Browse content similar to 14/07/2016. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
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private members bills, they talk about the issues but they simply | :00:00. | :00:00. | |
don't pursue them. Point of order, Paula Sheriff. As a matter of | :00:07. | :00:13. | |
record, in recent weeks, there has been an escalation of misogynistic | :00:14. | :00:17. | |
abuse and threats of violence disproportionally towards female MPs | :00:18. | :00:21. | |
from all sides of this house. It is apparent that this abuse has become | :00:22. | :00:30. | |
completely out of hand now with many members fearful. To the point where | :00:31. | :00:34. | |
the number of members have discussed with me that they are worried about | :00:35. | :00:39. | |
their own personal health as a result of this abuse. This comes | :00:40. | :00:46. | |
just four weeks today that a dear colleague was murdered. This cannot | :00:47. | :00:50. | |
be allowed to continue Mr Speaker. I wonder if you could advise this | :00:51. | :00:54. | |
house what action the house can take to make it clear that this behaviour | :00:55. | :01:00. | |
will not be tolerated from any party and all perpetrators will be | :01:01. | :01:04. | |
punished appropriately. I thank her, to whose point of order I will | :01:05. | :01:11. | |
respond in a moment in truncated terms. The leader of the house is | :01:12. | :01:15. | |
signalling a desire to contribute and it is important we should hear | :01:16. | :01:21. | |
from him. Can I say first of all, I absolutely agree with the honourable | :01:22. | :01:25. | |
lady. Cannot I informed the house that there are measures to improve | :01:26. | :01:33. | |
the security of members. There is a detailed project group looking at | :01:34. | :01:37. | |
the lessons that can be learned after the tragic events of a few | :01:38. | :01:41. | |
weeks ago and the commission will continue proposals for an | :01:42. | :01:45. | |
improvement to the approach we take. I hope that included in that will be | :01:46. | :01:51. | |
a great opportunity for individual members to raise concerns about | :01:52. | :01:54. | |
their safety and have them acted upon. Please Mr Speaker, will | :01:55. | :01:58. | |
everyone in the Housby reassured that you, myself, the chairman of | :01:59. | :02:03. | |
ways and Means and the house officials are very mindful indeed | :02:04. | :02:07. | |
for us to step up the security of members of Parliament and the | :02:08. | :02:12. | |
service we provide to watch over their safety. I appreciate what he | :02:13. | :02:21. | |
has said. Traditionally, we don't discuss security on the floor of the | :02:22. | :02:26. | |
house for very good reasons. That said, the leader of the house has | :02:27. | :02:30. | |
pointed out the extensive work that is taking place behind-the-scenes. | :02:31. | :02:37. | |
What the right Honourable gentleman has said about cooperation between | :02:38. | :02:44. | |
colleagues is of course pertinent and on the money. The leader of the | :02:45. | :02:50. | |
house and I am the chairman of ways and Means are in regular discussions | :02:51. | :02:54. | |
about these matters and indeed cooperated only a few days ago in | :02:55. | :02:59. | |
putting together a letter to register our concerns and | :03:00. | :03:06. | |
constructive proposals. That letter into another senior colleague. It is | :03:07. | :03:11. | |
also true, that these matters will be broached in a meeting of the | :03:12. | :03:14. | |
House of Commons commission on Monday. By definition, I cannot | :03:15. | :03:18. | |
elaborate because the discussion is to be had but it is important that | :03:19. | :03:22. | |
members should know that we are not in anyway a medically sealed from | :03:23. | :03:28. | |
the rest of our colleagues. We share and take very seriously those | :03:29. | :03:35. | |
concerns. Moreover, those of us who are quite fortunate in our living | :03:36. | :03:43. | |
accommodation are very conscious of those who are not. To whom, we have | :03:44. | :03:50. | |
a very particular sense of responsibility. So far as the | :03:51. | :03:55. | |
honourable lady is concern today, I might make the point that if any | :03:56. | :04:00. | |
individual member has particular and personal concerns, as of now, the | :04:01. | :04:06. | |
best course of action is to approach the Parliamentary security director | :04:07. | :04:14. | |
for his best advice. He is immensely experienced and better placed at a | :04:15. | :04:17. | |
practical level to give guidance than any of us lay persons could be. | :04:18. | :04:26. | |
I hope that is helpful but doubtless there will be further updates in due | :04:27. | :04:30. | |
course. Point of order Mr Christian Matheson. I would like to save thank | :04:31. | :04:38. | |
you and my right honourable friend for those contributions which are | :04:39. | :04:42. | |
very reassuring. Could I seek your guidance about the rules of this | :04:43. | :04:46. | |
place as they refer to the language we use in this house in referring to | :04:47. | :04:51. | |
each other. We call each other honourable members and the | :04:52. | :04:55. | |
underlying thought is we act honourably and honestly. But in | :04:56. | :05:00. | |
business questions, it was raised that claims were being made during | :05:01. | :05:04. | |
the referendum campaign which we now believe to be palpably untrue. If I | :05:05. | :05:08. | |
was to accuse other honourable members to making those statements | :05:09. | :05:11. | |
knowingly, you would instruct me to withdraw those comments if I | :05:12. | :05:17. | |
referred to a specific member. Nevertheless, I do believe | :05:18. | :05:23. | |
honourable members no claims women made and I would wish to call out | :05:24. | :05:28. | |
those members. Is there a mechanism within the rules of the house | :05:29. | :05:34. | |
whereby I can make suggestions without falling foul of the rules | :05:35. | :05:41. | |
which we all hold very dear. Procedures with which some | :05:42. | :05:44. | |
experienced movers of the house are well familiar, I think that for now, | :05:45. | :05:50. | |
my best advice to the honourable gentleman is that he should go to | :05:51. | :05:55. | |
the table office. The table office staff will be well able to acquaint | :05:56. | :06:00. | |
him to that approach or mechanism which might enable him to pursue his | :06:01. | :06:08. | |
objective. It would be a profitable visit for the honourable gentleman | :06:09. | :06:12. | |
and it would consume, and he will know the whereabouts of the of this | :06:13. | :06:22. | |
in question, very little energy. If there are no further points of | :06:23. | :06:30. | |
order, we shall move on. The cloak will now read the orders of the day. | :06:31. | :06:40. | |
Report of the Iraqi boy -- Iraqi enquiry. The question is have this | :06:41. | :06:45. | |
has considered the report of the Iraqi enquiry. Before I call the | :06:46. | :06:51. | |
first speaker from the backbenches, this is a continuation of the debate | :06:52. | :06:58. | |
that began yesterday. I should say to the house that at this stage, I | :06:59. | :07:04. | |
have not imposed a time limit on speeches, the house will be aware | :07:05. | :07:10. | |
that there will have to be wind-up speeches from the opposition front | :07:11. | :07:14. | |
bench and the government front bench tonight for which I have to allow. | :07:15. | :07:21. | |
But beyond that, I will wait to see how things go. My best advice to | :07:22. | :07:26. | |
colleagues is that if each feels able to contribute for ten minutes | :07:27. | :07:32. | |
but not much more than that, it may not be necessary to have any formal | :07:33. | :07:39. | |
limit. There is a burden upon the shoulders of distinguished | :07:40. | :07:44. | |
colleagues as they commence their contributions. That burden I am sure | :07:45. | :07:50. | |
will be keenly felt by the chair of the Defence Select Committee, the | :07:51. | :07:57. | |
right honourable gentleman, remember for New Forest East, Doctor Julian | :07:58. | :08:01. | |
Lewis. Thank you Mr Speaker. I shall endeavour to follow that instruction | :08:02. | :08:06. | |
to be brief. There is very good reason to be brief at this stage of | :08:07. | :08:10. | |
consideration of the Chilcott Report. That is that we have had | :08:11. | :08:16. | |
very little time to consider a very large mass of detailed information. | :08:17. | :08:24. | |
I generally find when trying to unravel what has happened | :08:25. | :08:29. | |
historically that it is sensible to look back at some of the original | :08:30. | :08:34. | |
sources. What I have done in the very short time available is to pick | :08:35. | :08:38. | |
out a few original documents that have been included in the mass of | :08:39. | :08:45. | |
published material. One of them is the joint intelligence committee | :08:46. | :08:50. | |
assessment dated 29th January 2003 and entitled" Iraq, the emerging | :08:51. | :09:00. | |
view from Baghdad." I just refer to two quotations from it. " The JI sea | :09:01. | :09:08. | |
say in paragraph ten, "We are unlikely to receive any advanced | :09:09. | :09:12. | |
warning of a pre-emptive attack on the Kurds. We judge that a | :09:13. | :09:16. | |
pre-emptive limited artillery strike on Kuwait using CBW could be | :09:17. | :09:25. | |
launched in as little as two hours." At another point in the report, a | :09:26. | :09:33. | |
list of things which might be the results of an attack on Saddam | :09:34. | :09:40. | |
Hussein is given. One of these possibilities is described in the | :09:41. | :09:45. | |
following terms. " To inflict enough casualties on any coalition ground | :09:46. | :09:50. | |
forces are perhaps in Kuwait, including through the use of CBW to | :09:51. | :09:56. | |
halt a coalition attack and to swing public opinion in the West against | :09:57. | :10:03. | |
hostilities. Moving forward to another note entitled "Saddam, the | :10:04. | :10:15. | |
beginning of the end. " Following a discussion on the JI C on 19th March | :10:16. | :10:20. | |
2003, we find the following quotation: "We judge Iraqi has a | :10:21. | :10:28. | |
usable CBW capability, deliverable using artillery, missiles and | :10:29. | :10:33. | |
possibly unmanned aerial vehicles. We judge Iraqi has esses up to 20 | :10:34. | :10:42. | |
missiles with a range of up to 650 kilometres and hundreds of shorter | :10:43. | :10:48. | |
range missiles mostly with a range of 150 kilometres or less. These | :10:49. | :10:53. | |
missiles may be able to deliver CBW although intelligence suggests | :10:54. | :11:00. | |
Barack may lack warheads capable of effective dispersal of such agents." | :11:01. | :11:07. | |
The reason I wrote those documents is that they were top secret | :11:08. | :11:11. | |
documents that were never intended for publication until the archives | :11:12. | :11:16. | |
eventually came to be released many years later. What that shows beyond | :11:17. | :11:23. | |
any reasonable doubt is that the advice being received by the Labour | :11:24. | :11:29. | |
government at that time was that Saddam Hussein did possess, in the | :11:30. | :11:36. | |
assessment of our intelligence agencies, chemical and biological | :11:37. | :11:39. | |
weapons. Ful As a result of the release of | :11:40. | :11:56. | |
those documents, we know that the Labour Government of the day did not | :11:57. | :11:59. | |
lie to Parliament over the question of its belief that chemical and | :12:00. | :12:06. | |
biological weapons were kept. More contentious is the question of | :12:07. | :12:10. | |
whether or not Tony Blair exaggerated. And there it is a | :12:11. | :12:23. | |
matter of harder judgment I sometimes say to mayself - I wonder | :12:24. | :12:27. | |
what the reaction of Parliament would have been, if we had come to | :12:28. | :12:36. | |
myself and said - we really don't know for certain whether Saddam | :12:37. | :12:42. | |
Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons. We know he has | :12:43. | :12:47. | |
had them in the past, we know he has used them in the past, and because | :12:48. | :12:51. | |
we can't be certain that he hasn't got them now, and because of the | :12:52. | :12:55. | |
events that happened, only a matter of months earlier, which put | :12:56. | :12:57. | |
Al-Qaeda and its suicide-brand of terrorism on the world stage, we | :12:58. | :13:00. | |
cannot be sure that, for reasons of his own, he might not seek to supply | :13:01. | :13:04. | |
such weapons to suicidal terrorist groups. We judge we can't take the | :13:05. | :13:12. | |
chance. I will give way. I thank the honourable gentleman. I welcome the | :13:13. | :13:18. | |
approach he is taking in going back to the resources. It is a us autoful | :13:19. | :13:22. | |
one on this occasion, does not the information to which he refers, | :13:23. | :13:25. | |
though, highlight just how dangerous it is to go to war on the basis of | :13:26. | :13:31. | |
intelligence alone, which is essentially what marked the Iraq war | :13:32. | :13:36. | |
out from every other and does he not agree with me, that in fact the be | :13:37. | :13:40. | |
availability and assessment of intelligence by this House has got | :13:41. | :13:45. | |
to be approved for the future or we could risk going there again? ! It | :13:46. | :13:52. | |
is very tricky because, you see there are two types of scenario when | :13:53. | :13:58. | |
you can go to war, and one type is quite straightforward - somebody | :13:59. | :14:01. | |
attacks you, you get on with it, you are given no choi.s the other type | :14:02. | :14:09. | |
is a situation like this, where you have -- reason to believe that | :14:10. | :14:13. | |
horrible could happen and the question arises - should you | :14:14. | :14:21. | |
intervene. I have to say I find one of the most problematic aspects of | :14:22. | :14:27. | |
the Chilcot report, is where they say that military action was not a | :14:28. | :14:31. | |
last resort and the peace process could have been given longer. The | :14:32. | :14:36. | |
reality is, unless an attack is launched on you, you can always go | :14:37. | :14:41. | |
on talking longer and longer and longer. I can't think of any point | :14:42. | :14:45. | |
at which it would be possible to say - we have to launch an attack now | :14:46. | :14:51. | |
because there is no prospect of continuing to try to find out, | :14:52. | :14:57. | |
without taking military action. When the right honourable gentleman talks | :14:58. | :15:04. | |
about this House then having to assess the intelligence, I'm not | :15:05. | :15:08. | |
sure that that helps us too much, because we can never - I will in a | :15:09. | :15:12. | |
moment - we can never be certain that what we are assessing is the | :15:13. | :15:18. | |
whole picture because sometimes, as those of us who have served on | :15:19. | :15:22. | |
bodies like the Intelligence and Security Committee will know, | :15:23. | :15:28. | |
sometimes there are sources of intelligence that cannot be revealed | :15:29. | :15:33. | |
and therefore, to present raw intelligence to the House, without | :15:34. | :15:39. | |
being able to say but there is other intelligence we are not presenting | :15:40. | :15:45. | |
to the House, leaves the House in an an op louse position. The right how | :15:46. | :15:51. | |
long agree with me that the House voted in 2003 knotted just or mainly | :15:52. | :15:54. | |
on the intelligence, if you look at the debate Mr Speaker, but on Saddam | :15:55. | :16:00. | |
Hussein's repeated and unpress departmented non-compliance with | :16:01. | :16:01. | |
mandatory United Nations' resolutions and on his record. Does | :16:02. | :16:06. | |
he think from his reading of the report, that Saddam Hussein executed | :16:07. | :16:09. | |
a massive bluff on the international community and his own people by | :16:10. | :16:13. | |
pretending he still had the weapons, we know he had, or does he agree | :16:14. | :16:17. | |
with the current Iraqi government that he sent them across the border | :16:18. | :16:22. | |
to Syria? I agree with a great deal of what the honourable gentleman has | :16:23. | :16:25. | |
just said, the right honourable gentleman has just said. The fact is | :16:26. | :16:31. | |
that Saddam Hussein, although it is not a matter of primary concern to | :16:32. | :16:37. | |
us now, was the author of his own misfortune. Saddam Hussein, we must | :16:38. | :16:44. | |
remember, apart from just being a broughtal dictator, had invaded and | :16:45. | :16:51. | |
occupied Kuwait in 1990. And Saddam Hussein chose to try to convince his | :16:52. | :16:56. | |
own people that he had not given up these weapons when either he had | :16:57. | :17:01. | |
given them up, or, as the right honourable gentleman says - and | :17:02. | :17:07. | |
rumours persist to this day - he had spirited them away, possibly to | :17:08. | :17:13. | |
Syria. However, although I see sort of a degree of agreement with me on | :17:14. | :17:24. | |
the Labour benches on this issue, they may find it harder to September | :17:25. | :17:32. | |
next point I wish to make. I have the greatest respect for my right | :17:33. | :17:38. | |
honourable friend. Can I suggest on this issue, it was not just about | :17:39. | :17:45. | |
intelligence sources from here, the United Nations inspectors at the | :17:46. | :17:50. | |
time were pleading for more time because they couldn't find the WMD, | :17:51. | :17:53. | |
possible which that premise we were going to war. We should have | :17:54. | :17:55. | |
listened to them. The reason they don't find them all was ultimately | :17:56. | :17:58. | |
because they didn't exist Yes, but the problem that they would always | :17:59. | :18:02. | |
face and we would face was summed up by something that was said from the | :18:03. | :18:06. | |
inquiry into the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly. I was | :18:07. | :18:11. | |
going to vote this at a later stage. I will do so now. I attended the | :18:12. | :18:21. | |
Hutton inquiry on 21st August 2003. In the course course of giving | :18:22. | :18:26. | |
evidence, a journalist made a statement about a conversation he | :18:27. | :18:31. | |
had had on the telephone with Dr David Kelly in June 2003. Now, Dr | :18:32. | :18:36. | |
Kelly was, of course, a weapons' expert and knew all about the | :18:37. | :18:41. | |
difficulties of defecting weapons, stockpiles, if they were hidden. And | :18:42. | :18:48. | |
in the course of that telephone conversation, Dr Kelly said it Mr | :18:49. | :18:54. | |
Rufford the following. "It was very easy to hide weapons of mass | :18:55. | :18:58. | |
destruction because you simply had to dig a hole in the desert, put | :18:59. | :19:06. | |
them inside, cover them with tarpaulin, put them in sand and then | :19:07. | :19:13. | |
they would be' almost impossible to discover'." The question we come | :19:14. | :19:17. | |
back to once again is - if Tony Blair had come to this House and if | :19:18. | :19:22. | |
he had more honestly highlighted the question marks against the | :19:23. | :19:29. | |
reliability of the intelligence, would he be as ex-coraited today as | :19:30. | :19:35. | |
he has been? And, in particular, just be counterfactual for a moment. | :19:36. | :19:45. | |
Some stocks of anthrax had been discovered. Supposing there had been | :19:46. | :19:51. | |
a secret cache, would we still be saying that is it was absolutely | :19:52. | :19:55. | |
wrong for the people who took the decision in 2003, on the basis of | :19:56. | :20:00. | |
what clearly was an honest belief that Saddam Hussein might have | :20:01. | :20:04. | |
deadly stocks of anthrax, would it still be the case that we would now | :20:05. | :20:10. | |
be saying they were wrong. So, in my opinion, and I have no hesitation in | :20:11. | :20:14. | |
saying this, I believe that although the Government may have exaggerated | :20:15. | :20:18. | |
and probably did exaggerate the strength of the evidence they had, I | :20:19. | :20:24. | |
do believe that they genuinely believed and expected to find stocks | :20:25. | :20:40. | |
of these weapons. I am I am I am taking interventions but am keen | :20:41. | :20:44. | |
knotted to abuse the time limit. This is a focal point on the | :20:45. | :20:48. | |
discussion. Would he not accept that there are some on these benches who | :20:49. | :20:53. | |
think the whole issue - and this is justified in the Chilcot findings - | :20:54. | :20:57. | |
that the whole issue of weapons of mass destruction, was an artificial | :20:58. | :21:06. | |
causi, sms beli, in order to affect regime change. And if they were an | :21:07. | :21:12. | |
issue, why wait 13 years, why not go in at the time of the first war? The | :21:13. | :21:16. | |
answer to the second question is easy. And this is - what had | :21:17. | :21:19. | |
happened in those 30 years was something that happened in September | :21:20. | :21:23. | |
2001, namely, the appearance, on the international stage of a group that | :21:24. | :21:29. | |
had been around for a long time, but had not succeeded in killing 3,000 | :21:30. | :21:36. | |
people in the heart of New York and Washington DC. And, therefore, and, | :21:37. | :21:45. | |
therefore, the issue at question was now the traditional policy and we | :21:46. | :21:49. | |
often hear this said, quite rightly said in the context of debates about | :21:50. | :21:54. | |
international terrorism, that the technique of containment, which is | :21:55. | :22:02. | |
usually the best technique to deal with rogue regimes with weapons | :22:03. | :22:07. | |
stocks, stocks could not apply under circumstances when it was feared | :22:08. | :22:15. | |
that rational deterrents would be ineffective in trying to prevent an | :22:16. | :22:17. | |
international terrorist organisation, if, for any reason, it | :22:18. | :22:23. | |
was supplied with a substance-like anthrax from using it, no matter how | :22:24. | :22:30. | |
suicidely. Mr Speaker, I'm grateful to my right honourable friend for | :22:31. | :22:33. | |
giving way. Giving the role he plays as Chairman of the Defence Select | :22:34. | :22:36. | |
Committee, I wondered if he could qualify the statement he has just | :22:37. | :22:40. | |
made, which did cause a reaction, I think in the House. He suggested | :22:41. | :22:46. | |
that somehow the events of 9/11 then created a divan scenario in Iraq. | :22:47. | :22:51. | |
Would he not agree with me that -- created a different scenario in | :22:52. | :22:55. | |
Iraq. Would he agree with me in 2000 #3, Al-Qaeda was not present in Iraq | :22:56. | :23:08. | |
and the relationship there cannot be made? That was not the point I was | :23:09. | :23:12. | |
making. The point I was making was that the West was in a major | :23:13. | :23:17. | |
stwand-off with -- stand-off with Saddam Hussein. And people use other | :23:18. | :23:21. | |
groups and organisations for their own ends. And the danger was, and | :23:22. | :23:27. | |
the Prime Minister said at the time - and this is what conadvised me to | :23:28. | :23:33. | |
support him, at the time the danger was that for reasons of his own, | :23:34. | :23:41. | |
Saddam Hussein might decide to make some of these weapons available to | :23:42. | :23:47. | |
groups for - not because he was Allied to such groups, but because | :23:48. | :23:52. | |
he and Al-Qaeda scared a common enemy in the West. But I want to | :23:53. | :23:56. | |
move on. Some members will agree with what I have said, some won't. | :23:57. | :24:00. | |
But let me continue and make the second branch of my remarks and then | :24:01. | :24:06. | |
it will be for other members to put their own perspective on T I Hayesen | :24:07. | :24:10. | |
to add, although my Chairmanship of the Defence Committee has been | :24:11. | :24:14. | |
referred to a number of times, I am, of course, speaking entirely on my | :24:15. | :24:18. | |
own behalf in making my remarks as someone who was here at the time and | :24:19. | :24:24. | |
took part in the debate and indeed in the vote. So, when I look back at | :24:25. | :24:31. | |
those circumstances, I say to myself that the reason I supported and | :24:32. | :24:37. | |
spoke in favour of military action, the primary reason, was that I | :24:38. | :24:42. | |
believed what I was told by the then Labour Government, about the | :24:43. | :24:47. | |
possession, or the believed possession of anthrax and other | :24:48. | :24:50. | |
weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. But here is where I | :24:51. | :25:00. | |
have to make a major admission. At the back of may mind - and at the | :25:01. | :25:06. | |
back, I believe of many other honourable members' minds was a | :25:07. | :25:09. | |
second belief. It was the belief that if Saddam Hussein was removed, | :25:10. | :25:16. | |
we might see the emergence of some form of democracy in Iraq. And in | :25:17. | :25:24. | |
that belief, I was profoundly mistaken. And in looking at the | :25:25. | :25:34. | |
scenario, as it developed, it is quite clear that what emerged was | :25:35. | :25:43. | |
not any form of democracy, what reemerged was the mutual hatred | :25:44. | :25:49. | |
between different branches of fundamentalist Islam that had led | :25:50. | :25:53. | |
hem into bitter conflict for more than 1,000 years. And that was the | :25:54. | :26:03. | |
lesson that I drew from the Iraq war and that was why subsequently, when | :26:04. | :26:09. | |
it became clear that the same scenario was going to be played out | :26:10. | :26:17. | |
in other theatres, for the same sort of reasons, particularly in relation | :26:18. | :26:24. | |
to Syria, in August 2013, I was determined not to make the same | :26:25. | :26:32. | |
mistake again. And I and 29 other honourable and Right Honourable | :26:33. | :26:37. | |
members of the Conservative Party and nine members of the Liberal | :26:38. | :26:42. | |
Democrat party, voted not to take the same sort of action against | :26:43. | :26:47. | |
President Assad that we had taken against Saddam Hussein. | :26:48. | :26:54. | |
Are a member hearing the same arguments in favour of removing | :26:55. | :27:02. | |
President Assad that everyone now accept it had been inadequate for | :27:03. | :27:06. | |
removing Saddam Hussein. I think honourable and right honourable | :27:07. | :27:11. | |
members who feel so strongly that it was the wrong thing to do in 2003 | :27:12. | :27:19. | |
ought to check what the consequences were not doing, taking the same step | :27:20. | :27:31. | |
in 2013. We have seen since 2013 huge blood-letting continuing in | :27:32. | :27:37. | |
Syria but many of us still argue that if it is an alternative between | :27:38. | :27:45. | |
an authoritarian dictatorship and eight total to civil conflict, where | :27:46. | :27:54. | |
people are in gauge in it who believe that suicide terrorism is | :27:55. | :28:03. | |
the answer to the world's problems and the fastest route to paradise. | :28:04. | :28:08. | |
We can come to an appreciation that very often there are no simple or | :28:09. | :28:20. | |
easy answers in these dilemmas. I am respectful, I believe I voted for | :28:21. | :28:24. | |
him actually, is what he is saying, if he had voted, had his time again, | :28:25. | :28:31. | |
he would have voted against it in 2003 and in favour of conflict in | :28:32. | :28:38. | |
2010? What I am saying is I was absolutely right not to vote to | :28:39. | :28:43. | |
remove resident Assad in 2013. And I was absolutely wrong to vote the way | :28:44. | :28:51. | |
I did in 2003, but I did it because I believed what I was told about | :28:52. | :28:54. | |
weapons of mass destruction. I also believed wrongly that there was a | :28:55. | :29:02. | |
chance for Iraqi society to advance along more democratic lines. That | :29:03. | :29:09. | |
was the terrible error I made. I will make a little more progress and | :29:10. | :29:13. | |
then I will give way. That leads me to the second question. I have | :29:14. | :29:21. | |
effectively, I hope, shown that when the Labour government of the day | :29:22. | :29:26. | |
said to the House of Commons that it believed there were weapons of mass | :29:27. | :29:32. | |
destruction, it was not lying. And that there was a reasonable case to | :29:33. | :29:36. | |
be made on those grounds for taking the action that was taken. What the | :29:37. | :29:46. | |
papers also show was that the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was not | :29:47. | :29:54. | |
unaware of the possible consequences of removing Saddam Hussein. It in | :29:55. | :30:02. | |
the results of the enquiry, Sir John Chilcot says the following? "We Do | :30:03. | :30:08. | |
not agree that hindsight is required, the risks of internal | :30:09. | :30:13. | |
strife in Iraqi, active Iranians pursuits of interest and Al-Qaeda | :30:14. | :30:18. | |
activity in Barack were each explicitly identified before the | :30:19. | :30:27. | |
invasion. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion | :30:28. | :30:32. | |
were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraqi after | :30:33. | :30:35. | |
Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate. " There is a January | :30:36. | :30:42. | |
2003 briefing note from Mr Blair to President Bush in which the then | :30:43. | :30:47. | |
Prime Minister wrote "The biggest risk we face is into Nice I'm | :30:48. | :30:54. | |
fighting between all the rival groups, tribes, etc in Iraq when the | :30:55. | :31:00. | |
military strike destabilises the regime. They are perfectly capable | :31:01. | :31:07. | |
on previous form of killing each other in large numbers." Let us | :31:08. | :31:13. | |
remind ourselves Mr Speaker, that this vast total of deaths that have | :31:14. | :31:20. | |
taken place in Iraqi are not people who have been killed by Westerners, | :31:21. | :31:24. | |
they are Muslims who have been killed by other Muslims once the lid | :31:25. | :31:30. | |
of authoritarian repression was removed. I am coming to an end, I | :31:31. | :31:37. | |
promised I would give way. I am nervous to open up a new thread for | :31:38. | :31:44. | |
him, but some of the deaths in Barack were our soldiers. Chilcot | :31:45. | :31:49. | |
said there were some equipment to shortfalls when things began, two of | :31:50. | :31:55. | |
my constituents died in Iraq, Sergeant Roberts -- Sergeant Robert | :31:56. | :32:00. | |
died because of the wrong body armour, does my right honourable | :32:01. | :32:04. | |
friend agree that we should never again send Armed Forces into combat | :32:05. | :32:10. | |
without Rob Elliot gripping them for the task in hand? Never, ever again | :32:11. | :32:16. | |
is a very strong statement. The truth of the matter is that it is | :32:17. | :32:23. | |
seldom the case that when a conflict arises, especially a conflict which | :32:24. | :32:33. | |
arises as a result of events unforeseen, that the Armed Forces | :32:34. | :32:37. | |
are fully equipped in every respect. The history of our engagement in | :32:38. | :32:43. | |
many conflicts is of a disastrous start, usually gradually rectified | :32:44. | :32:48. | |
as events go on. What the report does bring out is that for far too | :32:49. | :32:52. | |
long while the conflict was going on, equipment deficiencies were not | :32:53. | :33:00. | |
identified and remedied. I think I will leave it at that at the moment. | :33:01. | :33:05. | |
I just have two points on which to conclude. One is that I feel that we | :33:06. | :33:20. | |
have now to accept that societies -- are not ready for Western-style | :33:21. | :33:21. | |
democracy while politics remain linked with totalitarian religious | :33:22. | :33:30. | |
supremacy is. I am not saying anything racialist in making these | :33:31. | :33:33. | |
remarks because only a few hundred years ago, religious wars devastated | :33:34. | :33:41. | |
Europe and here in England, heretics were treated just as barbarously as | :33:42. | :33:48. | |
they are in the middle east today. But the reality is that the | :33:49. | :33:54. | |
democratic model, if it is to work, usually has to evolve. If it doesn't | :33:55. | :33:59. | |
evolve, a country has to be totally occupied for many years in order for | :34:00. | :34:08. | |
it to be implanted and take root. Yesterday, the then Foreign | :34:09. | :34:13. | |
Secretary said that he believed that some of these decisions that were | :34:14. | :34:18. | |
mistaken at the time would be less likely to be taken in the future | :34:19. | :34:28. | |
because of the creation and existence of the National Security | :34:29. | :34:32. | |
Council. And that the national Security Council was a forum where | :34:33. | :34:38. | |
these matters could be thrashed out more realistically. I am not sure | :34:39. | :34:45. | |
that forum is white strong enough. I know that in bygone years, the heads | :34:46. | :34:53. | |
of each of the three services had direct input to the policy debate. I | :34:54. | :35:01. | |
know that the chiefs of staff committee was a body that had to be | :35:02. | :35:07. | |
reckoned with, even by prime ministers as forceful as Winston | :35:08. | :35:11. | |
Churchill. And I know the present arrangements we have in which the | :35:12. | :35:15. | |
Chiefs of staff are supposed to funnel their views to the | :35:16. | :35:21. | |
politicians, through the medium of just one person, the chief of the | :35:22. | :35:25. | |
defence staff, is entirely inadequate. I am pleased that the | :35:26. | :35:30. | |
Defence Secretary, my right honourable friend is continuing in | :35:31. | :35:39. | |
his post and that he is here. I hope he his summing survey that I hope he | :35:40. | :35:42. | |
will hear from the Defence Select Committee more about in the future. | :35:43. | :35:48. | |
That is that there is too much of a disconnect between our top military | :35:49. | :35:54. | |
advisers and the politicians. It is easier for a Prime Minister with a | :35:55. | :35:59. | |
bee in his bonnet about overthrowing one regime or another to brush aside | :36:00. | :36:06. | |
the words of one man, no matter how authoritative any Chief of defence | :36:07. | :36:12. | |
staff may be, manages to brush aside the contribution of the heads of the | :36:13. | :36:17. | |
Armed Forces as a whole. The Defence Select Committee suggested in one of | :36:18. | :36:22. | |
its final reports under my predecessor as chairman, the | :36:23. | :36:27. | |
honourable member for Penrith and the Borders, that the chief of staff | :36:28. | :36:32. | |
committee needs to be constituted as the military subcommittee of the | :36:33. | :36:38. | |
National Security Council. That recommendation was ignored but it is | :36:39. | :36:46. | |
a recommendation I reiterate today. Because only when you have got | :36:47. | :36:51. | |
people who are authoritative and expert and in a position to stand up | :36:52. | :36:57. | |
to a Prime Minister on a mission, whether it is a mission to remove | :36:58. | :37:02. | |
Saddam Hussein or a mission to remove Gadhafi while telling this | :37:03. | :37:05. | |
house we were just going to do a no-fly zone to protect citizens. But | :37:06. | :37:13. | |
it was very important that the strategic calculus should be | :37:14. | :37:18. | |
properly presented to politicians so we don't get the situation ever | :37:19. | :37:24. | |
again, as we are told happened in Libya where the chief of defence | :37:25. | :37:29. | |
staff was told to do the fighting while the politicians did the | :37:30. | :37:34. | |
planning. I am extremely grateful to the right honourable gentleman, Gray | :37:35. | :37:45. | |
who interpreted my guidance loosely. He had to take lots of | :37:46. | :37:51. | |
interventions, that is true, can I just ask, it is not the limit, I am | :37:52. | :37:56. | |
leaving the house to regulate itself but members will want to take into | :37:57. | :38:01. | |
account that people will want to intervene on them but we do want to | :38:02. | :38:05. | |
hear from everybody, I say that with sincerity. The next contributor will | :38:06. | :38:10. | |
be Ben Bradshaw, he now doesn't wish to contribute. I rather hope that Mr | :38:11. | :38:22. | |
Pat McFadden does. I am happy to be a substitute for my honourable | :38:23. | :38:27. | |
friend. The decision to go to war in Iraqi was in policy terms the most | :38:28. | :38:31. | |
controversial decision of the Blair premiership and of that entire | :38:32. | :38:37. | |
Labour period in government. 179 troops died, over 4000 American | :38:38. | :38:44. | |
troops and many thousands of Iraqi civilians in the chaos and | :38:45. | :38:49. | |
destruction afterwards. Sir John's enquiry was asked to look at how the | :38:50. | :38:54. | |
decision was taken and what lessons can be learned. First there is the | :38:55. | :38:58. | |
crucial question as to whether the war was based on a lie. On this the | :38:59. | :39:03. | |
report concludes "There is no evidence that intelligence was | :39:04. | :39:09. | |
improperly included in the dossier that was published or that number | :39:10. | :39:13. | |
ten improperly influenced the text. " Prior to the publication of Sir | :39:14. | :39:22. | |
John's report, there had been years of accusations about fabricating | :39:23. | :39:27. | |
intelligence. In the wake of its publication, a different question | :39:28. | :39:31. | |
has been raised, as to why the intelligence was not challenged? The | :39:32. | :39:35. | |
Honourable member for new Forest is quoted from some of the report, I | :39:36. | :39:41. | |
don't need to repeat his quotations but for a example, from 2002, the | :39:42. | :39:51. | |
reports say that the intelligence was "Sporadic and patchy." They also | :39:52. | :39:57. | |
say "It is clear Barack continues to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD and | :39:58. | :40:05. | |
deliver -- and their delivery means. They have a chemical weapons | :40:06. | :40:09. | |
programme and they have chemical and biological weapons capability and | :40:10. | :40:15. | |
Saddam is repaired to use them." These views turned out to be wrong | :40:16. | :40:21. | |
but it was genuinely felt, reported to government time after time and | :40:22. | :40:26. | |
shared by many intelligence services around the world, including | :40:27. | :40:28. | |
countries that fiercely opposed the war. Sir John makes important | :40:29. | :40:35. | |
recommendations about how intelligence is to be assessed and | :40:36. | :40:40. | |
challenged in future. These are not the same as accusations of | :40:41. | :40:44. | |
fabrication or lying or the use of intelligence deliberately to | :40:45. | :40:49. | |
mislead. Moving on, Sir John concludes that the war was not a | :40:50. | :40:53. | |
last resort. That the inspection process should have been given more | :40:54. | :40:58. | |
time and the decision to use military action undermined the | :40:59. | :41:01. | |
authority of the UN Security Council. This founding -- this | :41:02. | :41:10. | |
finding these are huge constitutional question, in view of | :41:11. | :41:12. | |
the fact that Saddam Hussein had been in breach of a series of UN | :41:13. | :41:18. | |
Security Council resolutions over a period of 12 years and in view of | :41:19. | :41:23. | |
the fact he had used chemical weapons in the past against his own | :41:24. | :41:24. | |
people. One has to ask who was really | :41:25. | :41:36. | |
undermining the UN in this situation, the country in breech or | :41:37. | :41:40. | |
the countries trying to enforce the UN's will? And what does this | :41:41. | :41:45. | |
finding in the report mean about this responsibility to protevenlingt | :41:46. | :41:48. | |
an issue that was raised in the debate yesterday by my right | :41:49. | :41:50. | |
honourable friend, the member for Leeds central S one of the lessons | :41:51. | :41:54. | |
we are going to draw -- is one of the lessons, that we should never | :41:55. | :42:01. | |
engage in military action, no matter how multiple the breaches of | :42:02. | :42:04. | |
previous UN Security Council resolutions, unless there is full | :42:05. | :42:07. | |
support from the UN Security Council itself? And if that is our | :42:08. | :42:11. | |
conclusion, what does that mean for the authority of the UN? This is not | :42:12. | :42:17. | |
the view that we took in Kosovo, where, although that action was | :42:18. | :42:20. | |
opposed by some, it is generally felt to have had a positive | :42:21. | :42:26. | |
outcomfort people there and prevented a disaster in the Balkans. | :42:27. | :42:32. | |
Thirdly, let me turn to the issue of the aftermath and the chaos and | :42:33. | :42:39. | |
destruction which ensued. Surely the question that this House has to ask | :42:40. | :42:45. | |
is whether there is a weight of evidence to justify action or not. | :42:46. | :42:52. | |
And to say that we should never go without express authority from the | :42:53. | :42:55. | |
United Nations' Security Council is not the question, because that would | :42:56. | :43:01. | |
be merely one section of evidence which the House should take into | :43:02. | :43:04. | |
consideration. The example of Kosovo is a good one, there were other | :43:05. | :43:08. | |
reasons for acting in the way we did there which I supported then and | :43:09. | :43:14. | |
continue to support now. I appreciate the honourable | :43:15. | :43:15. | |
gentleman's intervention, the point I'm raise something I think this | :43:16. | :43:20. | |
finding about undermining the authority of the UN raises huge | :43:21. | :43:23. | |
questions here and is one of the controversial findings in the | :43:24. | :43:28. | |
report. Colin Powell famously remarked - you break it, you own it. | :43:29. | :43:32. | |
And it is undoubtedly the responsibility of countries who | :43:33. | :43:36. | |
remove a broughtal dictator, to put in place security measures | :43:37. | :43:41. | |
afterwards. On this measure, Sir John's report is understandably | :43:42. | :43:44. | |
critical of the UK and the United States. With intervention comes | :43:45. | :43:48. | |
responsibility and security is a key part of that responsibility. But we | :43:49. | :43:53. | |
should be clear about two other points. Firstly, that the killing of | :43:54. | :43:58. | |
innocent civilians in Iraq was not being carried out by the UK or the | :43:59. | :44:04. | |
US Armed Forces, but by terrorists and militias who blew up the United | :44:05. | :44:10. | |
Nations' headquarters attack mosques and destroy already fragile | :44:11. | :44:12. | |
infrastructure and bombed marketplaces. Secondly, sectarian | :44:13. | :44:18. | |
violence and willing in Iraq, did not begin in 20003. Prior to 2003, | :44:19. | :44:24. | |
it was carried out by the Saddam regime itself. The The use of | :44:25. | :44:32. | |
chemical weapons against the Kurds in the North, the brutal supression | :44:33. | :44:36. | |
of the Shia uprising after the first Gulf War in 1991. It was a rein of | :44:37. | :44:43. | |
terror were mass graves are still being discovered decades on. I want | :44:44. | :44:47. | |
it pay tribute to the courage and determination of my right honourable | :44:48. | :44:50. | |
friend, the member for kol win valley, who was campaigning for the | :44:51. | :44:56. | |
victims at Saddam's brutal regime long before the Iraq war in 20003. | :44:57. | :45:02. | |
Fourthly, what is the lesson in terms of our own security? Now, I | :45:03. | :45:07. | |
believe people supported the Iraq war for different reasons. I believe | :45:08. | :45:12. | |
many people opposed it for different reasons, too and they should not all | :45:13. | :45:17. | |
be put in the one bracket. Not everyone has drawn a direct line | :45:18. | :45:22. | |
between this intervention and you will all the security problems we | :45:23. | :45:29. | |
faced but some have. Now foreign interventions will anger jihadists. | :45:30. | :45:34. | |
They may also be used as a recruiting sergeant for jihadists | :45:35. | :45:38. | |
but it would be a fundamental mistake to believe that the mass | :45:39. | :45:43. | |
murder of innocent people is only a response to what we do and if we | :45:44. | :45:49. | |
start doing it, they would leave us alone. We should remember that | :45:50. | :45:53. | |
Islamist terrorism existed long before the Iraq war. The U s. SS | :45:54. | :46:06. | |
Cole was bombed and the US trade centre was bombed first in 2003 and | :46:07. | :46:16. | |
then again and Bali in 2002, which saw the murder of many tourists. And | :46:17. | :46:25. | |
in Paris last year, which took place in the country country which was | :46:26. | :46:30. | |
most opposed to the Iraq war. I have said this before in the House, Mr | :46:31. | :46:38. | |
speaker, understanding Islamist terrorism simply in what we do, | :46:39. | :46:43. | |
infantilis it, confers responsibility on them for what we | :46:44. | :46:48. | |
do and fails to stand up for the pluralism, diversity and religious | :46:49. | :46:52. | |
freedom which we hold dear Whatever lesson we learn from past | :46:53. | :46:57. | |
interventions, it should not be to franchise out our foreign policy | :46:58. | :47:03. | |
decisions for the approval or veto of the terrorists who oppose our way | :47:04. | :47:08. | |
of life. Now, finally, Mr Speaker, there is the lesson on | :47:09. | :47:16. | |
interintervention itself. Sir John makes a number of interventions | :47:17. | :47:20. | |
about how intelligence should be treated, mine steerial oversight, | :47:21. | :47:23. | |
the challenge of arguments and so on. They look eminently sensible and | :47:24. | :47:27. | |
I'm sure any future Government will take them on board. But the truth | :47:28. | :47:33. | |
is, this is not just a matter of process. I'm grateful to my right | :47:34. | :47:41. | |
honourable friend. He made a strong critique of one of Sir John's | :47:42. | :47:48. | |
findings. One of the other findings, I find problematicical is the last | :47:49. | :47:52. | |
resort suggestion which was also criticised by the Chairman of the | :47:53. | :47:56. | |
Defence Select Committee. Does he agree with me that at that time, it | :47:57. | :48:01. | |
was clear that time was running out, Saddam had been given 90 days when | :48:02. | :48:05. | |
the resolution was specified, 30 days and to say that there was | :48:06. | :48:09. | |
somehow other avenues that could be explored but not realistic at the | :48:10. | :48:14. | |
time. I agree with my right honourable friend. I know at some | :48:15. | :48:22. | |
point there is always the issue of deciding. Every debate about | :48:23. | :48:26. | |
intervention since 2003 has taken place until the shadow of this | :48:27. | :48:29. | |
decision. Iraq has already increased the threshold for military action | :48:30. | :48:33. | |
and the Chilcot report will raise it further. But there is an inescapable | :48:34. | :48:37. | |
question. Put bluntly -- you can have all the committees and | :48:38. | :48:41. | |
processes that you want, but you still have to decide and your is he | :48:42. | :48:46. | |
significance could go wrong and you cannot predict everything that will | :48:47. | :48:49. | |
happen in the aftermath. A lot has been said about the size of the | :48:50. | :48:52. | |
report, 2.5 million words, from here, it looks like, if you stack | :48:53. | :48:56. | |
those volumes on top of one another, you would have a Bo two feet high of | :48:57. | :49:01. | |
paper. The very sight of the report would be a warning to future Prime | :49:02. | :49:03. | |
Ministers. Prime Minister and presidents since | :49:04. | :49:18. | |
2003 have been cautious and this should make them cautious in the | :49:19. | :49:22. | |
future but between what wrong after the invasion, now the timings of the | :49:23. | :49:27. | |
report and add into the reduced size of our Armed Forces in reapers yoo, | :49:28. | :49:32. | |
what if the conclusion was never to intervene again. What message would | :49:33. | :49:37. | |
that send out to the oppressed of the world or to dictators or to | :49:38. | :49:44. | |
terrorists groups? I was not an MP in 2003. And therefore never had to | :49:45. | :49:50. | |
face the responsibility of the vote for the war in Iraq. The most | :49:51. | :49:57. | |
significant vote on what happened on foreign policy, since I was elected, | :49:58. | :50:02. | |
was over Syria in 2014. A vote heavily coloured by our experience | :50:03. | :50:06. | |
in Iraq. I have a slightly different interpretation of that to the member | :50:07. | :50:12. | |
for New Forest East. I voted against military action in 2013. Even after | :50:13. | :50:21. | |
Assad had used chemical weapons against his own people, yet Syria, | :50:22. | :50:25. | |
where we did not intervene, beyond limited air strikes we voted for | :50:26. | :50:29. | |
last year, has been a humanitarian disaster, even worse than Iraq. | :50:30. | :50:33. | |
Hundreds of thousands dead. Millions displaced. The greatest movement of | :50:34. | :50:37. | |
refugees across Europe since the end of the Second World War. It isn't a | :50:38. | :50:46. | |
vote it intervene which has troubled me most in my 11 years here, it is | :50:47. | :50:51. | |
that vote not to intervee. As the international community, with the | :50:52. | :50:54. | |
exception of Russia and where have the demonstrations been outside | :50:55. | :50:59. | |
their embassies? Indeed, hear, hear. They decided it was all too | :51:00. | :51:02. | |
difficult There is no Chilcot report into Syria. We can tell ourselves | :51:03. | :51:06. | |
that because we didn't break it, we didn't buy it. But that makes | :51:07. | :51:10. | |
absolutely no difference to the human cost. Exactly But let us | :51:11. | :51:21. | |
learn, let us not sign a blank check for despots and terrorist groups | :51:22. | :51:25. | |
around the world or delude ourselves that the security issues we face | :51:26. | :51:30. | |
stem only from our decisions rather than the ideology that encourages | :51:31. | :51:35. | |
the killing of innocent people in countries around the world. Yes, | :51:36. | :51:39. | |
intervening has consequences. There are 2.5 million words detailing them | :51:40. | :51:44. | |
before us. But, so does standing back. We have to decide the | :51:45. | :51:51. | |
difference. Mr Speaker, thank you for calling | :51:52. | :51:58. | |
me, I would suggest that Iraq 20003 ranks with Suez in a catalogue of | :51:59. | :52:03. | |
British foreign policy disasters. It cost the lives of over 200 British | :52:04. | :52:08. | |
nationals, many tens of thousands of lives of Iraqi nationals and | :52:09. | :52:16. | |
citizens and set in train a terrible sequence of events, including a | :52:17. | :52:20. | |
vicious civil war and fundmentally altering the balance of power within | :52:21. | :52:24. | |
the region and 13 years later, Mr Speaker, I suggest we are still | :52:25. | :52:27. | |
living with many of these consequences. Having resigned from | :52:28. | :52:31. | |
the shadow frerge in 20003, to investigate against the war, I | :52:32. | :52:35. | |
suppose it could be said it was a pivotal point in defining my | :52:36. | :52:37. | |
political career, Mr Speaker, such as it has been. So it's been a | :52:38. | :52:42. | |
little bit more than a passing interest to see the gross of the | :52:43. | :52:48. | |
Chilcot report. -- see the progress. I defended the time he took and I | :52:49. | :52:52. | |
would like to thank the opportunity of thanking Sir John and his team | :52:53. | :52:59. | |
for the thoroughness of that report. As a former soldier, I would just | :53:00. | :53:04. | |
like to start by making this point - and that is that whatever has been | :53:05. | :53:07. | |
said previously, war should always be the measure of last resort when | :53:08. | :53:11. | |
all other possibilities have been exhausted. And we should never lose | :53:12. | :53:17. | |
sight of that simple fact. Of course there is such a thing as a just war | :53:18. | :53:25. | |
but at the same time you owe it to your citizens, your Parliament and | :53:26. | :53:28. | |
of about all the soldiers you are committing to battle that it has to | :53:29. | :53:34. | |
be the measure of last resort. For me, the overwhelming conclusion from | :53:35. | :53:38. | |
Sir John's report was actually that Iraq was not that last resort. Other | :53:39. | :53:43. | |
possibilities had about not been exhausted. I think that was the most | :53:44. | :53:47. | |
damming conclusion of the report itself. -- most damning. It made | :53:48. | :53:53. | |
other points, the premise of war, we wept on to war on the premise of | :53:54. | :54:00. | |
WMD, it was overtold and there was caveats attached to the intelligence | :54:01. | :54:05. | |
and there was a lack of preparedness with regard to our Armed Forces and | :54:06. | :54:09. | |
there was an absence of post-war planning. This litany of errors was | :54:10. | :54:14. | |
compounded by an overestimation of our influence over the US. We could | :54:15. | :54:17. | |
not at the time believe that it could be an in our interests not to | :54:18. | :54:22. | |
be there, not to be on the frontline, when, when I think one of | :54:23. | :54:26. | |
the proudest and best moments when it came to Prime Minister Wilson, | :54:27. | :54:30. | |
was saying no to the Americans when it came to Veet nap t did not | :54:31. | :54:35. | |
fracture the special relationship, in fact between 15 to 20 years, the | :54:36. | :54:39. | |
special relationship, as it is so-called was on a very firm footing | :54:40. | :54:44. | |
indeed. A litany of errors. I don't intend looking back on those, I do | :54:45. | :54:49. | |
suggest that there are two key lessons from this episode that I | :54:50. | :54:53. | |
think we would do well to reflect upon. The first is that Parliament | :54:54. | :54:56. | |
should have done more to question the evidence that came before it. | :54:57. | :55:03. | |
It's a failure, almost at every level. The legislative is not | :55:04. | :55:07. | |
examining the evidence. It is not questioning the executive, at times | :55:08. | :55:11. | |
like this, then when is it going to do so. There was a failure of those | :55:12. | :55:16. | |
in the know. I would suggest at all level, and particularly the Cabinet | :55:17. | :55:20. | |
at the time, to challenge what is being presented to the public. I | :55:21. | :55:23. | |
think the one figure that stands proud with all of this, when it | :55:24. | :55:27. | |
comes to the select group of people, within the Cabinet is Robin Cook who | :55:28. | :55:38. | |
clearly, what he forecast on that eventful debate in 2003, everything | :55:39. | :55:41. | |
he said has been proved right. I contributed to that debate as well | :55:42. | :55:46. | |
but it was one of the best speeches I have heard for a very, very long | :55:47. | :55:53. | |
time. But, we should - I will in a second - we should have questioned | :55:54. | :55:56. | |
more. We should have examined the detail. I was told to stop asking | :55:57. | :56:02. | |
awkward questions. We were asking so few awkward questions, as an | :56:03. | :56:07. | |
Opposition, as an official Opposition, it was being suggested | :56:08. | :56:10. | |
to me from the other side that we were trying to take, play political | :56:11. | :56:14. | |
games with this issue, that they were hoping to perhaps, if it did | :56:15. | :56:19. | |
blow up in the Government's face, then we, as an official Opposition | :56:20. | :56:22. | |
could perhaps take advantage of that. That is how bad it got in that | :56:23. | :56:29. | |
debate in 20003. We simply were not asking enough questions and we | :56:30. | :56:31. | |
should have done so. I was here in 2003 and I went | :56:32. | :56:45. | |
against the leader of my party and voted against action in the Iraqi | :56:46. | :56:50. | |
war. It is being disingenuous to the house because it was one of the | :56:51. | :56:55. | |
biggest rebellions there had been on the government side. And I remember | :56:56. | :57:03. | |
that debate and how difficult it was to make that judgment. When you are | :57:04. | :57:06. | |
being led by the leader of your party whose judgment you respect, it | :57:07. | :57:13. | |
is a tough call to disagree and vote against an action of that kind. Can | :57:14. | :57:18. | |
the Honourable gentleman accept as I do, that in a difference of opinion, | :57:19. | :57:24. | |
I have not had any cause to change my mind over the decision I make but | :57:25. | :57:28. | |
I believe those who made the decisions relieved they were doing | :57:29. | :57:34. | |
the right thing. I believe we are saying different things. I am not | :57:35. | :57:38. | |
saying there was intentional deceit. What I am saying is that this place, | :57:39. | :57:43. | |
many of us did not question enough the evidence before us. The JI see | :57:44. | :57:50. | |
report was full of caveats and holes but we relied on the Prime | :57:51. | :57:55. | |
Minister's interpretation given in his foreword. I fully respect | :57:56. | :58:00. | |
members views on that evening itself. If you cannot trust the | :58:01. | :58:04. | |
Prime Minister standing at the dispatch box making the case for war | :58:05. | :58:08. | |
and perhaps privy to intelligence that we haven't seen, then it is a | :58:09. | :58:13. | |
sad turn of events. But I still come back to the fundamental point that | :58:14. | :58:18. | |
we should have questioned more because there was a firm lack of | :58:19. | :58:23. | |
evidence of WMD and that was the premise for war. We cannot forget | :58:24. | :58:28. | |
that point. The reason the inspectors were pleading for more | :58:29. | :58:32. | |
time is because they couldn't find WMD because they didn't exist. There | :58:33. | :58:36. | |
is that component in this debate that the UN was asking us to give | :58:37. | :58:41. | |
them more time. The problem was we were marching to a military | :58:42. | :58:46. | |
timetable at that point. I am grateful to the Honourable gentleman | :58:47. | :58:51. | |
to indulge me for a second, I was reduced to four minutes yesterday so | :58:52. | :58:56. | |
I did not get the opportunity to page of you to my predecessor Robin | :58:57. | :59:00. | |
Cook, who if not for his untimely death, I would not be in this place, | :59:01. | :59:07. | |
he was my MP going up, we disagreed on many things but on Iraq we agreed | :59:08. | :59:12. | |
and he is missed by many, and his family. I am conscious time is | :59:13. | :59:19. | |
pressing on. I will try and wrap this up in a few minutes. That was | :59:20. | :59:23. | |
the first lesson from my point of view that we would do well to | :59:24. | :59:28. | |
reflect on. The second important lesson we should learn from Iraqi is | :59:29. | :59:34. | |
that we need a proper functioning and funded well sited foreign policy | :59:35. | :59:42. | |
apparatus. There is no doubt about it, Barack revealed clear | :59:43. | :59:46. | |
deficiencies in that apparatus. Subsequent interventions would | :59:47. | :59:49. | |
suggest that we still haven't put that right to a large part. In | :59:50. | :59:54. | |
Helmand province, most of us supported the initial invasion in | :59:55. | :59:59. | |
Afghanistan or the intervention to get rid of Al-Qaeda, we made a | :00:00. | :00:04. | |
massive mistake in allowing that mission to morph into one of | :00:05. | :00:09. | |
nation-building. That was a mission that was completely under resourced. | :00:10. | :00:14. | |
In Libya, we did not understand events on the ground and that once | :00:15. | :00:18. | |
you knocked the doors down, the easy part, you laid open all of the | :00:19. | :00:23. | |
tribal rivalries. Again we had a lack of understanding of events on | :00:24. | :00:30. | |
the ground. In Syria in 2013, there was a suggestion we would be arming | :00:31. | :00:33. | |
the rebels, not realising that lurking in the shadows were the ISI | :00:34. | :00:40. | |
tell situation and how that would play out. -- I | :00:41. | :00:44. | |
a loss of expertise and foreign policy and it is a problem felt | :00:45. | :00:54. | |
within the SCO. In this country we have a narrow pyramid when it comes | :00:55. | :00:58. | |
to foreign policy making. In the States it is more open and diverse | :00:59. | :01:01. | |
with lobbyists and political analysts. The experts can buy into | :01:02. | :01:07. | |
the system and influence the system. In this country it is more narrowly | :01:08. | :01:13. | |
defined. It is the reserve of the select few, which is why the SCO is | :01:14. | :01:19. | |
part of that few, it must be firing on all cylinders. It has not been | :01:20. | :01:26. | |
so. That is why we need proper funding of the SCO, we have had a | :01:27. | :01:32. | |
continual erosion of the budget and hollowing out of expertise and | :01:33. | :01:35. | |
staff. Traditional skills like languages and knowledge of events on | :01:36. | :01:41. | |
the ground and peoples, places, have all been downgraded. As illustrated | :01:42. | :01:45. | |
by the closure of the in-house language school and the gutting of | :01:46. | :01:52. | |
the venerable library. How is it that we have got to the point that | :01:53. | :01:57. | |
when Russia intervened in Ukraine, we did not how one Crimean expert | :01:58. | :02:02. | |
within the FCO. How is it when the Arab uprising took place, we had so | :02:03. | :02:08. | |
few Arabists that we were calling them out of retirement. And how we | :02:09. | :02:13. | |
have a different budget, ten times that of the Foreign and Commonwealth | :02:14. | :02:19. | |
Office. It does not serve us well. We need to increase the budget for | :02:20. | :02:24. | |
long-term investment and make sure we are as well sited as we can be. | :02:25. | :02:29. | |
That is not the case at the moment. There is continual pressure on the | :02:30. | :02:33. | |
FCO budget and we need to put that right. It is no surprise that | :02:34. | :02:38. | |
Parliament has raised the bar when it comes to interventions. It | :02:39. | :02:43. | |
expects to be consulted. That is one of the positive developments of the | :02:44. | :02:47. | |
Iraqi intervention. If you believe there is a loss of expertise at the | :02:48. | :02:51. | |
heart of your foreign policy apparatus and if there is a lack of | :02:52. | :02:58. | |
trust, not just because of Barack but because of Helmand province, | :02:59. | :03:03. | |
Libya, Syria, again, the bar needs to be raised. This is not a healthy | :03:04. | :03:10. | |
position in the long term. In the increasingly challenging | :03:11. | :03:13. | |
international environment, we need a knowledgeable executive to be firing | :03:14. | :03:18. | |
on all cylinders. Well informed and resourced FCO has to be central to | :03:19. | :03:23. | |
that, acting as a counterweight to number ten and it may help us avoid | :03:24. | :03:28. | |
costly errors and conflicts going forward. There has to be within the | :03:29. | :03:34. | |
system readiness to speak truth to power and I am not sure we are quite | :03:35. | :03:40. | |
there yet. That is one of the key lessons with regard to Iraq. In | :03:41. | :03:45. | |
conclusion Mr Speaker, we face enormous geopolitical challenges, | :03:46. | :03:50. | |
both the UK and the West, going forward. The world population will | :03:51. | :03:56. | |
rise to 9 billion by 2050, changing distribution in terms of Africa, | :03:57. | :04:02. | |
urbanisation, the consequent strain on natural resources. 1 billion | :04:03. | :04:07. | |
people lack access to sufficient water, by 2050, three quarters of | :04:08. | :04:14. | |
the world could face water scarcity. There are environmental challenges | :04:15. | :04:20. | |
caused by political and economic uncertainty. In the global | :04:21. | :04:22. | |
information world, success will depend on not to prevail by force | :04:23. | :04:28. | |
but who wins the story. One of the failures of Iraq is that it is | :04:29. | :04:34. | |
symptomatic of a wider malaise. The deficiency in strategic analysis at | :04:35. | :04:39. | |
the corner of our foreign policy apparatus. The greatest challenge | :04:40. | :04:45. | |
for policymakers is to ensure that we embrace flexibility and foresight | :04:46. | :04:50. | |
and perhaps diplomacy's greatest challenge must be to restore foreign | :04:51. | :04:56. | |
policy and defence capabilities. Otherwise the country risks being | :04:57. | :05:01. | |
left behind. This is happening at a time when international community is | :05:02. | :05:05. | |
failing to produce coordinated responses to challenges facing | :05:06. | :05:10. | |
mankind including poverty, organised crime, conflict, disease, hunger and | :05:11. | :05:14. | |
inequality. In conclusion, I properly resourced and respected | :05:15. | :05:20. | |
foreign policy apparatus, investment in soft power and old friendships | :05:21. | :05:25. | |
and strong in defence because diplomacy and soft power cannot | :05:26. | :05:30. | |
succeed by it self. We must have this proper funding in place for our | :05:31. | :05:36. | |
FCO. If we are not well sited, the next intervention challenge, there | :05:37. | :05:41. | |
will be more, it might not be as local in its ramifications as it has | :05:42. | :05:46. | |
been in the past errors. We need to be better sited because the cost of | :05:47. | :05:51. | |
getting it wrong might be so much greater next time. Jim Shannon. It | :05:52. | :05:56. | |
is a pleasure to speak and to follow the members who have given a wealth | :05:57. | :06:01. | |
and depth of information to this debate. My comments, the mistakes | :06:02. | :06:11. | |
made and lessons learned, that is what I wish to refer to. British | :06:12. | :06:16. | |
forces, 146,000 in the invasion phase but because of how things | :06:17. | :06:21. | |
work, more than actually served, I would like to pay tribute to the 179 | :06:22. | :06:26. | |
brave and courageous servicemen and women who died during the campaign | :06:27. | :06:34. | |
and commend those who served in this place and in the other place as | :06:35. | :06:40. | |
well. The Chilcot Report has raised many issues. There is a lack of | :06:41. | :06:45. | |
answers on such key issues as the cause of much of the public rage. It | :06:46. | :06:49. | |
is now very clear that we followed the American lead without properly | :06:50. | :06:58. | |
analysing intelligence. It was the public commitment from Tony Blair to | :06:59. | :07:05. | |
the US president on support. We need to be more discerning about how we | :07:06. | :07:08. | |
get material in regards intelligence. The plan for success | :07:09. | :07:17. | |
was absent and in 2003, there was an expected success for which no one | :07:18. | :07:24. | |
had planned. No one could see Saddam Hussein capitulating so early. So | :07:25. | :07:30. | |
there were no successful programmes is sit such as oil aid. We did not | :07:31. | :07:37. | |
have a vision of understanding what would happen if we were successful | :07:38. | :07:45. | |
at time. It is felt strongly to this day, in the region and across the | :07:46. | :07:50. | |
world. We did not understand the complex society of Barack. The | :07:51. | :07:55. | |
cultural sensitivity and local division, the sectarianism and the | :07:56. | :07:59. | |
politics that meant our presence was resented as time went on and things | :08:00. | :08:04. | |
did not get better. There was the incident in Basra where war was | :08:05. | :08:10. | |
pronounced. All of these were unforeseen. We cannot seem -- keep | :08:11. | :08:14. | |
sending forces into places where they are not equipped Ford the | :08:15. | :08:23. | |
surroundings and understanding. We need to fully prepare our Armed | :08:24. | :08:26. | |
Forces and regain much of the damaged public trust. I was not a | :08:27. | :08:29. | |
member at the time of the rock wall but I had constituents who were | :08:30. | :08:35. | |
sending socks and boots and food and I have to say, on one occasion, body | :08:36. | :08:42. | |
armour, there is something wrong when our people serve across the | :08:43. | :08:47. | |
seas and we as families have to send them stuff that the army should send | :08:48. | :08:52. | |
them. There needs to be a conversation. A lot of the things | :08:53. | :08:55. | |
went wrong can be explained by the lack of resources. We have not got | :08:56. | :09:01. | |
the capacity to fight on so many fronts any more. It is now clear | :09:02. | :09:07. | |
that we greatly underestimated -- overestimated the capability of the | :09:08. | :09:13. | |
enemy. That was another important point to learn and one that must be | :09:14. | :09:21. | |
taken forward. I want to speak of the veterans in the family support | :09:22. | :09:25. | |
package when soldiers were away. At that time, there were two soldiers | :09:26. | :09:30. | |
left at headquarters to take care of family affairs, it became | :09:31. | :09:36. | |
overpowering for them. I know that things have changed and I welcome | :09:37. | :09:39. | |
those changes but we have to build on this and make sure these things | :09:40. | :09:47. | |
are not forgotten. We need foresight and to continue learning. I want to | :09:48. | :09:54. | |
quote an example of a gentleman who served in uniform. His story will be | :09:55. | :10:00. | |
well-known to those who read the Sunday Times, Chris Braithwaite, 41, | :10:01. | :10:06. | |
a former major in the Duke of Lancaster Regiment. His quote was | :10:07. | :10:14. | |
"In Basra, we were attacked daily for seven months. We believe the | :10:15. | :10:19. | |
financial support that was provided by the Army in recognition of long | :10:20. | :10:22. | |
service would reflect the family sacrifice until the rug was pulled | :10:23. | :10:30. | |
from under us." "I have saved the Queen 's Diamond Jubilee Medal, I | :10:31. | :10:33. | |
was given the news I was made risk -- made redundant, 87 days short of | :10:34. | :10:41. | |
my 16 years service for that medal." These people fought for Queen and | :10:42. | :10:44. | |
country, they did their bit and when they were needed, they had support | :10:45. | :10:49. | |
back home but it fell short with a vengeance. We must take care of our | :10:50. | :10:54. | |
veterans and make sure they get first-class services. Offer the best | :10:55. | :10:59. | |
and get the best as well for those things are vitally important. I | :11:00. | :11:05. | |
asked this question and I will ask again, are we going to have a | :11:06. | :11:11. | |
statistic someday where more Iraqi -- Iraqi war veterans kill | :11:12. | :11:19. | |
themselves than were killed in the conflict? There are statistical | :11:20. | :11:30. | |
facts over Afghanistan, these are things we need to take recognition | :11:31. | :11:36. | |
of and be aware of. If I can quickly referred to the reserves. We use the | :11:37. | :11:43. | |
highest number of reservists on record and we have no method of | :11:44. | :11:56. | |
tracking them to see if they have suffered after the conflict, and the | :11:57. | :12:00. | |
number dropped from 45,000 to 30,000, there needs to be a rethink. | :12:01. | :12:10. | |
It may well be that the Tony Blair was strong, is own self-importance | :12:11. | :12:16. | |
having had successes in Kosovo and Sierra Leone and having brokered the | :12:17. | :12:19. | |
Good Friday Agreement the genuinely thought he could do no long. This | :12:20. | :12:25. | |
could be the will be with you whatever memo, it is increasingly | :12:26. | :12:29. | |
clear, that our soldiers were being sent to war by Tony Blair no matter | :12:30. | :12:33. | |
what. Tim Collins said that at the time they believe that there was it | :12:34. | :12:37. | |
plan in place but we know now that this was not the case and we know | :12:38. | :12:41. | |
that the lack of planning was disastrous for many. It is easy to | :12:42. | :12:46. | |
point the finger at Tony Blair but there are others, Alistair Campbell, | :12:47. | :12:50. | |
Jeff Kuhn and those in a circle of friends, decision-makers and there | :12:51. | :12:53. | |
is something for them to think about. Mr Speaker, in the time that | :12:54. | :12:58. | |
is available to me, right honourable and honourable members will be aware | :12:59. | :13:04. | |
of that famous poem by Roger Kipling, from the poem Tommy. I will | :13:05. | :13:08. | |
read the second burst your fifth one. The theme is applicable to | :13:09. | :13:18. | |
today, "I went into a theatre as sober as could be, they sent him to | :13:19. | :13:24. | |
the musicals but when it came to fighting they will show me in the | :13:25. | :13:32. | |
stalls. It is Tommy this and Tommy that, the troop ships on the Tyne, | :13:33. | :13:40. | |
it is special train for Atkins when the ships are on the Tyne. We talk | :13:41. | :13:55. | |
of schools and fires for all. For it is Tommy this and Tommy that, and | :13:56. | :13:59. | |
talk about the bridge, the saviour of his country when the guns begun | :14:00. | :14:05. | |
to shoot. And it is anything you please but Tommy isn't a blooming | :14:06. | :14:11. | |
fool. " I believe we need to do better by our veterans to make sure | :14:12. | :14:15. | |
that those who have served this country well, should be looked | :14:16. | :14:18. | |
after. I want to conclude with one comment. There was a vulnerable | :14:19. | :14:27. | |
person scheme, set up after the war, when the current reflection in Iraq | :14:28. | :14:31. | |
is important, it doesn't make an impact, the honourable member for | :14:32. | :14:34. | |
Leeds Central referred to it. I want to refer to it again. There are | :14:35. | :14:40. | |
Catholics, Protestants, and many others who continue to be targeted | :14:41. | :14:46. | |
on the basis of their identity. Around 3.3 million have been | :14:47. | :14:50. | |
displaced due to the instability of Iraq, many minority groups are on | :14:51. | :14:54. | |
the verge of disappearance and during the UN Independent | :14:55. | :14:56. | |
commission, it was determined that there should committed genocide | :14:57. | :15:02. | |
against the UCD is, around 90% of them are Iraqi. The resettlement | :15:03. | :15:10. | |
schemes are not national specific, they have only taken up to 315 | :15:11. | :15:18. | |
Iraqis, while some might fit the scheme, they're not eligible for | :15:19. | :15:23. | |
asylum because they're not Syrian asylum seekers. I would call, for | :15:24. | :15:28. | |
the modest increase in the resettlement scheme, for Iraqis who | :15:29. | :15:34. | |
fit the criteria to qualify for asylum in the UK. A modest expansion | :15:35. | :15:39. | |
is particularly pertinent, because the Iraqis have suffered as much as | :15:40. | :15:43. | |
their Syrian counterparts at the hands of the Irish. The UK cannot | :15:44. | :15:48. | |
absolve itself promises to Iraqis, making them illegible for | :15:49. | :15:54. | |
resettlement. It is the least we can do. Mr Speaker, we have heard about | :15:55. | :15:59. | |
mistakes, we can learn from those mistakes, we can move forward, we | :16:00. | :16:05. | |
can make it a better place for our soldiers to serve. With the veteran | :16:06. | :16:09. | |
support when they get home for our families as well. Let us learn from | :16:10. | :16:12. | |
the report and move forward, learning from those mistakes. Thank | :16:13. | :16:21. | |
you. Johnny Mercer. Thank you very much Mr Speaker, and for allowing me | :16:22. | :16:26. | |
to rise. The Chilcot report allowed for sobering reading, many things | :16:27. | :16:29. | |
had been said on the issue and I will not repeat them, the chief | :16:30. | :16:32. | |
protagonists at the time have received in my view their | :16:33. | :16:35. | |
criticisms. I have the fortunate position of having been in the Army | :16:36. | :16:39. | |
at the time of the Iraq war and now a member of this place. I did not | :16:40. | :16:44. | |
serve in combat in theatre, my theatre was another unpopular war in | :16:45. | :16:45. | |
Afghanistan. The time of the Iraq the Army was a strange place to be. | :16:46. | :16:57. | |
It is difficult to be positive about a million people marched against | :16:58. | :17:01. | |
appointment just before you go. But it is a testament to the character | :17:02. | :17:05. | |
and the professionalism of UK Armed Forces that the initial operation | :17:06. | :17:09. | |
was a success despite cruel losses including from my enrichment on the | :17:10. | :17:15. | |
23rd of March 2003 when Ian Seymour, and others from 29 commando were | :17:16. | :17:19. | |
killed in southern Iraq by insurgents. But what happened | :17:20. | :17:23. | |
following the initial operation, for the following seven years bad is | :17:24. | :17:28. | |
indeed right up to date, has been a tragedy for Iraq. I visited the | :17:29. | :17:32. | |
country last autumn and I met with the current president, it remains a | :17:33. | :17:36. | |
place of extreme violence, heavy corruption and deep division. It was | :17:37. | :17:40. | |
a challenge to return from a visit to Baghdad with much of a sense of | :17:41. | :17:45. | |
optimism although recent changes in the Iraqi security forces and the | :17:46. | :17:48. | |
international coalition's mammoth efforts in the fight against Daesh | :17:49. | :17:52. | |
give real cause for hope and I want to pay tribute to all UK forces | :17:53. | :17:55. | |
engaged in a fight to date as we speak in this house. But how did we | :17:56. | :18:01. | |
really get here? I to the youngster and the public rage, the actions of | :18:02. | :18:05. | |
some of those both at the top of government at the time and yes at | :18:06. | :18:07. | |
the top of the military were negligent. I am concerned however | :18:08. | :18:13. | |
that the public's fixation upon Tony Blair could make us miss some of the | :18:14. | :18:17. | |
learning points, this is the whole point of this process that must be | :18:18. | :18:21. | |
taken from the very conference of work. It was encouraging to hear the | :18:22. | :18:26. | |
Prime Minister who left office yesterday say that it would be | :18:27. | :18:29. | |
impossible for these events to happen again today because of the | :18:30. | :18:32. | |
structures that he and his team have put in place and I commend him and | :18:33. | :18:35. | |
the sexual state for defence for that. -- the Secretary of State for | :18:36. | :18:45. | |
Defence. But there is a decency issue, the morality issue. It is a | :18:46. | :18:50. | |
rarer and treasured commodity, in an organisation configured to but | :18:51. | :18:54. | |
physical courage, the ability to stand up for your men in the face of | :18:55. | :18:59. | |
a seemingly unstoppable sequence of events, to speak truth to power is | :19:00. | :19:03. | |
an integral part of the duty of the nation. We drive it into the | :19:04. | :19:07. | |
subordinate and we preach to anyone who will listen, so where was this | :19:08. | :19:10. | |
courage in the build-up to this disastrous war? It is inconceivable | :19:11. | :19:15. | |
to me to allow political administration in this country to | :19:16. | :19:17. | |
have the preparations for war because it did not physically to be | :19:18. | :19:21. | |
seen to be doing so. It is inconceivable to me to allow | :19:22. | :19:25. | |
soldiers out patrol bases into contact with the enemy without body | :19:26. | :19:29. | |
armour, not as a tactical decision, or a of enemy action, but simply | :19:30. | :19:35. | |
because of bad planning. It is inconceivable to me to continually | :19:36. | :19:39. | |
allow patrolling in snatch Land Rover is when they were known to | :19:40. | :19:42. | |
provide no protection whatsoever to our men and women against a | :19:43. | :19:46. | |
well-known and obvious IED threat. But yet these things happened and | :19:47. | :19:49. | |
they directly cost UK military lives. And in this almost this rule | :19:50. | :19:56. | |
fixation of hatred upon Tony Blair these lessons must not be missed | :19:57. | :19:59. | |
less we do a further disservice to our men and women who serve. The | :20:00. | :20:03. | |
Prime Minister does not make tactical decisions, she does not | :20:04. | :20:09. | |
plan logistics, she is advised by those who do. I cannot as a very | :20:10. | :20:13. | |
junior and insignificant commander in another unpopular war in | :20:14. | :20:17. | |
Afghanistan would ever sanction an operation knowingly lacking in | :20:18. | :20:20. | |
equipment required to protect my men from a threat that I clearly knew | :20:21. | :20:24. | |
about because I wasn't prepared to say no. And I find it hard as do | :20:25. | :20:27. | |
many of my cohort to understand why it was the case in this instance. | :20:28. | :20:32. | |
And yet we did, we as a military betrayed the individuals who lost | :20:33. | :20:36. | |
their lives in this conflict, as a direct result of equipment shortages | :20:37. | :20:45. | |
and that is the point for me that really sticks in the group from all | :20:46. | :20:48. | |
this. The political arguments, the strategic comings and goings will be | :20:49. | :20:50. | |
debated at in-flight and so they must to ensure that we do not make | :20:51. | :20:53. | |
the same stakes again. But the military and the tactical lessons | :20:54. | :20:56. | |
must be learned also. What happened in Iraq had a profound effect on a | :20:57. | :21:00. | |
whole generation of us junior commanders and military, who grew up | :21:01. | :21:03. | |
in a deep sense of mistrust in our superiors as a result of the lack of | :21:04. | :21:07. | |
actions or actions in the Iraq war. I know for many is formed us at a | :21:08. | :21:11. | |
very formative stage in our careers. Finally in my contribution today, I | :21:12. | :21:15. | |
want to speak strongly against this idea that the lives of British | :21:16. | :21:20. | |
servicemen and women where somehow wasted in this war died for nothing. | :21:21. | :21:25. | |
I'm afraid I simply cannot reconcile in my not insignificant personal | :21:26. | :21:30. | |
experience of commanding men in combat that lives lost in the | :21:31. | :21:33. | |
pursuit of protections of freedoms and privileges that we enjoyed in | :21:34. | :21:36. | |
his country have been lost in vain. For the families, many of whom I | :21:37. | :21:40. | |
know intimately, nothing common omission, no cause can be worth | :21:41. | :21:44. | |
losing a loved one. But as a soldier I thought that I must represent the | :21:45. | :21:48. | |
intimate conversations that we share, the deep motivations that we | :21:49. | :21:51. | |
fell back on to get through yet another date in a sweat, he, blood | :21:52. | :21:57. | |
and dust of these recent wars. For we soldiers are drawn from all | :21:58. | :22:00. | |
backgrounds, race, original, colour and creed, we'll have different | :22:01. | :22:04. | |
views, usually much more informed than anybody gives us credit for. No | :22:05. | :22:08. | |
doubt crafted from each of R.N. Personal experience. But we wear one | :22:09. | :22:13. | |
you reform, with one union Jack on our sleep, we sign up to the same | :22:14. | :22:18. | |
core values to protect our nation, in the same traditions of the | :22:19. | :22:21. | |
immense sacrifices of our forefathers who wore the same cap | :22:22. | :22:24. | |
badges under the same flag. The truth is when a soldier leaves his | :22:25. | :22:28. | |
patrol base in the morning comedies not thinking about how his | :22:29. | :22:31. | |
particular contribution that they will help advance the cause of | :22:32. | :22:34. | |
Iraq's future prosperity will gather some's place in the world. He's not | :22:35. | :22:38. | |
thinking about whether we should have believed a dossier about the | :22:39. | :22:41. | |
weapons of mass structure whether he will stumble upon a summer's house. | :22:42. | :22:47. | |
He's thinking about calling his wife later comedies thinking of covering | :22:48. | :22:52. | |
his arts and trying not to blink unless he misses something. He's | :22:53. | :22:56. | |
making sure that he has got spare batteries, the is making sure he | :22:57. | :23:00. | |
doesn't let his mates down. He is more focused on doing his section, | :23:01. | :23:04. | |
his platoon and his battalion proud than whether or not he should be | :23:05. | :23:07. | |
there in the first base. And in these endeavours he showing that | :23:08. | :23:12. | |
courage, that fortitude and that resilience, that humanity that we | :23:13. | :23:15. | |
all aspire to on the most revealing stage of all, welfare, where norms | :23:16. | :23:21. | |
do not exist and brutality and brought human emotion is everywhere. | :23:22. | :23:24. | |
We aspire to these things because they are good, because they are | :23:25. | :23:28. | |
noble, because they are to be desired. These young men and women | :23:29. | :23:31. | |
who made the sacrifices demonstrating these qualities, it | :23:32. | :23:35. | |
makes those are those who witnessed it and lucky to return refuse to | :23:36. | :23:40. | |
think it is futile. For they did make differences, they said, it's | :23:41. | :23:43. | |
lives through their bravery, they shielded civilians from brutal | :23:44. | :23:48. | |
enemy, with the intent showing the worst of the humanity. Improved | :23:49. | :23:51. | |
amenities and made them safer and better. OK on a strategic level | :23:52. | :23:56. | |
overall perhaps no, but it wasn't all a waste. So that courage, that | :23:57. | :24:00. | |
resilience, that discipline, that commitment, that is why we must | :24:01. | :24:04. | |
number from these conflicts to comic cannot and must never be forgotten, | :24:05. | :24:08. | |
for that would be an even greater betrayal than the ones we see laid | :24:09. | :24:12. | |
out in this report. They are not wasted lives, they were engaged in | :24:13. | :24:17. | |
noble pursuits in the generational struggle of our lifetime, as in the | :24:18. | :24:21. | |
First World War, the Second World War and conflicts since, these | :24:22. | :24:24. | |
privileges that we enjoy. These freedoms that we exercise do not | :24:25. | :24:29. | |
come cheap. So Mr Speaker in conclusion, let us learn these | :24:30. | :24:32. | |
painful lessons, let us not fixate on Tony Blair, he is yesterday's | :24:33. | :24:37. | |
man. Let us not commit to things that we cannot fulfil and pass the | :24:38. | :24:41. | |
buck to the lower end of the command chain to simply work it out. Of | :24:42. | :24:46. | |
course. I thank the honourable member for giving way and I thank | :24:47. | :24:50. | |
him also for his very powerful speech. It is one of the things that | :24:51. | :24:53. | |
has always worried me about the debate on the Iraq war has been the | :24:54. | :24:57. | |
military as victims. As victims who were forced to go and fight when in | :24:58. | :25:01. | |
fact they absolutely trained and wanted to do so. But what they | :25:02. | :25:05. | |
didn't want was bad equipment. And what they don't want today, is bad | :25:06. | :25:10. | |
equipment. And does it not behove this house and its members to be | :25:11. | :25:14. | |
much more interested on a daily basis with what we are providing a | :25:15. | :25:19. | |
service personnel with. Rather than just focusing on past decisions? | :25:20. | :25:24. | |
Absolutely and I thank my honourable friend for her intervention, I think | :25:25. | :25:28. | |
that we have, shortly long way in this process. -- an extraordinarily | :25:29. | :25:32. | |
long way in this process. And absolutely right in that we do | :25:33. | :25:45. | |
not want sympathy. We want more MP3 and understanding in what we do, | :25:46. | :25:50. | |
there is sometimes too much sympathy. -- empathy. We do not | :25:51. | :25:55. | |
expect to be ill-equipped to do so or be part of a mission which is | :25:56. | :26:02. | |
badly planned and badly resourced. So let us never lose the courage to | :26:03. | :26:07. | |
speak truth, no matter our rank or position in life. Let us remember it | :26:08. | :26:13. | |
very humility and courage and sacrifice of our service men and | :26:14. | :26:18. | |
women in Iraq and make sure we have learned the lessons that the | :26:19. | :26:21. | |
hundreds of thousands who have lost lives on either side, civilian and | :26:22. | :26:27. | |
military, the human race can only move forward and I sincerely hope we | :26:28. | :26:35. | |
do. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to follow the honourable | :26:36. | :26:40. | |
and gallant member, he makes such a powerful contribution. This whole | :26:41. | :26:45. | |
House will congratulate him on that speech and remember that people went | :26:46. | :26:52. | |
to that war on our behalf. Mr Speaker, it is a great pleasure to | :26:53. | :26:55. | |
take part in this particular debate. I was one of the members of this | :26:56. | :27:00. | |
House who was in the House when this House voted to go to war. For some | :27:01. | :27:07. | |
of us, it offers closure now we have the Chilcot report. There is a real | :27:08. | :27:12. | |
sense of vindication for people like me who resolutely oppose that | :27:13. | :27:15. | |
conflict and opposed it all the way through. I remember that D, it was a | :27:16. | :27:25. | |
horrible and ugly DE. It should be imprinted on the collective | :27:26. | :27:32. | |
consciousness of this House. I refresh my memory about the | :27:33. | :27:38. | |
atmosphere and culture, I know it sounds masochistic to look at | :27:39. | :27:41. | |
YouTube recordings of Tony Blair making his speech but I felt it was | :27:42. | :27:47. | |
important to get a sense of what that day was like. We had to listen | :27:48. | :27:53. | |
to Tony Blair when he laid out back exaggerated and fabricated case. To | :27:54. | :27:58. | |
listen again to those flights of fancy. We now know because of the | :27:59. | :28:03. | |
Chilcot report that it was mainly nonsense and most of it was fiction. | :28:04. | :28:08. | |
I was the chief whip of what was then a small group of MPs in 2003. I | :28:09. | :28:15. | |
remember observing the government whips rounding up the recalcitrant | :28:16. | :28:19. | |
and the doubters and those who were trying to make up their mind about | :28:20. | :28:25. | |
this. Let us not forget, but Labour Government imposed a harsh three | :28:26. | :28:30. | |
line whip on their members that day. Women and men dragooned into that | :28:31. | :28:37. | |
lobbied to support that fabricated case and to giving support to their | :28:38. | :28:43. | |
very flawed prime minister. The House passed that vote, 412 to 149. | :28:44. | :28:51. | |
I was among the 149. It is the proudest fort of my 15 years in this | :28:52. | :28:58. | |
House. It was a vote that characterised the last Labour | :28:59. | :29:03. | |
government, just like the vote to leave Europe will characterise this | :29:04. | :29:08. | |
Conservative Government. Both were done in a reckless gamble. There was | :29:09. | :29:17. | |
no planning for what would happen when it comes to Brexit, there was | :29:18. | :29:21. | |
no planning as we have learned from Chilcot about what they would do | :29:22. | :29:27. | |
once they had advanced into Iraq. There are lots of parallels. It is | :29:28. | :29:32. | |
curious that they seem big events that characterise particular | :29:33. | :29:37. | |
governments and forever the last Labour government will be | :29:38. | :29:40. | |
characterised by Iraq. More than that, it is all around one man and | :29:41. | :29:45. | |
my apologies to the Member for Plymouth. It is Tony Blair. There is | :29:46. | :29:51. | |
no escape from the personal association with the former Prime | :29:52. | :29:56. | |
Minister and what transpired in Iraq. It will follow him to the | :29:57. | :30:02. | |
grave. It will be on his headstone, such is his association with this | :30:03. | :30:06. | |
conflict in Iraq. It would be as well being tattooed on his forehead. | :30:07. | :30:10. | |
It is about this man and how he approached this war. When I look | :30:11. | :30:16. | |
around, and I have listened carefully to many of the speeches | :30:17. | :30:23. | |
from my colleagues, back on that day in 2003, I think we can grow them | :30:24. | :30:29. | |
into three categories. I will explain what these categories are. | :30:30. | :30:33. | |
First, my category, those who voted against the war, who did not except | :30:34. | :30:40. | |
for a minute the case which was presented to us. We feel in a good | :30:41. | :30:46. | |
place today. I look at some of my colleagues who were at the House | :30:47. | :30:50. | |
that the. I want to pay tribute to the Liberal Party. They led that | :30:51. | :30:58. | |
case against the war in 2003. And also to the Labour members. Take it | :30:59. | :31:05. | |
easy, gentlemen. Labour members opposed it. It was as he said, the | :31:06. | :31:13. | |
biggest rebellion we had during that period. They saw through it. They | :31:14. | :31:19. | |
were prepared to reject the fabricated and nonsensical case the | :31:20. | :31:22. | |
Prime Minister gave. They did the right thing. The second case... Yes, | :31:23. | :31:33. | |
of course. Just briefly. It was historically the biggest government | :31:34. | :31:38. | |
rebellion within the governing party in British political history. 122 | :31:39. | :31:42. | |
backbench colleagues in the Labour party voted on the motion that the | :31:43. | :31:51. | |
case was not proven. Only 190 backbench colleagues voted with the | :31:52. | :31:55. | |
government, under immense pressure as the honourable gentleman pointed | :31:56. | :32:00. | |
out from the whips. He is correct. This is why it is important that I | :32:01. | :32:05. | |
was setting the context of that day, it was horrible and ugly and | :32:06. | :32:12. | |
dreadful. I want to come to the Conservatives because these are the | :32:13. | :32:17. | |
second category. I have listened to several Conservative members, I | :32:18. | :32:21. | |
cannot remember which one made the case earlier. There is a real sense | :32:22. | :32:26. | |
among Conservative members that they were misled. They range in | :32:27. | :32:32. | |
categories from angry and upset about the way they were misled and | :32:33. | :32:37. | |
duped by the former Prime Minister to the former Prime Minister who | :32:38. | :32:41. | |
resigned yesterday who was a bit more followers also about it. -- | :32:42. | :32:48. | |
philosophical about it. You have to go along with it because he was | :32:49. | :32:53. | |
prime minister. But what the Conservative Party failed to do, | :32:54. | :32:56. | |
this was the utter failure they had that day, they never held that | :32:57. | :33:03. | |
Labour Government to account. They were not inquisitive. They did not | :33:04. | :33:07. | |
look at the case presented to them and said, hold on a minute, this is | :33:08. | :33:12. | |
a lot of nonsense. They should have known. The rest of the country knew | :33:13. | :33:18. | |
this was wrong. 100,000 people marched in Glasgow. I was on the | :33:19. | :33:24. | |
front of them. 1 million people in London marched against that war. | :33:25. | :33:31. | |
There was an atmosphere in the nation, amongst the public who just | :33:32. | :33:35. | |
knew profoundly that there was something wrong with this case. They | :33:36. | :33:40. | |
just knew instinctively that what they were hearing night after night | :33:41. | :33:46. | |
from Tony Blair and his cronies was an comfortable. There was something | :33:47. | :33:50. | |
wrong. The Conservatives should have picked that up and had they done | :33:51. | :33:55. | |
their job, we would not have been presented with this absolute utter | :33:56. | :33:59. | |
failure and disaster. Thirdly, I won't come to the last category. | :34:00. | :34:05. | |
Those of us to the who still seem to be almost making the case for war. | :34:06. | :34:12. | |
As of this was somehow justified, that this was right. They point to | :34:13. | :34:17. | |
things like the world is a better place without Saddam. Of course it | :34:18. | :34:22. | |
is, but what price we have paid for the world. Half a million people | :34:23. | :34:31. | |
dead. A region destabilised, a generation radicalise, foreign | :34:32. | :34:34. | |
policy discredited like never before. It is unlikely we will ever | :34:35. | :34:39. | |
restore that feeds in foreign policy ever again. This trust in politics. | :34:40. | :34:44. | |
That was a key point where the public fell of trust with what we | :34:45. | :34:50. | |
did in this House. Of course we welcome Saddam being removed, no one | :34:51. | :34:55. | |
least of all the Iraqis who have to live with the consequences. Who | :34:56. | :35:02. | |
would start to suggest that Iraq is a better place than it was in 2002. | :35:03. | :35:10. | |
This decision about the public losing faith in this House, many of | :35:11. | :35:16. | |
those accusations made against this government are not founded in the | :35:17. | :35:19. | |
Chilcot report do not come to this conclusion about this House... Dirty | :35:20. | :35:24. | |
not except that on that day it was very difficult for all others, even | :35:25. | :35:28. | |
those who voted against it were not we had made the right decision. You | :35:29. | :35:34. | |
cannot be so exact about your judgment call on that day. Surely he | :35:35. | :35:38. | |
can except that those who voted in favour on that day thought they were | :35:39. | :35:45. | |
doing the right thing? He is right. Let us have a look at this. He was | :35:46. | :35:53. | |
in the House in 2003, and I correct? Yes. He would've been recalled to | :35:54. | :35:56. | |
Parliament in September 2000 and two. When he was recalled like me, | :35:57. | :36:04. | |
we would take out what has now become cold the dodgy dossier. Did | :36:05. | :36:11. | |
he for a minute believe the fabricated nonsense that was that | :36:12. | :36:14. | |
dossier? It was absolutely appalling for this case for war. Most of it | :36:15. | :36:21. | |
came from the post doctoral thesis of a student. I have just finished | :36:22. | :36:29. | |
reading a report from this student who has said his evidence and his | :36:30. | :36:33. | |
work was doctored by this government. That was the case for | :36:34. | :36:38. | |
war. That was the case that he and I have to make a judgment about. It | :36:39. | :36:43. | |
was fabricated, a flight of fancy and that was what we were asked to | :36:44. | :36:49. | |
go to war on, it was a disgrace, like a comedy sketch or a case to go | :36:50. | :36:57. | |
to war. More sex dog than some teenage starlet embarking on their | :36:58. | :37:04. | |
first video. -- sexed up. It was an appalling document. It should never | :37:05. | :37:08. | |
have been taken for a minute, it was rubbish and nonsense. I listen to | :37:09. | :37:13. | |
Tony Blair last week. I was appalled. I was appalled at his | :37:14. | :37:20. | |
response to all of this. The lack of contrition. The half-hearted apology | :37:21. | :37:24. | |
which would probably do nothing other than incense the victims. The | :37:25. | :37:29. | |
flights of fancy still there. Almost an attempt to rewrite several | :37:30. | :37:37. | |
sections of the Chilcot Report. His failure to acknowledge the enormity | :37:38. | :37:42. | |
of what was unleashed. It is appalling what happened. Several | :37:43. | :37:46. | |
things have to happen. My view is that we not at the end this process. | :37:47. | :37:53. | |
I still think there is a journey to go in this particular story. This | :37:54. | :37:59. | |
sorry saga. I do not think we're at the conclusion what happened in | :38:00. | :38:04. | |
Iraq, mainly because of a couple of points that members have made. They | :38:05. | :38:09. | |
were not able to judge about the legality of this conflict and we | :38:10. | :38:13. | |
still have that extra mile to go just to get to say if this was an | :38:14. | :38:17. | |
illegal war. Until we get back conclusion, there will still be big | :38:18. | :38:22. | |
outstanding issues when it comes to this conflict and how it will be | :38:23. | :38:26. | |
assessed. I think there is further journeys to go. Honourable members | :38:27. | :38:31. | |
have waited Years and Years for the Chilcot report will have the sense | :38:32. | :38:36. | |
this is another journey we have to take. What must happen -- those who | :38:37. | :38:44. | |
are responsible for the biggest foreign policy disaster I have seen | :38:45. | :38:49. | |
as, this is bigger than the Suez crisis. They must be held to account | :38:50. | :38:55. | |
for the decisions they made and the things they did in the course of | :38:56. | :39:00. | |
this conflict and how it was per suit. I support overwhelming the | :39:01. | :39:06. | |
case that the chief architect, designer of the Iraq war, Mr Tony | :39:07. | :39:09. | |
Blair should be brought in front of this House to face the charges that | :39:10. | :39:14. | |
have been suggested. I really hope this House gets the opportunity to | :39:15. | :39:18. | |
discuss this because the public expect us to do it. The public do | :39:19. | :39:24. | |
not want after all this time to let this go. The only people who lost | :39:25. | :39:28. | |
their jobs in the course of this conflict are two BBC journalist. Is | :39:29. | :39:32. | |
that not an appalling way to leave things? I believe there is real | :39:33. | :39:37. | |
public desire to move to the next stage now which is holding people to | :39:38. | :39:44. | |
account so I hope we do that. Mr Speaker, I heated every single | :39:45. | :39:48. | |
minute of the debate about the Iraq war and the build up to it and the | :39:49. | :39:55. | |
post-conflict resolution. It was this House at its very worst. We | :39:56. | :40:00. | |
must ever get the ever again. The one thing we can take from this is | :40:01. | :40:05. | |
hopefully a case for lessons learned and we never do this again. Hold the | :40:06. | :40:12. | |
people responsible to account and let us apologise for that conflict. | :40:13. | :40:19. | |
Start to try to move on from all of this and let us know we will never | :40:20. | :40:23. | |
do something like the Iraq war ever again in this Parliament. Doctor | :40:24. | :40:31. | |
Philip Lee. Thank you Mr Speaker. Many important lessons will emerge | :40:32. | :40:35. | |
over the coming months and years. Deep sympathy for the people of Iraq | :40:36. | :40:39. | |
must persist and indeed to the families of the members of our | :40:40. | :40:43. | |
outstanding Armed Forces who fell in the line of duty. I wish to focus on | :40:44. | :40:50. | |
the Iraq inquiry's immediate lessons for the leadership of country. In | :40:51. | :40:55. | |
which this House has such a vital role. Firstly, can I offer some | :40:56. | :41:04. | |
historical perspective. It is worth noting some similarities between the | :41:05. | :41:08. | |
times we're living in now and the last period in recent history which | :41:09. | :41:14. | |
similarly defined by what I would define as a political sclerosis. | :41:15. | :41:20. | |
Trigger first half of the 20th-century we witnessed the | :41:21. | :41:26. | |
collapse of empires, Ottoman Empire, we saw a failure of an | :41:27. | :41:29. | |
intergovernmental institution, the league of Nations. We enjoyed | :41:30. | :41:34. | |
economic turbulence and oppression. Such dramatic chip physical change | :41:35. | :41:37. | |
was fuelled by a remarkable technological change. With the mass | :41:38. | :41:43. | |
transit of people. Advanced weapons of war, along with large armies | :41:44. | :41:48. | |
which resulted in appalling human cost in two world wars. Today, we | :41:49. | :41:55. | |
are experiencing similar geopolitical change. An expansionist | :41:56. | :42:01. | |
China, a research and Russia. A socially unstable and perhaps more | :42:02. | :42:06. | |
parochial United States of America, it is said people that we have mass | :42:07. | :42:12. | |
transit. And globalisation which brings with it opportunities, and | :42:13. | :42:19. | |
costs. Trojans have replaced tanks. And the potential for spaced based | :42:20. | :42:27. | |
weaponry looms -- drones have replaced tanks. Within this context | :42:28. | :42:31. | |
dramatic change, the new government must set its path, the crucial | :42:32. | :42:35. | |
lesson from the Iraq Inquirer is that we had to be better prepared to | :42:36. | :42:40. | |
provide great leadership, at historic tipping points. For our | :42:41. | :42:46. | |
nation and for our world. It was not wrong to wish to depose Saddam | :42:47. | :42:49. | |
Hussein but the way in which the US led coalition went about it has had | :42:50. | :42:54. | |
effects that were predicted by many experts. Perfectly foreseeable and | :42:55. | :42:59. | |
catastrophic for the Iraqi people but also for our own regional | :43:00. | :43:04. | |
interests. R.N. Country's leadership at every level, from the Prime | :43:05. | :43:08. | |
Minister down was far too weak to deliver the good outcome. I would | :43:09. | :43:14. | |
note that we are again at a critical moment, this time in history of our | :43:15. | :43:20. | |
own nation and continent, delivering a good and long-term outcome once | :43:21. | :43:24. | |
again depends on this house supplying the best possible | :43:25. | :43:30. | |
leadership now. The ties that have bound our nation, communities and | :43:31. | :43:34. | |
people at home and abroad, are severely strained. Some are | :43:35. | :43:38. | |
breaking. Our people mistrust those whom they have elected to represent | :43:39. | :43:45. | |
their interests and lead our nation. As in 2003, decisions taken quickly | :43:46. | :43:49. | |
today will have enormous ramifications over the coming | :43:50. | :43:53. | |
decades. Like the proverbial flap of the butterfly wings in one part of | :43:54. | :43:57. | |
the world, that creates a hurricane in another. It is that such critical | :43:58. | :44:02. | |
moments that we require greater leadership. Leadership with the | :44:03. | :44:08. | |
experience and perspective to see our nation 's role clearly. | :44:09. | :44:13. | |
Leadership with the wisdom and understanding to realise what must | :44:14. | :44:17. | |
be done, the vision to set clear direction, the tenacity to deliver a | :44:18. | :44:21. | |
plan and the good sense to adapt when the context changes as it | :44:22. | :44:26. | |
always does. We must not be sclerotic. Leadership and | :44:27. | :44:35. | |
self-awareness to put the public interest at its heart. We needed a | :44:36. | :44:39. | |
ship that will forge our future, not allow us to be carried off in the | :44:40. | :44:44. | |
currents of history to an unknown hand unwonted destination. The Prime | :44:45. | :44:49. | |
Minister, our new Prime Minister has taken an important step in setting | :44:50. | :44:53. | |
out her vision for a country that works for everyone. And this and the | :44:54. | :45:00. | |
previous government have made, welcome changes. Notably the | :45:01. | :45:04. | |
National Security Council structures, enable more strategic | :45:05. | :45:06. | |
decision-making in our national interests. Of course. I thank him | :45:07. | :45:15. | |
for giving way: one of the lessons that I took from the Chilcot report | :45:16. | :45:20. | |
was a habit that we have beaten out of those of us who have been to | :45:21. | :45:23. | |
sound Hirst, which is not to start with your aim and retrofit | :45:24. | :45:30. | |
justifications from that. At this time of change of national | :45:31. | :45:33. | |
leadership, would he welcome any calls that might be made to the new | :45:34. | :45:39. | |
Prime Minister to have a robust team of people to provide counter | :45:40. | :45:43. | |
narratives that time key decision-making to really test | :45:44. | :45:45. | |
hypotheses and to make sure that went difficult decisions have to be | :45:46. | :45:48. | |
made the made in the best possible way. I thank my noble friend for his | :45:49. | :45:55. | |
intervention, yes I think the absence of people speaking truth to | :45:56. | :45:59. | |
power, in the room that matters, I think we have seen too much evidence | :46:00. | :46:03. | |
of that over the last ten or 15 years. I am hopeful, that the | :46:04. | :46:08. | |
elevation of our new Prime Minister will be ushering in the new period | :46:09. | :46:12. | |
in which we do listen to experts and that we are prepared to listen to | :46:13. | :46:16. | |
people who might have a different view and a different approach to the | :46:17. | :46:23. | |
world in which we live. But the changes of the National Security | :46:24. | :46:26. | |
Council are nowhere near enough to guarantee good leadership, this | :46:27. | :46:29. | |
means that we are running an unacceptable level of risk for the | :46:30. | :46:35. | |
security, our nation and our world. The referendum on UK membership of | :46:36. | :46:39. | |
the European Union is the latest example, I'm no fan of our country's | :46:40. | :46:42. | |
previous relationship with the European Union, it had to change. | :46:43. | :46:47. | |
But to hold a referendum on membership, I fear was a strategic | :46:48. | :46:50. | |
blunder which will add verse the impact our country and our world | :46:51. | :46:55. | |
over the coming years and decades. We must avoid further such blunders | :46:56. | :47:01. | |
in the future, because we face existential threats. These threats, | :47:02. | :47:05. | |
across borders, they are by their very nature, transnational. | :47:06. | :47:15. | |
International terrorism, radicalisation, a resurgent Russia | :47:16. | :47:19. | |
and expansionist China, who are not respecting current borders. Cyber | :47:20. | :47:24. | |
security, organised crime, pandemics, environmental | :47:25. | :47:30. | |
degradation. All these are asked to work with other nations. We must now | :47:31. | :47:37. | |
set out our geopolitical priorities. We must properly fund the objective | :47:38. | :47:42. | |
to increase our influence around the world, we must revisit the | :47:43. | :47:46. | |
government and how it works. Wisdom and experience must be at the heart | :47:47. | :47:51. | |
of our decision-making. We must put people who know what they are doing | :47:52. | :47:55. | |
in charge of delivering, and they must stay in jobs long enough to see | :47:56. | :48:01. | |
them through. We must urgently overhaul how we identify and nurture | :48:02. | :48:05. | |
future leaders, our people must once again be able to trust the aims, | :48:06. | :48:09. | |
intentions and abilities of those who lead our country. We have two | :48:10. | :48:14. | |
provide leaders worthy of that trust because it will be painstaking work | :48:15. | :48:20. | |
turning back. This house must insist that we now go much further, and | :48:21. | :48:26. | |
only then will members of this house in all conscience be able to | :48:27. | :48:29. | |
reassure the people that we represent, that our nation will have | :48:30. | :48:35. | |
the leadership that it needs when we need it. | :48:36. | :48:42. | |
Thank you Mr Speaker, I have had very long involvement with Iraq, for | :48:43. | :48:49. | |
the members not here, in the 80s and 90s and in the year 2000 aspect many | :48:50. | :48:53. | |
times in this chamber, about the regime in Iraq. I chaired an | :48:54. | :49:00. | |
organisation called the campaign against repression for democratic | :49:01. | :49:05. | |
rights in Iraq, which had many members in this country. And | :49:06. | :49:11. | |
overseas. We published several books, from academics, and people | :49:12. | :49:14. | |
who lived in Iraq about the situation in the country. And I used | :49:15. | :49:23. | |
to have somebody who is now the representative of Iraq, in South | :49:24. | :49:29. | |
Korea, he would come here almost every other week with a list of | :49:30. | :49:34. | |
people who had been executed at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. | :49:35. | :49:40. | |
Sometimes, they can solve their executions and their torture, were | :49:41. | :49:46. | |
so dreadful that I would say to him, are you sure this is right? And he | :49:47. | :49:51. | |
would come back, perhaps a week later and say, yes, it was right. | :49:52. | :49:57. | |
And here is another long list. So we have no doubt what the situation was | :49:58. | :50:06. | |
in Iraq. And it existed for a number of years the association and then I | :50:07. | :50:10. | |
came back from the European Parliament in 1984 and I was asked | :50:11. | :50:14. | |
to chair an organisation called indict. It was set up, with American | :50:15. | :50:23. | |
backing and backing from the Kuwaitis. The Kuwaitis had a | :50:24. | :50:27. | |
particular interest of course in finding the lost Kuwaitis who were | :50:28. | :50:35. | |
captured during the invasion by Saddam Hussein, of Kuwait. And for | :50:36. | :50:40. | |
many years, we tried to search for those missing people and to look | :50:41. | :50:46. | |
maybe for their graves. So the Kuwaitis gave us backing, so did the | :50:47. | :50:52. | |
Americans. We set up an organisation, with a team of | :50:53. | :50:54. | |
researchers and the aim was to collect evidence against Iraqi war | :50:55. | :51:02. | |
criminals. We had a list of 12 in particular, the most wanted, and we | :51:03. | :51:07. | |
collected very detailed evidence about a great number of them. | :51:08. | :51:10. | |
Because the idea was to bring them to court, by the mid-19 90s, a body | :51:11. | :51:17. | |
of law existed that could bring human rights abusers to court. | :51:18. | :51:24. | |
Development of international law was slow, even though the law existed, | :51:25. | :51:30. | |
its application was dependent, on institutions, and governments that | :51:31. | :51:35. | |
have their own political agendas. A new ruling of the International | :51:36. | :51:38. | |
Court of Justice, blocked indictments for example of heads of | :51:39. | :51:45. | |
state so whatever evidence we had against Saddam Hussein, we could not | :51:46. | :51:52. | |
use it. In a court of law. And like the loss of which, who was brought | :51:53. | :51:58. | |
before an international court. But that still left key members of the | :51:59. | :52:05. | |
regime, open to indictments. We had a great deal of evidence for example | :52:06. | :52:10. | |
against Tareq Aziz, who was then the Foreign Minister in Iraq. And then | :52:11. | :52:15. | |
of course, Ali has an arm achieved, chemical Ali, we had plenty against | :52:16. | :52:22. | |
him. I had meetings with the UN special rapporteur on torture, the | :52:23. | :52:29. | |
then UN High Commissioner on human rights, Mary Robinson. And the | :52:30. | :52:35. | |
Secretary General, Kofi Anand. I also addressed several international | :52:36. | :52:40. | |
conferences, and tried to spell out what it was that we were doing. We | :52:41. | :52:47. | |
had to have evidence that could stand up in court so we dismissed a | :52:48. | :52:49. | |
loss of the evidence that we did not feel could stand | :52:50. | :52:58. | |
up". We had, the advice of a top human rights barrister, a QC, and we | :52:59. | :53:04. | |
worked hard interviewing over a period of five or six years | :53:05. | :53:07. | |
thousands of people to collect testimonies. Once the evidence had | :53:08. | :53:12. | |
been gathered and analysed by our legal team, my role along the other | :53:13. | :53:21. | |
board members, was to persuade the lawmakers, in the relevant country, | :53:22. | :53:25. | |
that there was enough evidence to indict the people concerned. We came | :53:26. | :53:30. | |
very close to prosecution in Belgium for example. But at the last minute | :53:31. | :53:38. | |
they change their laws. When I have finished my sentence. In the last | :53:39. | :53:41. | |
minute they change the laws because someone had also tried to indict an | :53:42. | :53:48. | |
Israeli leader Ariel Charente. Durable lady is making a speech | :53:49. | :53:54. | |
where she persuades us that Saddam Hussein was a vile dictator. We all | :53:55. | :54:03. | |
accept that. But, the argument was made on the basis of weapons of mass | :54:04. | :54:08. | |
destruction, she will strongly in favour, when I come to that part of | :54:09. | :54:14. | |
my speech durable gentleman will get his answer. We went to Switzerland, | :54:15. | :54:21. | |
we went to Norway and we went to Belgium -- my speech, the honourable | :54:22. | :54:26. | |
gentleman and will get his answer. Just like Britain, there were lots | :54:27. | :54:34. | |
of warm words but no action. So we were trying very hard to avoid a | :54:35. | :54:39. | |
war. We thought there was an alternative, and we tried to make | :54:40. | :54:47. | |
the case, I made it in this chamber, and if the honourable gentleman was | :54:48. | :54:51. | |
here, he would have heard it. But there were alternatives, but | :54:52. | :54:56. | |
unfortunately all of the authorities prevaricated, and the issue dragged | :54:57. | :55:02. | |
on. Without getting anywhere. Meanwhile our main funders, the | :55:03. | :55:06. | |
Americans were having a change of heart. The Clinton administration | :55:07. | :55:10. | |
had originally been enthusiastic, wanting us to campaign in the US as | :55:11. | :55:15. | |
well as Europe. Suddenly they changed their minds, they had moved | :55:16. | :55:19. | |
to a policy of containment. Not indictment. So our activities really | :55:20. | :55:26. | |
no longer fitted in with their plans. But as the organisation was | :55:27. | :55:30. | |
set up in this country, we continued, collecting the evidence. | :55:31. | :55:37. | |
We turned our attention in particular to Tarik Aziz, because of | :55:38. | :55:41. | |
his involvement in the taking of British hostages. I think people | :55:42. | :55:47. | |
forget this, British hostages were taken in Kuwait, and | :55:48. | :55:53. | |
we never had proper answers to the question why were they in two H, why | :55:54. | :56:02. | |
the plane landed in Kuwait, and although Saddam Hussein had already | :56:03. | :56:06. | |
invaded Kuwait, those people were obviously taken as human shields. | :56:07. | :56:13. | |
Will I presented our evidence to the Attorney General. I had continual | :56:14. | :56:20. | |
meetings with him to pressurise his teams because we felt they were not | :56:21. | :56:24. | |
moving fast enough. They kicked their heels for a number of years | :56:25. | :56:30. | |
and then our top barrister could not understand, given the evidence we | :56:31. | :56:34. | |
had presented, they were still dragging their feet. We had as much | :56:35. | :56:40. | |
evidence as we could possibly need, apart from getting a signed | :56:41. | :56:47. | |
confession from Saddam Hussein, there was nothing further is legally | :56:48. | :56:53. | |
we could possibly have done. I would occasionally spot Lord Williams in | :56:54. | :56:57. | |
the corridors of Westminster and take off after him, chasing him down | :56:58. | :57:02. | |
corridors. He would frequently jokey had to duck into the gents to avoid | :57:03. | :57:10. | |
me. One day he said, I have good news regarding in sight. He was | :57:11. | :57:14. | |
going to refer the case against Tarik Aziz to Scotland Yard. I said | :57:15. | :57:18. | |
he was kicking it into the long grass but he denied that was the | :57:19. | :57:25. | |
case. We visited the indict team which was made up mainly of Iraqis. | :57:26. | :57:31. | |
We visited a chief superintendent in new Scotland Yard and talked about | :57:32. | :57:36. | |
the evidence we had offered. We offered to help him and provide more | :57:37. | :57:42. | |
evidence but we never got a single word back. It is understandable in | :57:43. | :57:49. | |
some ways, it was not there are met, they had neither the resources nor | :57:50. | :57:56. | |
expert sees nor the interest. -- expertise. We came in for somebody | :57:57. | :58:02. | |
call from the tabloid press with cartoons of British bobbies | :58:03. | :58:07. | |
apprehending Saddam Hussein. I think it was a very good opportunity | :58:08. | :58:14. | |
missed. I make this point because there were alternatives and those | :58:15. | :58:18. | |
alternatives for whatever reasons were not per suit in the way I would | :58:19. | :58:22. | |
have wished and I am sure many others in this House would have | :58:23. | :58:27. | |
wished as well. -- were not followed. I would like to be a | :58:28. | :58:33. | |
tribute to my honourable friend from Northampton who was of great | :58:34. | :58:38. | |
assistance at the time we were looking at many of these matters. He | :58:39. | :58:44. | |
is a very wise counsellor and he assisted the Iraqis in many ways. I | :58:45. | :58:52. | |
first became aware of human rights atrocities in Iraq before I was a | :58:53. | :59:00. | |
politician in the 1970s. I met Iraqi students in Cardiff. I'm sure some | :59:01. | :59:06. | |
of my Scottish friends will have met Iraqi students in Scotland. Some of | :59:07. | :59:09. | |
whom had been imprisoned. There was one couple from Basra and one of | :59:10. | :59:15. | |
them had been imprisoned and gone through a mock execution and the | :59:16. | :59:19. | |
stories they told... He was a student activist. I came to learn of | :59:20. | :59:25. | |
course that this was only the tip of the iceberg. In 1991, I was shadow | :59:26. | :59:34. | |
set for International development. I stood up in Parliament and described | :59:35. | :59:40. | |
what I had seen, myself on the mountains of Iraq and Iran when the | :59:41. | :59:43. | |
Kurds fled from their helicopter gunships of Saddam. The scenes were | :59:44. | :59:50. | |
appalling and typical of the attacks made by the Iraqi regime on Iraqis. | :59:51. | :59:58. | |
Sometime later I met an Iraqi who made the point to me that Saddam had | :59:59. | :00:03. | |
killed hundreds of thousands of his own people. He said to me that the | :00:04. | :00:10. | |
biggest weapon of mass drop -- mass destruction was Saddam, why did it | :00:11. | :00:14. | |
take so long for them to be removed? Many cars were killed during the | :00:15. | :00:21. | |
genocide campaign, including as a result of the Bard issues of | :00:22. | :00:28. | |
chemical weapons. -- barbarous use. I met some of the horribly injured | :00:29. | :00:36. | |
victims. I took some of them to a London hospital. Many were killed | :00:37. | :00:45. | |
brutally in cold blood in prisons and torture chambers all over the | :00:46. | :00:49. | |
country. Repression, abuse and ethnic cleansing and extrajudicial | :00:50. | :00:57. | |
killings continued right up to 2003. Saddam was without doubt a serious | :00:58. | :01:04. | |
threat to domestic, regional and global stability. I had hoped the | :01:05. | :01:07. | |
international community would neutralise them, but sanctions | :01:08. | :01:15. | |
failed. International indictments never took place. UN Security | :01:16. | :01:21. | |
Council resolutions were ignored time after time. All had been tried, | :01:22. | :01:32. | |
all had failed. So from 1997 until 2003, I worked against Saddam and | :01:33. | :01:36. | |
leading members of his regime to get them prosecuted under international | :01:37. | :01:40. | |
law war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, on the basis | :01:41. | :01:47. | |
of rock-solid witness testimony. The evidence was finally used in the | :01:48. | :01:53. | |
trials of Saddam, Tariq Aziz and others when eventually be stood | :01:54. | :01:57. | |
trial in Baghdad and I was very pleased to be there to witness some | :01:58. | :02:03. | |
of those trials. I knew that our evidence was being used. I saw it in | :02:04. | :02:11. | |
the rooms behind the chamber where they were being tried. In February | :02:12. | :02:20. | |
2003, the cars were terrified. That chemical weapons were going to be | :02:21. | :02:24. | |
used against them again. -- the Kurdish people. Since 2003, more | :02:25. | :02:34. | |
secrets of this evil and despotic regime were revealed. I stood on a | :02:35. | :02:44. | |
huge mound in the open ear several acres near Babylon. Where about | :02:45. | :02:51. | |
10,000 bodies in a mass graves were being disinterred, mostly Shia | :02:52. | :03:01. | |
Muslims. As more than 20 visits to Iraq as an envoy on human rights, I | :03:02. | :03:07. | |
opened the first Kurdish genocide museum. It was snowing and people | :03:08. | :03:12. | |
crowded into the museum. Their relatives had been tortured, many to | :03:13. | :03:18. | |
death there. Former detainees had written messages on the cell walls. | :03:19. | :03:25. | |
Sometimes the writing was on blood and sometimes there were just | :03:26. | :03:28. | |
marched to cross off the days of the week. An old woman came up to me | :03:29. | :03:34. | |
with a bit of plastic in her hands. I unwrapped it and saw three photos | :03:35. | :03:39. | |
of her husband and two sons who had been killed in that place. Mr | :03:40. | :03:50. | |
Speaker, over the last few days since the Chilcot report which I | :03:51. | :03:57. | |
gave evidence to follow all afternoon, there have been very few | :03:58. | :04:03. | |
voices of Iraqis heard. I have one from a doctor who is presently the | :04:04. | :04:08. | |
senior adviser to the Iraqis president. He was appointed water | :04:09. | :04:17. | |
Minister in 2003 in Baghdad. He was very successful, he managed to | :04:18. | :04:24. | |
re-flight over a few years the marshes where the Marsh Arabs had | :04:25. | :04:29. | |
been crudely displaced. This is what he said, it must be remembered that | :04:30. | :04:35. | |
at the time, not only did Prime Minister Blair and President Bush | :04:36. | :04:38. | |
wish to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq but so did most of the | :04:39. | :04:43. | |
entire spectrum of the Iraqi opposition, including Kurds, Arabs, | :04:44. | :04:49. | |
Shia and all minorities which make up Iraq. And most of the | :04:50. | :04:55. | |
international community. The Dracula position lobbied governments | :04:56. | :04:58. | |
throughout the world and wears representatives of the occupation | :04:59. | :05:03. | |
believed that Prime Minister Blair and President Bush were acting in | :05:04. | :05:07. | |
response to the Iraqi people and to protect them on the basis of | :05:08. | :05:12. | |
evidence available at that time. -- the Iraqi opposition. There was, | :05:13. | :05:19. | |
treat evidence that Saddam Hussein was complicit and instructed | :05:20. | :05:23. | |
campaigns of genocide, torture, ethnic cleansing and use of chemical | :05:24. | :05:27. | |
and biological weapons against the Iraqis population as well as | :05:28. | :05:32. | |
neighbouring countries. We are still finding their mass graves of nearly | :05:33. | :05:36. | |
1 million Iraqis murdered as a result of his actions. I believe... | :05:37. | :05:48. | |
Iraqis themselves will always remember grateful for the support | :05:49. | :05:52. | |
shown by Tony Blair and the British Government and British Parliament at | :05:53. | :05:59. | |
that time. Mr Speaker, I thank the honourable lady for whom I have the | :06:00. | :06:03. | |
utmost respect for all the work she has done over the years to try and | :06:04. | :06:09. | |
get evidence against this regime, incredible work and I pay great | :06:10. | :06:15. | |
tribute to her. One question that I have, I have never really understood | :06:16. | :06:18. | |
where the chemical weapons went? Weirded big O? -- weirded the call? | :06:19. | :06:29. | |
That is a very interesting question. I can only speculate. I ensure he | :06:30. | :06:35. | |
has done so as well. I am sure some of them went to Syria. There is | :06:36. | :06:41. | |
evidence that some of them went to Syria but there are still unanswered | :06:42. | :06:47. | |
questions because the Kurds in particular truly believed that there | :06:48. | :06:53. | |
were weapons of mass destruction. I myself never use that argument | :06:54. | :06:56. | |
because I did not have all the answers but I did use their | :06:57. | :07:03. | |
humanitarian argument for intervention because I thought it | :07:04. | :07:08. | |
was important that the world should not turn its face away against the | :07:09. | :07:13. | |
horrors that were going on in Iraq. Finally Mr Speaker, I just wanted to | :07:14. | :07:21. | |
make a plea for continuing engagement with Iraq. The needs of | :07:22. | :07:32. | |
the Iraqis are great. I personally have continued my association with | :07:33. | :07:39. | |
Iraqis, with the Kurds and very well aware of their problems at this | :07:40. | :07:47. | |
time, especially the threat of Isis and Daesh. It is not true to say | :07:48. | :07:55. | |
that such people did not exist in Iraq before the war. They existed in | :07:56. | :08:01. | |
Kurdistan for example under another name. It was in fact the Americans | :08:02. | :08:08. | |
who managed to get them out at that time. We still need to protect the | :08:09. | :08:15. | |
minorities of Iraq, there are so many of them. We have a | :08:16. | :08:19. | |
responsibility to continue to assist that country in any way we can. | :08:20. | :08:26. | |
Thank you. To try and accommodate all remaining colleagues, there will | :08:27. | :08:30. | |
now be a ten minute limit on speeches with immediate effect. It | :08:31. | :08:38. | |
is not a cause for the exhalation of a year, it is perfectly adequate. I | :08:39. | :08:42. | |
know it is very important but I hope you can do it in ten minutes. David | :08:43. | :08:47. | |
Davis. We now have the Chilcot Report, seven long years we have | :08:48. | :08:51. | |
waited for the report. 2.6 million words. It has cost a huge amount of | :08:52. | :08:58. | |
money and after seven years Sir John Chilcot comes up with the sentence, | :08:59. | :09:06. | |
we have concluded that the United Kingdom chose to join the invasion | :09:07. | :09:12. | |
of Iraq before peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. It | :09:13. | :09:17. | |
took seven years to come up with that conclusion. It took so long, Mr | :09:18. | :09:23. | |
Speaker, that one of the five members of the inquiry actually died | :09:24. | :09:31. | |
during the proceedings. I pay tribute to the speeches that were | :09:32. | :09:34. | |
made yesterday by my right honourable friend, the Member for | :09:35. | :09:42. | |
Houghton place. The right honourable member for Gordon. My honourable | :09:43. | :09:49. | |
friend, the Member for Thanet and today's speech by the honourable | :09:50. | :09:56. | |
member for Perth. I was absolutely sickened when I saw the interview of | :09:57. | :10:00. | |
the former Labour Prime Minister on television. I thought if anyone | :10:01. | :10:06. | |
deserved an Oscar, he should have been given it. After everything that | :10:07. | :10:12. | |
we now know all has happened, instead of apologising like the | :10:13. | :10:19. | |
noble Lord Prescott did, who has admitted he got it wrong. He was a | :10:20. | :10:24. | |
deputy and made huge mistakes. He then told us he was presented with | :10:25. | :10:31. | |
the same fact, what a joke, he would do the same again. -- if he was. I | :10:32. | :10:39. | |
am delighted we are having a two deep report -- debate on this report | :10:40. | :10:45. | |
but I do not think this is a great report. Both of the major parties | :10:46. | :10:49. | |
are distracted. They are distracted about who is going to lead their | :10:50. | :10:53. | |
party, at least the Conservatives have come to a conclusion about | :10:54. | :10:58. | |
that. No doubt the Conservative benches are distracted about who is | :10:59. | :11:04. | |
going to become a minister today. Not as! I feel the Chilcot Report | :11:05. | :11:13. | |
deserves better scrutiny than the way it has been distracted over the | :11:14. | :11:18. | |
last couple of days. This report has affected the world, not just the | :11:19. | :11:22. | |
future of the Labour party or the future of the Conservative Party, | :11:23. | :11:29. | |
but the whole of the world. So I am very disappointed that the two prime | :11:30. | :11:33. | |
ministers could not have intervened and said to Sir John Chilcot, seven | :11:34. | :11:39. | |
years? This is absolutely ridiculous. We should have had the | :11:40. | :11:44. | |
report much more quickly than the seven years. | :11:45. | :11:50. | |
Mr Speaker just very quickly wanted to draw on five elements of the | :11:51. | :11:59. | |
report. The first one, misrepresentation of French | :12:00. | :12:01. | |
declarations relating to their potential veto of any further United | :12:02. | :12:09. | |
Nations resolutions. Sir Stephen Wall, the EU adviser to Mr Blair, | :12:10. | :12:14. | |
told the Iraq Inquirer that following Jacques Chirac's statement | :12:15. | :12:20. | |
he heard Mr Blair telling Alistair Gamble, the number ten direct | :12:21. | :12:25. | |
rocking indications, to play the anti-French card with the Sun and | :12:26. | :12:33. | |
others well that is nice, isn't it. Then statements related to suspected | :12:34. | :12:36. | |
Iraqi stockpiles of chemical weapons. Mr Blair's speech gave the | :12:37. | :12:44. | |
impression that the overwhelming evidence supported the view that | :12:45. | :12:48. | |
Iraq had retained a significant stocks of chemical weapons in | :12:49. | :12:54. | |
material breach of United Nations resolution 1441. In reality, the | :12:55. | :13:02. | |
report did not claim that Iraq claimed banned weapons, merely that | :13:03. | :13:07. | |
material was unaccounted for. The third element I wanted to draw on, | :13:08. | :13:13. | |
statements related to suspected Iraqi stockpiles of biological | :13:14. | :13:19. | |
weapons. Mr Blair confuse the distinction between biological | :13:20. | :13:26. | |
weapons being unaccounted for and existing, and that the evidence did | :13:27. | :13:31. | |
not support Mr Blair's representations to the house that | :13:32. | :13:36. | |
Iraq had significant stockpiles of viable biological weapons. Fourthly, | :13:37. | :13:44. | |
statements relating to Hussein Kamal's evidence regarding Iraq's | :13:45. | :13:47. | |
chemical and by logic weapons programmes. By selectively quoting | :13:48. | :13:53. | |
from General Kamal's evidence and by omitting his claims that Iraq's | :13:54. | :13:58. | |
weapons of mass destruction programme had been closed in 1991, | :13:59. | :14:03. | |
Mr Blair misled this House of Commons as to the extent of Iraq's | :14:04. | :14:07. | |
chemical and biological weapons programme. And finally Mr Speaker, | :14:08. | :14:14. | |
statements relating to the consequences of the Iraq war on the | :14:15. | :14:17. | |
threat of terrorism to the United Kingdom. Baroness Manningham Buller, | :14:18. | :14:24. | |
head no less of MI5 at the time of the Iraq war, gave evidence to the | :14:25. | :14:30. | |
Iraq Inquiry regarding the assessment made by her department | :14:31. | :14:35. | |
about the effect of joining the war on the risk of terrorism. Responding | :14:36. | :14:40. | |
to the question of whether the United Kingdom participation in the | :14:41. | :14:43. | |
Iraq war would increase the threat of terrorism in the UK by saying" I | :14:44. | :14:51. | |
think you'll see from our report in early 2003, which is reflected in | :14:52. | :14:56. | |
the G8 IC reporting, that the threat from Al-Qaeda would increase. " She | :14:57. | :15:06. | |
went on to explain "I think it, the Iraq war, is highly significant and | :15:07. | :15:11. | |
the Jake IC assessments that I have reminded myself of say that. Our | :15:12. | :15:16. | |
involvement in Iraq radicalised for want of a better word, a whole | :15:17. | :15:22. | |
generation of young people, some British scissors and is. Not a whole | :15:23. | :15:28. | |
generation, a view among a generation who sought our | :15:29. | :15:33. | |
involvement in Iraq on top of our involvement in Afghanistan as being | :15:34. | :15:39. | |
an attack on Islam. And it is clear from the evidence provided to the | :15:40. | :15:46. | |
Iraq Inquiry, that Mr Blair was made aware that the war would increase | :15:47. | :15:50. | |
the risk of terrorist activity in United Kingdom and that he misled | :15:51. | :15:54. | |
the house about how the conflict would impact on terrorist activity. | :15:55. | :16:03. | |
So Mr Speaker, how many times have we heard today, there will be | :16:04. | :16:08. | |
lessons to be learned from the Chilcot report. Since I have been in | :16:09. | :16:14. | |
the house, I have seen at first hand, how most significant political | :16:15. | :16:18. | |
careers end in tears. So I'm not sure how these lessons were actually | :16:19. | :16:25. | |
be learned, and I say this to you Mr Speaker and I know my honourable | :16:26. | :16:28. | |
friend from North Thanet said that he very much hoped that you would | :16:29. | :16:34. | |
look favourably on a debate in terms of contempt of this house. I think | :16:35. | :16:42. | |
that it would be an insult, to the families, who have lost loved ones | :16:43. | :16:47. | |
in the conflict if we did nothing. Those families are going to take | :16:48. | :16:51. | |
their own action, I understand that. But this will goodness sake is the | :16:52. | :16:55. | |
mother of all parliaments and we can't just sweep it under the table | :16:56. | :17:00. | |
as if nothing has happened. What is the point of being a member of | :17:01. | :17:03. | |
Parliament and coming here and admitting that we got it wrong | :17:04. | :17:07. | |
because we did get it wrong and I am one of the people who got it wrong. | :17:08. | :17:11. | |
I voted the wrong way and I very much regret that, so I do hope Mr | :17:12. | :17:16. | |
Speaker and I know not so many members were here in 2003, but we | :17:17. | :17:24. | |
owe it to everyone, to make sure, that we put right the wrong, that we | :17:25. | :17:30. | |
were responsible for in 2003. And that we hold the former Prime | :17:31. | :17:37. | |
Minister, the then leader of the Labour Party, we should hold him to | :17:38. | :17:43. | |
account for the way that he misled this Parliament. Mr Ian C Lucas. | :17:44. | :17:56. | |
Stop Mac thank you Ray much can I was here in 2003 and I listen to his | :17:57. | :18:02. | |
great interest. I'm one of the people who got it right. I listened | :18:03. | :18:06. | |
to the evidence given to me at the time by the Prime Minister and I | :18:07. | :18:09. | |
decide on the basis of what I heard and I sat on the back bench | :18:10. | :18:16. | |
throughout the entire debate. And I was not called. During the debate | :18:17. | :18:19. | |
but I did hear the debate and I made my decision on the evidence, and I | :18:20. | :18:25. | |
believed then that I made the right decision and I believe today that I | :18:26. | :18:28. | |
made the right decision. I think this to report is a very good report | :18:29. | :18:32. | |
and I know it has taken a long time to arrive but I think it is very | :18:33. | :18:39. | |
valuable. I would like to start if I may, talking about the context of | :18:40. | :18:43. | |
where we were in 2003 because it is very important that we remember what | :18:44. | :18:48. | |
happened in 2001 at 911 because much of what we discussed during the | :18:49. | :18:53. | |
period leading up to war, was really seen from the prism of the attack on | :18:54. | :18:57. | |
the World Trade Center. And I visited as a new MP, in 2001, New | :18:58. | :19:06. | |
York and the United Nations. And, it was an extraordinary time, it was | :19:07. | :19:11. | |
You could also feel the strength, You could also feel the strength, | :19:12. | :19:16. | |
the entirely understandable strength of feeling within the United States | :19:17. | :19:21. | |
about what had happened. And as a result of that we had the military | :19:22. | :19:24. | |
intervention in Afghanistan which was very broadly supported not just | :19:25. | :19:28. | |
in this house, but right across the world. One of the most extraordinary | :19:29. | :19:36. | |
things that I saw in the UN in November 2001, was a committee which | :19:37. | :19:43. | |
was chaired by the UK special representative Sir Jeremy | :19:44. | :19:45. | |
Greenstock, taking evidence, and auditing terrorist activity in | :19:46. | :19:51. | |
countries across the Middle East. There was a feeling and a sentiment, | :19:52. | :19:57. | |
for a very short period before the Iraq war, that we could actually | :19:58. | :20:03. | |
make some progress in dealing with international terrorism. But | :20:04. | :20:08. | |
unfortunately very quickly, there was a development of a linkage | :20:09. | :20:16. | |
between what happened in New York, in September 2001, and the issue of | :20:17. | :20:21. | |
Iraq. And there were people who developed an agenda trying to draw | :20:22. | :20:27. | |
together what happened at the World Trade Center, and the issue and the | :20:28. | :20:35. | |
problem of Iraq. And this was in the area and it was referred to in the | :20:36. | :20:40. | |
various discussions that we had, -- in the air. So although we had no | :20:41. | :20:43. | |
direct evidence of links at all between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda, | :20:44. | :20:51. | |
there was usage of a broad description of international | :20:52. | :20:56. | |
terrorism. I will certainly give way. Does the honourable gentleman | :20:57. | :21:03. | |
accept that it was a ruse of all linkage to try and associate the | :21:04. | :21:07. | |
secular Saddam Hussein with fundamentalist Islamist who had a | :21:08. | :21:14. | |
mutual loathing for one another? I think it is right, it is very clear, | :21:15. | :21:19. | |
it would be very convenient for those people who were wanting to | :21:20. | :21:25. | |
take their reaction in Iraq. If they could have made a linkage but | :21:26. | :21:28. | |
clearly there was not and in all other discussions that they had in | :21:29. | :21:32. | |
the lead up to the war there was no linkage established. But looking | :21:33. | :21:37. | |
back from today, and also immediately after the votes in 2003, | :21:38. | :21:42. | |
there was a terrible sense of inevitability about the military | :21:43. | :21:46. | |
action in Iraq for me. I have always been reminded of the fact, the | :21:47. | :21:52. | |
historian a GP Taylor talks about the importance of railway timetables | :21:53. | :21:55. | |
at the beginning of the First World War. And when I was approaching the | :21:56. | :22:01. | |
vote in March of 2003, I had that idea in my mind. And there seems to | :22:02. | :22:09. | |
me that we were on a road that lead it to an inevitable conclusion. And | :22:10. | :22:16. | |
it is a very interesting paragraph, in 830 of the report, it says "That | :22:17. | :22:22. | |
a military timetable should not be allowed to dictate a diplomatic | :22:23. | :22:26. | |
timetable. " I believe that the time of the vote this is exactly what | :22:27. | :22:31. | |
happened. I recall very well what Hans Blix turned the UN weapons | :22:32. | :22:36. | |
inspectors, I was watching Hans Blix to very closely, when I was deciding | :22:37. | :22:45. | |
how to vote in the build-up of March 2000 and three. It seemed to me that | :22:46. | :22:48. | |
he was doing his best to establish a position on weapons of mass to | :22:49. | :22:52. | |
structure in and he was asking on March the 18th 2003, four more time. | :22:53. | :23:00. | |
And on the basis of information, that I listen to in the debate, I | :23:01. | :23:05. | |
thought it was right, to give more time. That is why, I voted in the | :23:06. | :23:11. | |
way that I did and why I supported the amendment. Vary interestingly, I | :23:12. | :23:16. | |
attended a meeting a couple of years after the vote, in which has Blix | :23:17. | :23:26. | |
spoke. And I recall that he said, in March of 2003, that he believed that | :23:27. | :23:29. | |
Sadam had weapons of mass to structure in. I had not known that | :23:30. | :23:37. | |
-- weapons of mass destruction. On the day that the vote was cast I did | :23:38. | :23:42. | |
not know that. But I think it is extraordinary, that he did say that. | :23:43. | :23:46. | |
And that he genuinely believed himself the position. It seems to me | :23:47. | :23:54. | |
that he had a similar view to the then Prime Minister Tony Blair at | :23:55. | :23:59. | |
that time. He had a genuine honest belief, the difference was that he | :24:00. | :24:02. | |
wanted more time to investigate it further. And the Prime Minister did | :24:03. | :24:14. | |
not allow us more time so to do. So the drumbeat in March of 2003 was | :24:15. | :24:19. | |
quickening, that is why military action happened. That is not a good | :24:20. | :24:25. | |
reason for military action. The then US government was acting in the long | :24:26. | :24:30. | |
shadow at 911, it had people there who had an agenda to intervene in | :24:31. | :24:35. | |
the Middle East. They used that context to justify this | :24:36. | :24:42. | |
intervention. The immediate post-911 period, they made some really bad | :24:43. | :24:49. | |
judgments. In Iran there had been Mordred forces who were holding sway | :24:50. | :24:55. | |
before 2003, -- moderate. George Bush then made a dreadful axis of | :24:56. | :24:59. | |
evil speech which was part of the process that shattered any chance of | :25:00. | :25:05. | |
a unified response to 911. The alienation of Iran at that time also | :25:06. | :25:09. | |
had a massive negative impact on the post-war period in Iraq after 2003 | :25:10. | :25:15. | |
and undermined progress towards reconstruction. I think it was a | :25:16. | :25:20. | |
massive and state for the UK Government and Tony Blair to support | :25:21. | :25:29. | |
that Bush and US agenda at the time. I am quite certain, that Tony Blair | :25:30. | :25:36. | |
acted in good faith. In March 2003, I think he believed just like Hans | :25:37. | :25:41. | |
Blix to, that Sadam possessed weapons of mass destruction. I | :25:42. | :25:46. | |
believe, it was through the UK insistence that the US was involved | :25:47. | :25:55. | |
in the UN. But when the weapons inspectors asked for more time in | :25:56. | :25:59. | |
2003, the ally should have given it to them. -- the Allies. | :26:00. | :26:08. | |
As Sir John Chilcot concludes, diplomatic options had not been | :26:09. | :26:16. | |
exhausted. The point had not been reached where military action was a | :26:17. | :26:21. | |
last resort. On the information available to me at the time, a | :26:22. | :26:27. | |
backbencher, I voted against the Leibowitz for the first time, along | :26:28. | :26:33. | |
with many many Labour colleagues. -- the Labour whip. The nationalist | :26:34. | :26:40. | |
parties and some conservatives did the same. The official Conservative | :26:41. | :26:45. | |
opposition however supported military action in a largely | :26:46. | :26:55. | |
unquestioningly. I will give way. Prior to the debate and the | :26:56. | :26:59. | |
statement by the Prime Minister in that debate which was criticised by | :27:00. | :27:04. | |
the honourable member who spoke previously, my recollection of that | :27:05. | :27:08. | |
time was the Conservatives were cut -- were calling for action earlier, | :27:09. | :27:14. | |
before that evidence was presented so to turn up now and say it was | :27:15. | :27:18. | |
because of Tony Blair, is a little bit disingenuous. I would not go | :27:19. | :27:23. | |
quite that far because I am more kindly. My recollection is that we | :27:24. | :27:33. | |
had a Leader of the Opposition who got this completely and utterly | :27:34. | :27:39. | |
wrong. The official opposition failed in its constitutional duty to | :27:40. | :27:46. | |
ask difficult, hard questions and to hold the government to account. It | :27:47. | :27:51. | |
was left to other parties in the House and the Labour backbenchers to | :27:52. | :27:57. | |
hold the government to account. The failure of the official opposition | :27:58. | :28:01. | |
to charge the Prime Minister and the government effectively... Wrong | :28:02. | :28:09. | |
decision easier. This is a big lesson for the official opposition | :28:10. | :28:14. | |
today. There were a number of things the government did write on the Iraq | :28:15. | :28:20. | |
issue. Firstly it did hold a vote and it should be remembered, this | :28:21. | :28:26. | |
was the first time... I will handover. I think he's being | :28:27. | :28:32. | |
slightly disingenuous because there were only 165 Conservative members | :28:33. | :28:40. | |
of Parliament, we were not a huge opposition so he is slightly | :28:41. | :28:45. | |
misrepresenting things. Why are you using the word disingenuous? | :28:46. | :28:50. | |
Anyway... There is a misrepresentation which you think is | :28:51. | :28:54. | |
inadvertent. We will leave it there. Ian Lucas. I have no offence, I | :28:55. | :29:02. | |
understand his point. It is difficult to be a small opposition, | :29:03. | :29:07. | |
but it is important nonetheless to our survey questions. The Leader of | :29:08. | :29:11. | |
the Opposition got this completely wrong. -- to ask the right | :29:12. | :29:21. | |
questions. I think it changed the relationship between government and | :29:22. | :29:25. | |
Parliament on questions of military action. We have seen the | :29:26. | :29:29. | |
consequences of those in the more recent decisions on Libya and Syria. | :29:30. | :29:38. | |
Sorry there is a conversation down near but on the main issue of taking | :29:39. | :29:44. | |
military action in Iraq in much of 2003, Tony Blair and the Labour | :29:45. | :29:48. | |
Government made a huge, honest error. I think this is supported by | :29:49. | :29:57. | |
the Chilcot Report in front of us. It is a conclusion with which I | :29:58. | :30:06. | |
agree. Mr Graham Allen. Mr Speaker, the decision to commit to the US | :30:07. | :30:13. | |
neo-con agenda for the invasion of Iraq was and remains the biggest | :30:14. | :30:17. | |
political misjudgement in foreign policy in my political lifetime. | :30:18. | :30:26. | |
Chilcot, and I gave evidence to Chilcot, was an opportunity which | :30:27. | :30:31. | |
could have been seized by the then former Prime Minister Tony Blair to | :30:32. | :30:36. | |
actually said, I need a serious misjudgement, I was wrong but at the | :30:37. | :30:40. | |
time I thought I was doing the right thing. Instead we had a very | :30:41. | :30:48. | |
equivocal set of apologies which, considering the circumstances, some | :30:49. | :30:53. | |
people got injured and died, was not enough. Had he taken that | :30:54. | :30:57. | |
opportunity, he would have healed not only himself, but he would have | :30:58. | :31:05. | |
healed a fault line in his party and the heart suffered to some extent by | :31:06. | :31:12. | |
the nation and people across the globe but he missed that | :31:13. | :31:17. | |
opportunity. I am sorry he did that because it will remain with us for | :31:18. | :31:23. | |
as long as he feels to do that. They were two biggest rebellions in | :31:24. | :31:28. | |
British political history within a governing party in February and | :31:29. | :31:34. | |
March 2000 three. I want to talk about the Parliamentary side. | :31:35. | :31:39. | |
Because Parliament could have done better, even in those circumstances. | :31:40. | :31:44. | |
It was used and abused by thicket of power in the most blatant way. I | :31:45. | :31:50. | |
will mention some examples later. I will be pleased to give way. I | :31:51. | :31:58. | |
recall the role he in formulating the cross-party amendment which was | :31:59. | :32:03. | |
put to the House. I expect I will agree with most of what he was | :32:04. | :32:06. | |
saying about Parliament, before he does so will you reflect on the fact | :32:07. | :32:12. | |
that Parliament did one thing perfectly which was to the credit of | :32:13. | :32:19. | |
Michael Martin, the Speaker, in that he selected the honourable | :32:20. | :32:21. | |
gentleman's amendment over the official opposition one? I have some | :32:22. | :32:28. | |
things to say about the Speaker and I will get onto those fairly | :32:29. | :32:34. | |
quickly. To set a context, I think there was an growing unease, | :32:35. | :32:40. | |
certainly around the time of the Crawford talks between Prime | :32:41. | :32:45. | |
Minister Blair and the US President George W Bush that we were being set | :32:46. | :32:50. | |
on an inevitable path. This was not something anybody was going to | :32:51. | :32:54. | |
change but something which had been agreed and was going to happen, | :32:55. | :33:01. | |
whatever. That was the thing that I think frustrated and annoyed | :33:02. | :33:03. | |
parliamentarians throughout the House at that point. It was a | :33:04. | :33:08. | |
decision which was preordained and was going to happen. So that is why | :33:09. | :33:15. | |
I and many many others felt, as Chilcot said, this was not | :33:16. | :33:21. | |
hindsight, this was foresight. You could say it. If you read the | :33:22. | :33:27. | |
history books about the composition of Iraq, religious and tribal, you | :33:28. | :33:32. | |
would realise this would set off an incendiary device in the Middle East | :33:33. | :33:38. | |
which was even then in difficulty. So many of us felt that rather than | :33:39. | :33:43. | |
Parliament being ignored, people talk about the debates, what a | :33:44. | :33:47. | |
wonderful thing that was for Parliament! We had to drag | :33:48. | :33:52. | |
Parliament kicking and screaming to a debate. I wrote to the Speaker and | :33:53. | :33:56. | |
suggested the recall of the House. He said of course you can put that | :33:57. | :33:59. | |
suggestion to the House when it returns. So we had to wait until the | :34:00. | :34:05. | |
House returns in order to get the House are called. I felt that was | :34:06. | :34:10. | |
probably not the finest moments from the cheer but what we actually did | :34:11. | :34:18. | |
was to create, because there were such clarity among many parties in | :34:19. | :34:22. | |
the House, that the House had a role hear. We actually petitions -- | :34:23. | :34:32. | |
petitions and did letters and did everything possible and because all | :34:33. | :34:38. | |
that failed, we decided collectively to set up our own alternative | :34:39. | :34:43. | |
Parliament. I hired a Church House in order that members of Parliament, | :34:44. | :34:49. | |
members of Parliament could speak on this issue. I met the former speaker | :34:50. | :34:57. | |
who very kindly agreed to put his reputation on the line to be the | :34:58. | :35:00. | |
Speaker of that Parliament. One of the things we agreed was that people | :35:01. | :35:05. | |
would not be left out, as my honourable friend and I wear when | :35:06. | :35:12. | |
trying to speak in the debate. Jack Weatherall said he would take every | :35:13. | :35:16. | |
single person who wanted to speak for ten minutes at least, even it | :35:17. | :35:25. | |
that back if it meant that we would go on until three o'clock in the | :35:26. | :35:32. | |
morning. Having then got that critical mass of backbenchers | :35:33. | :35:36. | |
willing to do that, I asked the BBC if they would cover it. Then they | :35:37. | :35:45. | |
finally said they would cover the alternative Parliament since the | :35:46. | :35:48. | |
actual Parliament was not allowed to meet. They would cover it from the | :35:49. | :35:52. | |
opening until the end of the proceedings. Amazingly, within a | :35:53. | :35:59. | |
day, I then received a phone call from Robin Cook saying that you lot | :36:00. | :36:07. | |
had won, we are going to recall the proper Parliament. As he recalls in | :36:08. | :36:14. | |
his memoir is, my reply was, my God that leaves me with 1000 volt longs | :36:15. | :36:19. | |
and 200 bottles of wine on my slate which I ordered to refresh their | :36:20. | :36:25. | |
members in the alternative Parliament. I am still working my | :36:26. | :36:29. | |
way through those from my deepfreeze. This was the House at | :36:30. | :36:37. | |
its best in the sense that backbenchers came together. Some are | :36:38. | :36:44. | |
hear today, some are not, Charles Kennedy, Charles Smith, Tony Lloyd, | :36:45. | :36:52. | |
Gordon, Orkney, Shetland, Tayside North and Angus. Many of those | :36:53. | :37:02. | |
colleagues, some are still hear today, the collectively decided on | :37:03. | :37:08. | |
how do the resolutions and the amendments be framed. That was | :37:09. | :37:13. | |
members of parliament working together in a next fluent way. 24 | :37:14. | :37:19. | |
September, Parliamentary called and the debate was held. Not many people | :37:20. | :37:26. | |
voted at that point. As we went through, there were a series of | :37:27. | :37:29. | |
issues which we all raised again collectively about how the House | :37:30. | :37:34. | |
works. Legal advice to members of Parliament. We were in a position | :37:35. | :37:39. | |
where some of us could have been arranged to the International Court | :37:40. | :37:42. | |
of Justice. We needed to know what the truth was, the then Clerk of the | :37:43. | :37:50. | |
House said he would get as legal advice and sent me off to the lawyer | :37:51. | :37:55. | |
that the House employees for health and safety matters who assumed I had | :37:56. | :37:59. | |
some sort of accident in the offices. It was not of great help | :38:00. | :38:06. | |
which was not his fault. The House and members should have legal | :38:07. | :38:09. | |
advice, just as the government has legal advice which is also | :38:10. | :38:19. | |
controversial. Powers we should divide in this House, how are we | :38:20. | :38:25. | |
involved? A sensible set of words and we worked hard in the reform | :38:26. | :38:29. | |
committee to come up with those words so be could respond in the | :38:30. | :38:32. | |
event of the immediate threat of attack where appropriate. In a | :38:33. | :38:39. | |
proper democracy where the executive and the legislator work together. | :38:40. | :38:44. | |
Recalling the House, instead of being farcical, allowed the Speaker | :38:45. | :38:47. | |
to say, on the balance of why have heard from people, there is a very | :38:48. | :38:52. | |
strong feeling that the House should be recalled on whatever issue rather | :38:53. | :38:58. | |
than one dozen people doing it or 550 not being allowed to. Give the | :38:59. | :39:03. | |
Speaker that power rather than the government have that power to ask | :39:04. | :39:10. | |
the Speaker to do that. Of course, not standing orders, but a free vote | :39:11. | :39:15. | |
on war because if you look at the first result on the vault on | :39:16. | :39:24. | |
Wednesday the 26th of February, 122 Labour backbenchers voted against | :39:25. | :39:29. | |
the proposal. 190 and Labour backbenchers voted with the | :39:30. | :39:34. | |
government. I am absolutely confident, if those backbenchers had | :39:35. | :39:39. | |
been allowed to make their own decision, not being pressured by | :39:40. | :39:45. | |
whips and being asked as he the Prime Minister and even his wife on | :39:46. | :39:50. | |
occasion and being got at at a relentless basis, the majority would | :39:51. | :39:55. | |
have been much more than 122 Labour members. I would guess there would | :39:56. | :40:02. | |
be around of about 20 or 30 who would've voted with the government | :40:03. | :40:09. | |
in that case. I would also suggest that some of the Conservative | :40:10. | :40:13. | |
members that stood with us on that day deserve a mention at this point, | :40:14. | :40:20. | |
after Chilcot. I have not spoken on this matter at any length at all | :40:21. | :40:24. | |
since we went to war because I thought afterwards my job was to | :40:25. | :40:29. | |
support the young men and women of my constituency who went to war. I | :40:30. | :40:36. | |
will mention a member of politically -- member of the leaky, the Member | :40:37. | :40:43. | |
for Isle of Wight, they are all still with us, good colleagues like | :40:44. | :40:48. | |
Peter Ainsworth and other who are no longer with us and to put their | :40:49. | :40:56. | |
necks out on the conservative side. Finally we came to the vote on March | :40:57. | :41:01. | |
the 18th. The case for war was not established and 139 Labour | :41:02. | :41:08. | |
colleagues rebelled, they supported that resolution and 217 in favour. | :41:09. | :41:14. | |
Despite the immense pressure put on people. Mr Speaker, we went to war, | :41:15. | :41:20. | |
we won the war but lost the peace. We are now reaping the whirlwind. | :41:21. | :41:25. | |
Let Parliament to be strong what ever. John Nicholson. | :41:26. | :41:35. | |
Two weeks ago many of us in this houseboat in another debate on the | :41:36. | :41:41. | |
centenary of the Battle of the Somme. The events of hundred years | :41:42. | :41:47. | |
ago were commemorated and one of the recurring themes here and elsewhere | :41:48. | :41:50. | |
was the importance of treasuring the Young lives of our soldiers. When we | :41:51. | :41:55. | |
read about the senseless slaughter on the Somme, we like to think of | :41:56. | :41:59. | |
ourselves as more sophisticated than previous generations and less | :42:00. | :42:03. | |
gullible. We like to think that we are more concerned with the lives of | :42:04. | :42:07. | |
others, be it our own soldiers or civilians abroad. And yet in this | :42:08. | :42:11. | |
house in very recent history we voted for a war which was an total | :42:12. | :42:21. | |
folly. In March 18, 2000 three, 411 MPs followed Tony Blair into the yes | :42:22. | :42:28. | |
lobby unleashing the forces of Heck in Iraq. 139 of those MPs are still | :42:29. | :42:34. | |
serving in Parliament today. That must be difficult to live with that | :42:35. | :42:39. | |
vote, but rather than accept personal responsibility, too many | :42:40. | :42:42. | |
say that if I had known then what I know now, I would never have voted | :42:43. | :42:46. | |
for the war. I would like to focus on that because I don't buy it and I | :42:47. | :42:52. | |
think it is too easy a copout. Tony Blair has become such a discredited | :42:53. | :42:57. | |
figure that he is a convenient depository for shared guilt, it was | :42:58. | :43:02. | |
his golden oratory that bamboozled me, say some MPs. The seductive | :43:03. | :43:06. | |
mendacity. Who could have questioned our security services in all their | :43:07. | :43:12. | |
wisdom either? We believe: Powell to with his illustrated talk at the | :43:13. | :43:16. | |
United Nations, with its cartoon mock-up of mobile laboratories and | :43:17. | :43:21. | |
trucks. And we fell for his dire warnings that the secular Saddam | :43:22. | :43:25. | |
Hussein was in cahoots with the fundamentalist Osama bin live in, | :43:26. | :43:32. | |
however culturally illiterate the claim was. It was all so convincing, | :43:33. | :43:36. | |
if only we had known then what we know now. But it is all nonsense Mr | :43:37. | :43:41. | |
Speaker, we did know then much of what we know now. And if we did not | :43:42. | :43:46. | |
it is because we chose not to absorb the expert opinion available at the | :43:47. | :43:53. | |
time. We knew that Saddam Hussein had once possessed chemical weapons, | :43:54. | :43:57. | |
used them in the 1980s, we all used that, against the Kurds, the | :43:58. | :44:02. | |
Iranians and the Shia. We also knew that the implementation of two | :44:03. | :44:07. | |
no-fly zones from 1991 until the war in 2003, one in the north of Iraq | :44:08. | :44:11. | |
and one in the south prevented any further chemical attacks as the | :44:12. | :44:15. | |
chemical weapons could no longer be dropped. Even at the height of his | :44:16. | :44:21. | |
powers, there were limits to those powers. In 1991, 39 SCUD missiles | :44:22. | :44:27. | |
were fired at Israel, I was there at the time as a journalist. He crudely | :44:28. | :44:32. | |
targeted Tel Aviv, and killed no one. But even if he couldn't fire | :44:33. | :44:39. | |
his chemical weapons, might they somehow have become a threat in the | :44:40. | :44:44. | |
battlefield? In the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait in the Gulf War | :44:45. | :44:49. | |
in 1990, the United Nations special commission, was set up to inspect | :44:50. | :44:52. | |
Iraqi weapons facilities and maintained a presence in the country | :44:53. | :44:59. | |
until several years later. And there was broad agreement among experts | :45:00. | :45:03. | |
that Iraq was not an imminent threat. Those that had been used | :45:04. | :45:07. | |
against Iranians and Kurdish opponents had been destroyed or were | :45:08. | :45:13. | |
degraded beyond use. Let us remind ourselves what the experts said at | :45:14. | :45:19. | |
the time. Scott Ritter, a UN weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998 | :45:20. | :45:27. | |
stated in 2002 the following "Since 1998, Iraq had been a fundamentally | :45:28. | :45:33. | |
disarmed country, 90 to 95% of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction | :45:34. | :45:39. | |
capacity been verifiably eliminated. If Iraq was producing chemical | :45:40. | :45:43. | |
weapons we would have had proof, and simple. " Chemical weapons the | :45:44. | :45:50. | |
experts told us, repeatedly, don't have a long shelf life. He stated | :45:51. | :45:56. | |
that Iraqi sarin and the other one had a shelf life of approximately | :45:57. | :46:01. | |
five years, but the toxin and anthrax last about three years. So | :46:02. | :46:06. | |
as members debated the war in this house, they knew that at the height | :46:07. | :46:12. | |
of his powers, Saddam had never had the capacity to fight chemical | :46:13. | :46:17. | |
weapons long range. But with years of no-fly zone restrictions and the | :46:18. | :46:21. | |
passage of time, he's weapons even had he had the power to fire them | :46:22. | :46:25. | |
which we knew he did not, were degraded and beyond use. I seem to | :46:26. | :46:33. | |
recall Mr Speaker that the honourable gentleman and myself were | :46:34. | :46:37. | |
both in television studios at the time and I also seem to recall us | :46:38. | :46:43. | |
laughing at those mock-ups of those vehicles, and together, we agreed | :46:44. | :46:51. | |
that if those vehicles existed you could easily photograph them from | :46:52. | :46:54. | |
the sky so we thought they can't exist. Why do you need to make | :46:55. | :46:58. | |
drawings of them when you can get photographs of the actual vehicles. | :46:59. | :47:02. | |
The honourable and gallant member remembers very well, we did indeed | :47:03. | :47:08. | |
sit in television studios because we called in experts to ask experts for | :47:09. | :47:12. | |
their evidence. And so it was relatively easy even as a | :47:13. | :47:16. | |
journalist, to pick apart many of the absurd claims. But of course | :47:17. | :47:22. | |
some journalists were screaming for war. The sun around the absurd | :47:23. | :47:29. | |
headline" Brits 45 minutes from doom." About how supposed threats to | :47:30. | :47:36. | |
the troops in Cyprus. The Star wrote "Mad Sadam ready to attack". And | :47:37. | :47:41. | |
quite 45 minutes from a chemical war". It was all nonsense, the | :47:42. | :47:46. | |
journalists knew it was nonsense but it was terrifying for some members | :47:47. | :47:51. | |
of the house. In January 2003, the UN weapons inspectors had reported | :47:52. | :47:55. | |
that they had found no indication whatsoever that Iraq possessed | :47:56. | :47:59. | |
nuclear weapons or an active programme of chemical weapons. These | :48:00. | :48:04. | |
national atomic energy agency at the time found no evidence, or plausible | :48:05. | :48:08. | |
indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. | :48:09. | :48:15. | |
And the UN monitoring verification Inspectorate said at the time that | :48:16. | :48:20. | |
they did not find evidence of the continuation or resumption of | :48:21. | :48:23. | |
programmes of weapons of mass destruction. However, Vice President | :48:24. | :48:30. | |
Dick Cheney retorted "We believe that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein has | :48:31. | :48:33. | |
in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr L Baradari, | :48:34. | :48:41. | |
director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, | :48:42. | :48:46. | |
frankly is wrong. " So who are Parliament Terence to believe, the | :48:47. | :48:51. | |
chemical weapons experts, the missiles expert, the atomic energy | :48:52. | :48:56. | |
agency, or Dick Cheney, George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld and the neocons? The | :48:57. | :49:02. | |
house had to make up its mind. In the run-up to the Iraqi war, I was | :49:03. | :49:06. | |
working as a journalist, has the honourable gentleman has pointed | :49:07. | :49:11. | |
out, presenting among other things a three hour daily radio news | :49:12. | :49:15. | |
programme. We had access to expert has any news journalist do. We | :49:16. | :49:20. | |
called them in and asked them to outline their evidence. Now I'm not | :49:21. | :49:25. | |
a pacifist, I supported Nato action in Bosnia and Kosovo due to the | :49:26. | :49:28. | |
imminent threat of life and the need to say civilians. In fact, I was on | :49:29. | :49:34. | |
the hostage flight back from Iraq which an honourable member mentioned | :49:35. | :49:39. | |
earlier on. I was with the hostages, as they returned having fled from | :49:40. | :49:43. | |
Saddam Hussein. However, during interviews with experts and | :49:44. | :49:47. | |
academics in the run-up to the house 's vote, I saw clearly, that's the | :49:48. | :49:51. | |
case for war was built on exaggeration deceit. It was | :49:52. | :49:58. | |
blindingly obvious. Tony Blair frequently told this house and the | :49:59. | :50:01. | |
British people that he was working towards disarming Iraq and its | :50:02. | :50:05. | |
weapons of mass structure and comedy repeatedly told this house that his | :50:06. | :50:09. | |
aim is not regime change. So the house could have been under no | :50:10. | :50:12. | |
illusion what it was being asked to vote for. Mr Blair said "JIC is a | :50:13. | :50:24. | |
very brutal and repressive leader, however disarmament of the weapons | :50:25. | :50:29. | |
of mass destruction is our aim, it is not regime change -- Saddam is a | :50:30. | :50:34. | |
very brutal and repressive leader. " So the challenge to the house, Mr | :50:35. | :50:38. | |
Blair was asking members to vote on one basis and one basis alone. The | :50:39. | :50:43. | |
Yemen is danger posed by Saddam's weaponry. -- the imminent danger. | :50:44. | :50:49. | |
Soap were all the experts wrong, were there any elevated groups of | :50:50. | :50:56. | |
experts, a court with extraordinary knowledge, unavailable to the | :50:57. | :51:00. | |
ordinary expert. Tony Blair often said, that if only you could see | :51:01. | :51:03. | |
what crosses my desk you would never doubted the danger that we are in | :51:04. | :51:07. | |
and the pressing case for immediate action. Yes. The I thank the | :51:08. | :51:15. | |
honourable member for giving way, does he share my concerns about | :51:16. | :51:22. | |
recent mission creep, drone strikes, after the event and what that means | :51:23. | :51:27. | |
full transparency. I am and I'm not at all convinced that we have | :51:28. | :51:30. | |
learned the lessons, many members say that we have learned the lessons | :51:31. | :51:35. | |
of war. I am not convinced, I was not convinced when we had the debate | :51:36. | :51:40. | |
on Syria. Tony Blair made a direct appeal saying that he was seeing | :51:41. | :51:42. | |
privileged information that no one else was seeing. He asked the house | :51:43. | :51:49. | |
to trust him. And many members have said that appeal for trust was what | :51:50. | :51:54. | |
swayed them. It was a direct appeal to members to ignore the available | :51:55. | :52:02. | |
scientific evidence, but there was one embarrassing hurdle in the way. | :52:03. | :52:06. | |
That was Robin Cook, I had an extensive interview with Robin Cook | :52:07. | :52:09. | |
after his resignation from the Labour front bench on the 17th of | :52:10. | :52:14. | |
March 2000 three. I asked him if he saw the same briefings as the Prime | :52:15. | :52:18. | |
Minister on Iraq? He says, yes I do. I said what was it I asked him which | :52:19. | :52:23. | |
had crossed Mr Blair 's desk which he couldn't tell us about, but which | :52:24. | :52:27. | |
contradicted all the expert evidence. Robin Cook told me there | :52:28. | :52:34. | |
was nothing. Nothing crossed the Prime Minister 's desk that hadn't | :52:35. | :52:38. | |
crossed his as Foreign Secretary and nothing had crossed his or the Prime | :52:39. | :52:41. | |
Minister 's desk that suggested an imminent threat from chemical | :52:42. | :52:47. | |
weapons. He told me that on that basis the war could therefore not be | :52:48. | :52:53. | |
justified. Now every MP listening to that interview meeting with Robin | :52:54. | :52:57. | |
Cook Kirin house, or taking on board the opinion of experts, at the time, | :52:58. | :53:02. | |
would have known that the case presented to this house was flimsy | :53:03. | :53:09. | |
to the point of absurdity. I am of course aware of the pressure that | :53:10. | :53:13. | |
MPs were under, setting aside their promotion prospects in government, | :53:14. | :53:18. | |
tabloid newspapers had launched a vicious campaign against opponents | :53:19. | :53:23. | |
of the war. The sun published a traitor 's dart board, something | :53:24. | :53:27. | |
that I noted has since deleted from the website in the aftermath of the | :53:28. | :53:32. | |
Chilcot report. It ran a front-page picture, showing a picture of a | :53:33. | :53:36. | |
snake and Charles Kennedy with a headline, spot the difference, one | :53:37. | :53:39. | |
is a spineless reptile that spits venom and the other a poisonous | :53:40. | :53:45. | |
snake. MPs were frightened that they would be targeted as cowards and | :53:46. | :53:50. | |
peaceniks. But as we survey the carnage of Iraq, the countless | :53:51. | :53:55. | |
civilian lives lost, soldiers lives lost, and family lives destroyed, it | :53:56. | :53:58. | |
is easy to look for a single stakeholder and while I share the | :53:59. | :54:05. | |
thing about Tony Blair, there is something gutless about attributing | :54:06. | :54:11. | |
all of the MPs votes to him and him alone. The truth is that expert | :54:12. | :54:14. | |
information was freely available to any member who chose to take it. Can | :54:15. | :54:22. | |
I start by saying that I welcome the fact that the government have | :54:23. | :54:26. | |
allocated stays for this debate. And I would also welcome the fact that | :54:27. | :54:32. | |
this is an opportunity to remind the house that some members from all | :54:33. | :54:37. | |
parties here, considered the same evidence as other members, and | :54:38. | :54:41. | |
evidence presented to the house by Mr Blair, and came to a different | :54:42. | :54:45. | |
conclusion about whether military action was timely or illegal. I | :54:46. | :54:51. | |
would also like to say that he's no longer in his place, but the member | :54:52. | :54:58. | |
for Plymouth, I wanted to thank him for the service he has given to the | :54:59. | :55:01. | |
country as have other members who are here today. But also to reassure | :55:02. | :55:06. | |
him that whilst I along with many other members here today marched | :55:07. | :55:11. | |
against the Iraq war, I have always been fully supportive of our troops | :55:12. | :55:16. | |
who were dispatched by our government to fight that war, or | :55:17. | :55:20. | |
indeed any other. I have no criticism of them. I might have some | :55:21. | :55:24. | |
criticism of their senior officers but that is a different matter. What | :55:25. | :55:32. | |
do we know about all since the publication of the Chilcot report? | :55:33. | :55:38. | |
My friend, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, provided a helpful | :55:39. | :55:41. | |
summary in his speech earlier this week, in the Lords, so we know that | :55:42. | :55:47. | |
the Cabinet was not provided with a full detailed opinion of the | :55:48. | :55:52. | |
Attorney General. And Sir John Chilcot falsely finds that is not | :55:53. | :55:56. | |
proper and should not happen again. He found that military action was | :55:57. | :55:59. | |
not the last resort, diplomatic options were still available, that | :56:00. | :56:03. | |
there was no imminent threat, that Doctor Hans Blix and about I was | :56:04. | :56:08. | |
still able to carry out their responsibilities and there were | :56:09. | :56:10. | |
conflicting views about resolution 1441. | :56:11. | :56:14. | |
And about article two of the night Nations charter about regime change | :56:15. | :56:28. | |
that this was not a legal water. We also heard from my friend Lord Tyler | :56:29. | :56:34. | |
that Chilcot was quite explicit on the fact that going to war without | :56:35. | :56:39. | |
as majority on the United Nations Security Council undermined the | :56:40. | :56:44. | |
authorities of the native Nations. We have put great stead in ensuring | :56:45. | :56:52. | |
we support the United Nations. -- the United Nations. My friend Lord | :56:53. | :57:01. | |
be pointed out in his contribution the inadequacies in the preparation | :57:02. | :57:08. | |
from a military perspective from the MoD, inadequate preparation for the | :57:09. | :57:15. | |
known danger of IED is and the failure to provide adequate armoured | :57:16. | :57:20. | |
vehicles. I want to dwell on that for a few more minutes. The focus on | :57:21. | :57:26. | |
post-conflict reconstruction, and area which has not had much of an | :57:27. | :57:33. | |
outing today. It is possible that better planning and preparation for | :57:34. | :57:38. | |
a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq might not necessarily have prevented the | :57:39. | :57:42. | |
events that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and now but I think the major | :57:43. | :57:49. | |
issue that Chilcot has identified was that there was no planning to | :57:50. | :57:52. | |
speak of at all for the post-conflict stage. Before I was | :57:53. | :58:05. | |
elected, I used to work in project management. It has been interesting | :58:06. | :58:12. | |
looking at the section, section 530 onwards in the executive summary, a | :58:13. | :58:21. | |
cursory examination of that section highlights that if we consider the | :58:22. | :58:26. | |
work done in Iraq as a project, it failed the most basic test in | :58:27. | :58:32. | |
initiation and execution of the smallest project. Is it clear who | :58:33. | :58:38. | |
was responsible for which tasks? Paragraph 593 says this is not the | :58:39. | :58:45. | |
case. The UK thought the United States would be responsible for | :58:46. | :58:51. | |
preparing a post-conflict plan. Will there are any contingency plans? The | :58:52. | :58:57. | |
answer is there were not. None were made for the case of the UK being | :58:58. | :59:01. | |
drawn in for a huge commitment of resources. Is the clarity be about | :59:02. | :59:08. | |
who had the power to take decisions? Paragraph 603 says not. No one has | :59:09. | :59:14. | |
sufficient authority to establish unified planning across the MOD and | :59:15. | :59:21. | |
the Treasury and tested. Was it clear who was in overall control? | :59:22. | :59:26. | |
The answer Es no, no single person was in control of overseeing all | :59:27. | :59:34. | |
aspects of preparation. -- the answer was no. Where there are | :59:35. | :59:38. | |
sufficient trains people available? The answers there were not. The MoD | :59:39. | :59:43. | |
were not prepared for nation building on this scale. Where | :59:44. | :59:49. | |
assumptions challenged? They were not, they were seldom challenged. | :59:50. | :59:55. | |
Any project manager in IT, construction or any other field, who | :59:56. | :00:01. | |
had designed a project as purely planned, resourced and executed as | :00:02. | :00:10. | |
this one would have been sacked. Yet in 2003, our government was planning | :00:11. | :00:15. | |
to invade and country, support regime change and introduce | :00:16. | :00:19. | |
democracy, rebuild their lackey infrastructure without so much as a | :00:20. | :00:24. | |
plan literally written on the back of a cigarette packet. This is one | :00:25. | :00:30. | |
of them was shocking aspects of the Iraq war. To conclude, the Iraq war | :00:31. | :00:38. | |
and its legacy of internecine religious war, the 180 UK troops who | :00:39. | :00:45. | |
were killed and the many casualties, the car bombs, suicide bombers, | :00:46. | :00:50. | |
hundreds of thousands of dead Iraqis civilians, the instability which | :00:51. | :00:53. | |
reverberates around the region to this day. We can argue whether this | :00:54. | :00:59. | |
was linked to our intervention in 2003 but no one can argue that our | :01:00. | :01:03. | |
intervention actually helped stabilise Iraq. On the contrary. | :01:04. | :01:11. | |
What we need today from the Minister is some reassurances that the UK | :01:12. | :01:15. | |
government will never ever again launch into such a reckless | :01:16. | :01:19. | |
adventure on such a flimsy premise with so little preparation. I wonder | :01:20. | :01:25. | |
if the Minister will be able to give us that guarantee? Paul Williams. Mr | :01:26. | :01:33. | |
Speaker, I was a member of this House when the decision to invade | :01:34. | :01:37. | |
Iraq was taken. Plaid Cymru was against the war from the start, | :01:38. | :01:42. | |
along with colleagues from other parties and direct knowledge their | :01:43. | :01:49. | |
part in this. Myself and colleagues were unanimous in our opposition to | :01:50. | :01:54. | |
the war and we were subject to vilification way beyond what is | :01:55. | :02:00. | |
respect -- expected in the usual argy-bargy between politicians of | :02:01. | :02:06. | |
exposing -- of opposing views or from the press. I made no complaint | :02:07. | :02:12. | |
then and I make no complaint now. We did not really pay the price. The | :02:13. | :02:16. | |
price was paid by those who lost their lives, those injured | :02:17. | :02:20. | |
physically and psychologically, the women and children who were killed. | :02:21. | :02:24. | |
Paid by those who are still fighting and by those who are still having | :02:25. | :02:31. | |
lives blighted for ever. It is all right to say this now when | :02:32. | :02:34. | |
opposition to the war is the accepted view, it was not the case | :02:35. | :02:40. | |
then. Plaid Cymru is a party for peace. We are not a pacifist party | :02:41. | :02:44. | |
and we are prepared to support military action as a last resort in | :02:45. | :02:50. | |
extreme circumstances and with international agreement. That is why | :02:51. | :02:53. | |
we supported emergency military action in Libya with the required | :02:54. | :03:01. | |
support of the United Nations. I certainly regret that we did not | :03:02. | :03:06. | |
then press the case harder for reconstruction. We have seen the | :03:07. | :03:14. | |
effect of intervention in Libya as we have seen in Iraq. Immediately | :03:15. | :03:20. | |
hear we have two of the reasons why we oppose the invasion of Iraq. The | :03:21. | :03:28. | |
required UN resolution had not been passed. As Chilcot says clearly, in | :03:29. | :03:36. | |
the executive summary, as said, the diplomatic options had not been | :03:37. | :03:40. | |
exhausted at that stage. Military action was therefore not a last | :03:41. | :03:47. | |
resort. Mr Blair presents Iraq is a real and present danger with | :03:48. | :03:53. | |
certainty which was not justified. Yesterday the honourable member for | :03:54. | :03:58. | |
North Thanet made a telling point, his colleague persuaded him the | :03:59. | :04:05. | |
night before to vote for the war. He in turn had been misled by Mr Blair. | :04:06. | :04:14. | |
Later we content that Mr Blair misled this House and for that he | :04:15. | :04:20. | |
must be held to account. It is clear from Chilcot, not least from Mr | :04:21. | :04:26. | |
Blair supporting Mr Bush, that he had already agreed to go to war | :04:27. | :04:30. | |
whilst reporting to this House that it had a part in the matter. That is | :04:31. | :04:37. | |
the only reasonable interpretation of the infamous statements recorded | :04:38. | :04:42. | |
in Chilcot volume two. That was Mr Blair's choice as point 364 states, | :04:43. | :04:53. | |
the UK felt it was right and necessary to defer to its close ally | :04:54. | :04:57. | |
and senior partner, the United States. It was clear that President | :04:58. | :05:04. | |
Bush had long before decided to go to war. My personal experience | :05:05. | :05:12. | |
confirms this. I was with Adam tries, the MP for Caernarfon East in | :05:13. | :05:20. | |
mid-September to in Washington. -- Adam Price. On a visit with new MPs, | :05:21. | :05:32. | |
are very instructive visit. But it was the first anniversary of 9/11 | :05:33. | :05:38. | |
and feelings were running high. There were official ceremonies to | :05:39. | :05:42. | |
commemorate the event and to support the forces of justice and an implied | :05:43. | :05:52. | |
impression to make someone pay. One felt it was not just someone but | :05:53. | :05:57. | |
anyone should pay. That was the atmosphere then and it is important | :05:58. | :06:03. | |
to remember that. In Washington we discussed Iraq with the State | :06:04. | :06:08. | |
Department officials. This official was not a high official but had been | :06:09. | :06:13. | |
tasked with briefing MPs from across the pond. It was Adam tries to put | :06:14. | :06:19. | |
the blunt question, do you intend to invade Iraq in September 2002? And | :06:20. | :06:25. | |
the answer was equally forthright. Yes, he said. With our friends if he | :06:26. | :06:34. | |
can, without them if we must. As it seems was a commonplace view amongst | :06:35. | :06:41. | |
officials at that time. One that they shared with insignificant | :06:42. | :06:46. | |
visitors such as ourselves. It is very insignificant is that is the | :06:47. | :06:55. | |
significant point ear. If we knew what they intended then so did Mr | :06:56. | :06:58. | |
Blair and his associates. I will give way. Can I complements him for | :06:59. | :07:08. | |
his support in the Iraq rebellions and also commend the MP for | :07:09. | :07:14. | |
Carshalton. What he's saying about America going ahead regardless of | :07:15. | :07:19. | |
the UK is absolutely right and a of one week before the final vote that | :07:20. | :07:26. | |
this House took to go to Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld said in a press | :07:27. | :07:29. | |
conference that it was not necessary for the UK to join America and there | :07:30. | :07:35. | |
would be work friends if that is -- if the UK decided not. He makes a | :07:36. | :07:42. | |
telling point, it was a conscious decision therefore to join our | :07:43. | :07:48. | |
senior ally and deferred to their view of the world. That is | :07:49. | :07:54. | |
significant matter. It was a choice taken by Mr Blair and his associates | :07:55. | :07:58. | |
because he did know what America intended. We know about the meetings | :07:59. | :08:03. | |
with Crawford. I do not need to go over that. Of course he knew and the | :08:04. | :08:08. | |
response was, we will be there with you whatever. American preparedness | :08:09. | :08:16. | |
was also confirmed quite casually in the conversation I referred to a | :08:17. | :08:19. | |
moment ago when I asked about the war aims. I had a particular | :08:20. | :08:26. | |
interest, I have an interest in the situation of the Kurdish people for | :08:27. | :08:33. | |
a long time. The northern cards, as aware rather than the southern cards | :08:34. | :08:38. | |
with whom the other honourable member has been involved for several | :08:39. | :08:43. | |
years. -- southern Kurdish people. The answer was, he said, we are | :08:44. | :08:51. | |
looking for a democratic Iraq within its current borders. I remember the | :08:52. | :08:58. | |
words clearly because the cards in the North were thinking of having a | :08:59. | :09:06. | |
semi-independent state, if not being the southern part of a greater | :09:07. | :09:12. | |
Kurdistan. That was the war name and we know the subsequent outcome only | :09:13. | :09:19. | |
too well. The northern Iraqis, this southern cards have a degree of | :09:20. | :09:24. | |
self-government but as to a democratic Iraq, that is an even | :09:25. | :09:30. | |
which has not been achieved. -- this southern cards. My point is there | :09:31. | :09:39. | |
was no secrecy about this. There was no deficiency of vision or idealism | :09:40. | :09:44. | |
either, just an enormous deficiency of realism and good sense. I want to | :09:45. | :09:51. | |
finish on one point as time is short. I want to ask the Minister | :09:52. | :09:59. | |
for some action. Yesterday the Member for be concealed expressed | :10:00. | :10:05. | |
his concern about a process of sanction which could be employed by | :10:06. | :10:10. | |
this House in respect of Mr Blair. -- be concealed. I do not know if | :10:11. | :10:20. | |
this was entirely persuasive but he made his argument very well indeed. | :10:21. | :10:26. | |
-- Beaconsfield. We have consistently called for those | :10:27. | :10:33. | |
responsible for taking the UK to war against Iraq to appear before the | :10:34. | :10:40. | |
International Criminal Court. It is not currently prosecutable by that | :10:41. | :10:45. | |
court. Some 30 countries have agreed to rectify this following a | :10:46. | :10:50. | |
convention in 2010. The UK has also said informally that it would | :10:51. | :10:55. | |
support such change but has not yet formally ratified that position. | :10:56. | :11:03. | |
Under ICC rules, signatories have to agree which means all countries have | :11:04. | :11:08. | |
to sign up so I am asking the Minister and calling on the UK | :11:09. | :11:12. | |
government to formally agreed to the necessary change to pave the way by | :11:13. | :11:17. | |
those responsible for taking the UK into the illegal war in Iraq to face | :11:18. | :11:21. | |
this quartz and I hope that assurance today. Mr Speaker, let me | :11:22. | :11:30. | |
begin by making a declaration of interest, my brother served on the | :11:31. | :11:35. | |
front line in the Iraq war and the decision taken in this House had a | :11:36. | :11:40. | |
direct impact on my family and his wife and two children. I do get | :11:41. | :11:45. | |
concerned when we debate issues in this House and we discuss Islam, | :11:46. | :11:52. | |
critically we equate it fundamentally with fanaticism and | :11:53. | :11:56. | |
fundamentalism. Many belief systems are prone to fanaticism. | :11:57. | :12:06. | |
In 1995, a Christian fanatic to 168 people, injuring nearly 1000 in a 16 | :12:07. | :12:17. | |
block radius in Oklahoma. And if members wish to debate fanaticism, I | :12:18. | :12:20. | |
do wish they would bring it to the floor of the house itself and | :12:21. | :12:26. | |
debated in detail. It was just under three months ago that I myself with | :12:27. | :12:29. | |
many other colleagues participated in a debate and I was grateful to be | :12:30. | :12:34. | |
able to sum up on behalf of my party, one calling for the | :12:35. | :12:37. | |
publication of the report, I'm glad that I got to the point, I am | :12:38. | :12:43. | |
grateful as for many others to Sir John and those others participating | :12:44. | :12:46. | |
in its construction for their diligence, work and the man on which | :12:47. | :12:49. | |
they have carried out their examinations. I believe that the | :12:50. | :12:54. | |
report will go down as one of the most important documents to be | :12:55. | :12:57. | |
created on the floor of this house and will have far-reaching | :12:58. | :13:00. | |
consequences. Although I do agree with the right Honourable member | :13:01. | :13:07. | |
that their radars come a point in his couple of weeks of politics in | :13:08. | :13:10. | |
which it will be overshadowed and that is quite sad. The publication | :13:11. | :13:16. | |
and conclusion of this report will come as some comfort to families | :13:17. | :13:21. | |
with Army personnel such as my own. Those also with casualties and those | :13:22. | :13:24. | |
who have been waiting for answers for far too long and why we were | :13:25. | :13:29. | |
taken to war. I would like to take a moment to praise those families who | :13:30. | :13:33. | |
have liked their loved ones fought the good fight and have never | :13:34. | :13:36. | |
allowed this issue to be forgotten with their quest for justice and | :13:37. | :13:40. | |
truth. This house must note their courage in seeking answers regarding | :13:41. | :13:47. | |
the conflict. The report should and must send reverberations through the | :13:48. | :13:51. | |
whole British establishment, which undermined by the decision to go to | :13:52. | :13:55. | |
war, the report must if anything enhance the debate about the nature | :13:56. | :13:59. | |
of our constitutional democracy and the duties of the government and its | :14:00. | :14:06. | |
attitude to war and peace. The words "I will be with you whatever" will | :14:07. | :14:10. | |
be forever associated with a former member for Sedgefield. It will be | :14:11. | :14:15. | |
their political epitaph. And yet that phrase is much more than that, | :14:16. | :14:20. | |
it will forever live and scar the hearts of those families whose | :14:21. | :14:22. | |
relations were casualties of that war. May they be in the armed | :14:23. | :14:29. | |
services or the civilians of Iraq. That is the true legacy of "I will | :14:30. | :14:33. | |
be with you whatever" and one that must never allow the allowed to be | :14:34. | :14:42. | |
forgotten. We must remind our representatives that the actions | :14:43. | :14:45. | |
will have wide ranging consequences beyond this place. Thank you Mr | :14:46. | :14:53. | |
Speaker, I thank durable gentleman for allowing me to intervene on him. | :14:54. | :15:00. | |
For me, that phrase really blows apart my absolute belief that our | :15:01. | :15:07. | |
Prime Minister would always act in the best interests of our country, | :15:08. | :15:13. | |
regardless of political persuasion. It has been deeply upsetting for me | :15:14. | :15:18. | |
to hear that phrase used on a memo to the United States president. I'm | :15:19. | :15:24. | |
grateful for the intervention, from the gallant Honourable member whose | :15:25. | :15:28. | |
opinion I take on board on many occasions. I will go on to that | :15:29. | :15:32. | |
further in my speech. The actions in the lead up to the invasion had a | :15:33. | :15:37. | |
detrimental and fundamental impact in the confidence in our mocha Seat | :15:38. | :15:44. | |
Parliamentary system. We must use that report to rebuild the | :15:45. | :15:47. | |
confidence as we risk so much if we don't. Parliamentary democracy is | :15:48. | :15:52. | |
being attacked across the world as we speak. The report brings forward | :15:53. | :15:56. | |
damming and fundamental issues with regard to the role of government in | :15:57. | :16:00. | |
the invasion. The duty of the government is to carry out its | :16:01. | :16:05. | |
responsibilities, in a responsible and transparent manner in terms of | :16:06. | :16:08. | |
war and peace. This is vitally important and is now clear that in | :16:09. | :16:13. | |
2003, those actions of the then member for Sedgefield flew in the | :16:14. | :16:18. | |
face of this. We are told that collective responsibility has | :16:19. | :16:22. | |
underpinned our democracy for centuries. As outlined in this | :16:23. | :16:27. | |
report, this system was abused and ignored by the former member for | :16:28. | :16:32. | |
Sedgefield. Their actions, are a warning to the current government | :16:33. | :16:36. | |
and to future governments, that the mechanism of government itself must | :16:37. | :16:41. | |
not be twisted and subverted by an individual to meet their own as I | :16:42. | :16:46. | |
would think delusional self appointed Godlike views, and that | :16:47. | :16:49. | |
the full transparency and accountability must at all times be | :16:50. | :16:56. | |
addressed. To ensure accountability and transparency and for justice to | :16:57. | :17:00. | |
be carried out, those who made the decision to go to war must be | :17:01. | :17:04. | |
brought to order. That is why like many other members in this house, I | :17:05. | :17:09. | |
will be fully supporting the contempt motion against the former | :17:10. | :17:14. | |
member for Sedgefield and that the general public expects this house | :17:15. | :17:18. | |
needs to demand it, and the international community, has two C | :17:19. | :17:23. | |
justice be done. And with that, I wish to say Mr Speaker, there will | :17:24. | :17:28. | |
be those who questioned this motion given the former premier's public | :17:29. | :17:32. | |
apology. Yet I would draw this conclusion on that apology. An act | :17:33. | :17:40. | |
of contrition requires a heartfelt and sincere and full intention not | :17:41. | :17:47. | |
to recommit that sin. The apology given by the former member of | :17:48. | :17:51. | |
Sedgefield, I would advise them this, is to seek a longer console | :17:52. | :17:57. | |
with their confessor to understand the full concept of an act of | :17:58. | :18:02. | |
contrition. I wish not to take much more time, but I wish to consider | :18:03. | :18:08. | |
the words of the former presiding officer, of the Scottish parliament. | :18:09. | :18:12. | |
George Reid. When a motion was placed before that place to debate | :18:13. | :18:18. | |
this very matter. And they stated "Above the doors of the Red Cross in | :18:19. | :18:21. | |
the knee jerk, there is a phrase from Dostoevsky that we should | :18:22. | :18:26. | |
remember in a time of war. It states that in war everyone is responsible | :18:27. | :18:33. | |
to everyone for everything. " And it reminds me Mr Speaker, of the | :18:34. | :18:42. | |
journalist, Michael Wayne, and their account of their time reporting the | :18:43. | :18:47. | |
conflict itself. While we may wish to seek peace, and an end to war. | :18:48. | :18:56. | |
Only the dead CD end of war. -- CD end. Thank you Mr Speaker, a number | :18:57. | :19:03. | |
of people have said today that the 2003 decision casts a long shadow. | :19:04. | :19:10. | |
And indeed it does Mr Speaker. And there has been lots of talk about | :19:11. | :19:15. | |
lessons learnt. And lessons needing to be learnt. But I fear that really | :19:16. | :19:25. | |
what this is, is largely about "I was right". And others were wrong, | :19:26. | :19:32. | |
and there is a slightly self-righteousness about where you | :19:33. | :19:40. | |
stood. On the vote in 2003. That I feel is not going to help us | :19:41. | :19:46. | |
actually make the decisions that we are facing. Which are, as Sirius and | :19:47. | :19:56. | |
as dangerous and as consequential. I wasn't in the house in 2003, I | :19:57. | :20:03. | |
didn't come in until 2005. And at the time, I was outside, I was one | :20:04. | :20:07. | |
of the people marching up and down and saying no to war. And when I | :20:08. | :20:15. | |
came in, I never in my wildest dreams thought I would spend most of | :20:16. | :20:21. | |
my time on defence matters. But I came into this chamber one day, and | :20:22. | :20:27. | |
I noticed, that there was a group of middle-aged men talking to a group | :20:28. | :20:31. | |
of middle-aged men. Across the chamber, on perhaps one of the most | :20:32. | :20:35. | |
important subject that the subject had to face. I thought I am not | :20:36. | :20:44. | |
having this. And I went out of my way, to teach myself to fence. -- | :20:45. | :20:48. | |
myself defence. I had to say you have to do | :20:49. | :21:03. | |
that unless you have been in the Armed Forces, to find out how | :21:04. | :21:07. | |
decisions are made, what kind of equipment is used. How on earth a | :21:08. | :21:12. | |
decision to go to war is implemented, and how it is carried | :21:13. | :21:18. | |
through. It is not enough, to be a member of this Parliament and think | :21:19. | :21:24. | |
that defence is something that you can dip into. And sadly, too many | :21:25. | :21:28. | |
honourable and right Honourable members think it is. You have no | :21:29. | :21:35. | |
right I don't feel to criticise unless you actually have looked and | :21:36. | :21:44. | |
questioned. What equipment are rather people going to war with? -- | :21:45. | :21:51. | |
our war. How many of them are there. What is going to happen when we have | :21:52. | :21:56. | |
two meet the numbers of personal that we want to send, against a | :21:57. | :22:01. | |
number of personnel they are going to be meeting. A disastrous decision | :22:02. | :22:07. | |
that we made when we sent our people to hell mad, nobody questioned it, | :22:08. | :22:13. | |
we're not having a big two-day debate. About that disaster. And how | :22:14. | :22:17. | |
many honourable members bothered to read the defence committee report on | :22:18. | :22:23. | |
anything. And quite honestly I wonder how many honourable members | :22:24. | :22:29. | |
have read the STS are. How many members have been worried and | :22:30. | :22:32. | |
concerned about the paring back over and over and over again of our Armed | :22:33. | :22:41. | |
Forces -- have read the SDSR. Hanley people have been worried about the | :22:42. | :22:44. | |
cuts to the platforms they are going to be able to utilise. It is all | :22:45. | :22:49. | |
very well to go back to 2003 and beat our breasts, to spend seven | :22:50. | :22:52. | |
years, but I have been in this house and I had taken three decisions. | :22:53. | :22:59. | |
About going to war. And I spent a lot of time on all three decisions. | :23:00. | :23:15. | |
Libya. As great a disaster as Iraq. I spent a lot of time asking is this | :23:16. | :23:22. | |
resume change? And I was told no this is not regime change. I don't | :23:23. | :23:29. | |
believe actually that is true, I think it was always going to be | :23:30. | :23:33. | |
regime change. I asked about what we were going to do about post-conflict | :23:34. | :23:37. | |
reconstruction because it was the big lesson, I was told that we | :23:38. | :23:42. | |
weren't putting boots on the ground and therefore it wasn't an issue for | :23:43. | :23:49. | |
us. I most certainly will. The honourable member knows that I have | :23:50. | :23:55. | |
deep respect for her and that will continue, but I seem to recall that | :23:56. | :24:00. | |
we had little choice but to intervene in Libya and I personally | :24:01. | :24:08. | |
voted for it because I was terrified that people would be killed. Thank | :24:09. | :24:17. | |
you for that intervention, that is most helpful. Because it takes you | :24:18. | :24:21. | |
back to the exact same issue. That people were facing in relation to | :24:22. | :24:28. | |
Saddam Hussein. Because Saddam Hussein led people down a track | :24:29. | :24:34. | |
where really, intervention was almost inevitable. He ignored all of | :24:35. | :24:46. | |
the UN missions, he was obstructive many times. To the people who went | :24:47. | :24:55. | |
in, looking for weapons. I actually asked Iraqis and I'm not sure of the | :24:56. | :24:58. | |
honourable gentleman was with us on the visit to Iraq, when we met a | :24:59. | :25:04. | |
group of tribal elders, we met in a room, where they told us that the | :25:05. | :25:10. | |
last time they had been in it, they had been called there by Saddam | :25:11. | :25:14. | |
Hussein to hear a report about the changes that he was introducing to | :25:15. | :25:18. | |
the health service in Iraq. Someone had stood up and said, not that he | :25:19. | :25:24. | |
disagreed with it, not that he thought that Saddam Hussein was | :25:25. | :25:30. | |
wrong, but that perhaps a small change would make it slightly | :25:31. | :25:34. | |
better. The man was marched out of the room and shot at the front door | :25:35. | :25:44. | |
of the building. That is the world that we were trying to understand. I | :25:45. | :25:51. | |
asked on that occasion, why on earth did Saddam Hussein not just say I | :25:52. | :25:57. | |
have given up the weapons of mass destruction, I don't have any. I got | :25:58. | :26:03. | |
rid of the chemical weapons. I dead have any. Why didn't he step | :26:04. | :26:06. | |
forward? I was told because he was more | :26:07. | :26:17. | |
afraid of his own people than you. He had to convince his own people | :26:18. | :26:23. | |
that he had those weapons so that is why he kept that myth going, not | :26:24. | :26:28. | |
fries, not because he was afraid of our invasion but because he was | :26:29. | :26:35. | |
afraid of his own people if they thought he showed any weakness. -- | :26:36. | :26:42. | |
not for us. That was exactly the same situation in Libya. Gaddafi | :26:43. | :26:46. | |
made it impossible for the people in this House is not to feel that we | :26:47. | :26:51. | |
could not sit back and let him say, I am going to slaughter those people | :26:52. | :26:56. | |
in Benghazi which is what he said he was going to do and we acted. But | :26:57. | :27:02. | |
look at the consequences. In seven years' time, I people going to | :27:03. | :27:07. | |
criticise others for that vote and stand there self righteously seeing | :27:08. | :27:15. | |
how you had no reconstruction plan. We did not and it is a mess and | :27:16. | :27:19. | |
there are so many lessons to learn. I have been to Iraq and Afghanistan. | :27:20. | :27:26. | |
I believe as a member of the defence committee, if we send our personnel | :27:27. | :27:32. | |
there, we have a responsibility to go ourselves and C and talk with | :27:33. | :27:38. | |
people on the front line and ask them, have you got the right kit and | :27:39. | :27:43. | |
equipment? Are you being looked after correctly? What do we need to | :27:44. | :27:48. | |
change in Parliament, tell us and we will be your voice? That is the | :27:49. | :27:55. | |
lessons we have to learn. We have to be more robust in our understanding | :27:56. | :28:03. | |
of defence. We have to be more responsible in understanding the | :28:04. | :28:07. | |
tasks and responsibilities we place in front of our Armed Forces. We | :28:08. | :28:12. | |
don't want to be pontificating about whether Tony Blair was a liar and | :28:13. | :28:19. | |
weather when he says, I will be with you whatever, there is a jolly big | :28:20. | :28:24. | |
but underneath that sentence. I want us to be looking much more at what | :28:25. | :28:30. | |
we have learnt and what we're going to do about the future because, I | :28:31. | :28:37. | |
doubt if any of you have read it but the defence Select Committee put out | :28:38. | :28:43. | |
a report recently about Russia. Be afraid, be very afraid because that | :28:44. | :28:46. | |
is coming down the track. I will give way. I do not disagree with her | :28:47. | :28:53. | |
speech but does she not agree with me that part of the problem during | :28:54. | :28:59. | |
that period was that the United Nations, all the major partners did | :29:00. | :29:03. | |
not want to play a part? That includes the Russian Federation who | :29:04. | :29:08. | |
did not want to play its part. I look at the Russians in Syria, I | :29:09. | :29:15. | |
look at what the Russians did in Afghanistan. Do I want to stand | :29:16. | :29:22. | |
alongside them? You know, I have my standards. But I am not for the | :29:23. | :29:30. | |
Barrow bombing of civilians. The Russians take it as perfectly | :29:31. | :29:36. | |
acceptable. I am not someone who is going to be happy coming to this | :29:37. | :29:44. | |
House and seeing, we made mistakes in Iraq, yes. We made mistakes in | :29:45. | :29:55. | |
Libya. We made mistakes, quite honestly, in every war this country | :29:56. | :29:59. | |
has been involved in. Every time. What I would like to know, and I am | :30:00. | :30:06. | |
glad the Secretary of State is with us, is when are the historic | :30:07. | :30:13. | |
analysis team that used to be in the Ministry of defence and actually | :30:14. | :30:17. | |
looked historically and analysed and taught the lessons learnt. Two | :30:18. | :30:25. | |
military personnel. Whether that is going to be reinstated? Because that | :30:26. | :30:32. | |
will have more impact than anything else that we discussed in the year | :30:33. | :30:38. | |
because that is what we need. We need our personnel to know the | :30:39. | :30:42. | |
lessons which are learnt. The South China Sea. We have 19 ships, 19 | :30:43. | :30:53. | |
ships. Are you worried about Iraq? Worry about the South China Sea. We | :30:54. | :31:01. | |
have 19 ships. Please let us be realistic because the world is | :31:02. | :31:08. | |
looking and laughing. Laughing at us tearing ourselves apart. I want a | :31:09. | :31:14. | |
confident Britain, a secure Britain, a country which is not afraid of | :31:15. | :31:18. | |
making difficult decisions. I Britain which is not afraid of | :31:19. | :31:23. | |
sticking its neck into wasps nest, well equipped and well trained. But | :31:24. | :31:29. | |
we will take on our responsibilities in the world. We will look at our | :31:30. | :31:36. | |
mistakes and we will learn, but we will not waste our time just casting | :31:37. | :31:43. | |
rude and offensive remarks at people who lead us. Thank you very much. It | :31:44. | :31:51. | |
is a pleasure to follow the honourable lady and I commend her | :31:52. | :31:56. | |
for a thoughtful and well thought contribution to the debate. I | :31:57. | :32:00. | |
disagree with every point she had. You would not expect that but I did | :32:01. | :32:05. | |
agree with the tone in which we should approach this debate today. I | :32:06. | :32:10. | |
think we should approach it with a degree of humility. We should be | :32:11. | :32:16. | |
careful not to reinvent history. I was here into thousand three. I | :32:17. | :32:20. | |
remember these debates. I was listening to my other colleagues, I | :32:21. | :32:27. | |
kept looking over their because that is where I remember her sitting as | :32:28. | :32:33. | |
she made the speeches during the debates in 2003 and they were very | :32:34. | :32:39. | |
powerful speeches. I remember well the atmosphere which was described | :32:40. | :32:43. | |
by the honourable member for Perth in the way in which these thoughts | :32:44. | :32:48. | |
were whipped and the way the government steam-rollered every | :32:49. | :32:50. | |
effort into getting these motions through the House. The honourable | :32:51. | :32:57. | |
member for Perth said he felt vindicated. I know what he meant by | :32:58. | :33:05. | |
that, I confess I do not feel anything quite as possible -- | :33:06. | :33:12. | |
positive as vindication. If anything I feel slightly depressed because I | :33:13. | :33:17. | |
think there was an inevitability which wasn't addressed by this House | :33:18. | :33:21. | |
at the time. It is depressing because I view we still would not | :33:22. | :33:26. | |
address that if we were placed in the same situation today. I will | :33:27. | :33:33. | |
turn later to talk more about that and how the House should deal with | :33:34. | :33:37. | |
this in the future but I think first of all we should place on record our | :33:38. | :33:42. | |
regards to Sir John Chilcot and his team who have done a thorough piece | :33:43. | :33:47. | |
of work. I have been critical about the length of time it has taken, but | :33:48. | :33:50. | |
there is no denying the thoroughness of the work which has been done. I | :33:51. | :33:56. | |
think we should be grateful to them. Given what we seen out in the table | :33:57. | :34:02. | |
in front of us, it certainly clarifies one thing in my mind, that | :34:03. | :34:08. | |
we were absolutely right to set the inquiry up as an independent inquiry | :34:09. | :34:12. | |
because we have been chivvying that man and his team for years now and | :34:13. | :34:17. | |
now we C White it has taken as long as a House. The report fills in a | :34:18. | :34:24. | |
lot of the background detail. -- now we C Y. He does place on the page a | :34:25. | :34:37. | |
lot of the dots and it is now for Parliament to join them up to | :34:38. | :34:45. | |
produce a discernible picture. In particular he says clearly and | :34:46. | :34:48. | |
fairly he will not express a view on the locality of the war. But he does | :34:49. | :34:54. | |
offer as evidence from which we can draw our own conclusions. In | :34:55. | :35:00. | |
particular we now have the already infamous memo from Tony Blair to | :35:01. | :35:04. | |
George Bush saying I will be with you whatever. I think it is | :35:05. | :35:10. | |
important that the House puts that into the context of the time because | :35:11. | :35:15. | |
as others have said, Tony Blair was always meticulous in this House in | :35:16. | :35:20. | |
making a case which was based on weapons of mass destruction. That | :35:21. | :35:25. | |
was not true of George Bush. George Bush never pretended this was | :35:26. | :35:30. | |
anything other than an exercise in regime change so when Tony Blair was | :35:31. | :35:33. | |
saying to George Bush, I will be with you whatever, then he was | :35:34. | :35:38. | |
saying I will support you even though I know what you're doing is | :35:39. | :35:43. | |
something which is done on a quite different bases than that for which | :35:44. | :35:47. | |
am seeking authority from the House of Commons. That is significant | :35:48. | :35:54. | |
because of course, a war which was entered into for the purpose of | :35:55. | :35:58. | |
regime change would be an illegal war. One for which the purpose was | :35:59. | :36:06. | |
the removal of weapons of mass destruction was one for which there | :36:07. | :36:10. | |
could have been a legal basis. The right honourable member, the | :36:11. | :36:16. | |
chairman of the defence Select Committee, post what I think was a | :36:17. | :36:23. | |
pertinent question. He said, how would the House have reacted if Tony | :36:24. | :36:31. | |
Blair had been more balanced and evenhanded in the presentation of | :36:32. | :36:36. | |
the evidence? That is where the detail of what Chilcot tells us is | :36:37. | :36:40. | |
important because we C from that memo why Tony Blair was not more | :36:41. | :36:47. | |
evenhanded and balanced in the presentation of the evidence because | :36:48. | :36:53. | |
he was working to an objective. He was supporting a commitment that he | :36:54. | :36:59. | |
had already made. The right honourable member also referred to | :37:00. | :37:08. | |
the vote from 2013 on Syria. I would suggest to him that he goes back and | :37:09. | :37:13. | |
refreshes his many on the terms of the motion against which he and | :37:14. | :37:18. | |
others voted, quite legitimately. I do not challenge his reasons for | :37:19. | :37:22. | |
doing so but it was not a vote to remove Assad, it was a motion which | :37:23. | :37:29. | |
instructed the government to obtain authority from the United Nations | :37:30. | :37:36. | |
and then to come back to this House for any further military action to | :37:37. | :37:40. | |
be sanctioned. That is why I was prepared to support it. I say he | :37:41. | :37:46. | |
wants to intervene. Yes, I had planned to intervene to haven't | :37:47. | :37:49. | |
spoken earlier on but this is one of the knock-on effects of we are | :37:50. | :37:54. | |
discussing today. By the time we got to that vote, we knew perfectly well | :37:55. | :38:00. | |
that if we had passed that resolution, the bombing would have | :38:01. | :38:05. | |
started that weekend. All the planes were ready to go and I am surprised | :38:06. | :38:10. | |
that the right honourable gentleman is naive enough to believe anything | :38:11. | :38:17. | |
else, if I can say so gently. I do not want to be taken down a side | :38:18. | :38:21. | |
alley into the question of Syria, compelling as that is. The bombing | :38:22. | :38:26. | |
could not have started without the authorisation of this House on the | :38:27. | :38:30. | |
basis of the motion which was put to the south against which he voted. It | :38:31. | :38:36. | |
is interesting to speculate although not germane to this debate what | :38:37. | :38:40. | |
would have happened if the House had gone down the road which was marched | :38:41. | :38:47. | |
on it in 2013. What might then have been the action of President Obama, | :38:48. | :38:51. | |
how things might have moved on, whether we would have been put in | :38:52. | :38:54. | |
the position we were in relation to the vote are two clashed year on | :38:55. | :39:02. | |
Syria. What I think is undeniable, of all these decisions, Libya is a | :39:03. | :39:07. | |
good example, they were taken under a cloud which still hangs over | :39:08. | :39:11. | |
foreign policy and our role in the world as a result of the experience | :39:12. | :39:20. | |
of the debate in Iraq. It is also I think as my right honourable friend | :39:21. | :39:27. | |
for Carshalton pointed out, quite remarkable if regime change was the | :39:28. | :39:31. | |
agenda that sat behind the American intervention in Iraq, then needed so | :39:32. | :39:39. | |
little to prepare for the aftermath. -- they did. The removal of the Bath | :39:40. | :39:45. | |
party from government stands out as one of the biggest strategic errors | :39:46. | :39:49. | |
we have ever been party to. It completely failed to understand that | :39:50. | :39:55. | |
for many ordinary Iraqis who were engaged in Iraqi government and | :39:56. | :39:59. | |
civic society, they did so as part of this party because it was the | :40:00. | :40:05. | |
only party in town. Two renews the intercept -- the infrastructure in | :40:06. | :40:10. | |
government in the week was done in 2003, has left a void in the | :40:11. | :40:13. | |
infrastructure of government which remains a problem for Iraq to this | :40:14. | :40:22. | |
day. -- to remove. It also provided fertile ground for extremism to | :40:23. | :40:29. | |
flourish. That was all staff which was predicted by many of us who | :40:30. | :40:33. | |
questioned the decision to go to war in 2003. The House today, I have to | :40:34. | :40:40. | |
say, is a very different one from the House that to that decision in | :40:41. | :40:47. | |
2003. 659 members at the time of that only 172 remain members of the | :40:48. | :40:56. | |
House today. I calculate that that 172 there are 141 who voted in | :40:57. | :41:02. | |
favour of action and now only 21 voted against. | :41:03. | :41:08. | |
I rewrote the debates before I came here. I was reminded and I agree | :41:09. | :41:19. | |
with the honourable member, that it was not a happy atmosphere. It was | :41:20. | :41:26. | |
tench, brutal and it was deliberately so because it was that | :41:27. | :41:30. | |
atmosphere that forced many to vote for an enterprise against their | :41:31. | :41:35. | |
better judgment. This is why it is important that we approach this with | :41:36. | :41:40. | |
some humility. The amendment that the honourable member garnered | :41:41. | :41:47. | |
support said that the case for war had not been proven and that was | :41:48. | :41:52. | |
certainly the view that I took. I was not going to vote for a motion | :41:53. | :41:55. | |
that said we would never go to war because like other members, I knew | :41:56. | :42:04. | |
that Saddam was a British dictator. We knew he had weapons of mass | :42:05. | :42:09. | |
destruction in the past, we had been quite happy to turn a blind eye to | :42:10. | :42:15. | |
it in the past because he had been using it against Iran, a regime we | :42:16. | :42:21. | |
will also happy to see removed. It was that sort of double standard in | :42:22. | :42:26. | |
our foreign policy that I hope we can see an end of. Sadly, it does | :42:27. | :42:33. | |
not seem to have been the case. I go back to the speech I said in 2003 | :42:34. | :42:41. | |
calling for the implementation of UN security council resolution 242. | :42:42. | :42:44. | |
Sadly we are no further forward ahead on that issue today than we | :42:45. | :42:50. | |
were in 2003, arguably if anything we are further behind. That is why | :42:51. | :42:54. | |
should we ever find ourselves in this position again, the House has | :42:55. | :42:59. | |
got to take is due to youth more seriously. We have got to ask the | :43:00. | :43:06. | |
questions we cannot accept assertions when we should be given | :43:07. | :43:16. | |
evidence. The honourable member is exactly right. The issue of where | :43:17. | :43:24. | |
the House allowed itself to assertions of evidence touches on | :43:25. | :43:27. | |
the point I think I would agree with that the honourable member was | :43:28. | :43:32. | |
making that members of this House have to take seriously their | :43:33. | :43:36. | |
responsibilities when it comes to vote on matters like this, because | :43:37. | :43:39. | |
it is matter that will not just affect the life and lives of others | :43:40. | :43:45. | |
in other countries, but affects the life of servicemen and women that | :43:46. | :43:53. | |
will be deployed. There is a huge lesson and I hear it from people who | :43:54. | :43:57. | |
were in the debates on all sides at that time. People now regret that | :43:58. | :44:06. | |
they allowed, they downloaded from the dispatch box their sense, their | :44:07. | :44:12. | |
judgment because they believed that a Prime Minister would not tell us | :44:13. | :44:17. | |
things in these terms unless it was absolutely firm and true and | :44:18. | :44:19. | |
therefore it must be right, and those who demurred from that you | :44:20. | :44:24. | |
were being demonised both inside and outside this House because that was | :44:25. | :44:30. | |
the assumption. If there is any lesson from all of this, it has to | :44:31. | :44:36. | |
be that never again should anybody mistake dispatch box certitude for | :44:37. | :44:40. | |
certainty on key and grave matters. We are told by some people that this | :44:41. | :44:47. | |
report shows that there is no smoking gun against the former Prime | :44:48. | :44:55. | |
Minister and people say what are the exaggerated versions against Tony | :44:56. | :44:57. | |
Blair that he lied or misled Parliament, and they said none of | :44:58. | :45:05. | |
that is in this report. I would just say a number of things. Firstly, I | :45:06. | :45:11. | |
did in the past make the point that I had experienced working with John | :45:12. | :45:18. | |
Chilcot in various capacities and I did say that while he had many | :45:19. | :45:23. | |
attributes, I was not sure he would be independent or challenging. I | :45:24. | :45:30. | |
accept this is a very compelling report and it might be written with | :45:31. | :45:35. | |
typical British understatement, but we should not neglect just the key | :45:36. | :45:40. | |
truths that are in here and the lessons that do need to be learned. | :45:41. | :45:46. | |
While some will say, there is not the smoking gun that there was, that | :45:47. | :45:53. | |
the dossier was dodgy, let's just as an example of that understatement, | :45:54. | :45:57. | |
the way in which John Chilcot reports. He says, the enquiry shares | :45:58. | :46:05. | |
the conclusion is that it was a mistake not to see the risk of | :46:06. | :46:11. | |
combining in the September dossier the assessment of intelligence and | :46:12. | :46:15. | |
other evidence with the interpretation and presentation of | :46:16. | :46:18. | |
the evidence in order to make the case for policy action. That I think | :46:19. | :46:23. | |
is a very telling criticism about what exactly was the photo with the | :46:24. | :46:31. | |
September dossier. The Prime Minister when he reported to us on | :46:32. | :46:36. | |
the report last week, he highlighted that Sir John had identified that | :46:37. | :46:43. | |
there was an ingrained belief genuinely held by people in both the | :46:44. | :46:47. | |
US and UK governments about Saddam and the weapons that were held. I | :46:48. | :46:55. | |
think that is actually true and possible. I know that I myself in | :46:56. | :47:02. | |
November of 2002 hurt Tony Blair address myself and other socialist | :47:03. | :47:10. | |
leaders in Downing Street when he told us not just about what he | :47:11. | :47:14. | |
believed was the case with Sadam and what he thought would be found, but | :47:15. | :47:20. | |
also shared the view that the US were going to go to war anyway and | :47:21. | :47:26. | |
that it was important that he maintained a restraining influence | :47:27. | :47:29. | |
and he described himself as someone in the role of a bridge, trying to | :47:30. | :47:33. | |
make sure that America would not go too far in relation to Iraq, trying | :47:34. | :47:40. | |
to hold America back and I said I did not buy the image he was selling | :47:41. | :47:45. | |
of him as a mooring rope trying to hold America closer to where Europe | :47:46. | :47:50. | |
was, but I thought America saw him as a tow rope he would pull Europe | :47:51. | :47:55. | |
and watching Europe in the course of this. I don't doubt that he | :47:56. | :48:01. | |
sincerely believed that he somehow was in a position of restraining and | :48:02. | :48:05. | |
influencing America by adopting because he was preparing to adopt. | :48:06. | :48:15. | |
However... A very different approach was taken at the time by Canada. The | :48:16. | :48:21. | |
then Prime Minister said Canada would not stand with the United | :48:22. | :48:27. | |
States. Now, 13 years down the line, does he think that the relationship | :48:28. | :48:30. | |
between Canada and the US is any the worse for the decision they took? | :48:31. | :48:37. | |
No, I don't and to say that I might accept the point that this was an | :48:38. | :48:43. | |
ingrained belief genuinely held is not to anyway endorse that belief or | :48:44. | :48:47. | |
to say it was actually a wife's belief. It was a very foolish and | :48:48. | :48:52. | |
rash belief and I think in some ways was deluded. The fact is alongside | :48:53. | :48:58. | |
the ingrained belief that was genuinely held, the Chilcot report | :48:59. | :49:07. | |
also brings out that there was an ingrained intent on the part of the | :49:08. | :49:11. | |
UK Government particularly Tony Blair that was not genuinely | :49:12. | :49:15. | |
expressed either to this House or in public, because the ingrained intent | :49:16. | :49:20. | |
was that they were going to war anyway because he thought that was | :49:21. | :49:26. | |
where America was going. We see in the report examples of where | :49:27. | :49:29. | |
evidence was being bent and melted and confected to justify that the | :49:30. | :49:34. | |
preparation for any intervention was going to be on the basis of weapons | :49:35. | :49:40. | |
of mass destruction, where as it was clear the Prime Minister knew the | :49:41. | :49:45. | |
intervention was really on the agenda of regime changed and people | :49:46. | :49:49. | |
on this House move this was illegal and so that was withheld. Nobody can | :49:50. | :49:56. | |
say in saying, Chilcot has not said Tony Blair led to macrolide or | :49:57. | :50:04. | |
misled this House. Nobody can say that it is not the case that there | :50:05. | :50:09. | |
was a Jupiter city in presentation in this throughout. The other big | :50:10. | :50:15. | |
indictment from this report is the paucity of preparation. The fact | :50:16. | :50:19. | |
that there was a commitment to go to war without the proper equipment | :50:20. | :50:23. | |
that would protect and safeguard people who were being put in harms | :50:24. | :50:29. | |
way and allowed them to give care to people they would be meeting in | :50:30. | :50:33. | |
distress as well. The paucity of preparation in terms of the | :50:34. | :50:41. | |
aftermath in terms of any kind of reconstruction, the assumption that | :50:42. | :50:46. | |
the Americans would sort that out. That is something that is serious | :50:47. | :50:50. | |
and has to bear on all of our minds and that is why when it came to | :50:51. | :50:55. | |
things like the vote on Syria and the vote on Libya, I and other | :50:56. | :51:01. | |
members obviously had to look to what is it that we're being told, | :51:02. | :51:05. | |
what are the assurances and assumptions on which the | :51:06. | :51:08. | |
Government's position is resting and that is why I was not convinced on | :51:09. | :51:18. | |
any of those. Say that because I hoped I was going to be proved wrong | :51:19. | :51:24. | |
and when it looked as though the early intervention in Libya had | :51:25. | :51:27. | |
achieved what people had wanted it to achieve, I was more than happy in | :51:28. | :51:35. | |
that instance to have been proved wrong. Similarly in relation to | :51:36. | :51:41. | |
Syria, there was a time, there were points in the debates were some of | :51:42. | :51:46. | |
us who were asking questions about the Government's proposals were | :51:47. | :51:50. | |
being advised that we should listen to what the Prime Minister was | :51:51. | :51:55. | |
saying, so there were people here still who had not let the lessons | :51:56. | :51:58. | |
from the Iraq war because if our Prime Minister is telling us this, | :51:59. | :52:04. | |
then we should do it and proceed. It is clear that in this House we do | :52:05. | :52:08. | |
need to do much more to learn the lessons of all of this. The motion | :52:09. | :52:15. | |
before us says that the House has considered the Chilcot report. I do | :52:16. | :52:19. | |
not do your font that motion but we should not pretend that this debate | :52:20. | :52:25. | |
is anything like adequate consideration of this report. I | :52:26. | :52:29. | |
cannot pretend to have read all 2.6 million words of it. And of course | :52:30. | :52:38. | |
it has taken place in the context of a swirl of other events as well | :52:39. | :52:43. | |
which is somewhat distracting. It is also the case that a strong | :52:44. | :52:48. | |
undertone has been in this debate about the question of the former | :52:49. | :52:53. | |
Prime Minister and the member for Plymouth was very right in pleading | :52:54. | :52:58. | |
that we don't just personalise it around him and I thought also the | :52:59. | :53:02. | |
very significant point is that he made on behalf of people who serve | :53:03. | :53:07. | |
in these sorts of military ventures was hugely important as well. But I | :53:08. | :53:13. | |
would ask those members who tried to say that this somehow exonerate Tony | :53:14. | :53:18. | |
Blair, to stop making the mistake of polishing non-findings and trying to | :53:19. | :53:24. | |
rubbish some of the findings that are in this report because some of | :53:25. | :53:29. | |
the people who are highlighting the non-findings of questioning some of | :53:30. | :53:34. | |
the findings in relation to what the future requirements should be in | :53:35. | :53:38. | |
terms of upholding UN positions and proper Parliamentary oversight, | :53:39. | :53:44. | |
proper Parliamentary information and awareness. The final point I would | :53:45. | :53:48. | |
make in agreeing with the honourable member in which he said people don't | :53:49. | :53:53. | |
have the right to criticise unless they have the right equipment. | :53:54. | :53:56. | |
People don't have the right to justify the Iraq war and pretend the | :53:57. | :54:01. | |
report is not an indictment of that decision and how it was taken. If | :54:02. | :54:05. | |
they did not ask those questions at the time, questions that should have | :54:06. | :54:11. | |
been screening out at us, any reading of the intelligence at the | :54:12. | :54:18. | |
time would have told them. It is a privilege to take part in this | :54:19. | :54:22. | |
debate on the Chilcot report and to listen to some colleagues who have | :54:23. | :54:25. | |
much greater knowledge and more direct experience of the issues and | :54:26. | :54:28. | |
events concerned than I have and I don't intend to repeat many of the | :54:29. | :54:33. | |
points that have been made. I was not an MP at the time so my | :54:34. | :54:37. | |
opposition was from my limited knowledge from outside this House | :54:38. | :54:42. | |
and I made my view is now very vigorously to my then MP. In this | :54:43. | :54:47. | |
report, Chilcot has been prepared to be critical of processes and | :54:48. | :54:54. | |
decisions and that opportunity to be critical is vital to our democracy. | :54:55. | :54:57. | |
What is important is we learn the lessons from the report. It was the | :54:58. | :55:01. | |
Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown who set up the Chilcot enquiry in | :55:02. | :55:10. | |
June 2009. That it would cover the period 2001-2009, including the way | :55:11. | :55:14. | |
decisions were made and identified the lessons that can be learned. | :55:15. | :55:20. | |
There had been calls for an enquiry before and our response was that we | :55:21. | :55:23. | |
should wait until troops had withdrawn. For us now, we need to | :55:24. | :55:31. | |
learn the lessons and as parliamentarians, we need to focus | :55:32. | :55:35. | |
on the decision-making process. The basis for the advice on the legality | :55:36. | :55:41. | |
of the war was that the Attorney General understands that it is | :55:42. | :55:44. | |
unequivocally the Prime Minister's view that Iraq has committed further | :55:45. | :55:49. | |
material breaches as specified in paragraph four. But this is a | :55:50. | :55:53. | |
judgment for the PM. It's quite clearly on the Prime | :55:54. | :56:02. | |
Minister and the lesson that we need to learn is whether the level of | :56:03. | :56:07. | |
Defence Secretary wider cabinet or Defence Secretary wider cabinet or | :56:08. | :56:11. | |
abuse we should scrutinise most Catholic any such advice before we | :56:12. | :56:12. | |
commit to war. Clearly, when MPs in commit to war. Clearly, when MPs in | :56:13. | :56:21. | |
2013 when cancer meeting the integration and Syria, events in | :56:22. | :56:23. | |
Iraq were very much on their minds. The dilemma is when you see the | :56:24. | :56:28. | |
terribles suffering in Syria, how do you deal with it? With our | :56:29. | :56:33. | |
intervention cause more suffering and make matters worse? What do you | :56:34. | :56:40. | |
do with people like that? As mentioned by the member, we need to | :56:41. | :56:47. | |
fund the FCO properly and to ensure that we have a very detailed and | :56:48. | :56:48. | |
up-to-date understanding of the up-to-date understanding of the | :56:49. | :56:51. | |
complexities of what is happening in many foreign countries where there | :56:52. | :56:57. | |
could be potential conflict or we could potentially be involved. It's | :56:58. | :57:01. | |
an easy option to cut as it is out of sight of public outcry but better | :57:02. | :57:05. | |
understanding and diplomatic efforts can avoid the devastation and | :57:06. | :57:08. | |
cost of war, it is money well spent. cost of war, it is money well spent. | :57:09. | :57:15. | |
Likewise with the commitment to 0.1 -- 0.7% of GDP development. Work | :57:16. | :57:22. | |
like this helps make the world a safer place and reduces the new form | :57:23. | :57:25. | |
initially intervention. During the last Parliament, it was worrying to | :57:26. | :57:31. | |
note that Sir John Stanley joined committed on Arms export control | :57:32. | :57:35. | |
reported that since 2010, there had been a relaxation and astringency on | :57:36. | :57:40. | |
the bridge aims that we were spotting too. It is vital that we | :57:41. | :57:44. | |
should be wary of what we sell to who. That committee needs to | :57:45. | :57:47. | |
continue to be belligerent and the Government to be responsive to its | :57:48. | :57:52. | |
concerns. We need to pull support and strength the work of the UN. The | :57:53. | :57:58. | |
Security Council on the protection Security Council on the protection | :57:59. | :58:02. | |
of civilians and armed conflict. Therefore, as chair of the | :58:03. | :58:13. | |
protection of civilians. Order. Quite a lot of conversations going | :58:14. | :58:17. | |
on in the chamber. I think you're going to reply to the debate and it | :58:18. | :58:24. | |
would be a courtesy if members would listen, there is a minister | :58:25. | :58:28. | |
wittering away from essentially position which is not a great sign | :58:29. | :58:33. | |
of intelligent and which is discourteous. It is very obvious. | :58:34. | :58:36. | |
The honourable lady will be heard. With courtesy. Thank you very much. | :58:37. | :58:44. | |
I am particularly concerned that the UK is not supportive of the UN | :58:45. | :58:49. | |
Secretary General's initiative to development at political declaration | :58:50. | :58:52. | |
to stop the gaze of explosive weapons with wild area effects in | :58:53. | :58:57. | |
populated areas and I do believe, Mr Speaker, we need to take it very | :58:58. | :59:00. | |
within the secretive Council of the within the secretive Council of the | :59:01. | :59:03. | |
UN and make sure we do everything we possibly can to avoid the walk | :59:04. | :59:06. | |
through working with international organisations like the UN. Thank | :59:07. | :59:15. | |
you. I have sat through all of the debate, yesterday and today, and I | :59:16. | :59:18. | |
must say it has been a fascinating education. I have really appreciated | :59:19. | :59:23. | |
listening to many of the members who were here 13 years ago. I have been | :59:24. | :59:29. | |
disappointed by the lack of numbers on the benches here. I am new to | :59:30. | :59:35. | |
of this issue over the years and of this issue over the years and | :59:36. | :59:41. | |
given the long wait that we have had for the Chilcott report, I am | :59:42. | :59:43. | |
here. I will put that down to the here. I will put that down to the | :59:44. | :59:47. | |
fact that so much more is going on in the political firmament and there | :59:48. | :59:57. | |
is so much to read. I would place on the Government benches to think | :59:58. | :00:01. | |
about that and to realise that this is not the end of the Chilcott | :00:02. | :00:06. | |
procedure and the Chilcott investigation, a lot more discussion | :00:07. | :00:09. | |
and thought has to go into that report and I would appeal to the | :00:10. | :00:12. | |
Government to think about that, take that away and think how we could | :00:13. | :00:18. | |
come back and look into all the ramifications that the report has | :00:19. | :00:23. | |
brought this chamber. Can I also say that I think no one has quite given | :00:24. | :00:27. | |
due recognition to the fact that it was the previous Labour Government | :00:28. | :00:31. | |
under Gordon Brown by commission this report and I think that should | :00:32. | :00:34. | |
be recondite because that was a brief thing to do. -- brave thing to | :00:35. | :00:46. | |
do. The Suez intervention which is the other post-war diplomatic | :00:47. | :00:52. | |
disaster on the verbal scale, that Britain blundered into. There were | :00:53. | :00:55. | |
repeated attempts over the eight years remaining of the Conservative | :00:56. | :00:58. | |
Government after 1956 to get a public inquiry after the Suez and | :00:59. | :01:04. | |
that was rejected. Now we got the that was rejected. Now we got the | :01:05. | :01:10. | |
Chilcott report we have learned that when we make the six we have to own | :01:11. | :01:14. | |
up to them and examine the details. I particularly enjoyed listening to, | :01:15. | :01:27. | |
enjoy is perhaps the wrong word,. I have been surprised by the response | :01:28. | :01:31. | |
of some members, particularly on the Labour says, and trying to justify | :01:32. | :01:36. | |
what it was quite clearly the biggest diplomatic blunder of the | :01:37. | :01:43. | |
last 30 years. And particularly I was surprised by the honourable | :01:44. | :01:53. | |
member for Leeds Central and for the member for Wolverhampton South East. | :01:54. | :01:57. | |
Both of whom tried to draw some comfort in the fact that the | :01:58. | :02:04. | |
Chilcott report has not found the former prime Minster Tony Blair | :02:05. | :02:08. | |
guilty of misleading the House. I don't know if that's what Chilcott | :02:09. | :02:09. | |
set out to do but certainly it comes set out to do but certainly it comes | :02:10. | :02:15. | |
by mislead. Because there is by mislead. Because there is | :02:16. | :02:19. | |
abundant evidence, even in the cursory read of the report, even if | :02:20. | :02:23. | |
you have only read the summary report, there is abundant evidence | :02:24. | :02:31. | |
in the Chilcott findings that the fax were pummelled, twisted, jumped | :02:32. | :02:35. | |
on, stretched to the point where no one knew what was going on. And that | :02:36. | :02:40. | |
was a deliberate move of the executive to try and impose its view | :02:41. | :02:47. | |
of the world on this chamber. Is abundant, Mr Speaker, but I think we | :02:48. | :02:53. | |
have to grasp as well as the politics and the dependency and the | :02:54. | :02:56. | |
military issues that Chilcott deals with, there is essential | :02:57. | :03:02. | |
constitutional issue at the heart of that report that this chamber and | :03:03. | :03:05. | |
yourself, so, has to take into account. The executive in the shape | :03:06. | :03:13. | |
of Tony Blair and his immediate allies, the executive got out of | :03:14. | :03:17. | |
hand. This chamber and the Cabinet lost control of the executive in the | :03:18. | :03:25. | |
run-up to the intervention in Iraq. That is the fundamental findings of | :03:26. | :03:30. | |
the Chilcott report. Yes, the actual nature of the intubation, all that | :03:31. | :03:34. | |
extract from that, the executive was extract from that, the executive was | :03:35. | :03:38. | |
not under control. That can never happen again. It has been bred in | :03:39. | :03:43. | |
the history, in the whole history, it has been breath the such an event | :03:44. | :03:51. | |
to take place. The executive to completely get out of control. It | :03:52. | :03:56. | |
cannot happen again. And so if we're going to have a debate later on | :03:57. | :04:03. | |
about bringing some of the individuals, the former Prime | :04:04. | :04:06. | |
Minister Tony Blair to this House, to answer for their actions, the | :04:07. | :04:13. | |
issue is not retribution. The issue is not they were wrong in Iraq and | :04:14. | :04:18. | |
got us into a terrible disaster and we should hold them to account, that | :04:19. | :04:21. | |
is an issue but the fundamental issue in this House in deciding | :04:22. | :04:25. | |
whether or not the former Prime Minister is still to be held account | :04:26. | :04:29. | |
in this chamber is the executive got out of control, we have to have | :04:30. | :04:34. | |
Beirne learn the lessons of that and we cannot let that happen again. If | :04:35. | :04:45. | |
that is what happened, we cannot let those who flouted this House, who | :04:46. | :04:49. | |
flouted Cabinet Government get away with it. Because if we do that, then | :04:50. | :04:56. | |
it could happen again. I also was rather surprised by the verb both of | :04:57. | :05:04. | |
which the honourable member Leeds Central and some of the other | :05:05. | :05:12. | |
members tried to argue that whatever happens, whatever mistakes happened | :05:13. | :05:16. | |
in the intervention in 2003, the ramifications, the breakdown of law | :05:17. | :05:20. | |
and order and the breakdown of society in Iraq, subsequent | :05:21. | :05:27. | |
calamities that perceptive Middle East, that they will not only the | :05:28. | :05:29. | |
fault is that intervention. But there were deep fragmentation and | :05:30. | :05:36. | |
deep divisions in the Middle East anyway and as bad as the | :05:37. | :05:40. | |
intervention was, as a mistake as it was, it cannot be held to be | :05:41. | :05:43. | |
fundamental to the divisions and development in the last 13 years. I | :05:44. | :05:48. | |
am sorry, I think Chilcott shows otherwise. I think history shows | :05:49. | :05:56. | |
otherwise. If we take by yes, it is a horrible amalgam of these former | :05:57. | :06:03. | |
military leadership of Saddam and the party and people who were | :06:04. | :06:10. | |
radicalised inside American jails asked to the intervention in Iraq. I | :06:11. | :06:19. | |
think there is a reasonable conclusion that it would not have | :06:20. | :06:23. | |
existed if we had not invaded Iraq and cause them meltdown of Iraq | :06:24. | :06:28. | |
Society. We are living without consequence ever since. I often | :06:29. | :06:35. | |
think it is rather misguided of members of the Labour benches not to | :06:36. | :06:41. | |
understand that Western intervention and Western support for Saddam and | :06:42. | :06:46. | |
previous to the intervention in Iraq previous to the intervention in Iraq | :06:47. | :06:55. | |
by America and Great Britain, the long and horrible war between Iraq | :06:56. | :07:01. | |
by the west as a means of containing by the west as a means of containing | :07:02. | :07:08. | |
Iran after 1979. And that war multiplied a million for the | :07:09. | :07:14. | |
divisions between the populations of the Middle East and North Africa. We | :07:15. | :07:21. | |
are living with that. The west cannot claim it is not capable for | :07:22. | :07:25. | |
stoking up the divisions in the Middle East prior to 2003. I will | :07:26. | :07:32. | |
finish on that, Mr Speaker, my basic point is that we are not finished | :07:33. | :07:35. | |
with Chilcott and we not finished with the ramifications of what | :07:36. | :07:38. | |
happened in terms of the failure of this House and the Cabinet | :07:39. | :07:44. | |
Government to hold the executive to control. And I think I would have | :07:45. | :07:48. | |
skewed to bear that in mind in future issues when this was raised | :07:49. | :07:54. | |
in this House. The next person but I am due to call on my list is Liz | :07:55. | :08:08. | |
McInnis. Mr Speaker. Thank you. During these two days, we have heard | :08:09. | :08:11. | |
from members of all sides of the House who have contributed to | :08:12. | :08:14. | |
substantially and thoughtfully on substantially and thoughtfully on | :08:15. | :08:17. | |
controversial subjects. It has given controversial subjects. It has given | :08:18. | :08:23. | |
us the chance to have a rigorous debate, to give the subject tutor | :08:24. | :08:28. | |
for consideration and sombre reflection and I thank all my | :08:29. | :08:32. | |
colleagues about. First of all, I would like to add my own personal | :08:33. | :08:35. | |
tribute to the 179 servicemen and tribute to the 179 servicemen and | :08:36. | :08:39. | |
women who gave their lives in the Iraq war for this country while on | :08:40. | :08:45. | |
duty and I give my deepest condolences to the families from | :08:46. | :08:49. | |
whom they have been taken. The commitment to keeping our freedoms | :08:50. | :08:53. | |
and ultimately their sacrifice for the United Kingdom will not be | :08:54. | :08:56. | |
forgotten. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the 220,000 | :08:57. | :09:04. | |
personnel who served and wore the Queen's uniform overseas in no most | :09:05. | :09:09. | |
to use a duty of the southern regions and in Basra. Some of whom | :09:10. | :09:12. | |
now serve in this House, including the members of Barnsley Central, and | :09:13. | :09:15. | |
the Wells. I know the whole house the Wells. I know the whole house | :09:16. | :09:21. | |
would agree that we owe them a great deal for the service and their | :09:22. | :09:25. | |
continued public servers by bringing their expertise onto the floor of | :09:26. | :09:29. | |
this chamber. Second, I would like to thank Sir John Chilcott and his | :09:30. | :09:35. | |
team for their judo legends and frantic detailing in such a complex | :09:36. | :09:40. | |
matter. At the time of the Iraq role and the period preceding it, I was | :09:41. | :09:48. | |
not a member of this House. I was working for the NHS as a clinical | :09:49. | :09:52. | |
scientist and I can vividly remember the conversations I had with my NHS | :09:53. | :09:56. | |
colleagues around that time. People I worked with in the laboratory were | :09:57. | :10:03. | |
convinced that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons at | :10:04. | :10:08. | |
his disposal which could wipe us out in 45 minutes. There was real fear | :10:09. | :10:11. | |
amongst my friends and colleagues and many of them supported the | :10:12. | :10:15. | |
action taken by the then Prime Minister. Personally, I was very | :10:16. | :10:20. | |
dubious about the justification of war and was concerned that we were | :10:21. | :10:23. | |
being led into your action without a being led into your action without a | :10:24. | :10:27. | |
second resolution. The me, the most telling phrase of the executive | :10:28. | :10:31. | |
summary of the Chilcott report was .3 39. Which said diplomatic options | :10:32. | :10:38. | |
have not been exhausted, the point had not been reached when military | :10:39. | :10:43. | |
action was the last resort. At one point, which is awesome encrypted by | :10:44. | :10:48. | |
my honourable friend the member for Wrexham, encapsulated my feelings at | :10:49. | :10:53. | |
the time, although I do have a great delivery stacked all be thorough and | :10:54. | :10:57. | |
painstaking work done by search John Chilcott and would hope that my | :10:58. | :11:01. | |
comments are taking in the spread in which they are intended and I most | :11:02. | :11:04. | |
certainly not presenting myself as an expert in this field. | :11:05. | :11:08. | |
I did not support the Iraq war. But I do now hope that I have a better | :11:09. | :11:18. | |
understanding of the great gift difficulties that come with taking | :11:19. | :11:22. | |
these daunting but necessary decisions. Yet for me the enquiry | :11:23. | :11:27. | |
highlights and underlines the key lesson - the need to learn of the | :11:28. | :11:33. | |
grave mistake of triggering an event that we have not fully planned for | :11:34. | :11:39. | |
or have a coherent exit strategy. If we as elected members and a | :11:40. | :11:46. | |
collective legislative body are to grasp the extent of these failures, | :11:47. | :11:51. | |
now is the time. We must see the errors of Iraq and implement them in | :11:52. | :11:57. | |
today's context and that context came 13 days before the enquiry was | :11:58. | :12:02. | |
published in the formal Brexit. Some members outside the House has | :12:03. | :12:06. | |
infamously said that the public are fed up with experts and that is | :12:07. | :12:13. | |
flawed intelligence. I think now is a time the UK will need experts more | :12:14. | :12:19. | |
than ever. We now face HMO chewers and treacherous period over the next | :12:20. | :12:24. | |
coming years while negotiating our exit from the European Union. The | :12:25. | :12:28. | |
Government who called the referendum did not have a contingency plan to | :12:29. | :12:33. | |
leave the European Union, nor have the Brexiteer 's who had campaigned | :12:34. | :12:37. | |
for us to leave. Both the EU referendum and the invasion of Iraq | :12:38. | :12:44. | |
were pedals and pushed on myths truths and will miss represented | :12:45. | :12:47. | |
with a certainty which was not certified. This is we seem to have | :12:48. | :12:52. | |
entered over the two months calls post-truth politics can be traced | :12:53. | :12:58. | |
back to the hyperbole of the 45 minutes to Armageddon document which | :12:59. | :13:01. | |
warned of imminent threat from Saddam Hussein. Now is the time to | :13:02. | :13:06. | |
turn the tide of Thai raids against the truth back and that should begin | :13:07. | :13:13. | |
here in Westminster. Sir John Chilcot wrote that assessments were | :13:14. | :13:15. | |
not challenged and they should have been. He continued, despite explicit | :13:16. | :13:24. | |
warnings, the consequences of what underestimated and that inadequate | :13:25. | :13:30. | |
planning were fatal error was. Let us not now fall into the perilous | :13:31. | :13:36. | |
trap that we did 13 years ago. Some decisions cannot be reversed by | :13:37. | :13:40. | |
lessons can and should be learned from the Chilcot enquiry and the | :13:41. | :13:43. | |
parallels are here in front of us now. I would like to conclude by | :13:44. | :13:48. | |
echoing the words of Winston Churchill, plans are of little | :13:49. | :13:53. | |
importance of bad planning is essential. Thank you. I welcome the | :13:54. | :14:00. | |
opportunity to participate in this debate, on an issue which should | :14:01. | :14:04. | |
have been addressed long ago and those responsible held to account. I | :14:05. | :14:11. | |
was interested to hear the excellent speech by the member for South and | :14:12. | :14:16. | |
West and I agree with him and with the member for Gordon who are | :14:17. | :14:21. | |
calling for action in this House against Tony Blair. There is a | :14:22. | :14:24. | |
growing sense in the UK of a protected elite, above the law too | :14:25. | :14:31. | |
often because the law is drafted to permit things most of us would | :14:32. | :14:39. | |
required as unacceptable. They have seen companies stripped of assets, | :14:40. | :14:44. | |
leaving pensions underfunded and care home residents steering | :14:45. | :14:48. | |
eviction. Thanks to this report, a former Prime Minister is exposed as | :14:49. | :14:52. | |
having taken this country to war on grounds that were set in train. Tony | :14:53. | :15:00. | |
Blair's infamous memo now seems tantamount to subcontracting to | :15:01. | :15:05. | |
President Bush the decision to invade Iraq. If anywhere in the 2.6 | :15:06. | :15:14. | |
million words of search on Chilcot's report he clarifies a time when he | :15:15. | :15:18. | |
thinks Tony Blair reconciled that private commitment to war with a | :15:19. | :15:22. | |
public statement, I have yet to find it and when this House was recalled | :15:23. | :15:30. | |
in 2002 to consider Mr Blair's .co, he said then that Saddam Hussein's | :15:31. | :15:35. | |
weapons of mass destruction was active, detailed and growing. This | :15:36. | :15:40. | |
was part of a plan orchestrated to take Iraq on to the brink of war. He | :15:41. | :15:49. | |
called this his clever strategy in a paper sent to President Bush, | :15:50. | :15:52. | |
suggesting a strategy for regime change that built over time to the | :15:53. | :15:57. | |
point where military action could be taken if necessary. It seems the | :15:58. | :16:02. | |
Blair owes more to Robert Maxwell than just the opportunity to rewrite | :16:03. | :16:10. | |
evidence against him. If you're going to tell a whopper, make sure | :16:11. | :16:14. | |
you do it in plain sight and no one can accuse you of concealing | :16:15. | :16:18. | |
anything except the truth. It is instructive to remember who were the | :16:19. | :16:22. | |
cheerleaders. The enquiry notes that an editorial in the News of the | :16:23. | :16:26. | |
World claimed the glacier would be as devastating as it is vital and | :16:27. | :16:31. | |
that it would show that Saddam has enough chemical and biological | :16:32. | :16:35. | |
stocks to attack the entire planet and the Missile technology to | :16:36. | :16:39. | |
deliver them. That government planted story was a lesson in | :16:40. | :16:44. | |
building the kind of narrative that dossier was aimed to back up by a | :16:45. | :16:48. | |
Prime Minister intent on feeling the hand of history on his shoulder. | :16:49. | :16:52. | |
Instead of the hand of history, it is surely right that the hind of | :16:53. | :16:56. | |
Parliament lands on Mr Blair's shoulder and returns him to this | :16:57. | :17:02. | |
House to recount this legacy. The US strategy for Iraq was described in | :17:03. | :17:10. | |
2001 as to leave Iraq unstable and chaotic so it does not pose a | :17:11. | :17:15. | |
powerful threat in the region. 13 years later, it is an deed -- indeed | :17:16. | :17:25. | |
unstable and chaotic. These consequences cast a long shadow over | :17:26. | :17:30. | |
our age and will not be easily forgiven or forgotten. At the heart | :17:31. | :17:34. | |
of this decision-making process we were sending the men and women of | :17:35. | :17:39. | |
our Armed Forces into conflict. It is incumbent on the Government and | :17:40. | :17:43. | |
the defence staff to ensure troops sent into battle are properly | :17:44. | :17:48. | |
equipped for the task and their welfare giving due consideration. I | :17:49. | :17:53. | |
was disappointed to hear general Sir Mike Jackson's comments on the | :17:54. | :17:58. | |
inadequacy of the equipment available to the Armed Forces, | :17:59. | :18:03. | |
saying simply, we had what we had, because the MOD had not been given | :18:04. | :18:18. | |
the Green light to obtain equipment. The evidence is that the Government | :18:19. | :18:24. | |
wantonly ran ahead of the service's capacity to deliver without being | :18:25. | :18:30. | |
overstretched. No self-respecting commander would want his forces on | :18:31. | :18:36. | |
the battlefield without adequate protection. That is what the | :18:37. | :18:40. | |
Government did require of the troops. The National Audit Office | :18:41. | :18:44. | |
reported major deficiencies in the supply of these protective suits, | :18:45. | :18:50. | |
vapour detector kits and a shortfall in tactical nerve agent detection | :18:51. | :18:56. | |
systems. The Defence Secretary reassured members there was at least | :18:57. | :19:01. | |
one nuclear and biological suit for all personnel. If the risk of | :19:02. | :19:06. | |
chemical or biological weapons was taken seriously, many more suits | :19:07. | :19:11. | |
would have been required and in reality, personnel were given suits | :19:12. | :19:14. | |
that did not fit and the MoD noted that troops and equipment were in | :19:15. | :19:23. | |
the same country but not necessarily in close proximity. Why did it take | :19:24. | :19:32. | |
the MOD until weeks before a department to find the protective | :19:33. | :19:39. | |
gear was in short supply? The evidence given by Gordon Brown | :19:40. | :19:42. | |
highlights the financing assumptions for the MOD. They are funded to be | :19:43. | :19:47. | |
ready in case there is military action. The costs are meant by the | :19:48. | :19:55. | |
Treasury. Some of the kit needed in Iraq could have been bought for the | :19:56. | :20:01. | |
1991 Gulf War and appears to have been untouched. How many more items | :20:02. | :20:06. | |
on the infantry are in such condition? Combat critical items | :20:07. | :20:11. | |
needed to be procured at the last minute but no one was authorised to | :20:12. | :20:18. | |
start that until Tony Blair will give the go-ahead. Days before the | :20:19. | :20:24. | |
invasion, in the name of accounting orthodoxy, we like basic items. | :20:25. | :20:28. | |
Clearly these are key issues to bear in mind in our debate next week on | :20:29. | :20:33. | |
the issue of Trident. How can it be that a defence budget that can | :20:34. | :20:37. | |
barely sustain basic equipment and is based on ever declining personnel | :20:38. | :20:42. | |
numbers can stretch to accommodate the UK's own weapons of mass | :20:43. | :20:48. | |
destruction. The other way the MOD overstretch is their budget is to | :20:49. | :20:54. | |
overstretch our armed services. The House will note that the report | :20:55. | :20:58. | |
highlights considerable overstretch on the army throughout the Iraq war. | :20:59. | :21:02. | |
This UK Government aims to reduce the strength of the regular army by | :21:03. | :21:08. | |
2020 by an amount virtually the same as the initial land force deployment | :21:09. | :21:13. | |
in Iraq. Clearly with such a reduction, the potential for | :21:14. | :21:15. | |
overstretch has increased considerably. Yet the computerised | :21:16. | :21:21. | |
personnel system introduced in 2007 makes it now impossible to measure | :21:22. | :21:26. | |
overstretch. I would like to close by considering the Armed Forces | :21:27. | :21:30. | |
waiting in Kuwait for word to move into Iraq. Among them the officers | :21:31. | :21:35. | |
and men of the Black Watch. In action, soldiers walk around many | :21:36. | :21:39. | |
problems posed by the failure of others, however there must be a | :21:40. | :21:45. | |
special contempt for top brass who dodge responsibility for poor kit. | :21:46. | :21:49. | |
Three days into the Iraq war, the chain gun on a well lit armoured | :21:50. | :21:56. | |
vehicle caused serious injuries. In the face of compelling contrary | :21:57. | :22:03. | |
evidence, senior evidence tee officers blame to the warrior. | :22:04. | :22:13. | |
Senior officers held a board of enquiry in secret and pointed the | :22:14. | :22:18. | |
finger of blame once more. The MOD caved in and settled out of court. | :22:19. | :22:25. | |
Nevertheless, I am now told BMA do will do nothing to reserve the | :22:26. | :22:29. | |
self-serving findings from its records. Captain Henderson allowed | :22:30. | :22:33. | |
me to highlight his fight for justice. I will raise the | :22:34. | :22:40. | |
opportunity more fully after recess but those who served in Iraq face | :22:41. | :22:44. | |
such injustice when those responsible face no justice at all. | :22:45. | :22:54. | |
It is an honour to follow the honourable member. I don't agree | :22:55. | :23:00. | |
necessarily with all her settlements but agree with many of the angles | :23:01. | :23:06. | |
and points she is making. The Chilcot report was sombre and | :23:07. | :23:10. | |
sobering reading. I am glad it was commissioned. I welcome the openers | :23:11. | :23:15. | |
that is in it and the debate and I wonder what I would have done had I | :23:16. | :23:20. | |
been here booting. For those of you that don't know, in this House that | :23:21. | :23:26. | |
I was a serviceman until Minety native for. But I do feel we should | :23:27. | :23:35. | |
always show our sympathy to the armed personnel who served, | :23:36. | :23:38. | |
especially those that lost their lives or were injured but also to | :23:39. | :23:41. | |
those in the Middle East still suffering from it today. We are all | :23:42. | :23:47. | |
proud of how well respected the Armed Forces are the world over. We | :23:48. | :23:53. | |
were always brought up to use whatever equipment we were given and | :23:54. | :23:57. | |
to do the best with it. But if we are to learn the lessons from | :23:58. | :24:03. | |
Chilcot, that is what we must learn from it, that there is a point that | :24:04. | :24:09. | |
the equipment, if it is no good, we cannot do our job and so by first | :24:10. | :24:15. | |
point is to ask the Ministry of Defence, the defence minister, will | :24:16. | :24:21. | |
we make sure that senior officers, naval officers and RAAF officers are | :24:22. | :24:24. | |
allowed to speak out so there is never any feeling, whether it is | :24:25. | :24:31. | |
political pressure, that they are able to speak out early and to be | :24:32. | :24:35. | |
listened to. Sometimes I feel everyone when they reach the top, | :24:36. | :24:40. | |
they feel they are not controlled, that they cannot speak out and say | :24:41. | :24:43. | |
what is needed and it seems evident in this enquiry that that may have | :24:44. | :24:52. | |
been behind certain decisions. Another key area I would like to see | :24:53. | :24:56. | |
us learning from is the influence of the press. We're always told it is | :24:57. | :25:03. | |
dangerous to criticise pressed but they must examine themselves, they | :25:04. | :25:07. | |
must look to see how much of what went wrong in Iraq was due to their | :25:08. | :25:11. | |
pressure and at the same time we must look at how we use the press | :25:12. | :25:16. | |
and how senior members pushed the pressed to do what they want. There | :25:17. | :25:21. | |
must be more openness so that people can feel that they can put a size. I | :25:22. | :25:27. | |
was lucky enough to visit Iraq last year, to visit the curbs and when | :25:28. | :25:31. | |
you see the internationally displaced peoples and all that is | :25:32. | :25:36. | |
going on, we know from the Chilcot report that we did not properly | :25:37. | :25:40. | |
prepare what was meant to happen afterwards but we have a due tea and | :25:41. | :25:44. | |
we do do some of it and there is good foreign aid going there but the | :25:45. | :25:51. | |
IDPs need to have a legal status, they need to be properly resourced | :25:52. | :25:55. | |
and looked after and we need to continually try and make up for the | :25:56. | :25:59. | |
mess we have left there. Those are the key issues I want to leave | :26:00. | :26:04. | |
everyone with today. But I do thought it is right that this House | :26:05. | :26:08. | |
always look at the place of the UK in the world and we did not deal | :26:09. | :26:14. | |
with things in Rwanda and made the early enough in Syria and we should | :26:15. | :26:19. | |
always look at our key players in the world, take our rightful place | :26:20. | :26:20. | |
but follow the wishes of this House. It has been a great pleasure or | :26:21. | :26:36. | |
privilege should I choose add better word to sit through the entire | :26:37. | :26:40. | |
debate today and much of yesterday, particularly thing to the honourable | :26:41. | :26:45. | |
members who've been here since 2003 and many cases before that in the | :26:46. | :26:51. | |
lead up to the Iraq conflict. One thing that I've noticed about many | :26:52. | :26:55. | |
of the contributions from the people who have been here for this length | :26:56. | :26:59. | |
of time is the way in which some of the emotions are still raw, they | :27:00. | :27:02. | |
still feel lately in all sense of the House the way in which they were | :27:03. | :27:09. | |
led into voting for that conflict or the way in which they had to delve | :27:10. | :27:16. | |
around to find the truth before deciding how they were going to | :27:17. | :27:20. | |
vote. I think any reasonable reading of the Chilcott report would | :27:21. | :27:26. | |
conclude that it is certainly the case that this parliament was never | :27:27. | :27:32. | |
given at any stage the whole truth, nor the on avoid truth about what | :27:33. | :27:39. | |
was in preparation. Indeed, as I was listening to many of the | :27:40. | :27:43. | |
honourable gentleman, the chair of honourable gentleman, the chair of | :27:44. | :27:47. | |
the defence committee and others, I broke down a few words in trying to | :27:48. | :27:55. | |
summarise his own and also the honourable member from south and | :27:56. | :28:00. | |
east, if my memory is correctly, how it might summarise some of their | :28:01. | :28:03. | |
points. The words I noted down without the primers that the time | :28:04. | :28:08. | |
didn't seem to allow the evidence, the analysis or expert opinion to | :28:09. | :28:15. | |
get in the way of his intuition or pre-chosen narrative and I think the | :28:16. | :28:22. | |
me that is the centre of much of the issue today, the way in which there | :28:23. | :28:28. | |
was a denial to expose the truth of the matter that was known at the | :28:29. | :28:35. | |
time. As this House knows, a total of 179 bridges personnel were killed | :28:36. | :28:42. | |
in the Iraq conflict. What is best while knowing that is that according | :28:43. | :28:46. | |
to the Ministry of Defence, there were a total of 5970 casualties, | :28:47. | :28:52. | |
including deaths are two July 2000 and nine. I pay tribute to their | :28:53. | :28:58. | |
courage and I hope above all, we do right for those left with the | :28:59. | :29:02. | |
mental injuries that they continue mental injuries that they continue | :29:03. | :29:09. | |
to ensure. I will give way. Thank you. Would he agree and I speak as | :29:10. | :29:16. | |
the wife of a former member as Armed Forces personnel it is particularly | :29:17. | :29:26. | |
important for the families, Steven Ferguson, who lost his leg, 831, | :29:27. | :29:31. | |
sorry but special have special tribute to him. I thank you for that | :29:32. | :29:36. | |
integration and I'm sure we all wish to pay tribute to the constituent | :29:37. | :29:43. | |
she names. I think the people who are living now with the consequences | :29:44. | :29:48. | |
and living with these appalling injuries, they need support and care | :29:49. | :29:54. | |
that they also develop the truth and justice. I have heard one or two | :29:55. | :30:02. | |
members in the course of the last two days wondering if it is a waste | :30:03. | :30:03. | |
of time to hold the previous Prime of time to hold the previous Prime | :30:04. | :30:08. | |
Minister to account. The way in which I would phrase that is justice | :30:09. | :30:17. | |
ever a waste of time? I think not. I was not a member of this House in | :30:18. | :30:22. | |
2003 like some people, I oppose the war at the time that many people | :30:23. | :30:27. | |
supported the war. I have not had time to read the whole of the | :30:28. | :30:32. | |
report, I have not been a good enough speed reading course to | :30:33. | :30:36. | |
accomplish that. I have made an attempt to focus on a few issues | :30:37. | :30:41. | |
that I am particularly interested in. Not least because I'm the chair | :30:42. | :30:47. | |
of the APPG for explosive weapons, and interested in summer because the | :30:48. | :30:52. | |
gritters of conflict and therefore interesting from that point of view | :30:53. | :30:56. | |
on issues such as reconstruction and prepare a nurse for the aftermath. | :30:57. | :31:02. | |
As Sarah 's UK troops poured into Iraq on the 20th of March, 2003, | :31:03. | :31:08. | |
what we now know is that the ill-conceived hope in Whitehall was | :31:09. | :31:13. | |
a quick victory over the regime of Saddam Hussein followed by a | :31:14. | :31:20. | |
relatively benign security environment which of course never | :31:21. | :31:24. | |
exists. The victory in terms of the immediate conflict unleashed | :31:25. | :31:31. | |
people have estimated 250,000 miles people have estimated 250,000 miles | :31:32. | :31:35. | |
or more. It should not have been a surprise. As Chilcott argues, UK | :31:36. | :31:42. | |
hopes were exposed as hopelessly vague, under resourced and contacted | :31:43. | :31:49. | |
by a complete Government planning failure. Indeed the report finds | :31:50. | :31:53. | |
that the UK Government plans were adequate, wholly inadequate. For | :31:54. | :32:00. | |
this failing, Sir John Chilcott particularly criticise the door of | :32:01. | :32:06. | |
Tony Blair, saying again, I quite, he did not ensure that there was a | :32:07. | :32:09. | |
flexible, realistic and fully resourced plan that integrated UK | :32:10. | :32:14. | |
military and civilian contributions and addressed the non-risks. Yet | :32:15. | :32:22. | |
before the troops rolled in, on February 2003, the joint | :32:23. | :32:25. | |
intelligence committee, the overarching body bringing together | :32:26. | :32:31. | |
the agencies such as MI6 concluded that the broader threat from Islamic | :32:32. | :32:37. | |
terrorists will also increase in the event of war, reflecting intensified | :32:38. | :32:44. | |
anti-US, anti-Western sentiment in anti-US, anti-Western sentiment in | :32:45. | :32:45. | |
the Muslim world, including amongst the Muslim world, including amongst | :32:46. | :32:50. | |
Muslim committees in the west. A little over two years later, and | :32:51. | :32:56. | |
this very city would become the target of the 77 attacks. There has | :32:57. | :33:04. | |
been a reluctance to accept any link with the invasion of Iraq despite | :33:05. | :33:07. | |
the intelligence that was given years earlier. I have at times, | :33:08. | :33:14. | |
before becoming an MP, worked in places that have suffered from | :33:15. | :33:18. | |
earlier conflicts, Albion not to the same extent as Iraq. There is | :33:19. | :33:24. | |
absolutely no shortage of historical information showing that severe | :33:25. | :33:29. | |
conflicts through our not merely economic infrastructure and security | :33:30. | :33:32. | |
challenges that cultural challenges to. Sometimes seen in the scheduling | :33:33. | :33:38. | |
of sectarian attachment of many sorts. This regard, Sir John found | :33:39. | :33:44. | |
that the UK Government had completely fell to appreciate the | :33:45. | :33:48. | |
magnitude of the task of stabilising, administrating and | :33:49. | :33:56. | |
reconstructing Iraq. He commented as well that impose conflict in Iraq | :33:57. | :34:00. | |
never match the scale of the challenge. Whitehall departments and | :34:01. | :34:05. | |
the ministers failed to but collectively behind the task. What | :34:06. | :34:12. | |
may have begun as a failure of leadership by a few had become a | :34:13. | :34:17. | |
collective failure of the entire Government. Indeed, what has become | :34:18. | :34:22. | |
clear is that there was one central strand to UK strategy post-conflict | :34:23. | :34:27. | |
and it was to lead Iraq as soon as possible. As Sir John Pittard, in | :34:28. | :34:39. | |
practice, the UK's most strategic in relation to Iraq, was to reduce its | :34:40. | :34:42. | |
level at the point forces. The report found that the Government had | :34:43. | :34:45. | |
built to protect its troops with appropriate kit and vehicles that my | :34:46. | :34:51. | |
honourable friend has explained a short time ago. It failed to act on | :34:52. | :34:57. | |
dangers faced by our troops such as the user as IED 's, the immediate | :34:58. | :35:05. | |
appropriate armed vehicles with the appropriate armed vehicles with | :35:06. | :35:07. | |
appropriate case and the troops do appropriate case and the troops do | :35:08. | :35:13. | |
not have sufficient resources to conduct simultaneous long-term | :35:14. | :35:16. | |
operations in Iraq and discover some from 2006 onwards. On Monday of this | :35:17. | :35:24. | |
week, I was in discussions with senior staff at Imperial College is | :35:25. | :35:27. | |
Centre for blast injuries and was surprised to hear the leg learn that | :35:28. | :35:35. | |
as far back as the 1970s and the conflict as it was known at the time | :35:36. | :35:40. | |
there were reports and studies undertaken that demonstrated to the | :35:41. | :35:44. | |
MoD at the time what they needed to do to upgrade and have better | :35:45. | :35:47. | |
equipment for armed personnel in equipment for armed personnel in | :35:48. | :35:53. | |
such types of conflict. At that time, the lessons were ignored. What | :35:54. | :35:59. | |
we mustn't have this time is the lessons being ignored from Chilcott. | :36:00. | :36:09. | |
Because if I return... I am grateful to the honourable gentleman who is | :36:10. | :36:13. | |
making the most interesting speech. May I just remind him of the point | :36:14. | :36:22. | |
that I raised in July 2003 which was there is not a failure and that is | :36:23. | :36:26. | |
that 13 days after the fall of Baghdad, it was still possible for | :36:27. | :36:33. | |
journalists to go into the gutted headquarters of the Iraqi Foreign | :36:34. | :36:36. | |
Ministry and intelligence services and pick up classified documents | :36:37. | :36:40. | |
that were available for anyone to take away and you would have thought | :36:41. | :36:41. | |
that if one were so determined to that if one were so determined to | :36:42. | :36:48. | |
other matters, those ministries and other matters, those ministries and | :36:49. | :36:52. | |
agencies headquarters should have been the first targets to be | :36:53. | :36:58. | |
searched by a intelligence teams. I think the honourable member makes a | :36:59. | :37:02. | |
wonderful telling point. I particularly like your phrase in one | :37:03. | :37:07. | |
word, if. If they had been interested in finding out the truth | :37:08. | :37:11. | |
about weapons of mass destruction they would have been they would have | :37:12. | :37:15. | |
care of much earlier. The fact that care of much earlier. The fact that | :37:16. | :37:20. | |
there was no planning to do that tells its own tail, I feel. If I | :37:21. | :37:28. | |
returned however to my opening points about the people who are | :37:29. | :37:31. | |
still alive today who have suffered some of the terrible injuries of | :37:32. | :37:36. | |
that conflict, I would like to end with your permission, Mr Speaker, a | :37:37. | :37:40. | |
quote from the British medical Journal as only two days ago and it | :37:41. | :37:46. | |
read this. No matter how good the short-term care, nothing will remove | :37:47. | :37:53. | |
the injuring attacks of the deaths and the physical and psychological | :37:54. | :37:57. | |
injuries, the true legacy of the conflict for individuals and wider | :37:58. | :38:04. | |
society NBC or UK anorak may not be evident for many years to come. It | :38:05. | :38:11. | |
is because of that we need to learn all the lessons that are to be | :38:12. | :38:19. | |
learned and we need to go to Iraq that track hold those two account to | :38:20. | :38:27. | |
deserve to be held to account. In order to put on the record the | :38:28. | :38:31. | |
thanks of members in this chamber that the fact that you have that do | :38:32. | :38:34. | |
this debate from the very beginning that the whole two days and no doubt | :38:35. | :38:39. | |
is very appreciated by the members of the hall. I'm extremely grateful | :38:40. | :38:46. | |
to the honourable gentleman for his point of order which obviously was | :38:47. | :38:50. | |
unsolicited that is something that I'm very grateful and I thank | :38:51. | :38:54. | |
colleagues for their response. As prime concern, it is just a matter | :38:55. | :38:58. | |
of duty. I feel it is important that they want to hear what people have | :38:59. | :39:01. | |
to say. It is my privilege to hear colleagues. Thank you. My honourable | :39:02. | :39:08. | |
friend took the words out of my mouth in terms of your presence | :39:09. | :39:12. | |
here. I would like to think in terms of the debate when we have one in | :39:13. | :39:16. | |
this House, the quality of that debate. You get an idea of how good | :39:17. | :39:20. | |
it has been one we all have been nodding vigorously no matter which | :39:21. | :39:23. | |
side of the House the boys have been made and I think this has happened | :39:24. | :39:27. | |
quite a lot over the last two days. Mr Speaker, I am honoured to be the | :39:28. | :39:35. | |
debate on the side of the opposition. I hope the whole house | :39:36. | :39:39. | |
will join me in congratulating solar John Talbot and his assets. He did a | :39:40. | :39:43. | |
fair amount of flak in the lengthy writing of it but it seems clear to | :39:44. | :39:47. | |
me that has been worth the wait. This report is in the very highest | :39:48. | :39:51. | |
and noblest traditions of our countries. It has shone a light upon | :39:52. | :39:56. | |
crucial decisions made by our leaders and on how those decisions | :39:57. | :40:00. | |
were made. It has not ducked from shining the light at the very | :40:01. | :40:04. | |
highest levels of a garment, indeed at the very top. It would be naive | :40:05. | :40:09. | |
to oppose back complete openness is always possible and Government, | :40:10. | :40:14. | |
especially the matters as grave is going to war. Nonetheless, openness | :40:15. | :40:18. | |
would ensure that our policies have a firm moral foundation. As a great | :40:19. | :40:24. | |
American journalist once said, if the broad like they could be let in | :40:25. | :40:28. | |
upon men's actions, it would purify them as the sun disinfects. This | :40:29. | :40:32. | |
report has let some light in an much the same. It is the most concert | :40:33. | :40:41. | |
offensive and devastating critique we have ever had of the individual, | :40:42. | :40:46. | |
collective and systemic errors that added up to failure in Iraq. As | :40:47. | :40:50. | |
belly of those consequences we are still dealing with and will have to | :40:51. | :40:51. | |
deal with for many years to come. I would like to pay to view to some | :40:52. | :41:02. | |
of the comments made by members. Over the two days, we have had | :41:03. | :41:10. | |
contributions from the member on the opportunities the report provides to | :41:11. | :41:17. | |
learn lessons for the future. The member emphasise the need for more | :41:18. | :41:20. | |
to be seen as a last resort and the honourable member who spoke with | :41:21. | :41:29. | |
particular insight about some of the legal questions involved in the | :41:30. | :41:33. | |
decision to go to war and about the failures of intelligence in the case | :41:34. | :41:37. | |
of Iraq. That issue was raised by my honourable friend who has served as | :41:38. | :41:45. | |
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and speaks with | :41:46. | :41:49. | |
some authority on these issues. Problems with military equipment | :41:50. | :41:55. | |
were also raised by many members. As well as what I thought was one of | :41:56. | :42:02. | |
the finest speeches on this debate made by the honourable member for | :42:03. | :42:08. | |
Plymouth. While the member for Salisbury and Leeds Central were | :42:09. | :42:12. | |
among the many contributors to yesterday's debate, who spoke about | :42:13. | :42:17. | |
the lack of adequate planning for the post-war reconstructive face. | :42:18. | :42:22. | |
The same mistake was repeated in Libya when the Government spent 13 | :42:23. | :42:27. | |
times more on the military campaign than it did on post-war | :42:28. | :42:32. | |
reconstruction. The case was made for better leadership on such | :42:33. | :42:36. | |
matters and that this House learned from the Iraq report to build public | :42:37. | :42:42. | |
trust in politics, politicians and the big decisions will inevitably | :42:43. | :42:46. | |
must make on their behalf. The knowledgeable and honourable member | :42:47. | :42:51. | |
for New Forest East who reminded us how the many tribal and religious | :42:52. | :42:59. | |
hatreds and released by the war did not require hindsight to predict. As | :43:00. | :43:03. | |
members of this House, we are elected to act in good faith but | :43:04. | :43:10. | |
also with good judgment. And finally, the speech I felt best | :43:11. | :43:14. | |
captured my personal anxieties were that for the honourable member for | :43:15. | :43:20. | |
Basildon and Billericay. He spoke of the need for a more holistic | :43:21. | :43:24. | |
approach to defence in both soft and hard power and warning us that the | :43:25. | :43:30. | |
continual budget cuts to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office undermines | :43:31. | :43:34. | |
our ability to react and respond to global security threats but to | :43:35. | :43:39. | |
pre-empt them as well. I want in particular to focus on two topics | :43:40. | :43:44. | |
that stand out to me. Civilian casualties and equipment failures. | :43:45. | :43:51. | |
Sir John estimates there were at least 150,000 Iraqi fatalities but | :43:52. | :43:55. | |
he also suggests that number was probably much higher. A proper | :43:56. | :43:59. | |
assessment of likely civilian casualties was not made before the | :44:00. | :44:05. | |
invasion and that there was no systematic recording of casualties | :44:06. | :44:10. | |
even after the war had started. He reports that more time was devoted | :44:11. | :44:15. | |
to the question of which department should have responsibility for the | :44:16. | :44:19. | |
issue of civilian casualties than it was to effort to determine the | :44:20. | :44:26. | |
actual number. Today it seems that Whitehall is yet to learn from this | :44:27. | :44:32. | |
mistake. In the campaign against Daesh, the Government in this not a | :44:33. | :44:35. | |
single civilian life has been lost in almost two years of air strikes. | :44:36. | :44:41. | |
This seems literally incredible. Ministers give cryptic answers to | :44:42. | :44:45. | |
questions about how they assess the damage caused by air strikes, how | :44:46. | :44:49. | |
they distinguished combat and is and what they mean when they say they | :44:50. | :44:53. | |
will consider all edible reports of civilian loss of life. I would urge | :44:54. | :45:02. | |
the Secretary of State to look again at how his department monitors and | :45:03. | :45:05. | |
collate information on civilian casualties. The exposure of | :45:06. | :45:12. | |
equipment failures is one of the gravest findings of this report. | :45:13. | :45:17. | |
Chilcot sheds new light by documenting the sheer scale of the | :45:18. | :45:21. | |
problem. There were shortages not just of helicopters and armoured | :45:22. | :45:27. | |
vehicles, shortages with terrible consequences. Day after day we saw | :45:28. | :45:32. | |
snatched land Rovers, blown to bits. There was also shortages of | :45:33. | :45:39. | |
uniforms, boots and toilet paper. Some units had to borrow Russians | :45:40. | :45:44. | |
from the Americans and one unit became known as the brothers. It is | :45:45. | :45:51. | |
a disgrace that they were sent there so woefully prepared. Whilst we | :45:52. | :45:57. | |
understand it is literally impossible to plan for every | :45:58. | :46:03. | |
equipment need in contingency, we can never again let such | :46:04. | :46:06. | |
catastrophic failure occur. I would like it to pay a very personal | :46:07. | :46:11. | |
tribute to the families of our troops who died for their dog-eared | :46:12. | :46:20. | |
assistance of the truth. Their stuff fastness was heroic and I owe them a | :46:21. | :46:27. | |
very deep debt of gratitude. We got the kit, their sons and daughters | :46:28. | :46:33. | |
didn't and I will never forget the commitment to this cause that they | :46:34. | :46:38. | |
showed. It undoubtedly saved many lives and I hope that knowledge can | :46:39. | :46:43. | |
bring them some small consolation. I have spoken of some of the specific | :46:44. | :46:48. | |
failings that this report identifies. But I must also speak of | :46:49. | :46:53. | |
the much wider failings that a report of this scale makes clear. | :46:54. | :46:58. | |
The failure of this House to sufficiently hold the executive to | :46:59. | :47:02. | |
account on matters as grave as taking this country to war. Chilcot | :47:03. | :47:07. | |
tells us we must never allow a rush to war to blind us to fax or their | :47:08. | :47:11. | |
absence. We must never allow a debate to close down with the snide | :47:12. | :47:16. | |
invitations of lack of Patrick isn't with the kind of macho posturing -- | :47:17. | :47:30. | |
patriotism. The guardianship of this country's future and the future | :47:31. | :47:34. | |
safety of the world are not issues which require the bravado of | :47:35. | :47:40. | |
adolescence but mature wisdom. A readiness to accept that every voice | :47:41. | :47:44. | |
in this chamber is worthy of our fullest respect because they have | :47:45. | :47:49. | |
been sent here as representatives of the British people in all their | :47:50. | :47:53. | |
variety and complexity. We all speak for Britain here. If we speak again | :47:54. | :48:01. | |
the rush to bomb the odious government of President Assad, we | :48:02. | :48:05. | |
should not be derided as supporters of the Assad regime and that went | :48:06. | :48:09. | |
just two years later we are told we must now bomb president said's | :48:10. | :48:16. | |
enemies and we ask, how will that achieve our aims, we must not be | :48:17. | :48:21. | |
told we are soft on terrorism. We demand evidence of a coherent | :48:22. | :48:25. | |
long-term plan, backed with sufficient resources to achieve it | :48:26. | :48:32. | |
lasting peace. I am not a pacifist. My grandfather whom -- was a power | :48:33. | :48:45. | |
shooter -- para cheaper. I demand the proof for taking our country to | :48:46. | :48:49. | |
war. These are matters of life and death. The British people deserve | :48:50. | :48:54. | |
better than political posturing. Similarly, if we cannot accept the | :48:55. | :49:00. | |
consequences of our actions, we cannot learn the lessons and we | :49:01. | :49:04. | |
cannot make wiser choices in future. I hope when we discuss issues of the | :49:05. | :49:11. | |
gravest possible importance, that of Britain's nuclear capability, this | :49:12. | :49:17. | |
House will do so in the spirit of humility and awareness of our | :49:18. | :49:21. | |
shortcomings. When we are making choices of such gravity, we must | :49:22. | :49:24. | |
speak with the best part of ourselves and not stoop to political | :49:25. | :49:29. | |
point scoring. To conclude, if I may now owned by quoting the words of | :49:30. | :49:35. | |
the former Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook. In his resignation speech, he | :49:36. | :49:40. | |
said, the longer I have served in this place, the greater respect I | :49:41. | :49:44. | |
have for the good sense and collective wisdom of the British | :49:45. | :49:49. | |
people. On Iraq, I've believe the prevailing mood of the British | :49:50. | :49:54. | |
people is sound. They do not doubt that Saddam is a brutal dictator | :49:55. | :49:58. | |
that they are not persuaded that he is a clear and present danger to | :49:59. | :50:04. | |
Britain. They want inspections to be given a chance and they suspect they | :50:05. | :50:08. | |
are being pushed too quickly into conflict by a US administration of | :50:09. | :50:23. | |
-- with an agenda of its own. There it is in a nutshell. We went to war | :50:24. | :50:27. | |
without the support of international alliances, institutions or our | :50:28. | :50:33. | |
allies. Without sufficient evidence, without support of the British | :50:34. | :50:38. | |
people. Some members saw that and they are to be congratulated for | :50:39. | :50:42. | |
their honesty and integrity in saying so at the time. We were | :50:43. | :50:46. | |
railroaded into war, that was shameful and it must not happen | :50:47. | :50:58. | |
again. This has indeed been a considered and moving to bait as | :50:59. | :51:03. | |
befits such a serious subject over the last two days. More than 50 | :51:04. | :51:08. | |
members have contributed and I would like to join them in thanking Sir | :51:09. | :51:13. | |
John and his colleagues, including the late Sir Martin Gilbert for | :51:14. | :51:16. | |
their immense efforts. They have produced a report which I think we | :51:17. | :51:23. | |
all agree is comprehensive, accurate and is an unvarnished record of the | :51:24. | :51:28. | |
events and they have been unremitting in their efforts to | :51:29. | :51:32. | |
understand the causes and consequences of the Iraq war and its | :51:33. | :51:37. | |
aftermath. We are all in bed debt. I also hope that members of the Armed | :51:38. | :51:43. | |
Forces and their families are able to find some measure of consolation | :51:44. | :51:48. | |
in the report's acknowledgement of that enormous service and our | :51:49. | :51:53. | |
thoughts remain with them. We should bear in mind what Sir John says | :51:54. | :51:58. | |
about the efforts of the men and women of the Armed Forces that the | :51:59. | :52:02. | |
initial war fighting phase was a military success. They did fight to | :52:03. | :52:08. | |
help topple a tyrant who had murdered hundreds of thousands of | :52:09. | :52:12. | |
his own people and the subsequent failures in the campaign wherever | :52:13. | :52:18. | |
else they are laid cannot and should not be laid at the door of those who | :52:19. | :52:23. | |
did the fighting on our behalf. However, Sir John also makes clear | :52:24. | :52:31. | |
that the United Kingdom did not achieve its overall strategic | :52:32. | :52:33. | |
objectives in Iraq. There were too many challenges into many different | :52:34. | :52:38. | |
areas. There was a lack of leadership, across government and | :52:39. | :52:46. | |
there was too much groupthink within our military, security and | :52:47. | :52:50. | |
intelligence cultures that stops short of challenging key decisions, | :52:51. | :52:55. | |
a point that has been made many times over the last couple of days. | :52:56. | :53:01. | |
There was flawed intelligence which led to assertions, particularly | :53:02. | :53:07. | |
around WMD, that could not be justified. There was a fatal lack of | :53:08. | :53:12. | |
post-war planning and lessons from previous complex and exercises had | :53:13. | :53:19. | |
not been properly learned. They also failed as the campaign unravelled to | :53:20. | :53:25. | |
adapt to the changing situation on the ground and the wares, the | :53:26. | :53:31. | |
honourable member for East when Fletcher listed in some detail, | :53:32. | :53:37. | |
there were significant equipment shortfalls for our troops. There was | :53:38. | :53:43. | |
much in that campaign that we must try whatever else we do to avoid in | :53:44. | :53:49. | |
future. It is not going to be possible for me to refer to every | :53:50. | :53:53. | |
single speech that has been made over the last couple of days, the | :53:54. | :53:58. | |
honourable member for Norwich South picked out some of the more | :53:59. | :54:02. | |
memorable ones. We have speeches of anger, speeches of divorce. We have | :54:03. | :54:09. | |
also had thought provoking speeches about the overall effect of the Iraq | :54:10. | :54:14. | |
war on our processes and on our political culture. We have heard | :54:15. | :54:18. | |
speeches from those who played significant roles at the time the | :54:19. | :54:23. | |
right honourable member for Derby South spoke very illuminating Lee on | :54:24. | :54:33. | |
the need for humidity, that how so many of those involved | :54:34. | :54:36. | |
professionally were able to come to the same conclusions without | :54:37. | :54:40. | |
properly challenging the culture involved. The member for Rushcliffe | :54:41. | :54:50. | |
spoke of the drive to converge our views with those of the United | :54:51. | :54:57. | |
States. The member for Leeds Central and Sutton Coldfield underline the | :54:58. | :55:02. | |
importance of planning for reconstruction in any military | :55:03. | :55:06. | |
action and the House also had the benefit of the military experience | :55:07. | :55:15. | |
of the member for Tunbridge and Plymouth. I also was particularly | :55:16. | :55:21. | |
struck by the speech from the member for Wolverhampton South East who did | :55:22. | :55:26. | |
remind the House that Islamic terrorism did not start in 2003. It | :55:27. | :55:31. | |
was there long before and there were other countries also engaged in | :55:32. | :55:37. | |
trying to deal with it. The question I think the House has to ask itself | :55:38. | :55:44. | |
is given we all want to avoid this happening in the future, have their | :55:45. | :55:48. | |
already been sufficient and significant changes for the better? | :55:49. | :55:53. | |
I think and I would like to suggest to the House that there have been | :55:54. | :55:55. | |
some changes for the better. We are better coordinated. We now | :55:56. | :56:05. | |
have the national Security Council that ensures the decision-making is | :56:06. | :56:09. | |
taken and dealt with in a joined up way across Government. The National | :56:10. | :56:15. | |
Security Council includes not only ministers from the main departments | :56:16. | :56:19. | |
but the chief independent staff and the chairman of the joint | :56:20. | :56:24. | |
intelligence committee, the heads of the intelligence services, the | :56:25. | :56:27. | |
relative senior officials and the relative senior officials and the | :56:28. | :56:28. | |
Attorney General. Of course. I am Attorney General. Of course. I am | :56:29. | :56:35. | |
very grateful. He's just listed the membership of the National Security | :56:36. | :56:39. | |
Council and while it is revealing that all the intelligence services | :56:40. | :56:44. | |
are individually represented, it is the fact that all the Armed Forces | :56:45. | :56:49. | |
are represented only by the Chief of the defence staff and will he give | :56:50. | :56:53. | |
future consideration to the suggestion of the Defence Select | :56:54. | :56:58. | |
Committee that the chief of staff committee could more usefully serve | :56:59. | :57:03. | |
it they were constituted as the military sub committee of the NSC | :57:04. | :57:09. | |
and future? My honourable friend's speech earlier today when he made | :57:10. | :57:13. | |
that point at some length and I would caution him against over | :57:14. | :57:19. | |
complicating the structure that we have in setting up the subcommittees | :57:20. | :57:23. | |
of it. The Armed Forces are represented to the Chief of the | :57:24. | :57:29. | |
defence staff that has not only good national-security council itself | :57:30. | :57:31. | |
that the visuals meeting that precedes it. It is the council where | :57:32. | :57:41. | |
all those who attend... Of course. I'm delighted to say serving under | :57:42. | :57:45. | |
his second Prime Minister in the role years and I trust you will | :57:46. | :57:50. | |
is experience... If we keep having is experience... If we keep having | :57:51. | :58:01. | |
the leadership crisis. Seriously, as he has exposed of Cabinet Government | :58:02. | :58:06. | |
and of the National Security Council and as he remembers serving | :58:07. | :58:11. | |
Government they could to go under former Prime Minister 's, witty, | :58:12. | :58:14. | |
with his new leader of the Government, considered the | :58:15. | :58:18. | |
possibility of Cabinet sitting for slightly longer than one and a half | :58:19. | :58:23. | |
hours each week, particularly when there are pressing engagement and | :58:24. | :58:30. | |
issues on the agenda and having individual briefing more readily | :58:31. | :58:34. | |
before issues are taken to Cabinet and that the NSC simile that the | :58:35. | :58:42. | |
flexible and debriefing might be flexible and debriefing might be | :58:43. | :58:45. | |
given to members before they see it and matters might be returned to | :58:46. | :58:51. | |
subsequent meetings if there is a basis for challenging some of the | :58:52. | :58:55. | |
advice that is being given? We do the have a difficult four years to | :58:56. | :58:59. | |
go for, can he agree that more collective Government might be a | :59:00. | :59:05. | |
good way of proceeding? I'm grateful to my right honourable friend | :59:06. | :59:08. | |
critically for his kind words, I have now served, now serving my | :59:09. | :59:14. | |
fourth Conservative premise. I don't think I've matched my right | :59:15. | :59:17. | |
honourable friend's freckled. But I'm closing in on it and I will not | :59:18. | :59:21. | |
be drawn on the possibility of serving yet another, given that my | :59:22. | :59:26. | |
prime Mr has only been in office for prime Mr has only been in office for | :59:27. | :59:30. | |
a day. My right honourable friend did sit together on the | :59:31. | :59:34. | |
national-security council as well as in Cabinet and look at these things | :59:35. | :59:41. | |
again, it is not for me, I think, to instruct the new Prime Minister on | :59:42. | :59:45. | |
how to run her Cabinet that I will certainly ensure that his suggestion | :59:46. | :59:50. | |
is passed on. The National Security Council I think is, I hope he would | :59:51. | :59:55. | |
recognise, a significant improvement on what went before in his time in | :59:56. | :59:59. | |
Government and is certainly an improvement on the kind of save the | :00:00. | :00:03. | |
Government that the Chilcot report exposes. It is not, it does not | :00:04. | :00:11. | |
operate in a vacuum. The national-security adviser who | :00:12. | :00:13. | |
attends it is now well established attends it is now well established | :00:14. | :00:17. | |
position in Government, supported by a strong team and the National | :00:18. | :00:22. | |
Security Council and the adviser are supported by structure of cross | :00:23. | :00:24. | |
Government boards and subcommittees Government boards and subcommittees | :00:25. | :00:29. | |
to which the Ministry of Defence makes its full contribution and I | :00:30. | :00:32. | |
think that those answer the point made by the chairman of the select | :00:33. | :00:35. | |
committee. There is no shortage way of the abuse of the Chiefs that | :00:36. | :00:42. | |
brought forward in this particular 's structure. One more time. I am | :00:43. | :00:53. | |
very grateful. I feared slight contradiction thing it would | :00:54. | :00:57. | |
congregate the machinery if the heads of the armed services were | :00:58. | :01:02. | |
allowed to form one of their subcommittees when they are added at | :01:03. | :01:05. | |
the no shortage of other subcommittees. The fact remains that | :01:06. | :01:10. | |
it is easier for politicians with bees in their bonnet to sweep aside | :01:11. | :01:15. | |
views of the Chief of the defence staff as a single individual which | :01:16. | :01:18. | |
appears to have happened in the position of Libya to sweep aside the | :01:19. | :01:23. | |
abuse of the heads of the Armed Forces as a collective fatigue and I | :01:24. | :01:27. | |
this night. -- views. The views of this night. -- views. The views of | :01:28. | :01:37. | |
the good of the Armed Forces by the defence. It is not the case that the | :01:38. | :01:42. | |
defence staff who has been serving up until now is likely to be | :01:43. | :01:49. | |
disregarded by the politicians that sit on this committee, both he and | :01:50. | :01:52. | |
his successor, and I hope the House will welcome the arrival of the new | :01:53. | :01:58. | |
chief of staff today. His successor are people who are well able to help | :01:59. | :02:03. | |
their own against the politicians. I will give way to my shadow. Thank | :02:04. | :02:10. | |
you very much. Would you acknowledge that one of the architects of the | :02:11. | :02:17. | |
NSC has said the secretarial that coordinates NSC is actually | :02:18. | :02:18. | |
understaffed and under roasters? One understaffed and under roasters? One | :02:19. | :02:20. | |
of the other criticisms that has of the other criticisms that has | :02:21. | :02:23. | |
been made if there is a lack of outside expertise that is brought | :02:24. | :02:27. | |
into the NSC and more can be made of Sotheby's experts? I read the speech | :02:28. | :02:36. | |
and they do advise all members of this House to have a look at the | :02:37. | :02:39. | |
other debate that took place in the other place and with a memorable | :02:40. | :02:43. | |
contributions, including those who were very actively involved at the | :02:44. | :02:50. | |
time. The point that the honourable member makes has been made before, | :02:51. | :02:55. | |
that there should be some external expertise. There is external | :02:56. | :03:01. | |
expertise available to the different departments. I'm convinced that the | :03:02. | :03:05. | |
new machinery is a massive improvement on what was there | :03:06. | :03:13. | |
before. Of course. I am most grateful to my right honourable | :03:14. | :03:16. | |
friend for giving way. He thought of late this canard about how the NSC | :03:17. | :03:24. | |
operates without expertise to rest. Can I reinforce the point from the | :03:25. | :03:30. | |
2010 example of the FST are that we conducted on the national-security | :03:31. | :03:34. | |
council at the time that expertise from the greatest experts in the | :03:35. | :03:37. | |
country is frequently heard and always available to the NSC and | :03:38. | :03:43. | |
populates the very significant briefing papers that go before the | :03:44. | :03:46. | |
NSC and inform the judgments that are made? I can confirm that is | :03:47. | :03:52. | |
exactly the position. There are no shortage of briefing for members of | :03:53. | :03:56. | |
the NSC and they are able to bring that expertise to the regular | :03:57. | :04:03. | |
meetings of the Council. And aggression the experts themselves | :04:04. | :04:09. | |
who are present. -- question. I think the recent reviews does show | :04:10. | :04:15. | |
how across Whitehall approach is being incremented in practices and | :04:16. | :04:19. | |
leading to better decision-making. In defence... Of course. Thank you. | :04:20. | :04:27. | |
On that point of cross departmentally arrangements working | :04:28. | :04:29. | |
more effectively, does he feel that more effectively, does he feel that | :04:30. | :04:33. | |
any of the lessons identified in Chilcot in ratio to the post | :04:34. | :04:39. | |
reconstruction in Iraq will fed through all might already have fed | :04:40. | :04:42. | |
through in relation to what happened in Libya? It is not obvious that | :04:43. | :04:47. | |
that is the case. I will becoming to that particular sin, the importance | :04:48. | :04:52. | |
of planning for reconstruction in a moment. I just want to finish if I | :04:53. | :04:57. | |
may this particular point about the machinery of Government because it | :04:58. | :05:02. | |
is important. In defence itself, speaking now of my own ministry, we | :05:03. | :05:07. | |
have revamped strategy and policy making with the institution of an | :05:08. | :05:10. | |
annual defence plan which reflects the outcomes of this you ditch | :05:11. | :05:16. | |
defence and Security reviews with senior leaders in the ministry, | :05:17. | :05:19. | |
being individually held to account for their role in delivering it and | :05:20. | :05:25. | |
defence strategy group that is shared by the permanent Secretary | :05:26. | :05:28. | |
and the chief of defence staff to address how defence can be best | :05:29. | :05:33. | |
contribute to deliver a king developer to Goody policy | :05:34. | :05:41. | |
objectives. I am listening very carefully to what my right | :05:42. | :05:43. | |
honourable friend is saying that that is not just an issue of how | :05:44. | :05:47. | |
best to encourage communication and expertise within the system. What | :05:48. | :05:51. | |
Chilcot was also saying is that there was a lack of investment, a | :05:52. | :05:57. | |
lack of proper siting of events on the ground. And this can only be put | :05:58. | :06:00. | |
right by long-time investment to right by long-time investment to | :06:01. | :06:03. | |
make sure that we are better sited so we have a better idea of what is | :06:04. | :06:07. | |
actually happened on the ground and because occurrences of actions. That | :06:08. | :06:10. | |
he not agree that is also very important to take away as a lesson | :06:11. | :06:17. | |
from the Chilcot report? Yes, I do. I think defence intelligence and the | :06:18. | :06:21. | |
machinery of information gathering on the ground there as well, I think | :06:22. | :06:26. | |
that has improved and that is more available to those taking the key | :06:27. | :06:29. | |
course. I am very grateful. I think course. I am very grateful. I think | :06:30. | :06:40. | |
this is an important area that the gentleman has been focusing on the | :06:41. | :06:42. | |
executive and isn't one of the most executive and isn't one of the most | :06:43. | :06:48. | |
important lessons from Chilcot that the most effective opposition to the | :06:49. | :06:52. | |
decision that now many of us except to be wrong was from the backbenches | :06:53. | :06:57. | |
and particularly when the frontbenchers agreed to use his own | :06:58. | :07:05. | |
phrase, group think applies amongst the frontbenchers and is at the | :07:06. | :07:10. | |
lesson from this that one needs to listen to independent minded | :07:11. | :07:13. | |
backbenches who represent their views on this passionately to | :07:14. | :07:21. | |
Government regardless of the consequences to their own careers | :07:22. | :07:24. | |
and make difficult decisions that Government ministers need to listen | :07:25. | :07:29. | |
to much more closely in the future? I accept that. I was here at the | :07:30. | :07:35. | |
time and I voted in that particular division and it is important that | :07:36. | :07:38. | |
Government listens to its backbenches. We were not the | :07:39. | :07:42. | |
Government banned but it is important that members are free to | :07:43. | :07:47. | |
speak their minds independently and so they have done so independently | :07:48. | :07:51. | |
and passionately over the debate we have had the last two days. They | :07:52. | :07:55. | |
have done so over both sides of the arguments. Although directed not | :07:56. | :08:03. | |
turn out as wanted, but it was still justify them right. His new | :08:04. | :08:12. | |
colleague who the secretary of the Brexit, speaking as a backbencher, | :08:13. | :08:18. | |
said the House has to rely on the prime Minster of the day telling the | :08:19. | :08:22. | |
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Does the Defence | :08:23. | :08:28. | |
Secretary a great? Members and ministers should speak the truth in | :08:29. | :08:32. | |
this House but the issue whether the primacy of the date deliberately | :08:33. | :08:36. | |
misled the House is exhaustively investigated bursar John Chilcot in | :08:37. | :08:40. | |
the report and I don't want to add any more to what he has said. I | :08:41. | :08:45. | |
wanted to add to the issue that the honourable member raised at | :08:46. | :08:49. | |
stabilisation. Since that Iraq war, stabilisation. Since that Iraq war, | :08:50. | :08:52. | |
we have been increasingly focusing as the Government on prevention | :08:53. | :08:57. | |
rather than intervention in the first place. We've been helping to | :08:58. | :09:00. | |
build capability with partners and tackle some of these problems of | :09:01. | :09:05. | |
fragile states at source and that of course is only possible because we | :09:06. | :09:12. | |
are now spending 0.7% of GDP on international development. It is by | :09:13. | :09:17. | |
good governance, to tackle good governance, to tackle | :09:18. | :09:20. | |
corruption, to build capacity in their defence and security forces | :09:21. | :09:24. | |
that we can stop crises turning into the kind of chaos that we have seen. | :09:25. | :09:30. | |
That requires insight and understanding often into very | :09:31. | :09:33. | |
complex situations to achieve that. We have set up the cross Government | :09:34. | :09:41. | |
complex stability and security fund, building on the conflict pool that | :09:42. | :09:45. | |
have in place for some time. Supporting the delivery of country | :09:46. | :09:48. | |
or region wide national security Council strategies. All of that | :09:49. | :09:55. | |
promotes a much stronger culture of cross Government working on | :09:56. | :10:00. | |
strategy, policy and delivery in fragile and conflict affected | :10:01. | :10:02. | |
countries. And they think an example of our success and that so far has | :10:03. | :10:08. | |
Sierra Leone to combat Ebola where Sierra Leone to combat Ebola where | :10:09. | :10:16. | |
we thought developments and military and officials from the Department | :10:17. | :10:18. | |
for International Development working alongside. The state | :10:19. | :10:23. | |
election unit that we have set up as continued to develop so we have | :10:24. | :10:27. | |
experts now on hand to deploy impose conflict situations anywhere in the | :10:28. | :10:31. | |
world at short notice and I've seen for myself how civilian advisers are | :10:32. | :10:38. | |
now routinely part of military exercises so that military and | :10:39. | :10:43. | |
civilian staff gain experience of working together before they are | :10:44. | :10:46. | |
deployed the development in his tenant agrees get the consideration | :10:47. | :10:53. | |
and attention they need alongside the military plans. Thirdly, we are | :10:54. | :10:57. | |
now trying to make sure that our Armed Forces are properly equipped | :10:58. | :11:03. | |
and resourced. Not only are we meeting be Nato commitment to spend | :11:04. | :11:09. | |
2% of GDP on defence but the defence budget is now growing for the first | :11:10. | :11:10. | |
time in six years. That is on the back of the | :11:11. | :11:20. | |
successful efforts we have been making to restore financial | :11:21. | :11:24. | |
discipline to the Ministry of Defence and to balance the defence | :11:25. | :11:29. | |
budget. That is the foundation of the focus of delivering an | :11:30. | :11:33. | |
affordable ten year equipment programme allowing us to invest in | :11:34. | :11:38. | |
the right equipment for our Armed Forces and that programme will total | :11:39. | :11:44. | |
at least ?178 billion on new military equipment over the next | :11:45. | :11:51. | |
decade. I am glad he has come to this point about members of the | :11:52. | :11:57. | |
Armed Forces and equipment. Can he expand as to how this learning | :11:58. | :12:03. | |
opportunity will support those who come back from conflict? The | :12:04. | :12:06. | |
reservists who take up much of that challenge and fell off the radar | :12:07. | :12:12. | |
after Iraq. We have taken a lot of messages to involve the reservists. | :12:13. | :12:20. | |
After Iraq, we had been learning more rapidly the lessons from each | :12:21. | :12:25. | |
deployment, particularly from Afghanistan, to make sure we do not | :12:26. | :12:30. | |
have to wait for the kind of report that Sir John Chilcot has produced, | :12:31. | :12:36. | |
we are able to learn the lessons so they can be applied to the next | :12:37. | :12:41. | |
units taking up particular roles. The Strategic Defence Review takes | :12:42. | :12:47. | |
the balance of investment decisions including where our main priorities | :12:48. | :12:51. | |
lie. Decisions on how that money will be invested rest with the | :12:52. | :12:57. | |
service chiefs, giving them the freedom and responsibility to make | :12:58. | :13:02. | |
decisions on how best to apply their resources and obliging them to be | :13:03. | :13:06. | |
clear about where they are carrying risk against potential equipment | :13:07. | :13:11. | |
failures or shortfall. Where changing circumstances or unexpected | :13:12. | :13:18. | |
threats lead to shortfalls, we should be ready and able quickly and | :13:19. | :13:21. | |
effectively to make good any shortcomings. The Chilcot Report | :13:22. | :13:27. | |
recognises that the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury between | :13:28. | :13:30. | |
them worked hard to develop and refine what is called the urgent | :13:31. | :13:35. | |
operational requirements process and as the Prime Minister told this | :13:36. | :13:41. | |
House, that process did deliver results and new improved equipment | :13:42. | :13:47. | |
into theatre quickly in the Afghanistan campaign, responding to | :13:48. | :13:54. | |
the needs of our Armed Forces there. One of the troubling observations is | :13:55. | :14:00. | |
the lack back then clear focus of responsibility for identifying | :14:01. | :14:07. | |
capability gaps during and in during operations. The new post of the | :14:08. | :14:13. | |
deputy of defence staff fulfils that role. As well as properly equipping | :14:14. | :14:18. | |
and resourcing our people, the Government has a due to to ensure | :14:19. | :14:23. | |
the welfare of our Armed Forces and their families and then to ensure | :14:24. | :14:26. | |
that they suffer no disadvantage when they return to civilian life. | :14:27. | :14:32. | |
By putting the Armed Forces covenant into law and committing resources to | :14:33. | :14:37. | |
it, we are making sure that all those who put their lives on the | :14:38. | :14:41. | |
line for this country get the help and support they need. However, | :14:42. | :14:49. | |
however much we have done, however much things may have changed and | :14:50. | :14:55. | |
improved since the Iraq campaign, the question I think for this House | :14:56. | :15:00. | |
is to judge whether or not we have done enough. And my answer is no. Of | :15:01. | :15:08. | |
course we have not yet done enough. It is evident that the Chilcot | :15:09. | :15:12. | |
Report contains many harsh lessons still for us to learn. Given the | :15:13. | :15:18. | |
length and forensic detail of the report, it will still take us some | :15:19. | :15:23. | |
more time to analyse and do it for justice but what is clear to me is | :15:24. | :15:29. | |
that we now need to take a long, hard look at our decision-making | :15:30. | :15:34. | |
processes and our culture to satisfy ourselves that the similar | :15:35. | :15:39. | |
misjudgements to the misjudgements are made at the time could not | :15:40. | :15:46. | |
recur. It is absolutely right we have to take account of all these | :15:47. | :15:52. | |
things but surely the public expects somebody to be held to account for | :15:53. | :15:57. | |
what is the biggest foreign policy disaster probably since the war. | :15:58. | :16:02. | |
What is the Secretary of State going to do about that because the public | :16:03. | :16:09. | |
demand somebody be held responsible. The report itself holds to account | :16:10. | :16:12. | |
those who were involved and took the key decisions and makes its judgment | :16:13. | :16:18. | |
on them and it is for them, not for me to respond to those judgments and | :16:19. | :16:24. | |
to account for the actions and the way in which they took their | :16:25. | :16:28. | |
decisions at that time and it is for them to do so. So far as the | :16:29. | :16:35. | |
decision-making culture itself is concerned, the details of the | :16:36. | :16:39. | |
committees and machinery of government which we have discussed a | :16:40. | :16:43. | |
few moments ago is not really the stuff of headlines and speeches, but | :16:44. | :16:49. | |
Chilcot shows us that some of these internal procedures of government | :16:50. | :16:54. | |
really are important. He set out in pretty stark terms what happens when | :16:55. | :16:59. | |
those structures and the opportunities they provide for the | :17:00. | :17:01. | |
proper flow of information and challenge are missing what are | :17:02. | :17:09. | |
bypassed. In defence, we have transformed in recent years our | :17:10. | :17:14. | |
approach to risk. We have a clear focus of responsibility in each key | :17:15. | :17:19. | |
area, we have designated risk due to holders and it is their | :17:20. | :17:23. | |
responsibility to come to me if they believe the levels of risk in each | :17:24. | :17:28. | |
of their particular areas are becoming excessive. And I expect | :17:29. | :17:33. | |
military chiefs and commanders now to shared the same degree of rigour | :17:34. | :17:40. | |
and transparency with respect to operational planning. Our | :17:41. | :17:44. | |
organisation and culture must not prevent our people having to | :17:45. | :17:49. | |
challenge and question institutional assumptions even if those | :17:50. | :17:53. | |
assumptions are made by their superiors. That was a point | :17:54. | :17:57. | |
eloquently made yesterday by my right honourable friend the member | :17:58. | :18:03. | |
for Beaconsfield and it was made again by the member for South Antrim | :18:04. | :18:08. | |
today. And that view is fully shared by the current chiefs of staff. Each | :18:09. | :18:15. | |
of whom served in different roles during the Iraq campaign, including | :18:16. | :18:20. | |
the outgoing and the incoming chief of the defence staff and it shared | :18:21. | :18:25. | |
by the permanent Secretary. We are committed to leading defence through | :18:26. | :18:30. | |
a period of rigorous reflection, analysis and improvement and I am | :18:31. | :18:35. | |
determined to make that improvement happen. I need and the House would | :18:36. | :18:43. | |
want me to be absolutely sure that when our servicemen and women are | :18:44. | :18:47. | |
deployed in future and inevitably that is when and not if, that nobody | :18:48. | :18:56. | |
will be able to point to Sir John's report and justifiably accuse cars | :18:57. | :18:59. | |
of simply repeating the same mistakes. I want to give the House | :19:00. | :19:05. | |
and assurance that Sir John's report will not be the last word. In | :19:06. | :19:12. | |
conclusion, let me say that our strategic defence and Security | :19:13. | :19:15. | |
review reminds us that we are living in an ever more dangerous world. We | :19:16. | :19:22. | |
must, despite the report and the Iraq campaign, we must still be | :19:23. | :19:28. | |
ready to act as we have shown in our participation in the international | :19:29. | :19:31. | |
coalition campaign against Daesh in Iraq and Syria to -- today. We must | :19:32. | :19:39. | |
remain committed to protecting our people and standing up to any kind | :19:40. | :19:44. | |
of terrorism or aggression that seeks to destroy our very way of | :19:45. | :19:49. | |
life. Sir John and his team, I repeat, have done us all a great | :19:50. | :19:54. | |
service. Their work will enable us to learn the vital lessons from | :19:55. | :20:00. | |
those operations in Iraq and to ensure that we are not condemned to | :20:01. | :20:07. | |
make the same mistakes in future. The question is that this House has | :20:08. | :20:12. | |
considered the report of the Iraq enquiry. As many of that opinion say | :20:13. | :20:24. | |
aye. The ayes have it. Order. We come now... To the adjournment. The | :20:25. | :20:33. | |
House do now adjourn. The question is that this House... The question | :20:34. | :20:49. | |
is that this House do now adjourn. As an ethnic minority immigrant of | :20:50. | :20:54. | |
this country, I am intrigued at the way this House works. We have two | :20:55. | :20:58. | |
days of a deeply serious debate and it is an opportunity to put a small | :20:59. | :21:05. | |
key point on a small but very important issue that is almost local | :21:06. | :21:11. | |
in comparison. I am referring of course to the possibility of a small | :21:12. | :21:16. | |
change in the Mental Health Act that will enable the police to act more | :21:17. | :21:19. | |
properly in the care of any person they find in need of mental health | :21:20. | :21:27. | |
assessment and immediate care. I raise this previously in 2014. I did | :21:28. | :21:33. | |
not proceed as I was informed there was an ongoing review. That has come | :21:34. | :21:39. | |
and gone. This small point was not referred to in the review. However, | :21:40. | :21:44. | |
there is a positive -- possible negative. Change in the Police and | :21:45. | :21:51. | |
Crime Bill. I was prompted to see changes having seen first-hand the | :21:52. | :21:55. | |
need. I was on a police Parliamentary scheme on foot or in a | :21:56. | :22:02. | |
car in one Smurf in 2014. I'll join two young police officers in their | :22:03. | :22:11. | |
response car. The first call was to eight council residential tower | :22:12. | :22:15. | |
block. It was to a flood on the 14th floor. The mother of the household | :22:16. | :22:20. | |
nervously let the officer in to see her daughter, aged 22, standing on | :22:21. | :22:25. | |
the window ledge, threatening to jump. It was quickly established she | :22:26. | :22:30. | |
had a short history of previous suicide attempts. With the back-up | :22:31. | :22:35. | |
of two plainclothed officers, the young woman was persuaded to come | :22:36. | :22:40. | |
down and a young female officer sat on the bed beside her and calmly | :22:41. | :22:45. | |
discuss the problem. The police officer suggested she might wish to | :22:46. | :22:50. | |
go to a place of safety for psychiatric medical help. This was | :22:51. | :22:54. | |
refused and when pressed further followed by education and threats. | :22:55. | :23:02. | |
Police officers outside had contacted Saint Georges Hospital for | :23:03. | :23:06. | |
assistance. After a couple of hours, and individual from there arrived | :23:07. | :23:11. | |
with an ambulance and crew. There was further alarm, rejection and a | :23:12. | :23:16. | |
struggle ensued but in due course they said Lady was transported to | :23:17. | :23:21. | |
the hospital. The whole pantomime had occupied five police officers, | :23:22. | :23:28. | |
three NHS staff officers, and 3-4 hours to sort out. It was obvious | :23:29. | :23:31. | |
the police could themselves have taken care of the young lady very | :23:32. | :23:38. | |
quickly, therefore reducing the police and NHS manpower hours and | :23:39. | :23:40. | |
reducing the risk of the young lady leaping out the window. I have a | :23:41. | :23:45. | |
second personal case which involves a wall -- lady resident. She had | :23:46. | :23:54. | |
been threatening neighbours to such a degree that some of the other | :23:55. | :23:58. | |
residents are fluent for their lives that alone obtaining any peace at | :23:59. | :24:02. | |
any hour of the day. The contact between the mental health team and | :24:03. | :24:06. | |
the police has not coincided. Until very recently. I asked the head | :24:07. | :24:13. | |
police officer in charge about section 136 and predictably was told | :24:14. | :24:17. | |
that her home was a private place and therefore do police action was | :24:18. | :24:21. | |
legally possible. From discussions with the Met police officers, I | :24:22. | :24:25. | |
found the situation is far from unusual. A more tragic case was the | :24:26. | :24:31. | |
death of Martin Milton. He was taken to a Leeds police station by | :24:32. | :24:38. | |
officers who had visited him in his home and noted his serious | :24:39. | :24:42. | |
preparations for committing suicide. The arresting police officers | :24:43. | :24:45. | |
believed they had arrested Mr Middleton under section one 36. At | :24:46. | :24:51. | |
the police station, the custody Sergeant refused to detain him as | :24:52. | :24:56. | |
the arrest had taken place in his private residence. The police | :24:57. | :25:00. | |
officers therefore had to take him to what they hoped with some form of | :25:01. | :25:05. | |
safety to a relative's home. Sadly, later that day, Mr Middleton hanged | :25:06. | :25:13. | |
himself. At his inquest the coroner had no hesitation in agreeing with | :25:14. | :25:20. | |
the professor that Mr Middleton fell into a category of mental persons | :25:21. | :25:25. | |
for whom there is no appropriate revision under the act. I heard from | :25:26. | :25:33. | |
many front-line officers and again from Professor Keith Rex who is an | :25:34. | :25:37. | |
academic psychiatrist and an expert in this area. I have no doubt that | :25:38. | :25:43. | |
the act needs amending in order to protect the police and of course | :25:44. | :25:46. | |
those suffering from mental illness crisis. The Republic of Ireland has | :25:47. | :25:53. | |
a clear operational advantage in that under section 12 of their | :25:54. | :25:58. | |
Mental Health Act where there is, a serious likelihood of a person | :25:59. | :26:03. | |
causing immediate and serious harm to himself or herself or to other | :26:04. | :26:10. | |
persons, the gardener can enter any building or other premises if he or | :26:11. | :26:13. | |
she has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is to be | :26:14. | :26:15. | |
found there. Whether police had had the act | :26:16. | :26:23. | |
outside the boundaries of the law to concern for the safety of the vigil. | :26:24. | :26:31. | |
There are also recognises it of the district police dissuading the | :26:32. | :26:35. | |
people out of their homes and into a public place in order to affect an | :26:36. | :26:38. | |
arrest under section 136 and take the person to proper and appropriate | :26:39. | :26:44. | |
care, thus presenting a suicide. Over the ten years from 1997 to | :26:45. | :26:51. | |
1998, admissions to hospital with a place of safety increased from 2237 | :26:52. | :27:00. | |
to 7035. The Minister will recognise this as a threefold increase. In | :27:01. | :27:09. | |
2005 two 2006, it was captivated that is over 17,000 people were | :27:10. | :27:14. | |
detained under section three 16. By the 2011, 2012, the overall numbers | :27:15. | :27:21. | |
were recorded to be 23 and a half thousand. I rode it touched on, | :27:22. | :27:28. | |
although the powers under 136, there is evidence as I've touched on that | :27:29. | :27:35. | |
this is sometimes used by removing and defecting from their homes and | :27:36. | :27:39. | |
services authority ordered the services authority ordered the | :27:40. | :27:42. | |
figures indicated that something like 30% of section 136 arrests were | :27:43. | :27:50. | |
outside the detainee's home. Out of outside the detainee's home. Out of | :27:51. | :27:54. | |
desperation that the police to menu that the individual outside the | :27:55. | :28:00. | |
private residence. I get this as an indication of the desperation of the | :28:01. | :28:05. | |
police to take care the disturbed individuals and hence supports my | :28:06. | :28:08. | |
desire for a change in legislation. But badly, strict interpretation of | :28:09. | :28:15. | |
section 136 as it stands, could mean that hundreds if not thousands of | :28:16. | :28:19. | |
sea as potential suicides where admission to hospital delayed or the | :28:20. | :28:24. | |
night, thus risking suicidal self harm merely because the police who | :28:25. | :28:30. | |
have to observe it cannot actually act because it is the person's home | :28:31. | :28:32. | |
or someone else's home. At many or someone else's home. At many | :28:33. | :28:36. | |
incidences, this means the police will have to spend quite some | :28:37. | :28:41. | |
considerable time sitting and waiting until they obtain a medical | :28:42. | :28:45. | |
practitioner or health official to give the police the nod to transport | :28:46. | :28:50. | |
the patient care. Arguments against the amendment that I have been | :28:51. | :28:53. | |
suggesting is that the police already have sufficient powers, it | :28:54. | :28:56. | |
is quite clear from IO observation that this is basically incorrect. | :28:57. | :29:01. | |
The second argument against it is that it will extend the right of the | :29:02. | :29:05. | |
properties. Quite clearly under properties. Quite clearly under | :29:06. | :29:09. | |
those circumstances I think it is appropriate codes somebody is a need | :29:10. | :29:13. | |
of medical help or care and that is the whole point of the change I'm | :29:14. | :29:16. | |
thinking. It is possible ready for the police to enter an individual's | :29:17. | :29:21. | |
private home to investigate a breach of the piece is aiming the police | :29:22. | :29:25. | |
that we utilise this to enter the property. Often I have dealt help | :29:26. | :29:32. | |
people clearly and mental disorder. Other residents of the property can | :29:33. | :29:36. | |
allow police said that having do so on my first case, they are then | :29:37. | :29:41. | |
unable to act. The police, it is my belief and from my experience, are | :29:42. | :29:44. | |
acting in the very best interests of acting in the very best interests of | :29:45. | :29:47. | |
the individual's and said the safety of the public. We should give them | :29:48. | :29:53. | |
the legal mechanism to do so. I don't believe that doing nothing is | :29:54. | :29:54. | |
an option. I have suggested that a an option. I have suggested that a | :29:55. | :29:59. | |
simple solution would be to amend section 136 by just simply removing | :30:00. | :30:03. | |
the words and I quote in a place to which the public have access. Mr | :30:04. | :30:08. | |
Speaker, I am hopeful other positive answer from the ballistic, I know he | :30:09. | :30:12. | |
is extremely fixable and I would be happy to work with them to seek a | :30:13. | :30:17. | |
ten minute rule Bill or take to a direction tiny change in the | :30:18. | :30:22. | |
Policing and Crime Bill in another place. If the Minister has meant the | :30:23. | :30:32. | |
Leave -- a problem with my solution, I would propose a solution to help | :30:33. | :30:37. | |
police saved lives and not go the Department appear to be going a bit | :30:38. | :30:44. | |
is exactly the opposite. I called the Minister of State for policing, | :30:45. | :30:47. | |
crime, criminal Justice and victims at the Home Office and at the | :30:48. | :30:50. | |
Ministry of Justice to reply to the debate. Mr Speaker, however I lost | :30:51. | :30:59. | |
ground some time ago I now have fire. The total is great apart from | :31:00. | :31:04. | |
no cry but lots of fire. Can I say to my honourable friend it is a | :31:05. | :31:09. | |
pleasure to be responding to the debate this evening. We have met and | :31:10. | :31:14. | |
discussed his concerns before and I've had delegations in this | :31:15. | :31:18. | |
particular area for some time and it was discussed extensively during the | :31:19. | :31:23. | |
course of the committee stage of the policing crime Bill. I think, to be | :31:24. | :31:29. | |
fair, he does highlight an issue. I am not going to run away from that. | :31:30. | :31:32. | |
He is absolutely right. There are He is absolutely right. There are | :31:33. | :31:36. | |
concerns about extending powers into a place of safety which were deemed | :31:37. | :31:41. | |
to be someone's abode. At the same time, I have also been on patrol | :31:42. | :31:45. | |
with the police who've encountered very similar situations, and | :31:46. | :31:52. | |
particularly to the first case. I have also express, a long-time | :31:53. | :31:55. | |
before I got this position, where there was a feeling that if we could | :31:56. | :32:01. | |
get this person outside of their home, we could help them, within | :32:02. | :32:06. | |
custody sergeants they simply custody sergeants they simply | :32:07. | :32:16. | |
fantastic job. For instance, in the example that he used, once the | :32:17. | :32:21. | |
custody Sergeant has said that the 136 was not appropriate, they were | :32:22. | :32:28. | |
then in a public place and that is also... I don't think that is not | :32:29. | :32:34. | |
right either but that the same time, police officers are not mental | :32:35. | :32:38. | |
health experts and one of the problems with 136 is it is | :32:39. | :32:43. | |
absolutely deservedly designed as a last resort when you have exhausted | :32:44. | :32:49. | |
all other measures to particularly help the individual. And there are | :32:50. | :32:55. | |
measures that are going on at the moment but I will touch on in a | :32:56. | :32:58. | |
moment, particularly with adding the expertise which the police officers | :32:59. | :33:02. | |
do not have with them, with street triage and in the custody suites | :33:03. | :33:07. | |
itself. More importantly, as with offices that I have expressed with | :33:08. | :33:10. | |
myself. However, what we have to look at very carefully is firstly | :33:11. | :33:17. | |
before we change 136 is 136 being used correctly? I will give way in a | :33:18. | :33:23. | |
second. Whether 136 is being used correctly because they beat that I | :33:24. | :33:27. | |
have been asking for, we really concerned about the amount of 136 | :33:28. | :33:31. | |
being used, in some parts of the country, there are almost no 136s | :33:32. | :33:36. | |
being used within a force and then the other areas they are been used | :33:37. | :33:42. | |
extensively. I give way. I thank you for way. If you look at the | :33:43. | :33:48. | |
statistics and so so so so grandkids parented grass. Anyone arrested | :33:49. | :33:53. | |
under 136 must be seen by our law or under 136 must be seen by our law or | :33:54. | :34:00. | |
the characters of biomedical psychiatrist within 72 years which | :34:01. | :34:06. | |
is enormous safeguard. My honourable friend is absolutely right and I | :34:07. | :34:09. | |
not just to do with suicides but to not just to do with suicides but to | :34:10. | :34:16. | |
do with criminal assaults. Often on their loved ones. I was on patrol in | :34:17. | :34:22. | |
Camden with the Metropolitan Police when we went to what was described | :34:23. | :34:27. | |
by the neighbours as a domestic situation, where somebody looked to | :34:28. | :34:31. | |
be assaulted and when we arrived and eventually got into the flat, the | :34:32. | :34:36. | |
one thing that the person had been assaulted desperately didn't want | :34:37. | :34:40. | |
with their loved one to be arrested and taken to a prison cell because | :34:41. | :34:46. | |
they were ill. Ill as if someone had a broken leg and as Eliot someone | :34:47. | :34:51. | |
had a medical reason, a and needed to needed to go to a suitable place | :34:52. | :34:55. | |
of safety. We know over the years all too often that person would have | :34:56. | :34:58. | |
been arrested, would have ended up in a police cell, may not have been | :34:59. | :35:03. | |
may not have had that the card of may not have had that the card of | :35:04. | :35:07. | |
being seen by a medical site pelagic specialist in that time which is one | :35:08. | :35:12. | |
of the reason that within the Bill itself the restriction of the amount | :35:13. | :35:17. | |
of time that someone with big cat in the cellar this issue is massively | :35:18. | :35:22. | |
restricted. Can I also say this is not a matter just for the police? | :35:23. | :35:31. | |
This is an issue for social services and the NHS in particular. It is not | :35:32. | :35:35. | |
a police officer to diagnose even a police officer to diagnose even | :35:36. | :35:38. | |
silly whether someone is having an mental episode or stroke or perhaps | :35:39. | :35:52. | |
an illegal drugs. -- or drunk. One of things desperate to make sure if | :35:53. | :35:59. | |
be the police minister of the be the police minister of the | :36:00. | :36:02. | |
reshuffle goes on, at the moment, they are my police officers and I am | :36:03. | :36:07. | |
not putting this difficult position where we have the port of first page | :36:08. | :36:13. | |
rather than in many cases what it should be, which is the last resort | :36:14. | :36:18. | |
remember being a fireman and remember being a fireman and | :36:19. | :36:23. | |
attending incidents on a regular basis with Fire Services where they | :36:24. | :36:26. | |
had called the police station on a Friday night and said we had seen | :36:27. | :36:31. | |
Mary Johnny for the course of the week. They were going home for the | :36:32. | :36:35. | |
week end. They were vulnerable, so would we go? And make sure they are | :36:36. | :36:42. | |
OK. I argue now and I argued then that is not the role of the | :36:43. | :36:44. | |
emergency services, certainly not emergency services, certainly not | :36:45. | :36:46. | |
the role of the police that it has become the norm around the country. | :36:47. | :36:53. | |
I'm sure you will be pleased to know that there is a interministerial | :36:54. | :36:57. | |
group, when I was the disabilities and as I sat on this group and argue | :36:58. | :37:02. | |
this point, just not about people with mental health illness but with | :37:03. | :37:05. | |
people with learning difficulties. They become very confused as well as | :37:06. | :37:11. | |
we desperately try to look after them and the place of safety that we | :37:12. | :37:17. | |
take people to is not a police cell if they got mental health illnesses, | :37:18. | :37:21. | |
it is what it says on the tin, a place of safety, the NHS. I support | :37:22. | :37:30. | |
my honourable friend in what a brilliant tragedy. Just on the point | :37:31. | :37:37. | |
on medical practitioners, does he agree that the safeguards in section | :37:38. | :37:43. | |
136 which actually require examination by a registered medical | :37:44. | :37:46. | |
practitioner within 70 hours or interview by an approved medical | :37:47. | :37:51. | |
health professional within 70 users, back at the Jews, maybe to 12 hours | :37:52. | :37:56. | |
which would mean that the person in question would get more immediate | :37:57. | :38:02. | |
help? I think my honourable friend is absolutely right and that is | :38:03. | :38:05. | |
actually what will happen in the legislation that is going to the | :38:06. | :38:08. | |
House at the moment. You want to be able to hold the person in a police | :38:09. | :38:15. | |
cell and waiting for that medical examination. I think 12 hours is too | :38:16. | :38:20. | |
long. 12 hours is too long. If someone is ill, would we find it | :38:21. | :38:27. | |
acceptable that someone could be a unique 472 hours with a leg? My | :38:28. | :38:34. | |
honourable friend is a qualified dentist. Would you wait 72 hours | :38:35. | :38:37. | |
because you had a huge abscess on the side of your map and you needed | :38:38. | :38:40. | |
urgent treatment could likewise mental health very different than | :38:41. | :38:45. | |
other illnesses? I think it is of the we see, particularly my | :38:46. | :38:48. | |
honourable friend for north Bedfordshire has been working on | :38:49. | :38:52. | |
extensively, Sibelius decided to return to the backbenches. Accepted | :38:53. | :39:01. | |
that the NHS with letting these people down and the police force, | :39:02. | :39:05. | |
mess of these people in desperate mess of these people in desperate | :39:06. | :39:14. | |
situations, desperate situations. As a police force which actually really | :39:15. | :39:20. | |
isn't there a role and unless Government comes together to | :39:21. | :39:23. | |
actually deal with this then the concerns that my honourable friend | :39:24. | :39:32. | |
has to deal with 136s and 135s are absolutely right and if he will take | :39:33. | :39:35. | |
up my offer for us to work together and I'm sorry I didn't and should be | :39:36. | :39:38. | |
with him to meet the professor the last time we would have had this | :39:39. | :39:45. | |
debate. But I think we need to work together and if the concerns cannot | :39:46. | :39:51. | |
be met in the way that my officials and the three departments that are | :39:52. | :39:53. | |
dealing with this are saying that they can't then absolutely we are in | :39:54. | :39:57. | |
a position that we need to amend 136. But let's try to make sure we | :39:58. | :40:02. | |
can get to the right position of those because what I don't want to | :40:03. | :40:08. | |
do and this is go to sound critical, I don't want the police to be seen | :40:09. | :40:12. | |
to be picking up something which actually yet again needs to be | :40:13. | :40:16. | |
addressed by other departments because that is what has happened | :40:17. | :40:20. | |
over the years. One of the arguments that has been put towards me when I | :40:21. | :40:24. | |
said we were struck the amount of time that these people who are very | :40:25. | :40:27. | |
vulnerable can be held in a police cell is where will they go? How many | :40:28. | :40:32. | |
specialist a need facilities are the? How many places of safety are | :40:33. | :40:36. | |
there if they don't go to that place of safety which happens to be the | :40:37. | :40:40. | |
local cells in the local prison and the odds are that there has to be a | :40:41. | :40:44. | |
provision so that the cells are not the first port of call. And I'm | :40:45. | :40:49. | |
slightly dragging my comments on this part of mice each because I | :40:50. | :40:52. | |
know we are arriving close to the time when perhaps something might | :40:53. | :40:53. | |
happen. Subtitles will resume on 'Thursday | :40:54. | :40:57. | |
In Parliament' at 2300. | :40:58. | :41:08. |