express our view. That's right. I

:14:19.:14:22.

understand it is the system we have at the moment. What I am concerned

:14:23.:14:28.

about is that in a way, although the convention continues to devdlop and

:14:29.:14:32.

strengthens as time goes on, it is still in the gift of the exdcutive

:14:33.:14:36.

to decide whether or not we bring this matter to Parliament. H know

:14:37.:14:40.

that, as times goes on, it strengthens but there is an argument

:14:41.:14:45.

to put it on to a more form`l basis. There is the danger about court

:14:46.:14:51.

intervention. I think it's ` mute point and one we need to continue to

:14:52.:15:00.

rook at. I'm very grateful for the honourable lady's strategic lesson

:15:01.:15:06.

in modern combat capabilitids in Armed Forces and her description in

:15:07.:15:12.

the use of special forces in almost combat capabilities having served in

:15:13.:15:17.

various of Her Majesty's forces in the past. It is a very novel

:15:18.:15:24.

interpretation that hybrid warfare is somehow something that m`y not

:15:25.:15:29.

continue to exist. We are gdtting into a rather bizarre discussion, if

:15:30.:15:35.

you'll forgive me, on the strategy and use of Armed Forces when,

:15:36.:15:40.

surely, the focus should be on the legality and appropriateness of

:15:41.:15:43.

deployment. One does sort of feel it might be best to stick to the area

:15:44.:15:47.

this House is qualified to talk about rather than dress up `s

:15:48.:15:50.

armchair generals and pretend we know what's going on in different

:15:51.:15:55.

areas? I think it is very ilportant that we look to tomorrow's problems.

:15:56.:16:00.

I think it is likely the spdcial forces will be used increashngly. I

:16:01.:16:07.

think the idea that we will be sending, for example, speci`l forces

:16:08.:16:14.

into Libya in a training capacity, I agree exactly how that might end up

:16:15.:16:20.

being a quasi--combat role, presumably if these training forces

:16:21.:16:23.

are in Libya, they will be hn a camp, a part of Libya that hs

:16:24.:16:28.

allegedly supposed to be safe. They will need to be guarded. Who will be

:16:29.:16:33.

guarding them? We can see a slippery slope. Therefore, it seems to me, at

:16:34.:16:38.

the moment, though inappropriate for a decision to send special forces or

:16:39.:16:45.

trainers into a particular `rea if we can have parliamentary scrutiny

:16:46.:16:56.

of our secret service and there is a way in which there is, that the

:16:57.:17:00.

behaviour of MI5 and MI6 is answerable to a committee of the

:17:01.:17:04.

House, it is not beyond our wit to allow there to be a similar form of

:17:05.:17:08.

cat ability when it comes to special forces. I have written about this

:17:09.:17:12.

issue. On a very important point here, the oversight that thd ISC and

:17:13.:17:18.

their prominent members of the ISC present, the oversight that the ISC

:17:19.:17:25.

ex-or sizes over the intellhgence community is always post thd fact.

:17:26.:17:32.

The only oversight over special force deployment would have to be

:17:33.:17:35.

before the fact. That would be a very, very different proposhtion.

:17:36.:17:39.

I'm grateful for the honour`ble gentleman for his question. I'm not

:17:40.:17:45.

expecting that before speci`l forces are used they have to go before a

:17:46.:17:48.

committee of Parliament and get permission. But I do think that

:17:49.:17:56.

there should be some form of cat ability and explanation. I felt that

:17:57.:18:04.

it was embarrassing and showed the Democratic Deficit that we have in

:18:05.:18:09.

relation to hybrid warfare when one read in the papers that the king of

:18:10.:18:14.

Jordan was gossiping with congressmen in America about our

:18:15.:18:18.

special forces in a way that we haven't even been told about and

:18:19.:18:21.

no-one in this housest Housd had been told about. That seems to me to

:18:22.:18:26.

highlight the deficit we have in this country. We should learn

:18:27.:18:30.

lessons from Chilcot, about accountability, about not shmply

:18:31.:18:33.

trusting the executive to gdt a decision right and we should make

:18:34.:18:37.

sure there is more accountability and we are on our toes and `re

:18:38.:18:42.

prepared to modernise our structures as necessary in order to reflect the

:18:43.:18:46.

changing nature of warfare going into the 21st Century. If I can go

:18:47.:18:51.

back to the speech. I was t`lking about the development of hybrid

:18:52.:18:54.

warfare and new mechanisms `nd different ways in the which the

:18:55.:18:57.

executive should be held to account. I believe all parties should be

:18:58.:19:01.

working together on that. Another point raised was about

:19:02.:19:08.

American/British relations. Chilcot made is clear American/Brithsh

:19:09.:19:12.

relations would not have bedn harmed had the UK not joined the US-led

:19:13.:19:17.

coalition. Chilcot argues that was not a basis to join the inv`sion.

:19:18.:19:22.

Indeed, in my view, that is another lesson we've not learned. In 20 3,

:19:23.:19:28.

there was pressure from the United States playing a major role in the

:19:29.:19:35.

Government's rush to intervdne in Syria. It became obvious th`t the US

:19:36.:19:41.

administration's own efforts to persuade Congress to back

:19:42.:19:44.

intervention hinged on the success of the Prime Minister in persuading

:19:45.:19:47.

Parliament. Speaking after our House declined to support the acthon in

:19:48.:19:52.

Syria, the then Defence Secretary now the Foreign Secretary s`id that

:19:53.:19:57.

the vote would "certainly doomage the Anglo-American relationship . It

:19:58.:20:01.

did. In my view, the relationship endured. We've got over it without

:20:02.:20:07.

any adverse consequences. It serves as a reminder that our alli`nce with

:20:08.:20:12.

the United States rests on stronger foundations than an expectation of

:20:13.:20:16.

unquestioning British complhance with American wishes. The hop rebel

:20:17.:20:24.

lady speaks of the special relationship and clearly thd

:20:25.:20:28.

relationship with the United States is deeper than one incidencd or one

:20:29.:20:36.

vote. But is it not also valid to listen to various American generals

:20:37.:20:42.

who after the vote pointed to the damaging reimpact that vote would

:20:43.:20:47.

have on the enduring commitlent and understanding between the US and the

:20:48.:20:51.

British militaries? Would she not also recognise that just as there

:20:52.:20:58.

are many threads that build up that special relationship undermhning

:20:59.:21:01.

that thread by thread also weakens it.

:21:02.:21:10.

Our relationship is strong dnough to endure differences of opinion, and

:21:11.:21:16.

if we are to be good friends, good friends trust each other and trust

:21:17.:21:20.

each other to be able to disagree at times, and I think it's important we

:21:21.:21:27.

do that. 2013 Syria vote made clear parliament understood this `nd also

:21:28.:21:31.

suggested the Government did not. This is one of the reasons ht is

:21:32.:21:36.

such a tragedy in my view that cuts to the Foreign Office budget has

:21:37.:21:39.

weakened Whitehall 's institutional knowledge of the world becatse in my

:21:40.:21:42.

view it is important for our leadership role in the world for us

:21:43.:21:47.

to have a proper understandhng of the world, and we have had for

:21:48.:21:52.

hundreds of years, have had an insight into the world the other

:21:53.:21:56.

countries have not, and we have a leadership role and we can have a

:21:57.:21:59.

different voice than the Amdricans because we will have a diffdrent

:22:00.:22:05.

understanding. So for us to have 16% cuts in the Foreign Office xear on

:22:06.:22:09.

year, and to be hollowing ott the institutional knowledge has been a

:22:10.:22:18.

tragedy in my view. And sorry, the honourable gentleman has intervened

:22:19.:22:23.

twice. Fifth, Chilcot says Tony Blair ignored warnings about the

:22:24.:22:28.

sectarian violence that would sweep Iraq after Saddam fell with an

:22:29.:22:32.

appalling loss of life that has followed in Iraq and surrounding

:22:33.:22:36.

countries. We are still livhng with that mistake but has the lessons

:22:37.:22:40.

being learned? Looking at intervention in Libya, it is clear

:22:41.:22:45.

it has not. Armed militias `cross the country focused their attention

:22:46.:22:49.

on toppling the regime, the British Government later seemed surprised

:22:50.:22:52.

that once the goal had been achieved they turned their fire on e`ch

:22:53.:22:58.

other. While divisions in Lhbya were always more tribal than sectarian

:22:59.:23:02.

divisions in Iraq, the result has been the same, and to believe

:23:03.:23:06.

democratic elections would fill the power vacuum proved to be

:23:07.:23:16.

overoptimistic. Had those whth knowledge of the country te`m

:23:17.:23:20.

directly consulted at the thme, they would have warned the Government

:23:21.:23:23.

this would happen. Such warnings were readily available and hn the

:23:24.:23:30.

public domain and had inforled advice been supplied it would be

:23:31.:23:36.

made clear there would be a huge risk of knock-on instabilitx as well

:23:37.:23:40.

armed highly trained mercen`ries returned to their native cotntries

:23:41.:23:45.

such as Mali, Nigeria and Chad. The warnings were there but such advice

:23:46.:23:50.

was not heard or not listendd to one that was too late. Again thdre is a

:23:51.:23:55.

parallel to be drawn between our intervention in Libya and otr

:23:56.:23:59.

understanding of what would happen next and are listening to experts

:24:00.:24:17.

and what happened. I wanted to say two things, firstly the intdrvention

:24:18.:24:20.

in Libya was at the request of the Arab League who I suggest would have

:24:21.:24:25.

an insight into the region, would count as people who knew wh`t was

:24:26.:24:30.

going on. Secondly while I understand the analysis

:24:31.:24:32.

cheesemaking, doesn't it le`d her to the conclusion that toppling any

:24:33.:24:41.

despot creates the risk of chaos and confusion. We are five years down

:24:42.:24:46.

the line from ending a 40 ydar ruling of a brutal dictatorship in

:24:47.:24:51.

Libya and this game isn't over yet but I predict Libya will end up a

:24:52.:24:55.

better place than it was under Gaddafi. It is interesting to hear

:24:56.:24:59.

what the honourable gentlem`n says but I think it is an issue of

:25:00.:25:04.

speculation. It is my view that it is not legal to intervene in a

:25:05.:25:09.

country to topple the regimd, and that we should not in any event

:25:10.:25:14.

morally be intervening in a country unless we can have some forl of

:25:15.:25:19.

strategy that will ensure that the country we leave is in a better

:25:20.:25:25.

state than when we first arrived. I'm grateful to the honourable lady.

:25:26.:25:32.

Firstly I have to say to her that I don't think there was a blinding of

:25:33.:25:36.

oneself to the potential problems that might come from that

:25:37.:25:40.

intervention. I really don't think that at all from my memory. The

:25:41.:25:45.

second thing is that the trhgger for the intervention was the fact

:25:46.:25:48.

Colonel Gaddafi was about to kill tens of thousands of his own

:25:49.:25:53.

citizens, and it is that whhch prompted the UN resolution which

:25:54.:25:59.

provided the legal basis for the intervention. If I may say to her, I

:26:00.:26:05.

think this highlights some of the really difficult decisions that we

:26:06.:26:10.

have in these areas, even qtestions of legality don't come into it. But

:26:11.:26:14.

I certainly wouldn't be willing to characterise that interventhon as

:26:15.:26:18.

having been wrong in the circumstances that prevailed at the

:26:19.:26:22.

time. I think the point I'm trying to make is that it was again about

:26:23.:26:29.

information that was available that could have informed the way in which

:26:30.:26:33.

the intervention was made, `nd then once the intervention was m`de, what

:26:34.:26:41.

happened thereafter, and how the dangers that were obvious wdre

:26:42.:26:45.

protected against. I don't think that happened, and it is a lesson

:26:46.:26:49.

that we can get from Chilcot and Iraq that is so much more ilportant

:26:50.:26:54.

than any form of soap opera in relation to Tony Blair. If H may

:26:55.:27:00.

move on, the other issue I think is important is about post-war

:27:01.:27:04.

planning, and there has been some that has been touched on as well,

:27:05.:27:10.

and this is my final point. Finally and perhaps most devastatingly,

:27:11.:27:14.

Chilcot highlight the total absence of adequate planning for wh`t would

:27:15.:27:18.

happen after the war, and what the long-term strategy was for Hraq If

:27:19.:27:24.

ever there was a mistake, it should never be repeated, it is thd idea we

:27:25.:27:27.

go into another military intervention with no idea of its

:27:28.:27:33.

consequences, no plan for the aftermath, no long-term str`tegy,

:27:34.:27:39.

and yet it is the exact hallmark of all the outgoing Prime Minister s

:27:40.:27:45.

interventions. And again, wd can see the evidence in Libya. The Prime

:27:46.:27:50.

Minister, in the words of President Obama, became distracted. Once the

:27:51.:27:54.

Gaddafi regime had been overthrown and the lengthy task of post-war

:27:55.:27:58.

reconstruction was supposed to be started, it was all but ignored and

:27:59.:28:04.

in the years since Libya has been riven with factionalism and

:28:05.:28:08.

violence. Its experiment with democracy was brief, with power in

:28:09.:28:12.

the hands of rival militias and the ungoverned space that this created

:28:13.:28:20.

was an invitation to Daesh to establish a strategic foothold. It

:28:21.:28:24.

is a stain on this Government that only begun to pay any attention to

:28:25.:28:30.

the mess it made in Libya once the terrorist threat from Daesh became

:28:31.:28:36.

too urgent to ignore. I'm not sure the honourable lady has said

:28:37.:28:40.

anything about Chilcot's finding about the circumstances in which it

:28:41.:28:45.

was ultimately decided therd was a legal basis for UK particip`tion. He

:28:46.:28:49.

says they were far from satisfactory. I'm sure he whll agree

:28:50.:28:54.

with me the Attorney General should give independent and imparthal

:28:55.:28:57.

advice. Chilcot details how according to the then Attorney

:28:58.:29:04.

General's evidence, he inithally resisted the legality and eventually

:29:05.:29:11.

acquiesced that the view of military force could be legally justhfied. As

:29:12.:29:17.

she got a view on what changed his mind? Tempting though it is to

:29:18.:29:24.

debate this aspect with the honourable lady, it is important

:29:25.:29:30.

that anyone taking the role of Attorney General knows that they are

:29:31.:29:35.

the only person in the Cabinet who can say to the Prime Ministdr no.

:29:36.:29:42.

You cannot do that, it is not legal, you are not allowed to, no. The

:29:43.:29:47.

burden of that is heavy and is one that needs to be exercised by people

:29:48.:29:55.

of great courage and substance. And it is about the rule of law, and

:29:56.:29:59.

it's about the fact that no one is above the law. I think therd is a

:30:00.:30:09.

lesson that all AGs need to learn, and they need to be confident of

:30:10.:30:13.

being able to stand up to their leader because that is an ilportant

:30:14.:30:18.

point. One of the things I would say in relation to international law is

:30:19.:30:23.

that Britain has always been a leading light in the development of

:30:24.:30:28.

international law. It is much of international law has been ` result

:30:29.:30:33.

of documents we have drafted and our adherence to international law has

:30:34.:30:36.

been an important part of the development of it. One thing that

:30:37.:30:41.

has been clouded as a result of intervention in Iraq, and indeed

:30:42.:30:47.

intervention since, has been the law that we do need to have, and we do

:30:48.:30:53.

need to have a clear law in relation to in what circumstances yot can

:30:54.:30:57.

intervene and what circumst`nces you can't, has not developed as well as

:30:58.:31:03.

it might have. If there had not been a temptation to press the f`cts into

:31:04.:31:11.

what was understood of the law. My honourable friend who is sitting

:31:12.:31:15.

behind me, the right honour`ble lady for Leith Central is a big fan of

:31:16.:31:25.

RTP, and it is very sad the effect the Iraq war had on the devdlopment

:31:26.:31:36.

of that, which is something Cook was attempting to develop at thd time of

:31:37.:31:42.

the Iraq war and was held up. If I may go back, whether lessons on

:31:43.:31:53.

long-term planning in Iraq learned? In conclusion, we cannot turn the

:31:54.:31:58.

clock back, we cannot correct the mistakes that were made, we cannot

:31:59.:32:02.

bring back the lives of those who were lost, we cannot undo the chaos

:32:03.:32:07.

we have created but we can `nd must stop the mistakes being repdated.

:32:08.:32:12.

Unfortunately, as I pointed out today, whatever his rhetoric and

:32:13.:32:16.

well-meaning intentions, too often the outgoing Prime Minister has

:32:17.:32:22.

repeated exactly those same mistakes in his own military interventions

:32:23.:32:27.

relying on speculative intelligence, and failing to plan for whatever

:32:28.:32:32.

happens afterwards. It is hoped the new Prime Minister will study the

:32:33.:32:36.

Chilcot report, not as a colmentary on decisions made in the past but as

:32:37.:32:40.

a guide to future decisions she will have to make. Let's hope shd does

:32:41.:32:48.

so, and that as she takes on her new and owner its responsibilithes, we

:32:49.:32:57.

wish her well. Mr Speaker, the decision to invade Iraq was in my

:32:58.:33:00.

opinion the most disastrous foreign policy decision taken by thhs

:33:01.:33:06.

country in my lifetime. And it didn't cause but greatly contributed

:33:07.:33:10.

to the extraordinary problels that have persisted in the Middld East

:33:11.:33:14.

and the wider world ever since, and it will continue to have tr`gic

:33:15.:33:19.

consequences I fear for somd years to come, so I think firstly we all

:33:20.:33:24.

owe a debt to Sir John Chilcot for producing what will undoubtddly be

:33:25.:33:29.

the most authoritative analxsis of how on earth such and appalling

:33:30.:33:38.

blunder was taken. I haven't had chance to get much beyond the

:33:39.:33:42.

executive summary, and I thhnk it will take a long time beford anyone

:33:43.:33:46.

in this House gets through the millions of words we have h`d

:33:47.:33:50.

produced. But I think the ldssons from this inquiry based on the Iraq

:33:51.:33:58.

war will in fact be of benefit to specialists in particular, those in

:33:59.:34:04.

the military, in the intellhgence services, and diplomatic corps and

:34:05.:34:08.

politicians. Those who have held the Government to account. It is too

:34:09.:34:15.

soon to follow up on his extremely formidable findings which I'm sure

:34:16.:34:18.

are correct but there is a role for this House to consider, as we are,

:34:19.:34:24.

the political aspect of this. Sir John Chilcot has examined the formal

:34:25.:34:29.

records, the meetings, the processes, and obviously he has

:34:30.:34:32.

analysed those in terms of looking at what happened and why it's

:34:33.:34:36.

arrived at, but he's not a politician and I think the House of

:34:37.:34:42.

Commons and ministers involved can look at this with a slightlx

:34:43.:34:56.

different eye as to why people reach decisions, and what went wrong,

:34:57.:35:01.

particularly as far as the Cabinet is concerned, and accountabhlity

:35:02.:35:04.

through Parliament to the whder public is concerned. I'm not sure

:35:05.:35:11.

Sir John Chilcot, who is not a politician, can on his own `nswer

:35:12.:35:15.

that wider perspective for the future. May I begin by agreding

:35:16.:35:22.

briefly with one point the honourable lady made from the front

:35:23.:35:26.

bench opposite, in saying how irrelevant I think it has bden to

:35:27.:35:30.

try to turn all this into a witchhunt against celebrity

:35:31.:35:35.

individuals who were involvdd at the time. It is one of the great

:35:36.:35:40.

failures of political debatd of our day has so far as the wider media

:35:41.:35:45.

and world were concerned, the recent referendum debate was largely the

:35:46.:35:52.

David and Boris show, and I think it's quite pointless to say, let's

:35:53.:35:58.

persecute Tony Blair. He was in charge, are we going to prosecute

:35:59.:36:05.

him as a war criminal and the rest of it.

:36:06.:36:09.

Nobody's committed any crimd. As one who was present at the time, I have

:36:10.:36:15.

absolutely no doubt that nobody acted at the time on any other basis

:36:16.:36:20.

than they believed passionately they were acting in the public interest.

:36:21.:36:24.

One of the great things abott Tony Blair was he did believe,

:36:25.:36:29.

passionately, what he was doing at the time. It was very evident on the

:36:30.:36:33.

floor of the House. He never had a doubt about what he was doing. I'm

:36:34.:36:36.

not surprised he continues to protest as strongly as he does. He

:36:37.:36:43.

hasn't changed his mind. He did believe he was acting in thd

:36:44.:36:49.

national interest in cementhng our alliance with the Americans. He

:36:50.:36:52.

thought it was absolutely kdy to our security. He actually thought a

:36:53.:36:56.

British contribution would help the Americans with the planning and the

:36:57.:37:04.

add sow Cassie and so on. Hd firmly believed just removing Sadd`m

:37:05.:37:08.

Hussein was a virtuous act which would make the world a bettdr place.

:37:09.:37:13.

He still does. Then, as now, that's the bit where he gets most

:37:14.:37:18.

passionate, the regime change. He really thinks, probably right, I

:37:19.:37:22.

agree with him actually, he got rid of an evil regime. I agree with

:37:23.:37:29.

those who say that wasn't in itself totally adequate achievement. He

:37:30.:37:33.

certainly believed they'd wdapons of mass destruction. I faced hhm in the

:37:34.:37:39.

House. I remember one day thinking this is the last man still living

:37:40.:37:45.

who still believes they're going to find weapons of mass destruction in

:37:46.:37:52.

Iraq. Everybody else, it became increasingly obvious no such

:37:53.:37:57.

material was going to be fotnd. Anyway, pursuing Tony Blair is a

:37:58.:38:02.

complete irrelevance to what the House should be doing. I'll give

:38:03.:38:08.

way. I am not in the front bench, I can't keep giving way. I'm grateful

:38:09.:38:15.

to him for giving way. I agree about the dangers of focusing on one

:38:16.:38:18.

person. I worry about the w`y in which he appears to be letthng off

:38:19.:38:22.

that one person from any re`l responsibility for misleading the

:38:23.:38:28.

House. You only have to read Chilcot how Blairs led the House about the

:38:29.:38:32.

position of the French. In that motion to the House he said it has

:38:33.:38:36.

not proved possible to secure a second resolution because one

:38:37.:38:40.

permanent member of the Sectrity Council may play its intensd to use

:38:41.:38:44.

the veto whatever the circulstances. A few minutes, even before PMQs the

:38:45.:38:49.

French were on the phone to Tony Blair saying he was misreprdsenting

:38:50.:38:54.

their position. We should not only focus on one man but let's not let

:38:55.:39:01.

him off the hook completely. I certainly didn't rise to defend Tony

:39:02.:39:05.

Blair. He's not the first politician to make a mistake and won't be the

:39:06.:39:11.

last. If she believes the French, she believes the French. Thd French

:39:12.:39:17.

were not able to exercise a veto in the Security Council. It was a

:39:18.:39:20.

mistake at the time to try to blame the French entirely. They wdre never

:39:21.:39:24.

going to get a majority in the Security Council. The French were...

:39:25.:39:31.

No, I'm not going to... THE SPEAKER: Order, order, the right

:39:32.:39:36.

honourable gentleman has made it plain he's not giving way. The House

:39:37.:39:42.

must listen to the developmdnt of the gentleman's argument. Mdmbers

:39:43.:39:49.

who wish to argue about the French veto in 2003 can argue betwden

:39:50.:39:52.

themselves. The point I'm going to make is that the political

:39:53.:39:56.

background to this, what was actually being decided, what the

:39:57.:40:01.

politicians wanted to do was key. I was, of course, a backbench MP

:40:02.:40:05.

opposite. I followed these dvents with some care. I had one advantage,

:40:06.:40:10.

not the access to what was going on inside the Government, but H did

:40:11.:40:14.

know a lot of Americans as well as British politicians. At varhous

:40:15.:40:19.

political gathering, I knew quite a lot of the key American Neo cons. On

:40:20.:40:27.

friendly terms. I was arguing the merits of the invasion of Iraq some

:40:28.:40:30.

time before the debate ever started here. That's quite an important

:40:31.:40:36.

background to this question. In the Bush administration, the kex policy

:40:37.:40:44.

makers wanted to envied Irap immediately after 9/11. By 2001

:40:45.:40:51.

they were going to invade Iraq. There wasn't the slightest doubt

:40:52.:40:57.

about it. They had a rather naive, idealistic approach which f`intly

:40:58.:41:00.

shocked me. They thought thd previous administration had not used

:41:01.:41:06.

American military power for all the benefits it could produce in the

:41:07.:41:09.

world. They were going to use military power for good. Thdy

:41:10.:41:15.

thought they would be greetdd as liberating here rows when they

:41:16.:41:23.

arrived in Baghdad and be able to improve a better regime. Thdy

:41:24.:41:29.

actually thought a man would win the election that would be held there

:41:30.:41:33.

after. I met that man once or two. He once go about 2% in an Iraqi

:41:34.:41:38.

election. He was going to bd in charge. But he need supervision

:41:39.:41:46.

There would be a US general. Constant comparisons made whth

:41:47.:41:51.

General McArthur turning imperial Japan into a democracy after the

:41:52.:41:57.

war. The importance of deNaziification that followdd the

:41:58.:42:03.

fall of Hitler. Hence you h`ve to go in for debathification when you went

:42:04.:42:08.

to Iraq. Get rid of people hn the army security service and so on I

:42:09.:42:13.

won't go on. I fiercely dis`greed with this. I liked these people But

:42:14.:42:18.

my thought all the time was, one of us isn't on the same planet when I

:42:19.:42:23.

got into some of these disctssions. But I formed a fairly hoes style

:42:24.:42:27.

view to this a long time before it arrived here. The point is, moving

:42:28.:42:33.

on, if I knew enough in 2000 to know that the Bush administration was

:42:34.:42:40.

going to invade Iraq, I am puite certain Tony Blair knew, I'l quite

:42:41.:42:46.

sure the British military knew and they had a long time to work out how

:42:47.:42:52.

they were going to join in. And that is the explanation of a lot of these

:42:53.:42:58.

things. Why did the Americans want the British to join in? Thex didn't

:42:59.:43:02.

need us for military purposds. They could defeat the Iraqis without our

:43:03.:43:07.

military assistance. They dhdn't rate our military that highly though

:43:08.:43:13.

our special forces and our intelligence they thought wdre very

:43:14.:43:16.

good. We were a very valuable political ally. The present`tion of

:43:17.:43:22.

what they were doing, would, they thought, be greatly improved if the

:43:23.:43:25.

British could be at the heart of the alliance. As I've already s`id, Tony

:43:26.:43:30.

Blair was very enthusiastic`lly keen to join them. I doubt whethdr he

:43:31.:43:40.

bought all the neo-con theories U but clearly he thought getthng rid

:43:41.:43:46.

of Saddam Hussein's regime could be one of the best contributions to

:43:47.:43:50.

make to the Iraqi people. Hd dough sided to join in. You reed these

:43:51.:43:57.

mysteries you ask what was the snag for Tony Blair and the Government? I

:43:58.:44:02.

feel confident I knew enough about what was actually going on tat,

:44:03.:44:07.

through my various contacts to feel pretty confident about this, the

:44:08.:44:13.

snag for Tony Blair who wanted to take part, who, it seems, h`d

:44:14.:44:20.

already told George Bush th`t, George W Bush, that he wantdd to

:44:21.:44:26.

take part was that it wasn't legal for the United Kingdom to t`ke part

:44:27.:44:31.

in a war being launched for the purpose of changing the reghme in

:44:32.:44:37.

another country. When he received that advice, I think every lawyer in

:44:38.:44:41.

the place is agreed that was undoubtedly right. And, as somebody

:44:42.:44:47.

has said, that wasn't the vhew the Americans took. American neo-cons

:44:48.:44:53.

are not so impressed with international law. Their

:44:54.:44:57.

constitution doesn't constr`in them. I once had a quay Americanoficial

:44:58.:45:02.

tell me, we have all the legal authority we have to invade. We have

:45:03.:45:08.

a large majority in both Hotses of Congress. That was it. But, of

:45:09.:45:14.

course, they were so keen to have the British, they were prep`red to

:45:15.:45:20.

give some time to Tony Blair to tackle this problem of whether it

:45:21.:45:27.

was lawful for him to take part and to work out some basis upon which

:45:28.:45:33.

the British could join. Now, so far, I think the motives of all these

:45:34.:45:37.

people were virtuous. They believed all this. They were making the world

:45:38.:45:45.

a better place by removing ` tyrant and installing a western,

:45:46.:45:50.

pro-American, pro-Western, pro-Israeli democratic Government in

:45:51.:45:54.

a liberal society. And they were, therefore, going to change the

:45:55.:45:57.

regime. We were going to do it lawfully and we had to turn to this

:45:58.:46:03.

whole question of the dreadful weapons which Saddam Hussein

:46:04.:46:06.

undoubtedly had used against his own people years before. Whether they

:46:07.:46:13.

had all been disposed off and whether you could actually

:46:14.:46:16.

demonstrate he was a continting threat. Because, if you could

:46:17.:46:21.

demonstrate he had weapons of mass destruction, that they were a threat

:46:22.:46:27.

to British and his neighbours and that he was not cooperating with

:46:28.:46:33.

weapons inspections and so on, and if you got an UN Resolution, then

:46:34.:46:42.

you had a legal base for invading. I think once one realises that was the

:46:43.:46:49.

perfectly worthy, well-intentioned mind-set of most of the British

:46:50.:46:55.

people taking part in this process to intervene, I think then one can

:46:56.:47:02.

understand why some of thesd extraordinary processes took part. I

:47:03.:47:11.

personally believe that the American administration actually del`yed the

:47:12.:47:20.

invasion for a month or few... Two months... Two months, to give the

:47:21.:47:26.

British more time to get through this convoluted legal stuff, I use

:47:27.:47:32.

sarcastic words which probably the occasion impatient American used a

:47:33.:47:36.

version of at the time, to get through before they could join in.

:47:37.:47:42.

Then the problem occurred for the Americans. They went to the UN. Got

:47:43.:47:46.

Resolution 1441 and you will the rest of it. They began to lose

:47:47.:47:50.

patience. They began to see this could go on forever. They bdcame,

:47:51.:47:56.

they reached a stage where they were going to invade in March 2003. They

:47:57.:48:08.

couldn't wait any longer. So, the Blair Government, those that knew

:48:09.:48:12.

what was going on, had to speed the thing up a bit. Because thex

:48:13.:48:17.

realised if they were not c`reful, they were going to fail to get there

:48:18.:48:27.

in time. One thing that surprises me is the advice from the JIC which

:48:28.:48:37.

really surprises me. They dhd eventually produce enough

:48:38.:48:41.

intelligence which was plausible and believed in by those putting it in

:48:42.:48:44.

the reports for the Attornex General, I think it is obvious,

:48:45.:48:49.

quite reluctantly to be persuaded there probably was a basis on this

:48:50.:48:54.

for going ahead. Then the urgent debates to take place in thhs House

:48:55.:49:00.

would last about two days bdfore everyone knew the troops who were

:49:01.:49:04.

already in battle positions in the middle east were about to go ahead

:49:05.:49:10.

with the whole operation. I do think it's from that that we should learn

:49:11.:49:18.

the political lessons. One of the first lessons was that, I think an

:49:19.:49:24.

ever-increasing rush to acttally get into the position where you could

:49:25.:49:30.

lawfully invade left everyone to engage in wanting to be persuaded

:49:31.:49:35.

that various things were correct, various steps had been taken which,

:49:36.:49:43.

if they'd submitted themselves to slower, more challenged and

:49:44.:49:47.

considered consideration, would have led to a different conclusion. So,

:49:48.:49:53.

what in my opinion is the ottline at least to the political lessons from

:49:54.:50:00.

this. The first is the Amerhcan alliance should not be entered into

:50:01.:50:06.

blindly. I would only briefly say, I think I'm a passionate belidver that

:50:07.:50:10.

our alliance with the United States is crucial to this country's future

:50:11.:50:14.

security and our role in thd world as Tony Blair is. So, I'm not - not

:50:15.:50:23.

a trace of anti-Americanism. It is one of our most valuable fe`tures of

:50:24.:50:29.

foreign policy. But that dodsn't mean blindly, always right or wrong,

:50:30.:50:33.

you can let yourself go along with what the American president of the

:50:34.:50:38.

day wishes to do. I take th`t no further. We might have a prdsident

:50:39.:50:44.

Trump. So it's a question worth bearing in mind. I actually do agree

:50:45.:50:49.

with the right honourable l`dy, you don't destroy the American `lliance.

:50:50.:50:54.

You may damage it for a month or two if you don't go along absolttely

:50:55.:50:59.

with what the President wants you to do. The other thing that's clear in

:51:00.:51:06.

Chilcot, it was plain from the way the ministry behaved at the time,

:51:07.:51:13.

the advice of our defence chiefs is hugely important. I share the pride

:51:14.:51:18.

in them that keeps being expressed in these debates. They alwaxs want

:51:19.:51:24.

to take part in any militarx activity in which the Americans want

:51:25.:51:30.

them to join. It may be verx considered advice but it always

:51:31.:51:34.

comes down to, we must ask the Americans to let us make a big

:51:35.:51:40.

contribution. If you're a trained military man, you have trained for

:51:41.:51:44.

the purpose of using your mhlitary force in the national doctors,

:51:45.:51:47.

further worthwhile objectivds, you can't help but think this is our

:51:48.:51:51.

moment, this is the great action I've got to take part in.

:51:52.:51:59.

Similarly with the intelligdnce services, they prise their

:52:00.:52:04.

relationship with the Americans above all relationships thex have

:52:05.:52:09.

with the outside world, and so they are dependent on cooperation. They

:52:10.:52:16.

do depend on us in some ways, but they are anxious to please `nd

:52:17.:52:22.

anxious to do what they think their and American colleagues wish to do.

:52:23.:52:26.

When you have a Prime Minister and government that wants to enter the

:52:27.:52:31.

war, then everybody is extrdmely anxious to find the facts, to be

:52:32.:52:36.

convinced of the situation, to enable the Prime Minister to do what

:52:37.:52:41.

he wants and to go ahead. I think that's actually quite an essential

:52:42.:52:46.

point because it requires a simple politician like me to make ht, it

:52:47.:52:52.

doesn't appear in the pages of the report. That when you raise your

:52:53.:52:56.

eyebrows going through what happened, I think that answdrs a

:52:57.:53:01.

lot. I do think the time we were talking about, there weren't enough

:53:02.:53:06.

diplomats involved, there w`sn't enough looking at the expertise of

:53:07.:53:11.

the Foreign Office. The Americans got rid of most of theirs and got

:53:12.:53:17.

people who had been involved in the Nicaraguan episode because they were

:53:18.:53:23.

ideological more sound. Americans did not like the therapists we got

:53:24.:53:26.

in the Foreign Office because they kept complicating things by talking

:53:27.:53:33.

about tribes and different sorts of Muslim which they thought w`s not

:53:34.:53:38.

relevant in the new era of western democracy, in which they were going

:53:39.:53:43.

to take the country. I haven't got time, I apologise to my honourable

:53:44.:53:52.

friend. The Attorney General was obviously giving the right `dvice. I

:53:53.:53:58.

am sitting alongside a very tough Attorney General who would not give

:53:59.:54:07.

the advice that the Prime Mhnister wanted, and I agree with wh`t the

:54:08.:54:11.

honourable lady said, that hs what the Attorney General 's fourth. I

:54:12.:54:18.

know Lord Goldsmith, he's all right, but he must have felt so exposed

:54:19.:54:22.

that in the end he gave in to the temptation to say, well just about,

:54:23.:54:30.

I suppose that what you say is satisfactorily proved, you lust do

:54:31.:54:35.

so. I have taken longer than I intended, but the big thing that

:54:36.:54:39.

matters, it matters very much as we are having a change of government

:54:40.:54:46.

today, is how does the Cabinet come into this? What about accountability

:54:47.:54:51.

to Parliament? I must say it was obvious at the time, it was obvious

:54:52.:54:55.

if you listened to the Forehgn Secretary publicly, it was obvious

:54:56.:54:59.

to what half the Labour Party said, obvious that if you listened to

:55:00.:55:02.

officials that Cabinet government was not working properly in the

:55:03.:55:07.

Government of Tony Blair. Hd went in for sofa government, and Margaret

:55:08.:55:19.

Thatcher got keener on sofa government towards the end of her

:55:20.:55:29.

time. Parliament, the same thing. There was reluctance to comd to

:55:30.:55:33.

Parliament. Both were essentially seen as hurdles.

:55:34.:55:45.

How are you going to get it passed Parliament? I would suggest for the

:55:46.:55:53.

future that is not the mindset that people should be in, they should be

:55:54.:55:58.

setting the proposition, advocating it to covenants, and with proper

:55:59.:56:02.

information listen to it behng debated and examined by people who

:56:03.:56:07.

have got time to do so. Simhlarly parliaments should be consulted when

:56:08.:56:14.

it can be, given proper information, and you shouldn't rely on the of the

:56:15.:56:19.

debate and the work of the whips to yourself through to say aftdrwards

:56:20.:56:25.

that you have the democratic endorsement, and I haven't got time

:56:26.:56:33.

to apply my strong stricturds. If you read it with my arguments in

:56:34.:56:38.

mind, the chubby report I think defeat the impression I had as

:56:39.:56:45.

someone who participated in debate. Military action is difficult.

:56:46.:56:49.

There's no point politicians being light-heartedly irresponsible. There

:56:50.:56:56.

will be occasions you cannot do it, there will be occasions somdone has

:56:57.:56:59.

attacked the British interest and you have got to fight back. You can

:57:00.:57:04.

tell Cabinet, you can tell Parliament afterwards and any

:57:05.:57:07.

sensible Parliament will endorse it. This wasn't an emergency. For two

:57:08.:57:22.

years we were told there wotld be an invasion of Iraq. It had bedn

:57:23.:57:26.

planned and discussed. The reason there was in full Cabinet

:57:27.:57:29.

discussion, and the reason there wasn't time the Parliamentary

:57:30.:57:32.

debate, was because you might not get it past them. We didn't start

:57:33.:57:42.

debating in Parliament till February 2003, and the actual final key vote

:57:43.:57:48.

as I say is when the troops were in the field, which put a lot of

:57:49.:57:51.

Conservatives off voting ag`inst it who might otherwise have voted

:57:52.:57:56.

against it, our boys were about to go into action the next day which is

:57:57.:58:01.

what occurred. Some off that has been addressed. The National

:58:02.:58:05.

Security Council is a hugelx beneficial innovation of my right

:58:06.:58:14.

honourable friend's, the outgoing Prime Minister, who brought it in. I

:58:15.:58:19.

would only say it is not tile to debated now. It still needs to be

:58:20.:58:24.

improved. It has not covered everything, it is a lot better than

:58:25.:58:31.

it was. Cabinet government, I think my right honourable friend should

:58:32.:58:34.

ask themselves if they are still in office under the next Prime

:58:35.:58:37.

Minister, can they ensure adequate time is given to discuss thhngs

:58:38.:58:40.

that adequate information is given in advance, that Cabinet government

:58:41.:58:49.

isn't moving quickly from fhghting to item, that you have had papers

:58:50.:58:54.

beforehand to allow you to consider it, and the National Security

:58:55.:59:01.

Council certainly. I genuindly congratulate the Prime Minister

:59:02.:59:06.

Some of the best discussions I took part in whether in the National

:59:07.:59:10.

Security Council, with my total approval. I personally may be too

:59:11.:59:16.

sensitive, I think it could be improved sometimes because there are

:59:17.:59:20.

occasions when a freight Colpany has been brought there and expl`ined to

:59:21.:59:36.

you. -- a fait accompli. Thd whole history of the Middle East `nd North

:59:37.:59:40.

Africa is we have removed f`scist dictatorships of the most poisonous

:59:41.:59:46.

kind from country after country and then been surprised that thdy had

:59:47.:59:50.

been replaced by a situation which is sometimes even worse than the one

:59:51.:59:56.

we have removed. A continuing answer to that problem needs to be sought,

:59:57.:00:04.

although at the moment we h`ve reached a stage that there `re now

:00:05.:00:08.

perhaps bigger problem is that we have to confront. I began bx saying

:00:09.:00:12.

this is the biggest foreign policy disaster of my time. We all have to

:00:13.:00:19.

ask, why did the institutions of the United Kingdom failed to evdn

:00:20.:00:27.

develop a hint of that? It wasn t particularly courageous for the

:00:28.:00:32.

House to vote in favour. 70$ of the British public supported thd

:00:33.:00:37.

invasion. For the first week or two it was extremely popular. H`d we

:00:38.:00:41.

held a referendum, which is now the fashionable way of governing the

:00:42.:00:46.

country, compared with this old-fashioned Parliamentary

:00:47.:00:49.

democracy, it would have sahled through with animal must majority.

:00:50.:00:53.

The danger of following opinion polls is that I've found a xear

:00:54.:00:57.

later you couldn't find a mdmber of the public who had never met anybody

:00:58.:01:01.

who agreed with the invasion of Iraq. In the light of better

:01:02.:01:07.

information, people suddenlx realised it had been a terrhble are.

:01:08.:01:22.

-- terrible error. We voted against it, we spoke against it, neddless to

:01:23.:01:26.

say I have looked at my spedch and I'm very sad to say I predicted

:01:27.:01:30.

quite a lot of the consequences of what was going to go ahead. We all

:01:31.:01:36.

agree never again we can avoid it, but there's a big, big subjdct and

:01:37.:01:43.

it's no good saying we should look at the intelligence arrangelents, we

:01:44.:01:46.

should have a look at the arrangements for the way our

:01:47.:01:50.

government is run, the way this Parliament organises itself, and how

:01:51.:01:54.

we get sensible accountabilhty to the House of Commons the next time

:01:55.:01:58.

the Government has to engagd in such difficult decisions. Mr Alex

:01:59.:02:09.

Salmond. The Parliamentary wounds on the Iraq war are still perthnent

:02:10.:02:14.

today, but we should remembdr they are as nothing compared to the

:02:15.:02:20.

wounds of the 179 families who lost servicepeople, and the 23 British

:02:21.:02:25.

civilian staff who were killed, the 200,000 Iraqis, the thousands of

:02:26.:02:28.

American soldiers, the carn`ge in the Middle East which is with us

:02:29.:02:33.

today, these wounds are still raw and open and continuing. I looked

:02:34.:02:43.

back at the debate on the 18th of March 2003, and I was struck by a

:02:44.:02:48.

number of things we don't always remember. We remember Robin Cook's

:02:49.:02:53.

brilliant resignation speech the day before. We don't necessarilx

:02:54.:02:59.

remember John Denham's disthnguished and measured contribution on the day

:03:00.:03:06.

of the debate. He reminded ts that public opinion at that stagd was in

:03:07.:03:12.

favour of war and those who spoke against it weren't given a

:03:13.:03:17.

particularly easy time. I looked at the contribution from Charlds

:03:18.:03:19.

Kennedy in that day, who was barracked throughout his spdech

:03:20.:03:26.

against war. Suggestions of Chamberlain Charlie was one of the

:03:27.:03:30.

more printable epithets, or the toast of Baghdad, which was flung at

:03:31.:03:42.

some of us who opposed the war. Members who argued against ht have

:03:43.:03:47.

been vindicated, but also to remind people of the nature and context of

:03:48.:03:52.

the debate we were in. Therd were only 179 members in this Parliament

:03:53.:03:59.

who were members of that parliament in 2003, little over a quarter of

:04:00.:04:05.

members in this Parliament were present and voting in that

:04:06.:04:09.

particular debate so it is `s well that people remember and understand

:04:10.:04:13.

the context if we are to understand the feelings of Parliamentary

:04:14.:04:18.

democracy. Not referendum btt Parliamentary democracy that votes

:04:19.:04:24.

on that illustrated about Iraq. And I have also been checking the

:04:25.:04:28.

record, and I think I can honestly say I don't think I've ever quoted

:04:29.:04:32.

in The Times newspaper ever in 0 years in this place off and on, but

:04:33.:04:37.

I'm going to quote it today because I thought their headline and their

:04:38.:04:42.

first paragraph in the report last Thursday hit the mark absolttely.

:04:43.:04:47.

Under the headline, Blair's private war, they wrote, Britain fotght a

:04:48.:04:53.

potentially illegal war in Hraq because of Tony Blair's misguided

:04:54.:04:59.

and personal commitment to George Bush, the Chilcot report concluded

:05:00.:05:05.

yesterday. It would be impossible in reading the Chilcot report not to

:05:06.:05:08.

look at that personal level of accountability as well as the wider

:05:09.:05:14.

context of the legality. Thd right honourable member for Rushcliffe

:05:15.:05:16.

started his speech by saying this is not all about Tony Blair, and the

:05:17.:05:21.

rest of his speech illustrated why it is very largely about Tony Blair.

:05:22.:05:26.

The Chilcot report, more importantly, let me quote from the

:05:27.:05:32.

executive summary, but belidve me it is backed enormously in the full

:05:33.:05:38.

report on page 58 and 59, goes through the sequence of

:05:39.:05:45.

decision-making until the ilmediate onset of war. If it was sof`

:05:46.:05:50.

government, it was a very slall sofa indeed because the crucial decisions

:05:51.:05:55.

about the strategy and of this country were made with the Prime

:05:56.:06:02.

Minister and very few of his advisers. Chilcot finds not even a

:06:03.:06:07.

Cabinet committee, according to Chilcot, discussed these crtcial

:06:08.:06:12.

decisions, which are listed on page 58 and 59. For example the first of

:06:13.:06:17.

which, the decision at the beginning of September 2001 to offer to work

:06:18.:06:21.

with President Bush and a strategy to deal with Iraq as part of phase

:06:22.:06:26.

two on the war on terror, ddspite the fact there was no evidence of

:06:27.:06:31.

Iraqi involvement in the attacks on the United States. Right through to

:06:32.:06:37.

our view of UK policy at thd end of February 2003, where the inspectors

:06:38.:06:41.

have found no evidence of wdapons of mass destruction and only lhmited

:06:42.:06:44.

support for the second resolution in the Security Council.

:06:45.:06:49.

All of these decisions made without consultation with a range of

:06:50.:06:56.

colleagues in the cabinet. When the Deputy Prime Minister concltded this

:06:57.:06:59.

weekend in a way that Chilcot wasn't allowed to do either becausd of his

:07:00.:07:04.

remit or lack of specialisms on the inquiry that the war was illegal and

:07:05.:07:11.

apologised for it, what he `ctually should have been apologising for as

:07:12.:07:14.

Deputy Prime Minister was that this was allowed to happen over `

:07:15.:07:18.

sequence of 15 months where one individual, the Prime Minister, with

:07:19.:07:22.

his advisers was able to take these decisions without any account of any

:07:23.:07:27.

sort or kind of collective responsibility. Doesn't Chilcot also

:07:28.:07:35.

say, though, that the form of Government should be described as a

:07:36.:07:41.

profession Al Faw um? That ht shouldn't be regarded as just

:07:42.:07:46.

advisers and cronies. Isn't that the specific point of evidence that Lord

:07:47.:07:52.

Turnbull gave to Chilcot? I'm dealing with the findings of

:07:53.:07:57.

Chilcot. The inquiry considdrs that there should have been a collective

:07:58.:08:02.

discussion by a Cabinet comlittee or small group of ministers on the

:08:03.:08:08.

basis of advice agreed at a senior level of officials. That is page 58,

:08:09.:08:13.

if it helps the honourable gentleman. Paragraph 409. I've

:08:14.:08:18.

answered the honourable gentleman. Let me continue. Perhaps I'll give

:08:19.:08:27.

way later. THE SPEAKER:. We cannot conduct a

:08:28.:08:34.

debate with people yelling from a sedentary position. If the right

:08:35.:08:38.

honourable gentleman wants to give way later he will. If he dodsn't, he

:08:39.:08:41.

heent'. No doubt the Chilcot report would

:08:42.:08:48.

have concluded otherwise but we have the report as it's concluded not not

:08:49.:08:53.

just on individual pieces of evidence but the conclusion of the

:08:54.:08:59.

Chilcot Inquiry itself. That's why the Times were undoubtedly right to

:09:00.:09:02.

describe this in the way thdy did as Blair's private war. In terls of

:09:03.:09:08.

what this place and this pl`ce's collective responsibility. Where I

:09:09.:09:12.

fundamentally disagree with the Right Honourable Member for

:09:13.:09:16.

Rushcliffe, if a Parliament is to hold future executives to account,

:09:17.:09:22.

it's not just a question of changing the process of decision makhng. I

:09:23.:09:27.

accept some changes have bedn made. I don't accept the confidence of the

:09:28.:09:32.

Foreign Secretary that mist`kes could never be repeated agahn. I

:09:33.:09:37.

don't believe his disstings between a land campaign in Iraq and an

:09:38.:09:43.

aerial bombardment in Libya fully explains, for example, why this

:09:44.:09:47.

country, never mind its allhes, spent 13 times as much bombhng Libya

:09:48.:09:52.

as we did in any budget for reconstruction. That might be a

:09:53.:09:56.

lesson which hasn't been carried forward. But the changes th`t must

:09:57.:10:00.

be made are not just in terls of Government processes. They're

:10:01.:10:04.

changes in terms of parliamdntary accountability. The most fundamental

:10:05.:10:10.

point of parliamentary accountability is the Parli`ment

:10:11.:10:13.

decided whether it has been misled or not. My contention is... I give

:10:14.:10:18.

Waugh to the member. On this question of Libya. The fact is Libya

:10:19.:10:26.

was already in a brutal civhl war before western airforces prdvented

:10:27.:10:28.

Gaddafi slaughtering innocent people. That's what was happening.

:10:29.:10:33.

The question he has to answdr is what would he have done to help

:10:34.:10:37.

those women and children in Benghazi? What would he havd done to

:10:38.:10:44.

help them? Probably, as my honourable friend said, probably not

:10:45.:10:48.

supplying arms to people like that over a period of time. Not doing oil

:10:49.:10:53.

deals in the sun in a tent with Colonel Gaddafi might be a second.

:10:54.:10:58.

That wasn't the point. Let le make my speech. That wasn't the point I

:10:59.:11:03.

was making. It was about thd lesson of reconstruction. Not about the

:11:04.:11:07.

argument of the conflict. Btt the lesson of reconstruction. It is a

:11:08.:11:13.

very fair point to make to point out of fact this country spent 03 times

:11:14.:11:19.

as much bombing Libya as we did in aiding a budget for recon strukts of

:11:20.:11:23.

Libya. That -- reconstruction of Libya. That may be a lesson given

:11:24.:11:28.

priority to the aftermath of conflict which I'm not cert`in the

:11:29.:11:30.

Foreign Secretary fully took on board. The point I was going to

:11:31.:11:35.

make, this is not just about the process of Government but about

:11:36.:11:39.

parliamentary accountabilitx. The most fundamental point of all. In

:11:40.:11:44.

the past, we've held people accountable in the relatively recent

:11:45.:11:49.

past, pro fume owe and a sex scandal. Stephen Byers accused of

:11:50.:11:54.

misleading Parliament because he was nationalising a railway company if

:11:55.:11:57.

I remember correct. And these are things which, no doubt, are very

:11:58.:12:02.

important and that line of accountability is crucial. How much

:12:03.:12:06.

more important is a line of accountability on peace or war where

:12:07.:12:09.

thousands or hundreds of thousands of people lose their lives `s a

:12:10.:12:14.

result of decisions that ard made by the executive? My contention would

:12:15.:12:22.

be that Chilcot gives huge `rray of evidence of a lack of parli`mentary

:12:23.:12:28.

truthfulness. One thing was being said to the president of thd United

:12:29.:12:31.

States and quite a different thing was being said to Parliament and to

:12:32.:12:37.

people. That doesn't take place over a single speech or a single

:12:38.:12:41.

parliamentary statement, though the immediate run up to the war gives

:12:42.:12:46.

ample and detailed examples. For example, as my honourable friend for

:12:47.:12:54.

the Green Party indicated, the total misrepresentation to the UN. Chilcot

:12:55.:12:59.

published what was being sahd within Government and we can compare that

:13:00.:13:02.

directly to what was being offered to this Parliament as an

:13:03.:13:07.

explanation. But the process of Parliament being told one thing

:13:08.:13:13.

while George W Bush was being assured another didn't take place

:13:14.:13:17.

over a fee weeks or single debate or statement, it took place ovdr 1

:13:18.:13:23.

months. It's amply demonstr`ted in the evidence presented to Chilcot.

:13:24.:13:29.

We know now why Chilcot fought so strongly to have these priv`te memos

:13:30.:13:33.

to be part of the overall rdview of the report. The Right Honourable

:13:34.:13:40.

Member for Rushcliffe pointdd to the motivations of regime changd and the

:13:41.:13:45.

difficulty that regime change could not make the war legal in gdnerally

:13:46.:13:50.

understood international terms. That's demonstrated in the private

:13:51.:13:55.

memos from Tony Blair to George W Bush. In December 2001. Any link to

:13:56.:14:03.

11th accept and Al-Qaeda is at best very tenuous. At present

:14:04.:14:07.

international opinion would be reluctant outside the United States

:14:08.:14:13.

or the UK to sup pour immedhate military action. For sure, people

:14:14.:14:18.

want to be rid of Saddam. Wd need a strategy for regime change that

:14:19.:14:25.

builds over time. That was Des 001. However, at the same time, December.

:14:26.:14:31.

Charles Kennedy in pursuing the Prime Minister at Question Time was

:14:32.:14:39.

told the two faces of war included Afghanistan and the pursuit of

:14:40.:14:42.

international terrorism in `ll of its different forms. That is a

:14:43.:14:47.

matter for investigating thd finances, how terrorists move across

:14:48.:14:51.

frontiers. The House was behng told stage two of the war on terror was

:14:52.:14:58.

not an assault on Iraq, far less a regime change in Iraq but a pursuit

:14:59.:15:03.

of infer national terrorism. The two things are totally incompathble One

:15:04.:15:10.

thing to George Bush in private -- private, another to this Parliament

:15:11.:15:15.

and the people of the country. Then there's the issue moving into 2 02

:15:16.:15:20.

which was amply picked up bx the press after the Chilcot

:15:21.:15:24.

REPORTER:Ed. I will be with you whatever. That was in the mdmo of

:15:25.:15:33.

20th July 20002 to George Btsh. I heard the former Prime Minister

:15:34.:15:38.

explain this to John Humphrdys as the idea of "What." Meant somehow

:15:39.:15:44.

whatever and didn't give an unconditional commitment to stand

:15:45.:15:47.

with the United States in a war I'm not sure I fully understood that

:15:48.:15:53.

explanation. But crucially, neither did John Chilcot. And neithdr did

:15:54.:15:58.

Jack Straw, a crucial member of the administration. Jack Straw's memos

:15:59.:16:07.

to Tony Blair were also published. And the -- on 11th March 2003 in the

:16:08.:16:15.

report Straw wrote to Blair, when British graishly accepted your offer

:16:16.:16:18.

to be with him all the way, he wanted you alive not dead. Referring

:16:19.:16:26.

to not the mortal danger to troops or civilians from a war but

:16:27.:16:29.

politically whether the Prile Minister would be alive or dead

:16:30.:16:34.

Jack Straw was under no illtsions whatsoever about the commitlent that

:16:35.:16:37.

had been given to George Bush and neither were Tony Blair's own

:16:38.:16:43.

advisers who advised him to take it out of the memo and neither,

:16:44.:16:47.

certainly, it was George Bush or his advisers or Secretary of St`te Colin

:16:48.:16:54.

Powell. Sir John Chilcot concludes that the meaning of this, Mr Blair's

:16:55.:16:58.

note, which had not been discussed or agreed with colleagues sdt the UK

:16:59.:17:02.

on a path leading to diplom`tic activity in the UN. The possibility

:17:03.:17:09.

of participation in militarx action in a way to make it very difficult

:17:10.:17:13.

for the UK to withdraw support from the United States. But that was not

:17:14.:17:17.

what was being told to Parlhament at the same time. Parliament w`s not

:17:18.:17:23.

told of assurances to Georgd W Bush on military action. Parliamdnt was

:17:24.:17:27.

told the Prime Minister was striving for peace. He was trying to find

:17:28.:17:33.

anyway way to avoid a conflhct. That it was all up to Saddam whether he

:17:34.:17:40.

those peace or conflict. And that deliberate misrepresentation of what

:17:41.:17:42.

was being said to the Americans and what was being said to Parlhament,

:17:43.:17:48.

continued, of course, into the very onset of war itself. And whdn the

:17:49.:17:58.

memo quoted by my honourabld friend earlier on in this debate, when

:17:59.:18:04.

Blair was telling Parliament even in the speech, in the war or pdace

:18:05.:18:09.

debate, I have never put out justification for action as regime

:18:10.:18:14.

change. He was telling George Bush only a few days later, that's why

:18:15.:18:18.

Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is the immediate justificathon for

:18:19.:18:22.

action, ridding Iraq of Saddam is the real prize. Now, we heard

:18:23.:18:30.

earlier that this was not a matter of one man. But that one man was the

:18:31.:18:36.

Prime Minister. We were told earlier it was really about processds of

:18:37.:18:40.

Government. But it was the Prime Minister who dictated the process of

:18:41.:18:44.

Government and prevented processes of Government in terms of checks and

:18:45.:18:47.

balances not working. And, `bove all, it was the Prime Minister who

:18:48.:18:53.

prevented this House having the information it required to take a

:18:54.:19:00.

reasonable judgment. I heard last week that one of the defencds of

:19:01.:19:06.

intervention in Iraq was a counter-factual argument. What if

:19:07.:19:11.

Saddam Hussein had stayed in power? What would he have done? Dalage in

:19:12.:19:20.

the Arab string, for exampld? There's another counter-factual

:19:21.:19:25.

argument I have in mind. Wh`t if the massive international coalition that

:19:26.:19:33.

was built to deal with Al-Q`eda in Afghanistan had been held together,

:19:34.:19:36.

what if the hundreds of billions of dollars which were then to be

:19:37.:19:42.

waisted in the Iraqi desert, what if they had been applied to making a

:19:43.:19:46.

real success of the rebuildhng of Afghanistan? What if the

:19:47.:19:52.

justification for a totally legal international intervention which

:19:53.:19:56.

this country took part in h`d resulted in a genuine benefht and

:19:57.:20:00.

that massive coalition which extended, incidentally, even to

:20:01.:20:06.

approval from the Palestini`n liberation organisation, th`t

:20:07.:20:09.

massive Corration could havd demonstrated a legal war, correctly

:20:10.:20:14.

applied, could result in thd reconstruction and in allowhng a

:20:15.:20:17.

country the investment requhred to be a shining light of a gentine

:20:18.:20:22.

international intervention? And the United States of America, in a way,

:20:23.:20:29.

never stronger than it was hn the immediate aftermath of 9/11, was

:20:30.:20:33.

never more respected becausd it had suffered under the terrorist

:20:34.:20:39.

atrocity. If a broader coalhtion had brought that to fruition instead of

:20:40.:20:46.

this meandering into Iraq on a private vendetta from the President

:20:47.:20:55.

of the United States with its closet advisor of neo-Conservative and

:20:56.:21:00.

prevented this Parliament from having the information it rdquired

:21:01.:21:02.

to hold him to account? I once told the former Primd

:21:03.:21:14.

Minister that he would answdr to a higher law than this Parlialent and

:21:15.:21:18.

I believe that to be absolutely true. But in the meantime, this

:21:19.:21:22.

Parliament, add this stage, should hold him accountable. Not bdcause it

:21:23.:21:29.

is a matter of pursuing the former Prime Minister but because ht will

:21:30.:21:33.

demonstrate and illustrate that even retrospectively, if thd

:21:34.:21:36.

parliament is systematicallx misled, they will say, up with it they shall

:21:37.:21:43.

not put. It is part of the change we are going to make, not just in the

:21:44.:21:48.

processes of government, to pause collective responsibility, not just

:21:49.:21:55.

in hope but the essential changes of parliamentary accountabilitx. We

:21:56.:21:58.

will be able to say legitim`tely that this could never happen again.

:21:59.:22:05.

Mr Dominic Grieve. Thank yot, Mr Speaker. It is a pleasure to follow

:22:06.:22:10.

the honourable member and indeed my right honourable friend in this

:22:11.:22:15.

debate. There is no doubt, Lr Speaker, they have to clear

:22:16.:22:19.

advantages over me in this debate in that both of them of course opposed

:22:20.:22:25.

the notion in the House in 2003 which initiated our militarx action

:22:26.:22:31.

in Iraq. Whereas I supported it Something which, I have to say, I

:22:32.:22:36.

have come to very much regrdt. I supported it at the time because I

:22:37.:22:39.

was indeed persuaded by the arguments put forward by thd Prime

:22:40.:22:45.

Minister, at the time, Mr Blair with great eloquence, to thhs House,

:22:46.:22:50.

about the fact that in his tse and a real and present danger, but in the

:22:51.:22:57.

immediate context is justifhed taking military action against him,

:22:58.:23:01.

even without going back for a further resolution of the United

:23:02.:23:08.

Nations Security Council, rdlying on the previous resolutions whhch, I

:23:09.:23:12.

have to say, there was conshderable evidence that Saddam Hussein had

:23:13.:23:17.

Celia Lee breached. Certainly in terms of his non-co-operation. So on

:23:18.:23:23.

that basis I voted for the lotion as did many other honourable mdmbers

:23:24.:23:30.

still present in this House today. Sir John Chilcot's report hhghlights

:23:31.:23:40.

how the decision-making processes of governments can become distorted

:23:41.:23:44.

under pressure of events. Indeed, I would like to think, I am always a

:23:45.:23:48.

little wary of this, that the distortions are so consider`ble in

:23:49.:23:56.

relation to the report that he highlights a dysfunctionality within

:23:57.:23:58.

the heart of Mr Blair's govdrnment but I hope may have been exceptional

:23:59.:24:04.

to him. But for all that I think there are plenty of caution`ry tales

:24:05.:24:08.

for us in this House today which we can look at in current contdxt as

:24:09.:24:13.

much as they would have been looked at, at the time. But the pohnt seems

:24:14.:24:17.

to me to have been rather wdll made and I will not repeat it. That

:24:18.:24:21.

because Mr Blair had formed in his view very strong resolution that we

:24:22.:24:28.

should support the United States including removing Saddam Htssein

:24:29.:24:34.

and effecting regime change that the entirety of the processes of

:24:35.:24:39.

government and Whitehall was skewed in order to achieve that ail and

:24:40.:24:43.

have the mischief of disreg`rding all the evidence that might be

:24:44.:24:46.

available to contradict whether this was in fact the right coursd of

:24:47.:24:53.

action to take. Whether it was intelligence information or for that

:24:54.:24:58.

matter whether it was the thorny problem of legality, both of which I

:24:59.:25:01.

want to touch on briefly thhs afternoon. So far as the qudstion of

:25:02.:25:09.

the intelligence is concerndd, those of us who have been in government

:25:10.:25:13.

and served on the National Security Council, as I have or indeed in my

:25:14.:25:18.

current role as chairman of the intelligence and Security committee,

:25:19.:25:21.

know perfectly well that intelligence often obtained at great

:25:22.:25:26.

risk and with difficulty can only be what it is, which is a tool to

:25:27.:25:33.

decision-making. It may be listaken. You cannot prevent that in human

:25:34.:25:39.

society and you cannot guar`ntee its interpretation will be corrdct. I

:25:40.:25:42.

have to say that my impresshon during my time in government was

:25:43.:25:50.

that the intelligence committees go to considerable lengths to point out

:25:51.:25:55.

the limits to which intelligence can properly be put. A lesson I suspect

:25:56.:25:59.

that they derived from this experience. The simple fact is that

:26:00.:26:05.

one can only read the Chilcot Report to conclude the way in which the

:26:06.:26:09.

intelligence was handled stdering the run-up to the war was in some

:26:10.:26:15.

cases truly breathtaking. And it makes troublesome reading. @nd I

:26:16.:26:21.

hope very much, I will say nothing more about this, those withhn the

:26:22.:26:26.

agencies who are known do the work will read and reread this rdport in

:26:27.:26:36.

order to remind ourselves of how reasonable intelligence was misused

:26:37.:26:42.

for the purpose of justifying theory. As proved by Mr Blahr when

:26:43.:26:53.

he came to address the Housd before the war was sanctioned by this

:26:54.:26:56.

Parliament. It is the certahnties engendered by this, and my right

:26:57.:27:06.

honourable friend made a good intervention last week when he said

:27:07.:27:09.

that if we had actually takdn the time and trouble to read sole of the

:27:10.:27:13.

background information available we might have doubted some of the

:27:14.:27:15.

certainties that were being expressed. I think it was absolutely

:27:16.:27:20.

right about that, and think it is another burden which members of this

:27:21.:27:24.

House or participated in thhs debate will have to bear. So much then for

:27:25.:27:30.

the intelligence. What about the process of legal advice. Mr Speaker,

:27:31.:27:34.

I have been apart of trying to provide legal advice to govdrnment

:27:35.:27:38.

when I was a law officer. Mx right honourable friend the Solichtor

:27:39.:27:42.

General was on the front bench and he too has also been involvdd in

:27:43.:27:49.

these processes. Legal advice is often, and law officers know this,

:27:50.:27:56.

advice which cannot in any way be certain. Legal advice is ex`ctly

:27:57.:28:02.

what it says it is. In some cases, particularly when one is de`ling

:28:03.:28:05.

with international law, the question as to whether or not you ard on the

:28:06.:28:10.

right side or the wrong sidd of international law is an intdnsely

:28:11.:28:15.

grey area precisely because there is no ultimate tribunal to detdrmine

:28:16.:28:21.

those issues. And yet apart of the British government's doctrine and

:28:22.:28:26.

ethics is that we must act lawfully at all times. And it is for the law

:28:27.:28:30.

officers to try and steer that course. What of course shinds

:28:31.:28:35.

through to me, reading the Chilcot Inquiry report, is not, as some

:28:36.:28:41.

critics have said, and I will come back to this in a moment, that Lord

:28:42.:28:50.

Goldsmith as an Attorney General abandoned legal objectivity, because

:28:51.:28:54.

I have to say now that I have read the Chilcot Inquiry and looked at

:28:55.:28:57.

these passages carefully, it seems to me that you fulfilled those

:28:58.:29:03.

criteria as best he possiblx could. But he was drawn into this process

:29:04.:29:08.

which in itself was utterly flawed because he cherry picked whhchever

:29:09.:29:14.

bit of advice he wanted to present and then sold it in that wax both to

:29:15.:29:19.

the Cabinet would never properly scrutinised it at all and ultimately

:29:20.:29:23.

to the public. I give way to my right honourable friend. I thank my

:29:24.:29:27.

right honourable friend forgiving way. Does he really think the

:29:28.:29:32.

Attorney General met all his duties? Report refers to the final puestion,

:29:33.:29:38.

to Tony Blair, which it says was answered the phone and orally about

:29:39.:29:42.

the weather conditions had been met. Surely he should have been lore

:29:43.:29:46.

pressing than just accepting a Coventry report before changing his

:29:47.:29:51.

view? Is simply quote from paragraph eight, ten, from this summary, I'm

:29:52.:29:57.

sorry I don't have the entire sorry. This was written by an official in

:29:58.:30:02.

the attorney's department. @bout a further resolution of the sdcurity

:30:03.:30:05.

council that that is strong evidence that Iraq has failed to comply with

:30:06.:30:11.

and corporate body within the remit resolution 1441. It has failed to

:30:12.:30:15.

take the final opportunity offered by the Security Council in that

:30:16.:30:19.

resolution. The Attorney General understands and is unequivocally the

:30:20.:30:21.

view of the Prime Minister that Iraq has committed further materhal

:30:22.:30:27.

breach is, as specified in resolution 1441. But as this is a

:30:28.:30:31.

judgment for the Prime Minister the attorney would be grateful for

:30:32.:30:36.

confirmation that this is the case. Now, Mr Speaker, it is important to

:30:37.:30:41.

understand, I think, one of the big changes that has taken placd between

:30:42.:30:46.

2003 and today, in a way in which a law officer's advice would be

:30:47.:30:50.

secured. My impression, I hope of got it right, reading Chilcot, in

:30:51.:30:57.

practice, the Attorney General was only provided with sketched

:30:58.:31:02.

backgrounds of the factual `nalysis on which his legal opinion was being

:31:03.:31:09.

sought. The big difference, which I can tell the House without giving

:31:10.:31:14.

away state secrets, is, if law officers are now being asked to

:31:15.:31:19.

advise on a factual basis which involves serious or context problem

:31:20.:31:22.

of international law, they will receive briefing as good as,

:31:23.:31:27.

potentially better, if they demand it, of that which would be provided

:31:28.:31:32.

to the Prime Minister himself, as to the intelligence and factual base

:31:33.:31:37.

that justifies it. So they have to make an independent assessmdnt of

:31:38.:31:42.

that. But I have to say it hs quite clear that in 2003, and I think

:31:43.:31:47.

before them, it's not peculhar to 2003, this is not the practhce that

:31:48.:31:52.

was being adopted. It was not how government works. So in practice the

:31:53.:31:57.

law officer, Lord Goldsmith, was being placed in a position where he

:31:58.:32:01.

had reasonably to take on trust the factual assessment is laid by others

:32:02.:32:05.

and particularly the Prime Linister, I want to make clear, I cannot make

:32:06.:32:12.

a judgment on whether Lord Goldsmith's advice of March seven

:32:13.:32:17.

was right or not but he set out correctly in my view, the

:32:18.:32:22.

alternative interpretations available for resolution 1441, and I

:32:23.:32:25.

simply make the point, as I made earlier in my intervention, that

:32:26.:32:32.

there are areas of internathonal law which raise massive difficulties of

:32:33.:32:37.

interpretation. If for example and I give it as an example to thd House,

:32:38.:32:45.

if we stuck, as some jurists would argue, to the principle that no

:32:46.:32:51.

military intervention Kante place without the United Nations Security

:32:52.:32:53.

Council authorisation, then the United Kingdom doctrine, -- can take

:32:54.:32:59.

place, a well established one of intervening on the basis of the

:33:00.:33:03.

monetary and is a city which is what led us to be able to take action in

:33:04.:33:08.

Kosovo, would never have happened -- one intervening on the basis of

:33:09.:33:13.

human necessity. S check this into the debate the House has had to try

:33:14.:33:18.

to understand the complexithes - is simply check this in. Of cotrse none

:33:19.:33:22.

of this gets away from the fact that the debate would likely havd been

:33:23.:33:28.

very different within Cabindt if Lord Goldsmith's advice in hts

:33:29.:33:32.

original form had been propdrly presented, circulated, and

:33:33.:33:40.

discussed, because if any of us know who have been in government, the

:33:41.:33:43.

process by which you moderate each others' opinions is challenging

:33:44.:33:47.

them. And if you don't have a process of challenge we shotldn t be

:33:48.:33:51.

surprised that at the end of the day people end up rubber stamping

:33:52.:33:54.

decisions because it seems convenient to do so. One of the

:33:55.:33:58.

interesting features of being in publishing was that I quickly came

:33:59.:34:01.

to realise that, because thdre were some members, of whether it was the

:34:02.:34:06.

national Security Council or Cabinet will not be held on to the Prime

:34:07.:34:09.

Minister, it raised the levdl of challenge in a manner that one might

:34:10.:34:14.

not necessarily have found when in fact it is single party govdrnment.

:34:15.:34:19.

An interesting reflection on some of the problems that flow from it. And

:34:20.:34:22.

when you have a Prime Minister who is an utterly dominant figure after

:34:23.:34:31.

four or five years in government and a triumphant second mandate it gets

:34:32.:34:35.

even harder. So Mr Speaker those are my thoughts on looking on these two

:34:36.:34:40.

principal issues. There are lots of other issues in this report but

:34:41.:34:44.

think it is one of the most compelling read but I've had. I m

:34:45.:34:48.

not sure I'll be able to get through the lot but I will certainlx try to

:34:49.:34:53.

read much more of it. But I just make two final points? -- could

:34:54.:34:59.

adjust? Firstly to the honotrable member for Gordon and his ddsire

:35:00.:35:06.

that accountability should lead to at least someone being held in

:35:07.:35:09.

contempt of this House Mr Blair has acted improperly. As to say to him

:35:10.:35:16.

that just as some people talked about impeachment, stews in 180 ,

:35:17.:35:22.

contempt proceedings in Parliament, unless based on findings made in an

:35:23.:35:30.

external tribunal which meets Article six's compliance, is going

:35:31.:35:39.

to be, in practice, difficult. And I would strongly recommend th`t,

:35:40.:35:41.

tempting as such a route might suggest itself to be, the practical

:35:42.:35:46.

difficulties are likely to lake it impossible to follow and I say that

:35:47.:35:53.

in all since 30. I give way... - I give way in all sincerity.

:35:54.:35:59.

Am not quite clear in what way the honourable and learned gentleman

:36:00.:36:05.

considers that the former Prime Minister's civil rights and

:36:06.:36:10.

obligations would be determhned at that contempt motion, as I

:36:11.:36:15.

understand it as a novice and Parliamentary procedure. It is a

:36:16.:36:20.

breach of privilege, it is not a criminal charge, it is not `

:36:21.:36:24.

contempt of court. I wonder if he could elucidate on which basis he

:36:25.:36:30.

thinks article six would be engaged. It depends, I suppose, if I may say

:36:31.:36:34.

to the honourable lady, what sanction this house wishes to

:36:35.:36:38.

follow. In addition to that, I think there is a second issue. Yot may

:36:39.:36:43.

have examples where somebodx says one thing to this house and in front

:36:44.:36:52.

of a tribunal or court of rdcord on evidence, on oath, says somdthing

:36:53.:36:57.

different. And the house can look at those two things juxtapose them to

:36:58.:37:01.

conclude, for example, that the house was misled in evidencd that it

:37:02.:37:06.

was being given. That, if I may say so, might well found a findhng of

:37:07.:37:11.

breach of privilege for contempt, although that still leaves the

:37:12.:37:16.

question unanswered as to s`nctions, but I understand her point. In this

:37:17.:37:24.

case, if I may say, I am not giving some definitive statements, I am

:37:25.:37:27.

simply saying what, to my mhnd, appears to be the difficulthes

:37:28.:37:32.

likely to come from pursuing this particular course of action. As on

:37:33.:37:35.

the whole, I would like the reputation of this house to stand an

:37:36.:37:40.

enhanced by the way we report the Chilcot Inquiry report and hts

:37:41.:37:45.

aftermath, I am always wary of suggesting, counselling or

:37:46.:37:47.

recommending a course of action which might lead to the verx

:37:48.:37:50.

opposite of what is intended. I give way. He is very generous He

:37:51.:37:56.

knows that an old legal expdrtise in the highest regard. -- he knows that

:37:57.:38:04.

I hold his legal expertise. He says it is important that the reputation

:38:05.:38:07.

of the house is enhanced in the outcome of dealing with this report.

:38:08.:38:11.

Surely the reputation will not be enhanced if there is not anx attempt

:38:12.:38:16.

to hold the former Prime Minister to account?

:38:17.:38:24.

I listen to what the honour`ble and learning lady says, and this is a

:38:25.:38:27.

matter that can perhaps be debated or discussed at greater length. But

:38:28.:38:32.

I simply counsel caution. The truth is that the Prime Minister has been

:38:33.:38:36.

examined, or the then Prime Minister, Mr Blair, has been

:38:37.:38:39.

examined at the Court of public opinion and the judgment of history,

:38:40.:38:46.

and I think that it is likely that that judgment will be prettx unkind

:38:47.:38:51.

to the way in which this was carried out. Whether this house feels that

:38:52.:38:57.

it wants to do more immediately is a matter that we can debate at another

:38:58.:39:02.

time. Can I then turned fin`lly the point has been made that thd outcome

:39:03.:39:07.

of this process in the Middle East has been, on the evidence,

:39:08.:39:12.

lamentable. Of course, the Liddle East is a place of massive

:39:13.:39:17.

dysfunctionality, maybe even if we had not intervened in 2003 we would

:39:18.:39:22.

find ourselves with another pattern that would have occurred of war and

:39:23.:39:30.

bloody conflict based on a whole series of disintegration is of the

:39:31.:39:33.

social fabric of that area which has been going on for some time, and we

:39:34.:39:37.

can see manifested in the ctrrent conflict in Iraq and Syria which, I

:39:38.:39:41.

have to say, I don't think hs necessarily entirely due to our

:39:42.:39:47.

intervention in 2003, it has element inherent inside those societies

:39:48.:39:52.

themselves. But I worry, and very much, and I think it has coloured my

:39:53.:39:56.

view as a politician ever shnce that it has also had a terrhble

:39:57.:40:00.

effect on public trust in us and our institutions in this countrx,

:40:01.:40:05.

sometimes which, I rather agreed, for once, with the new statdsman

:40:06.:40:08.

article, it carries itself `ll the way into the Brexit referendum and

:40:09.:40:15.

its aftermath. -- the New Statesman article. I think we have lots to

:40:16.:40:20.

learn from this sorry episode. The nuggets that I derive from ht is

:40:21.:40:27.

that we have to have open ddbate, and we must avoid simply trdating

:40:28.:40:30.

politics as presentational gimmick is. -- gimmicks. Because if we keep

:40:31.:40:38.

doing it, and it has become a habit in modern Western society bdcause of

:40:39.:40:43.

the development of social mddia the press and the way in which we

:40:44.:40:47.

communicate ideas, if we continue doing it we will ruthlessly

:40:48.:40:54.

undermine sensible decision,making and the ability to come to the right

:40:55.:40:58.

conclusions by debate, which is absolutely the heart of what this

:40:59.:41:03.

house should be about. Mrs Margaret Beckett. Thank you Mr

:41:04.:41:09.

Speaker. I want to begin whdther right honourable gentleman who has

:41:10.:41:13.

just spoken very eloquently ended by saying that I entirely agred that

:41:14.:41:18.

there is much to learn from the Chilcot Report. One of the things

:41:19.:41:23.

that concerns me much is th`t honour and it is very early to say so, I

:41:24.:41:28.

know, but it is far from cldar to me that we will actually learn the

:41:29.:41:31.

things we should. In the morning of the Chilcot Inquiry publication I

:41:32.:41:39.

listened to the radio and hdard a number of commentators and, indeed,

:41:40.:41:45.

members of this house, I thhnk that right honourable member was one

:41:46.:41:49.

saying one after another well, of course, we all know what happens.

:41:50.:41:55.

And it was a simple script, Familia. Tony Blair knew there were no

:41:56.:41:59.

weapons of mass destruction, a deliberately lied to the Hotse of

:42:00.:42:05.

Commons about the intelligence. . Whether there was intelligence to

:42:06.:42:08.

suggest there were such weapons He had a secret pact made with George

:42:09.:42:14.

Bush won before -- long before to commit us to war in all

:42:15.:42:18.

circumstances, and so all that went in between was irrelevant and almost

:42:19.:42:21.

did not happen, that the war itself was illegal because there w`s not a

:42:22.:42:26.

second United Nations resolttion. And it seems to me that this is the

:42:27.:42:30.

right moment to point out that, I think, this is the fifth inpuiry

:42:31.:42:35.

into what happened in 2003 `nd before and after the invasion, and

:42:36.:42:42.

as far as I recall, none of them has actually verified that incrddibly

:42:43.:42:45.

simple script, nor does it seem to me that the Chilcot Inquiry either

:42:46.:42:53.

simply confirms it. The inqtiry team accept, as the right honour`ble

:42:54.:42:56.

member for Rush Chris Hazzard the former Attorney General, th`t when

:42:57.:43:00.

the Prime Minister told this house that he believed that Saddal Hussein

:43:01.:43:05.

had weapons of mass destruction he believed it in place of the TB true.

:43:06.:43:10.

He was not making up the intelligence, he was not telling

:43:11.:43:12.

this house anything other than what he believed to be true, let alone

:43:13.:43:19.

inventing a light, which sedms to be implied, and, indeed, the rdport

:43:20.:43:25.

points out that the basic c`se that Saddam Hussain had both ret`ined

:43:26.:43:29.

weapons of mass destruction and that he had the intent to develop more,

:43:30.:43:35.

given the opportunity, was what the joint intelligence committed itself

:43:36.:43:41.

believed. The former Attorndy General touched on this and it seems

:43:42.:43:44.

to be one of the most important things coming out of Chilcot, the

:43:45.:43:49.

degree to which whole swathds of people whose professional jtdgment

:43:50.:43:54.

was involved were, indeed, listaken. That continue to be the casd right

:43:55.:44:01.

up to and, indeed, beyond the invasion. What Chilcot makes clear

:44:02.:44:06.

is that that was what the joint intelligence committee had

:44:07.:44:09.

continually reported, both to the then Prime Minister and to the

:44:10.:44:15.

Cabinet. I noticed that there was no evidence, they say, that

:44:16.:44:19.

intelligence was improperly included in the dossier, or that Number Ten

:44:20.:44:27.

improperly influenced the tdxt. They said that this inquiry is not

:44:28.:44:31.

questioning Mr Blair's belidfs, or his legitimate role in advocating

:44:32.:44:38.

Government policy. That, I think, is really important to bear in mind,

:44:39.:44:43.

especially as one listens to some of the detailed and very deterlined

:44:44.:44:46.

attempts to create a differdnt impression. Sir John Chilcot also

:44:47.:44:52.

pointed out that, along with the dangers that the intelligence

:44:53.:44:56.

community believed Saddam Htssein presented, they believed, and again,

:44:57.:45:00.

I am quoting from what Sir John Chilcot said, that Saddam Htssain

:45:01.:45:05.

could not be removed without an invasion. And they also thotght that

:45:06.:45:16.

to be relevant. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the

:45:17.:45:19.

intelligence community and the then Prime Minister were wrong, but we

:45:20.:45:24.

did not know it then. And, what s more, it is what our intellhgence

:45:25.:45:30.

services believed, it was bdlieved by almost every other intelligence

:45:31.:45:34.

service in the world, including the French and the Russians, whhch is,

:45:35.:45:42.

no doubt, why security council resolution 1441 was actuallx carried

:45:43.:45:44.

unanimously. I give way. I thank the right

:45:45.:45:50.

honourable lady for giving way. The JAC, on the 15th of March 2002, said

:45:51.:45:57.

the intelligence on Iraq Ha`s weapons of mass destruction and

:45:58.:46:01.

ballistic missile production is sporadic and patchy -- JIC said

:46:02.:46:09.

Tony Blair said, two weeks later, we know these weapons constitute a

:46:10.:46:15.

threat. How is that consistdnt? I am familiar with this exchange and this

:46:16.:46:19.

insistence that in some way this is hugely important. This is not the

:46:20.:46:24.

impression that the public `re being given and, if I may say so, that he

:46:25.:46:29.

amongst others is striving to give them. They are being given the

:46:30.:46:32.

impression that the intelligence services, not that they said it was

:46:33.:46:37.

sporadic and patchy but that they knew there were no weapons of mass

:46:38.:46:40.

destruction and the then Prhme Minister knew there were no weapons

:46:41.:46:44.

of mass destruction and delhberately this led the house. That is not

:46:45.:46:50.

true, it was never true, and no attempt to read that into the

:46:51.:46:57.

record, it seems to me, can possibly be justified. We did not know it

:46:58.:47:02.

then, no one knew it then, lost people very firmly believed in

:47:03.:47:06.

Saddam Hussein's intentions. The third allegation is the one about

:47:07.:47:11.

the secret commitment, I was not the slightest bit surprised to hear the

:47:12.:47:16.

honourable member quoting the single sentence quoted in the background

:47:17.:47:22.

notification, I agree with him entirely of his assertion that it

:47:23.:47:28.

was a profound mistake for the former Prime Minister to usd that

:47:29.:47:33.

phraseology. However, I don't read into it the sinister feeling that he

:47:34.:47:40.

reads in it nor, indeed, it seems to me, and the Chilcot Inquiry. To my

:47:41.:47:44.

mind, if this had been a conversation rather than a written

:47:45.:47:47.

memorandum, it was something along the lines of, look, I am on your

:47:48.:47:54.

side, but... But, if we are to take action, all these things have to be

:47:55.:47:57.

addressed, we had to go to the United Nations, and so on.

:47:58.:48:02.

Certainly, Chilcot... In a loment. Certainly Chilcot acknowledges that

:48:03.:48:08.

it was Mr Blair's intent to get the president to go through the United

:48:09.:48:12.

Nations route, that he pursted that with determination and, indded, he

:48:13.:48:17.

was doing so against the advice of President Bush's own allies.

:48:18.:48:22.

I think as she pursues the report she will find that Chilcot find that

:48:23.:48:25.

much more significant, that is why it said it would make it difficult

:48:26.:48:33.

for the UK, and the US. How does she explained Jack Straw's memo to Tony

:48:34.:48:36.

Blair, when President Bush graciously accepted your offer to be

:48:37.:48:42.

with him all the way. Can she explain? It would be better to as my

:48:43.:48:47.

former colleague. Having bedn the recipient of his notes, I would

:48:48.:48:52.

suggest that what he was dohng was ironically quoting back to the Prime

:48:53.:48:56.

Minister words he didn't thhnk the Prime Minister should have tsed and

:48:57.:49:00.

he was right about that, as, no doubt, the honourable gentldman will

:49:01.:49:04.

agree. And then there is thd question of the legality. It has

:49:05.:49:08.

been said here before, and no doubt will be again, but Chilcot does not

:49:09.:49:13.

pronounce on the legality of the proceeding. He criticises the

:49:14.:49:18.

processes, he does not say that a second resolution was needed,

:49:19.:49:22.

although I accept that he does not go into that territory. There is an

:49:23.:49:26.

enormous amount of dispute `bout this matter, and the former Attorney

:49:27.:49:30.

General touched on it a momdnt ago. It has led to the query which he

:49:31.:49:34.

raised why there were so few questions from the Cabinet to the

:49:35.:49:38.

Attorney General when he gave us his advice. One of the things that I am

:49:39.:49:44.

pretty sure I have said before but I don't suppose anybody has p`id

:49:45.:49:48.

attention and they probably will not now, it is quite simply the case

:49:49.:49:52.

that the issue of whether or not we needed a second resolution had been

:49:53.:49:55.

gone over, if you like, at nausea. It had been discussed at length The

:49:56.:50:02.

Cabinet had had extensive vdrbal reports from the then Foreign

:50:03.:50:06.

Secretary and Prime Minister about the progress of discussions in the

:50:07.:50:10.

security council, about the desire for a second resolution, about how

:50:11.:50:13.

things were going, who was objecting. Very much in det`iled

:50:14.:50:18.

terms about how that process of negotiation was taking placd. The

:50:19.:50:25.

views, of course, of the thdn Foreign Office legal adviser in

:50:26.:50:29.

London have been very much puoted, and evidence was given to the

:50:30.:50:33.

Chilcot Inquiry about that. That is absolutely right and wholly

:50:34.:50:37.

understandable that all the focus has been on that advice, thd advice

:50:38.:50:40.

of the Foreign Office legal people in London. I was interested in the

:50:41.:50:46.

remarks of the former Attorney General about how unclear

:50:47.:50:50.

international law is, and how it is not always easy to interpret, it is

:50:51.:50:53.

certainly not the impression that the public has been given. What I

:50:54.:50:58.

have rarely seen quoted at `ll or referenced in any way is th`t

:50:59.:51:02.

someone else gave evidence to the inquiry about the legality of

:51:03.:51:09.

resolution 1441 and whether a second resolution was required. Th`t was

:51:10.:51:12.

the head of the Foreign Offhce legal team at the United Nations. The team

:51:13.:51:20.

whose day to day dealings whth the security council, the team who

:51:21.:51:23.

advised the then Government and presumably, equivalent to pdople in

:51:24.:51:27.

the Government today on the handling of negotiations and to give them

:51:28.:51:31.

legal advice about the detahl of what resolutions mean, the hmporter

:51:32.:51:38.

that they will have and so on. He confirmed what, indeed, consistently

:51:39.:51:42.

the former Foreign Secretarx told the cabinet, day after day, that the

:51:43.:51:47.

Russians and the French in particular had tried to get an

:51:48.:51:51.

explicit reference into resolution 1441 to the need for a second

:51:52.:51:54.

resolution before any milit`ry action could be undertaken, even

:51:55.:52:01.

though 1441 as drafted use the words this is a final opportunity to

:52:02.:52:06.

comply with UN resolutions, and talked about serious conseqtences if

:52:07.:52:07.

Saddam did not comply. Those discussions at the Security

:52:08.:52:18.

Council, we were told, this legal adviser told the Chilcot Inpuiry

:52:19.:52:23.

those discussions were exhatsted, it was a very strong attempt m`de to

:52:24.:52:27.

insist that a second resolution was carried yet in the end the Russians

:52:28.:52:31.

and the French accepted that a second resolution was not rdferred

:52:32.:52:36.

to and the resolution was c`rried unanimously, including, if H recall

:52:37.:52:41.

correctly, with the vote of the Syrian government, a remark`ble

:52:42.:52:45.

thought in today's circumst`nces. The accusation has also been made in

:52:46.:52:50.

all of these discussions th`t the attempts to get Saddam Hussdin to

:52:51.:52:54.

conform with United Nations resolutions was in some way false,

:52:55.:52:59.

but there was no intention, no wish for Saddam Hussein to conform, that

:53:00.:53:03.

the intention from the beginning was military action. As I said darlier,

:53:04.:53:11.

in an intervention, I think, from the Foreign Secretary, the then

:53:12.:53:15.

Prime Minister repeatedly w`rned the Cabinet that if Saddam Hussdin

:53:16.:53:18.

indeed chose to comply with United Nations resolutions, he staxs and

:53:19.:53:23.

reminded us that that in itself would be an outcome that many, not

:53:24.:53:28.

least the many in this Housd who campaigned on behalf of the Kurdish

:53:29.:53:33.

people, would deplore and rdgret. Yet it was repeatedly pointdd out to

:53:34.:53:38.

us that if Saddam complied, no military action, he would stay in

:53:39.:53:46.

power. Yes? Graciously giving way. I wanted to point out the fact that in

:53:47.:53:50.

the Chilcot Report he quotes Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6 at

:53:51.:53:56.

the time, telling Tony Blair that the US were deliberately setting the

:53:57.:53:59.

bar, and I quote, so high that Saddam Hussein would not be able to

:54:00.:54:06.

comply. So when Tony Blair was standing in the House of Colmons on

:54:07.:54:09.

the day of the vote, this c`se that there was still time for Saddam to

:54:10.:54:14.

comply is something wrong. He had already been told by Siri Jtde

:54:15.:54:17.

Dearlove that the bar had bden set so high by the weapons inspdctors

:54:18.:54:22.

that Saddam could not possibly comply. -- Sir Richard Dearlove I

:54:23.:54:28.

know about the view that Sir Richard Dearlove expressed, he was not in

:54:29.:54:33.

place at the time that we speaking of. I accept that it was serious and

:54:34.:54:41.

difficult but if Saddam had shown any intention of complying `nd given

:54:42.:54:46.

any move to admit inspectors, when, for example, a series of tests were

:54:47.:54:51.

proposed that he could meet to show if he was complying, all th`t was

:54:52.:54:55.

rejected. By the French, by the way, and also by Saddam. So that is where

:54:56.:55:05.

we are, there was indeed a warning, that if Saddam complied milhtary

:55:06.:55:11.

action would not occur. The original four point zero is accusations

:55:12.:55:18.

placed. No three further accusations have been added. One from the

:55:19.:55:26.

Chilcot report itself, action taken when it was not a matter of the last

:55:27.:55:32.

resort, the second, that we could have held back longer and the whole

:55:33.:55:35.

matter could have been addrdssed by further inspections and the third,

:55:36.:55:39.

that the events in the Middle East since all as a result of thd Iraq

:55:40.:55:47.

invasion, that should also be on the consciences of all of us who voted

:55:48.:55:53.

for the invasion. On the qudstion of whether or not it was a last resort,

:55:54.:55:58.

it is appoint that was also made by my late right honourable frhend

:55:59.:56:04.

Robin Cook. -- appoint made by Robin Cook. And those who make thdir case

:56:05.:56:08.

rest their argument on the continual effectiveness of containment, backed

:56:09.:56:13.

by sanctions. But one of thd things that no one seems to mention any

:56:14.:56:18.

more is that, at this time, it was widely and seriously believdd that

:56:19.:56:24.

containment was weakening, but containment was seeking to be

:56:25.:56:29.

affected. And certainly anyone who was around and casts their linds

:56:30.:56:34.

back, will recall, there was an enormous, growing campaign `gainst

:56:35.:56:37.

the sanctions which were helping to keep in place the hope for

:56:38.:56:44.

containment. Many Right Honourable members here will recall th`t the

:56:45.:56:48.

process used to take place on a continual basis across the road in

:56:49.:56:52.

Parliament Square. I think lost everyone has forgotten, that was not

:56:53.:56:56.

in the beginning protest ag`inst the war, it was a protest against the

:56:57.:57:01.

maintenance of sanctions on Saddam Hussein. And to be fed to the people

:57:02.:57:06.

who undertook it, and the ldgitimate basis because Saddam was stdaling

:57:07.:57:11.

the money that was given to feed the Iraqi people and using it for his

:57:12.:57:15.

own purposes, so consequently there was growing poverty and hardship in

:57:16.:57:20.

Iraq. So it was understandable that people should be against thd

:57:21.:57:24.

sanctions on that basis accdnt they were in the campaign against

:57:25.:57:33.

sanctions was itself growing. Does the right honourable lady ftlly

:57:34.:57:36.

understand the significance of chapter 20 in the except sulmary

:57:37.:57:40.

which says quite clearly th`t this was not a last resort? The

:57:41.:57:45.

importance of this is that ht is absolutely fundamental to the

:57:46.:57:49.

definition of a just war. And if we accept that assertion by Chhlcot the

:57:50.:57:55.

corollary is that this was not a just war with all the consepuences

:57:56.:58:00.

that follow from that so all this volume is of stuff, that silple

:58:01.:58:04.

sentence in the executive stmmary that bangs the whole lot to rights.

:58:05.:58:11.

I did realise that was what it meant, although for the just war, I

:58:12.:58:17.

had the impression, unlike lany others I'm not a lawyer, although I

:58:18.:58:22.

thought that was a religious, rather than the military legal concept I

:58:23.:58:29.

do understand it in those tdrms Apart from the question of whether

:58:30.:58:34.

or not this was just becausd it was not a last resort, can I also say,

:58:35.:58:41.

on the matter of containment, that after that invasion, evidence was

:58:42.:58:45.

found that indeed Saddam had been in further breach of United Nations

:58:46.:58:48.

resolution even more than wd understood at the time of the

:58:49.:58:52.

invasion. Bridges that we wdre unaware of, for example Robhn Cook

:58:53.:58:55.

was not aware of them when he made his statement in the house. The

:58:56.:58:59.

impression was that containlent was working on a salad of element, which

:59:00.:59:12.

had been forbidden, -- on containment, they could, Ir`q was

:59:13.:59:15.

developing ballistic missilds with a longer range than permitted, and

:59:16.:59:23.

council resolutions, and he clearly intended to reconstitute long-range

:59:24.:59:25.

delivery systems and those systems were potentially for use with

:59:26.:59:29.

weapons of mass destruction. So it's not simple matter, if contahnment

:59:30.:59:37.

had been working, Saddam Hussain was not trying to take things forward in

:59:38.:59:43.

terms of weapons development, as we discovered once invasion had taken

:59:44.:59:47.

place. The second point on this is the argument that we could have held

:59:48.:59:53.

on. And there I must say, I have to accept the verdict of Chilcot. But

:59:54.:00:03.

it was not impossible but again the difficulty on which no one now

:00:04.:00:07.

touches was the circumstancds in which by then everyone found

:00:08.:00:12.

themselves. We had chips in theatre in very, very difficult incredibly

:00:13.:00:17.

difficult and dangerous circumstances. Troops who wdre

:00:18.:00:24.

indeed expecting, hourly, d`ily intentional attacks by biological or

:00:25.:00:28.

chemical weapons which everxone leaved Saddam possessed, and indeed

:00:29.:00:35.

which they hoped to resist. So it wasn't a simple matter of s`ying,

:00:36.:00:39.

there is no need. If you ard going to take action you have to start

:00:40.:00:45.

military reparations, and bx that point military preparations had

:00:46.:00:48.

advanced to such an extent that our troops were in theatre. And you

:00:49.:00:52.

could ultimately argue and no doubt some will, those troops could have

:00:53.:00:56.

been withdrawn. But what a signal would that have sent to Saddam or to

:00:57.:01:01.

the rest of the world? It sdems to me it would have given Sadd`m

:01:02.:01:05.

Hussein the signal that he was free to resume the kind of operations

:01:06.:01:10.

he'd done in the past, whether it be against the Kurds, or indeed as he

:01:11.:01:14.

had done against Iran? So these things are not as simple as it is

:01:15.:01:18.

sometimes seemed, although H completely accept the argumdnt made

:01:19.:01:23.

in Chilcot that one of the lessons we should learn is that we should be

:01:24.:01:28.

wary of letting military concerns drive political decisions. @nd that

:01:29.:01:32.

brings me back to my principal thesis, which is that there is much

:01:33.:01:37.

in Chilcot from which we cotld learn, but only if we do not divert

:01:38.:01:41.

ourselves onto things that Chilcot does not say.

:01:42.:01:49.

That brings me to the final issue, Mr Speaker, but I want to address.

:01:50.:01:58.

The final accusation, if yot like. The accusation that everythhng that

:01:59.:02:02.

has happened in Iraq, Syria, or across the Middle East sincd as all

:02:03.:02:06.

flowed from the invasion of Iraq, that it is all down to a drdadful

:02:07.:02:11.

miscalculation, the right honourable gentleman for Rushcliffe Cordoba and

:02:12.:02:15.

the worst foreign policy mistake. Let's say it was. I don't t`ke that

:02:16.:02:20.

view, but lead us take that premise. I don't think he argues, and I don't

:02:21.:02:24.

for one second I accept that everything terrible that has

:02:25.:02:28.

happened now in the Middle Dast is as a result of that invasion. And I

:02:29.:02:32.

think it is grossly irresponsible in order for people to satisfy the

:02:33.:02:38.

clear, very real anger and passion that people feel against thd then

:02:39.:02:42.

government, against the then Prime Minister, against the war in Iraq,

:02:43.:02:47.

it is grossly irresponsible to say to the evil men of Daesh, Isil, or

:02:48.:02:56.

Al-Qaeda that they are of the hook for any of the terrible things they

:02:57.:03:00.

do because it is all our fatlt. And it's no good people making noises

:03:01.:03:04.

off because we all know that that is just the kind of assertion that many

:03:05.:03:08.

people make. All this stuff is down to the mistakes of the West, all

:03:09.:03:13.

down to the evildoing of thd West, and everyone else is absolvdd. No

:03:14.:03:18.

one should be absolved from responsibility for the things that

:03:19.:03:23.

they themselves advocate or do. I do not seek to resile from the

:03:24.:03:26.

responsibility that I exerchsed when I voted in Cabinet and I voted in

:03:27.:03:32.

this House for the Iraq war. I regret bitterly the events that have

:03:33.:03:37.

occurred since, as any senshble person would. But I do not pretend

:03:38.:03:42.

that the decision I made was not my decision, that it was all somehow

:03:43.:03:46.

someone else's fault. Ray m`c order, I'm sorry to have to announce this

:03:47.:03:51.

to the House, on account of the number of would-be contributors

:03:52.:03:54.

there will be a ten minute limit on backbench speeches. That lilit may

:03:55.:03:58.

have to be reviewed although it is ten minutes for now. Mr Davhd Davis.

:03:59.:04:04.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, it is a privilege to follow the right

:04:05.:04:08.

honourable lady although I think she attributed to use that the body

:04:09.:04:13.

holds, that somehow Isil is off the hook because of the failures of the

:04:14.:04:17.

British government. Let's bd clear what those failures. 150,000 deaths

:04:18.:04:23.

by violence, a large majority of those innocent civilians. More than

:04:24.:04:29.

1 million deaths as a result of this war, medical estimates. A ddstroyed

:04:30.:04:34.

country. And at last dictatorship, but containment was broadly working.

:04:35.:04:41.

-- and a steep dictatorship. Sanctions, inspections were allowed,

:04:42.:04:45.

and no-fly zones. Damage to the stability of the Middle East. Of

:04:46.:04:49.

course it's not. Great but let's remember that Isis started hn

:04:50.:04:56.

prisoner of war camps so let's not forget that. And a signific`ntly

:04:57.:05:01.

increased terrorist threat worldwide, something known `nd

:05:02.:05:05.

warned of before we took thhs action. That is what we are talking

:05:06.:05:11.

about. That is what the worst foreign policy mistake in otr modern

:05:12.:05:16.

history means, for many, many innocent people in this world. Now,

:05:17.:05:24.

before this happened, I had in the 1990s responsibility for cotnter

:05:25.:05:26.

proliferation in the Conservative government at the time. And I accept

:05:27.:05:30.

that the behaviour of the S`ddam Hussein regime was peculiar, to say

:05:31.:05:37.

the least. As far as we could tell from inspections and from otr

:05:38.:05:41.

intelligence, they did not have weapons of mass destruction and they

:05:42.:05:50.

had no workable WMD programle but they were deliberately creating

:05:51.:05:54.

confusion about that fact bx not cooperating at the time and by

:05:55.:05:58.

moving trucks from one site to another before inspections `rrived.

:05:59.:06:02.

Probably because they were keeping Iran convinced that they had a WMD

:06:03.:06:07.

regime. That was what they were worried about, not us, that

:06:08.:06:10.

next-door neighbour against whom they'd had a massive war not long

:06:11.:06:14.

before. So that does explain some of the strange behaviour of thd Saddam

:06:15.:06:19.

regime. And at that time, I guess, until just before 2001, the general

:06:20.:06:26.

belief was that this was a loderate, controllable threat.

:06:27.:06:30.

In deed, our Middle East spdcialist in amongst our delegation to the UN

:06:31.:06:39.

said, when I first took the job I was briefed, basically, we don't

:06:40.:06:42.

think there is anything there. We're justifying sanctions on the basis

:06:43.:06:47.

that Iraq has not answered puestions about its past stocks. And, since

:06:48.:06:53.

then, all the JIC, Sisi GC @G reports corroborate this. A moderate

:06:54.:06:57.

and controllable threat at that time. -- S IS and GCHQ. Then 9/ 1

:06:58.:07:08.

shocked the world, 3000 deaths in a massive terrorist spectacul`r. Of

:07:09.:07:13.

course, Tony Blair justifies his actions on the basis of that. But I

:07:14.:07:18.

had to say to him that this is a reason for getting it right, not an

:07:19.:07:24.

excuse for getting it wrong. It is understandable that there w`s a

:07:25.:07:27.

paranoia about something else like it may happen again, either here or

:07:28.:07:33.

somewhere else. And at that point came a dangerous and simplistic

:07:34.:07:38.

compilation between the real threat from Al-Qaeda, a real, presdnt and

:07:39.:07:46.

continuing threat, from our cave, and Iraq and the axis of evhl

:07:47.:07:50.

nonsense generated by President Bush at this time. The friction was

:07:51.:07:55.

reinforced in February 2002 when the Americans rendered to Egypt someone

:07:56.:08:06.

who was tortured and asked whether there was a chemical biologhcal

:08:07.:08:10.

weapon relationship to be in Iraq and Al-Qaeda. He was torturdd,

:08:11.:08:15.

essentially, until he said xes. That was the evidence that Colin Powell

:08:16.:08:20.

cited, members of the house might remember, in United Nations when he

:08:21.:08:23.

said we have substantial evhdence of this case. Of course, it was fiction

:08:24.:08:27.

obtained under torture. I al quite sure that that intelligence was

:08:28.:08:33.

shared with Mr Blair. And hd would have foundered, because you probably

:08:34.:08:37.

did not know source, persuasive that this was told to them by an

:08:38.:08:43.

Al-Qaeda commander. So at some point between December 2001 and what is in

:08:44.:08:46.

the Chilcot Report, probablx by March 2002, certainly by July 2 02,

:08:47.:08:52.

Mr Blair respectively signed up written to the American milhtary

:08:53.:08:57.

effort. And as I think my rhght honourable friend said, the issue

:08:58.:09:02.

was not soldiers, it was our reputation, our involvement that

:09:03.:09:07.

legitimised the American action This produced a problem for our

:09:08.:09:14.

Prime Minister. Under American law, to go to war on the basis of regime

:09:15.:09:19.

change is entirely legal. They do not recognise the International laws

:09:20.:09:25.

that render it otherwise, and so for them regime change is perfectly

:09:26.:09:32.

legitimate, a perfectly leghtimate aim. From what you said, and the

:09:33.:09:39.

comments and the items that another member referred to in his speech,

:09:40.:09:44.

Tony Blair also agreed with that. That he has a problem. Our law does

:09:45.:09:49.

not allow it. International law does not allow it. He saw his role as

:09:50.:09:55.

building a coalition to support the Americans. Nothing dishonourable in

:09:56.:09:58.

that if he believed the aim, nothing dishonourable in that if yot believe

:09:59.:10:02.

the aim. But, to do that, hd had to achieve a number of rings, he had to

:10:03.:10:07.

create a Casas Belle Isle under international law. He needed Bruce

:10:08.:10:16.

of a terrorist threat, a UN resolution and proof of the

:10:17.:10:23.

legality. They put in place you when 1441. -- UN 1441. They said this was

:10:24.:10:31.

the last opportunity for Ir`q to claim its disarmament oblig`tions.

:10:32.:10:36.

There was a 15-0 vote for that, but as the right honourable ladx just

:10:37.:10:40.

said it did not include a ddliberate trigger to war, it required a

:10:41.:10:43.

further resolution. The UN inspectorate went in, they did 00

:10:44.:10:50.

inspections over 500 sites. Interestingly, they went three dozen

:10:51.:10:53.

sites given to them the CIA and MI6 goes with all that was that the

:10:54.:10:59.

weapons were, and they found not a thing, over 3.5 months they found

:11:00.:11:04.

nothing what the weather. Then the American president set a tiletable,

:11:05.:11:11.

which created a real problel over and above United Nations, w`r by

:11:12.:11:15.

March. That is why Chilcot said that going to war was not the last

:11:16.:11:21.

resort. It was not. It gave Mr Blair report. What did he do? Manx other

:11:22.:11:26.

countries viewed the inspection process is incomplete, France,

:11:27.:11:31.

Russia, of course, it was. They lost the UN voted 11-4. When he came back

:11:32.:11:37.

here to the UK, he had to whn a votes in the House of Commons, a

:11:38.:11:40.

debate in the House of Commons. He made what some people think was the

:11:41.:11:44.

greatest speech of his life. But in order to persuade the House of

:11:45.:11:47.

Commons he had to say three things which were a clear, sorry, five

:11:48.:11:52.

things which were a clear misrepresentation. He accusdd France

:11:53.:11:56.

of saying they would never votes for war. That was simply not trte. But

:11:57.:12:01.

only is it not true, he is not true. I refer to an interview givdn on

:12:02.:12:06.

Radio 4 in the last year by Sir Stephen Wall. One of his Foreign

:12:07.:12:13.

Office advisers in Number Tdn privy to some things. He said what really

:12:14.:12:18.

was said was that as of now, France will votes against. When it was put

:12:19.:12:22.

to him, so Downing Street deliberately lied about the

:12:23.:12:25.

statement, he said, yes, deliberately lied about Jacpues

:12:26.:12:30.

Chirac has macro statement. Two things which were misrepresdntations

:12:31.:12:38.

were quotations from the UN inspectors' reports. Since H have no

:12:39.:12:43.

time, I will very quickly rdad what Hans Blix, the head of the

:12:44.:12:46.

inspectorate, said. If the British Government had gone to the British

:12:47.:12:50.

Parliament in 2003 and said we have a lot of things unaccounted for and

:12:51.:12:53.

we suspect there may be somdthing, we think it is safer to inv`de them,

:12:54.:12:58.

with the British Parliament have dreamt of saying yes to such a

:12:59.:13:02.

thing? I don't think so. I think in order to go ahead, they needed to

:13:03.:13:04.

make the allegation that thdy made, which were not sustainable. They

:13:05.:13:10.

misrepresented what we did hn order to get authorisation they should not

:13:11.:13:15.

have had. That is what Tony Blair did in the House of Commons, that

:13:16.:13:23.

was Hans Blix's you. Mr Blahr also said that Hussein Kamal, Saddam

:13:24.:13:28.

Hussein has macro son-in-law, had told the Allies that the we`pons of

:13:29.:13:36.

mass destruction... Will yot give way? I will. That is what I have in

:13:37.:13:40.

mind. Going back to the point madd before,

:13:41.:13:44.

does he think that, with hindsight, as Hans Blix was perfectly willing

:13:45.:13:49.

to carry on with inspections, the Americans could have been dhssuaded

:13:50.:13:54.

to delay for another month, then possibly this could have bedn

:13:55.:13:57.

avoided? But the Americans were dismissing Senedd Hans Blix as a

:13:58.:14:02.

waste of time and trying to get him out of the way? -- were dislissing

:14:03.:14:08.

Hans Blix? Yes, but Tony Bl`ir chose to come to Parliament to

:14:09.:14:14.

misrepresent the case. He also misrepresented the line put by Mr

:14:15.:14:18.

Hussein Kamal, later killed by Saddam Hussein, as saying that

:14:19.:14:22.

weapons of mass destruction -- the weapons of mass destruction

:14:23.:14:26.

programme is continuing. In interview with the inspectorate he

:14:27.:14:29.

said the weapons of mass destruction had all been destroyed by 1891.

:14:30.:14:35.

Finally, Mr Blair was asked what would be the risk of terrorhsm

:14:36.:14:44.

arising from this war? The Prime Minister did not give an answer

:14:45.:14:48.

despite having been told by the JIC and by MI5 that this would hncrease

:14:49.:14:54.

the international risk of tdrrorism and the domestic risk of terrorism

:14:55.:14:58.

and would destabilise the states in the area. So five County

:14:59.:15:04.

misrepresented the substanthve aspect of the argument for the war

:15:05.:15:10.

to this House. If this has lacro is to give decisions on war in the

:15:11.:15:14.

future it must be able to rdly on being told the truth, the whole

:15:15.:15:18.

truth and nothing but the truth by our Prime Minister.

:15:19.:15:25.

Governor Mr Hilary Benn. For those of us who took that fateful decision

:15:26.:15:32.

on the 18th of March 2003, the Chilcot Report makes diffictlt and

:15:33.:15:35.

uncomfortable reading. Our thoughts above all should be with thd

:15:36.:15:39.

families, Iraqi and British, who lost loved ones in the conflict But

:15:40.:15:44.

members who voted for war, `nd I was one, did so in good faith. H agree

:15:45.:15:48.

with my right honourable frhend I do not think that we were mhsled or

:15:49.:15:54.

lied to and, more importantly, nor does the Chilcot Report conclude

:15:55.:15:58.

that. But we must all take full share of the responsibility for that

:15:59.:16:03.

decision and, indeed, as we now know, the intelligence was wrong.

:16:04.:16:07.

Even though, and my right honourable friend made the point, any

:16:08.:16:11.

countries, many people, including a rock's neighbours, some of his own

:16:12.:16:15.

military and the elected nehghbours all thought that Iraq possessed

:16:16.:16:20.

them. Had we known the truth of the time the House would never have

:16:21.:16:23.

voted for war, nor would I, and for that we should apologise, and I

:16:24.:16:28.

certainly do. But we could only decide at the time on the b`sis of

:16:29.:16:34.

what we thought we knew. I `lso however, wish to say this. Hf I am

:16:35.:16:39.

asked, do I regret the fact that Saddam Hussein is no longer in

:16:40.:16:44.

power? My reply is, no, I do not. Because he was a brutal dictator who

:16:45.:16:50.

had killed hundreds of thousands of his own citizens and used chemical

:16:51.:16:56.

weapons upon them. I want to reflect briefly on three issues, thd tasks

:16:57.:17:00.

we faced a reconstruction why Iraq was as it was answer wider lessons.

:17:01.:17:05.

The problems faced in Basra and surrounding provinces in 2003 was

:17:06.:17:10.

not the humanitarian crisis we had anticipated, but a different set of

:17:11.:17:13.

circumstances altogether. The dysfunction a shall and the problems

:17:14.:17:18.

of the CPA because of the f`ilure to plan, the legacy of Saddam's dig

:17:19.:17:23.

Tata ship, because while we were trying to persuade authorithes in

:17:24.:17:26.

the south to talk to Baghdad, the last thing they wanted to do was to

:17:27.:17:29.

do that, because they remembered what dealing with dad had hd with in

:17:30.:17:37.

the past -- Mac... What dealing with Baghdad had been in the past. Though

:17:38.:17:42.

one has mentioned thus far hn this debate bomb that killed Sergio

:17:43.:17:50.

Vieira to mellow and 23 of his staff in August 2003 in the Canal Hotel

:17:51.:17:57.

which was the beginning, in fact, of the insurgency which grew stronger

:17:58.:18:00.

with each passing month. On the problem faced with reconstrtction

:18:01.:18:04.

was not one of many macro. The Chilcot Report concludes, and I

:18:05.:18:11.

quote, there are no indicathon that activities were constrained by a

:18:12.:18:16.

lack of resources. Iraq was and is still a medal in country with oil.

:18:17.:18:24.

-- a middle-income country. The problem was spending is bec`use of

:18:25.:18:27.

rapidly deteriorating securhty. No sooner did we try to fix solething,

:18:28.:18:32.

and we made a contribution to improving electricity and w`ter

:18:33.:18:36.

supply in the country, that people would try to blow it up. I want to

:18:37.:18:39.

place on record my thanks to the huge contribution made by m`ny

:18:40.:18:44.

courageous individuals that I had the privilege of working with, from

:18:45.:18:48.

Deptford and other departments, British and Iraqi, military and

:18:49.:18:53.

civilian, humanitarian staff, who tried to help the people of Iraq in

:18:54.:19:00.

the most difficult circumst`nces. They all acted in the best

:19:01.:19:04.

traditions of public servicd. We should thank them for what they do.

:19:05.:19:09.

I will give way. While I am most grateful for him

:19:10.:19:13.

giving way and I would 100% endorse the thanks and tributes he has just

:19:14.:19:19.

paid to DFID officials, he has passed rather rapidly over the

:19:20.:19:23.

months afterwards in which `ppeared to be no planning for reconstruction

:19:24.:19:26.

at all. I will freely acknowledge one of the

:19:27.:19:31.

failures, and it is laid out very, very clearly in the report was,

:19:32.:19:36.

indeed, the failure to plan in advance of the decision takdn on the

:19:37.:19:43.

18th of March 2003, and those lessons which we must learn. But the

:19:44.:19:49.

truth is that Iraq was a suppressed, repressed and brutalised society in

:19:50.:19:54.

which Saddam was the lead on the pressure cooker. And when hd left,

:19:55.:19:58.

the lid came off. We have sden it in other countries, Libya has been

:19:59.:20:03.

mentioned in the debate so far. My right honourable friend was right

:20:04.:20:07.

when she said that those who seek to blame all of the subsequent events

:20:08.:20:13.

on the decision to invade mhss the responsibility that others have for

:20:14.:20:20.

what has gone on. We have to (INAUDIBLE)

:20:21.:20:22.

For the responsibility and to disband the Iraqi army, meaning that

:20:23.:20:26.

thousands of men had no sal`ry, no income but a gun and a grievance.

:20:27.:20:32.

That is a profound mistake. But Iraqi politicians also have to

:20:33.:20:35.

bearing responsibility for the sectarian policies that thex have

:20:36.:20:39.

pursued, and those still letting of suicide bombs cannot look to us and

:20:40.:20:47.

say look what you made me do. They must bear responsibility for what

:20:48.:20:52.

they themselves have chosen to do to their fellow citizens. The best

:20:53.:20:54.

evidence for the difference that good politics and good governance

:20:55.:20:59.

can make in Iraq is shown bx the Kurdish region which, let us not

:21:00.:21:04.

forget, was as it was in part because of the support that we had

:21:05.:21:08.

given them through the no-fly zone. As a result they are now thd most

:21:09.:21:14.

stable and relatively prospdrous part of Iraq, and I pay tribute as

:21:15.:21:19.

others have, to the role th`t the Peshmerga have played and still play

:21:20.:21:23.

in trying to defeat dice. The Kurds regard the 2003 invasion as a

:21:24.:21:31.

liberation. As the Kurdistan regional government representative

:21:32.:21:35.

to the UK wrote this week about the Chilcot Report, and I quote, there

:21:36.:21:41.

was an Iraq before the 2003 invasion, an Iraq that, for

:21:42.:21:45.

millions, was a concentration camp on the surface, and a mass grave

:21:46.:21:52.

beneath. And you only have to go back, Mr Speaker, to read the report

:21:53.:21:55.

of Human Rights Watch to sed what they had to say at the time about

:21:56.:22:01.

the mass executions, the Masters appearances, the use of chelical

:22:02.:22:06.

weapons, the suppression of the Shia majority, particularly after the

:22:07.:22:12.

1991 uprising, and the attelpts by Saddam to eradicate the poptlation

:22:13.:22:16.

and culture of the Marsh Ar`bs, who had resided consider is the --

:22:17.:22:21.

continuously in the Martians for more than 5000 years. And that is

:22:22.:22:25.

what life was like, we should not forget it.

:22:26.:22:31.

At least today Iraq has a fragile democracy. Whatever our views on

:22:32.:22:39.

what happened 13 years ago we have a continuing responsibility to assist

:22:40.:22:43.

especially when the democratically elected government asks for our help

:22:44.:22:48.

and this is why this House was right in 2014 to provide support hn

:22:49.:22:52.

helping them to defeat Daesh. And we've seen the benefit of that

:22:53.:22:56.

support in the progress madd in the months since. And we've also

:22:57.:23:01.

discovered more about what Daesh to as towns have been liberated. Which

:23:02.:23:07.

was why this House was right to vote unanimously to describe what is

:23:08.:23:11.

being done to the Yazidis, Christian and other religious minorithes in

:23:12.:23:16.

Iraq and Syria as genocide `t the hands of Daesh. And I wish the

:23:17.:23:21.

government would do what thd House asked and take that to the TN

:23:22.:23:26.

security Council so it can be passed the International criminal Court.

:23:27.:23:30.

Finally, Mr Speaker, the wider lessons. For too long in foreign

:23:31.:23:34.

affairs governments often argued, that of the strong man we know know

:23:35.:23:37.

the Mercure swiftly. Even when that strong man is a brutal murddring

:23:38.:23:41.

dictator, but got what happdns when the strong falls. In Libya, Egypt,

:23:42.:23:50.

and indeed in Iraq. Three ydars after the end of World War HI United

:23:51.:23:54.

Nations proclaimed the inverse of declaration of human rights. Article

:23:55.:23:59.

three states that everyone has the right to life, liberty and freedom

:24:00.:24:04.

from persecution. Everyone hs entitled to an international and

:24:05.:24:07.

social order in which the rhghts of freedom set forth in this

:24:08.:24:11.

declaration can be fully re`lised. And yet for millions in the world

:24:12.:24:15.

those rights, nobly expressdd, have remained words on paper. And they

:24:16.:24:20.

certainly have during the thme of Saddam Hussein 's rule. Surdly Mr

:24:21.:24:26.

Speaker, this will not do. Having created the United Nations, why

:24:27.:24:30.

don't we have the same responsibility internationally to

:24:31.:24:35.

ensure that the principles of the universal suppression of hulan

:24:36.:24:39.

rights are given expression and we have managed to achieve in our own

:24:40.:24:43.

country for example of many years. Now it is the responsibilitx of the

:24:44.:24:49.

United Nations Security Council to do it, it is why we created the

:24:50.:24:56.

United Nations, it is why it has a moral responsibility and legitimacy

:24:57.:24:59.

to act and it is why indeed I am a strong supporter of the

:25:00.:25:05.

responsibility to protect. Because that principle says that st`te 0 is

:25:06.:25:10.

not absolute and the intern`tional community has a responsibilhty to

:25:11.:25:14.

act in certain circumstances. And finally what I think Chilcot forces

:25:15.:25:19.

us to consider, even though it is not spoken about in the report, is,

:25:20.:25:24.

while there are always consdquences to taking action and we meet today

:25:25.:25:28.

to discuss them and their ldgacy, there are also consequences, always,

:25:29.:25:35.

of not doing so. And for me this is the main lesson of Iraq. Before as

:25:36.:25:45.

well as after 2003. I'm going to bring my remarks to a concltsion. I

:25:46.:25:49.

will do because some many others wished his big. As a world, we have

:25:50.:25:57.

a responsibility to be much more effective and determined to deal

:25:58.:26:02.

with conflicts and countries in circumstances such as this before

:26:03.:26:06.

they turn into brutal and bloody civil wars. And I believe the best

:26:07.:26:10.

way to do that is to demonstrate that multilateralism, countries

:26:11.:26:16.

working together, can provide the answer to that uncomfortabld

:26:17.:26:20.

question, what is to be dond? Because, the more we do so, the

:26:21.:26:25.

stronger will be the argument to those who would act unilaterally,

:26:26.:26:29.

and at times we have to do so, we were right to act in Kosovo, will

:26:30.:26:35.

write to act in Sierra Leond, but the stronger the argument that we

:26:36.:26:37.

can make that there is another, a better way, but for that to happen

:26:38.:26:45.

the UN needs to do the job for which it was created. After the ndxt

:26:46.:26:49.

speaker I am trying to accolmodate as many colleagues as possible, it

:26:50.:26:53.

will be necessary to reduce the limit to six units. I'm sorry, it is

:26:54.:26:59.

inevitable. Mr Andrew Mitchdll. It is a pleasure to follow the right

:27:00.:27:03.

honourable gentleman I followed regularly when we were both on the

:27:04.:27:06.

front bench our respective parties. By the end of this debate should be

:27:07.:27:12.

to heal wounds and learn lessons, I fear that the debate will bd

:27:13.:27:15.

characterised by a discussion of whether Mr Blair is guilty or very

:27:16.:27:20.

guilty. And it seems to me that such a discussion would betray the

:27:21.:27:23.

interests of all those whosd loved ones were placed in harms w`y and

:27:24.:27:29.

who paid the ultimate price as well as the thousands of Iraqis who lost

:27:30.:27:33.

their lives. It is the entire system of governance that we need to hold

:27:34.:27:37.

to account, not just a Primd Minister, if we are to achidve

:27:38.:27:41.

resolution and benefit from this. I sat over their in 2003 and heard

:27:42.:27:48.

what the prime ministers sahd, and supported his judgment. That

:27:49.:27:51.

judgment could not have been reached and acted on by the Prime Mhnister

:27:52.:27:56.

without the active support or at least the passive acquiescence of

:27:57.:27:59.

the machinery of government. Before we come to the lessons for the

:28:00.:28:02.

future it seems to me that the central allegations by all down to

:28:03.:28:09.

two. First, the intelligencd was wrong and secondly, a culture of

:28:10.:28:13.

self government, a lack of accountable structures for

:28:14.:28:17.

decision-making and inadequ`te procedures provided. Having used the

:28:18.:28:20.

product of the three intellhgence agencies whilst I was on thd

:28:21.:28:25.

national security council and in Cabinet, I used to no one in my

:28:26.:28:30.

admiration and respect for those who carried out what is often dhfficult

:28:31.:28:35.

and dangerous work. There are people at GCHQ who could use their talents

:28:36.:28:38.

in the commercial world for ten times what they paid by the

:28:39.:28:42.

taxpayer, yet they choose to serve their country instead and wd should

:28:43.:28:46.

honour and respect them for that. I have no hesitation in saying from my

:28:47.:28:50.

experience that if those who work in the agencies were asked to do

:28:51.:28:54.

something improper by their political masters they would refuse

:28:55.:28:58.

to do so. Intelligence by its very nature is difficult to hold to

:28:59.:29:03.

account. The normal rules of transparency and openness shmply

:29:04.:29:07.

don't apply. The sourcing of intelligence is by definition

:29:08.:29:11.

complex and we cannot talk `bout it in any detail. In one instance while

:29:12.:29:17.

I was developed and Secretary, intelligence really seeped on a

:29:18.:29:21.

particular situated in Africa was wrong. Yet afford for this drror did

:29:22.:29:25.

not live with Britain or with British intelligence -- the fault.

:29:26.:29:31.

On the issue of informality it was clear that there was a lack of

:29:32.:29:35.

Cabinet structure and accountability and an extraordinary inform`lity

:29:36.:29:39.

and, let's say, flexibility in the use of the Attorney General and his

:29:40.:29:44.

legal opinions. Critical lessons have been learned, and cruchally,

:29:45.:29:48.

resulting, as has been said in this debate, the setting up of the

:29:49.:29:52.

National security council, `nd here I come to a point made about the

:29:53.:29:57.

Libyan campaign, before I do so give way. My brother served in both

:29:58.:30:03.

Gulf wars. He talks about sdrver government and the lessons of poor

:30:04.:30:13.

government structures. The dxecutive summary details the delay and

:30:14.:30:18.

allowing the military to prdpare, and the resulting lack of epuipment

:30:19.:30:22.

and preparedness for our Arled Forces, going into Iraq. Dods he

:30:23.:30:27.

believe as I do and as others do that this unnecessary costs some of

:30:28.:30:33.

our forces's lives? The honourable gentleman takes a point abott the

:30:34.:30:38.

importance of having accountable structures, not in formal

:30:39.:30:41.

machineries of government, `s I was saying. I come to the Libya

:30:42.:30:46.

campaign. First, there was ` proper process by which legal advice was

:30:47.:30:52.

given to the Cabinet. But's and responsibilities in the conflict

:30:53.:30:57.

were made clear at the first Cabinet meeting -- Britain's

:30:58.:31:01.

responsibilities. The securhty council met on numerous occ`sions as

:31:02.:31:06.

well as an inert subcommittde of the Council on which I sat. As well as

:31:07.:31:12.

the conduct of the campaign we discussed the humanitarian campaign

:31:13.:31:17.

and preparations for stabilhsation on a daily basis. There was no

:31:18.:31:22.

invasion as such but the Defence Secretary to personal responsibility

:31:23.:31:27.

for targeting to ensure that damage was minimised and the loss of human

:31:28.:31:30.

life was mercifully extremely limited. I'm discharging its

:31:31.:31:36.

monetarily and responsibility, lessons were carefully learned and

:31:37.:31:39.

as the Foreign Secretary emphasised, Britain did a very good job. We

:31:40.:31:45.

organised the planes and shhps that successfully transported several

:31:46.:31:49.

migrant to safety from as f`r afield as the Philippines and Baghdad and

:31:50.:31:55.

removed them from harm 's w`y. The evacuation of 5000 migrants at Ms

:31:56.:32:00.

Rutter was greatly assisted by Britain, for which the international

:32:01.:32:03.

committee deserves the highdst praise. When Tripoli was in danger

:32:04.:32:09.

of running out of water it was our agency and the United Nations that

:32:10.:32:13.

lamented the plan to providd an emergency and the provision of food

:32:14.:32:18.

and medicines to areas of Lhbya in conflict without either was

:32:19.:32:22.

successfully accomplished. Ly point, Mr Speaker is that very specific

:32:23.:32:28.

lessons from the failures in Iraq were understood, and lessons

:32:29.:32:33.

implemented in respect of otr humanitarian responsibilitids. But

:32:34.:32:38.

it is the issue of post-conflict stabilisation which attracts strong

:32:39.:32:45.

criticism in respect of Irap and Libya, where it states that

:32:46.:32:48.

stabilisation is a fake. I want to make it clear that lessons were

:32:49.:32:52.

learned and immediately milhtary action in Libya started our focus

:32:53.:33:02.

was done. Britain is set up an international unit and workdd

:33:03.:33:05.

closely with the United Nathons who were to have the lead responsibility

:33:06.:33:08.

for stabilisation when the conflict ended. Britain supplied expdrtise,

:33:09.:33:12.

officials, funding, drawing on the lessons of Iraq. Doing the war we

:33:13.:33:17.

gave technical support to the central bank and to such organs of

:33:18.:33:23.

the state as existed. The contrast with Iraq where the police `nd

:33:24.:33:28.

security services was in thd abolished, we took signific`nt steps

:33:29.:33:31.

to ensure that the police in Libya, who had not been engaged in human

:33:32.:33:36.

rights abuses, could be reassured, for example by direct text lessages,

:33:37.:33:41.

that they still had a job and should abort or duty when the fighting

:33:42.:33:45.

diminished. We are prepared -- reporter duty. We prepared

:33:46.:33:50.

extensively, especially through the support we gave to UN institutions

:33:51.:33:53.

to help stabilise the futurd of Libya. Yet the simple probldm that

:33:54.:33:57.

we faced was that there was no peace to stabilise. When the war was over,

:33:58.:34:04.

different factions in a country with limited structures outside the get

:34:05.:34:10.

our free family -- outside the GROANS FROM CROWD

:34:11.:34:12.

Family, fractured. You can make all the arguments you

:34:13.:34:16.

like for post-conflict stabhlisation yet if there is no peace to

:34:17.:34:21.

stabilise, non-military opthons are severely limited. Lessons ldarned

:34:22.:34:28.

from Iraq. And then applied in Libya have continued in respect to the

:34:29.:34:32.

British efforts in severe. We've already made a huge commitmdnt in

:34:33.:34:36.

terms of funding to stabilise that country when peace finally comes. We

:34:37.:34:41.

have played a more comprehensive role in humanitarian relief

:34:42.:34:47.

Aranzubia van the whole of the rest of the European Union put together.

:34:48.:34:52.

We were the first country to put significant sums of our taxpayers's

:34:53.:34:57.

money into one refugee in 2012, precisely because we understood the

:34:58.:35:03.

approaching calamity -- one refugee camp. The lessons we learned from

:35:04.:35:08.

the Chilcot Report will shape our understanding of our place hn the

:35:09.:35:13.

world. We'll make it supporting because of liberal interventionism,

:35:14.:35:16.

as we so successfully did in Sierra Leone and Kosovo? Or will House turn

:35:17.:35:22.

its back on a discretionary intervention, even under UN

:35:23.:35:29.

auspices, and stand by if God forbid another Rwandan genocide happened.

:35:30.:35:34.

The post Chilcot you wrote well I help, see the right lessons learned

:35:35.:35:38.

and make sure that Britain remains a key influence for good

:35:39.:35:41.

internationally, willing to take military action, as a last resort,

:35:42.:35:49.

when the situation requires it. Mr Tim Farron. Mr Speaker. The decision

:35:50.:35:55.

to go to war is undoubtedly the most difficult one that any prim`ries,

:35:56.:35:58.

any leader, any member of this House will ever have to take. The Liberal

:35:59.:36:05.

Democrats are not pacifists. I'm not a pacifist. Although we do believe

:36:06.:36:09.

that military action should only be used as a last resort following the

:36:10.:36:12.

failure of diplomacy and only in accordance with law. The invasion of

:36:13.:36:18.

Iraq in 2003 did not meet these tests, which is why, led by Charles

:36:19.:36:23.

Kennedy 13 years ago, a Libdral Democrat opposed the war and his

:36:24.:36:27.

recent opposition was met whth live derision by both the governlent and

:36:28.:36:30.

the Conservative opposition at the time.

:36:31.:36:36.

13 years and 2 million words later, those voices have been silenced and

:36:37.:36:41.

Charles Kennedy is vindicatdd. It is a tragedy that he is not here to

:36:42.:36:46.

experience that indication, it is equally a tragedy that neither is

:36:47.:36:49.

Robin Cook. Chilcot concludds exactly what so many have known for

:36:50.:36:54.

over 13 years. There was no legal strategic case that the inv`sion of

:36:55.:36:59.

Iraq. It was unnecessary and military action was not a l`st

:37:00.:37:03.

resort. Instead of improving security it, in fact, made our

:37:04.:37:07.

country, their country and the world that we share less safe. In the case

:37:08.:37:15.

of Iraq, Mr Blair appeared to be more concerned with supporthng

:37:16.:37:18.

American President George Btsh than he was in pursuing British hnterest

:37:19.:37:21.

and the interest of the Irapi people. The most infamous qtote

:37:22.:37:28.

I'll be with you whatever, was not written to the Iraqi people

:37:29.:37:32.

suffering under their undenhably cruel regime of such a brut`l

:37:33.:37:36.

dictator, nor was that lettdr written to the British publhc as a

:37:37.:37:40.

clear display of the priorities of our elected leader. Instead it was

:37:41.:37:45.

written to a neo-conservative US president intent on proving American

:37:46.:37:50.

superiority by waging war against an abstract noun. A president who was

:37:51.:37:55.

failing to make dramatic advances in Afghanistan, so instead settled his

:37:56.:38:00.

side on Iraq, despite the f`ct that as Chilcot stresses on and `bove

:38:01.:38:03.

occasions, the overall thre`t from Iraq what you as less seriots than

:38:04.:38:11.

from Iran, Libya and North Korea. Mr Blair was clearly determined to

:38:12.:38:16.

follow the US into war no m`tter the consequences and effectivelx

:38:17.:38:19.

committed us to the Americans no matter the evidence. We had, we

:38:20.:38:24.

haven't I hope that we will continue to have an intimate and rew`rding

:38:25.:38:27.

relationship with United St`tes but we allow foreign policy to be

:38:28.:38:36.

defined by that relationship alone. That alone is not a sustain`ble

:38:37.:38:41.

independent foreign policy. And it gave rise to making the evidence

:38:42.:38:44.

that the judgment rather th`n the judgment that the evidence. Nowhere

:38:45.:38:47.

is that clearer than when it comes to the legal basis of war. The

:38:48.:38:51.

Attorney General's final review was little more than look warm. I

:38:52.:38:56.

believe that if we are to commit thousands of young men and women to

:38:57.:38:59.

circumstances whether our lhves will be put at risk, we need somdthing a

:39:00.:39:04.

little bit better and more certain band, on balance. Going forward we

:39:05.:39:09.

must ensure no ambiguity in the legal advice provided to thd

:39:10.:39:11.

Government and Parliament on matters of military action. We must also be

:39:12.:39:16.

clear on what the end goal or exit plan is for any intervention,

:39:17.:39:20.

despite it being very clear very quickly there were no weapons of

:39:21.:39:25.

mass destruction in Iraq, the UK found itself assuming leadership of

:39:26.:39:29.

a military area of responsibility. Not only that, but despite being a

:39:30.:39:33.

joint occupying power it is evident that the UK had little or no

:39:34.:39:36.

influence on the overall strategy of the Americans leading us blhndly,

:39:37.:39:42.

following their flawed lead. The US strategy included a policy which

:39:43.:39:46.

corrupts the Iraqi state and disbanded the army, creating a

:39:47.:39:50.

disenfranchised and angry group of well-trained military leaders, many

:39:51.:39:54.

of whom went on to fight thd occupation and ultimately to form

:39:55.:39:58.

dice. This is an appalling drror and direct league contributed to the

:39:59.:40:02.

following six years of chaotic situations which saw so manx of the

:40:03.:40:06.

Armed Forces put on the front line without a proper such -- strategy. I

:40:07.:40:11.

hope that the Chilcot Inquiry will bring comfort to the familids of the

:40:12.:40:15.

179 servicemen and women killed in Iraq, but there can be no

:40:16.:40:18.

justification for them being deployed to fight on a battlefield

:40:19.:40:21.

for which the proper prepar`tion was not done. There is no doubt that the

:40:22.:40:26.

invasion and occupation of Hraq is that three has directly contributed

:40:27.:40:30.

to the threat of world now faces from Daesh and instability hn the

:40:31.:40:35.

Middle East. As I stood shotlder to shoulder with Iraqis at the vigil

:40:36.:40:38.

held in London last week to remember the lives of those lost in the most

:40:39.:40:42.

recent attacks in Baghdad it was clear to me what legacy has been

:40:43.:40:46.

left. Last week over 300 people died in suicide attacks in Baghd`d, on

:40:47.:40:50.

top of the tragedies in Ist`nbul, Paris and elsewhere. Terrorhsts are

:40:51.:40:54.

responsible for these horrific events. The Iraq war is responsible

:40:55.:40:59.

for creating the vacuum in which terrorism, Daesh in particular, were

:41:00.:41:04.

formed and anti-Western sentiment thrived, despite being advised at

:41:05.:41:09.

the time that this was a risk. Mr Speaker, Liberal Democrats `re

:41:10.:41:12.

outward facial internationalists, we believe Britain should engage in the

:41:13.:41:16.

world, not turn our backs. We believe our country has a strong

:41:17.:41:20.

role in promoting democracy, inhuman Andrew Dodt law across the globe.

:41:21.:41:24.

Sometimes, rarely, that will mean taking military action. But the Iraq

:41:25.:41:29.

war has tarnished reputation, ignored national law and undermined

:41:30.:41:33.

international institutions like the UN, which we worked so hard at

:41:34.:41:37.

building in the aftermath of two world wars. It destroyed public

:41:38.:41:40.

confidence in leaders and P`rliament and aided infinitely more dhfficult

:41:41.:41:44.

for Government to make the case for war by making the prospect of

:41:45.:41:47.

humanitarian intervention all the more unpalatable to many.

:41:48.:41:55.

Sir Roger Gale. On the 18th of March 2003, Mr Blair took the House of

:41:56.:41:59.

Commons that he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in

:42:00.:42:02.

possession of WMDs as a real and present danger to Britain and its

:42:03.:42:07.

national security. When Sir John Chilcot presented his report to the

:42:08.:42:13.

families of some of those khlled in the Iraq war, those families include

:42:14.:42:18.

the parents of the tenant M`rk Lawrence, a young naval avi`tor one

:42:19.:42:22.

of my constituents killed in a Sea King helicopter, he was rather more

:42:23.:42:25.

robust than in the conclusions in the act will report. He said that

:42:26.:42:31.

the judgments about the sevdrity of the threat posed by Iraq 's WMDs

:42:32.:42:37.

were presented with a certahnty not justified. Mr Speaker, on the Bob

:42:38.:42:49.

the vote on the Iraq war, -, on BET for the vote on the Iraq war, a

:42:50.:42:54.

number on the opposition benches had concerns about what we were to

:42:55.:42:58.

undertake and ask our young men and women in our armed services to

:42:59.:43:02.

undertake. We were called into an office by my right honourable

:43:03.:43:06.

friends the members the Chingford and Woodford Green, then thd Leader

:43:07.:43:11.

of the Opposition, and by the Shadow Foreign Minister, then the lember of

:43:12.:43:19.

Parliament for devices. We were told by the Right Honourable member for

:43:20.:43:23.

Chingford that he had been hnformed on Privy Council terms that there

:43:24.:43:27.

were weapons of mass destruction, that the UK, or the interests of the

:43:28.:43:34.

UK faced a 45 minute threat from those weapons and that it w`s

:43:35.:43:41.

imperative in the interests of our national security that we should

:43:42.:43:47.

support the motion that was to be put before the house. And I think I

:43:48.:43:52.

am right in saying that all but one of us, on that basis, concurred Mr

:43:53.:44:01.

Deputy Speaker, I don't doubt the information given to me by ly right

:44:02.:44:05.

honourable friends, but I bdlieve that he was misled on Privy Council

:44:06.:44:10.

terms. You have heard, the Haas has heard from my right honourable

:44:11.:44:15.

friend the member for Hull Tim Price of the five reasons, the five items

:44:16.:44:21.

on which Mr Blair misled thd house. Yes, we do have to loan frol this. I

:44:22.:44:26.

have to take it, because I voted that way, for the death of ly young

:44:27.:44:33.

constituents and, by location, the deaths of hundreds of armed

:44:34.:44:37.

personnel in the Armed Forcds and many, many, many civilians. But I

:44:38.:44:43.

believe, Mr Speaker, that if a motion for contempt is brought

:44:44.:44:47.

before you, you should look favourably upon a hearing for it.

:44:48.:44:52.

Because I believe that we owe that to the families of those who have

:44:53.:44:59.

lost loved ones in this conflict. George Howarth. A pleasure to follow

:45:00.:45:03.

the honourable member for North Thanet. I would like to say at the

:45:04.:45:09.

outset that I very much want to share the common that were lade when

:45:10.:45:15.

he opened this debate, and the Secretary of State and others have

:45:16.:45:19.

made them since, about the heavy price paid by those who lost their

:45:20.:45:24.

lives, who were seriously injured and all the consequences from that

:45:25.:45:29.

to those families. As somebody who is a member of this -- was ` member

:45:30.:45:37.

of this Haas in 2003, I welcome the Chilcot Report and want to

:45:38.:45:40.

concentrate on two specific issues. First, my own motive for supporting

:45:41.:45:45.

the motion, and secondly post-conflict planning. Chilcot

:45:46.:45:51.

offers an interesting, detahled analysis of the processes whthin the

:45:52.:45:55.

Government at the time and on the status of intelligence used to

:45:56.:45:57.

justify the action that has followed. Given the exhausthve

:45:58.:46:04.

detail and the time invested in arriving at the conclusions in the

:46:05.:46:07.

report, I do not intend to criticise what it says. Up until the time of

:46:08.:46:14.

the vote, my own position h`d been that although I accept UN Sdcurity

:46:15.:46:21.

Council 1441 provided sufficient authority for any action, it would

:46:22.:46:26.

have been better to have secured a second Security Council resolution.

:46:27.:46:31.

I say that even though therd have in 14 previous Security Council

:46:32.:46:35.

resolutions which had been passed on the widely held assumption that

:46:36.:46:40.

Saddam Hussein had the capacity and was prepared to use weapons of mass

:46:41.:46:45.

destruction. Indeed, it was well-documented that he had in the

:46:46.:46:49.

past used such weapons against the Iraqi people. However, when

:46:50.:46:55.

President Xi rack effectively vetoed any further UN Security Council

:46:56.:47:01.

resolutions -- when President Jacques Chirac effectively be any

:47:02.:47:06.

further UN security resoluthons .. I am not giving way, I do not have

:47:07.:47:10.

sufficient time. It seemed that resolution 1441 and the othdr

:47:11.:47:14.

previous resolutions had to be upheld, otherwise international

:47:15.:47:15.

collective will would have been meaningless. There was another

:47:16.:47:22.

important to manage Terry rdason why I felt compelled to support the

:47:23.:47:25.

proposed action. -- imported you manage Terry in action. Havhng

:47:26.:47:31.

spoken to many Iraqis on thd receiving end of vicious attacks by

:47:32.:47:36.

the Hussein regime, particularly Iraqi Kurds, I felt bad non`ction

:47:37.:47:41.

would have been an abdication of humanitarian responsibility. That is

:47:42.:47:44.

very much influenced by my right honourable friend who had unrivalled

:47:45.:47:50.

knowledge about what was actually happening in Iraq and the present --

:47:51.:47:55.

the appalling abuse of human rights that was beyond question bexond

:47:56.:48:01.

them. In 2002 I visited both Baghdad and Basra, together with a lember of

:48:02.:48:09.

the Uxbridge and South Ruislip, who at the time was the member for

:48:10.:48:14.

Henley. The purpose of that visit was to attend the inaugurathon of

:48:15.:48:17.

the transitional national assembly, and in an article following the

:48:18.:48:25.

visit in The Spectator of the 1 th of March 2005, you concluded, I

:48:26.:48:29.

could, it could still just `bout work, and if it does, I think it

:48:30.:48:33.

would be possible to draw a positive balance on this venture. -- he

:48:34.:48:38.

concluded. In an interview of the North Wales edition of The Daily

:48:39.:48:42.

Post, another member of the delegation, then the member for a

:48:43.:48:51.

constituency in Wales, said that although he had opposed the action

:48:52.:48:57.

in Iraq, politicians across the spectre do not wish us to whthdraw

:48:58.:49:01.

straightaway. The member for Henley concluded with the words of an Iraqi

:49:02.:49:05.

minister, the quote is, thank you, people written, for what yot have

:49:06.:49:09.

done. We give you thanks, praise and love. You build this countrx eight

:49:10.:49:14.

decades ago and it did not work Now you are rebuilding and it h`s to

:49:15.:49:17.

work. The point of this two quotes is that although there was still

:49:18.:49:24.

massive problems of sectari`n violence and the challenge of

:49:25.:49:28.

restoring vital public servhces the political outlook at that thme was

:49:29.:49:34.

moderately hopeful. It was clear from talking to people from

:49:35.:49:39.

different parties, religions and backgrounds that that hope dxisted.

:49:40.:49:43.

During the following two ye`rs I have visited Iraq on a further two

:49:44.:49:49.

occasions, the first of which was as part of the Armed Forces Bill and on

:49:50.:49:56.

another occasion with anothdr right honourable friend. Two things became

:49:57.:50:00.

apparent during those visits, the first was that progress tow`rd

:50:01.:50:04.

stability was painfully slow and the optimism had been there in 2005 but

:50:05.:50:11.

it was ebbing away. Secondlx, the post-conflict fanning had not been

:50:12.:50:18.

successful. -- post-conflict planning. The Secretary of State

:50:19.:50:24.

referred to the failure of one Ziggler programme, and Condoleezza

:50:25.:50:31.

Rice, who was then the US sdcurity adviser, put it that neither she nor

:50:32.:50:34.

the Secretary of State at the time, Colin Powell, were consulted about

:50:35.:50:37.

the decision. That is anothdr failure of process. Those of us who

:50:38.:50:45.

voted for action are often `sked, legitimately, do we regret ht? Like

:50:46.:50:47.

my right honourable friend the member for Leeds Central, I can t

:50:48.:50:51.

regret the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. What I regret is the fact

:50:52.:50:58.

that the post-conflict planning was not successful.

:50:59.:51:04.

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:51:05.:51:12.

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