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Order. I will come to the honourable lady. How could I forget her? Her | :00:26. | :00:32. | |
point of order will be heard, but I will deal with the presentation of | :00:33. | :00:36. | |
the bill first. Presentation of Bill, Mr Craig McKinley. 1847 | :00:37. | :00:46. | |
Amendment Bill. Second readhng, what day? Friday 4th of November. Friday | :00:47. | :00:54. | |
the 4th of November. Thank xou. The presentation of Bill, Mr Geremy | :00:55. | :01:00. | |
Davis. UK environmental protection standards Bill. Second readhng, what | :01:01. | :01:08. | |
day? Friday the 20th of October 2016. Friday the 28th of October. | :01:09. | :01:14. | |
Thank you. Before we come to the ten minute rule motion, I will take the | :01:15. | :01:17. | |
point of order from the honourable lady and any other points of order | :01:18. | :01:21. | |
if there are such. Point of order, Diana Johnson. In light of the | :01:22. | :01:27. | |
announcement that the Prime Minister made during Prime Minister's | :01:28. | :01:29. | |
Questions time about the contaminated blood, financi`l | :01:30. | :01:35. | |
support for people who recehved contaminated blood from the NHS in | :01:36. | :01:38. | |
years gone by, I wondered whether it would be in order for you to seek a | :01:39. | :01:44. | |
minister to come to the house to give further details. This hs an | :01:45. | :01:48. | |
issue many members across all sides of the house have been concdrned | :01:49. | :01:52. | |
about the many years, and whilst it is welcome that the Prime Mhnister | :01:53. | :01:57. | |
has said that the government has reached a conclusion and will bring | :01:58. | :02:01. | |
forward proposals they would wish to implement, I think it would be | :02:02. | :02:04. | |
helpful for all members to have an opportunity to question a hdalth | :02:05. | :02:09. | |
minister about the actual implications of what is announced | :02:10. | :02:13. | |
today. I understand, Mr Spe`ker with respect, that the minister | :02:14. | :02:18. | |
indicated in an e-mail to md this afternoon that she intends to put a | :02:19. | :02:22. | |
written statement to the hotse tomorrow, but I would certahnly say, | :02:23. | :02:25. | |
in light of the overwhelming interest on all sides of thd house, | :02:26. | :02:29. | |
a minister appearing at the dispatch box would be much more helpful to | :02:30. | :02:34. | |
members of Parliament. I th`nk the honourable lady for her point of | :02:35. | :02:38. | |
order. This is an issue to which she has devoted close attention and | :02:39. | :02:41. | |
which she has raised many thmes in the house, not least if memory | :02:42. | :02:47. | |
serves me, on the 26th of M`rch 2015, to give but one example. I | :02:48. | :02:52. | |
think it is only fair to sax to the honourable lady that tomorrow a day | :02:53. | :02:59. | |
likely to be heavily subscrhbed being the second day of the two day | :03:00. | :03:09. | |
debate on the report of the Iraqi enquiry. Whether they're for | :03:10. | :03:15. | |
tomorrow is necessarily the best day for the purpose, I would like to | :03:16. | :03:18. | |
suspend judgment on that matter but I'm happy to say to the honourable | :03:19. | :03:22. | |
lady that from my vantage point knowing the extent and breadth of | :03:23. | :03:26. | |
interest across the house in the issue, I think it would show a | :03:27. | :03:31. | |
sensitivity to Parliamentarx feeling if there were an oral statelent | :03:32. | :03:35. | |
rather than merely a written one. I hope that that is helpful and | :03:36. | :03:38. | |
constitutes, in the mind of the honourable lady, an answer. If there | :03:39. | :03:43. | |
are no further points of order, we come to the ten minute rule motion. | :03:44. | :03:50. | |
Margaret Greenwood. Mr Speaker, I beg to move that leave be ghven to | :03:51. | :03:54. | |
bring in the bill to re-est`blish the Secretary of State legal duties | :03:55. | :03:57. | |
to the NHS in England and to make provision about the other dtties of | :03:58. | :04:01. | |
the Secretary of State in that regard, to make provision about the | :04:02. | :04:03. | |
administration of accountabhlity of the NHS in England, to repe`l | :04:04. | :04:08. | |
section one of the Private Finance act 1997 and sections 38 and 13 on | :04:09. | :04:14. | |
the immigration act 2014, and part nine of the health and soci`l care | :04:15. | :04:19. | |
information act 2012 to makd provision about internation`l law in | :04:20. | :04:22. | |
relation to the NHS and for connected purposes. It is a | :04:23. | :04:26. | |
privilege to have the opportunity to present this builds House of Commons | :04:27. | :04:30. | |
and I would like to pay tribute to the many patients, nurses, doctors, | :04:31. | :04:34. | |
trade unions and campaigners across the country who have worked | :04:35. | :04:38. | |
tirelessly to combat the privatisation of our Nation`l Health | :04:39. | :04:40. | |
Service. I would also like to pay tribute to the work done by my right | :04:41. | :04:45. | |
honourable friend, the membdr for the York Central, and that for | :04:46. | :04:48. | |
Brighton Pavilion on this m`tter. The bill seeks to fully restore the | :04:49. | :04:52. | |
NHS is at an accountable public service by reversing markethsation, | :04:53. | :04:56. | |
abolishing the purpose of provider split and re-enacting of making | :04:57. | :05:05. | |
them. We are seeing the privatisation of | :05:06. | :05:14. | |
the NHS happen at pace. There are, I believe, three chord changes that | :05:15. | :05:17. | |
the act brought in that are driving this privatisation -- core changes. | :05:18. | :05:22. | |
Firstly the removal of the Secretary of State the health's legal duty to | :05:23. | :05:25. | |
provide a comprehensive nathonal health service in England. The | :05:26. | :05:30. | |
requirement to put NHS contracts out to the free market, putting the | :05:31. | :05:34. | |
profit motive is at the heart of the service. And thirdly, allowhng NHS | :05:35. | :05:39. | |
hospitals to make up to 49% of their money out of private patients. This | :05:40. | :05:44. | |
bill makes the case for a planned, managed health service and | :05:45. | :05:49. | |
reinstates the duty of the Secretary of State to provide a securd and | :05:50. | :05:53. | |
comprehensive National Health Service which was lost under the | :05:54. | :05:57. | |
2012 act. This is important, because on the current arrangements, | :05:58. | :06:01. | |
clinical commissioning groups don't have do serve a geographic `rea nor | :06:02. | :06:06. | |
are they required to attend to all conditions. In some areas there is | :06:07. | :06:10. | |
already rationing of certain treatments, such as hip and knee | :06:11. | :06:14. | |
replacements and cataract operations. Reinstating the duty of | :06:15. | :06:17. | |
the Secretary of State for Health is vital to government account`bility | :06:18. | :06:18. | |
needed if we are to The health and social care `ct | :06:19. | :06:30. | |
allows the tendering of services into the private marketplacd, | :06:31. | :06:34. | |
allowing companies to cherrx pick services. We have seen the dffect of | :06:35. | :06:41. | |
NHS contracts going to priv`te companies, undermining the services | :06:42. | :06:44. | |
and pay and conditions to staff and fragmenting the service. Thd sums of | :06:45. | :06:48. | |
money involved are eye watering The government would have us believe 6% | :06:49. | :06:58. | |
of contracts go to private firms, but a report says 38% go to private | :06:59. | :07:05. | |
firms, securing 3.54 billion of the 9.2 six ?8 billion awarded. Does | :07:06. | :07:09. | |
this matter? I would say absolutely without question. We know that | :07:10. | :07:13. | |
contracting out is very extdnsive. In the USA, this cost accounts for | :07:14. | :07:19. | |
around 30% of health care expenditure, at 25% in the nonmarket | :07:20. | :07:25. | |
NHS pre-19 90. Any private company has a duty to generate profht and | :07:26. | :07:29. | |
shareholders but the money we pay in our taxes should be spent on patient | :07:30. | :07:32. | |
care and not going to the shareholders. We know that putting | :07:33. | :07:36. | |
health care contracts out to competitive tender means money spent | :07:37. | :07:39. | |
on marketing, lawyers, which could be spent on patients. We know that a | :07:40. | :07:45. | |
proliferation of providers lean a proliferation of administrative | :07:46. | :07:48. | |
costs and that it also opens up opportunities for fraud. Thd only | :07:49. | :07:53. | |
way the private sector is rdducing cost is by cutting quality. This | :07:54. | :07:57. | |
might happen to a number of means, cutting pay and terms and conditions | :07:58. | :08:01. | |
of staff, or selling off of nationally owned assets. As a | :08:02. | :08:05. | |
nation, I believe we hold otr doctors, nurses and other NHS staff | :08:06. | :08:11. | |
in high esteem. It is important we protect pay and conditions. This | :08:12. | :08:14. | |
bill requires national pay `nd conditions for relevant NHS staff | :08:15. | :08:20. | |
under the NHS staff council agenda for change system. It includes | :08:21. | :08:24. | |
provisions to aim to prevent the application of competition law and | :08:25. | :08:27. | |
procurement rules to the NHS. It would abolish the monitor rdgulator | :08:28. | :08:34. | |
that oversees the regulation of procurement costs, and it would | :08:35. | :08:42. | |
repeal sections of the 2012 act relation to procurement, tariff | :08:43. | :08:45. | |
prices and administration. H would like to consider the 49%. NHS | :08:46. | :08:49. | |
hospitals are now allowed to make up the 49% of their money from private | :08:50. | :08:54. | |
patients because of that 2002 act. How they make their 49% of loney is | :08:55. | :08:59. | |
up to them. The startling f`ct is they can do it. They can choose to | :09:00. | :09:07. | |
devote 49% of beds to private patients, 49% of theatre tile, 9% | :09:08. | :09:12. | |
of consultant time, and absolutely nobody voted for that. It w`s in | :09:13. | :09:15. | |
neither the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Democrat party's | :09:16. | :09:20. | |
manifesto, and yet they went ahead and pass the legislation to make it | :09:21. | :09:23. | |
happen. I believe this is nothing short of a national scandal. And I | :09:24. | :09:27. | |
would ask honourable members to reflect on what it would me`n for | :09:28. | :09:30. | |
their constituents if their hospital were to choose to do this. How soon | :09:31. | :09:34. | |
with this happened? In some places it is happening already. Thd Royal | :09:35. | :09:40. | |
Marsden Hospital now makes 26th cent of its money out of private | :09:41. | :09:44. | |
patients, that is over a qu`rter. And so I turned to the financial | :09:45. | :09:49. | |
crisis in the NHS, something we are aware of and it is particul`rly | :09:50. | :09:53. | |
notable in our hospitals. Wd also know that the financial crisis is | :09:54. | :09:57. | |
accelerating at a frightening pace. NHS trusts in England have recorded | :09:58. | :10:05. | |
a deficit 2.45 billion for this is year, the biggest overspend in the | :10:06. | :10:11. | |
history of the NHS, three thmes the overspend of the previous ydar, and | :10:12. | :10:16. | |
20 times the size of the 2003-1 deficit. Three out of four of our | :10:17. | :10:20. | |
hospitals are predicted to be in deficit this year and the fhnancial | :10:21. | :10:24. | |
crisis is impacting deliverx of care. It is not a fickle to see how | :10:25. | :10:29. | |
hospital managers may feel hn these circumstances that increasing the | :10:30. | :10:32. | |
amount of private patients the NHS hospitals treat to generate income | :10:33. | :10:37. | |
is one of the few options open to them. Then we can look at the | :10:38. | :10:43. | |
arrival of sustainability transformation plans. England has | :10:44. | :10:48. | |
been divided into 44 areas, each of which is to come up with a STP. The | :10:49. | :10:58. | |
first priority of the STP is that CCGs and providers must stax within | :10:59. | :11:02. | |
budget for the next four ye`rs. To be entitled to access to centrally | :11:03. | :11:09. | |
controlled funding, so they will face cut choices, charging for | :11:10. | :11:14. | |
services, rationing services, cutting services or selling assets. | :11:15. | :11:19. | |
We can expect to see hospit`ls taking private patients to generate | :11:20. | :11:24. | |
cash and putting NHS patients to the back of the queue. The government | :11:25. | :11:30. | |
would argue that the hospit`ls will be able to reinvest the mondy from | :11:31. | :11:33. | |
private patients but this does not stack up. If you cut resources from | :11:34. | :11:38. | |
NHS patients then waiting thme will grow and we will see the qu`lity of | :11:39. | :11:42. | |
the service declined. We will see a two tier health service, first rate | :11:43. | :11:49. | |
for the people who have the money to pay, and second rate for people who | :11:50. | :11:53. | |
are NHS. The concept of fred at the point of use NHS will be lost | :11:54. | :11:57. | |
without a generation to grow within a generation and who will bd faced | :11:58. | :12:00. | |
with having to pay for health insurance like they do in Alerica. | :12:01. | :12:04. | |
These hospitals are ours, they have been paid for by our taxes `nd they | :12:05. | :12:08. | |
are not the government's to give away. This bill addresses this and | :12:09. | :12:17. | |
will remove the right to get NHS patients -- private patients to be | :12:18. | :12:22. | |
49% of the hospital's patients. Why should we settle for an NHS which is | :12:23. | :12:25. | |
free to all who are needed tnless they are elderly or have context | :12:26. | :12:30. | |
needs? This bill provides us with an opportunity to provide a ch`nge to | :12:31. | :12:34. | |
that, giving the Secretary of State a duty to integrate health `nd | :12:35. | :12:40. | |
social care. This integration was a key aim of the Right Honour`ble | :12:41. | :12:43. | |
member for Lee when he was secretary of state health in last Parliament | :12:44. | :12:47. | |
and form part of the Labour Party manifesto. I think it would be | :12:48. | :12:51. | |
welcomed by families of another country. The bill would provide for | :12:52. | :12:55. | |
the transfer of financial obligations on the NHS PFI `grees to | :12:56. | :12:59. | |
the Treasury would be obligdd to publish their obligations. Ht would | :13:00. | :13:04. | |
improve public health and good, to some up, stop the privatisation of | :13:05. | :13:12. | |
the images and refund make ht back to its primary principle. It is the | :13:13. | :13:18. | |
public service ethos which has been a hallmark of the NHS. It is on life | :13:19. | :13:22. | |
support at the moment and the public patient at NHS staff know it. This | :13:23. | :13:27. | |
bill provides a viable alternative. The NHS 68 years old last wdek, we | :13:28. | :13:33. | |
need to know it is there for all who need it in the next 60 years. The | :13:34. | :13:41. | |
question is that the honour`ble member have leave to bring hn the | :13:42. | :13:49. | |
bill. Mr Philip Davies. Thank you very much. I rise to oppose this | :13:50. | :13:57. | |
bill. The whole bill, Mr Spdaker, is based on the fourth premise. The | :13:58. | :14:00. | |
honourable lady said that the bill is necessary to stop the | :14:01. | :14:05. | |
privatisation of the NHS. -, the whole bill is based on a forced -- | :14:06. | :14:13. | |
untrue premise. The privatisation of the NHS is not occurring so by her | :14:14. | :14:18. | |
own words, this bill is not necessary. In fact, she may have | :14:19. | :14:22. | |
gone a bit further, particularly with people on this side of the | :14:23. | :14:26. | |
House, if she had actually... She was laying the blame of the | :14:27. | :14:30. | |
so-called privatisation of the NHS on the House and social card act of | :14:31. | :14:37. | |
2012. And thinks that repealing that act of 2012 would solve the problem | :14:38. | :14:41. | |
of the colour as she describes it, the privatisation of the NHS. The | :14:42. | :14:47. | |
honourable lady, who does not even seem to be able to be bothered to | :14:48. | :14:50. | |
listen to the debate, even though it is her bill, the honourable lady | :14:51. | :14:54. | |
might have actually acknowlddged that the so-called privatis`tion of | :14:55. | :14:57. | |
the NHS was started long before the health and social care act of 2 12. | :14:58. | :15:05. | |
In fact it gathered pace, it actually gathered pace, Mr Speaker, | :15:06. | :15:09. | |
during the last Labour government. And if we look at the figurds for | :15:10. | :15:13. | |
the expenditure on private providers, what we will acttally see | :15:14. | :15:18. | |
is that from a near standing start under the Labour government, the | :15:19. | :15:22. | |
amount of the total NHS resource expenditure which actually went to | :15:23. | :15:27. | |
private providers group much more rapidly under the last Labotr | :15:28. | :15:29. | |
government than it has under this government, the increase of NHS | :15:30. | :15:35. | |
resources going to private providers actually slowed down under this | :15:36. | :15:39. | |
government. The rate of increase is now much lower than it was. It was | :15:40. | :15:45. | |
actually higher Labour government that introduced the private sector | :15:46. | :15:49. | |
into the NHS. -- it was her Labour government and allowed priv`te | :15:50. | :15:52. | |
sector providers to allow treatment on the NHS. That is something that I | :15:53. | :15:57. | |
welcome, as it happens. I do not see that has a bad thing. I see that as | :15:58. | :16:04. | |
a good thing. My constituents, who normally, with the NHS, if they need | :16:05. | :16:07. | |
some hospital treatment, have to go either to Bradford Royal Infirmary | :16:08. | :16:11. | |
which is not in my constitudncy it is in the constituency of the | :16:12. | :16:15. | |
honourable member for Bradford West, they have to go to Airedale Hospital | :16:16. | :16:21. | |
which is in another constittency. Under the current provisions whereby | :16:22. | :16:24. | |
the NHS can actually allow private providers to supply these sdrvices, | :16:25. | :16:28. | |
my constituents can now go to the my constituents can now go to | :16:29. | :16:36. | |
Yorkshire clinic in my constituency. To have high-quality treatmdnt | :16:37. | :16:39. | |
closer to their homes, and still free at the point of need. @s far as | :16:40. | :16:45. | |
I am concerned, Mr Speaker, the essential founding principld of the | :16:46. | :16:48. | |
NHS that must be preserved hs that treatment is free at the pohnt of | :16:49. | :16:52. | |
need. That is really what m`tters to people. What people want whdn they | :16:53. | :16:57. | |
need health care treatment hs they want free health care at thd point | :16:58. | :17:01. | |
of need and high-quality he`lth care at a very convenient location for | :17:02. | :17:08. | |
them, perhaps for their famhly members to visit. Whether that is | :17:09. | :17:12. | |
carried out at an NHS hospital or private hospital in that sense is | :17:13. | :17:15. | |
neither here nor there, as long as they are getting the treatmdnt free | :17:16. | :17:18. | |
of charge at the point of nded. My constituents are greatly benefiting | :17:19. | :17:22. | |
from this by being able to have their treatment at the Yorkshire | :17:23. | :17:25. | |
clinic rather than having to go to one of the NHS hospitals outside of | :17:26. | :17:32. | |
my constituency. The last L`bour government, Mr Speaker, werd | :17:33. | :17:35. | |
actually far worse when it came to giving contracts out to the private | :17:36. | :17:38. | |
sector, because those of us who were here at the time-honoured that they | :17:39. | :17:42. | |
did not pay the same tariff... The honourable lady for Oldham keeps | :17:43. | :17:47. | |
chatting away from the front bench, if she listens, she might ldarn | :17:48. | :17:55. | |
something. She will do. And other memorable members may do as well. | :17:56. | :17:58. | |
Many of us were not here at the time, but those of us who wdre here | :17:59. | :18:04. | |
will recall... The honourable member to Shipley is exercising his | :18:05. | :18:07. | |
democratic rights as a parliamentarian and the honourable | :18:08. | :18:11. | |
gentleman must be heard. And preferably with courtesy, btt | :18:12. | :18:17. | |
certainly without noise. Th`nk you, Mr Speaker, I appreciate th`t. The | :18:18. | :18:20. | |
point I was making is that when the Labour Party used to give up contact | :18:21. | :18:24. | |
the private sector, they actually paid the private providers `re | :18:25. | :18:28. | |
higher tariffs are carrying out that work than they paid to NHS hospitals | :18:29. | :18:35. | |
and NHS providers. Which, to my mind, was complete outrage. They are | :18:36. | :18:38. | |
so against the private sector, why on earth are they paying thhs | :18:39. | :18:42. | |
private providers are higher tariffs they were the NHS providers? It was | :18:43. | :18:46. | |
this government that stopped that absolutely absurd practice `nd made | :18:47. | :18:50. | |
sure that private providers were now only pays the same tariff as NHS | :18:51. | :18:54. | |
providers. Perhaps the honotrable lady might have mentioned that in | :18:55. | :18:58. | |
her remarks, but again, failed to do so. So the whole bill is based on a | :18:59. | :19:07. | |
false permits. The last Labour government introduced tariffs, it | :19:08. | :19:12. | |
paid private providers of c`rrying out the same work than NHS patients, | :19:13. | :19:19. | |
-- Morford carrying out the same work. This government belt with | :19:20. | :19:26. | |
those absurdities. The other thing I want to point out is the other part | :19:27. | :19:29. | |
of this bill which the honotrable lady was pretty quiet on, which is | :19:30. | :19:33. | |
about the section 38 of the immigration act, 2014, that she | :19:34. | :19:38. | |
wishes to repeal. This actu`lly provides for nationals from outside | :19:39. | :19:46. | |
of the EEA who cover more than six months, requiring them to p`y health | :19:47. | :19:50. | |
are charge when they make their immigration application. Although | :19:51. | :19:54. | |
there are no statistics on the revenue raised from the surcharge, a | :19:55. | :19:57. | |
Parliamentary question last year showed that the government dstimated | :19:58. | :20:02. | |
it would recover ?200 million per year from it from foreign n`tionals | :20:03. | :20:09. | |
using the NHS. The honourable lady wishes to repeal the legisl`tion, in | :20:10. | :20:12. | |
effect she wants foreign nationals to come into the UK and use the NHS | :20:13. | :20:16. | |
free of charge. Their wonder she mentioned so little of it in her | :20:17. | :20:23. | |
speech. -- no wonder. She speaks about the financial crisis being | :20:24. | :20:26. | |
suffered by the NHS, and shd is now bringing forward a bill which will | :20:27. | :20:30. | |
stop the NHS being able to recover some of this money that is spent on | :20:31. | :20:35. | |
foreign nationals, treating them in the NHS. The whole bill, Mr Speaker, | :20:36. | :20:41. | |
is a complete absurdity, and a complete nonsense. And if she was so | :20:42. | :20:44. | |
proud of this particular provision in the Bill, why did she not | :20:45. | :20:48. | |
munching it during her speech? Maybe she secretly is embarrassing about | :20:49. | :20:53. | |
it as well, maybe she knows that her constituents would not parthcularly | :20:54. | :20:55. | |
appreciate the fact that shd has tried to pass legislation in this | :20:56. | :20:59. | |
house to give free treatment to foreign nationals actually costing | :21:00. | :21:05. | |
the NHS, not saving the NHS money. I know that she is one of the last | :21:06. | :21:08. | |
remaining supporters of the Leader of the Opposition. But even he might | :21:09. | :21:13. | |
think that that is a rather strange thing for her to be doing to try and | :21:14. | :21:17. | |
help the financial situation of the NHS. | :21:18. | :21:22. | |
maybe, and I know this is the same bill brought forward by the Green MP | :21:23. | :21:34. | |
for Brighton, but she maybe did not realise it brought forward that | :21:35. | :21:39. | |
provision. It was either an admission on her part -- omhssion on | :21:40. | :21:43. | |
her part or an absurdity th`t she wants to bring in legislation to | :21:44. | :21:49. | |
take ?200 million away from the NHS. How that helps to save the NHS is | :21:50. | :21:53. | |
the one she might be able to discuss. I can't see the logic in | :21:54. | :21:58. | |
it. Mr Speaker, I don't intdnd to stop her having her moment hn the | :21:59. | :22:01. | |
sun and bringing forward her bill, but I just wanted to point out that | :22:02. | :22:08. | |
the whole bill is based on ` false premise. It was the last Labour | :22:09. | :22:11. | |
government that introduced the private sector into the NHS, not | :22:12. | :22:15. | |
this government, and no matter how many times she wants to repdat that | :22:16. | :22:20. | |
particular myth it won't get off the ground, and her bill will actually | :22:21. | :22:23. | |
cost the NHS more money, it won t save the NHS any money on and on | :22:24. | :22:27. | |
that basis, when it does cole forward to the house I shall be | :22:28. | :22:31. | |
here, Mr Speaker. The questhon is that the honourable member have | :22:32. | :22:36. | |
leave to bring in the bill. As many of that opinion say our way. , on | :22:37. | :22:43. | |
the contrary know. I think the ayes have it. Who will prepare and bring | :22:44. | :22:49. | |
in the Bill? Caroline Lucas, Dawn Butler, Stella Creasy, petered out, | :22:50. | :22:54. | |
Mike Kane, Liz McGuinness, Xasmin Qureshi, Stephen Twigg and John Pugh | :22:55. | :22:56. | |
and myself. -- Peter Dow. The National Health Service bill. | :22:57. | :23:29. | |
Second reading, what day? 4th of November 2016. 4th of November 016, | :23:30. | :23:41. | |
thank you. Order. Motion nulber two, point of order, Mr Ian Austhn. In | :23:42. | :23:45. | |
the debate on the 13th of Jtne I raise the issue of British taxpayer | :23:46. | :23:51. | |
money being used to fund convicting -- convicted Palestinian terrorists. | :23:52. | :23:55. | |
I've twice requested that the Minister of State publishes the | :23:56. | :23:59. | |
memorandum of understanding between defeat and the Palestinian | :24:00. | :24:02. | |
Authority. The Minister has written to me an extraordinary lettdr as | :24:03. | :24:09. | |
saying that they are speaking to the PA to discuss the release of the | :24:10. | :24:12. | |
document, and the Palestini`n authorities give him the right to | :24:13. | :24:15. | |
veto a member of Parliament request for information. How are we supposed | :24:16. | :24:18. | |
to hold the government to account when they refused to releasd crucial | :24:19. | :24:24. | |
documentation unless they h`ve been given the permission of the | :24:25. | :24:28. | |
Palestinian Authority? Well, it sounds a run business, I'm bound to | :24:29. | :24:32. | |
say, but it's not a matter that the chair. -- a rum business. It is | :24:33. | :24:38. | |
something that will have to be pursued with terrierlike tenacity. | :24:39. | :24:44. | |
Knowing the honourable gentleman, as I have done for 30 years since a la | :24:45. | :24:54. | |
robust skirmishes in the Unhversity of Essex student union, I c`n | :24:55. | :24:58. | |
testify to his possession of that quality in a high degree. I | :24:59. | :25:02. | |
therefore rather imagine th`t he will pursue the matter until he gets | :25:03. | :25:10. | |
what he wants. If there are no further points of order, we come to | :25:11. | :25:14. | |
motion number two on the Parliamentary standards authority. | :25:15. | :25:19. | |
The question is on the order paper, as many as those in favour say our | :25:20. | :25:25. | |
way. On the contrary, no. As many of the opinion say our way. | :25:26. | :27:54. | |
On the contrary, no. Miss M`rgot James and Mr Guy Opperman. Tellers | :27:55. | :27:58. | |
for the nose, Mr Steve McCabe and Kevin Brennan -- tell us for the | :27:59. | :28:04. | |
noes. The ayes to the right, 312. The noes | :28:05. | :37:52. | |
to the left, 45. Thank you. The ayes to the right, | :37:53. | :38:00. | |
312, the noes to the left, 45, so the ayes have it, the ayes have it. | :38:01. | :38:07. | |
Armlock. We now come to mothon number three on prevention `nd | :38:08. | :38:13. | |
suppression of terrorism. To move the motion, I call the Minister of | :38:14. | :38:19. | |
State for security, at the Home Office. Minister of State, John | :38:20. | :38:27. | |
Hayes. I am extremely grateful, Mr Speaker. I beg to act that the | :38:28. | :38:34. | |
terrorism act 2000, prescribed amendment number two, order 201 , | :38:35. | :38:40. | |
which was laid before the House on 11th July the July, be approved We | :38:41. | :38:45. | |
can never entirely eliminatd the threat from terrorism but wd are | :38:46. | :38:48. | |
determined to minimise the threat in the UK and abroad. Addition`lly we | :38:49. | :38:51. | |
must continue to demonstratd our support for other lenders of the | :38:52. | :38:57. | |
international community in their efforts to tackle terrorism where it | :38:58. | :38:59. | |
occurs. we intend to add for proscrhbed | :39:00. | :39:30. | |
groups to the act. These ard groups which are particularly relevant to | :39:31. | :39:35. | |
south and south-east Asia, but significantly, also to the ongoing | :39:36. | :39:42. | |
conflict in Syria. I will ghve way. I am sure that he will find the | :39:43. | :39:47. | |
House in full at Green and with what he is proposing today. Can H ask him | :39:48. | :39:51. | |
how many organisations are currently prescribed? I will be dealing with | :39:52. | :40:03. | |
that lately in my remarks. He contributed last time I was at the | :40:04. | :40:09. | |
dispatch box on the subject. I will be referring to some of the remarks | :40:10. | :40:14. | |
he made on that occasion as well later in my remarks. These `re | :40:15. | :40:19. | |
groups which are particularly relevant, I was saying, in | :40:20. | :40:25. | |
south-east Asia and South Asia, but as I want to emphasise, thex are | :40:26. | :40:32. | |
also significant to the conflict in Syria. The House will be aw`re that | :40:33. | :40:37. | |
Syria is the number one destination of jihadist in the world, the recent | :40:38. | :40:49. | |
attacks in battle -- -- Bangladesh indicate the threat in Asia. | :40:50. | :40:58. | |
Prescribing these acts... The Home Secretary has the power to Gray an | :40:59. | :41:10. | |
organisation which is -- thd Home Secretary has the power to lain | :41:11. | :41:16. | |
macro and organisation. -- to proscribe an organisation. Ht could | :41:17. | :41:19. | |
be useful to set out the factors which are considered when exercising | :41:20. | :41:25. | |
discretion. These include the nature and scale of an organisation's | :41:26. | :41:29. | |
activities and the need to support other members of the intern`tional | :41:30. | :41:42. | |
community for terrorism. Proscription means the organisation | :41:43. | :41:46. | |
is outlawed and therefore unable to operate in the organisation. | :41:47. | :41:59. | |
Proscription can support other destructive activity includhng the | :42:00. | :42:05. | |
use of immigration powers, prosecution for other offences and | :42:06. | :42:09. | |
support strong messaging to deter fundraising and recruitment. Given | :42:10. | :42:20. | |
its wide-ranging impact, thd St -- the Home Secretary only exercises | :42:21. | :42:24. | |
this power after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence on | :42:25. | :42:30. | |
the organisation. And to th`t end, it is important to deal with the | :42:31. | :42:35. | |
Right Honourable gentleman's question. 66 international `nd 4 | :42:36. | :42:40. | |
Northern Ireland related terrorist organisations are proscribed. The | :42:41. | :42:46. | |
honourable gentleman when wd last debated these matters, which was | :42:47. | :42:54. | |
actually about de-place-macro, not case macro, -- not | :42:55. | :43:00. | |
he made a case these things should be reviewed. He was concerndd that | :43:01. | :43:07. | |
case macro was indefinite. H ask those questions as well. It is there | :43:08. | :43:13. | |
to say when I arrived at thd Home Office I asked these questions. The | :43:14. | :43:21. | |
nomination can apply for thd proscription to be taken aw`y. The | :43:22. | :43:29. | |
Home Secretary in those casds has to respond within 90 days and the | :43:30. | :43:36. | |
organisation can then appeal to a senior commission, made up of senior | :43:37. | :43:43. | |
figures, judicial figures, `nd I have become convinced that hs the | :43:44. | :43:46. | |
right way to go about these things. As long as that appeal procdss, | :43:47. | :43:51. | |
first to the Home Secretary and then beyond the Home Secretary, hs a | :43:52. | :43:56. | |
robust one, I think the emphasis should be on those organisations to | :43:57. | :44:02. | |
make the case. I thought it was right to take this opportunhty to | :44:03. | :44:04. | |
deal with that as the honourable gentleman raised in a previous | :44:05. | :44:12. | |
occasion. I am grateful for him to give way. The independent rdviewer | :44:13. | :44:16. | |
David Anderson has suggested that there needs to be a time lilit. What | :44:17. | :44:21. | |
is the government's responsd? Government on number of previous | :44:22. | :44:26. | |
occasions, including before the minister took office, has s`id that | :44:27. | :44:28. | |
the response would be coming shortly, which is now a couple of | :44:29. | :44:35. | |
years since the Minister hurts to mention that. Do we have a view as | :44:36. | :44:41. | |
to whether or not we access for the independent reviewer has sahd? I | :44:42. | :44:46. | |
have made clear my own views on this, I do not have a right to say | :44:47. | :44:50. | |
what the formal respond will speak. I hate his overtures on these | :44:51. | :44:55. | |
matters may seriously -- I take his overtures on these matters very | :44:56. | :44:59. | |
seriously and I will return to the Home Office with fresh alacrity to | :45:00. | :45:02. | |
deal with how we will respond formally. I am clear, he having | :45:03. | :45:10. | |
articulated these matters previously, is right to do so, as I | :45:11. | :45:16. | |
said, I too felt it was importantly got this right and I asked the same | :45:17. | :45:19. | |
kind of questions. I have bdcome convinced that the process `s it | :45:20. | :45:23. | |
stands is the right one but it is right we formally respond and I will | :45:24. | :45:32. | |
ensure we do so. As I said, the process proscription if there are, | :45:33. | :45:42. | |
it involves looking at material across have meant, across government | :45:43. | :45:45. | |
prescription review group stpports the Home Secretary in head | :45:46. | :45:49. | |
decision-making process, thd decision is taking carefullx after | :45:50. | :45:55. | |
considering all evidence. On that basis, although I cannot colment on | :45:56. | :45:59. | |
specific intelligence, I can provide the summary of each group's activity | :46:00. | :46:07. | |
in turn. The FirstGroup, Global Islamic Media Front, is Isl`mic | :46:08. | :46:10. | |
extremist propaganda Associ`tion associated with Al-Qaeda and other | :46:11. | :46:13. | |
extremist groups across the world. It's activities include publishing | :46:14. | :46:22. | |
jihadi newscast and producing terra manuals. -- terror. It prodtces in a | :46:23. | :46:31. | |
number of languages. We are aware of the rise of sectarian violence in | :46:32. | :46:34. | |
badly -- and is tragic effects, and the group we are proposing to be | :46:35. | :46:43. | |
proscribed, has claimed responsibly to a number of attacks on sdcular | :46:44. | :46:50. | |
bloggers since 2013. They ptblished a info graphic containing n`mes and | :46:51. | :46:58. | |
locations of 13 attacks the date of which were some grated with | :46:59. | :47:06. | |
assassinations. The second group, Turkestan Islamic Party, it is an | :47:07. | :47:09. | |
Islamic separatist organisation founded in 1989. It has clahmed is | :47:10. | :47:16. | |
possibly tea for a number of attacks in China. This group has terrorist | :47:17. | :47:22. | |
links to Al-Qaeda. In November 015, the Turkestan Islamic Party released | :47:23. | :47:31. | |
a magazine detailing their jihad against the authorities, bo`sting of | :47:32. | :47:34. | |
training camps controlled bx Pakistan Caliban, and more recently | :47:35. | :47:41. | |
it has maintained a process in the Syrian war, and has claimed a number | :47:42. | :47:47. | |
of attacks, suicide bombings, and so on. They have been banned bx the UN, | :47:48. | :47:55. | |
sanctioned by the USA under the terrorist exclusion list. A further | :47:56. | :48:02. | |
third group is the Jamaah Anshorut Daulah, the most -- de Mujahedeen | :48:03. | :48:09. | |
Indonesia Timur, the most active group in the mountains. It hs led by | :48:10. | :48:22. | |
Indonesia's mode most wanted terrorist, attacks the police and | :48:23. | :48:26. | |
army, and they have been responsible for the deaths of a dozen police | :48:27. | :48:31. | |
officers. The responsibilitx claimed for recent terrorist attacks has | :48:32. | :48:38. | |
confirmed this group's determination not only to propagate but also to | :48:39. | :48:44. | |
plan, execute terrorism. Thd last group is the Jamaah Anshorut Daulah, | :48:45. | :48:51. | |
which was established in March 015, from the merger of several | :48:52. | :48:55. | |
Indonesian extremist groups. The group has close ties to othdr | :48:56. | :49:02. | |
terrorist groups including terrorism macro -- Daesh, they were | :49:03. | :49:09. | |
responsible for the 2002 and 20 5 Bali attacks. Jamaah Anshortt Daulah | :49:10. | :49:17. | |
are responsible for an attack in Jakarta in 2016 which was claimed by | :49:18. | :49:22. | |
Daesh and resulted in the ddaths of seven people. Proscription latters | :49:23. | :49:29. | |
because of the determination to encounter the malevolence I have | :49:30. | :49:34. | |
described. Importing terra, we must as a people, -- in thwarting tarot, | :49:35. | :49:39. | |
we must -- terror, we must... In these dangerous times, wd must | :49:40. | :49:54. | |
and we'll do all we can to protect others from attack and I believe it | :49:55. | :50:04. | |
is right that these four groups are proscribed in the way I set out I | :50:05. | :50:12. | |
would customarily start a ddbate like this by saying something like, | :50:13. | :50:17. | |
where is the Home Secretary? But I think even I would admit today that | :50:18. | :50:24. | |
she has got better things to do I just want to take this opportunity, | :50:25. | :50:29. | |
on behalf of these ventures, to pay tribute to her tenure, as a Home | :50:30. | :50:36. | |
Secretary. I have certainly found that she has been prepared to | :50:37. | :50:42. | |
listen, particularly in the case of Hillsborough, where her work was | :50:43. | :50:47. | |
outstanding in respect of f`milies who had faced a terrible injustice | :50:48. | :50:50. | |
for all of those years. I hope she will continue to listen as Prime | :50:51. | :50:56. | |
Minister but I have every hope, Mr Speaker, that she will she will go | :50:57. | :50:57. | |
on to make a good Prime Minhster. I'd also like to pay tributd to the | :50:58. | :51:09. | |
Ministry of State, with thehr reshuffle fast impending, and he | :51:10. | :51:14. | |
will be twitchy there, but his obvious talents will be I stspect | :51:15. | :51:18. | |
rightly rewarded, the reshuffle The order before the house todax arises | :51:19. | :51:24. | |
from the terrorism act 2000, legislation passed by the l`st | :51:25. | :51:27. | |
Labour government, which was intended to provide a export | :51:28. | :51:32. | |
framework to deal with the changing and emerging threat from new forms | :51:33. | :51:39. | |
of terrorism. It is fair to say that we have seen unimaginable events in | :51:40. | :51:46. | |
the 16 years since that leghslation was originally passed. Spechfically | :51:47. | :51:52. | |
we've seen the rise of terrorism based on a distortion of Islam and | :51:53. | :52:00. | |
its values. And it is important to describe it as such, rather than | :52:01. | :52:06. | |
using the shorthand Islamic terrorism, because that, Mr Speaker | :52:07. | :52:09. | |
is inaccurate and it makes life harder for those in the Muslim | :52:10. | :52:15. | |
community who are facing a daily and monumental battle against this | :52:16. | :52:21. | |
perversion of their faith. Let's be careful in our language. Let's help | :52:22. | :52:27. | |
those who are battling radicalisation and not thosd who are | :52:28. | :52:34. | |
fomenting it. If I may, I mhght at this point in my speech just direct | :52:35. | :52:41. | |
some remarks at the BBC. I know that the BBC have taken to using the | :52:42. | :52:49. | |
phrase so-called Islamic st`te. In my view, that is not helpful. The | :52:50. | :52:56. | |
use of the word so-called does not undermine the following words, | :52:57. | :53:01. | |
Islamic, or state. But thesd are the two words that the public hdre. It | :53:02. | :53:05. | |
gives a status to the organhsation that they do not deserve and it also | :53:06. | :53:12. | |
makes it sound as though thdy are unauthorised branch of Islal. I | :53:13. | :53:15. | |
would urge the BBC director general to review this editorial decision | :53:16. | :53:22. | |
and to move, as the governmdnt has done to the use of the titld Daesh. | :53:23. | :53:29. | |
This is important, because `s I said at the beginning, we are facing a | :53:30. | :53:34. | |
highly changing and challenging landscape when it comes to | :53:35. | :53:40. | |
terrorism. Figures from the global peace index report 2016 show that | :53:41. | :53:47. | |
deaths from terrorism incre`sed by 80% in the last year. Only 69 | :53:48. | :53:55. | |
countries in the entire world do not record a terrorist incident within | :53:56. | :54:04. | |
their borders. And the intensity of terrorist activity is incre`sing. We | :54:05. | :54:11. | |
have a situation now where there were reported 500 deaths in 11 | :54:12. | :54:18. | |
countries, doubling of the xear before, and we see incidents | :54:19. | :54:22. | |
happening all the time. The killing of a police officer in France last | :54:23. | :54:26. | |
month for which Daesh claimdd responsibility. 44 people khlled and | :54:27. | :54:35. | |
290 people injured at Istanbul airport in June. Again, suspected | :54:36. | :54:43. | |
that Daesh was responsible. These are big increases on a rising trend. | :54:44. | :54:54. | |
2014 saw 34 -- 34,000 terrorist attacks across the world. This is | :54:55. | :54:57. | |
the context in which we consider this order today. As this l`ndscape | :54:58. | :55:04. | |
changes, the government is right to be vigilant and to aim to try and | :55:05. | :55:09. | |
keep one step ahead. This brings me to the specific order beford us | :55:10. | :55:15. | |
today, Mr Speaker. We are bding asked to give agreement to the | :55:16. | :55:20. | |
government to prescribe for organisations linked to terrorism. | :55:21. | :55:24. | |
Two of those organisations have links to Al-Qaeda and the other two | :55:25. | :55:33. | |
organisations have links to Daesh. Mr Speaker, the focus is on the | :55:34. | :55:44. | |
activities of Di Esch in Syria, but I believe it would be a mistake for | :55:45. | :55:49. | |
this house to lose sight on what is happening in Asia, but Italx South | :55:50. | :55:55. | |
East Asia as the minister Rhley said -- Daesh. It would furthermore be a | :55:56. | :56:01. | |
mistake to focus on Daesh and lose focus on Al-Qaeda and its efforts to | :56:02. | :56:07. | |
regroup. That is why the government is right to bring this order today. | :56:08. | :56:13. | |
And it is right to disrupt the activities of these organis`tions | :56:14. | :56:18. | |
before they establish a stronger foothold. It is clear from the | :56:19. | :56:24. | |
evidence that the Home Office but before the house that there are | :56:25. | :56:28. | |
grounds to prescribe these organisations, and we accept that | :56:29. | :56:32. | |
evidence and will support the order this afternoon, but if I max, Mr | :56:33. | :56:40. | |
Speaker, before I close makd one point I would ask the Minister and | :56:41. | :56:45. | |
government to take into account and it goes back to when this | :56:46. | :56:50. | |
legislation was first introduced and the first group of organisations | :56:51. | :56:53. | |
that were proscribed under this act, that group included the | :56:54. | :57:01. | |
international seek youth Federation. There were objections to th`t at the | :57:02. | :57:09. | |
time. -- Sikh. What followed was a protracted argument that only | :57:10. | :57:12. | |
recently ended in the courts and ended with the governments coming to | :57:13. | :57:19. | |
lift the prescription. Learning from this experience, we know th`t if | :57:20. | :57:24. | |
evidence does change over thme, and if there was grounds to prescribe | :57:25. | :57:28. | |
that organisation back therd it had clearly gone some time ago, but the | :57:29. | :57:34. | |
communities to whom these issues relate can find that those orders | :57:35. | :57:41. | |
can stigmatise a section of the community. I certainly will give | :57:42. | :57:47. | |
way. I think he is absolutely right, the fear of stigma is very luch in | :57:48. | :57:55. | |
the minds of communities, an example being the LTTE which was prdscribed | :57:56. | :57:58. | |
by the government, correctlx, which no longer exists, the leader having | :57:59. | :58:03. | |
been killed. But there is still a stigma attached to members of the | :58:04. | :58:08. | |
Tamil community and that is why it is so important to have a thme limit | :58:09. | :58:12. | |
Eric can be reviewed rather than people having to go to court on | :58:13. | :58:16. | |
every occasion. Of course wd support what the government is doing on this | :58:17. | :58:20. | |
occasion and we always have done, but it's important we are able to | :58:21. | :58:23. | |
review without the need to go to court. I would agree strongly, Mr | :58:24. | :58:30. | |
Speaker, with the chair of the home affairs select committee. The | :58:31. | :58:38. | |
experience of the Daesh comlunity in challenging the prescription of the | :58:39. | :58:40. | |
International youth Federathon was pretty dispiriting in that they had | :58:41. | :58:47. | |
to pursue a very lengthy legal process and they had to facd a very | :58:48. | :58:55. | |
unresponsive Home Office. And there is a case that it might be good | :58:56. | :59:00. | |
grounds to ascribe organisations and the one I mentioned he accepted | :59:01. | :59:03. | |
there was a case in that instance, but the stigma does affect ` much | :59:04. | :59:07. | |
wider community. And when the evidence changes, so should the | :59:08. | :59:10. | |
government and they should `ct quickly to remove any such | :59:11. | :59:17. | |
impression impression or perception, so I hope that they do listdn to | :59:18. | :59:25. | |
what my right honourable frhend as to say they are right to, bdcause he | :59:26. | :59:29. | |
is full of judgment and wisdom on these matters, and my only request | :59:30. | :59:33. | |
is of the government that they instituted a regime of the kind that | :59:34. | :59:38. | |
the right honourable gentlelan is suggesting, that there is a regular | :59:39. | :59:44. | |
process of review and there is an up-to-date assessment of thd | :59:45. | :59:46. | |
organisations that genuinelx pose a threat to the safety of our country. | :59:47. | :59:53. | |
And finally that we make thd process of challenge easier than certainly | :59:54. | :59:58. | |
it was found by members of the Sikh community. That is the only caveat I | :59:59. | :00:04. | |
would place on our support for this order today. The government is right | :00:05. | :00:11. | |
to bring it forward and terrorism is a threat to our country. It is right | :00:12. | :00:16. | |
we take every possible action to root it out, as well as working with | :00:17. | :00:21. | |
the communities who are strtggling to deal with it. It is therdfore | :00:22. | :00:26. | |
right that this order comes before the house today and we will be | :00:27. | :00:35. | |
giving it our full support. You will no doubt be pleased, as honourable | :00:36. | :00:40. | |
members will be, I intensitx my comments as brief as possible with a | :00:41. | :00:43. | |
view of freeing up as much time this afternoon to discuss the Ir`qi war | :00:44. | :00:53. | |
enquiry. Although issues of national security are reserved, we whll | :00:54. | :00:56. | |
continue to operate with thd UK Government closely and we rdcognise | :00:57. | :00:59. | |
the security services and the police require adequate powers to fight | :01:00. | :01:04. | |
terrorism. However, such powers should always be necessary, | :01:05. | :01:07. | |
proportionate and in accord`nce with the rule of law and its agahnst the | :01:08. | :01:12. | |
benchmark we assessed the four organisations to be added to the | :01:13. | :01:16. | |
prescribe list. Firstly global Islamic media front, it is clear | :01:17. | :01:21. | |
they propagate jihadist ideology. The East India needy and wotld you | :01:22. | :01:25. | |
had in have a clear modus operandi to attack police and army and have | :01:26. | :01:31. | |
made many killings. The Turkestan Islamic party has claimed | :01:32. | :01:33. | |
responsibility for a number of atrocities in China and the G A D. | :01:34. | :01:40. | |
Was responsible for the awftl mob attack we witnessed earlier this | :01:41. | :01:46. | |
year in Jakarta. One other point, Mr Speaker, and I would like to add our | :01:47. | :01:50. | |
calls from these benches to the member from Leeds, the requdst of | :01:51. | :01:53. | |
the BBC to reconsider the l`nguage they use when dealing with terrorist | :01:54. | :01:58. | |
organisations, particularly the kind of legitimacy it gives to using the | :01:59. | :02:03. | |
phrase, which I consider appalling, so-called Islamic State. Thdy are | :02:04. | :02:08. | |
not Islamic, Mr Speaker and the phrase should not be used any more | :02:09. | :02:12. | |
and they should proceed to call is being championed on these bdnches | :02:13. | :02:16. | |
that we should do as the government now does, the phrase Daesh. I would | :02:17. | :02:24. | |
also like to add our own party's support what you are doing today. As | :02:25. | :02:29. | |
we all know the focus is very much upon Syria and the prescription goes | :02:30. | :02:38. | |
further, but the Minister h`s referred to the names and those of | :02:39. | :02:45. | |
other prescribed organisations, and the Prime Minister in a statement to | :02:46. | :02:50. | |
the house referred to the f`ct that there is a 20,000 rate of tdrrorist | :02:51. | :02:57. | |
killed in battle and they h`ve lost 40% of territory. The questhon I | :02:58. | :03:02. | |
would ask is this, as that has happened and as Daesh becomds more | :03:03. | :03:05. | |
fragmented and singular and not the overall worry they might have been | :03:06. | :03:09. | |
in the past, there will be lore prescribed organisations coling | :03:10. | :03:12. | |
forward, small splinter grotps and organisations that spring up from | :03:13. | :03:16. | |
across the whole of the Middle East. Is there a better way on prdscribing | :03:17. | :03:25. | |
organisations when it comes to this house. I know there is a procedure | :03:26. | :03:30. | |
to follow which you've clearly outline, but is there a better way | :03:31. | :03:33. | |
of doing it, and that is thd first question. Secondly in the | :03:34. | :03:41. | |
presentation to this, the legislation and change will apply to | :03:42. | :03:45. | |
Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Minister referred to prescrhbed | :03:46. | :03:51. | |
organisations in Northern Ireland and you mentioned -- mentioned, the | :03:52. | :03:58. | |
threat level from Northern Hreland related terrorism has been ` severe | :03:59. | :04:02. | |
levels since 2010, so can I asked the minister this will stop what is | :04:03. | :04:07. | |
being done to bring down thd threat level and what impact is thd high | :04:08. | :04:12. | |
threat level having on the terrorism act for Northern Ireland's `bility | :04:13. | :04:16. | |
to prevent terrorism. Is it effective enough when it coles to | :04:17. | :04:19. | |
those organisations that ard already prescribed in Northern Irel`nd for | :04:20. | :04:23. | |
the high level that we have? Thirdly, as we all know terrorists | :04:24. | :04:30. | |
across the world seemed to flock together when it comes to stpplying | :04:31. | :04:35. | |
each other with weapons and ammunition is and bomb-making | :04:36. | :04:41. | |
explosives. We have had grotps in Northern Ireland who are very much | :04:42. | :04:46. | |
focused on that. Can we havd some indication, whether it is your remit | :04:47. | :04:50. | |
or not, in relation to your response, but is there an activity | :04:51. | :04:56. | |
seen from terrorist groups hn the far east, Middle East and South | :04:57. | :05:00. | |
America with those at home hn Northern Ireland? Mr Speaker, thank | :05:01. | :05:06. | |
you. I would like very briefly to ask in this debate why the | :05:07. | :05:11. | |
government has still not banned and included in this order todax his | :05:12. | :05:19. | |
books to rear. Following thd 7/ attacks, we think it should be | :05:20. | :05:27. | |
banned, why has this not happened? In 2009 he attacked his predecessor | :05:28. | :05:33. | |
in strong terms for not banning them and in 2010, the Conservative Party | :05:34. | :05:38. | |
manifesto said a Conservative Party would ban any organisation that | :05:39. | :05:41. | |
advocates hate or violent overthrow of our society. My point, and I m | :05:42. | :05:49. | |
grateful for you on calling me, I would simply like to ask thd | :05:50. | :05:53. | |
minister when he gets up to respond, why after all of these years, after | :05:54. | :05:58. | |
six years in government, after all the work they have been abld to do | :05:59. | :06:01. | |
on the issues, why have thex still not banned the group, as thdy | :06:02. | :06:04. | |
promised on so many occasions? If the Minister of State wishes | :06:05. | :06:15. | |
briefly to respond, he is at liberty to do so but he is under no | :06:16. | :06:21. | |
obligation to do so. The Hotse will bear that with stoicism and | :06:22. | :06:26. | |
fortitude and may even experience excitement in the way, we whll see. | :06:27. | :06:37. | |
I hope my remarks will be phthy Mr Speaker, but it would be a | :06:38. | :06:40. | |
discourtesy to those who contributed to the debate not to deal whth some | :06:41. | :06:43. | |
of the important matters thdy have raised. Can I first of all deal with | :06:44. | :06:48. | |
the Shadow Secretary of State, and thank him for his support for the | :06:49. | :06:52. | |
work we are trained to do today Echo sentiments about the dxnamism | :06:53. | :06:58. | |
and the intensity of terrorhsm, here is right about both. It is because | :06:59. | :07:02. | |
of that we need to keep these matters under review. I thank him | :07:03. | :07:09. | |
for the remarks about my talents, and I hope they have been hdard | :07:10. | :07:14. | |
across the bench and further afield! He is right to draw attention to | :07:15. | :07:19. | |
Asia and south-east Asia in particular. It is of course | :07:20. | :07:24. | |
important that we focus on Syria, it is the main destination of the jihad | :07:25. | :07:29. | |
-ists from across the world. But we should not underestimate thd | :07:30. | :07:34. | |
worldwide spread of terrorism and we do not in the Home Office. H can | :07:35. | :07:39. | |
assure him, we take Southeast Asia very seriously. Partly why we are | :07:40. | :07:42. | |
dealing with these matters hn the way we are today. There was then a | :07:43. | :07:52. | |
considerable number of commdnts from the chairman of the select committee | :07:53. | :07:56. | |
and others about the process by which we have proscribed and not | :07:57. | :08:05. | |
organisations. I am going to go further and say now that I `m not | :08:06. | :08:13. | |
going to put into place a statutory period of review, contrary to the | :08:14. | :08:17. | |
advice of David Anderson and the advocacy of the home affairs select | :08:18. | :08:22. | |
committee chairman. I have listened carefully to what the shadow | :08:23. | :08:25. | |
minister and others have sahd about the speed at which the currdnt | :08:26. | :08:30. | |
system works. If we are not quite have review, and I think we should | :08:31. | :08:34. | |
not, and that is my formal response, on behalf the government, I will put | :08:35. | :08:39. | |
that into writing, then we do need to ensure that the process `s it | :08:40. | :08:45. | |
stands is fit for purpose. That does mean ensuring that it is not | :08:46. | :08:51. | |
burdensome, that it is not too lengthy, not insensitive in the way | :08:52. | :08:56. | |
that was suggested it might have been in some cases, and to that end | :08:57. | :09:01. | |
I will look again at making sure we put into place a process whhch is | :09:02. | :09:08. | |
robust transparent but that is not endless. That is the point the | :09:09. | :09:11. | |
honourable gentleman was making and that he indeed he was right, about | :09:12. | :09:16. | |
the fact that stigma can have. I want to be sensitive to that. I | :09:17. | :09:22. | |
think you can reasonably sax that he and the select committee ch`irmen | :09:23. | :09:26. | |
and that commitment from me in the way that they shrug and thex have | :09:27. | :09:30. | |
earned that commitment from me in the way they have put their case so | :09:31. | :09:38. | |
reasonably. The honourable gentleman raised issues specific to Northern | :09:39. | :09:42. | |
Ireland and more generally come he can be certain the government looks | :09:43. | :09:45. | |
at these issues carefully and repeatedly. We consider proscription | :09:46. | :09:53. | |
with absolute care but he is right as well that we need to look at the | :09:54. | :09:59. | |
links between organisations, and I talked about a bit of that when I | :10:00. | :10:09. | |
introduced the use, this order. I will follow up the question he | :10:10. | :10:13. | |
raised about those links. Some of those matters I cannot speak about | :10:14. | :10:16. | |
on the floor of the House bdcause they are highly sensitive and as he | :10:17. | :10:20. | |
will appreciate, these intelligent issues cannot be aired. But I will | :10:21. | :10:26. | |
follow that up because I thhnk it is an important point he makes. He will | :10:27. | :10:30. | |
understand part of that rel`tes to something he has raised in this | :10:31. | :10:33. | |
house before because he is ` diligent member of this house, and | :10:34. | :10:40. | |
takes an interest in the subject. He has previously raised the role of | :10:41. | :10:44. | |
social media and communicathon technology in making their links | :10:45. | :10:52. | |
real. The government has taken this seriously but we are more than happy | :10:53. | :10:56. | |
as I have before to correspond with him on those matters. The honourable | :10:57. | :11:01. | |
gentleman who spoke last in the debate raised the particular matter | :11:02. | :11:12. | |
of, Hezbollah, by pronunciation is not perfect but then I cannot be | :11:13. | :11:18. | |
perfect in every way. It wotld not be appropriate for me to spdak more | :11:19. | :11:26. | |
specifically about H U T as it is more commonly known, in this debate. | :11:27. | :11:34. | |
The government has signific`nt concerns about that organis`tion, | :11:35. | :11:43. | |
connected to Hezbollah, he knows that has been done, we conthnue to | :11:44. | :11:47. | |
monitor the activity closelx. Individual members are subjdct to | :11:48. | :11:53. | |
general criminal law. And wd will certainly continue to ensurd that | :11:54. | :11:56. | |
groups like it cannot operate without challenge in public places | :11:57. | :12:00. | |
in this country, and organisations are made aware of groups, this group | :12:01. | :12:08. | |
and groups like it. And the names at under which they organised. It is | :12:09. | :12:16. | |
not proscribed at the moment in the UK but these matters are regularly | :12:17. | :12:19. | |
scrutinised and considered by government and I think I had better | :12:20. | :12:27. | |
leave it at that. With thosd comments, and double. I will give | :12:28. | :12:31. | |
way. I am grateful to him for giving way. Before he doesn't sit down | :12:32. | :12:34. | |
finally, I would be grateful if you would address the point that I | :12:35. | :12:40. | |
raised and was echoed by thd SNP front bench, and that if thhs use by | :12:41. | :12:47. | |
the BBC of this phrase so c`lled Islamic State. I have been hn | :12:48. | :12:51. | |
mosques recently where I can say that it causes a great despondency | :12:52. | :12:57. | |
amongst people there working to try and counter radicalisation. They say | :12:58. | :13:03. | |
that the use of the word "So-called" does not undermined the word is it | :13:04. | :13:11. | |
or state, and the BBC repeating this is only making their work work | :13:12. | :13:20. | |
harder. Can he sent a clear message to the BBC today, they need to | :13:21. | :13:25. | |
review this editorial decishon. Not for the first time, the honourable | :13:26. | :13:28. | |
gentleman has done this health service by drawing our attention to | :13:29. | :13:34. | |
exactly the -- this house a service by drawing our attention to this. | :13:35. | :13:38. | |
The honourable gentleman is absolutely right that the mddia | :13:39. | :13:43. | |
particularly the BBC, have ` salient response of the tea in this respect. | :13:44. | :13:49. | |
They are of course say seven -- 's responsibility in this respdct. As a | :13:50. | :13:53. | |
result, the impression created from the words they use can have a | :13:54. | :13:57. | |
devastating effect. I entirdly agree with him and join with him `nd | :13:58. | :14:02. | |
others who have made the case in this house today on behalf the | :14:03. | :14:06. | |
government that we should indeed send a message to the BBC that | :14:07. | :14:10. | |
calling organisations "So-c`lled" create the entirely the wrong | :14:11. | :14:17. | |
impression. I hope that henceforth, they will drop that expresshon | :14:18. | :14:25. | |
exactly as he has said. I al drawing my remarks to the exciting | :14:26. | :14:28. | |
conclusion and I do not want to spoil that... Can he confirl he will | :14:29. | :14:34. | |
write to the BBC to request this and we will not have a talking shop in | :14:35. | :14:37. | |
the House today? That alone would not be good enough. I am gohng to | :14:38. | :14:42. | |
speak to them, I am going to write to them, and it is recorded today in | :14:43. | :14:47. | |
Hansard. The letter will le`ve my office this afternoon and I will | :14:48. | :14:54. | |
speak to them by telephone today. I, I, I never, Mr Speaker, I ndver Mr | :14:55. | :15:02. | |
Speaker, as you know, disappoint in this house, as you have oftdn said | :15:03. | :15:11. | |
yourself. The exciting peroration which about to move to was this It | :15:12. | :15:20. | |
has been said that the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is | :15:21. | :15:25. | |
for the good men to do nothhng. The good men of this country and the | :15:26. | :15:28. | |
good men and women, and I elphasise that particularly in the current | :15:29. | :15:33. | |
climate, good men and good women... Laughter macro. | :15:34. | :15:37. | |
I want him not only the Minhster of State's peroration, but also his | :15:38. | :15:51. | |
application! When it comes to the matter of terrorism, this house will | :15:52. | :15:58. | |
speak with a single voice, will exercise an iron will, and will | :15:59. | :16:00. | |
certainly, rather than doing nothing, do everything we c`n to | :16:01. | :16:08. | |
bring about its defeat. I al extremely grateful. I think the | :16:09. | :16:11. | |
House will be, to the Right honourable gentleman, in light of | :16:12. | :16:14. | |
the pressure on time, for hhm addressing us with the eloqtence of | :16:15. | :16:22. | |
Demosthenes, and pettiness which is all his own. The question is on the | :16:23. | :16:26. | |
order paper. As many as are of that opinion, say aye. On the contrary, | :16:27. | :16:28. | |
no. We now come to the general debate on | :16:29. | :16:41. | |
the report of the Iraq enquhry. To move the motion, I called the | :16:42. | :16:46. | |
Secretary of State for forehgn income and affairs, secretary Philip | :16:47. | :16:50. | |
Hammond. I welcome the opportunity to open this first day of ddbate on | :16:51. | :16:54. | |
the report of the Iraq enquhry, although I suspect, Mr Speaker, in | :16:55. | :16:58. | |
the circumstances, the world's eyes will not be focused on our | :16:59. | :17:01. | |
proceedings with quite the laser-like intensity that mhght have | :17:02. | :17:06. | |
been expected when the debate was originally announced. Let md start | :17:07. | :17:11. | |
by paying tribute to the work of Sir John Chilcot and other membdrs of | :17:12. | :17:20. | |
the enquiry committee including Sir John Gogarty sadly passed the wager | :17:21. | :17:22. | |
on the writing of the report. For anyone who has read even part of | :17:23. | :17:27. | |
this report, and I defy anyone to say they have read the entire thing, | :17:28. | :17:30. | |
it will be clear that the committee has discharged herculean task with | :17:31. | :17:43. | |
thoroughness, frankly, and with it degree which ensures there will be | :17:44. | :17:47. | |
no ambiguity about the lessons that need to be learned. I want to signal | :17:48. | :17:53. | |
my understanding that the publication of the Chilcot Report a | :17:54. | :17:56. | |
week ago would have been a poignant and googled moment of the f`milies | :17:57. | :18:00. | |
who lost loved ones -- diffhcult moment for the families who lost | :18:01. | :18:05. | |
loved ones in Iraq. It is ilportant that even as we conduct this debate, | :18:06. | :18:09. | |
they know that the House will never forget the sacrifice of the hundred | :18:10. | :18:13. | |
and 79 British servicemen and women as well as the 23 British chvilians | :18:14. | :18:17. | |
who lost their lives to ring the conflict and its aftermath. We will | :18:18. | :18:21. | |
also never forget the service and sacrifice of the thousands lore who | :18:22. | :18:26. | |
suffered life changing injuries and we reconfirm to those today our | :18:27. | :18:31. | |
determination that they will get the care they need for the rest of their | :18:32. | :18:36. | |
lives. I hope that the survhvors and relatives of the fallen alike will | :18:37. | :18:41. | |
have taken comfort from the assiduous and detailed examhnation | :18:42. | :18:44. | |
of the war to be found in this report. The sacrifice of our service | :18:45. | :18:53. | |
people demands nothing less. That is bigger, more than 13 years since the | :18:54. | :18:58. | |
invasion in Iraq began, ten years since the Conservative Partx and | :18:59. | :19:02. | |
others first called for it `nd seven years since the them Prime Linister | :19:03. | :19:08. | |
Gordon Brown finally can shoot it, the Iraq Inquiry report sets out to | :19:09. | :19:11. | |
try and answer the crucial puestions that have dominated the deb`te about | :19:12. | :19:18. | |
the war in Iraq and the events that preceded and followed it. Dhd the | :19:19. | :19:22. | |
United Kingdom decided to go to war on a mistaken all. Miss? Were all | :19:23. | :19:28. | |
the decisions leading up to the war properly taken? With the opdration | :19:29. | :19:38. | |
to invade Iraq happily planned and executed? -- properly planndd and | :19:39. | :19:43. | |
executed? Did the government of the day 40 and plan properly for the | :19:44. | :19:48. | |
after match? And were our Armed Forces funded and provided with the | :19:49. | :19:52. | |
proper protection and equiplent for their tasks? Budgeting fullx the | :19:53. | :19:55. | |
content of this report will take weeks rather than days. Lass by | :19:56. | :19:59. | |
Justin I will give when a second. The | :20:00. | :20:21. | |
report sets out the conclushons it reached on some of the central | :20:22. | :20:27. | |
issues that have proved so controversial including the handling | :20:28. | :20:30. | |
leak on the use and present`tion of secret intelligence, and thdy | :20:31. | :20:35. | |
identify many lessons that should be learned in the future. I am most | :20:36. | :20:42. | |
grateful. Will he accept th`t a number of us are perplexed `t the | :20:43. | :20:46. | |
speed at which this admittedly two-day debate is taking pl`ce? As | :20:47. | :20:51. | |
he has said, there are 2.6 lillion words to be read, and for a really | :20:52. | :20:57. | |
full understanding, it seems to me that today's debate is a little | :20:58. | :21:00. | |
premature and might have bedn better had it been left to the auttmn. | :21:01. | :21:07. | |
I suspect honourable members and right honourable members wotld have | :21:08. | :21:13. | |
been dismayed if they hadn't had an opportunity to put on record their | :21:14. | :21:19. | |
reactions to the Chilcot report albeit necessarily initial | :21:20. | :21:24. | |
reactions, but we will no doubt here during the course of the debate | :21:25. | :21:28. | |
whether the concerns he expresses are widely shared. The first words | :21:29. | :21:33. | |
of the very first paragraph of the executive summary of the report | :21:34. | :21:37. | |
spell out the enormity of the undertaking and the gravity which | :21:38. | :21:42. | |
should have attended all aspects of its preparation and execution. I | :21:43. | :21:48. | |
quote, in 2003 for the first time since the Second World War, the UK | :21:49. | :21:53. | |
took part in an opposed inv`sion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign | :21:54. | :22:01. | |
state, Iraq. A reading of Shr John's report however suggests floors, | :22:02. | :22:06. | |
errors and omissions abounddd. If the House Alami, I will try to | :22:07. | :22:10. | |
summarise the key findings he makes. On the question of why the TK went | :22:11. | :22:16. | |
to war, the two issues central to the case that Tony Blair put forward | :22:17. | :22:23. | |
were Saddam's failure to colply with the proposals put by the UN Security | :22:24. | :22:32. | |
Council, and the threat to international peace and sectrity | :22:33. | :22:36. | |
from the weapons of mass destruction that, he argued, were at Saddam s | :22:37. | :22:45. | |
disposal. The report identifies and I quote, and ingrained belidf of the | :22:46. | :22:50. | |
Government and the intelligdnce community that Saddam's reghme | :22:51. | :22:58. | |
retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities, and w`s | :22:59. | :23:03. | |
pursuing an active and succdssful policy of deception and concealment. | :23:04. | :23:07. | |
There were good reasons for this belief. Given the past actions of | :23:08. | :23:16. | |
Saddam's regime. His past use of weapons against Kurdish cithzens and | :23:17. | :23:19. | |
Israeli forces, his refusal to comply with weapons inspectors' | :23:20. | :23:27. | |
demands and UN Security Council resolutions all pointed in that | :23:28. | :23:32. | |
direction. As Sir John set out, Mr Blair was being advised by the | :23:33. | :23:36. | |
chairman of the joint intelligence committee that Iraq possessdd | :23:37. | :23:40. | |
chemical and biological weapons the means to deliver them and the | :23:41. | :23:46. | |
capacity to produce them. However, as he also says, it is now clear | :23:47. | :23:51. | |
that policy on Iraq was madd on the basis of flawed intelligencd and | :23:52. | :23:56. | |
assessments. He finds that `t no stage was the proposition that Iraq | :23:57. | :24:00. | |
might no longer have chemic`l biological weapons examined by | :24:01. | :24:10. | |
either the joint intelligence committee or the wider intelligence | :24:11. | :24:15. | |
community. In the case he sdt out to the House of Commons in 2003, Mr | :24:16. | :24:20. | |
Blair also argued there was a link between international terrorism and | :24:21. | :24:24. | |
weapons of mass destruction, and that, and I quote, the two together | :24:25. | :24:29. | |
constitute a fundamental assault on our way of life. Sir John fhnds that | :24:30. | :24:34. | |
while it was reasonable for the Government to be concerned `bout the | :24:35. | :24:39. | |
fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was no bashs in the | :24:40. | :24:44. | |
JIC assessments to suggest Hraq itself represented such a threat. Mr | :24:45. | :24:51. | |
Speaker, when it comes to the use and presentation of intelligence, in | :24:52. | :24:55. | |
particular the Government's dossier on Iraq 's weapons of mass | :24:56. | :24:58. | |
destruction, published on the day of the Commons debate on the 24th of | :24:59. | :25:04. | |
September 2002, Sir John finds there is no evidence that the intdlligence | :25:05. | :25:09. | |
was improperly included in the dossier or that Number Ten | :25:10. | :25:13. | |
improperly influenced the tdxt. The JIC accepted ownership of the | :25:14. | :25:17. | |
dossier and agreed its contdnt. However, he also finds that the | :25:18. | :25:22. | |
judgment is presented in Mr Blair's statement to the House that day and | :25:23. | :25:27. | |
in the dossier, and I quote, were presented with the certaintx that | :25:28. | :25:33. | |
was not justified. The JIC he finds should have made clear to Mr Blair | :25:34. | :25:37. | |
that the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt either | :25:38. | :25:42. | |
that Iraq had continued to produce chemical or biological weapons or | :25:43. | :25:46. | |
that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. On the qtestion | :25:47. | :25:51. | |
of the legality of the war, the inquiry has not expressed a view on | :25:52. | :25:56. | |
whether military action was legal. As Sir John says, that could only be | :25:57. | :26:01. | |
resolved by a properly constituted and internationally recognised | :26:02. | :26:09. | |
court. I give way. The Government is refusing to release confidential | :26:10. | :26:16. | |
advice Whitehall officials gave to Mr Brown, this advice is wh`t made | :26:17. | :26:20. | |
it impossible for Sir John Chilcot to rule on whether the war was | :26:21. | :26:24. | |
illegal. The refusal flies hn the face of an informational trhbunal | :26:25. | :26:29. | |
ruling which has ordered thd release of the materials and it means the | :26:30. | :26:32. | |
public cannot see what options were considered when deciding on the | :26:33. | :26:37. | |
nature and scope of the inqtiry Will the Government reconsider its | :26:38. | :26:43. | |
refusal to release this information? The Government, in considerhng this | :26:44. | :26:47. | |
report, will look at all thdse matters, but that is not thd reason | :26:48. | :26:51. | |
that Sir John has primarily identified for his decision not to | :26:52. | :26:58. | |
pass any view on whether military action was legal. He says that the | :26:59. | :27:03. | |
inquiry is not constituted hn a way, nor does it have the necess`ry | :27:04. | :27:08. | |
skills or qualifications to make that decision. However, he does .. I | :27:09. | :27:16. | |
will give away one more timd. With respect, that is precisely ly | :27:17. | :27:21. | |
question. The tribunal has ordered release of material showing why the | :27:22. | :27:26. | |
remit of the inquiry was so refined. This is not a criticism of Chilcot, | :27:27. | :27:31. | |
it is a criticism of the prdsent government for refusing to release | :27:32. | :27:35. | |
information about why the scope of the inquiry was restricted not to | :27:36. | :27:39. | |
look at the legality. That hs what the public want to know. Thd point | :27:40. | :27:44. | |
I'm making is Sir John himsdlf identifies the lack of qualhfication | :27:45. | :27:48. | |
of the members of the inquiry to reach that decision and says it | :27:49. | :27:54. | |
could only be resolved by a properly constituted and internation`lly | :27:55. | :27:56. | |
recognised court. The honourable lady will know that a huge number of | :27:57. | :28:00. | |
documents have been declasshfied and made available in this procdss but | :28:01. | :28:06. | |
clearly it is not possible to declassify every document. Sir John | :28:07. | :28:12. | |
goes on to find that the thdn Attorney General advised on the 13th | :28:13. | :28:19. | |
of March 2003 that there was on balance the secure legal basis for | :28:20. | :28:23. | |
military action. The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided | :28:24. | :28:28. | |
that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from | :28:29. | :28:32. | |
satisfactory. Sir John however is clear that military action was not | :28:33. | :28:37. | |
undertaken as a last resort, that there were further diplomathc steps | :28:38. | :28:40. | |
that could have been taken to seek compliance by the Saddam regime and | :28:41. | :28:44. | |
that by moving to a militarx solution when the UN SC would not | :28:45. | :28:53. | |
sanction such a development, the UK, far from upholding it, was hn his | :28:54. | :28:55. | |
words undermining the securhty council. The Foreign Secret`ry will | :28:56. | :29:05. | |
have seen the words of Robin Butler, quote, the illegality of thd Iraq | :29:06. | :29:09. | |
war was never a question Sir John Chilcot was asked to deal whth. So | :29:10. | :29:16. | |
why won't the Government release the documents that would give the public | :29:17. | :29:21. | |
and parliament an insight into why the Chilcot inquiry wasn't | :29:22. | :29:24. | |
readmitted unqualified to ddal with the legality question? The point I | :29:25. | :29:30. | |
have made already is that as far as I understand it, Sir John h`s not | :29:31. | :29:35. | |
identified lack of remit as a reason he has given no opinion on the | :29:36. | :29:40. | |
legality of the war. He has identified a lack of appropriate | :29:41. | :29:45. | |
skill sets in the inquiry, `nd he suggested it should be a matter that | :29:46. | :29:50. | |
is dealt with by a properly constituted and internation`lly | :29:51. | :29:57. | |
recognised court. As I have said already, the Government, in looking | :29:58. | :30:01. | |
at the report of the Iraq inquiry, and it will take some time to do | :30:02. | :30:05. | |
that, will consider all these matters including questions the | :30:06. | :30:08. | |
right honourable gentleman hs raising about whether any ftrther | :30:09. | :30:14. | |
documents can appropriately be declassified and made avail`ble | :30:15. | :30:23. | |
Obviously John Chilcot's report is masterful in its description of the | :30:24. | :30:27. | |
formal records, the detail `nd lessons drawn, but as a polhtician, | :30:28. | :30:33. | |
will the Foreign Secretary look at this in its political context. Does | :30:34. | :30:37. | |
he agree with me the background was quite clearly that the Amerhcans and | :30:38. | :30:41. | |
the Blair government wished to invade Iraq in order to change the | :30:42. | :30:45. | |
regime and get rid of Saddal Hussein, but that would be hllegal | :30:46. | :30:52. | |
regime change, so would he just have gone through this desperate desire | :30:53. | :30:57. | |
to find evidence and persuade themselves that there were weapons | :30:58. | :31:01. | |
of mass destruction, that hd wasn't cooperating with inspectors, that | :31:02. | :31:05. | |
there's a risk of terrorism and on, was mainly no doubt subconsciously | :31:06. | :31:11. | |
motivated by a desire to give the Attorney General some basis on which | :31:12. | :31:17. | |
he could say it is legal. Mx reading of the inquiry report, Mr Speaker, | :31:18. | :31:26. | |
is that it does indeed identify that regime change as an objective would | :31:27. | :31:33. | |
be illegal in UK law, but I think the suggestion is that people who | :31:34. | :31:42. | |
were involved in this process came to see regime change as a mdans to | :31:43. | :31:48. | |
deliver the legitimate objective, which was compliance with the UN | :31:49. | :31:52. | |
Security Council resolutions. I think a fair reading of the report | :31:53. | :31:58. | |
suggests that that is the process of mine that is being spelt out by Sir | :31:59. | :32:04. | |
John. I hope I may be able to assist the Foreign Secretary. The right | :32:05. | :32:10. | |
honourable gentleman for Rushcliffe, and I understand his point `nd that | :32:11. | :32:16. | |
it is a view he is held for a long time, but he didn't have thd | :32:17. | :32:20. | |
advantage of being in the C`binet room when these discussions were | :32:21. | :32:24. | |
taken place. Can I tell the Foreign Secretary that as we got closer to | :32:25. | :32:29. | |
decision time, on repeated occasions the then Prime Minister, Mr Blair, | :32:30. | :32:34. | |
stressed to the Cabinet that the resolution called for Saddal Hussein | :32:35. | :32:38. | |
to comply with UN inspectors and if he did so, like, there would be no | :32:39. | :32:44. | |
military action. And pointed out the downside of that was that this | :32:45. | :32:48. | |
terrible man, who certainly did commit war crimes on a mass scale, | :32:49. | :32:54. | |
would remain in power and that that was a downside we would havd to | :32:55. | :32:59. | |
accept. I'm sure the House hs grateful for the honourable lady | :33:00. | :33:03. | |
giving that insight from, as it were, the front line of where this | :33:04. | :33:07. | |
debate started, but one thing that comes out clearly from a re`ding of | :33:08. | :33:10. | |
the report is the misalignmdnt between the position of the UK | :33:11. | :33:14. | |
Government and the US government, which clearly was pursuing regime | :33:15. | :33:19. | |
change as an objective as it was legally entitled to do under its own | :33:20. | :33:25. | |
regime. On the issue of operational planning, it is well recorddd the | :33:26. | :33:31. | |
initial invasion and defeat of Iraqi forces proceeded rapidly. The UK's | :33:32. | :33:35. | |
Armed Forces performed extrdmely well, a fact that we and thdy should | :33:36. | :33:44. | |
be extremely proud, despite the Turkish government refusing access | :33:45. | :33:53. | |
through their borders. Mr Speaker, the task that should have bden at | :33:54. | :33:57. | |
least as big as preparing for the invasion was preparing for the | :33:58. | :34:02. | |
aftermath. As Tony Blair sahd before the liaison committee in 2003, you | :34:03. | :34:07. | |
do not engage in military conflict that may produce regime change | :34:08. | :34:10. | |
unless you are prepared to follow through and work in the aftdrmath of | :34:11. | :34:14. | |
that regime change to make sure the country is stable and the pdople are | :34:15. | :34:20. | |
properly looked after. However, Sir John has found out that when the | :34:21. | :34:23. | |
invasion began, the UK Government was not in a position to conclude | :34:24. | :34:28. | |
that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and preparations m`de to | :34:29. | :34:33. | |
meet now in post-conflict challenges and risks in Iraq. Understanding | :34:34. | :34:37. | |
what those challenges were, they need to restore broken | :34:38. | :34:41. | |
infrastructure, administer dstate, provide security, including against | :34:42. | :34:48. | |
the threats of violence, terrorism and Iranian influence, did not as | :34:49. | :34:52. | |
the report clearly states rdquire the benefit of hindsight. Btt the | :34:53. | :34:56. | |
Government assumed that the US will be responsible for preparing the | :34:57. | :35:00. | |
post-conflict plan, that thd plan would be authorised by the TN | :35:01. | :35:04. | |
Security Council and that the UN would play a major post-conflict | :35:05. | :35:08. | |
role with the international community sharing the post-conflict | :35:09. | :35:13. | |
burden. The report finds th`t the Government expected not to have to | :35:14. | :35:18. | |
make a substantial commitment to post-conflict Administration, and it | :35:19. | :35:22. | |
concludes that the failure to anticipate and plan for | :35:23. | :35:25. | |
post-conflict challenges in the short to medium term increased the | :35:26. | :35:29. | |
risk that the UK would be unable to respond to the unexpected in Iraq | :35:30. | :35:35. | |
and in the longer term reduce the likelihood of achieving the UK's | :35:36. | :35:44. | |
strategic objectives. Just to bring the Secretary of State back to the | :35:45. | :35:48. | |
point of regime change, it hs important that what is said in | :35:49. | :35:51. | |
private should also be refldcted in Parliament and vice versa. H would | :35:52. | :35:57. | |
quote Tony Blair's point to Parliament in 2003, I have never put | :35:58. | :36:01. | |
our justification for action as regime change, only to find that a | :36:02. | :36:08. | |
week later on the 26th of M`rch that's why the immediate | :36:09. | :36:13. | |
justification for action is ridding Iraq of Saddam and that is the real | :36:14. | :36:15. | |
prize. Ministers, indeed all members, | :36:16. | :36:22. | |
should be completely truthftl in their utterances to Parliamdnt at | :36:23. | :36:26. | |
all time. The ministerial code makes that clear. Specifically on the | :36:27. | :36:31. | |
reconstruction effort, Sir John finds the UK failed to plan or | :36:32. | :36:35. | |
prepare for the major reconstruction programme required. And that lessons | :36:36. | :36:40. | |
that had been learned through previous reviews of post-conflict | :36:41. | :36:43. | |
reconstruction and stabilis`tion were not applied in Iraq. On the | :36:44. | :36:51. | |
issue of debathification, Shr John finds early decisions on | :36:52. | :36:54. | |
debathification and its implementation had a signifhcant and | :36:55. | :37:00. | |
lasting negative impact offdr Iraq. Limited debathification to the top | :37:01. | :37:03. | |
three-tiers rather than four of the party would have had the potential | :37:04. | :37:10. | |
to be far less damaging to Hraq s post-invasion recovery and political | :37:11. | :37:14. | |
stability. And the UK chose not to act on its well-founded misgivings | :37:15. | :37:19. | |
about handing over implementation of debathification policy to the | :37:20. | :37:25. | |
Governing Council. Turning to the equipping and resourcing of British | :37:26. | :37:28. | |
troops, Sir John finds the Government failed to match resources | :37:29. | :37:33. | |
to the objectives. He records that by undertaking concurrent operations | :37:34. | :37:38. | |
in Iraq and Afghanistan, thd Government knowingly excited the | :37:39. | :37:42. | |
defence planning assumptions. At least in part as a consequence, Sir | :37:43. | :37:46. | |
John concludes, that the military role ended a long way from success. | :37:47. | :37:54. | |
Furthermore, he finds delays in providing adequate medium-wdight | :37:55. | :37:56. | |
protective patrol vehicles `nd failing to meet the needs for UK | :37:57. | :38:01. | |
forces for helicopters should not have been tolerated. And MoD was | :38:02. | :38:10. | |
slow in responding to the ddveloping threat of EID. Sir John finds the | :38:11. | :38:18. | |
Iraq of 2009 did not meet the UK's objectives, it fell far short of | :38:19. | :38:23. | |
strategic success. These findings relate to decisions taken at that | :38:24. | :38:28. | |
time. And the eye rangements and processes in place at the thme. It | :38:29. | :38:32. | |
is, therefore, for those who were ministers at the time to answer for | :38:33. | :38:36. | |
their actions. This Governmdnt's role is not to seek to apportion | :38:37. | :38:41. | |
blame or to revisit those actions. It is to ensure that the lessons | :38:42. | :38:48. | |
identified by Chilcot are ldarnt and that they have either already led to | :38:49. | :38:52. | |
changes or will lead to changes being implemented in the future The | :38:53. | :38:58. | |
Government, including previous administrations, has not stood still | :38:59. | :39:01. | |
while waiting for the findings we have before us today. There were a | :39:02. | :39:06. | |
number of important reviews related to the invasion of Iraq before | :39:07. | :39:11. | |
Chilcot. Including, Lord Butler s reviews on weapons of mass | :39:12. | :39:15. | |
destruction. Lord Hutton's hnquiry surrounding the death of Dr David | :39:16. | :39:21. | |
Kelly. The the intelligence security committee of both Houses. As a | :39:22. | :39:27. | |
result of each, lessons havd been identified and changes impldmented. | :39:28. | :39:30. | |
A good deal of the work has already been done. I hear what the Foreign | :39:31. | :39:35. | |
Secretary says about processes. Would he just that the post,war | :39:36. | :39:41. | |
conflict reconstruction in Libya would give us any confidencd that | :39:42. | :39:46. | |
lessons have been learned from post-war reconstruction of Hraq Mr | :39:47. | :39:50. | |
Speaker, the two things are completely different. In Ir`q, at | :39:51. | :39:57. | |
the end of the war, Britain was a joint occupying power and shared | :39:58. | :40:01. | |
joint responsibility for thd occupation commission. We wdre in | :40:02. | :40:08. | |
control of the territory exor sighing all the functions and | :40:09. | :40:11. | |
responsibilities of Governmdnt. As a result of the decisions takdn around | :40:12. | :40:15. | |
Libya, British boots were ndver on the ground. We were never in control | :40:16. | :40:20. | |
of that country in occupying power. We did not have it within otr | :40:21. | :40:27. | |
capability to take the actions we did or should have done in Hraq Let | :40:28. | :40:32. | |
me summarise the most important lessons Sir John in has drawn. | :40:33. | :40:36. | |
First, taking military action should always be a last resort. Only after | :40:37. | :40:42. | |
exhausting all credible resources should we consider taking the | :40:43. | :40:46. | |
country to war. This is my personal belief, the political price that has | :40:47. | :40:50. | |
been paid for apparently neglecting this important principal will ensure | :40:51. | :40:54. | |
future administrations are tnlikely to overlook it. Secondly, how | :40:55. | :41:01. | |
Government is conducted matters The failures of process, of challenge | :41:02. | :41:05. | |
and even of proper record-kdeping identified by Sir John was serious | :41:06. | :41:10. | |
and widespread. In part, to prevent such failures in the future, the | :41:11. | :41:17. | |
Conservative-led Coalition Government established the council | :41:18. | :41:23. | |
in may 2010 to ensure proper coordinated strategic decishon | :41:24. | :41:24. | |
making across the whole of Government. The NSC includes the | :41:25. | :41:32. | |
chief of defence star. Jaunt Intelligence Committee as wdll as | :41:33. | :41:39. | |
relevant officials. It is properly supported by a dedicated | :41:40. | :41:42. | |
secretariate led by the nathonal security adviser ensuring all parts | :41:43. | :41:46. | |
of the national security apparatus are properly joined up across | :41:47. | :41:51. | |
Whitehall and beyond. We now have a system that ensures gheeingses on | :41:52. | :41:56. | |
serious security issues are taken on the basis of full papers, proper | :41:57. | :42:00. | |
challenge and discussion with legal advice fully explained and | :42:01. | :42:04. | |
considered and proposals stress-tested by departments with | :42:05. | :42:09. | |
decisions formally recorded. Having sat on the National Securitx Council | :42:10. | :42:13. | |
for six years, firstly as an occasional member, as Transport | :42:14. | :42:17. | |
Secretariy, then purple nindtyly as Defence Secretary and now as Foreign | :42:18. | :42:22. | |
Secretary, it seems to me hhghly improbable that the process of | :42:23. | :42:27. | |
conduct of business in relation to that matter in 2002 and 2003 as set | :42:28. | :42:32. | |
out by Chilcot could be repdated now. I'm grateful. I think that last | :42:33. | :42:39. | |
comment was particularly colplacent. If you look at the example of | :42:40. | :42:44. | |
Attorney General, why is th`t not an independent appointment? Whx do we | :42:45. | :42:50. | |
still allow the Attorney General to be aan appointment of the Prime | :42:51. | :42:54. | |
Minister, it should be someone independently legally qualified in | :42:55. | :42:58. | |
that area. That wasn't the case during the Iraq war. The Attorney | :42:59. | :43:02. | |
General's Office is filled with expert lawyers. The Attornex General | :43:03. | :43:08. | |
produces his advice on the basis of the advice provided to him by his | :43:09. | :43:15. | |
expert lawyers. I have no doubt from my extensive experience of @ttorney | :43:16. | :43:18. | |
General advice as defence and Foreign Secretary that it is | :43:19. | :43:24. | |
impatient, it is fearless and quite often, it gives us advice that we | :43:25. | :43:28. | |
perhaps don't like and we h`ve to change course accordingly. That is | :43:29. | :43:36. | |
appropriate. No, the honour`ble lady's conspiracy theory gods too | :43:37. | :43:41. | |
far. If we get advice from the Attorney General which steers us | :43:42. | :43:44. | |
away from a course of action we change the course of action. I can | :43:45. | :43:51. | |
tell us from my direct experience off advice from the Attornex General | :43:52. | :43:56. | |
causing us to think again and go in a different direction. The third | :43:57. | :44:04. | |
lesson to draw... I thank mx honourable friend for giving way. On | :44:05. | :44:10. | |
that point, it is important to note, isn't it, that when sofa Government | :44:11. | :44:15. | |
takes place, officials from the Government legal service and | :44:16. | :44:18. | |
Attorney General's Office are not present to hear Thor conversations | :44:19. | :44:21. | |
and to give advice where th`t's necessary. That's right. Th`t's one | :44:22. | :44:30. | |
of the purposes of a more formal process of decision making. I can | :44:31. | :44:34. | |
say from personal experiencd Attorney General advice is often | :44:35. | :44:37. | |
complex. It is necessary to have it in advance of the meeting in which | :44:38. | :44:42. | |
decisions will be discussed and taken so one can absorb it `nd | :44:43. | :44:47. | |
consult one's own deParliamdntmental lawyers to explain it, or challenge | :44:48. | :44:52. | |
it or review it further. Mr Speaker, the third lesson to draw from the | :44:53. | :44:57. | |
inquiry is that a culture at the heart of Government that we cans | :44:58. | :45:02. | |
challenge to the convention`l - welcomes challenge or the strongly | :45:03. | :45:05. | |
held conviction of ministers is essential to avoid the group think | :45:06. | :45:11. | |
that led to what Chilcot describes as the ingrained belief Saddam | :45:12. | :45:18. | |
Hussein's regime had chemic`l and biological warfare abilities. It is | :45:19. | :45:22. | |
a product primarily of the climate established by the Prime Minister of | :45:23. | :45:26. | |
the day. Ensuring people around the NSC table feel free to speak their | :45:27. | :45:32. | |
minds without jeopardising their careers is the greatest contribution | :45:33. | :45:36. | |
a Prime Minister can make. H pay tribute to my right honourRhght | :45:37. | :45:39. | |
Honourable Friend, the membdr who are Whitney, in the way he has done | :45:40. | :45:44. | |
that over the last six years. Fourth, proper planning for the | :45:45. | :45:48. | |
aftermath of any intervention in another country is vital to | :45:49. | :45:51. | |
successfully delivering the overall objective. The failure in London | :45:52. | :45:57. | |
properly to plan for the conflict's aftermath fatally combined with the | :45:58. | :46:02. | |
flawed assumption the Americans must have a plan when they didn't led to | :46:03. | :46:06. | |
the chaos we saw on the grotnd in Iraq. As we know will be thd case in | :46:07. | :46:12. | |
Syria, Libya, Yemen and agahn, today, Iraq, when the current | :46:13. | :46:17. | |
conflicts in each end, the challenge of rebuilding effective Govdrnments | :46:18. | :46:20. | |
in conflict-torn countries hs enormous. Under this Governlent | :46:21. | :46:24. | |
we've created the conflict stability and stab I will Australiaathon fund | :46:25. | :46:29. | |
with a billion pounds a year in it now rising to ?1.3 billion by the | :46:30. | :46:34. | |
end of the Spending Review period. Building on the success of the | :46:35. | :46:37. | |
cross-Government establish H will Iation unit to ensure proper | :46:38. | :46:41. | |
planning for post-conflict situations and a capacity for rapid | :46:42. | :46:46. | |
deployment of expert staff `nywhere in the world. The fifth lesson we | :46:47. | :46:52. | |
draw, one that I feel particularly keenly as a former Defence | :46:53. | :46:56. | |
Secretary, is that our Armed Forces must always be properly equhpped for | :46:57. | :47:01. | |
the tasks we ask them to do. That is why we have instituted strategic | :47:02. | :47:07. | |
defence and security reviews to ensure we commit the level of | :47:08. | :47:10. | |
resources necessary to meet the ambition set out in the nathonal | :47:11. | :47:16. | |
security strategy. Since 2000, we've eliminated the ?38 billion black | :47:17. | :47:19. | |
hole we inherited in the defence pro cruorment budget. We've continued to | :47:20. | :47:24. | |
meet the Nato commitment to spend at least 2% of our GDP on defence. | :47:25. | :47:29. | |
We've set out a ten-year forward defence programme planning to invest | :47:30. | :47:33. | |
at least ?178 billion on new military equipment over the next | :47:34. | :47:38. | |
decade. I'm proud of these decisions. But we should be clear | :47:39. | :47:42. | |
today that the decision to send our troops into a pre-planned in | :47:43. | :47:46. | |
gaugementp without the right equipment in both Iraq and later in | :47:47. | :47:52. | |
Afghanistan was unacceptabld and something that no Government should | :47:53. | :47:57. | |
ever allow to happen again. There are, of course, many more ldssons to | :47:58. | :48:02. | |
be drawn from the report of the Iraq inquiry. Too many to fit into a | :48:03. | :48:06. | |
single speech. Some, I'm sure, will be drawn out during the course of | :48:07. | :48:09. | |
the debate today and tomorrow. But, as the Prime Minister said hn his | :48:10. | :48:14. | |
statement last week, there `re also some lessons and conclusions that we | :48:15. | :48:20. | |
could but should avoid drawhng. We should not dismiss the importance of | :48:21. | :48:25. | |
solidarity with our close friends and allies, the United Statds, when | :48:26. | :48:29. | |
our common security interests are threatened. As both President Obama | :48:30. | :48:35. | |
and Secretary of State Kerrx have reaffirmed in their respecthve | :48:36. | :48:39. | |
recent visits to London, thd relationship between the Unhted | :48:40. | :48:42. | |
States and the UK is special. We share not only culture and history | :48:43. | :48:47. | |
but fundamental values. America is our principal ally and partner | :48:48. | :48:51. | |
around the world. And our partnership remains vitally | :48:52. | :48:55. | |
important for our continued security and prosperity. Now, of course, that | :48:56. | :49:00. | |
does not mean we should blindly or slavishly follow US foreign policy | :49:01. | :49:05. | |
or fail to speak frankly and honestly as close friends should. | :49:06. | :49:09. | |
But we must be clear about the value of the relationship between our two | :49:10. | :49:15. | |
countries and that that valte is a legitimate factor to be takdn into | :49:16. | :49:19. | |
account in British foreign policy decisions. Protecting and enhancing | :49:20. | :49:24. | |
the special relationship in itself makes Britain safer. Secondly, it | :49:25. | :49:31. | |
would be wrong to conclude we cannot trust the analysis and judglents of | :49:32. | :49:34. | |
the UK intelligence community. As Foreign Secretary, I know as well as | :49:35. | :49:39. | |
anyone the vital contribution our intelligence agencies make to | :49:40. | :49:41. | |
keeping Britain and the British people safe. I know the risks they | :49:42. | :49:44. | |
sometimes have to take in order to do so. But intelligence is rarely | :49:45. | :49:52. | |
black and white. And it alw`ys comes with a calibrated health warning as | :49:53. | :49:55. | |
to the confidence level the user should attach to it. That places a | :49:56. | :50:03. | |
burden of responsibility on the user when decisions or indeed strategic | :50:04. | :50:06. | |
communications are based on intelligence. The reforms ptt in | :50:07. | :50:12. | |
place following the Butler Report have separated the process of | :50:13. | :50:19. | |
assessing intelligence from the policies making from it. We are in | :50:20. | :50:24. | |
much better shape than in 2003 as a result of this and other reforms. | :50:25. | :50:34. | |
Thirdly, we should not conclude our military lax capability to hntervene | :50:35. | :50:37. | |
successfully around the world. The military invasion of Iraq, despite | :50:38. | :50:42. | |
the problems of planning, w`s successfully and swiftly colpleted. | :50:43. | :50:45. | |
Rather, it was the failure of policy makers to plan for the aftermath | :50:46. | :50:52. | |
which led to the subsequent deterioration | :50:53. | :50:59. | |
We must not conclude military intervention in another country is | :51:00. | :51:07. | |
always wrong. In Kosovo in 0999 Sierra Leone in 2000, and the French | :51:08. | :51:14. | |
led intervention in Mali in 201 have shown there are circumstances | :51:15. | :51:17. | |
in which it is right and appropriate to intervene. Having commemorated | :51:18. | :51:23. | |
just two days ago the 21st anniversary of the strip | :51:24. | :51:34. | |
-- Srebrenica massacre, this is a prominent example. Britain lust not | :51:35. | :51:48. | |
and will not shrink from military intervention as a last resort when | :51:49. | :51:56. | |
our security is threatened, nor will it resile from its proper role on | :51:57. | :52:02. | |
the world stage. Our commitlent to the campaign against Daesh hn Iraq | :52:03. | :52:08. | |
and Syria is testament to that resolve, and today the Unitdd | :52:09. | :52:11. | |
Kingdom stands united with Hraq in the face of continued terrorism And | :52:12. | :52:16. | |
we will continue to help thd Iraqi people as they defeat Daesh, | :52:17. | :52:21. | |
reassert the territorial integrity of their country, and seek to build | :52:22. | :52:28. | |
a better future for their children. There is no greater decision that a | :52:29. | :52:32. | |
Prime Minister and cabinet can take them to commit this country to war, | :52:33. | :52:37. | |
to ask our troops to put thdmselves in harms way on our behalf, and the | :52:38. | :52:41. | |
decision to invade Iraq and topple its government in 2003 was `mong the | :52:42. | :52:47. | |
most controversial in our n`tion's recent history. It is right there | :52:48. | :52:52. | |
for that we should seek to learn the lessons from the mistakes that were | :52:53. | :52:56. | |
made to make sure they are not repeated in the future. The report | :52:57. | :53:00. | |
of the Iraq inquiry has been a long time coming, but I think most agree | :53:01. | :53:07. | |
that it is a thorough, independent tanks at -- independent and | :53:08. | :53:17. | |
exhaustive piece of work. As I set out earlier, I am confident that | :53:18. | :53:21. | |
many of the most important lessons identified in the report have | :53:22. | :53:26. | |
already been learned and thd necessary responses already | :53:27. | :53:30. | |
implemented, but in the weeks and months ahead, as we examine the | :53:31. | :53:33. | |
report in greater detail, the Government will look further at | :53:34. | :53:36. | |
whether any additional steps are required. Mr Speaker, the ddcision | :53:37. | :53:45. | |
to wage war is not easily rdversible so it must be carefully and | :53:46. | :53:49. | |
diligently made with proper regard to June process and legal | :53:50. | :53:54. | |
obligations. War itself is of course intrinsically dangerous so ht must | :53:55. | :54:00. | |
be properly prepared for and the people fighting it must be properly | :54:01. | :54:04. | |
equipped and protected, and the aftermath of war is unpredictable | :54:05. | :54:08. | |
but usually ugly so it must be meticulously planned for and | :54:09. | :54:14. | |
systematically executed. But subject to these conditions, we shotld be | :54:15. | :54:18. | |
clear as a nation that we whll not resile from the use of military | :54:19. | :54:24. | |
force to protect our security where all other options have faildd. Sir | :54:25. | :54:29. | |
John has done the nation a great service in pointing the way to | :54:30. | :54:34. | |
ensure the proper, safe and legal use of military force. The rest is | :54:35. | :54:43. | |
up to us. The question is that this House is considered the report of | :54:44. | :54:49. | |
the Iraq inquiry. I call thd Shadow Secretary of State, Emily | :54:50. | :54:53. | |
Thornberry. If this is the Foreign Secretary's last appearance at the | :54:54. | :54:57. | |
dispatch box in his current role, he has made a typically serious and | :54:58. | :55:05. | |
thoughtful speech for his f`rewell. We must reflect seriously and | :55:06. | :55:08. | |
thoughtfully on the Chilcot report, and for the Labour Party a duty to | :55:09. | :55:12. | |
apologise for the mistakes lade to all of the families of the British | :55:13. | :55:17. | |
servicemen and women and civilian personnel who lost their lives, to | :55:18. | :55:21. | |
all of those who suffered lhfe changing injuries, and some hundreds | :55:22. | :55:24. | |
of thousands of Iraqi civilhans who have died and are still dying today. | :55:25. | :55:29. | |
The Leader of the Opposition has rightly done that. But if there is | :55:30. | :55:34. | |
one grave danger we face, it is to assume the lessons of Chilcot have | :55:35. | :55:38. | |
been learned and I listened carefully to what the Secretary of | :55:39. | :55:41. | |
State said about this, and H am concerned at some of the st`tements | :55:42. | :55:47. | |
he has made. Because it concerns me that what one has to draw from that | :55:48. | :55:51. | |
is that he's assuming the mhstakes made in Iraq couldn't be made again, | :55:52. | :55:57. | |
indeed listening to the Prile Minister's statement last wdek, he | :55:58. | :56:02. | |
seemed to pick out the same five lessons as examples today bx the | :56:03. | :56:06. | |
Secretary of State. And agahn said that he felt the lessons have been | :56:07. | :56:11. | |
learned. He seemed to be saxing the actions that have already bden taken | :56:12. | :56:16. | |
such as setting up the national Security Council or creating the | :56:17. | :56:19. | |
conflict and stability fund had effectively fixed the kind of | :56:20. | :56:23. | |
problems that arose as a result of the Iraq war. Perhaps you would | :56:24. | :56:28. | |
allow me to read out what I said, I'm confident that many of the most | :56:29. | :56:32. | |
important lessons identified in the report have already been le`rned and | :56:33. | :56:36. | |
the necessary responses alrdady implemented, but in the weeks and | :56:37. | :56:40. | |
months ahead, the Government will look further at whether any | :56:41. | :56:45. | |
additional steps are requirdd. I'm grateful to the honourable gentleman | :56:46. | :56:49. | |
because I think the emphasis is important that I do believe there | :56:50. | :56:52. | |
are further lessons that nedd to be learned. I will not be spending any | :56:53. | :57:00. | |
particular time repeating f`ctual findings Chilcot made because I | :57:01. | :57:05. | |
think we need to be looking at the lessons and making sure that we do | :57:06. | :57:11. | |
not make any of those mistakes again. The Secretary of State for | :57:12. | :57:14. | |
Defence will speak later about operational lessons that thd | :57:15. | :57:18. | |
military must learn, but it seems to me that there are more than the five | :57:19. | :57:21. | |
lessons that ministers have been outlining so far. So in the time | :57:22. | :57:27. | |
available to me, I would like to outline some of the things H believe | :57:28. | :57:34. | |
jump out of the report. It seems to me that we have been continting to | :57:35. | :57:37. | |
make mistakes and we have bden making those mistakes during the | :57:38. | :57:44. | |
current Prime Minister's tile in office. Turning to flawed | :57:45. | :57:48. | |
intelligence, while Chilcot finds there was no deliberate attdmpt made | :57:49. | :57:52. | |
to mislead people, the intelligence on which the war was based was | :57:53. | :57:56. | |
clearly flawed and did not justify the certainty which was att`ched to | :57:57. | :58:01. | |
it by the Government, so has that lesson been learned? Last ydar the | :58:02. | :58:06. | |
Government asked this House to authorise military action in Syria, | :58:07. | :58:10. | |
in contrast to Iraq in 2003 the military action was not to hnclude | :58:11. | :58:18. | |
the deployment of ground troops Can I ask my right honourable friend | :58:19. | :58:25. | |
whether she is aware of an `ttempt to call a contempt motion for the | :58:26. | :58:30. | |
House to consider against Tony Blair, and does she agree whth me | :58:31. | :58:35. | |
that whatever else is in thd Chilcot report, it does not give grounds for | :58:36. | :58:42. | |
such a motion? I think this is a serious point and one that H hope | :58:43. | :58:49. | |
members will consider. In mx view, the question is whether or not the | :58:50. | :58:54. | |
House was deliberately misldd and Chilcot has said that althotgh the | :58:55. | :58:58. | |
intelligence may have been flawed and therefore the House was misled, | :58:59. | :59:03. | |
he didn't conclude the Housd had been deliberately misled. In my | :59:04. | :59:08. | |
opinion therefore, if this House was to try to make any findings as to | :59:09. | :59:13. | |
facts, and therefore to act on findings as to fact, they would be | :59:14. | :59:18. | |
moving away from previous thmes when this instrument has been usdd, | :59:19. | :59:23. | |
because in previous times when it has been used there has been a | :59:24. | :59:26. | |
finding of facts upon which the House has been able to act. Either | :59:27. | :59:32. | |
someone has been found guilty or admitted offences. There has been no | :59:33. | :59:36. | |
admission of deliberately mhsleading this House, therefore if thhs House | :59:37. | :59:41. | |
was to attempt to make a factual finding, in my view it would be a | :59:42. | :59:46. | |
kangaroo court. In my view ht would not be allowing the person `ccused | :59:47. | :59:52. | |
to be able to represent thelselves and it would fly in the facd of the | :59:53. | :59:56. | |
established principles of jtstice that we have in this countrx and for | :59:57. | :00:02. | |
those on this site particul`rly interested in the Human Rights Act, | :00:03. | :00:06. | |
particularly clause six, thd right to a fair trial. I'm grateftl to the | :00:07. | :00:13. | |
right honourable lady. It dhd seem to me to be somewhat strangd that | :00:14. | :00:18. | |
members of this House, some members who have proclaimed quite rhghtly | :00:19. | :00:22. | |
the importance of the Europdan Convention on human rights `nd I | :00:23. | :00:25. | |
need to adhere to do should suggest a process which cannot meet article | :00:26. | :00:35. | |
six requirements. I always get very worried when I agree so thoroughly | :00:36. | :00:39. | |
with the right honourable gdntleman but I do find myself agreeing with | :00:40. | :00:48. | |
him on many occasions. I he`r people saying you lawyers are all the same, | :00:49. | :00:52. | |
but when it comes to certain principles we do agree and they cut | :00:53. | :00:57. | |
through. Our concern is to dnsure our colleagues who are not lawyers | :00:58. | :01:01. | |
understand these basic principles as well. Shouldn't she be worrhed about | :01:02. | :01:08. | |
disagreeing with her own le`der and his comments on these matters just | :01:09. | :01:14. | |
at the weekend? My question to the honourable lady, has she actually | :01:15. | :01:18. | |
read the Private notes that the former Prime Minister sent the | :01:19. | :01:22. | |
president of the USA and colpared them with his public parlialentary | :01:23. | :01:29. | |
reports, and does she find these things consistent? The notes and the | :01:30. | :01:37. | |
statements were considered by Chilcot over a long period of time, | :01:38. | :01:44. | |
I feel the report and the pdrson writing it was a man of gre`t | :01:45. | :01:49. | |
standing and the report verx fair one and I'm not going to sax any | :01:50. | :01:53. | |
more than that. My view is there are plenty of lessons to learned from | :01:54. | :02:00. | |
this report, and in my view the lessons go much further than simply | :02:01. | :02:03. | |
focusing on one individual `nd what may have happened many years ago. | :02:04. | :02:10. | |
What is important in my view is what is happening now, and to make sure | :02:11. | :02:14. | |
the Government makes correct decisions before intervening in | :02:15. | :02:17. | |
other people's countries and losing of others. Is it the right | :02:18. | :02:24. | |
honourable lady's position that someone can only be found in | :02:25. | :02:29. | |
contempt of this House if they admit that contempt? No, what I'm saying | :02:30. | :02:37. | |
to this House is that there should be standards that we have always | :02:38. | :02:43. | |
upheld. For example, Warren Hastings may have been tried by this House | :02:44. | :02:48. | |
200 years ago but he was trhed by judges, represented, given `n | :02:49. | :02:51. | |
opportunity to come along and say what he said, and I don't think that | :02:52. | :02:57. | |
for us to draw conclusions hn a way that Chilcot was not able to without | :02:58. | :03:02. | |
the person involved, having an opportunity to speak or be | :03:03. | :03:07. | |
represented... I'm sorry, all right one more. In that case, can she say | :03:08. | :03:16. | |
which court called the Primd Minister be tried on? Their | :03:17. | :03:24. | |
respective nation, I apprechate about what may or may not h`ppen to | :03:25. | :03:29. | |
the former Prime Minister. This is not within my brief today speaking | :03:30. | :03:33. | |
as the Shadow Foreign Secretary and attempting to draw the lessons from | :03:34. | :03:38. | |
Chilcot. My own view is that it is important I address that thhs | :03:39. | :03:41. | |
afternoon in the time avail`ble to me and leave it to others to take | :03:42. | :03:46. | |
such legal action as they think is appropriate, and it will be for them | :03:47. | :03:51. | |
to take it to the proper cotrts But I don't think we can constitute | :03:52. | :03:55. | |
ourselves as a proper court within the great traditions of our country. | :03:56. | :04:02. | |
I can't remember where I was. The last year, the Government asked this | :04:03. | :04:06. | |
House to authorise military action in Syria, and in contrast to Iraq | :04:07. | :04:11. | |
the deployment of ground troops was ruled out, and that meant a reliance | :04:12. | :04:16. | |
on local forces instead. I was talking about flawed intellhgence, | :04:17. | :04:21. | |
because we were told at that stage there were 70,000 moderate rebels in | :04:22. | :04:25. | |
Syria, ripples that would hdlp defeat Daesh which in turn would | :04:26. | :04:31. | |
force Assad to step down. M`ny were sceptical about that 70,000 figure, | :04:32. | :04:38. | |
but the 70,000 figure was produced by the joint intelligence committee | :04:39. | :04:41. | |
and the Government declined to say which groups were included hn that | :04:42. | :04:47. | |
figure, where they were, wh`t the definition of moderate was, or how | :04:48. | :04:50. | |
we could be sure these rebels were signed up to the coalition's | :04:51. | :04:55. | |
military strategy or how thdy would get to the battlefield. All of those | :04:56. | :05:00. | |
questions mattered and as the Government itself acknowledged, no | :05:01. | :05:05. | |
military strategy could succeed without forces on the ground. Time | :05:06. | :05:10. | |
will tell whether those 70,000 moderate Sunni rebels existdd and | :05:11. | :05:14. | |
whether they are in a posithon to be able to fight the battles which it | :05:15. | :05:18. | |
was claimed they were going to be able to do, but I have to s`y that | :05:19. | :05:23. | |
it seems to me that there is a parallel to be drawn between the | :05:24. | :05:27. | |
intelligence relied on in rdlation to the 70,000 figure and fl`wed | :05:28. | :05:32. | |
intelligence that has been relied on in the past. It is important to | :05:33. | :05:36. | |
learn a lesson from Iraq 12 years earlier. Serious questions have been | :05:37. | :05:40. | |
raised about intelligence which underpins decisions we make to take | :05:41. | :05:46. | |
military action, and in my view once again Parliament has simply been | :05:47. | :05:50. | |
asked to take on trust what the Government says about intelligence. | :05:51. | :05:55. | |
There are further issues - the lack of ability to challenge intdrnally. | :05:56. | :06:01. | |
Chilcot made clear that civhl servants and Cabinet members lacked | :06:02. | :06:06. | |
the opportunity and information or encouragement to challenge the case | :06:07. | :06:10. | |
being made to them. The Prile Minister says his national Security | :06:11. | :06:14. | |
Council has fixed that. If that is right, why is it that the joint | :06:15. | :06:19. | |
committee on National Securhty strategy says that the NSC has so | :06:20. | :06:24. | |
far proved itself to be, and I quote, a reactive body rathdr than a | :06:25. | :06:29. | |
strategic one which seems to have lost an opportunity. | :06:30. | :06:34. | |
The NSC certainly did not challenge the short-sighted and highlx damage | :06:35. | :06:42. | |
it caused to our Armed Forcds in the last Parliament despite the huge | :06:43. | :06:48. | |
unjust I'vifiable misgivings of senior military figures abott their | :06:49. | :06:52. | |
impact on our defence capabhlities. Nor is there evidence of thd NSC to | :06:53. | :06:59. | |
challenge the inadequate pl`nning in the aftermath of Libya. Ulthmately, | :07:00. | :07:04. | |
while making progress in sm`ll ways, the NSC failed to address the | :07:05. | :07:07. | |
fundamental problem which is this. There is a culture in Whitehall I | :07:08. | :07:15. | |
still believe, of Averill optimistic group think which exposure to | :07:16. | :07:17. | |
independent views could help to us challenge. It is not good enough to | :07:18. | :07:24. | |
say it has been fixed. It h`s not. If the NSC... The honourabld | :07:25. | :07:30. | |
gentleman Sis how do I know? I'm giving the honourable gentldman how | :07:31. | :07:36. | |
I know theres. Because of the result of decisions, I have more I will go | :07:37. | :07:41. | |
into during this speech. Thd honourable lady is completely wrong | :07:42. | :07:50. | |
in her analysis of how the NSC approach the the review in 2010 I | :07:51. | :07:55. | |
was one of the members of the National Security Council. We spent | :07:56. | :08:00. | |
weeks reading the advice. In the light of situation the country found | :08:01. | :08:05. | |
itself in and a ?38 billion black hole in the defence budget we made | :08:06. | :08:08. | |
our decisions. The idea somd expertise was lacking beford the | :08:09. | :08:13. | |
National Security Council is the that time is completely wrong It is | :08:14. | :08:20. | |
certainly my view, I only spent six months doing defence, though I spent | :08:21. | :08:24. | |
a great deal immersing myself on it I don't just rely on my own views as | :08:25. | :08:32. | |
to what a disaster the first strategic defence roof coalhtion | :08:33. | :08:35. | |
spray deuce. There were senhor military figures in this cotntry and | :08:36. | :08:39. | |
amongst our allies who were very concerned about what the cuts to the | :08:40. | :08:45. | |
military budget was doing to our capability. The second Strategic | :08:46. | :08:51. | |
Defence Review spent a great deal of time patching up the holes from the | :08:52. | :08:57. | |
first review. Once again, she is wrong. At the table for the first | :08:58. | :09:02. | |
security and defence review were the most senior military offici`ls and | :09:03. | :09:05. | |
soldier in the country. Thex were part of the discussion. Thex were | :09:06. | :09:11. | |
not locked out. The honourable gentleman has had his opportunity to | :09:12. | :09:14. | |
put his views on the record. I'm sure he will speak later. It is my | :09:15. | :09:19. | |
view that if it has been fixed in the way in which the right | :09:20. | :09:24. | |
honourable gentleman, the Sdcretary of State for foreign affairs has | :09:25. | :09:26. | |
stated, we would not be getting ourselves into a position where we | :09:27. | :09:32. | |
swing backwards and forwards in our military budget. We spend the next | :09:33. | :09:40. | |
time trying to patch it up. As one of the defence ministers at the | :09:41. | :09:45. | |
time, may I say it was the lost unpleasant experience as a | :09:46. | :09:48. | |
Conservative having to make cuts in our Armed Forces. But the truth was | :09:49. | :09:54. | |
that the budget deficit of ?156 billion which we inherited was | :09:55. | :09:57. | |
itself a threat to our national security and we had to take action. | :09:58. | :10:01. | |
Sadly, defence had had to t`ke some of those cuts. Where would the right | :10:02. | :10:06. | |
honourable lady have made the cuts if not in defence? I think we are | :10:07. | :10:10. | |
moving a long way to the lessons that need to be drawn from Chilcot. | :10:11. | :10:14. | |
If I may, I will return to ly speech. The honourable gentleman and | :10:15. | :10:17. | |
I have discussed defence on many occasions. I always enjoy the | :10:18. | :10:21. | |
discussions I have with him. I'll be quite happy to take this at another | :10:22. | :10:28. | |
time. I don't want to spend the entire afternoon discussing defence, | :10:29. | :10:36. | |
much Asim tempted to. If thd NSC had brought in outside perspectdrs from | :10:37. | :10:40. | |
time to time it clearly hasn't done so enough to deal with the | :10:41. | :10:43. | |
underlying problem. There w`s another issue which I think comes | :10:44. | :10:47. | |
out in Chilcot. I don't think it has been fixed. The lack of challenge in | :10:48. | :10:54. | |
Parliament. The other potential source, challenge to the Government | :10:55. | :10:58. | |
was our Parliament. Whilst there were vigorous debates in thhs House, | :10:59. | :11:03. | |
those debates and the 217 MPs who voted that the case had not been | :11:04. | :11:08. | |
made were ultimately not enough to stop the march to war. I was not in | :11:09. | :11:12. | |
the House myself. I was on the demonstrations. Although thdre were | :11:13. | :11:16. | |
more Labour MPs who voted against the war than MPs from any other | :11:17. | :11:20. | |
political party there were not sufficient numbers in order to be | :11:21. | :11:23. | |
able to stop it. Have we moved on since then? If we look at 2013 vote | :11:24. | :11:29. | |
against taking military acthon in Syria, many people have said that | :11:30. | :11:34. | |
was a watershed moment. It cemented convention whatever the views of the | :11:35. | :11:39. | |
executive, it is this House that has the final say and asked to `pprove a | :11:40. | :11:43. | |
broad mandate for the use of military force where there hs no | :11:44. | :11:47. | |
coherent strategy, no clear objectives and long-term pl`n. It | :11:48. | :11:51. | |
was all too reminiscent to the approach to Iraq in my view. Members | :11:52. | :11:58. | |
of all sides of the House hdld a healthy degree of scepticisl. At the | :11:59. | :12:04. | |
same time, the House exercised a healthy degree of scepticisl. They | :12:05. | :12:08. | |
were right to do so. However, at the same time, the Government's | :12:09. | :12:11. | |
increasingly taken advantagd of loopholes in the existing convention | :12:12. | :12:15. | |
to intervene in more conflicts with less oversight. It has developed a | :12:16. | :12:19. | |
military capability in cyberspace which they refuse to say in what | :12:20. | :12:24. | |
circumstances it might be used or when Parliament might be informed. | :12:25. | :12:28. | |
Increased investment no drones and special forces at a time whdn there | :12:29. | :12:31. | |
has been so much cuts to other parts of the Armed Forces. It has shown a | :12:32. | :12:36. | |
willingness to use both as `ence moo of intervening in conflicts. The UK | :12:37. | :12:43. | |
is not a party in quasi-conventional roles. In doing so, the Govdrnment | :12:44. | :12:48. | |
seeks to bypass not just parliamentary support of thdse | :12:49. | :12:50. | |
interventions but any form of parliamentary oversight as well The | :12:51. | :12:54. | |
development of... If I may finish this point... The development of | :12:55. | :13:01. | |
hybrid warfare, in my view, demands new mechanisms to ensure th`t the | :13:02. | :13:05. | |
executive is held to account. All parties on both sides of thd House | :13:06. | :13:09. | |
should be working on how we develop these new mechanisms in orddr to | :13:10. | :13:12. | |
ensure the executive is held to account. Hybrid warfare, we all | :13:13. | :13:19. | |
know, ask likely to be the future. Would she not acknowledge there is | :13:20. | :13:23. | |
at least an argument using the Sis tomb it secure a parliament`ry | :13:24. | :13:27. | |
majority for a pre-determindd war, rather than empowering the House of | :13:28. | :13:32. | |
Commons it emass could you lates it. It prevents backbenchers from | :13:33. | :13:35. | |
holding the Government to account. Would she not be in favour of | :13:36. | :13:39. | |
bringing forward a UK war powers act to get round that difficultx? There | :13:40. | :13:43. | |
has been a continuing debatd about this. I think there is, so long as | :13:44. | :13:50. | |
we can be confident that a decision made in this House will not then | :13:51. | :13:56. | |
need to be taken off to the courts and the judges eventually m`ke a | :13:57. | :14:01. | |
decision about whether we wd go to war or not, which I would s`y is | :14:02. | :14:06. | |
entirely inappropriate. We can ensure we keep control of | :14:07. | :14:11. | |
legislation and it ensures Parliament, when it is posshble | :14:12. | :14:18. | |
will come to in order for us to express our view. That's right. I | :14:19. | :14:22. | |
understand it is the system we have at the moment. What I am concerned | :14:23. | :14:28. | |
about is that in a way, although the convention continues to devdlop and | :14:29. | :14:32. | |
strengthens as time goes on, it is still in the gift of the exdcutive | :14:33. | :14:36. | |
to decide whether or not we bring this matter to Parliament. H know | :14:37. | :14:40. | |
that, as times goes on, it strengthens but there is an argument | :14:41. | :14:45. | |
to put it on to a more form`l basis. There is the danger about court | :14:46. | :14:51. | |
intervention. I think it's ` mute point and one we need to continue to | :14:52. | :15:00. | |
rook at. I'm very grateful for the honourable lady's strategic lesson | :15:01. | :15:06. | |
in modern combat capabilitids in Armed Forces and her description in | :15:07. | :15:12. | |
the use of special forces in almost combat capabilities having served in | :15:13. | :15:17. | |
various of Her Majesty's forces in the past. It is a very novel | :15:18. | :15:24. | |
interpretation that hybrid warfare is somehow something that m`y not | :15:25. | :15:29. | |
continue to exist. We are gdtting into a rather bizarre discussion, if | :15:30. | :15:35. | |
you'll forgive me, on the strategy and use of Armed Forces when, | :15:36. | :15:40. | |
surely, the focus should be on the legality and appropriateness of | :15:41. | :15:43. | |
deployment. One does sort of feel it might be best to stick to the area | :15:44. | :15:47. | |
this House is qualified to talk about rather than dress up `s | :15:48. | :15:50. | |
armchair generals and pretend we know what's going on in different | :15:51. | :15:55. | |
areas? I think it is very ilportant that we look to tomorrow's problems. | :15:56. | :16:00. | |
I think it is likely the spdcial forces will be used increashngly. I | :16:01. | :16:07. | |
think the idea that we will be sending, for example, speci`l forces | :16:08. | :16:14. | |
into Libya in a training capacity, I agree exactly how that might end up | :16:15. | :16:20. | |
being a quasi--combat role, presumably if these training forces | :16:21. | :16:23. | |
are in Libya, they will be hn a camp, a part of Libya that hs | :16:24. | :16:28. | |
allegedly supposed to be safe. They will need to be guarded. Who will be | :16:29. | :16:33. | |
guarding them? We can see a slippery slope. Therefore, it seems to me, at | :16:34. | :16:38. | |
the moment, though inappropriate for a decision to send special forces or | :16:39. | :16:45. | |
trainers into a particular `rea if we can have parliamentary scrutiny | :16:46. | :16:56. | |
of our secret service and there is a way in which there is, that the | :16:57. | :17:00. | |
behaviour of MI5 and MI6 is answerable to a committee of the | :17:01. | :17:04. | |
House, it is not beyond our wit to allow there to be a similar form of | :17:05. | :17:08. | |
cat ability when it comes to special forces. I have written about this | :17:09. | :17:12. | |
issue. On a very important point here, the oversight that thd ISC and | :17:13. | :17:18. | |
their prominent members of the ISC present, the oversight that the ISC | :17:19. | :17:25. | |
ex-or sizes over the intellhgence community is always post thd fact. | :17:26. | :17:32. | |
The only oversight over special force deployment would have to be | :17:33. | :17:35. | |
before the fact. That would be a very, very different proposhtion. | :17:36. | :17:39. | |
I'm grateful for the honour`ble gentleman for his question. I'm not | :17:40. | :17:45. | |
expecting that before speci`l forces are used they have to go before a | :17:46. | :17:48. | |
committee of Parliament and get permission. But I do think that | :17:49. | :17:56. | |
there should be some form of cat ability and explanation. I felt that | :17:57. | :18:04. | |
it was embarrassing and showed the Democratic Deficit that we have in | :18:05. | :18:09. | |
relation to hybrid warfare when one read in the papers that the king of | :18:10. | :18:14. | |
Jordan was gossiping with congressmen in America about our | :18:15. | :18:18. | |
special forces in a way that we haven't even been told about and | :18:19. | :18:21. | |
no-one in this housest Housd had been told about. That seems to me to | :18:22. | :18:26. | |
highlight the deficit we have in this country. We should learn | :18:27. | :18:30. | |
lessons from Chilcot, about accountability, about not shmply | :18:31. | :18:33. | |
trusting the executive to gdt a decision right and we should make | :18:34. | :18:37. | |
sure there is more accountability and we are on our toes and `re | :18:38. | :18:42. | |
prepared to modernise our structures as necessary in order to reflect the | :18:43. | :18:46. | |
changing nature of warfare going into the 21st Century. If I can go | :18:47. | :18:51. | |
back to the speech. I was t`lking about the development of hybrid | :18:52. | :18:54. | |
warfare and new mechanisms `nd different ways in the which the | :18:55. | :18:57. | |
executive should be held to account. I believe all parties should be | :18:58. | :19:01. | |
working together on that. Another point raised was about | :19:02. | :19:08. | |
American/British relations. Chilcot made is clear American/Brithsh | :19:09. | :19:12. | |
relations would not have bedn harmed had the UK not joined the US-led | :19:13. | :19:17. | |
coalition. Chilcot argues that was not a basis to join the inv`sion. | :19:18. | :19:22. | |
Indeed, in my view, that is another lesson we've not learned. In 20 3, | :19:23. | :19:28. | |
there was pressure from the United States playing a major role in the | :19:29. | :19:35. | |
Government's rush to intervdne in Syria. It became obvious th`t the US | :19:36. | :19:41. | |
administration's own efforts to persuade Congress to back | :19:42. | :19:44. | |
intervention hinged on the success of the Prime Minister in persuading | :19:45. | :19:47. | |
Parliament. Speaking after our House declined to support the acthon in | :19:48. | :19:52. | |
Syria, the then Defence Secretary now the Foreign Secretary s`id that | :19:53. | :19:57. | |
the vote would "certainly doomage the Anglo-American relationship . It | :19:58. | :20:01. | |
did. In my view, the relationship endured. We've got over it without | :20:02. | :20:07. | |
any adverse consequences. It serves as a reminder that our alli`nce with | :20:08. | :20:12. | |
the United States rests on stronger foundations than an expectation of | :20:13. | :20:16. | |
unquestioning British complhance with American wishes. The hop rebel | :20:17. | :20:24. | |
lady speaks of the special relationship and clearly thd | :20:25. | :20:28. | |
relationship with the United States is deeper than one incidencd or one | :20:29. | :20:36. | |
vote. But is it not also valid to listen to various American generals | :20:37. | :20:42. | |
who after the vote pointed to the damaging reimpact that vote would | :20:43. | :20:47. | |
have on the enduring commitlent and understanding between the US and the | :20:48. | :20:51. | |
British militaries? Would she not also recognise that just as there | :20:52. | :20:58. | |
are many threads that build up that special relationship undermhning | :20:59. | :21:01. | |
that thread by thread also weakens it. | :21:02. | :21:10. | |
Our relationship is strong dnough to endure differences of opinion, and | :21:11. | :21:16. | |
if we are to be good friends, good friends trust each other and trust | :21:17. | :21:20. | |
each other to be able to disagree at times, and I think it's important we | :21:21. | :21:27. | |
do that. 2013 Syria vote made clear parliament understood this `nd also | :21:28. | :21:31. | |
suggested the Government did not. This is one of the reasons ht is | :21:32. | :21:36. | |
such a tragedy in my view that cuts to the Foreign Office budget has | :21:37. | :21:39. | |
weakened Whitehall 's institutional knowledge of the world becatse in my | :21:40. | :21:42. | |
view it is important for our leadership role in the world for us | :21:43. | :21:47. | |
to have a proper understandhng of the world, and we have had for | :21:48. | :21:52. | |
hundreds of years, have had an insight into the world the other | :21:53. | :21:56. | |
countries have not, and we have a leadership role and we can have a | :21:57. | :21:59. | |
different voice than the Amdricans because we will have a diffdrent | :22:00. | :22:05. | |
understanding. So for us to have 16% cuts in the Foreign Office xear on | :22:06. | :22:09. | |
year, and to be hollowing ott the institutional knowledge has been a | :22:10. | :22:18. | |
tragedy in my view. And sorry, the honourable gentleman has intervened | :22:19. | :22:23. | |
twice. Fifth, Chilcot says Tony Blair ignored warnings about the | :22:24. | :22:28. | |
sectarian violence that would sweep Iraq after Saddam fell with an | :22:29. | :22:32. | |
appalling loss of life that has followed in Iraq and surrounding | :22:33. | :22:36. | |
countries. We are still livhng with that mistake but has the lessons | :22:37. | :22:40. | |
being learned? Looking at intervention in Libya, it is clear | :22:41. | :22:45. | |
it has not. Armed militias `cross the country focused their attention | :22:46. | :22:49. | |
on toppling the regime, the British Government later seemed surprised | :22:50. | :22:52. | |
that once the goal had been achieved they turned their fire on e`ch | :22:53. | :22:58. | |
other. While divisions in Lhbya were always more tribal than sectarian | :22:59. | :23:02. | |
divisions in Iraq, the result has been the same, and to believe | :23:03. | :23:06. | |
democratic elections would fill the power vacuum proved to be | :23:07. | :23:16. | |
overoptimistic. Had those whth knowledge of the country te`m | :23:17. | :23:20. | |
directly consulted at the thme, they would have warned the Government | :23:21. | :23:23. | |
this would happen. Such warnings were readily available and hn the | :23:24. | :23:30. | |
public domain and had inforled advice been supplied it would be | :23:31. | :23:36. | |
made clear there would be a huge risk of knock-on instabilitx as well | :23:37. | :23:40. | |
armed highly trained mercen`ries returned to their native cotntries | :23:41. | :23:45. | |
such as Mali, Nigeria and Chad. The warnings were there but such advice | :23:46. | :23:50. | |
was not heard or not listendd to one that was too late. Again thdre is a | :23:51. | :23:55. | |
parallel to be drawn between our intervention in Libya and otr | :23:56. | :23:59. | |
understanding of what would happen next and are listening to experts | :24:00. | :24:17. | |
and what happened. I wanted to say two things, firstly the intdrvention | :24:18. | :24:20. | |
in Libya was at the request of the Arab League who I suggest would have | :24:21. | :24:25. | |
an insight into the region, would count as people who knew wh`t was | :24:26. | :24:30. | |
going on. Secondly while I understand the analysis | :24:31. | :24:32. | |
cheesemaking, doesn't it le`d her to the conclusion that toppling any | :24:33. | :24:41. | |
despot creates the risk of chaos and confusion. We are five years down | :24:42. | :24:46. | |
the line from ending a 40 ydar ruling of a brutal dictatorship in | :24:47. | :24:51. | |
Libya and this game isn't over yet but I predict Libya will end up a | :24:52. | :24:55. | |
better place than it was under Gaddafi. It is interesting to hear | :24:56. | :24:59. | |
what the honourable gentlem`n says but I think it is an issue of | :25:00. | :25:04. | |
speculation. It is my view that it is not legal to intervene in a | :25:05. | :25:09. | |
country to topple the regimd, and that we should not in any event | :25:10. | :25:14. | |
morally be intervening in a country unless we can have some forl of | :25:15. | :25:19. | |
strategy that will ensure that the country we leave is in a better | :25:20. | :25:25. | |
state than when we first arrived. I'm grateful to the honourable lady. | :25:26. | :25:32. | |
Firstly I have to say to her that I don't think there was a blinding of | :25:33. | :25:36. | |
oneself to the potential problems that might come from that | :25:37. | :25:40. | |
intervention. I really don't think that at all from my memory. The | :25:41. | :25:45. | |
second thing is that the trhgger for the intervention was the fact | :25:46. | :25:48. | |
Colonel Gaddafi was about to kill tens of thousands of his own | :25:49. | :25:53. | |
citizens, and it is that whhch prompted the UN resolution which | :25:54. | :25:59. | |
provided the legal basis for the intervention. If I may say to her, I | :26:00. | :26:05. | |
think this highlights some of the really difficult decisions that we | :26:06. | :26:10. | |
have in these areas, even qtestions of legality don't come into it. But | :26:11. | :26:14. | |
I certainly wouldn't be willing to characterise that interventhon as | :26:15. | :26:18. | |
having been wrong in the circumstances that prevailed at the | :26:19. | :26:22. | |
time. I think the point I'm trying to make is that it was again about | :26:23. | :26:29. | |
information that was available that could have informed the way in which | :26:30. | :26:33. | |
the intervention was made, `nd then once the intervention was m`de, what | :26:34. | :26:41. | |
happened thereafter, and how the dangers that were obvious wdre | :26:42. | :26:45. | |
protected against. I don't think that happened, and it is a lesson | :26:46. | :26:49. | |
that we can get from Chilcot and Iraq that is so much more ilportant | :26:50. | :26:54. | |
than any form of soap opera in relation to Tony Blair. If H may | :26:55. | :27:00. | |
move on, the other issue I think is important is about post-war | :27:01. | :27:04. | |
planning, and there has been some that has been touched on as well, | :27:05. | :27:10. | |
and this is my final point. Finally and perhaps most devastatingly, | :27:11. | :27:14. | |
Chilcot highlight the total absence of adequate planning for wh`t would | :27:15. | :27:18. | |
happen after the war, and what the long-term strategy was for Hraq If | :27:19. | :27:24. | |
ever there was a mistake, it should never be repeated, it is thd idea we | :27:25. | :27:27. | |
go into another military intervention with no idea of its | :27:28. | :27:33. | |
consequences, no plan for the aftermath, no long-term str`tegy, | :27:34. | :27:39. | |
and yet it is the exact hallmark of all the outgoing Prime Minister s | :27:40. | :27:45. | |
interventions. And again, wd can see the evidence in Libya. The Prime | :27:46. | :27:50. | |
Minister, in the words of President Obama, became distracted. Once the | :27:51. | :27:54. | |
Gaddafi regime had been overthrown and the lengthy task of post-war | :27:55. | :27:58. | |
reconstruction was supposed to be started, it was all but ignored and | :27:59. | :28:04. | |
in the years since Libya has been riven with factionalism and | :28:05. | :28:08. | |
violence. Its experiment with democracy was brief, with power in | :28:09. | :28:12. | |
the hands of rival militias and the ungoverned space that this created | :28:13. | :28:20. | |
was an invitation to Daesh to establish a strategic foothold. It | :28:21. | :28:24. | |
is a stain on this Government that only begun to pay any attention to | :28:25. | :28:30. | |
the mess it made in Libya once the terrorist threat from Daesh became | :28:31. | :28:36. | |
too urgent to ignore. I'm not sure the honourable lady has said | :28:37. | :28:40. | |
anything about Chilcot's finding about the circumstances in which it | :28:41. | :28:45. | |
was ultimately decided therd was a legal basis for UK particip`tion. He | :28:46. | :28:49. | |
says they were far from satisfactory. I'm sure he whll agree | :28:50. | :28:54. | |
with me the Attorney General should give independent and imparthal | :28:55. | :28:57. | |
advice. Chilcot details how according to the then Attorney | :28:58. | :29:04. | |
General's evidence, he inithally resisted the legality and eventually | :29:05. | :29:11. | |
acquiesced that the view of military force could be legally justhfied. As | :29:12. | :29:17. | |
she got a view on what changed his mind? Tempting though it is to | :29:18. | :29:24. | |
debate this aspect with the honourable lady, it is important | :29:25. | :29:30. | |
that anyone taking the role of Attorney General knows that they are | :29:31. | :29:35. | |
the only person in the Cabinet who can say to the Prime Ministdr no. | :29:36. | :29:42. | |
You cannot do that, it is not legal, you are not allowed to, no. The | :29:43. | :29:47. | |
burden of that is heavy and is one that needs to be exercised by people | :29:48. | :29:55. | |
of great courage and substance. And it is about the rule of law, and | :29:56. | :29:59. | |
it's about the fact that no one is above the law. I think therd is a | :30:00. | :30:09. | |
lesson that all AGs need to learn, and they need to be confident of | :30:10. | :30:13. | |
being able to stand up to their leader because that is an ilportant | :30:14. | :30:18. | |
point. One of the things I would say in relation to international law is | :30:19. | :30:23. | |
that Britain has always been a leading light in the development of | :30:24. | :30:28. | |
international law. It is much of international law has been ` result | :30:29. | :30:33. | |
of documents we have drafted and our adherence to international law has | :30:34. | :30:36. | |
been an important part of the development of it. One thing that | :30:37. | :30:41. | |
has been clouded as a result of intervention in Iraq, and indeed | :30:42. | :30:47. | |
intervention since, has been the law that we do need to have, and we do | :30:48. | :30:53. | |
need to have a clear law in relation to in what circumstances yot can | :30:54. | :30:57. | |
intervene and what circumst`nces you can't, has not developed as well as | :30:58. | :31:03. | |
it might have. If there had not been a temptation to press the f`cts into | :31:04. | :31:11. | |
what was understood of the law. My honourable friend who is sitting | :31:12. | :31:15. | |
behind me, the right honour`ble lady for Leith Central is a big fan of | :31:16. | :31:25. | |
RTP, and it is very sad the effect the Iraq war had on the devdlopment | :31:26. | :31:36. | |
of that, which is something Cook was attempting to develop at thd time of | :31:37. | :31:42. | |
the Iraq war and was held up. If I may go back, whether lessons on | :31:43. | :31:53. | |
long-term planning in Iraq learned? In conclusion, we cannot turn the | :31:54. | :31:58. | |
clock back, we cannot correct the mistakes that were made, we cannot | :31:59. | :32:02. | |
bring back the lives of those who were lost, we cannot undo the chaos | :32:03. | :32:07. | |
we have created but we can `nd must stop the mistakes being repdated. | :32:08. | :32:12. | |
Unfortunately, as I pointed out today, whatever his rhetoric and | :32:13. | :32:16. | |
well-meaning intentions, too often the outgoing Prime Minister has | :32:17. | :32:22. | |
repeated exactly those same mistakes in his own military interventions | :32:23. | :32:27. | |
relying on speculative intelligence, and failing to plan for whatever | :32:28. | :32:32. | |
happens afterwards. It is hoped the new Prime Minister will study the | :32:33. | :32:36. | |
Chilcot report, not as a colmentary on decisions made in the past but as | :32:37. | :32:40. | |
a guide to future decisions she will have to make. Let's hope shd does | :32:41. | :32:48. | |
so, and that as she takes on her new and owner its responsibilithes, we | :32:49. | :32:57. | |
wish her well. Mr Speaker, the decision to invade Iraq was in my | :32:58. | :33:00. | |
opinion the most disastrous foreign policy decision taken by thhs | :33:01. | :33:06. | |
country in my lifetime. And it didn't cause but greatly contributed | :33:07. | :33:10. | |
to the extraordinary problels that have persisted in the Middld East | :33:11. | :33:14. | |
and the wider world ever since, and it will continue to have tr`gic | :33:15. | :33:19. | |
consequences I fear for somd years to come, so I think firstly we all | :33:20. | :33:24. | |
owe a debt to Sir John Chilcot for producing what will undoubtddly be | :33:25. | :33:29. | |
the most authoritative analxsis of how on earth such and appalling | :33:30. | :33:38. | |
blunder was taken. I haven't had chance to get much beyond the | :33:39. | :33:42. | |
executive summary, and I thhnk it will take a long time beford anyone | :33:43. | :33:46. | |
in this House gets through the millions of words we have h`d | :33:47. | :33:50. | |
produced. But I think the ldssons from this inquiry based on the Iraq | :33:51. | :33:58. | |
war will in fact be of benefit to specialists in particular, those in | :33:59. | :34:04. | |
the military, in the intellhgence services, and diplomatic corps and | :34:05. | :34:08. | |
politicians. Those who have held the Government to account. It is too | :34:09. | :34:15. | |
soon to follow up on his extremely formidable findings which I'm sure | :34:16. | :34:18. | |
are correct but there is a role for this House to consider, as we are, | :34:19. | :34:24. | |
the political aspect of this. Sir John Chilcot has examined the formal | :34:25. | :34:29. | |
records, the meetings, the processes, and obviously he has | :34:30. | :34:32. | |
analysed those in terms of looking at what happened and why it's | :34:33. | :34:36. | |
arrived at, but he's not a politician and I think the House of | :34:37. | :34:42. | |
Commons and ministers involved can look at this with a slightlx | :34:43. | :34:56. | |
different eye as to why people reach decisions, and what went wrong, | :34:57. | :35:01. | |
particularly as far as the Cabinet is concerned, and accountabhlity | :35:02. | :35:04. | |
through Parliament to the whder public is concerned. I'm not sure | :35:05. | :35:11. | |
Sir John Chilcot, who is not a politician, can on his own `nswer | :35:12. | :35:15. | |
that wider perspective for the future. May I begin by agreding | :35:16. | :35:22. | |
briefly with one point the honourable lady made from the front | :35:23. | :35:26. | |
bench opposite, in saying how irrelevant I think it has bden to | :35:27. | :35:30. | |
try to turn all this into a witchhunt against celebrity | :35:31. | :35:35. | |
individuals who were involvdd at the time. It is one of the great | :35:36. | :35:40. | |
failures of political debatd of our day has so far as the wider media | :35:41. | :35:45. | |
and world were concerned, the recent referendum debate was largely the | :35:46. | :35:52. | |
David and Boris show, and I think it's quite pointless to say, let's | :35:53. | :35:58. | |
persecute Tony Blair. He was in charge, are we going to prosecute | :35:59. | :36:05. | |
him as a war criminal and the rest of it. | :36:06. | :36:09. | |
Nobody's committed any crimd. As one who was present at the time, I have | :36:10. | :36:15. | |
absolutely no doubt that nobody acted at the time on any other basis | :36:16. | :36:20. | |
than they believed passionately they were acting in the public interest. | :36:21. | :36:24. | |
One of the great things abott Tony Blair was he did believe, | :36:25. | :36:29. | |
passionately, what he was doing at the time. It was very evident on the | :36:30. | :36:33. | |
floor of the House. He never had a doubt about what he was doing. I'm | :36:34. | :36:36. | |
not surprised he continues to protest as strongly as he does. He | :36:37. | :36:43. | |
hasn't changed his mind. He did believe he was acting in thd | :36:44. | :36:49. | |
national interest in cementhng our alliance with the Americans. He | :36:50. | :36:52. | |
thought it was absolutely kdy to our security. He actually thought a | :36:53. | :36:56. | |
British contribution would help the Americans with the planning and the | :36:57. | :37:04. | |
add sow Cassie and so on. Hd firmly believed just removing Sadd`m | :37:05. | :37:08. | |
Hussein was a virtuous act which would make the world a bettdr place. | :37:09. | :37:13. | |
He still does. Then, as now, that's the bit where he gets most | :37:14. | :37:18. | |
passionate, the regime change. He really thinks, probably right, I | :37:19. | :37:22. | |
agree with him actually, he got rid of an evil regime. I agree with | :37:23. | :37:29. | |
those who say that wasn't in itself totally adequate achievement. He | :37:30. | :37:33. | |
certainly believed they'd wdapons of mass destruction. I faced hhm in the | :37:34. | :37:39. | |
House. I remember one day thinking this is the last man still living | :37:40. | :37:45. | |
who still believes they're going to find weapons of mass destruction in | :37:46. | :37:52. | |
Iraq. Everybody else, it became increasingly obvious no such | :37:53. | :37:57. | |
material was going to be fotnd. Anyway, pursuing Tony Blair is a | :37:58. | :38:02. | |
complete irrelevance to what the House should be doing. I'll give | :38:03. | :38:08. | |
way. I am not in the front bench, I can't keep giving way. I'm grateful | :38:09. | :38:15. | |
to him for giving way. I agree about the dangers of focusing on one | :38:16. | :38:18. | |
person. I worry about the w`y in which he appears to be letthng off | :38:19. | :38:22. | |
that one person from any re`l responsibility for misleading the | :38:23. | :38:28. | |
House. You only have to read Chilcot how Blairs led the House about the | :38:29. | :38:32. | |
position of the French. In that motion to the House he said it has | :38:33. | :38:36. | |
not proved possible to secure a second resolution because one | :38:37. | :38:40. | |
permanent member of the Sectrity Council may play its intensd to use | :38:41. | :38:44. | |
the veto whatever the circulstances. A few minutes, even before PMQs the | :38:45. | :38:49. | |
French were on the phone to Tony Blair saying he was misreprdsenting | :38:50. | :38:54. | |
their position. We should not only focus on one man but let's not let | :38:55. | :39:01. | |
him off the hook completely. I certainly didn't rise to defend Tony | :39:02. | :39:05. | |
Blair. He's not the first politician to make a mistake and won't be the | :39:06. | :39:11. | |
last. If she believes the French, she believes the French. Thd French | :39:12. | :39:17. | |
were not able to exercise a veto in the Security Council. It was a | :39:18. | :39:20. | |
mistake at the time to try to blame the French entirely. They wdre never | :39:21. | :39:24. | |
going to get a majority in the Security Council. The French were... | :39:25. | :39:31. | |
No, I'm not going to... THE SPEAKER: Order, order, the right | :39:32. | :39:36. | |
honourable gentleman has made it plain he's not giving way. The House | :39:37. | :39:42. | |
must listen to the developmdnt of the gentleman's argument. Mdmbers | :39:43. | :39:49. | |
who wish to argue about the French veto in 2003 can argue betwden | :39:50. | :39:52. | |
themselves. The point I'm going to make is that the political | :39:53. | :39:56. | |
background to this, what was actually being decided, what the | :39:57. | :40:01. | |
politicians wanted to do was key. I was, of course, a backbench MP | :40:02. | :40:05. | |
opposite. I followed these dvents with some care. I had one advantage, | :40:06. | :40:10. | |
not the access to what was going on inside the Government, but H did | :40:11. | :40:14. | |
know a lot of Americans as well as British politicians. At varhous | :40:15. | :40:19. | |
political gathering, I knew quite a lot of the key American Neo cons. On | :40:20. | :40:27. | |
friendly terms. I was arguing the merits of the invasion of Iraq some | :40:28. | :40:30. | |
time before the debate ever started here. That's quite an important | :40:31. | :40:36. | |
background to this question. In the Bush administration, the kex policy | :40:37. | :40:44. | |
makers wanted to envied Irap immediately after 9/11. By 2001 | :40:45. | :40:51. | |
they were going to invade Iraq. There wasn't the slightest doubt | :40:52. | :40:57. | |
about it. They had a rather naive, idealistic approach which f`intly | :40:58. | :41:00. | |
shocked me. They thought thd previous administration had not used | :41:01. | :41:06. | |
American military power for all the benefits it could produce in the | :41:07. | :41:09. | |
world. They were going to use military power for good. Thdy | :41:10. | :41:15. | |
thought they would be greetdd as liberating here rows when they | :41:16. | :41:23. | |
arrived in Baghdad and be able to improve a better regime. Thdy | :41:24. | :41:29. | |
actually thought a man would win the election that would be held there | :41:30. | :41:33. | |
after. I met that man once or two. He once go about 2% in an Iraqi | :41:34. | :41:38. | |
election. He was going to bd in charge. But he need supervision | :41:39. | :41:46. | |
There would be a US general. Constant comparisons made whth | :41:47. | :41:51. | |
General McArthur turning imperial Japan into a democracy after the | :41:52. | :41:57. | |
war. The importance of deNaziification that followdd the | :41:58. | :42:03. | |
fall of Hitler. Hence you h`ve to go in for debathification when you went | :42:04. | :42:08. | |
to Iraq. Get rid of people hn the army security service and so on I | :42:09. | :42:13. | |
won't go on. I fiercely dis`greed with this. I liked these people But | :42:14. | :42:18. | |
my thought all the time was, one of us isn't on the same planet when I | :42:19. | :42:23. | |
got into some of these disctssions. But I formed a fairly hoes style | :42:24. | :42:27. | |
view to this a long time before it arrived here. The point is, moving | :42:28. | :42:33. | |
on, if I knew enough in 2000 to know that the Bush administration was | :42:34. | :42:40. | |
going to invade Iraq, I am puite certain Tony Blair knew, I'l quite | :42:41. | :42:46. | |
sure the British military knew and they had a long time to work out how | :42:47. | :42:52. | |
they were going to join in. And that is the explanation of a lot of these | :42:53. | :42:58. | |
things. Why did the Americans want the British to join in? Thex didn't | :42:59. | :43:02. | |
need us for military purposds. They could defeat the Iraqis without our | :43:03. | :43:07. | |
military assistance. They dhdn't rate our military that highly though | :43:08. | :43:13. | |
our special forces and our intelligence they thought wdre very | :43:14. | :43:16. | |
good. We were a very valuable political ally. The present`tion of | :43:17. | :43:22. | |
what they were doing, would, they thought, be greatly improved if the | :43:23. | :43:25. | |
British could be at the heart of the alliance. As I've already s`id, Tony | :43:26. | :43:30. | |
Blair was very enthusiastic`lly keen to join them. I doubt whethdr he | :43:31. | :43:40. | |
bought all the neo-con theories U but clearly he thought getthng rid | :43:41. | :43:46. | |
of Saddam Hussein's regime could be one of the best contributions to | :43:47. | :43:50. | |
make to the Iraqi people. Hd dough sided to join in. You reed these | :43:51. | :43:57. | |
mysteries you ask what was the snag for Tony Blair and the Government? I | :43:58. | :44:02. | |
feel confident I knew enough about what was actually going on tat, | :44:03. | :44:07. | |
through my various contacts to feel pretty confident about this, the | :44:08. | :44:13. | |
snag for Tony Blair who wanted to take part, who, it seems, h`d | :44:14. | :44:20. | |
already told George Bush th`t, George W Bush, that he wantdd to | :44:21. | :44:26. | |
take part was that it wasn't legal for the United Kingdom to t`ke part | :44:27. | :44:31. | |
in a war being launched for the purpose of changing the reghme in | :44:32. | :44:37. | |
another country. When he received that advice, I think every lawyer in | :44:38. | :44:41. | |
the place is agreed that was undoubtedly right. And, as somebody | :44:42. | :44:47. | |
has said, that wasn't the vhew the Americans took. American neo-cons | :44:48. | :44:53. | |
are not so impressed with international law. Their | :44:54. | :44:57. | |
constitution doesn't constr`in them. I once had a quay Americanoficial | :44:58. | :45:02. | |
tell me, we have all the legal authority we have to invade. We have | :45:03. | :45:08. | |
a large majority in both Hotses of Congress. That was it. But, of | :45:09. | :45:14. | |
course, they were so keen to have the British, they were prep`red to | :45:15. | :45:20. | |
give some time to Tony Blair to tackle this problem of whether it | :45:21. | :45:27. | |
was lawful for him to take part and to work out some basis upon which | :45:28. | :45:33. | |
the British could join. Now, so far, I think the motives of all these | :45:34. | :45:37. | |
people were virtuous. They believed all this. They were making the world | :45:38. | :45:45. | |
a better place by removing ` tyrant and installing a western, | :45:46. | :45:50. | |
pro-American, pro-Western, pro-Israeli democratic Government in | :45:51. | :45:54. | |
a liberal society. And they were, therefore, going to change the | :45:55. | :45:57. | |
regime. We were going to do it lawfully and we had to turn to this | :45:58. | :46:03. | |
whole question of the dreadful weapons which Saddam Hussein | :46:04. | :46:06. | |
undoubtedly had used against his own people years before. Whether they | :46:07. | :46:13. | |
had all been disposed off and whether you could actually | :46:14. | :46:16. | |
demonstrate he was a continting threat. Because, if you could | :46:17. | :46:21. | |
demonstrate he had weapons of mass destruction, that they were a threat | :46:22. | :46:27. | |
to British and his neighbours and that he was not cooperating with | :46:28. | :46:33. | |
weapons inspections and so on, and if you got an UN Resolution, then | :46:34. | :46:42. | |
you had a legal base for invading. I think once one realises that was the | :46:43. | :46:49. | |
perfectly worthy, well-intentioned mind-set of most of the British | :46:50. | :46:55. | |
people taking part in this process to intervene, I think then one can | :46:56. | :47:02. | |
understand why some of thesd extraordinary processes took part. I | :47:03. | :47:11. | |
personally believe that the American administration actually del`yed the | :47:12. | :47:20. | |
invasion for a month or few... Two months... Two months, to give the | :47:21. | :47:26. | |
British more time to get through this convoluted legal stuff, I use | :47:27. | :47:32. | |
sarcastic words which probably the occasion impatient American used a | :47:33. | :47:36. | |
version of at the time, to get through before they could join in. | :47:37. | :47:42. | |
Then the problem occurred for the Americans. They went to the UN. Got | :47:43. | :47:46. | |
Resolution 1441 and you will the rest of it. They began to lose | :47:47. | :47:50. | |
patience. They began to see this could go on forever. They bdcame, | :47:51. | :47:56. | |
they reached a stage where they were going to invade in March 2003. They | :47:57. | :48:08. | |
couldn't wait any longer. So, the Blair Government, those that knew | :48:09. | :48:12. | |
what was going on, had to speed the thing up a bit. Because thex | :48:13. | :48:17. | |
realised if they were not c`reful, they were going to fail to get there | :48:18. | :48:27. | |
in time. One thing that surprises me is the advice from the JIC which | :48:28. | :48:37. | |
really surprises me. They dhd eventually produce enough | :48:38. | :48:41. | |
intelligence which was plausible and believed in by those putting it in | :48:42. | :48:44. | |
the reports for the Attornex General, I think it is obvious, | :48:45. | :48:49. | |
quite reluctantly to be persuaded there probably was a basis on this | :48:50. | :48:54. | |
for going ahead. Then the urgent debates to take place in thhs House | :48:55. | :49:00. | |
would last about two days bdfore everyone knew the troops who were | :49:01. | :49:04. | |
already in battle positions in the middle east were about to go ahead | :49:05. | :49:10. | |
with the whole operation. I do think it's from that that we should learn | :49:11. | :49:18. | |
the political lessons. One of the first lessons was that, I think an | :49:19. | :49:24. | |
ever-increasing rush to acttally get into the position where you could | :49:25. | :49:30. | |
lawfully invade left everyone to engage in wanting to be persuaded | :49:31. | :49:35. | |
that various things were correct, various steps had been taken which, | :49:36. | :49:43. | |
if they'd submitted themselves to slower, more challenged and | :49:44. | :49:47. | |
considered consideration, would have led to a different conclusion. So, | :49:48. | :49:53. | |
what in my opinion is the ottline at least to the political lessons from | :49:54. | :50:00. | |
this. The first is the Amerhcan alliance should not be entered into | :50:01. | :50:06. | |
blindly. I would only briefly say, I think I'm a passionate belidver that | :50:07. | :50:10. | |
our alliance with the United States is crucial to this country's future | :50:11. | :50:14. | |
security and our role in thd world as Tony Blair is. So, I'm not - not | :50:15. | :50:23. | |
a trace of anti-Americanism. It is one of our most valuable fe`tures of | :50:24. | :50:29. | |
foreign policy. But that dodsn't mean blindly, always right or wrong, | :50:30. | :50:33. | |
you can let yourself go along with what the American president of the | :50:34. | :50:38. | |
day wishes to do. I take th`t no further. We might have a prdsident | :50:39. | :50:44. | |
Trump. So it's a question worth bearing in mind. I actually do agree | :50:45. | :50:49. | |
with the right honourable l`dy, you don't destroy the American `lliance. | :50:50. | :50:54. | |
You may damage it for a month or two if you don't go along absolttely | :50:55. | :50:59. | |
with what the President wants you to do. The other thing that's clear in | :51:00. | :51:06. | |
Chilcot, it was plain from the way the ministry behaved at the time, | :51:07. | :51:13. | |
the advice of our defence chiefs is hugely important. I share the pride | :51:14. | :51:18. | |
in them that keeps being expressed in these debates. They alwaxs want | :51:19. | :51:24. | |
to take part in any militarx activity in which the Americans want | :51:25. | :51:30. | |
them to join. It may be verx considered advice but it always | :51:31. | :51:34. | |
comes down to, we must ask the Americans to let us make a big | :51:35. | :51:40. | |
contribution. If you're a trained military man, you have trained for | :51:41. | :51:44. | |
the purpose of using your mhlitary force in the national doctors, | :51:45. | :51:47. | |
further worthwhile objectivds, you can't help but think this is our | :51:48. | :51:51. | |
moment, this is the great action I've got to take part in. | :51:52. | :51:59. | |
Similarly with the intelligdnce services, they prise their | :52:00. | :52:04. | |
relationship with the Americans above all relationships thex have | :52:05. | :52:09. | |
with the outside world, and so they are dependent on cooperation. They | :52:10. | :52:16. | |
do depend on us in some ways, but they are anxious to please `nd | :52:17. | :52:22. | |
anxious to do what they think their and American colleagues wish to do. | :52:23. | :52:26. | |
When you have a Prime Minister and government that wants to enter the | :52:27. | :52:31. | |
war, then everybody is extrdmely anxious to find the facts, to be | :52:32. | :52:36. | |
convinced of the situation, to enable the Prime Minister to do what | :52:37. | :52:41. | |
he wants and to go ahead. I think that's actually quite an essential | :52:42. | :52:46. | |
point because it requires a simple politician like me to make ht, it | :52:47. | :52:52. | |
doesn't appear in the pages of the report. That when you raise your | :52:53. | :52:56. | |
eyebrows going through what happened, I think that answdrs a | :52:57. | :53:01. | |
lot. I do think the time we were talking about, there weren't enough | :53:02. | :53:06. | |
diplomats involved, there w`sn't enough looking at the expertise of | :53:07. | :53:11. | |
the Foreign Office. The Americans got rid of most of theirs and got | :53:12. | :53:17. | |
people who had been involved in the Nicaraguan episode because they were | :53:18. | :53:23. | |
ideological more sound. Americans did not like the therapists we got | :53:24. | :53:26. | |
in the Foreign Office because they kept complicating things by talking | :53:27. | :53:33. | |
about tribes and different sorts of Muslim which they thought w`s not | :53:34. | :53:38. | |
relevant in the new era of western democracy, in which they were going | :53:39. | :53:43. | |
to take the country. I haven't got time, I apologise to my honourable | :53:44. | :53:52. | |
friend. The Attorney General was obviously giving the right `dvice. I | :53:53. | :53:58. | |
am sitting alongside a very tough Attorney General who would not give | :53:59. | :54:07. | |
the advice that the Prime Mhnister wanted, and I agree with wh`t the | :54:08. | :54:11. | |
honourable lady said, that hs what the Attorney General 's fourth. I | :54:12. | :54:18. | |
know Lord Goldsmith, he's all right, but he must have felt so exposed | :54:19. | :54:22. | |
that in the end he gave in to the temptation to say, well just about, | :54:23. | :54:30. | |
I suppose that what you say is satisfactorily proved, you lust do | :54:31. | :54:35. | |
so. I have taken longer than I intended, but the big thing that | :54:36. | :54:39. | |
matters, it matters very much as we are having a change of government | :54:40. | :54:46. | |
today, is how does the Cabinet come into this? What about accountability | :54:47. | :54:51. | |
to Parliament? I must say it was obvious at the time, it was obvious | :54:52. | :54:55. | |
if you listened to the Forehgn Secretary publicly, it was obvious | :54:56. | :54:59. | |
to what half the Labour Party said, obvious that if you listened to | :55:00. | :55:02. | |
officials that Cabinet government was not working properly in the | :55:03. | :55:07. | |
Government of Tony Blair. Hd went in for sofa government, and Margaret | :55:08. | :55:19. | |
Thatcher got keener on sofa government towards the end of her | :55:20. | :55:29. | |
time. Parliament, the same thing. There was reluctance to comd to | :55:30. | :55:33. | |
Parliament. Both were essentially seen as hurdles. | :55:34. | :55:45. | |
How are you going to get it passed Parliament? I would suggest for the | :55:46. | :55:53. | |
future that is not the mindset that people should be in, they should be | :55:54. | :55:58. | |
setting the proposition, advocating it to covenants, and with proper | :55:59. | :56:02. | |
information listen to it behng debated and examined by people who | :56:03. | :56:07. | |
have got time to do so. Simhlarly parliaments should be consulted when | :56:08. | :56:14. | |
it can be, given proper information, and you shouldn't rely on the of the | :56:15. | :56:19. | |
debate and the work of the whips to yourself through to say aftdrwards | :56:20. | :56:25. | |
that you have the democratic endorsement, and I haven't got time | :56:26. | :56:33. | |
to apply my strong stricturds. If you read it with my arguments in | :56:34. | :56:38. | |
mind, the chubby report I think defeat the impression I had as | :56:39. | :56:45. | |
someone who participated in debate. Military action is difficult. | :56:46. | :56:49. | |
There's no point politicians being light-heartedly irresponsible. There | :56:50. | :56:56. | |
will be occasions you cannot do it, there will be occasions somdone has | :56:57. | :56:59. | |
attacked the British interest and you have got to fight back. You can | :57:00. | :57:04. | |
tell Cabinet, you can tell Parliament afterwards and any | :57:05. | :57:07. | |
sensible Parliament will endorse it. This wasn't an emergency. For two | :57:08. | :57:22. | |
years we were told there wotld be an invasion of Iraq. It had bedn | :57:23. | :57:26. | |
planned and discussed. The reason there was in full Cabinet | :57:27. | :57:29. | |
discussion, and the reason there wasn't time the Parliamentary | :57:30. | :57:32. | |
debate, was because you might not get it past them. We didn't start | :57:33. | :57:42. | |
debating in Parliament till February 2003, and the actual final key vote | :57:43. | :57:48. | |
as I say is when the troops were in the field, which put a lot of | :57:49. | :57:51. | |
Conservatives off voting ag`inst it who might otherwise have voted | :57:52. | :57:56. | |
against it, our boys were about to go into action the next day which is | :57:57. | :58:01. | |
what occurred. Some off that has been addressed. The National | :58:02. | :58:05. | |
Security Council is a hugelx beneficial innovation of my right | :58:06. | :58:14. | |
honourable friend's, the outgoing Prime Minister, who brought it in. I | :58:15. | :58:19. | |
would only say it is not tile to debated now. It still needs to be | :58:20. | :58:24. | |
improved. It has not covered everything, it is a lot better than | :58:25. | :58:31. | |
it was. Cabinet government, I think my right honourable friend should | :58:32. | :58:34. | |
ask themselves if they are still in office under the next Prime | :58:35. | :58:37. | |
Minister, can they ensure adequate time is given to discuss thhngs | :58:38. | :58:40. | |
that adequate information is given in advance, that Cabinet government | :58:41. | :58:49. | |
isn't moving quickly from fhghting to item, that you have had papers | :58:50. | :58:54. | |
beforehand to allow you to consider it, and the National Security | :58:55. | :59:01. | |
Council certainly. I genuindly congratulate the Prime Minister | :59:02. | :59:06. | |
Some of the best discussions I took part in whether in the National | :59:07. | :59:10. | |
Security Council, with my total approval. I personally may be too | :59:11. | :59:16. | |
sensitive, I think it could be improved sometimes because there are | :59:17. | :59:20. | |
occasions when a freight Colpany has been brought there and expl`ined to | :59:21. | :59:36. | |
you. -- a fait accompli. Thd whole history of the Middle East `nd North | :59:37. | :59:40. | |
Africa is we have removed f`scist dictatorships of the most poisonous | :59:41. | :59:46. | |
kind from country after country and then been surprised that thdy had | :59:47. | :59:50. | |
been replaced by a situation which is sometimes even worse than the one | :59:51. | :59:56. | |
we have removed. A continuing answer to that problem needs to be sought, | :59:57. | :00:04. | |
although at the moment we h`ve reached a stage that there `re now | :00:05. | :00:08. | |
perhaps bigger problem is that we have to confront. I began bx saying | :00:09. | :00:12. | |
this is the biggest foreign policy disaster of my time. We all have to | :00:13. | :00:19. | |
ask, why did the institutions of the United Kingdom failed to evdn | :00:20. | :00:27. | |
develop a hint of that? It wasn t particularly courageous for the | :00:28. | :00:32. | |
House to vote in favour. 70$ of the British public supported thd | :00:33. | :00:37. | |
invasion. For the first week or two it was extremely popular. H`d we | :00:38. | :00:41. | |
held a referendum, which is now the fashionable way of governing the | :00:42. | :00:46. | |
country, compared with this old-fashioned Parliamentary | :00:47. | :00:49. | |
democracy, it would have sahled through with animal must majority. | :00:50. | :00:53. | |
The danger of following opinion polls is that I've found a xear | :00:54. | :00:57. | |
later you couldn't find a mdmber of the public who had never met anybody | :00:58. | :01:01. | |
who agreed with the invasion of Iraq. In the light of better | :01:02. | :01:07. | |
information, people suddenlx realised it had been a terrhble are. | :01:08. | :01:22. | |
-- terrible error. We voted against it, we spoke against it, neddless to | :01:23. | :01:26. | |
say I have looked at my spedch and I'm very sad to say I predicted | :01:27. | :01:30. | |
quite a lot of the consequences of what was going to go ahead. We all | :01:31. | :01:36. | |
agree never again we can avoid it, but there's a big, big subjdct and | :01:37. | :01:43. | |
it's no good saying we should look at the intelligence arrangelents, we | :01:44. | :01:46. | |
should have a look at the arrangements for the way our | :01:47. | :01:50. | |
government is run, the way this Parliament organises itself, and how | :01:51. | :01:54. | |
we get sensible accountabilhty to the House of Commons the next time | :01:55. | :01:58. | |
the Government has to engagd in such difficult decisions. Mr Alex | :01:59. | :02:09. | |
Salmond. The Parliamentary wounds on the Iraq war are still perthnent | :02:10. | :02:14. | |
today, but we should remembdr they are as nothing compared to the | :02:15. | :02:20. | |
wounds of the 179 families who lost servicepeople, and the 23 British | :02:21. | :02:25. | |
civilian staff who were killed, the 200,000 Iraqis, the thousands of | :02:26. | :02:28. | |
American soldiers, the carn`ge in the Middle East which is with us | :02:29. | :02:33. | |
today, these wounds are still raw and open and continuing. I looked | :02:34. | :02:43. | |
back at the debate on the 18th of March 2003, and I was struck by a | :02:44. | :02:48. | |
number of things we don't always remember. We remember Robin Cook's | :02:49. | :02:53. | |
brilliant resignation speech the day before. We don't necessarilx | :02:54. | :02:59. | |
remember John Denham's disthnguished and measured contribution on the day | :03:00. | :03:06. | |
of the debate. He reminded ts that public opinion at that stagd was in | :03:07. | :03:12. | |
favour of war and those who spoke against it weren't given a | :03:13. | :03:17. | |
particularly easy time. I looked at the contribution from Charlds | :03:18. | :03:19. | |
Kennedy in that day, who was barracked throughout his spdech | :03:20. | :03:26. | |
against war. Suggestions of Chamberlain Charlie was one of the | :03:27. | :03:30. | |
more printable epithets, or the toast of Baghdad, which was flung at | :03:31. | :03:42. | |
some of us who opposed the war. Members who argued against ht have | :03:43. | :03:47. | |
been vindicated, but also to remind people of the nature and context of | :03:48. | :03:52. | |
the debate we were in. Therd were only 179 members in this Parliament | :03:53. | :03:59. | |
who were members of that parliament in 2003, little over a quarter of | :04:00. | :04:05. | |
members in this Parliament were present and voting in that | :04:06. | :04:09. | |
particular debate so it is `s well that people remember and understand | :04:10. | :04:13. | |
the context if we are to understand the feelings of Parliamentary | :04:14. | :04:18. | |
democracy. Not referendum btt Parliamentary democracy that votes | :04:19. | :04:24. | |
on that illustrated about Iraq. And I have also been checking the | :04:25. | :04:28. | |
record, and I think I can honestly say I don't think I've ever quoted | :04:29. | :04:32. | |
in The Times newspaper ever in 0 years in this place off and on, but | :04:33. | :04:37. | |
I'm going to quote it today because I thought their headline and their | :04:38. | :04:42. | |
first paragraph in the report last Thursday hit the mark absolttely. | :04:43. | :04:47. | |
Under the headline, Blair's private war, they wrote, Britain fotght a | :04:48. | :04:53. | |
potentially illegal war in Hraq because of Tony Blair's misguided | :04:54. | :04:59. | |
and personal commitment to George Bush, the Chilcot report concluded | :05:00. | :05:05. | |
yesterday. It would be impossible in reading the Chilcot report not to | :05:06. | :05:08. | |
look at that personal level of accountability as well as the wider | :05:09. | :05:14. | |
context of the legality. Thd right honourable member for Rushcliffe | :05:15. | :05:16. | |
started his speech by saying this is not all about Tony Blair, and the | :05:17. | :05:21. | |
rest of his speech illustrated why it is very largely about Tony Blair. | :05:22. | :05:26. | |
The Chilcot report, more importantly, let me quote from the | :05:27. | :05:32. | |
executive summary, but belidve me it is backed enormously in the full | :05:33. | :05:38. | |
report on page 58 and 59, goes through the sequence of | :05:39. | :05:45. | |
decision-making until the ilmediate onset of war. If it was sof` | :05:46. | :05:50. | |
government, it was a very slall sofa indeed because the crucial decisions | :05:51. | :05:55. | |
about the strategy and of this country were made with the Prime | :05:56. | :06:02. | |
Minister and very few of his advisers. Chilcot finds not even a | :06:03. | :06:07. | |
Cabinet committee, according to Chilcot, discussed these crtcial | :06:08. | :06:12. | |
decisions, which are listed on page 58 and 59. For example the first of | :06:13. | :06:17. | |
which, the decision at the beginning of September 2001 to offer to work | :06:18. | :06:21. | |
with President Bush and a strategy to deal with Iraq as part of phase | :06:22. | :06:26. | |
two on the war on terror, ddspite the fact there was no evidence of | :06:27. | :06:31. | |
Iraqi involvement in the attacks on the United States. Right through to | :06:32. | :06:37. | |
our view of UK policy at thd end of February 2003, where the inspectors | :06:38. | :06:41. | |
have found no evidence of wdapons of mass destruction and only lhmited | :06:42. | :06:44. | |
support for the second resolution in the Security Council. | :06:45. | :06:49. | |
All of these decisions made without consultation with a range of | :06:50. | :06:56. | |
colleagues in the cabinet. When the Deputy Prime Minister concltded this | :06:57. | :06:59. | |
weekend in a way that Chilcot wasn't allowed to do either becausd of his | :07:00. | :07:04. | |
remit or lack of specialisms on the inquiry that the war was illegal and | :07:05. | :07:11. | |
apologised for it, what he `ctually should have been apologising for as | :07:12. | :07:14. | |
Deputy Prime Minister was that this was allowed to happen over ` | :07:15. | :07:18. | |
sequence of 15 months where one individual, the Prime Minister, with | :07:19. | :07:22. | |
his advisers was able to take these decisions without any account of any | :07:23. | :07:27. | |
sort or kind of collective responsibility. Doesn't Chilcot also | :07:28. | :07:35. | |
say, though, that the form of Government should be described as a | :07:36. | :07:41. | |
profession Al Faw um? That ht shouldn't be regarded as just | :07:42. | :07:46. | |
advisers and cronies. Isn't that the specific point of evidence that Lord | :07:47. | :07:52. | |
Turnbull gave to Chilcot? I'm dealing with the findings of | :07:53. | :07:57. | |
Chilcot. The inquiry considdrs that there should have been a collective | :07:58. | :08:02. | |
discussion by a Cabinet comlittee or small group of ministers on the | :08:03. | :08:08. | |
basis of advice agreed at a senior level of officials. That is page 58, | :08:09. | :08:13. | |
if it helps the honourable gentleman. Paragraph 409. I've | :08:14. | :08:18. | |
answered the honourable gentleman. Let me continue. Perhaps I'll give | :08:19. | :08:27. | |
way later. THE SPEAKER:. We cannot conduct a | :08:28. | :08:34. | |
debate with people yelling from a sedentary position. If the right | :08:35. | :08:38. | |
honourable gentleman wants to give way later he will. If he dodsn't, he | :08:39. | :08:41. | |
heent'. No doubt the Chilcot report would | :08:42. | :08:48. | |
have concluded otherwise but we have the report as it's concluded not not | :08:49. | :08:53. | |
just on individual pieces of evidence but the conclusion of the | :08:54. | :08:59. | |
Chilcot Inquiry itself. That's why the Times were undoubtedly right to | :09:00. | :09:02. | |
describe this in the way thdy did as Blair's private war. In terls of | :09:03. | :09:08. | |
what this place and this pl`ce's collective responsibility. Where I | :09:09. | :09:12. | |
fundamentally disagree with the Right Honourable Member for | :09:13. | :09:16. | |
Rushcliffe, if a Parliament is to hold future executives to account, | :09:17. | :09:22. | |
it's not just a question of changing the process of decision makhng. I | :09:23. | :09:27. | |
accept some changes have bedn made. I don't accept the confidence of the | :09:28. | :09:32. | |
Foreign Secretary that mist`kes could never be repeated agahn. I | :09:33. | :09:37. | |
don't believe his disstings between a land campaign in Iraq and an | :09:38. | :09:43. | |
aerial bombardment in Libya fully explains, for example, why this | :09:44. | :09:47. | |
country, never mind its allhes, spent 13 times as much bombhng Libya | :09:48. | :09:52. | |
as we did in any budget for reconstruction. That might be a | :09:53. | :09:56. | |
lesson which hasn't been carried forward. But the changes th`t must | :09:57. | :10:00. | |
be made are not just in terls of Government processes. They're | :10:01. | :10:04. | |
changes in terms of parliamdntary accountability. The most fundamental | :10:05. | :10:10. | |
point of parliamentary accountability is the Parli`ment | :10:11. | :10:13. | |
decided whether it has been misled or not. My contention is... I give | :10:14. | :10:18. | |
Waugh to the member. On this question of Libya. The fact is Libya | :10:19. | :10:26. | |
was already in a brutal civhl war before western airforces prdvented | :10:27. | :10:28. | |
Gaddafi slaughtering innocent people. That's what was happening. | :10:29. | :10:33. | |
The question he has to answdr is what would he have done to help | :10:34. | :10:37. | |
those women and children in Benghazi? What would he havd done to | :10:38. | :10:44. | |
help them? Probably, as my honourable friend said, probably not | :10:45. | :10:48. | |
supplying arms to people like that over a period of time. Not doing oil | :10:49. | :10:53. | |
deals in the sun in a tent with Colonel Gaddafi might be a second. | :10:54. | :10:58. | |
That wasn't the point. Let le make my speech. That wasn't the point I | :10:59. | :11:03. | |
was making. It was about thd lesson of reconstruction. Not about the | :11:04. | :11:07. | |
argument of the conflict. Btt the lesson of reconstruction. It is a | :11:08. | :11:13. | |
very fair point to make to point out of fact this country spent 03 times | :11:14. | :11:19. | |
as much bombing Libya as we did in aiding a budget for recon strukts of | :11:20. | :11:23. | |
Libya. That -- reconstruction of Libya. That may be a lesson given | :11:24. | :11:28. | |
priority to the aftermath of conflict which I'm not cert`in the | :11:29. | :11:30. | |
Foreign Secretary fully took on board. The point I was going to | :11:31. | :11:35. | |
make, this is not just about the process of Government but about | :11:36. | :11:39. | |
parliamentary accountabilitx. The most fundamental point of all. In | :11:40. | :11:44. | |
the past, we've held people accountable in the relatively recent | :11:45. | :11:49. | |
past, pro fume owe and a sex scandal. Stephen Byers accused of | :11:50. | :11:54. | |
misleading Parliament because he was nationalising a railway company if | :11:55. | :11:57. | |
I remember correct. And these are things which, no doubt, are very | :11:58. | :12:02. | |
important and that line of accountability is crucial. How much | :12:03. | :12:06. | |
more important is a line of accountability on peace or war where | :12:07. | :12:09. | |
thousands or hundreds of thousands of people lose their lives `s a | :12:10. | :12:14. | |
result of decisions that ard made by the executive? My contention would | :12:15. | :12:22. | |
be that Chilcot gives huge `rray of evidence of a lack of parli`mentary | :12:23. | :12:28. | |
truthfulness. One thing was being said to the president of thd United | :12:29. | :12:31. | |
States and quite a different thing was being said to Parliament and to | :12:32. | :12:37. | |
people. That doesn't take place over a single speech or a single | :12:38. | :12:41. | |
parliamentary statement, though the immediate run up to the war gives | :12:42. | :12:46. | |
ample and detailed examples. For example, as my honourable friend for | :12:47. | :12:54. | |
the Green Party indicated, the total misrepresentation to the UN. Chilcot | :12:55. | :12:59. | |
published what was being sahd within Government and we can compare that | :13:00. | :13:02. | |
directly to what was being offered to this Parliament as an | :13:03. | :13:07. | |
explanation. But the process of Parliament being told one thing | :13:08. | :13:13. | |
while George W Bush was being assured another didn't take place | :13:14. | :13:17. | |
over a fee weeks or single debate or statement, it took place ovdr 1 | :13:18. | :13:23. | |
months. It's amply demonstr`ted in the evidence presented to Chilcot. | :13:24. | :13:29. | |
We know now why Chilcot fought so strongly to have these priv`te memos | :13:30. | :13:33. | |
to be part of the overall rdview of the report. The Right Honourable | :13:34. | :13:40. | |
Member for Rushcliffe pointdd to the motivations of regime changd and the | :13:41. | :13:45. | |
difficulty that regime change could not make the war legal in gdnerally | :13:46. | :13:50. | |
understood international terms. That's demonstrated in the private | :13:51. | :13:55. | |
memos from Tony Blair to George W Bush. In December 2001. Any link to | :13:56. | :14:03. | |
11th accept and Al-Qaeda is at best very tenuous. At present | :14:04. | :14:07. | |
international opinion would be reluctant outside the United States | :14:08. | :14:13. | |
or the UK to sup pour immedhate military action. For sure, people | :14:14. | :14:18. | |
want to be rid of Saddam. Wd need a strategy for regime change that | :14:19. | :14:25. | |
builds over time. That was Des 001. However, at the same time, December. | :14:26. | :14:31. | |
Charles Kennedy in pursuing the Prime Minister at Question Time was | :14:32. | :14:39. | |
told the two faces of war included Afghanistan and the pursuit of | :14:40. | :14:42. | |
international terrorism in `ll of its different forms. That is a | :14:43. | :14:47. | |
matter for investigating thd finances, how terrorists move across | :14:48. | :14:51. | |
frontiers. The House was behng told stage two of the war on terror was | :14:52. | :14:58. | |
not an assault on Iraq, far less a regime change in Iraq but a pursuit | :14:59. | :15:03. | |
of infer national terrorism. The two things are totally incompathble One | :15:04. | :15:10. | |
thing to George Bush in private -- private, another to this Parliament | :15:11. | :15:15. | |
and the people of the country. Then there's the issue moving into 2 02 | :15:16. | :15:20. | |
which was amply picked up bx the press after the Chilcot | :15:21. | :15:24. | |
REPORTER:Ed. I will be with you whatever. That was in the mdmo of | :15:25. | :15:33. | |
20th July 20002 to George Btsh. I heard the former Prime Minister | :15:34. | :15:38. | |
explain this to John Humphrdys as the idea of "What." Meant somehow | :15:39. | :15:44. | |
whatever and didn't give an unconditional commitment to stand | :15:45. | :15:47. | |
with the United States in a war I'm not sure I fully understood that | :15:48. | :15:53. | |
explanation. But crucially, neither did John Chilcot. And neithdr did | :15:54. | :15:58. | |
Jack Straw, a crucial member of the administration. Jack Straw's memos | :15:59. | :16:07. | |
to Tony Blair were also published. And the -- on 11th March 2003 in the | :16:08. | :16:15. | |
report Straw wrote to Blair, when British graishly accepted your offer | :16:16. | :16:18. | |
to be with him all the way, he wanted you alive not dead. Referring | :16:19. | :16:26. | |
to not the mortal danger to troops or civilians from a war but | :16:27. | :16:29. | |
politically whether the Prile Minister would be alive or dead | :16:30. | :16:34. | |
Jack Straw was under no illtsions whatsoever about the commitlent that | :16:35. | :16:37. | |
had been given to George Bush and neither were Tony Blair's own | :16:38. | :16:43. | |
advisers who advised him to take it out of the memo and neither, | :16:44. | :16:47. | |
certainly, it was George Bush or his advisers or Secretary of St`te Colin | :16:48. | :16:54. | |
Powell. Sir John Chilcot concludes that the meaning of this, Mr Blair's | :16:55. | :16:58. | |
note, which had not been discussed or agreed with colleagues sdt the UK | :16:59. | :17:02. | |
on a path leading to diplom`tic activity in the UN. The possibility | :17:03. | :17:09. | |
of participation in militarx action in a way to make it very difficult | :17:10. | :17:13. | |
for the UK to withdraw support from the United States. But that was not | :17:14. | :17:17. | |
what was being told to Parlhament at the same time. Parliament w`s not | :17:18. | :17:23. | |
told of assurances to Georgd W Bush on military action. Parliamdnt was | :17:24. | :17:27. | |
told the Prime Minister was striving for peace. He was trying to find | :17:28. | :17:33. | |
anyway way to avoid a conflhct. That it was all up to Saddam whether he | :17:34. | :17:40. | |
those peace or conflict. And that deliberate misrepresentation of what | :17:41. | :17:42. | |
was being said to the Americans and what was being said to Parlhament, | :17:43. | :17:48. | |
continued, of course, into the very onset of war itself. And whdn the | :17:49. | :17:58. | |
memo quoted by my honourabld friend earlier on in this debate, when | :17:59. | :18:04. | |
Blair was telling Parliament even in the speech, in the war or pdace | :18:05. | :18:09. | |
debate, I have never put out justification for action as regime | :18:10. | :18:14. | |
change. He was telling George Bush only a few days later, that's why | :18:15. | :18:18. | |
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is the immediate justificathon for | :18:19. | :18:22. | |
action, ridding Iraq of Saddam is the real prize. Now, we heard | :18:23. | :18:30. | |
earlier that this was not a matter of one man. But that one man was the | :18:31. | :18:36. | |
Prime Minister. We were told earlier it was really about processds of | :18:37. | :18:40. | |
Government. But it was the Prime Minister who dictated the process of | :18:41. | :18:44. | |
Government and prevented processes of Government in terms of checks and | :18:45. | :18:47. | |
balances not working. And, `bove all, it was the Prime Minister who | :18:48. | :18:53. | |
prevented this House having the information it required to take a | :18:54. | :19:00. | |
reasonable judgment. I heard last week that one of the defencds of | :19:01. | :19:06. | |
intervention in Iraq was a counter-factual argument. What if | :19:07. | :19:11. | |
Saddam Hussein had stayed in power? What would he have done? Dalage in | :19:12. | :19:20. | |
the Arab string, for exampld? There's another counter-factual | :19:21. | :19:25. | |
argument I have in mind. Wh`t if the massive international coalition that | :19:26. | :19:33. | |
was built to deal with Al-Q`eda in Afghanistan had been held together, | :19:34. | :19:36. | |
what if the hundreds of billions of dollars which were then to be | :19:37. | :19:42. | |
waisted in the Iraqi desert, what if they had been applied to making a | :19:43. | :19:46. | |
real success of the rebuildhng of Afghanistan? What if the | :19:47. | :19:52. | |
justification for a totally legal international intervention which | :19:53. | :19:56. | |
this country took part in h`d resulted in a genuine benefht and | :19:57. | :20:00. | |
that massive coalition which extended, incidentally, even to | :20:01. | :20:06. | |
approval from the Palestini`n liberation organisation, th`t | :20:07. | :20:09. | |
massive Corration could havd demonstrated a legal war, correctly | :20:10. | :20:14. | |
applied, could result in thd reconstruction and in allowhng a | :20:15. | :20:17. | |
country the investment requhred to be a shining light of a gentine | :20:18. | :20:22. | |
international intervention? And the United States of America, in a way, | :20:23. | :20:29. | |
never stronger than it was hn the immediate aftermath of 9/11, was | :20:30. | :20:33. | |
never more respected becausd it had suffered under the terrorist | :20:34. | :20:39. | |
atrocity. If a broader coalhtion had brought that to fruition instead of | :20:40. | :20:46. | |
this meandering into Iraq on a private vendetta from the President | :20:47. | :20:55. | |
of the United States with its closet advisor of neo-Conservative and | :20:56. | :21:00. | |
prevented this Parliament from having the information it rdquired | :21:01. | :21:02. | |
to hold him to account? I once told the former Primd | :21:03. | :21:14. | |
Minister that he would answdr to a higher law than this Parlialent and | :21:15. | :21:18. | |
I believe that to be absolutely true. But in the meantime, this | :21:19. | :21:22. | |
Parliament, add this stage, should hold him accountable. Not bdcause it | :21:23. | :21:29. | |
is a matter of pursuing the former Prime Minister but because ht will | :21:30. | :21:33. | |
demonstrate and illustrate that even retrospectively, if thd | :21:34. | :21:36. | |
parliament is systematicallx misled, they will say, up with it they shall | :21:37. | :21:43. | |
not put. It is part of the change we are going to make, not just in the | :21:44. | :21:48. | |
processes of government, to pause collective responsibility, not just | :21:49. | :21:55. | |
in hope but the essential changes of parliamentary accountabilitx. We | :21:56. | :21:58. | |
will be able to say legitim`tely that this could never happen again. | :21:59. | :22:05. | |
Mr Dominic Grieve. Thank yot, Mr Speaker. It is a pleasure to follow | :22:06. | :22:10. | |
the honourable member and indeed my right honourable friend in this | :22:11. | :22:15. | |
debate. There is no doubt, Lr Speaker, they have to clear | :22:16. | :22:19. | |
advantages over me in this debate in that both of them of course opposed | :22:20. | :22:25. | |
the notion in the House in 2003 which initiated our militarx action | :22:26. | :22:31. | |
in Iraq. Whereas I supported it Something which, I have to say, I | :22:32. | :22:36. | |
have come to very much regrdt. I supported it at the time because I | :22:37. | :22:39. | |
was indeed persuaded by the arguments put forward by thd Prime | :22:40. | :22:45. | |
Minister, at the time, Mr Blair with great eloquence, to thhs House, | :22:46. | :22:50. | |
about the fact that in his tse and a real and present danger, but in the | :22:51. | :22:57. | |
immediate context is justifhed taking military action against him, | :22:58. | :23:01. | |
even without going back for a further resolution of the United | :23:02. | :23:08. | |
Nations Security Council, rdlying on the previous resolutions whhch, I | :23:09. | :23:12. | |
have to say, there was conshderable evidence that Saddam Hussein had | :23:13. | :23:17. | |
Celia Lee breached. Certainly in terms of his non-co-operation. So on | :23:18. | :23:23. | |
that basis I voted for the lotion as did many other honourable mdmbers | :23:24. | :23:30. | |
still present in this House today. Sir John Chilcot's report hhghlights | :23:31. | :23:40. | |
how the decision-making processes of governments can become distorted | :23:41. | :23:44. | |
under pressure of events. Indeed, I would like to think, I am always a | :23:45. | :23:48. | |
little wary of this, that the distortions are so consider`ble in | :23:49. | :23:56. | |
relation to the report that he highlights a dysfunctionality within | :23:57. | :23:58. | |
the heart of Mr Blair's govdrnment but I hope may have been exceptional | :23:59. | :24:04. | |
to him. But for all that I think there are plenty of caution`ry tales | :24:05. | :24:08. | |
for us in this House today which we can look at in current contdxt as | :24:09. | :24:13. | |
much as they would have been looked at, at the time. But the pohnt seems | :24:14. | :24:17. | |
to me to have been rather wdll made and I will not repeat it. That | :24:18. | :24:21. | |
because Mr Blair had formed in his view very strong resolution that we | :24:22. | :24:28. | |
should support the United States including removing Saddam Htssein | :24:29. | :24:34. | |
and effecting regime change that the entirety of the processes of | :24:35. | :24:39. | |
government and Whitehall was skewed in order to achieve that ail and | :24:40. | :24:43. | |
have the mischief of disreg`rding all the evidence that might be | :24:44. | :24:46. | |
available to contradict whether this was in fact the right coursd of | :24:47. | :24:53. | |
action to take. Whether it was intelligence information or for that | :24:54. | :24:58. | |
matter whether it was the thorny problem of legality, both of which I | :24:59. | :25:01. | |
want to touch on briefly thhs afternoon. So far as the qudstion of | :25:02. | :25:09. | |
the intelligence is concerndd, those of us who have been in government | :25:10. | :25:13. | |
and served on the National Security Council, as I have or indeed in my | :25:14. | :25:18. | |
current role as chairman of the intelligence and Security committee, | :25:19. | :25:21. | |
know perfectly well that intelligence often obtained at great | :25:22. | :25:26. | |
risk and with difficulty can only be what it is, which is a tool to | :25:27. | :25:33. | |
decision-making. It may be listaken. You cannot prevent that in human | :25:34. | :25:39. | |
society and you cannot guar`ntee its interpretation will be corrdct. I | :25:40. | :25:42. | |
have to say that my impresshon during my time in government was | :25:43. | :25:50. | |
that the intelligence committees go to considerable lengths to point out | :25:51. | :25:55. | |
the limits to which intelligence can properly be put. A lesson I suspect | :25:56. | :25:59. | |
that they derived from this experience. The simple fact is that | :26:00. | :26:05. | |
one can only read the Chilcot Report to conclude the way in which the | :26:06. | :26:09. | |
intelligence was handled stdering the run-up to the war was in some | :26:10. | :26:15. | |
cases truly breathtaking. And it makes troublesome reading. @nd I | :26:16. | :26:21. | |
hope very much, I will say nothing more about this, those withhn the | :26:22. | :26:26. | |
agencies who are known do the work will read and reread this rdport in | :26:27. | :26:36. | |
order to remind ourselves of how reasonable intelligence was misused | :26:37. | :26:42. | |
for the purpose of justifying theory. As proved by Mr Blahr when | :26:43. | :26:53. | |
he came to address the Housd before the war was sanctioned by this | :26:54. | :26:56. | |
Parliament. It is the certahnties engendered by this, and my right | :26:57. | :27:06. | |
honourable friend made a good intervention last week when he said | :27:07. | :27:09. | |
that if we had actually takdn the time and trouble to read sole of the | :27:10. | :27:13. | |
background information available we might have doubted some of the | :27:14. | :27:15. | |
certainties that were being expressed. I think it was absolutely | :27:16. | :27:20. | |
right about that, and think it is another burden which members of this | :27:21. | :27:24. | |
House or participated in thhs debate will have to bear. So much then for | :27:25. | :27:30. | |
the intelligence. What about the process of legal advice. Mr Speaker, | :27:31. | :27:34. | |
I have been apart of trying to provide legal advice to govdrnment | :27:35. | :27:38. | |
when I was a law officer. Mx right honourable friend the Solichtor | :27:39. | :27:42. | |
General was on the front bench and he too has also been involvdd in | :27:43. | :27:49. | |
these processes. Legal advice is often, and law officers know this, | :27:50. | :27:56. | |
advice which cannot in any way be certain. Legal advice is ex`ctly | :27:57. | :28:02. | |
what it says it is. In some cases, particularly when one is de`ling | :28:03. | :28:05. | |
with international law, the question as to whether or not you ard on the | :28:06. | :28:10. | |
right side or the wrong sidd of international law is an intdnsely | :28:11. | :28:15. | |
grey area precisely because there is no ultimate tribunal to detdrmine | :28:16. | :28:21. | |
those issues. And yet apart of the British government's doctrine and | :28:22. | :28:26. | |
ethics is that we must act lawfully at all times. And it is for the law | :28:27. | :28:30. | |
officers to try and steer that course. What of course shinds | :28:31. | :28:35. | |
through to me, reading the Chilcot Inquiry report, is not, as some | :28:36. | :28:41. | |
critics have said, and I will come back to this in a moment, that Lord | :28:42. | :28:50. | |
Goldsmith as an Attorney General abandoned legal objectivity, because | :28:51. | :28:54. | |
I have to say now that I have read the Chilcot Inquiry and looked at | :28:55. | :28:57. | |
these passages carefully, it seems to me that you fulfilled those | :28:58. | :29:03. | |
criteria as best he possiblx could. But he was drawn into this process | :29:04. | :29:08. | |
which in itself was utterly flawed because he cherry picked whhchever | :29:09. | :29:14. | |
bit of advice he wanted to present and then sold it in that wax both to | :29:15. | :29:19. | |
the Cabinet would never properly scrutinised it at all and ultimately | :29:20. | :29:23. | |
to the public. I give way to my right honourable friend. I thank my | :29:24. | :29:27. | |
right honourable friend forgiving way. Does he really think the | :29:28. | :29:32. | |
Attorney General met all his duties? Report refers to the final puestion, | :29:33. | :29:38. | |
to Tony Blair, which it says was answered the phone and orally about | :29:39. | :29:42. | |
the weather conditions had been met. Surely he should have been lore | :29:43. | :29:46. | |
pressing than just accepting a Coventry report before changing his | :29:47. | :29:51. | |
view? Is simply quote from paragraph eight, ten, from this summary, I'm | :29:52. | :29:57. | |
sorry I don't have the entire sorry. This was written by an official in | :29:58. | :30:02. | |
the attorney's department. @bout a further resolution of the sdcurity | :30:03. | :30:05. | |
council that that is strong evidence that Iraq has failed to comply with | :30:06. | :30:11. | |
and corporate body within the remit resolution 1441. It has failed to | :30:12. | :30:15. | |
take the final opportunity offered by the Security Council in that | :30:16. | :30:19. | |
resolution. The Attorney General understands and is unequivocally the | :30:20. | :30:21. | |
view of the Prime Minister that Iraq has committed further materhal | :30:22. | :30:27. | |
breach is, as specified in resolution 1441. But as this is a | :30:28. | :30:31. | |
judgment for the Prime Minister the attorney would be grateful for | :30:32. | :30:36. | |
confirmation that this is the case. Now, Mr Speaker, it is important to | :30:37. | :30:41. | |
understand, I think, one of the big changes that has taken placd between | :30:42. | :30:46. | |
2003 and today, in a way in which a law officer's advice would be | :30:47. | :30:50. | |
secured. My impression, I hope of got it right, reading Chilcot, in | :30:51. | :30:57. | |
practice, the Attorney General was only provided with sketched | :30:58. | :31:02. | |
backgrounds of the factual `nalysis on which his legal opinion was being | :31:03. | :31:09. | |
sought. The big difference, which I can tell the House without giving | :31:10. | :31:14. | |
away state secrets, is, if law officers are now being asked to | :31:15. | :31:19. | |
advise on a factual basis which involves serious or context problem | :31:20. | :31:22. | |
of international law, they will receive briefing as good as, | :31:23. | :31:27. | |
potentially better, if they demand it, of that which would be provided | :31:28. | :31:32. | |
to the Prime Minister himself, as to the intelligence and factual base | :31:33. | :31:37. | |
that justifies it. So they have to make an independent assessmdnt of | :31:38. | :31:42. | |
that. But I have to say it hs quite clear that in 2003, and I think | :31:43. | :31:47. | |
before them, it's not peculhar to 2003, this is not the practhce that | :31:48. | :31:52. | |
was being adopted. It was not how government works. So in practice the | :31:53. | :31:57. | |
law officer, Lord Goldsmith, was being placed in a position where he | :31:58. | :32:01. | |
had reasonably to take on trust the factual assessment is laid by others | :32:02. | :32:05. | |
and particularly the Prime Linister, I want to make clear, I cannot make | :32:06. | :32:12. | |
a judgment on whether Lord Goldsmith's advice of March seven | :32:13. | :32:17. | |
was right or not but he set out correctly in my view, the | :32:18. | :32:22. | |
alternative interpretations available for resolution 1441, and I | :32:23. | :32:25. | |
simply make the point, as I made earlier in my intervention, that | :32:26. | :32:32. | |
there are areas of internathonal law which raise massive difficulties of | :32:33. | :32:37. | |
interpretation. If for example and I give it as an example to thd House, | :32:38. | :32:45. | |
if we stuck, as some jurists would argue, to the principle that no | :32:46. | :32:51. | |
military intervention Kante place without the United Nations Security | :32:52. | :32:53. | |
Council authorisation, then the United Kingdom doctrine, -- can take | :32:54. | :32:59. | |
place, a well established one of intervening on the basis of the | :33:00. | :33:03. | |
monetary and is a city which is what led us to be able to take action in | :33:04. | :33:08. | |
Kosovo, would never have happened -- one intervening on the basis of | :33:09. | :33:13. | |
human necessity. S check this into the debate the House has had to try | :33:14. | :33:18. | |
to understand the complexithes - is simply check this in. Of cotrse none | :33:19. | :33:22. | |
of this gets away from the fact that the debate would likely havd been | :33:23. | :33:28. | |
very different within Cabindt if Lord Goldsmith's advice in hts | :33:29. | :33:32. | |
original form had been propdrly presented, circulated, and | :33:33. | :33:40. | |
discussed, because if any of us know who have been in government, the | :33:41. | :33:43. | |
process by which you moderate each others' opinions is challenging | :33:44. | :33:47. | |
them. And if you don't have a process of challenge we shotldn t be | :33:48. | :33:51. | |
surprised that at the end of the day people end up rubber stamping | :33:52. | :33:54. | |
decisions because it seems convenient to do so. One of the | :33:55. | :33:58. | |
interesting features of being in publishing was that I quickly came | :33:59. | :34:01. | |
to realise that, because thdre were some members, of whether it was the | :34:02. | :34:06. | |
national Security Council or Cabinet will not be held on to the Prime | :34:07. | :34:09. | |
Minister, it raised the levdl of challenge in a manner that one might | :34:10. | :34:14. | |
not necessarily have found when in fact it is single party govdrnment. | :34:15. | :34:19. | |
An interesting reflection on some of the problems that flow from it. And | :34:20. | :34:22. | |
when you have a Prime Minister who is an utterly dominant figure after | :34:23. | :34:31. | |
four or five years in government and a triumphant second mandate it gets | :34:32. | :34:35. | |
even harder. So Mr Speaker those are my thoughts on looking on these two | :34:36. | :34:40. | |
principal issues. There are lots of other issues in this report but | :34:41. | :34:44. | |
think it is one of the most compelling read but I've had. I m | :34:45. | :34:48. | |
not sure I'll be able to get through the lot but I will certainlx try to | :34:49. | :34:53. | |
read much more of it. But I just make two final points? -- could | :34:54. | :34:59. | |
adjust? Firstly to the honotrable member for Gordon and his ddsire | :35:00. | :35:06. | |
that accountability should lead to at least someone being held in | :35:07. | :35:09. | |
contempt of this House Mr Blair has acted improperly. As to say to him | :35:10. | :35:16. | |
that just as some people talked about impeachment, stews in 180 , | :35:17. | :35:22. | |
contempt proceedings in Parliament, unless based on findings made in an | :35:23. | :35:30. | |
external tribunal which meets Article six's compliance, is going | :35:31. | :35:39. | |
to be, in practice, difficult. And I would strongly recommend th`t, | :35:40. | :35:41. | |
tempting as such a route might suggest itself to be, the practical | :35:42. | :35:46. | |
difficulties are likely to lake it impossible to follow and I say that | :35:47. | :35:53. | |
in all since 30. I give way... - I give way in all sincerity. | :35:54. | :35:59. | |
Am not quite clear in what way the honourable and learned gentleman | :36:00. | :36:05. | |
considers that the former Prime Minister's civil rights and | :36:06. | :36:10. | |
obligations would be determhned at that contempt motion, as I | :36:11. | :36:15. | |
understand it as a novice and Parliamentary procedure. It is a | :36:16. | :36:20. | |
breach of privilege, it is not a criminal charge, it is not ` | :36:21. | :36:24. | |
contempt of court. I wonder if he could elucidate on which basis he | :36:25. | :36:30. | |
thinks article six would be engaged. It depends, I suppose, if I may say | :36:31. | :36:34. | |
to the honourable lady, what sanction this house wishes to | :36:35. | :36:38. | |
follow. In addition to that, I think there is a second issue. Yot may | :36:39. | :36:43. | |
have examples where somebodx says one thing to this house and in front | :36:44. | :36:52. | |
of a tribunal or court of rdcord on evidence, on oath, says somdthing | :36:53. | :36:57. | |
different. And the house can look at those two things juxtapose them to | :36:58. | :37:01. | |
conclude, for example, that the house was misled in evidencd that it | :37:02. | :37:06. | |
was being given. That, if I may say so, might well found a findhng of | :37:07. | :37:11. | |
breach of privilege for contempt, although that still leaves the | :37:12. | :37:16. | |
question unanswered as to s`nctions, but I understand her point. In this | :37:17. | :37:24. | |
case, if I may say, I am not giving some definitive statements, I am | :37:25. | :37:27. | |
simply saying what, to my mhnd, appears to be the difficulthes | :37:28. | :37:32. | |
likely to come from pursuing this particular course of action. As on | :37:33. | :37:35. | |
the whole, I would like the reputation of this house to stand an | :37:36. | :37:40. | |
enhanced by the way we report the Chilcot Inquiry report and hts | :37:41. | :37:45. | |
aftermath, I am always wary of suggesting, counselling or | :37:46. | :37:47. | |
recommending a course of action which might lead to the verx | :37:48. | :37:50. | |
opposite of what is intended. I give way. He is very generous He | :37:51. | :37:56. | |
knows that an old legal expdrtise in the highest regard. -- he knows that | :37:57. | :38:04. | |
I hold his legal expertise. He says it is important that the reputation | :38:05. | :38:07. | |
of the house is enhanced in the outcome of dealing with this report. | :38:08. | :38:11. | |
Surely the reputation will not be enhanced if there is not anx attempt | :38:12. | :38:16. | |
to hold the former Prime Minister to account? | :38:17. | :38:24. | |
I listen to what the honour`ble and learning lady says, and this is a | :38:25. | :38:27. | |
matter that can perhaps be debated or discussed at greater length. But | :38:28. | :38:32. | |
I simply counsel caution. The truth is that the Prime Minister has been | :38:33. | :38:36. | |
examined, or the then Prime Minister, Mr Blair, has been | :38:37. | :38:39. | |
examined at the Court of public opinion and the judgment of history, | :38:40. | :38:46. | |
and I think that it is likely that that judgment will be prettx unkind | :38:47. | :38:51. | |
to the way in which this was carried out. Whether this house feels that | :38:52. | :38:57. | |
it wants to do more immediately is a matter that we can debate at another | :38:58. | :39:02. | |
time. Can I then turned fin`lly the point has been made that thd outcome | :39:03. | :39:07. | |
of this process in the Middle East has been, on the evidence, | :39:08. | :39:12. | |
lamentable. Of course, the Liddle East is a place of massive | :39:13. | :39:17. | |
dysfunctionality, maybe even if we had not intervened in 2003 we would | :39:18. | :39:22. | |
find ourselves with another pattern that would have occurred of war and | :39:23. | :39:30. | |
bloody conflict based on a whole series of disintegration is of the | :39:31. | :39:33. | |
social fabric of that area which has been going on for some time, and we | :39:34. | :39:37. | |
can see manifested in the ctrrent conflict in Iraq and Syria which, I | :39:38. | :39:41. | |
have to say, I don't think hs necessarily entirely due to our | :39:42. | :39:47. | |
intervention in 2003, it has element inherent inside those societies | :39:48. | :39:52. | |
themselves. But I worry, and very much, and I think it has coloured my | :39:53. | :39:56. | |
view as a politician ever shnce that it has also had a terrhble | :39:57. | :40:00. | |
effect on public trust in us and our institutions in this countrx, | :40:01. | :40:05. | |
sometimes which, I rather agreed, for once, with the new statdsman | :40:06. | :40:08. | |
article, it carries itself `ll the way into the Brexit referendum and | :40:09. | :40:15. | |
its aftermath. -- the New Statesman article. I think we have lots to | :40:16. | :40:20. | |
learn from this sorry episode. The nuggets that I derive from ht is | :40:21. | :40:27. | |
that we have to have open ddbate, and we must avoid simply trdating | :40:28. | :40:30. | |
politics as presentational gimmick is. -- gimmicks. Because if we keep | :40:31. | :40:38. | |
doing it, and it has become a habit in modern Western society bdcause of | :40:39. | :40:43. | |
the development of social mddia the press and the way in which we | :40:44. | :40:47. | |
communicate ideas, if we continue doing it we will ruthlessly | :40:48. | :40:54. | |
undermine sensible decision,making and the ability to come to the right | :40:55. | :40:58. | |
conclusions by debate, which is absolutely the heart of what this | :40:59. | :41:03. | |
house should be about. Mrs Margaret Beckett. Thank you Mr | :41:04. | :41:09. | |
Speaker. I want to begin whdther right honourable gentleman who has | :41:10. | :41:13. | |
just spoken very eloquently ended by saying that I entirely agred that | :41:14. | :41:18. | |
there is much to learn from the Chilcot Report. One of the things | :41:19. | :41:23. | |
that concerns me much is th`t honour and it is very early to say so, I | :41:24. | :41:28. | |
know, but it is far from cldar to me that we will actually learn the | :41:29. | :41:31. | |
things we should. In the morning of the Chilcot Inquiry publication I | :41:32. | :41:39. | |
listened to the radio and hdard a number of commentators and, indeed, | :41:40. | :41:45. | |
members of this house, I thhnk that right honourable member was one | :41:46. | :41:49. | |
saying one after another well, of course, we all know what happens. | :41:50. | :41:55. | |
And it was a simple script, Familia. Tony Blair knew there were no | :41:56. | :41:59. | |
weapons of mass destruction, a deliberately lied to the Hotse of | :42:00. | :42:05. | |
Commons about the intelligence. . Whether there was intelligence to | :42:06. | :42:08. | |
suggest there were such weapons He had a secret pact made with George | :42:09. | :42:14. | |
Bush won before -- long before to commit us to war in all | :42:15. | :42:18. | |
circumstances, and so all that went in between was irrelevant and almost | :42:19. | :42:21. | |
did not happen, that the war itself was illegal because there w`s not a | :42:22. | :42:26. | |
second United Nations resolttion. And it seems to me that this is the | :42:27. | :42:30. | |
right moment to point out that, I think, this is the fifth inpuiry | :42:31. | :42:35. | |
into what happened in 2003 `nd before and after the invasion, and | :42:36. | :42:42. | |
as far as I recall, none of them has actually verified that incrddibly | :42:43. | :42:45. | |
simple script, nor does it seem to me that the Chilcot Inquiry either | :42:46. | :42:53. | |
simply confirms it. The inqtiry team accept, as the right honour`ble | :42:54. | :42:56. | |
member for Rush Chris Hazzard the former Attorney General, th`t when | :42:57. | :43:00. | |
the Prime Minister told this house that he believed that Saddal Hussein | :43:01. | :43:05. | |
had weapons of mass destruction he believed it in place of the TB true. | :43:06. | :43:10. | |
He was not making up the intelligence, he was not telling | :43:11. | :43:12. | |
this house anything other than what he believed to be true, let alone | :43:13. | :43:19. | |
inventing a light, which sedms to be implied, and, indeed, the rdport | :43:20. | :43:25. | |
points out that the basic c`se that Saddam Hussain had both ret`ined | :43:26. | :43:29. | |
weapons of mass destruction and that he had the intent to develop more, | :43:30. | :43:35. | |
given the opportunity, was what the joint intelligence committed itself | :43:36. | :43:41. | |
believed. The former Attorndy General touched on this and it seems | :43:42. | :43:44. | |
to be one of the most important things coming out of Chilcot, the | :43:45. | :43:49. | |
degree to which whole swathds of people whose professional jtdgment | :43:50. | :43:54. | |
was involved were, indeed, listaken. That continue to be the casd right | :43:55. | :44:01. | |
up to and, indeed, beyond the invasion. What Chilcot makes clear | :44:02. | :44:06. | |
is that that was what the joint intelligence committee had | :44:07. | :44:09. | |
continually reported, both to the then Prime Minister and to the | :44:10. | :44:15. | |
Cabinet. I noticed that there was no evidence, they say, that | :44:16. | :44:19. | |
intelligence was improperly included in the dossier, or that Number Ten | :44:20. | :44:27. | |
improperly influenced the tdxt. They said that this inquiry is not | :44:28. | :44:31. | |
questioning Mr Blair's belidfs, or his legitimate role in advocating | :44:32. | :44:38. | |
Government policy. That, I think, is really important to bear in mind, | :44:39. | :44:43. | |
especially as one listens to some of the detailed and very deterlined | :44:44. | :44:46. | |
attempts to create a differdnt impression. Sir John Chilcot also | :44:47. | :44:52. | |
pointed out that, along with the dangers that the intelligence | :44:53. | :44:56. | |
community believed Saddam Htssein presented, they believed, and again, | :44:57. | :45:00. | |
I am quoting from what Sir John Chilcot said, that Saddam Htssain | :45:01. | :45:05. | |
could not be removed without an invasion. And they also thotght that | :45:06. | :45:16. | |
to be relevant. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the | :45:17. | :45:19. | |
intelligence community and the then Prime Minister were wrong, but we | :45:20. | :45:24. | |
did not know it then. And, what s more, it is what our intellhgence | :45:25. | :45:30. | |
services believed, it was bdlieved by almost every other intelligence | :45:31. | :45:34. | |
service in the world, including the French and the Russians, whhch is, | :45:35. | :45:42. | |
no doubt, why security council resolution 1441 was actuallx carried | :45:43. | :45:44. | |
unanimously. I give way. I thank the right | :45:45. | :45:50. | |
honourable lady for giving way. The JAC, on the 15th of March 2002, said | :45:51. | :45:57. | |
the intelligence on Iraq Ha`s weapons of mass destruction and | :45:58. | :46:01. | |
ballistic missile production is sporadic and patchy -- JIC said | :46:02. | :46:09. | |
Tony Blair said, two weeks later, we know these weapons constitute a | :46:10. | :46:15. | |
threat. How is that consistdnt? I am familiar with this exchange and this | :46:16. | :46:19. | |
insistence that in some way this is hugely important. This is not the | :46:20. | :46:24. | |
impression that the public `re being given and, if I may say so, that he | :46:25. | :46:29. | |
amongst others is striving to give them. They are being given the | :46:30. | :46:32. | |
impression that the intelligence services, not that they said it was | :46:33. | :46:37. | |
sporadic and patchy but that they knew there were no weapons of mass | :46:38. | :46:40. | |
destruction and the then Prhme Minister knew there were no weapons | :46:41. | :46:44. | |
of mass destruction and delhberately this led the house. That is not | :46:45. | :46:50. | |
true, it was never true, and no attempt to read that into the | :46:51. | :46:57. | |
record, it seems to me, can possibly be justified. We did not know it | :46:58. | :47:02. | |
then, no one knew it then, lost people very firmly believed in | :47:03. | :47:06. | |
Saddam Hussein's intentions. The third allegation is the one about | :47:07. | :47:11. | |
the secret commitment, I was not the slightest bit surprised to hear the | :47:12. | :47:16. | |
honourable member quoting the single sentence quoted in the background | :47:17. | :47:22. | |
notification, I agree with him entirely of his assertion that it | :47:23. | :47:28. | |
was a profound mistake for the former Prime Minister to usd that | :47:29. | :47:33. | |
phraseology. However, I don't read into it the sinister feeling that he | :47:34. | :47:40. | |
reads in it nor, indeed, it seems to me, and the Chilcot Inquiry. To my | :47:41. | :47:44. | |
mind, if this had been a conversation rather than a written | :47:45. | :47:47. | |
memorandum, it was something along the lines of, look, I am on your | :47:48. | :47:54. | |
side, but... But, if we are to take action, all these things have to be | :47:55. | :47:57. | |
addressed, we had to go to the United Nations, and so on. | :47:58. | :48:02. | |
Certainly, Chilcot... In a loment. Certainly Chilcot acknowledges that | :48:03. | :48:08. | |
it was Mr Blair's intent to get the president to go through the United | :48:09. | :48:12. | |
Nations route, that he pursted that with determination and, indded, he | :48:13. | :48:17. | |
was doing so against the advice of President Bush's own allies. | :48:18. | :48:22. | |
I think as she pursues the report she will find that Chilcot find that | :48:23. | :48:25. | |
much more significant, that is why it said it would make it difficult | :48:26. | :48:33. | |
for the UK, and the US. How does she explained Jack Straw's memo to Tony | :48:34. | :48:36. | |
Blair, when President Bush graciously accepted your offer to be | :48:37. | :48:42. | |
with him all the way. Can she explain? It would be better to as my | :48:43. | :48:47. | |
former colleague. Having bedn the recipient of his notes, I would | :48:48. | :48:52. | |
suggest that what he was dohng was ironically quoting back to the Prime | :48:53. | :48:56. | |
Minister words he didn't thhnk the Prime Minister should have tsed and | :48:57. | :49:00. | |
he was right about that, as, no doubt, the honourable gentldman will | :49:01. | :49:04. | |
agree. And then there is thd question of the legality. It has | :49:05. | :49:08. | |
been said here before, and no doubt will be again, but Chilcot does not | :49:09. | :49:13. | |
pronounce on the legality of the proceeding. He criticises the | :49:14. | :49:18. | |
processes, he does not say that a second resolution was needed, | :49:19. | :49:22. | |
although I accept that he does not go into that territory. There is an | :49:23. | :49:26. | |
enormous amount of dispute `bout this matter, and the former Attorney | :49:27. | :49:30. | |
General touched on it a momdnt ago. It has led to the query which he | :49:31. | :49:34. | |
raised why there were so few questions from the Cabinet to the | :49:35. | :49:38. | |
Attorney General when he gave us his advice. One of the things that I am | :49:39. | :49:44. | |
pretty sure I have said before but I don't suppose anybody has p`id | :49:45. | :49:48. | |
attention and they probably will not now, it is quite simply the case | :49:49. | :49:52. | |
that the issue of whether or not we needed a second resolution had been | :49:53. | :49:55. | |
gone over, if you like, at nausea. It had been discussed at length The | :49:56. | :50:02. | |
Cabinet had had extensive vdrbal reports from the then Foreign | :50:03. | :50:06. | |
Secretary and Prime Minister about the progress of discussions in the | :50:07. | :50:10. | |
security council, about the desire for a second resolution, about how | :50:11. | :50:13. | |
things were going, who was objecting. Very much in det`iled | :50:14. | :50:18. | |
terms about how that process of negotiation was taking placd. The | :50:19. | :50:25. | |
views, of course, of the thdn Foreign Office legal adviser in | :50:26. | :50:29. | |
London have been very much puoted, and evidence was given to the | :50:30. | :50:33. | |
Chilcot Inquiry about that. That is absolutely right and wholly | :50:34. | :50:37. | |
understandable that all the focus has been on that advice, thd advice | :50:38. | :50:40. | |
of the Foreign Office legal people in London. I was interested in the | :50:41. | :50:46. | |
remarks of the former Attorney General about how unclear | :50:47. | :50:50. | |
international law is, and how it is not always easy to interpret, it is | :50:51. | :50:53. | |
certainly not the impression that the public has been given. What I | :50:54. | :50:58. | |
have rarely seen quoted at `ll or referenced in any way is th`t | :50:59. | :51:02. | |
someone else gave evidence to the inquiry about the legality of | :51:03. | :51:09. | |
resolution 1441 and whether a second resolution was required. Th`t was | :51:10. | :51:12. | |
the head of the Foreign Offhce legal team at the United Nations. The team | :51:13. | :51:20. | |
whose day to day dealings whth the security council, the team who | :51:21. | :51:23. | |
advised the then Government and presumably, equivalent to pdople in | :51:24. | :51:27. | |
the Government today on the handling of negotiations and to give them | :51:28. | :51:31. | |
legal advice about the detahl of what resolutions mean, the hmporter | :51:32. | :51:38. | |
that they will have and so on. He confirmed what, indeed, consistently | :51:39. | :51:42. | |
the former Foreign Secretarx told the cabinet, day after day, that the | :51:43. | :51:47. | |
Russians and the French in particular had tried to get an | :51:48. | :51:51. | |
explicit reference into resolution 1441 to the need for a second | :51:52. | :51:54. | |
resolution before any milit`ry action could be undertaken, even | :51:55. | :52:01. | |
though 1441 as drafted use the words this is a final opportunity to | :52:02. | :52:06. | |
comply with UN resolutions, and talked about serious conseqtences if | :52:07. | :52:07. | |
Saddam did not comply. Those discussions at the Security | :52:08. | :52:18. | |
Council, we were told, this legal adviser told the Chilcot Inpuiry | :52:19. | :52:23. | |
those discussions were exhatsted, it was a very strong attempt m`de to | :52:24. | :52:27. | |
insist that a second resolution was carried yet in the end the Russians | :52:28. | :52:31. | |
and the French accepted that a second resolution was not rdferred | :52:32. | :52:36. | |
to and the resolution was c`rried unanimously, including, if H recall | :52:37. | :52:41. | |
correctly, with the vote of the Syrian government, a remark`ble | :52:42. | :52:45. | |
thought in today's circumst`nces. The accusation has also been made in | :52:46. | :52:50. | |
all of these discussions th`t the attempts to get Saddam Hussdin to | :52:51. | :52:54. | |
conform with United Nations resolutions was in some way false, | :52:55. | :52:59. | |
but there was no intention, no wish for Saddam Hussein to conform, that | :53:00. | :53:03. | |
the intention from the beginning was military action. As I said darlier, | :53:04. | :53:11. | |
in an intervention, I think, from the Foreign Secretary, the then | :53:12. | :53:15. | |
Prime Minister repeatedly w`rned the Cabinet that if Saddam Hussdin | :53:16. | :53:18. | |
indeed chose to comply with United Nations resolutions, he staxs and | :53:19. | :53:23. | |
reminded us that that in itself would be an outcome that many, not | :53:24. | :53:28. | |
least the many in this Housd who campaigned on behalf of the Kurdish | :53:29. | :53:33. | |
people, would deplore and rdgret. Yet it was repeatedly pointdd out to | :53:34. | :53:38. | |
us that if Saddam complied, no military action, he would stay in | :53:39. | :53:46. | |
power. Yes? Graciously giving way. I wanted to point out the fact that in | :53:47. | :53:50. | |
the Chilcot Report he quotes Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6 at | :53:51. | :53:56. | |
the time, telling Tony Blair that the US were deliberately setting the | :53:57. | :53:59. | |
bar, and I quote, so high that Saddam Hussein would not be able to | :54:00. | :54:06. | |
comply. So when Tony Blair was standing in the House of Colmons on | :54:07. | :54:09. | |
the day of the vote, this c`se that there was still time for Saddam to | :54:10. | :54:14. | |
comply is something wrong. He had already been told by Siri Jtde | :54:15. | :54:17. | |
Dearlove that the bar had bden set so high by the weapons inspdctors | :54:18. | :54:22. | |
that Saddam could not possibly comply. -- Sir Richard Dearlove I | :54:23. | :54:28. | |
know about the view that Sir Richard Dearlove expressed, he was not in | :54:29. | :54:33. | |
place at the time that we speaking of. I accept that it was serious and | :54:34. | :54:41. | |
difficult but if Saddam had shown any intention of complying `nd given | :54:42. | :54:46. | |
any move to admit inspectors, when, for example, a series of tests were | :54:47. | :54:51. | |
proposed that he could meet to show if he was complying, all th`t was | :54:52. | :54:55. | |
rejected. By the French, by the way, and also by Saddam. So that is where | :54:56. | :55:05. | |
we are, there was indeed a warning, that if Saddam complied milhtary | :55:06. | :55:11. | |
action would not occur. The original four point zero is accusations | :55:12. | :55:18. | |
placed. No three further accusations have been added. One from the | :55:19. | :55:26. | |
Chilcot report itself, action taken when it was not a matter of the last | :55:27. | :55:32. | |
resort, the second, that we could have held back longer and the whole | :55:33. | :55:35. | |
matter could have been addrdssed by further inspections and the third, | :55:36. | :55:39. | |
that the events in the Middle East since all as a result of thd Iraq | :55:40. | :55:47. | |
invasion, that should also be on the consciences of all of us who voted | :55:48. | :55:53. | |
for the invasion. On the qudstion of whether or not it was a last resort, | :55:54. | :55:58. | |
it is appoint that was also made by my late right honourable frhend | :55:59. | :56:04. | |
Robin Cook. -- appoint made by Robin Cook. And those who make thdir case | :56:05. | :56:08. | |
rest their argument on the continual effectiveness of containment, backed | :56:09. | :56:13. | |
by sanctions. But one of thd things that no one seems to mention any | :56:14. | :56:18. | |
more is that, at this time, it was widely and seriously believdd that | :56:19. | :56:24. | |
containment was weakening, but containment was seeking to be | :56:25. | :56:29. | |
affected. And certainly anyone who was around and casts their linds | :56:30. | :56:34. | |
back, will recall, there was an enormous, growing campaign `gainst | :56:35. | :56:37. | |
the sanctions which were helping to keep in place the hope for | :56:38. | :56:44. | |
containment. Many Right Honourable members here will recall th`t the | :56:45. | :56:48. | |
process used to take place on a continual basis across the road in | :56:49. | :56:52. | |
Parliament Square. I think lost everyone has forgotten, that was not | :56:53. | :56:56. | |
in the beginning protest ag`inst the war, it was a protest against the | :56:57. | :57:01. | |
maintenance of sanctions on Saddam Hussein. And to be fed to the people | :57:02. | :57:06. | |
who undertook it, and the ldgitimate basis because Saddam was stdaling | :57:07. | :57:11. | |
the money that was given to feed the Iraqi people and using it for his | :57:12. | :57:15. | |
own purposes, so consequently there was growing poverty and hardship in | :57:16. | :57:20. | |
Iraq. So it was understandable that people should be against thd | :57:21. | :57:24. | |
sanctions on that basis accdnt they were in the campaign against | :57:25. | :57:33. | |
sanctions was itself growing. Does the right honourable lady ftlly | :57:34. | :57:36. | |
understand the significance of chapter 20 in the except sulmary | :57:37. | :57:40. | |
which says quite clearly th`t this was not a last resort? The | :57:41. | :57:45. | |
importance of this is that ht is absolutely fundamental to the | :57:46. | :57:49. | |
definition of a just war. And if we accept that assertion by Chhlcot the | :57:50. | :57:55. | |
corollary is that this was not a just war with all the consepuences | :57:56. | :58:00. | |
that follow from that so all this volume is of stuff, that silple | :58:01. | :58:04. | |
sentence in the executive stmmary that bangs the whole lot to rights. | :58:05. | :58:11. | |
I did realise that was what it meant, although for the just war, I | :58:12. | :58:17. | |
had the impression, unlike lany others I'm not a lawyer, although I | :58:18. | :58:22. | |
thought that was a religious, rather than the military legal concept I | :58:23. | :58:29. | |
do understand it in those tdrms Apart from the question of whether | :58:30. | :58:34. | |
or not this was just becausd it was not a last resort, can I also say, | :58:35. | :58:41. | |
on the matter of containment, that after that invasion, evidence was | :58:42. | :58:45. | |
found that indeed Saddam had been in further breach of United Nations | :58:46. | :58:48. | |
resolution even more than wd understood at the time of the | :58:49. | :58:52. | |
invasion. Bridges that we wdre unaware of, for example Robhn Cook | :58:53. | :58:55. | |
was not aware of them when he made his statement in the house. The | :58:56. | :58:59. | |
impression was that containlent was working on a salad of element, which | :59:00. | :59:12. | |
had been forbidden, -- on containment, they could, Ir`q was | :59:13. | :59:15. | |
developing ballistic missilds with a longer range than permitted, and | :59:16. | :59:23. | |
council resolutions, and he clearly intended to reconstitute long-range | :59:24. | :59:25. | |
delivery systems and those systems were potentially for use with | :59:26. | :59:29. | |
weapons of mass destruction. So it's not simple matter, if contahnment | :59:30. | :59:37. | |
had been working, Saddam Hussain was not trying to take things forward in | :59:38. | :59:43. | |
terms of weapons development, as we discovered once invasion had taken | :59:44. | :59:47. | |
place. The second point on this is the argument that we could have held | :59:48. | :59:53. | |
on. And there I must say, I have to accept the verdict of Chilcot. But | :59:54. | :00:03. | |
it was not impossible but again the difficulty on which no one now | :00:04. | :00:07. | |
touches was the circumstancds in which by then everyone found | :00:08. | :00:12. | |
themselves. We had chips in theatre in very, very difficult incredibly | :00:13. | :00:17. | |
difficult and dangerous circumstances. Troops who wdre | :00:18. | :00:24. | |
indeed expecting, hourly, d`ily intentional attacks by biological or | :00:25. | :00:28. | |
chemical weapons which everxone leaved Saddam possessed, and indeed | :00:29. | :00:35. | |
which they hoped to resist. So it wasn't a simple matter of s`ying, | :00:36. | :00:39. | |
there is no need. If you ard going to take action you have to start | :00:40. | :00:45. | |
military reparations, and bx that point military preparations had | :00:46. | :00:48. | |
advanced to such an extent that our troops were in theatre. And you | :00:49. | :00:52. | |
could ultimately argue and no doubt some will, those troops could have | :00:53. | :00:56. | |
been withdrawn. But what a signal would that have sent to Saddam or to | :00:57. | :01:01. | |
the rest of the world? It sdems to me it would have given Sadd`m | :01:02. | :01:05. | |
Hussein the signal that he was free to resume the kind of operations | :01:06. | :01:10. | |
he'd done in the past, whether it be against the Kurds, or indeed as he | :01:11. | :01:14. | |
had done against Iran? So these things are not as simple as it is | :01:15. | :01:18. | |
sometimes seemed, although H completely accept the argumdnt made | :01:19. | :01:23. | |
in Chilcot that one of the lessons we should learn is that we should be | :01:24. | :01:28. | |
wary of letting military concerns drive political decisions. @nd that | :01:29. | :01:32. | |
brings me back to my principal thesis, which is that there is much | :01:33. | :01:37. | |
in Chilcot from which we cotld learn, but only if we do not divert | :01:38. | :01:41. | |
ourselves onto things that Chilcot does not say. | :01:42. | :01:49. | |
That brings me to the final issue, Mr Speaker, but I want to address. | :01:50. | :01:58. | |
The final accusation, if yot like. The accusation that everythhng that | :01:59. | :02:02. | |
has happened in Iraq, Syria, or across the Middle East sincd as all | :02:03. | :02:06. | |
flowed from the invasion of Iraq, that it is all down to a drdadful | :02:07. | :02:11. | |
miscalculation, the right honourable gentleman for Rushcliffe Cordoba and | :02:12. | :02:15. | |
the worst foreign policy mistake. Let's say it was. I don't t`ke that | :02:16. | :02:20. | |
view, but lead us take that premise. I don't think he argues, and I don't | :02:21. | :02:24. | |
for one second I accept that everything terrible that has | :02:25. | :02:28. | |
happened now in the Middle Dast is as a result of that invasion. And I | :02:29. | :02:32. | |
think it is grossly irresponsible in order for people to satisfy the | :02:33. | :02:38. | |
clear, very real anger and passion that people feel against thd then | :02:39. | :02:42. | |
government, against the then Prime Minister, against the war in Iraq, | :02:43. | :02:47. | |
it is grossly irresponsible to say to the evil men of Daesh, Isil, or | :02:48. | :02:56. | |
Al-Qaeda that they are of the hook for any of the terrible things they | :02:57. | :03:00. | |
do because it is all our fatlt. And it's no good people making noises | :03:01. | :03:04. | |
off because we all know that that is just the kind of assertion that many | :03:05. | :03:08. | |
people make. All this stuff is down to the mistakes of the West, all | :03:09. | :03:13. | |
down to the evildoing of thd West, and everyone else is absolvdd. No | :03:14. | :03:18. | |
one should be absolved from responsibility for the things that | :03:19. | :03:23. | |
they themselves advocate or do. I do not seek to resile from the | :03:24. | :03:26. | |
responsibility that I exerchsed when I voted in Cabinet and I voted in | :03:27. | :03:32. | |
this House for the Iraq war. I regret bitterly the events that have | :03:33. | :03:37. | |
occurred since, as any senshble person would. But I do not pretend | :03:38. | :03:42. | |
that the decision I made was not my decision, that it was all somehow | :03:43. | :03:46. | |
someone else's fault. Ray m`c order, I'm sorry to have to announce this | :03:47. | :03:51. | |
to the House, on account of the number of would-be contributors | :03:52. | :03:54. | |
there will be a ten minute limit on backbench speeches. That lilit may | :03:55. | :03:58. | |
have to be reviewed although it is ten minutes for now. Mr Davhd Davis. | :03:59. | :04:04. | |
Thank you, Mr Speaker, it is a privilege to follow the right | :04:05. | :04:08. | |
honourable lady although I think she attributed to use that the body | :04:09. | :04:13. | |
holds, that somehow Isil is off the hook because of the failures of the | :04:14. | :04:17. | |
British government. Let's bd clear what those failures. 150,000 deaths | :04:18. | :04:23. | |
by violence, a large majority of those innocent civilians. More than | :04:24. | :04:29. | |
1 million deaths as a result of this war, medical estimates. A ddstroyed | :04:30. | :04:34. | |
country. And at last dictatorship, but containment was broadly working. | :04:35. | :04:41. | |
-- and a steep dictatorship. Sanctions, inspections were allowed, | :04:42. | :04:45. | |
and no-fly zones. Damage to the stability of the Middle East. Of | :04:46. | :04:49. | |
course it's not. Great but let's remember that Isis started hn | :04:50. | :04:56. | |
prisoner of war camps so let's not forget that. And a signific`ntly | :04:57. | :05:01. | |
increased terrorist threat worldwide, something known `nd | :05:02. | :05:05. | |
warned of before we took thhs action. That is what we are talking | :05:06. | :05:11. | |
about. That is what the worst foreign policy mistake in otr modern | :05:12. | :05:16. | |
history means, for many, many innocent people in this world. Now, | :05:17. | :05:24. | |
before this happened, I had in the 1990s responsibility for cotnter | :05:25. | :05:26. | |
proliferation in the Conservative government at the time. And I accept | :05:27. | :05:30. | |
that the behaviour of the S`ddam Hussein regime was peculiar, to say | :05:31. | :05:37. | |
the least. As far as we could tell from inspections and from otr | :05:38. | :05:41. | |
intelligence, they did not have weapons of mass destruction and they | :05:42. | :05:50. | |
had no workable WMD programle but they were deliberately creating | :05:51. | :05:54. | |
confusion about that fact bx not cooperating at the time and by | :05:55. | :05:58. | |
moving trucks from one site to another before inspections `rrived. | :05:59. | :06:02. | |
Probably because they were keeping Iran convinced that they had a WMD | :06:03. | :06:07. | |
regime. That was what they were worried about, not us, that | :06:08. | :06:10. | |
next-door neighbour against whom they'd had a massive war not long | :06:11. | :06:14. | |
before. So that does explain some of the strange behaviour of thd Saddam | :06:15. | :06:19. | |
regime. And at that time, I guess, until just before 2001, the general | :06:20. | :06:26. | |
belief was that this was a loderate, controllable threat. | :06:27. | :06:30. | |
In deed, our Middle East spdcialist in amongst our delegation to the UN | :06:31. | :06:39. | |
said, when I first took the job I was briefed, basically, we don't | :06:40. | :06:42. | |
think there is anything there. We're justifying sanctions on the basis | :06:43. | :06:47. | |
that Iraq has not answered puestions about its past stocks. And, since | :06:48. | :06:53. | |
then, all the JIC, Sisi GC @G reports corroborate this. A moderate | :06:54. | :06:57. | |
and controllable threat at that time. -- S IS and GCHQ. Then 9/ 1 | :06:58. | :07:08. | |
shocked the world, 3000 deaths in a massive terrorist spectacul`r. Of | :07:09. | :07:13. | |
course, Tony Blair justifies his actions on the basis of that. But I | :07:14. | :07:18. | |
had to say to him that this is a reason for getting it right, not an | :07:19. | :07:24. | |
excuse for getting it wrong. It is understandable that there w`s a | :07:25. | :07:27. | |
paranoia about something else like it may happen again, either here or | :07:28. | :07:33. | |
somewhere else. And at that point came a dangerous and simplistic | :07:34. | :07:38. | |
compilation between the real threat from Al-Qaeda, a real, presdnt and | :07:39. | :07:46. | |
continuing threat, from our cave, and Iraq and the axis of evhl | :07:47. | :07:50. | |
nonsense generated by President Bush at this time. The friction was | :07:51. | :07:55. | |
reinforced in February 2002 when the Americans rendered to Egypt someone | :07:56. | :08:06. | |
who was tortured and asked whether there was a chemical biologhcal | :08:07. | :08:10. | |
weapon relationship to be in Iraq and Al-Qaeda. He was torturdd, | :08:11. | :08:15. | |
essentially, until he said xes. That was the evidence that Colin Powell | :08:16. | :08:20. | |
cited, members of the house might remember, in United Nations when he | :08:21. | :08:23. | |
said we have substantial evhdence of this case. Of course, it was fiction | :08:24. | :08:27. | |
obtained under torture. I al quite sure that that intelligence was | :08:28. | :08:33. | |
shared with Mr Blair. And hd would have foundered, because you probably | :08:34. | :08:37. | |
did not know source, persuasive that this was told to them by an | :08:38. | :08:43. | |
Al-Qaeda commander. So at some point between December 2001 and what is in | :08:44. | :08:46. | |
the Chilcot Report, probablx by March 2002, certainly by July 2 02, | :08:47. | :08:52. | |
Mr Blair respectively signed up written to the American milhtary | :08:53. | :08:57. | |
effort. And as I think my rhght honourable friend said, the issue | :08:58. | :09:02. | |
was not soldiers, it was our reputation, our involvement that | :09:03. | :09:07. | |
legitimised the American action This produced a problem for our | :09:08. | :09:14. | |
Prime Minister. Under American law, to go to war on the basis of regime | :09:15. | :09:19. | |
change is entirely legal. They do not recognise the International laws | :09:20. | :09:25. | |
that render it otherwise, and so for them regime change is perfectly | :09:26. | :09:32. | |
legitimate, a perfectly leghtimate aim. From what you said, and the | :09:33. | :09:39. | |
comments and the items that another member referred to in his speech, | :09:40. | :09:44. | |
Tony Blair also agreed with that. That he has a problem. Our law does | :09:45. | :09:49. | |
not allow it. International law does not allow it. He saw his role as | :09:50. | :09:55. | |
building a coalition to support the Americans. Nothing dishonourable in | :09:56. | :09:58. | |
that if he believed the aim, nothing dishonourable in that if yot believe | :09:59. | :10:02. | |
the aim. But, to do that, hd had to achieve a number of rings, he had to | :10:03. | :10:07. | |
create a Casas Belle Isle under international law. He needed Bruce | :10:08. | :10:16. | |
of a terrorist threat, a UN resolution and proof of the | :10:17. | :10:23. | |
legality. They put in place you when 1441. -- UN 1441. They said this was | :10:24. | :10:31. | |
the last opportunity for Ir`q to claim its disarmament oblig`tions. | :10:32. | :10:36. | |
There was a 15-0 vote for that, but as the right honourable ladx just | :10:37. | :10:40. | |
said it did not include a ddliberate trigger to war, it required a | :10:41. | :10:43. | |
further resolution. The UN inspectorate went in, they did 00 | :10:44. | :10:50. | |
inspections over 500 sites. Interestingly, they went three dozen | :10:51. | :10:53. | |
sites given to them the CIA and MI6 goes with all that was that the | :10:54. | :10:59. | |
weapons were, and they found not a thing, over 3.5 months they found | :11:00. | :11:04. | |
nothing what the weather. Then the American president set a tiletable, | :11:05. | :11:11. | |
which created a real problel over and above United Nations, w`r by | :11:12. | :11:15. | |
March. That is why Chilcot said that going to war was not the last | :11:16. | :11:21. | |
resort. It was not. It gave Mr Blair report. What did he do? Manx other | :11:22. | :11:26. | |
countries viewed the inspection process is incomplete, France, | :11:27. | :11:31. | |
Russia, of course, it was. They lost the UN voted 11-4. When he came back | :11:32. | :11:37. | |
here to the UK, he had to whn a votes in the House of Commons, a | :11:38. | :11:40. | |
debate in the House of Commons. He made what some people think was the | :11:41. | :11:44. | |
greatest speech of his life. But in order to persuade the House of | :11:45. | :11:47. | |
Commons he had to say three things which were a clear, sorry, five | :11:48. | :11:52. | |
things which were a clear misrepresentation. He accusdd France | :11:53. | :11:56. | |
of saying they would never votes for war. That was simply not trte. But | :11:57. | :12:01. | |
only is it not true, he is not true. I refer to an interview givdn on | :12:02. | :12:06. | |
Radio 4 in the last year by Sir Stephen Wall. One of his Foreign | :12:07. | :12:13. | |
Office advisers in Number Tdn privy to some things. He said what really | :12:14. | :12:18. | |
was said was that as of now, France will votes against. When it was put | :12:19. | :12:22. | |
to him, so Downing Street deliberately lied about the | :12:23. | :12:25. | |
statement, he said, yes, deliberately lied about Jacpues | :12:26. | :12:30. | |
Chirac has macro statement. Two things which were misrepresdntations | :12:31. | :12:38. | |
were quotations from the UN inspectors' reports. Since H have no | :12:39. | :12:43. | |
time, I will very quickly rdad what Hans Blix, the head of the | :12:44. | :12:46. | |
inspectorate, said. If the British Government had gone to the British | :12:47. | :12:50. | |
Parliament in 2003 and said we have a lot of things unaccounted for and | :12:51. | :12:53. | |
we suspect there may be somdthing, we think it is safer to inv`de them, | :12:54. | :12:58. | |
with the British Parliament have dreamt of saying yes to such a | :12:59. | :13:02. | |
thing? I don't think so. I think in order to go ahead, they needed to | :13:03. | :13:04. | |
make the allegation that thdy made, which were not sustainable. They | :13:05. | :13:10. | |
misrepresented what we did hn order to get authorisation they should not | :13:11. | :13:15. | |
have had. That is what Tony Blair did in the House of Commons, that | :13:16. | :13:23. | |
was Hans Blix's you. Mr Blahr also said that Hussein Kamal, Saddam | :13:24. | :13:28. | |
Hussein has macro son-in-law, had told the Allies that the we`pons of | :13:29. | :13:36. | |
mass destruction... Will yot give way? I will. That is what I have in | :13:37. | :13:40. | |
mind. Going back to the point madd before, | :13:41. | :13:44. | |
does he think that, with hindsight, as Hans Blix was perfectly willing | :13:45. | :13:49. | |
to carry on with inspections, the Americans could have been dhssuaded | :13:50. | :13:54. | |
to delay for another month, then possibly this could have bedn | :13:55. | :13:57. | |
avoided? But the Americans were dismissing Senedd Hans Blix as a | :13:58. | :14:02. | |
waste of time and trying to get him out of the way? -- were dislissing | :14:03. | :14:08. | |
Hans Blix? Yes, but Tony Bl`ir chose to come to Parliament to | :14:09. | :14:14. | |
misrepresent the case. He also misrepresented the line put by Mr | :14:15. | :14:18. | |
Hussein Kamal, later killed by Saddam Hussein, as saying that | :14:19. | :14:22. | |
weapons of mass destruction -- the weapons of mass destruction | :14:23. | :14:26. | |
programme is continuing. In interview with the inspectorate he | :14:27. | :14:29. | |
said the weapons of mass destruction had all been destroyed by 1891. | :14:30. | :14:35. | |
Finally, Mr Blair was asked what would be the risk of terrorhsm | :14:36. | :14:44. | |
arising from this war? The Prime Minister did not give an answer | :14:45. | :14:48. | |
despite having been told by the JIC and by MI5 that this would hncrease | :14:49. | :14:54. | |
the international risk of tdrrorism and the domestic risk of terrorism | :14:55. | :14:58. | |
and would destabilise the states in the area. So five County | :14:59. | :15:04. | |
misrepresented the substanthve aspect of the argument for the war | :15:05. | :15:10. | |
to this House. If this has lacro is to give decisions on war in the | :15:11. | :15:14. | |
future it must be able to rdly on being told the truth, the whole | :15:15. | :15:18. | |
truth and nothing but the truth by our Prime Minister. | :15:19. | :15:25. | |
Governor Mr Hilary Benn. For those of us who took that fateful decision | :15:26. | :15:32. | |
on the 18th of March 2003, the Chilcot Report makes diffictlt and | :15:33. | :15:35. | |
uncomfortable reading. Our thoughts above all should be with thd | :15:36. | :15:39. | |
families, Iraqi and British, who lost loved ones in the conflict But | :15:40. | :15:44. | |
members who voted for war, `nd I was one, did so in good faith. H agree | :15:45. | :15:48. | |
with my right honourable frhend I do not think that we were mhsled or | :15:49. | :15:54. | |
lied to and, more importantly, nor does the Chilcot Report conclude | :15:55. | :15:58. | |
that. But we must all take full share of the responsibility for that | :15:59. | :16:03. | |
decision and, indeed, as we now know, the intelligence was wrong. | :16:04. | :16:07. | |
Even though, and my right honourable friend made the point, any | :16:08. | :16:11. | |
countries, many people, including a rock's neighbours, some of his own | :16:12. | :16:15. | |
military and the elected nehghbours all thought that Iraq possessed | :16:16. | :16:20. | |
them. Had we known the truth of the time the House would never have | :16:21. | :16:23. | |
voted for war, nor would I, and for that we should apologise, and I | :16:24. | :16:28. | |
certainly do. But we could only decide at the time on the b`sis of | :16:29. | :16:34. | |
what we thought we knew. I `lso however, wish to say this. Hf I am | :16:35. | :16:39. | |
asked, do I regret the fact that Saddam Hussein is no longer in | :16:40. | :16:44. | |
power? My reply is, no, I do not. Because he was a brutal dictator who | :16:45. | :16:50. | |
had killed hundreds of thousands of his own citizens and used chemical | :16:51. | :16:56. | |
weapons upon them. I want to reflect briefly on three issues, thd tasks | :16:57. | :17:00. | |
we faced a reconstruction why Iraq was as it was answer wider lessons. | :17:01. | :17:05. | |
The problems faced in Basra and surrounding provinces in 2003 was | :17:06. | :17:10. | |
not the humanitarian crisis we had anticipated, but a different set of | :17:11. | :17:13. | |
circumstances altogether. The dysfunction a shall and the problems | :17:14. | :17:18. | |
of the CPA because of the f`ilure to plan, the legacy of Saddam's dig | :17:19. | :17:23. | |
Tata ship, because while we were trying to persuade authorithes in | :17:24. | :17:26. | |
the south to talk to Baghdad, the last thing they wanted to do was to | :17:27. | :17:29. | |
do that, because they remembered what dealing with dad had hd with in | :17:30. | :17:37. | |
the past -- Mac... What dealing with Baghdad had been in the past. Though | :17:38. | :17:42. | |
one has mentioned thus far hn this debate bomb that killed Sergio | :17:43. | :17:50. | |
Vieira to mellow and 23 of his staff in August 2003 in the Canal Hotel | :17:51. | :17:57. | |
which was the beginning, in fact, of the insurgency which grew stronger | :17:58. | :18:00. | |
with each passing month. On the problem faced with reconstrtction | :18:01. | :18:04. | |
was not one of many macro. The Chilcot Report concludes, and I | :18:05. | :18:11. | |
quote, there are no indicathon that activities were constrained by a | :18:12. | :18:16. | |
lack of resources. Iraq was and is still a medal in country with oil. | :18:17. | :18:24. | |
-- a middle-income country. The problem was spending is bec`use of | :18:25. | :18:27. | |
rapidly deteriorating securhty. No sooner did we try to fix solething, | :18:28. | :18:32. | |
and we made a contribution to improving electricity and w`ter | :18:33. | :18:36. | |
supply in the country, that people would try to blow it up. I want to | :18:37. | :18:39. | |
place on record my thanks to the huge contribution made by m`ny | :18:40. | :18:44. | |
courageous individuals that I had the privilege of working with, from | :18:45. | :18:48. | |
Deptford and other departments, British and Iraqi, military and | :18:49. | :18:53. | |
civilian, humanitarian staff, who tried to help the people of Iraq in | :18:54. | :19:00. | |
the most difficult circumst`nces. They all acted in the best | :19:01. | :19:04. | |
traditions of public servicd. We should thank them for what they do. | :19:05. | :19:09. | |
I will give way. While I am most grateful for him | :19:10. | :19:13. | |
giving way and I would 100% endorse the thanks and tributes he has just | :19:14. | :19:19. | |
paid to DFID officials, he has passed rather rapidly over the | :19:20. | :19:23. | |
months afterwards in which `ppeared to be no planning for reconstruction | :19:24. | :19:26. | |
at all. I will freely acknowledge one of the | :19:27. | :19:31. | |
failures, and it is laid out very, very clearly in the report was, | :19:32. | :19:36. | |
indeed, the failure to plan in advance of the decision takdn on the | :19:37. | :19:43. | |
18th of March 2003, and those lessons which we must learn. But the | :19:44. | :19:49. | |
truth is that Iraq was a suppressed, repressed and brutalised society in | :19:50. | :19:54. | |
which Saddam was the lead on the pressure cooker. And when hd left, | :19:55. | :19:58. | |
the lid came off. We have sden it in other countries, Libya has been | :19:59. | :20:03. | |
mentioned in the debate so far. My right honourable friend was right | :20:04. | :20:07. | |
when she said that those who seek to blame all of the subsequent events | :20:08. | :20:13. | |
on the decision to invade mhss the responsibility that others have for | :20:14. | :20:20. | |
what has gone on. We have to (INAUDIBLE) | :20:21. | :20:22. | |
For the responsibility and to disband the Iraqi army, meaning that | :20:23. | :20:26. | |
thousands of men had no sal`ry, no income but a gun and a grievance. | :20:27. | :20:32. | |
That is a profound mistake. But Iraqi politicians also have to | :20:33. | :20:35. | |
bearing responsibility for the sectarian policies that thex have | :20:36. | :20:39. | |
pursued, and those still letting of suicide bombs cannot look to us and | :20:40. | :20:47. | |
say look what you made me do. They must bear responsibility for what | :20:48. | :20:52. | |
they themselves have chosen to do to their fellow citizens. The best | :20:53. | :20:54. | |
evidence for the difference that good politics and good governance | :20:55. | :20:59. | |
can make in Iraq is shown bx the Kurdish region which, let us not | :21:00. | :21:04. | |
forget, was as it was in part because of the support that we had | :21:05. | :21:08. | |
given them through the no-fly zone. As a result they are now thd most | :21:09. | :21:14. | |
stable and relatively prospdrous part of Iraq, and I pay tribute as | :21:15. | :21:19. | |
others have, to the role th`t the Peshmerga have played and still play | :21:20. | :21:23. | |
in trying to defeat dice. The Kurds regard the 2003 invasion as a | :21:24. | :21:31. | |
liberation. As the Kurdistan regional government representative | :21:32. | :21:35. | |
to the UK wrote this week about the Chilcot Report, and I quote, there | :21:36. | :21:41. | |
was an Iraq before the 2003 invasion, an Iraq that, for | :21:42. | :21:45. | |
millions, was a concentration camp on the surface, and a mass grave | :21:46. | :21:52. | |
beneath. And you only have to go back, Mr Speaker, to read the report | :21:53. | :21:55. | |
of Human Rights Watch to sed what they had to say at the time about | :21:56. | :22:01. | |
the mass executions, the Masters appearances, the use of chelical | :22:02. | :22:06. | |
weapons, the suppression of the Shia majority, particularly after the | :22:07. | :22:12. | |
1991 uprising, and the attelpts by Saddam to eradicate the poptlation | :22:13. | :22:16. | |
and culture of the Marsh Ar`bs, who had resided consider is the -- | :22:17. | :22:21. | |
continuously in the Martians for more than 5000 years. And that is | :22:22. | :22:25. | |
what life was like, we should not forget it. | :22:26. | :22:31. | |
At least today Iraq has a fragile democracy. Whatever our views on | :22:32. | :22:39. | |
what happened 13 years ago we have a continuing responsibility to assist | :22:40. | :22:43. | |
especially when the democratically elected government asks for our help | :22:44. | :22:48. | |
and this is why this House was right in 2014 to provide support hn | :22:49. | :22:52. | |
helping them to defeat Daesh. And we've seen the benefit of that | :22:53. | :22:56. | |
support in the progress madd in the months since. And we've also | :22:57. | :23:01. | |
discovered more about what Daesh to as towns have been liberated. Which | :23:02. | :23:07. | |
was why this House was right to vote unanimously to describe what is | :23:08. | :23:11. | |
being done to the Yazidis, Christian and other religious minorithes in | :23:12. | :23:16. | |
Iraq and Syria as genocide `t the hands of Daesh. And I wish the | :23:17. | :23:21. | |
government would do what thd House asked and take that to the TN | :23:22. | :23:26. | |
security Council so it can be passed the International criminal Court. | :23:27. | :23:30. | |
Finally, Mr Speaker, the wider lessons. For too long in foreign | :23:31. | :23:34. | |
affairs governments often argued, that of the strong man we know know | :23:35. | :23:37. | |
the Mercure swiftly. Even when that strong man is a brutal murddring | :23:38. | :23:41. | |
dictator, but got what happdns when the strong falls. In Libya, Egypt, | :23:42. | :23:50. | |
and indeed in Iraq. Three ydars after the end of World War HI United | :23:51. | :23:54. | |
Nations proclaimed the inverse of declaration of human rights. Article | :23:55. | :23:59. | |
three states that everyone has the right to life, liberty and freedom | :24:00. | :24:04. | |
from persecution. Everyone hs entitled to an international and | :24:05. | :24:07. | |
social order in which the rhghts of freedom set forth in this | :24:08. | :24:11. | |
declaration can be fully re`lised. And yet for millions in the world | :24:12. | :24:15. | |
those rights, nobly expressdd, have remained words on paper. And they | :24:16. | :24:20. | |
certainly have during the thme of Saddam Hussein 's rule. Surdly Mr | :24:21. | :24:26. | |
Speaker, this will not do. Having created the United Nations, why | :24:27. | :24:30. | |
don't we have the same responsibility internationally to | :24:31. | :24:35. | |
ensure that the principles of the universal suppression of hulan | :24:36. | :24:39. | |
rights are given expression and we have managed to achieve in our own | :24:40. | :24:43. | |
country for example of many years. Now it is the responsibilitx of the | :24:44. | :24:49. | |
United Nations Security Council to do it, it is why we created the | :24:50. | :24:56. | |
United Nations, it is why it has a moral responsibility and legitimacy | :24:57. | :24:59. | |
to act and it is why indeed I am a strong supporter of the | :25:00. | :25:05. | |
responsibility to protect. Because that principle says that st`te 0 is | :25:06. | :25:10. | |
not absolute and the intern`tional community has a responsibilhty to | :25:11. | :25:14. | |
act in certain circumstances. And finally what I think Chilcot forces | :25:15. | :25:19. | |
us to consider, even though it is not spoken about in the report, is, | :25:20. | :25:24. | |
while there are always consdquences to taking action and we meet today | :25:25. | :25:28. | |
to discuss them and their ldgacy, there are also consequences, always, | :25:29. | :25:35. | |
of not doing so. And for me this is the main lesson of Iraq. Before as | :25:36. | :25:45. | |
well as after 2003. I'm going to bring my remarks to a concltsion. I | :25:46. | :25:49. | |
will do because some many others wished his big. As a world, we have | :25:50. | :25:57. | |
a responsibility to be much more effective and determined to deal | :25:58. | :26:02. | |
with conflicts and countries in circumstances such as this before | :26:03. | :26:06. | |
they turn into brutal and bloody civil wars. And I believe the best | :26:07. | :26:10. | |
way to do that is to demonstrate that multilateralism, countries | :26:11. | :26:16. | |
working together, can provide the answer to that uncomfortabld | :26:17. | :26:20. | |
question, what is to be dond? Because, the more we do so, the | :26:21. | :26:25. | |
stronger will be the argument to those who would act unilaterally, | :26:26. | :26:29. | |
and at times we have to do so, we were right to act in Kosovo, will | :26:30. | :26:35. | |
write to act in Sierra Leond, but the stronger the argument that we | :26:36. | :26:37. | |
can make that there is another, a better way, but for that to happen | :26:38. | :26:45. | |
the UN needs to do the job for which it was created. After the ndxt | :26:46. | :26:49. | |
speaker I am trying to accolmodate as many colleagues as possible, it | :26:50. | :26:53. | |
will be necessary to reduce the limit to six units. I'm sorry, it is | :26:54. | :26:59. | |
inevitable. Mr Andrew Mitchdll. It is a pleasure to follow the right | :27:00. | :27:03. | |
honourable gentleman I followed regularly when we were both on the | :27:04. | :27:06. | |
front bench our respective parties. By the end of this debate should be | :27:07. | :27:12. | |
to heal wounds and learn lessons, I fear that the debate will bd | :27:13. | :27:15. | |
characterised by a discussion of whether Mr Blair is guilty or very | :27:16. | :27:20. | |
guilty. And it seems to me that such a discussion would betray the | :27:21. | :27:23. | |
interests of all those whosd loved ones were placed in harms w`y and | :27:24. | :27:29. | |
who paid the ultimate price as well as the thousands of Iraqis who lost | :27:30. | :27:33. | |
their lives. It is the entire system of governance that we need to hold | :27:34. | :27:37. | |
to account, not just a Primd Minister, if we are to achidve | :27:38. | :27:41. | |
resolution and benefit from this. I sat over their in 2003 and heard | :27:42. | :27:48. | |
what the prime ministers sahd, and supported his judgment. That | :27:49. | :27:51. | |
judgment could not have been reached and acted on by the Prime Mhnister | :27:52. | :27:56. | |
without the active support or at least the passive acquiescence of | :27:57. | :27:59. | |
the machinery of government. Before we come to the lessons for the | :28:00. | :28:02. | |
future it seems to me that the central allegations by all down to | :28:03. | :28:09. | |
two. First, the intelligencd was wrong and secondly, a culture of | :28:10. | :28:13. | |
self government, a lack of accountable structures for | :28:14. | :28:17. | |
decision-making and inadequ`te procedures provided. Having used the | :28:18. | :28:20. | |
product of the three intellhgence agencies whilst I was on thd | :28:21. | :28:25. | |
national security council and in Cabinet, I used to no one in my | :28:26. | :28:30. | |
admiration and respect for those who carried out what is often dhfficult | :28:31. | :28:35. | |
and dangerous work. There are people at GCHQ who could use their talents | :28:36. | :28:38. | |
in the commercial world for ten times what they paid by the | :28:39. | :28:42. | |
taxpayer, yet they choose to serve their country instead and wd should | :28:43. | :28:46. | |
honour and respect them for that. I have no hesitation in saying from my | :28:47. | :28:50. | |
experience that if those who work in the agencies were asked to do | :28:51. | :28:54. | |
something improper by their political masters they would refuse | :28:55. | :28:58. | |
to do so. Intelligence by its very nature is difficult to hold to | :28:59. | :29:03. | |
account. The normal rules of transparency and openness shmply | :29:04. | :29:07. | |
don't apply. The sourcing of intelligence is by definition | :29:08. | :29:11. | |
complex and we cannot talk `bout it in any detail. In one instance while | :29:12. | :29:17. | |
I was developed and Secretary, intelligence really seeped on a | :29:18. | :29:21. | |
particular situated in Africa was wrong. Yet afford for this drror did | :29:22. | :29:25. | |
not live with Britain or with British intelligence -- the fault. | :29:26. | :29:31. | |
On the issue of informality it was clear that there was a lack of | :29:32. | :29:35. | |
Cabinet structure and accountability and an extraordinary inform`lity | :29:36. | :29:39. | |
and, let's say, flexibility in the use of the Attorney General and his | :29:40. | :29:44. | |
legal opinions. Critical lessons have been learned, and cruchally, | :29:45. | :29:48. | |
resulting, as has been said in this debate, the setting up of the | :29:49. | :29:52. | |
National security council, `nd here I come to a point made about the | :29:53. | :29:57. | |
Libyan campaign, before I do so give way. My brother served in both | :29:58. | :30:03. | |
Gulf wars. He talks about sdrver government and the lessons of poor | :30:04. | :30:13. | |
government structures. The dxecutive summary details the delay and | :30:14. | :30:18. | |
allowing the military to prdpare, and the resulting lack of epuipment | :30:19. | :30:22. | |
and preparedness for our Arled Forces, going into Iraq. Dods he | :30:23. | :30:27. | |
believe as I do and as others do that this unnecessary costs some of | :30:28. | :30:33. | |
our forces's lives? The honourable gentleman takes a point abott the | :30:34. | :30:38. | |
importance of having accountable structures, not in formal | :30:39. | :30:41. | |
machineries of government, `s I was saying. I come to the Libya | :30:42. | :30:46. | |
campaign. First, there was ` proper process by which legal advice was | :30:47. | :30:52. | |
given to the Cabinet. But's and responsibilities in the conflict | :30:53. | :30:57. | |
were made clear at the first Cabinet meeting -- Britain's | :30:58. | :31:01. | |
responsibilities. The securhty council met on numerous occ`sions as | :31:02. | :31:06. | |
well as an inert subcommittde of the Council on which I sat. As well as | :31:07. | :31:12. | |
the conduct of the campaign we discussed the humanitarian campaign | :31:13. | :31:17. | |
and preparations for stabilhsation on a daily basis. There was no | :31:18. | :31:22. | |
invasion as such but the Defence Secretary to personal responsibility | :31:23. | :31:27. | |
for targeting to ensure that damage was minimised and the loss of human | :31:28. | :31:30. | |
life was mercifully extremely limited. I'm discharging its | :31:31. | :31:36. | |
monetarily and responsibility, lessons were carefully learned and | :31:37. | :31:39. | |
as the Foreign Secretary emphasised, Britain did a very good job. We | :31:40. | :31:45. | |
organised the planes and shhps that successfully transported several | :31:46. | :31:49. | |
migrant to safety from as f`r afield as the Philippines and Baghdad and | :31:50. | :31:55. | |
removed them from harm 's w`y. The evacuation of 5000 migrants at Ms | :31:56. | :32:00. | |
Rutter was greatly assisted by Britain, for which the international | :32:01. | :32:03. | |
committee deserves the highdst praise. When Tripoli was in danger | :32:04. | :32:09. | |
of running out of water it was our agency and the United Nations that | :32:10. | :32:13. | |
lamented the plan to providd an emergency and the provision of food | :32:14. | :32:18. | |
and medicines to areas of Lhbya in conflict without either was | :32:19. | :32:22. | |
successfully accomplished. Ly point, Mr Speaker is that very specific | :32:23. | :32:28. | |
lessons from the failures in Iraq were understood, and lessons | :32:29. | :32:33. | |
implemented in respect of otr humanitarian responsibilitids. But | :32:34. | :32:38. | |
it is the issue of post-conflict stabilisation which attracts strong | :32:39. | :32:45. | |
criticism in respect of Irap and Libya, where it states that | :32:46. | :32:48. | |
stabilisation is a fake. I want to make it clear that lessons were | :32:49. | :32:52. | |
learned and immediately milhtary action in Libya started our focus | :32:53. | :33:02. | |
was done. Britain is set up an international unit and workdd | :33:03. | :33:05. | |
closely with the United Nathons who were to have the lead responsibility | :33:06. | :33:08. | |
for stabilisation when the conflict ended. Britain supplied expdrtise, | :33:09. | :33:12. | |
officials, funding, drawing on the lessons of Iraq. Doing the war we | :33:13. | :33:17. | |
gave technical support to the central bank and to such organs of | :33:18. | :33:23. | |
the state as existed. The contrast with Iraq where the police `nd | :33:24. | :33:28. | |
security services was in thd abolished, we took signific`nt steps | :33:29. | :33:31. | |
to ensure that the police in Libya, who had not been engaged in human | :33:32. | :33:36. | |
rights abuses, could be reassured, for example by direct text lessages, | :33:37. | :33:41. | |
that they still had a job and should abort or duty when the fighting | :33:42. | :33:45. | |
diminished. We are prepared -- reporter duty. We prepared | :33:46. | :33:50. | |
extensively, especially through the support we gave to UN institutions | :33:51. | :33:53. | |
to help stabilise the futurd of Libya. Yet the simple probldm that | :33:54. | :33:57. | |
we faced was that there was no peace to stabilise. When the war was over, | :33:58. | :34:04. | |
different factions in a country with limited structures outside the get | :34:05. | :34:10. | |
our free family -- outside the GROANS FROM CROWD | :34:11. | :34:12. | |
Family, fractured. You can make all the arguments you | :34:13. | :34:16. | |
like for post-conflict stabhlisation yet if there is no peace to | :34:17. | :34:21. | |
stabilise, non-military opthons are severely limited. Lessons ldarned | :34:22. | :34:28. | |
from Iraq. And then applied in Libya have continued in respect to the | :34:29. | :34:32. | |
British efforts in severe. We've already made a huge commitmdnt in | :34:33. | :34:36. | |
terms of funding to stabilise that country when peace finally comes. We | :34:37. | :34:41. | |
have played a more comprehensive role in humanitarian relief | :34:42. | :34:47. | |
Aranzubia van the whole of the rest of the European Union put together. | :34:48. | :34:52. | |
We were the first country to put significant sums of our taxpayers's | :34:53. | :34:57. | |
money into one refugee in 2012, precisely because we understood the | :34:58. | :35:03. | |
approaching calamity -- one refugee camp. The lessons we learned from | :35:04. | :35:08. | |
the Chilcot Report will shape our understanding of our place hn the | :35:09. | :35:13. | |
world. We'll make it supporting because of liberal interventionism, | :35:14. | :35:16. | |
as we so successfully did in Sierra Leone and Kosovo? Or will House turn | :35:17. | :35:22. | |
its back on a discretionary intervention, even under UN | :35:23. | :35:29. | |
auspices, and stand by if God forbid another Rwandan genocide happened. | :35:30. | :35:34. | |
The post Chilcot you wrote well I help, see the right lessons learned | :35:35. | :35:38. | |
and make sure that Britain remains a key influence for good | :35:39. | :35:41. | |
internationally, willing to take military action, as a last resort, | :35:42. | :35:49. | |
when the situation requires it. Mr Tim Farron. Mr Speaker. The decision | :35:50. | :35:55. | |
to go to war is undoubtedly the most difficult one that any prim`ries, | :35:56. | :35:58. | |
any leader, any member of this House will ever have to take. The Liberal | :35:59. | :36:05. | |
Democrats are not pacifists. I'm not a pacifist. Although we do believe | :36:06. | :36:09. | |
that military action should only be used as a last resort following the | :36:10. | :36:12. | |
failure of diplomacy and only in accordance with law. The invasion of | :36:13. | :36:18. | |
Iraq in 2003 did not meet these tests, which is why, led by Charles | :36:19. | :36:23. | |
Kennedy 13 years ago, a Libdral Democrat opposed the war and his | :36:24. | :36:27. | |
recent opposition was met whth live derision by both the governlent and | :36:28. | :36:30. | |
the Conservative opposition at the time. | :36:31. | :36:36. | |
13 years and 2 million words later, those voices have been silenced and | :36:37. | :36:41. | |
Charles Kennedy is vindicatdd. It is a tragedy that he is not here to | :36:42. | :36:46. | |
experience that indication, it is equally a tragedy that neither is | :36:47. | :36:49. | |
Robin Cook. Chilcot concludds exactly what so many have known for | :36:50. | :36:54. | |
over 13 years. There was no legal strategic case that the inv`sion of | :36:55. | :36:59. | |
Iraq. It was unnecessary and military action was not a l`st | :37:00. | :37:03. | |
resort. Instead of improving security it, in fact, made our | :37:04. | :37:07. | |
country, their country and the world that we share less safe. In the case | :37:08. | :37:15. | |
of Iraq, Mr Blair appeared to be more concerned with supporthng | :37:16. | :37:18. | |
American President George Btsh than he was in pursuing British hnterest | :37:19. | :37:21. | |
and the interest of the Irapi people. The most infamous qtote | :37:22. | :37:28. | |
I'll be with you whatever, was not written to the Iraqi people | :37:29. | :37:32. | |
suffering under their undenhably cruel regime of such a brut`l | :37:33. | :37:36. | |
dictator, nor was that lettdr written to the British publhc as a | :37:37. | :37:40. | |
clear display of the priorities of our elected leader. Instead it was | :37:41. | :37:45. | |
written to a neo-conservative US president intent on proving American | :37:46. | :37:50. | |
superiority by waging war against an abstract noun. A president who was | :37:51. | :37:55. | |
failing to make dramatic advances in Afghanistan, so instead settled his | :37:56. | :38:00. | |
side on Iraq, despite the f`ct that as Chilcot stresses on and `bove | :38:01. | :38:03. | |
occasions, the overall thre`t from Iraq what you as less seriots than | :38:04. | :38:11. | |
from Iran, Libya and North Korea. Mr Blair was clearly determined to | :38:12. | :38:16. | |
follow the US into war no m`tter the consequences and effectivelx | :38:17. | :38:19. | |
committed us to the Americans no matter the evidence. We had, we | :38:20. | :38:24. | |
haven't I hope that we will continue to have an intimate and rew`rding | :38:25. | :38:27. | |
relationship with United St`tes but we allow foreign policy to be | :38:28. | :38:36. | |
defined by that relationship alone. That alone is not a sustain`ble | :38:37. | :38:41. | |
independent foreign policy. And it gave rise to making the evidence | :38:42. | :38:44. | |
that the judgment rather th`n the judgment that the evidence. Nowhere | :38:45. | :38:47. | |
is that clearer than when it comes to the legal basis of war. The | :38:48. | :38:51. | |
Attorney General's final review was little more than look warm. I | :38:52. | :38:56. | |
believe that if we are to commit thousands of young men and women to | :38:57. | :38:59. | |
circumstances whether our lhves will be put at risk, we need somdthing a | :39:00. | :39:04. | |
little bit better and more certain band, on balance. Going forward we | :39:05. | :39:09. | |
must ensure no ambiguity in the legal advice provided to thd | :39:10. | :39:11. | |
Government and Parliament on matters of military action. We must also be | :39:12. | :39:16. | |
clear on what the end goal or exit plan is for any intervention, | :39:17. | :39:20. | |
despite it being very clear very quickly there were no weapons of | :39:21. | :39:25. | |
mass destruction in Iraq, the UK found itself assuming leadership of | :39:26. | :39:29. | |
a military area of responsibility. Not only that, but despite being a | :39:30. | :39:33. | |
joint occupying power it is evident that the UK had little or no | :39:34. | :39:36. | |
influence on the overall strategy of the Americans leading us blhndly, | :39:37. | :39:42. | |
following their flawed lead. The US strategy included a policy which | :39:43. | :39:46. | |
corrupts the Iraqi state and disbanded the army, creating a | :39:47. | :39:50. | |
disenfranchised and angry group of well-trained military leaders, many | :39:51. | :39:54. | |
of whom went on to fight thd occupation and ultimately to form | :39:55. | :39:58. | |
dice. This is an appalling drror and direct league contributed to the | :39:59. | :40:02. | |
following six years of chaotic situations which saw so manx of the | :40:03. | :40:06. | |
Armed Forces put on the front line without a proper such -- strategy. I | :40:07. | :40:11. | |
hope that the Chilcot Inquiry will bring comfort to the familids of the | :40:12. | :40:15. | |
179 servicemen and women killed in Iraq, but there can be no | :40:16. | :40:18. | |
justification for them being deployed to fight on a battlefield | :40:19. | :40:21. | |
for which the proper prepar`tion was not done. There is no doubt that the | :40:22. | :40:26. | |
invasion and occupation of Hraq is that three has directly contributed | :40:27. | :40:30. | |
to the threat of world now faces from Daesh and instability hn the | :40:31. | :40:35. | |
Middle East. As I stood shotlder to shoulder with Iraqis at the vigil | :40:36. | :40:38. | |
held in London last week to remember the lives of those lost in the most | :40:39. | :40:42. | |
recent attacks in Baghdad it was clear to me what legacy has been | :40:43. | :40:46. | |
left. Last week over 300 people died in suicide attacks in Baghd`d, on | :40:47. | :40:50. | |
top of the tragedies in Ist`nbul, Paris and elsewhere. Terrorhsts are | :40:51. | :40:54. | |
responsible for these horrific events. The Iraq war is responsible | :40:55. | :40:59. | |
for creating the vacuum in which terrorism, Daesh in particular, were | :41:00. | :41:04. | |
formed and anti-Western sentiment thrived, despite being advised at | :41:05. | :41:09. | |
the time that this was a risk. Mr Speaker, Liberal Democrats `re | :41:10. | :41:12. | |
outward facial internationalists, we believe Britain should engage in the | :41:13. | :41:16. | |
world, not turn our backs. We believe our country has a strong | :41:17. | :41:20. | |
role in promoting democracy, inhuman Andrew Dodt law across the globe. | :41:21. | :41:24. | |
Sometimes, rarely, that will mean taking military action. But the Iraq | :41:25. | :41:29. | |
war has tarnished reputation, ignored national law and undermined | :41:30. | :41:33. | |
international institutions like the UN, which we worked so hard at | :41:34. | :41:37. | |
building in the aftermath of two world wars. It destroyed public | :41:38. | :41:40. | |
confidence in leaders and P`rliament and aided infinitely more dhfficult | :41:41. | :41:44. | |
for Government to make the case for war by making the prospect of | :41:45. | :41:47. | |
humanitarian intervention all the more unpalatable to many. | :41:48. | :41:55. | |
Sir Roger Gale. On the 18th of March 2003, Mr Blair took the House of | :41:56. | :41:59. | |
Commons that he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in | :42:00. | :42:02. | |
possession of WMDs as a real and present danger to Britain and its | :42:03. | :42:07. | |
national security. When Sir John Chilcot presented his report to the | :42:08. | :42:13. | |
families of some of those khlled in the Iraq war, those families include | :42:14. | :42:18. | |
the parents of the tenant M`rk Lawrence, a young naval avi`tor one | :42:19. | :42:22. | |
of my constituents killed in a Sea King helicopter, he was rather more | :42:23. | :42:25. | |
robust than in the conclusions in the act will report. He said that | :42:26. | :42:31. | |
the judgments about the sevdrity of the threat posed by Iraq 's WMDs | :42:32. | :42:37. | |
were presented with a certahnty not justified. Mr Speaker, on the Bob | :42:38. | :42:49. | |
the vote on the Iraq war, -, on BET for the vote on the Iraq war, a | :42:50. | :42:54. | |
number on the opposition benches had concerns about what we were to | :42:55. | :42:58. | |
undertake and ask our young men and women in our armed services to | :42:59. | :43:02. | |
undertake. We were called into an office by my right honourable | :43:03. | :43:06. | |
friends the members the Chingford and Woodford Green, then thd Leader | :43:07. | :43:11. | |
of the Opposition, and by the Shadow Foreign Minister, then the lember of | :43:12. | :43:19. | |
Parliament for devices. We were told by the Right Honourable member for | :43:20. | :43:23. | |
Chingford that he had been hnformed on Privy Council terms that there | :43:24. | :43:27. | |
were weapons of mass destruction, that the UK, or the interests of the | :43:28. | :43:34. | |
UK faced a 45 minute threat from those weapons and that it w`s | :43:35. | :43:41. | |
imperative in the interests of our national security that we should | :43:42. | :43:47. | |
support the motion that was to be put before the house. And I think I | :43:48. | :43:52. | |
am right in saying that all but one of us, on that basis, concurred Mr | :43:53. | :44:01. | |
Deputy Speaker, I don't doubt the information given to me by ly right | :44:02. | :44:05. | |
honourable friends, but I bdlieve that he was misled on Privy Council | :44:06. | :44:10. | |
terms. You have heard, the Haas has heard from my right honourable | :44:11. | :44:15. | |
friend the member for Hull Tim Price of the five reasons, the five items | :44:16. | :44:21. | |
on which Mr Blair misled thd house. Yes, we do have to loan frol this. I | :44:22. | :44:26. | |
have to take it, because I voted that way, for the death of ly young | :44:27. | :44:33. | |
constituents and, by location, the deaths of hundreds of armed | :44:34. | :44:37. | |
personnel in the Armed Forcds and many, many, many civilians. But I | :44:38. | :44:43. | |
believe, Mr Speaker, that if a motion for contempt is brought | :44:44. | :44:47. | |
before you, you should look favourably upon a hearing for it. | :44:48. | :44:52. | |
Because I believe that we owe that to the families of those who have | :44:53. | :44:59. | |
lost loved ones in this conflict. George Howarth. A pleasure to follow | :45:00. | :45:03. | |
the honourable member for North Thanet. I would like to say at the | :45:04. | :45:09. | |
outset that I very much want to share the common that were lade when | :45:10. | :45:15. | |
he opened this debate, and the Secretary of State and others have | :45:16. | :45:19. | |
made them since, about the heavy price paid by those who lost their | :45:20. | :45:24. | |
lives, who were seriously injured and all the consequences from that | :45:25. | :45:29. | |
to those families. As somebody who is a member of this -- was ` member | :45:30. | :45:37. | |
of this Haas in 2003, I welcome the Chilcot Report and want to | :45:38. | :45:40. | |
concentrate on two specific issues. First, my own motive for supporting | :45:41. | :45:45. | |
the motion, and secondly post-conflict planning. Chilcot | :45:46. | :45:51. | |
offers an interesting, detahled analysis of the processes whthin the | :45:52. | :45:55. | |
Government at the time and on the status of intelligence used to | :45:56. | :45:57. | |
justify the action that has followed. Given the exhausthve | :45:58. | :46:04. | |
detail and the time invested in arriving at the conclusions in the | :46:05. | :46:07. | |
report, I do not intend to criticise what it says. Up until the time of | :46:08. | :46:14. | |
the vote, my own position h`d been that although I accept UN Sdcurity | :46:15. | :46:21. | |
Council 1441 provided sufficient authority for any action, it would | :46:22. | :46:26. | |
have been better to have secured a second Security Council resolution. | :46:27. | :46:31. | |
I say that even though therd have in 14 previous Security Council | :46:32. | :46:35. | |
resolutions which had been passed on the widely held assumption that | :46:36. | :46:40. | |
Saddam Hussein had the capacity and was prepared to use weapons of mass | :46:41. | :46:45. | |
destruction. Indeed, it was well-documented that he had in the | :46:46. | :46:49. | |
past used such weapons against the Iraqi people. However, when | :46:50. | :46:55. | |
President Xi rack effectively vetoed any further UN Security Council | :46:56. | :47:01. | |
resolutions -- when President Jacques Chirac effectively be any | :47:02. | :47:06. | |
further UN security resoluthons .. I am not giving way, I do not have | :47:07. | :47:10. | |
sufficient time. It seemed that resolution 1441 and the othdr | :47:11. | :47:14. | |
previous resolutions had to be upheld, otherwise international | :47:15. | :47:15. | |
collective will would have been meaningless. There was another | :47:16. | :47:22. | |
important to manage Terry rdason why I felt compelled to support the | :47:23. | :47:25. | |
proposed action. -- imported you manage Terry in action. Havhng | :47:26. | :47:31. | |
spoken to many Iraqis on thd receiving end of vicious attacks by | :47:32. | :47:36. | |
the Hussein regime, particularly Iraqi Kurds, I felt bad non`ction | :47:37. | :47:41. | |
would have been an abdication of humanitarian responsibility. That is | :47:42. | :47:44. | |
very much influenced by my right honourable friend who had unrivalled | :47:45. | :47:50. | |
knowledge about what was actually happening in Iraq and the present -- | :47:51. | :47:55. | |
the appalling abuse of human rights that was beyond question bexond | :47:56. | :48:01. | |
them. In 2002 I visited both Baghdad and Basra, together with a lember of | :48:02. | :48:09. | |
the Uxbridge and South Ruislip, who at the time was the member for | :48:10. | :48:14. | |
Henley. The purpose of that visit was to attend the inaugurathon of | :48:15. | :48:17. | |
the transitional national assembly, and in an article following the | :48:18. | :48:25. | |
visit in The Spectator of the 1 th of March 2005, you concluded, I | :48:26. | :48:29. | |
could, it could still just `bout work, and if it does, I think it | :48:30. | :48:33. | |
would be possible to draw a positive balance on this venture. -- he | :48:34. | :48:38. | |
concluded. In an interview of the North Wales edition of The Daily | :48:39. | :48:42. | |
Post, another member of the delegation, then the member for a | :48:43. | :48:51. | |
constituency in Wales, said that although he had opposed the action | :48:52. | :48:57. | |
in Iraq, politicians across the spectre do not wish us to whthdraw | :48:58. | :49:01. | |
straightaway. The member for Henley concluded with the words of an Iraqi | :49:02. | :49:05. | |
minister, the quote is, thank you, people written, for what yot have | :49:06. | :49:09. | |
done. We give you thanks, praise and love. You build this countrx eight | :49:10. | :49:14. | |
decades ago and it did not work Now you are rebuilding and it h`s to | :49:15. | :49:17. | |
work. The point of this two quotes is that although there was still | :49:18. | :49:24. | |
massive problems of sectari`n violence and the challenge of | :49:25. | :49:28. | |
restoring vital public servhces the political outlook at that thme was | :49:29. | :49:34. | |
moderately hopeful. It was clear from talking to people from | :49:35. | :49:39. | |
different parties, religions and backgrounds that that hope dxisted. | :49:40. | :49:43. | |
During the following two ye`rs I have visited Iraq on a further two | :49:44. | :49:49. | |
occasions, the first of which was as part of the Armed Forces Bill and on | :49:50. | :49:56. | |
another occasion with anothdr right honourable friend. Two things became | :49:57. | :50:00. | |
apparent during those visits, the first was that progress tow`rd | :50:01. | :50:04. | |
stability was painfully slow and the optimism had been there in 2005 but | :50:05. | :50:11. | |
it was ebbing away. Secondlx, the post-conflict fanning had not been | :50:12. | :50:18. | |
successful. -- post-conflict planning. The Secretary of State | :50:19. | :50:24. | |
referred to the failure of one Ziggler programme, and Condoleezza | :50:25. | :50:31. | |
Rice, who was then the US sdcurity adviser, put it that neither she nor | :50:32. | :50:34. | |
the Secretary of State at the time, Colin Powell, were consulted about | :50:35. | :50:37. | |
the decision. That is anothdr failure of process. Those of us who | :50:38. | :50:45. | |
voted for action are often `sked, legitimately, do we regret ht? Like | :50:46. | :50:47. | |
my right honourable friend the member for Leeds Central, I can t | :50:48. | :50:51. | |
regret the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. What I regret is the fact | :50:52. | :50:58. | |
that the post-conflict planning was not successful. | :50:59. | :51:04. | |
Subtitles will resume on 'Monday In Parliament' at 23 0. | :51:05. | :51:12. |