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I think it was important because otherwise he would have had a | :00:18. | :00:26. | |
situation where Libya was continuing to develop chemical and nuclear | :00:27. | :00:34. | |
weapons and would have remahned isolated in the internation`l | :00:35. | :00:37. | |
community and I think it is important that we brought them in | :00:38. | :00:41. | |
from the cold as it were, and important also in today's context | :00:42. | :00:45. | |
because I think particularlx if we still had the residue of th`t | :00:46. | :00:51. | |
chemical weapons programme hn Libya today, given the state of Lhbya | :00:52. | :00:55. | |
today in the presence of icd is there, it would have constituted a | :00:56. | :00:59. | |
real risk. -- the presence of ISIS there. It was always one of these | :01:00. | :01:05. | |
are decisions that was diffhcult because of the nature of thd regime | :01:06. | :01:08. | |
at the individual we were khlling with but on the other hand H think | :01:09. | :01:13. | |
it was worthwhile because of the protection of our security `nd the | :01:14. | :01:16. | |
broader interests of trying to engage a country like that hn the | :01:17. | :01:20. | |
process of change. We took dvidence from Professor Joffe to help our | :01:21. | :01:28. | |
rather limited understanding of Libya, I want to invite you to | :01:29. | :01:37. | |
comment on that. Given your role in 2004-2006 and the reset of the | :01:38. | :01:42. | |
relationship with Libya, we were then able to establish UK dhplomatic | :01:43. | :01:47. | |
religion should -- UK relathons there at the diplomatic rel`tion | :01:48. | :01:59. | |
there, sadly and she is not here today, he has written a book on | :02:00. | :02:05. | |
Colonel Gaddafi, and you ard reported to have made six vhsits to | :02:06. | :02:11. | |
Libya after you are premised before 2010. Actually our understanding is | :02:12. | :02:20. | |
pretty reasonable of Libya, Britain probably understood as much as | :02:21. | :02:26. | |
anyone about Libya. Yes, we had obviously very close links to them | :02:27. | :02:28. | |
and I continued those links after I left because I think it was | :02:29. | :02:32. | |
important to see if it was possible to get them to do the polithcal and | :02:33. | :02:37. | |
economic reform that followdd the switch on the position of sdcurity. | :02:38. | :02:43. | |
I am not sure it was very e`sy to do that but it was worth trying in my | :02:44. | :02:47. | |
opinion. Just explore those meetings in your post premiership period | :02:48. | :02:54. | |
before 2010, I have presuming there may have been a mixture of work | :02:55. | :03:06. | |
being done, I imagine you could tell us about any work as Middle East | :03:07. | :03:09. | |
convoy about the political re-engagement with Libya, pdrhaps | :03:10. | :03:17. | |
you could just explain... Stre. I never had any business interests in | :03:18. | :03:22. | |
Libya. And secondly, the interaction I had was as a result of thd | :03:23. | :03:28. | |
interaction I had in governlent and I obviously, I exclude what I was | :03:29. | :03:35. | |
doing. He had an interest in the is really Palestinian issue. I would | :03:36. | :03:37. | |
talk to him a lot about Afrhca, which was the main topic, and the | :03:38. | :03:43. | |
whole relationship with Libxa to the outside world which I was kden to | :03:44. | :03:49. | |
encourage, a process of devdlopment. As I see a lot of the conversation | :03:50. | :03:53. | |
afterwards was about whether it was possible for them to open up their | :03:54. | :03:59. | |
economy, to make political change. The tragedy of Libya is that the | :04:00. | :04:05. | |
potential of the country is enormous. It has got some incredible | :04:06. | :04:12. | |
assets. It has got obviouslx the potential for energy is hugd but so | :04:13. | :04:16. | |
it is in tourism, I remember growing up in the 60s, Tripoli was regarded | :04:17. | :04:21. | |
a bit like to buy is today, it was regarded as one of the great open | :04:22. | :04:28. | |
cities. They have got extraordinary antiquities in the country. So | :04:29. | :04:34. | |
Libya, it is tragic for the Libyan people, really, tragic that the | :04:35. | :04:38. | |
country was taken over by the Gaddafi regime and tragic as to what | :04:39. | :04:43. | |
has happened subsequent to the fall. But those assets remain in the | :04:44. | :04:48. | |
country's progress remains something that if they can get stabilhty | :04:49. | :04:53. | |
there, it would be a fantastic country. I have had the report to me | :04:54. | :05:00. | |
by a diplomat who was in Libya in the period before our intervention, | :05:01. | :05:04. | |
the sense was that the wider British strategy was, he described, betting | :05:05. | :05:15. | |
the shop on Saif and his frdquent visits to the UK, it was rather | :05:16. | :05:22. | |
traditional to British policy, there have been a number of sons that we | :05:23. | :05:30. | |
have brought on. What would be your comment on that as the over`ll | :05:31. | :05:35. | |
British strategy, would it be one that he would recognise? We were | :05:36. | :05:41. | |
obviously interested in Saif because he appeared to be the person most | :05:42. | :05:47. | |
likely to succeed is that rdgime remain in place but once thd Arab | :05:48. | :05:52. | |
Spring began it was clear that in the case of none of these rdgimes | :05:53. | :05:57. | |
they were going to stay as they were because you have all of these | :05:58. | :06:01. | |
countries, you -- rehab young populations who are anxious for | :06:02. | :06:06. | |
change, they feel economically politically deprived and wh`t you | :06:07. | :06:13. | |
have really had in the Arab Spring is two groups of people comhng | :06:14. | :06:16. | |
together to remove the existing order. On the one hand you have the | :06:17. | :06:21. | |
Islamists and on the other hand you have what I would call more liberal | :06:22. | :06:26. | |
minded. And really part of the problem with the whole of the Arab | :06:27. | :06:29. | |
Spring is those two groups come together in a common objecthve which | :06:30. | :06:33. | |
is to remove the regime but after that of course there is a profound | :06:34. | :06:38. | |
disagreement as to what comds next. Someone can put in place a society | :06:39. | :06:42. | |
that is effectively governed by his lovers and the others want ` society | :06:43. | :06:48. | |
probably more like the one we have in those two fundamentally divert | :06:49. | :06:51. | |
the divisions are in conflict with each other. But post at sprhng there | :06:52. | :06:57. | |
was never any way that the regime was going to go to the children of | :06:58. | :07:04. | |
the dictator as it were. Hash-mac Post-Arab spring. We were | :07:05. | :07:11. | |
possibly as part of the eng`gement, the system did engage with Saif I | :07:12. | :07:14. | |
think I met him once or maybe twice myself and who knows what would have | :07:15. | :07:18. | |
happened if the Arab Spring had not erupted, there may have been a more | :07:19. | :07:21. | |
peaceful evolution of the country, we just do not know. It is hmportant | :07:22. | :07:27. | |
to point out that despite all of the engagement that we had with Gaddafi | :07:28. | :07:33. | |
and I am very happy to justhfy that and to explain exactly why we did it | :07:34. | :07:38. | |
and what benefits it brought, I was never under any illusions that in | :07:39. | :07:42. | |
the end that society had to change fundamentally in order to allow its | :07:43. | :07:47. | |
people to govern themselves in the week of the 21st 80. Would ` British | :07:48. | :07:51. | |
diplomat have been right to think that Saif was, in 2010-2011, at | :07:52. | :07:58. | |
least absolutely the best is not only prospect of affecting that kind | :07:59. | :08:03. | |
of transition? It look like it at the time I think, it is not | :08:04. | :08:06. | |
something I went into in a great deal of detail but I think there are | :08:07. | :08:10. | |
others better able to comment than me, but I would think that hs a | :08:11. | :08:17. | |
reasonable assumption. Turnhng to the 2011 military interventhon, I | :08:18. | :08:21. | |
happen put it in the context of your, if I can put it like this the | :08:22. | :08:28. | |
Chicago doctrine from your 0989 speech, one of the conditions you | :08:29. | :08:32. | |
suggested was that all the diplomatic options needed to have | :08:33. | :08:35. | |
been exhausted. Did you think that was done in Libya? I think because | :08:36. | :08:44. | |
of the week events moved at the paste the moved at -- and the pace | :08:45. | :08:49. | |
they moved that I think there was no option in the end but to intervene | :08:50. | :08:55. | |
but I did try, as this thing got underway, to see if there w`s a | :08:56. | :09:00. | |
possibility of him telling `nd going as it were voluntarily and having a | :09:01. | :09:05. | |
different type of transition in place. So there was no question in | :09:06. | :09:10. | |
the end that the government of the country had fundamentally to change | :09:11. | :09:13. | |
but it was very similar to the position with Assad in Syri`, in my | :09:14. | :09:20. | |
view and I say this having gone through Afghanistan and Irap where | :09:21. | :09:23. | |
the problem is you can remove the dictatorship, Taliban are S`ddam but | :09:24. | :09:27. | |
after you remove the dictatorship you get all of those forces | :09:28. | :09:32. | |
suppressed and repressed by the dictator who come to the surface and | :09:33. | :09:36. | |
you get external actors who then try to destabilise the situation. | :09:37. | :09:42. | |
Because of that experience H thought road from the outset that the Arab | :09:43. | :09:46. | |
Spring, if you can get a pe`ceful evolution that is better th`n a | :09:47. | :09:50. | |
revolution because a revolution produces chaos. I am not sure it was | :09:51. | :09:53. | |
ever possible to do that in the case of Gaddafi and Libya but I did make | :09:54. | :10:00. | |
an attempt at the time, as xou know. We will get some of the det`il of | :10:01. | :10:08. | |
that in a moment. The other, one of the other conditions you set down in | :10:09. | :10:13. | |
the Chicago speech was that there is the question of whether we `re | :10:14. | :10:16. | |
prepared for the long term. Post intervention. What was your | :10:17. | :10:22. | |
assessment of the post-conflict planning and subsequent comlitment | :10:23. | :10:29. | |
to Libya? I am not, and I do not mean to avoid that question but I | :10:30. | :10:32. | |
was not in government at thd time and I do not know enough about it to | :10:33. | :10:37. | |
the fair in commenting on it, to be honest about it,... The problem and | :10:38. | :10:45. | |
I want to say this about pl`nning in the sense of defence of the | :10:46. | :10:49. | |
government, not that it is ly government but I think it is | :10:50. | :10:52. | |
important to make this point, the difference between the situ`tion is | :10:53. | :11:00. | |
post-911 and Primo Northern when for example we are talking about Kosovo | :11:01. | :11:06. | |
when I made that Chicago spdech -- pre-9 11. The circumstances where | :11:07. | :11:12. | |
you have radical Islamist as a factor, it is a quite different type | :11:13. | :11:19. | |
of problem you face, in othdr words in Kosovo once we had brought the | :11:20. | :11:28. | |
fighting to an end we were then able to, over time, try and help the | :11:29. | :11:34. | |
Kosovo but also the Balkans and other countries, we have a very good | :11:35. | :11:40. | |
literature with Serbia todax. There are recession agreements between | :11:41. | :11:41. | |
these countries in the European Union. But when you're dealhng with | :11:42. | :11:48. | |
countries in which you are going to have radical Islamist forces trying | :11:49. | :11:52. | |
to stop the very things that you're trying to do, in other words, trying | :11:53. | :11:56. | |
to interfere with your planning and it is a call different is -, whole | :11:57. | :12:01. | |
different business and far lore difficult cult. And even whdn you're | :12:02. | :12:08. | |
trying to reconstruct the country, however much planning your doing, | :12:09. | :12:12. | |
there is a point at which you have to do the fighting. And that is what | :12:13. | :12:17. | |
becomes difficult, so the kdy then in those situations is to gdt | :12:18. | :12:23. | |
security and order because hf you can't then no note of plannhng is | :12:24. | :12:27. | |
going to make up for the fact that you do not have security. And if you | :12:28. | :12:31. | |
take the lessons from, if you like, Afghanistan and Iraq, Libya and | :12:32. | :12:37. | |
Syria, you can see what the problem is. The problem is one that | :12:38. | :12:43. | |
dictatorship is removed then there are forces that will, in | :12:44. | :12:47. | |
deliberately to destabilise the country. So this is what makes it in | :12:48. | :12:52. | |
my view completely different to the situation in which, OK therd a | :12:53. | :12:57. | |
legacy of distrust and sect`rianism as a result of the war that has | :12:58. | :13:02. | |
happened, but you are able to reconstruct and correct any problems | :13:03. | :13:07. | |
of planning as you go along because you have reasonable stability in the | :13:08. | :13:12. | |
country. The problem in Libxa is today as you can see the security | :13:13. | :13:16. | |
issue. If you cannot get security, let's talk that this peace process | :13:17. | :13:21. | |
they are doing at the moment between the two factions and succeed, but it | :13:22. | :13:24. | |
is always going to be more difficult. So I am not qualhfied to | :13:25. | :13:30. | |
give you, because I was not there at the time, was not Prime Minhster, I | :13:31. | :13:34. | |
do not know what planning w`s done, but I do know that what, and this is | :13:35. | :13:38. | |
why by the way I was trying to secure a peaceful transition, | :13:39. | :13:42. | |
whatever planning you do yotr are going to find it very, very tough to | :13:43. | :13:48. | |
stay in there for the long-term if you have got these radical dlements | :13:49. | :13:50. | |
that are trying to destabilhse the country. Thank you. | :13:51. | :13:58. | |
You can't make a judgment bdcause you weren't in government btt a very | :13:59. | :14:04. | |
simple question, knowing wh`t you know now, do you think Olivha is in | :14:05. | :14:09. | |
a better or worse place as ` result of the 2011 intervention? -, Libya. | :14:10. | :14:19. | |
It is very hard to predict things. I think Libya, the Libyan people were | :14:20. | :14:29. | |
not going to accept continuhng rule by Gaddafi. It is in a statd of | :14:30. | :14:36. | |
instability and chaos and h`s caused huge problems in the region. Boko | :14:37. | :14:44. | |
Haram and other groups have been strengthened as a result of shipping | :14:45. | :14:47. | |
weapons and personnel from Libya. That is all true. But I don't | :14:48. | :14:52. | |
believe the Gaddafi regime was sustainable and I think this again | :14:53. | :15:01. | |
goes to a wider argument. You often find people saying it would be | :15:02. | :15:03. | |
better if we dealt with the dictators. At least if we h`d Assad, | :15:04. | :15:18. | |
Saddam, get our free, we -- get a few -- Colonel Gaddafi, we knew what | :15:19. | :15:26. | |
we were dealing with. In particular, a tiny group of people will not be | :15:27. | :15:31. | |
tolerated, often on representative of the majority of the country, | :15:32. | :15:34. | |
running the country. It is difficult, I can tell you today that | :15:35. | :15:43. | |
Libya has security problems but I don't think you can make thd | :15:44. | :15:46. | |
judgment as to whether it would be better if we had not intervdned | :15:47. | :15:50. | |
because then you have to ask how it would have played out as Gaddafi | :15:51. | :15:57. | |
tried to cling onto power. Xou can look at where we didn't intdrvene. | :15:58. | :16:13. | |
One of the issues as taxing as is the relationship which changed | :16:14. | :16:18. | |
dramatically in three or fotr years after you brought Colonel G`ddafi in | :16:19. | :16:25. | |
from the cold. What we're trying to do is ascertain why that ch`nge took | :16:26. | :16:31. | |
place. If you just parked Bdnghazi for a second. The nature of that | :16:32. | :16:39. | |
relationship, and there werd positive aspects as we have been | :16:40. | :16:45. | |
reminded, but just for the record, was there any sort of understanding | :16:46. | :16:51. | |
or agreement, however inforlal, that difficult issues such as thd Justice | :16:52. | :16:56. | |
for Yvonne Fletcher's relathves would be sidelined for the greater | :16:57. | :17:02. | |
prize of better relations and commercial interests in orddr to | :17:03. | :17:06. | |
bring Colonel Gaddafi in from the cold. Let me deal specifically with | :17:07. | :17:13. | |
Yvonne Fletcher and the Lockerbie victims. It is important to realise | :17:14. | :17:22. | |
that Yvonne Fletcher was murdered in 1984. Compensation was secured under | :17:23. | :17:31. | |
my government. Lockerbie happened in 1988. Compensation was secured under | :17:32. | :17:37. | |
my government. So we didn't let these issues aside. Indeed, the | :17:38. | :17:43. | |
Metropolitan Police went to interview people about Yvonne | :17:44. | :17:49. | |
Fletcher under my government and the arrangements we brokered with the | :17:50. | :17:55. | |
Libyans. We didn't set any of these issues aside but we did belheve that | :17:56. | :18:01. | |
there was a huge prize in bringing them from a position of sponsoring | :18:02. | :18:06. | |
terrorism to core operating in the fight against it, and secondly | :18:07. | :18:11. | |
creating the circumstances hn which they would voluntarily give up their | :18:12. | :18:20. | |
chemical and nuclear weapons programme. When they revealdd that, | :18:21. | :18:24. | |
it amounted to much more th`n we thought it was. We did not have a | :18:25. | :18:30. | |
full and clear picture of it. One thing that is important which I am | :18:31. | :18:37. | |
happy to go through, before this so-called deal in the Desert, my | :18:38. | :18:45. | |
meeting with Colonel Gaddafh in 2004, that was part of the whole | :18:46. | :18:51. | |
process that had begun over one year before in which we were bringing | :18:52. | :18:57. | |
them to the point where thex were going to make a full and colplete | :18:58. | :19:05. | |
confession, as it were, as to what they had been doing with chdmical | :19:06. | :19:09. | |
and nuclear weapons. There wasn t a sort of moment when I suddenly went | :19:10. | :19:14. | |
to see Colonel Gaddafi and we made an agreement. There had been a whole | :19:15. | :19:20. | |
process at work. There are ten different steps along the w`y up to | :19:21. | :19:27. | |
that meeting in March 2004 `nd the prize for us was enormous. Ht was | :19:28. | :19:37. | |
important. On the sponsoring of terrorism, tickle operating, that | :19:38. | :19:42. | |
was important. Conversation is one thing but seeing people brotght to | :19:43. | :19:51. | |
justice for crimes is quite another. The CPS very early in 2007 took | :19:52. | :19:58. | |
possession of evidence, so ht claims, that two key individuals | :19:59. | :20:10. | |
should be brought to justicd. After the improvement in relations in | :20:11. | :20:15. | |
2007, the Met police did not go to Libya to pursue those | :20:16. | :20:23. | |
investigations. The ambassador to Tripoli said... That is outside the | :20:24. | :20:34. | |
terms of reference. Blair 's administration not to take tp the | :20:35. | :20:37. | |
cudgels on behalf of the victims. It would help us to have an | :20:38. | :20:48. | |
explanation. We need to unddrstand the relationship at the beghnning. | :20:49. | :20:52. | |
The relationship didn't change in 2007. We had worked with hil over a | :20:53. | :20:57. | |
period of years. I don't know why the Met police did not take the case | :20:58. | :21:04. | |
forward but I know that prior to my government coming to power there | :21:05. | :21:07. | |
would be no interview with `ny suspects in Libya. In 2006 the Met | :21:08. | :21:18. | |
police went to interview 60 different people. There was no sense | :21:19. | :21:25. | |
that we were holding back on this. On the contrary, we were rahsing it. | :21:26. | :21:30. | |
The case of Yvonne Fletcher was raised virtually everything of time. | :21:31. | :21:34. | |
I don't know what is being referred to but it may be the other hssue to | :21:35. | :21:39. | |
do with the IRA victims which is a separate question, but we dhd not | :21:40. | :21:43. | |
hold back on Lockerbie or Yvonne Fletcher. On the contrary, we got | :21:44. | :21:53. | |
not just compensation agreed but those trials happened under my | :21:54. | :22:01. | |
government so there was nevdr any question of not raising these issues | :22:02. | :22:04. | |
because we wanted commercial deals or get into a better relationship. | :22:05. | :22:08. | |
On the contrary, those issuds were part of the very improved | :22:09. | :22:16. | |
relationship we had. Your foreign policy could be argued to h`ve led | :22:17. | :22:25. | |
to the Gaddafi regime to give up nuclear weapons. Do you think he | :22:26. | :22:31. | |
would have used those weapons if he saw had them in 2011? I don't know. | :22:32. | :22:43. | |
The may have been in a position that it could have been used but their | :22:44. | :22:48. | |
chemical weapons, which are quite substantial, the amount that were | :22:49. | :23:00. | |
discovered in the end, 3500 chemical aerial bombs, 23 tonnes of lustard | :23:01. | :23:11. | |
gas and 1300 tonnes of chemhcal precursors, and SCUD missilds and | :23:12. | :23:18. | |
other things. The bigger danger would have been knocked him using it | :23:19. | :23:24. | |
but that stockpile falling hnto the hands of various extremist groups, | :23:25. | :23:34. | |
which proliferated in Libya. Do you think that if future governlents are | :23:35. | :23:40. | |
negotiating over weapons of mass to stretching with other dictators that | :23:41. | :23:46. | |
this might put them off, it could be an added competition, seeing what | :23:47. | :23:51. | |
happened in Libya? He gave tp his weapons of mass to structurhng and | :23:52. | :23:55. | |
then a few years later he w`s caught red by Western intervention. Make | :23:56. | :24:01. | |
that cause difficulties in future? That is a good question. It is | :24:02. | :24:07. | |
difficult because you can't justify the maintenance of the regile once | :24:08. | :24:18. | |
the people have risen up but I think... I mean, Assad cert`inly, | :24:19. | :24:25. | |
well, I say certainly, I thhnk there is evidence that Assad did take the | :24:26. | :24:38. | |
view that Gaddafi having copper operated -- cooperated with the West | :24:39. | :24:42. | |
and then been removed was a lesson he should learn and he, of course, | :24:43. | :24:49. | |
did not give up his chemical weapons because we know he used thel against | :24:50. | :24:59. | |
his own people. In the end H think Gaddafi had to go and I don't think | :25:00. | :25:02. | |
there is a way out of that. There is a reason why I tried to get a | :25:03. | :25:11. | |
situation as part of a transition is because I think it was important | :25:12. | :25:15. | |
that we recognised that for a period of years he had been incorporating | :25:16. | :25:21. | |
and also because of the lessons of instability once you remove the | :25:22. | :25:33. | |
dictatorship. You mentioned a moment ago, the situation with Yvonne | :25:34. | :25:37. | |
Fletcher and Lockerbie, you said Northern Ireland was differdnt | :25:38. | :25:43. | |
regarding Libyan supplied Sdmtex. Why was it different? The | :25:44. | :25:51. | |
compensation for the victims of IRA terrorism was handled under | :25:52. | :25:56. | |
provisions that in place under a previous government and that was how | :25:57. | :26:03. | |
it was handled. I think that was a position that was accepted not just | :26:04. | :26:11. | |
in my government but previotsly You will appreciate that honestx when it | :26:12. | :26:16. | |
come to why we intervened is paramount. Those of us who opposed | :26:17. | :26:22. | |
to the intervention in Liby` at the time did so for a variety of reasons | :26:23. | :26:26. | |
including the belief that the government didn't at that thme | :26:27. | :26:30. | |
understand the events on thd ground and there was a lack of | :26:31. | :26:34. | |
postintervention planning btt one of the other key reasons was what was | :26:35. | :26:41. | |
the actual motives? Was it `bout the citizens of Benghazi or reghme | :26:42. | :26:46. | |
change? Can I suggest that we have had evidence before suggesthng that | :26:47. | :26:53. | |
the court about the massacrd of the citizens of Benghazi was not | :26:54. | :26:56. | |
accurate and there are lots of quotes to suggests that he was | :26:57. | :27:02. | |
actually after what he calldd the bearded ones, Islamic terrorists, | :27:03. | :27:06. | |
and that there had been no large-scale massacre by Gaddafi in | :27:07. | :27:20. | |
further towns. Why you think the West intervened? New Met get a few | :27:21. | :27:24. | |
several times in the lead up to the intervention. Do you think he would | :27:25. | :27:29. | |
have undertaken that massacre and do you think it was a legitimate reason | :27:30. | :27:32. | |
for our intervention given that this would have not been true to form in | :27:33. | :27:41. | |
his previous taking of towns? The answer is I don't know. Let's not | :27:42. | :27:49. | |
kid ourselves, it was a repressive regime. His case was was and was at | :27:50. | :27:57. | |
the time when I spoke to hil around late February 2011, his casd was | :27:58. | :28:05. | |
that there were fundamentalhsts radical Islamist creating the | :28:06. | :28:15. | |
trouble and I tried to suggdst at the time that he might step aside | :28:16. | :28:22. | |
and have an international commission of some sort to investigate what has | :28:23. | :28:25. | |
happened. I don't know if it was possible or it would come to | :28:26. | :28:31. | |
anything. I'm sure the reason for intervention is the reason the | :28:32. | :28:34. | |
government gave at the time, they thought there was going to be this | :28:35. | :28:39. | |
slaughter of innocent peopld. Whether there would have bedn or | :28:40. | :28:48. | |
not, I can't judge. But one of the reasons why I thought it important | :28:49. | :28:54. | |
to try at least to get some agreed outcome was because obviously his | :28:55. | :29:01. | |
case, but I can't verify it, that his case was he was not eng`ged in | :29:02. | :29:09. | |
this violence. You also havd to look at the statement Gaddafi made about | :29:10. | :29:15. | |
killing people and so on, it is difficult to judge. Some of us did | :29:16. | :29:22. | |
suspect rightly or wrongly that there was a case that the Wdst was | :29:23. | :29:32. | |
thinking about regime changd. In 1973, it was a coup as far `s a | :29:33. | :29:36. | |
British were concerned, gre`t piece of diplomacy. The Russians, Chinese, | :29:37. | :29:43. | |
African union, subsequently came to the conclusion that that was about | :29:44. | :29:46. | |
regime change and in effect they had been hoodwinked in the UN to support | :29:47. | :29:54. | |
the resolution. The subsequdnt action they would point to, the | :29:55. | :30:01. | |
bombing of his Winnebago, h`rdly a communication centre, do yot think | :30:02. | :30:06. | |
these UN members had a case? I think when you have a reghme like | :30:07. | :30:18. | |
this it is very difficult to distinguish between removal of | :30:19. | :30:21. | |
regime and stopping the repression because the two are so intilately | :30:22. | :30:28. | |
connected. President Putin has often expressed the view that he `greed to | :30:29. | :30:33. | |
Libya on one basis and then it was pursued on a different basis but | :30:34. | :30:42. | |
then his view is that all of these regimes are worth keeping in place | :30:43. | :30:47. | |
because they provide stabilhty. My point is very simple, that H am | :30:48. | :30:53. | |
afraid they do not in the end because the people are not going to | :30:54. | :30:56. | |
tolerate being governed in that way and therefore we can have an | :30:57. | :31:02. | |
argument about whether the @rab Spring is right or wrong and there | :31:03. | :31:06. | |
are a lot of people who will see it is not a real Arab Spring, ht is an | :31:07. | :31:09. | |
arrow pointer because of evdrything that has happened but my pohnt is | :31:10. | :31:15. | |
that you might think that I may think that in President Puthn might | :31:16. | :31:18. | |
think that but the people are not going to have it so I do not know | :31:19. | :31:22. | |
that you can draw a very binary distinction between removing the | :31:23. | :31:25. | |
regime and stopping the reghme killing people in that way but, | :31:26. | :31:31. | |
again, the hesitation you express and my own experience from | :31:32. | :31:37. | |
Afghanistan and Iraq was wh`t made me think if you can get evolution -- | :31:38. | :31:46. | |
get evolution, get it. This is why they are so obsessed with President | :31:47. | :31:49. | |
Mubarak in Egypt, let's try and work for a transition because if you do | :31:50. | :31:54. | |
not then first of all someone who has been your ally for a long period | :31:55. | :31:57. | |
of time and you are now gorgeous with them on a bus, that is not in | :31:58. | :32:03. | |
my view is great to policy. -- and you are now going to throw them | :32:04. | :32:09. | |
under a bus. We know what the problems are when the regimd goes so | :32:10. | :32:12. | |
I think there are two big ldssons out of all of this in the Mhddle | :32:13. | :32:15. | |
East based on not just the experience I had in office but being | :32:16. | :32:21. | |
out there twice per month, dvolution is better than revolution if you can | :32:22. | :32:32. | |
get it. And as especially when it turns into an extreme form of | :32:33. | :32:40. | |
Islamist fundamentalism or radicalism is going to be a problem. | :32:41. | :32:44. | |
That is going to be a probldm. Because let's be clear if you took | :32:45. | :32:50. | |
that component out of it we would not be having this discussion. Very | :32:51. | :32:54. | |
briefly, can I just press you if you do not mind Mr Blair, at thd time | :32:55. | :33:01. | |
given what you knew of the regime, given his actions previouslx in | :33:02. | :33:04. | |
sending his son to negotiatd to release prisoners and try to if you | :33:05. | :33:13. | |
like engage whilst isolated the extremists, giving your knowledge of | :33:14. | :33:16. | |
him and the regime, do you think it was right that the undertakhng a | :33:17. | :33:20. | |
bombing campaign and were you surprised by how long it took? I | :33:21. | :33:26. | |
think that once it was clearly were not going to agree a transition I do | :33:27. | :33:31. | |
not think there was an option but to get him out. But I think, and we | :33:32. | :33:40. | |
been able to agree a transition that would have been a better outcome. | :33:41. | :33:47. | |
Thank you. Mr Blair based on what you have just said about thd | :33:48. | :33:52. | |
preference of evolution rather than re-evolution, I think we have | :33:53. | :33:58. | |
learned that lesson. Do you think that in the mind of President | :33:59. | :34:00. | |
Sarkozy at David Cameron, do you think that they were trying to get a | :34:01. | :34:08. | |
-- get an evolution of Gadd`fi's regime going in a transitional way | :34:09. | :34:12. | |
or do you think they had given up hope or did they even try to succeed | :34:13. | :34:16. | |
in having more of an evoluthon rather than what we finished up | :34:17. | :34:22. | |
with? You are asking me to step into the might of two people I al not, as | :34:23. | :34:26. | |
it were, so I find that difficult to do. Because I had taken these types | :34:27. | :34:33. | |
of decisions in government lyself I am not going to criticise the Prime | :34:34. | :34:36. | |
Minister or Nicholas are catsing or anyone else, I know how difficult | :34:37. | :34:41. | |
these decisions are. I suspdct they came to the view that in thd end | :34:42. | :34:44. | |
there was no alternative but to remove Gaddafi if they wantdd to | :34:45. | :34:48. | |
save the country so I am sure they did it for reasons that are | :34:49. | :34:52. | |
perfectly well-intentioned `nd in good faith and I cannot, I lean I am | :34:53. | :35:00. | |
not able to tell you what they thought, but if you want my instinct | :35:01. | :35:05. | |
about it I think the thought he is going to kill large numbers of | :35:06. | :35:08. | |
people and we do have to intervene. Unless the clear the majority of | :35:09. | :35:11. | |
people in Libya wanted to sde Gaddafi gone, they do not w`nt the | :35:12. | :35:16. | |
present situation now but that has been the same in Afghanistan, it is | :35:17. | :35:20. | |
the same in Iraq, it is the same in Libya, the same in Syria, the same | :35:21. | :35:25. | |
in Yemen, people want rid of the same regime because it does not read | :35:26. | :35:31. | |
the people. Will had you sthll been in number ten at the time would you | :35:32. | :35:34. | |
have handled it in the same way differently? Because of the | :35:35. | :35:39. | |
relationship I had built and would have tried very hard to sectre an | :35:40. | :35:42. | |
agreement that he go under some process of transition and bdcause of | :35:43. | :35:46. | |
the experience I have been through in Afghanistan and Iraq, but I | :35:47. | :35:51. | |
cannot see the year that wotld have been successful. It might not have | :35:52. | :35:56. | |
been. Some of these people who have been in power a long time, they are | :35:57. | :36:02. | |
used to very repressive systems of government, they are not easy to | :36:03. | :36:06. | |
negotiate with. When you ard negotiating the end of the regime. I | :36:07. | :36:13. | |
would have, obviously because of the relationship I built up, I would | :36:14. | :36:19. | |
have tried to do in governmdnt what I tried to do outside of it as a | :36:20. | :36:24. | |
private individual, but I c`nnot say whether it would have succedded or | :36:25. | :36:29. | |
not. Let's explore some of those details as to what you did. Can you | :36:30. | :36:34. | |
tell us about the Telephone call you made to Colonel Gaddafi in figure | :36:35. | :36:42. | |
2011? Yes, I had a call in which I said, and I have pleased to give | :36:43. | :36:49. | |
some of the detail of the conversation since it has bden | :36:50. | :36:54. | |
presented as if other try to see Gaddafi, I was not try to sde | :36:55. | :36:59. | |
Gaddafi, I was trying to get into... You probably remember the | :37:00. | :37:01. | |
conversation she had and thd strategy you were following so. . | :37:02. | :37:07. | |
This is me in one of the e-lails, I said this, there was a note of the | :37:08. | :37:11. | |
Cole sent to the Secretary of State in the US, and just to read some of | :37:12. | :37:17. | |
the key parts. It gives you a sense of what I was saying. Tony Blair | :37:18. | :37:23. | |
delivered a very strong message to Colonel Gaddafi that the violence at | :37:24. | :37:27. | |
the end, that he has to stand aside to allow a peaceful process to take | :37:28. | :37:30. | |
place, and repeated this several times throughout the call, he | :37:31. | :37:33. | |
repeated the violence had to stop and he must leave the country. The | :37:34. | :37:37. | |
absolute key thing is that the bloodshed and violence must stop, if | :37:38. | :37:41. | |
you have a safe place to go then you should go there because this will | :37:42. | :37:45. | |
not end peacefully unless that happens and there has to be a | :37:46. | :37:51. | |
process of change. So it is... It was not that, my concern was not for | :37:52. | :37:57. | |
his safety but my concern w`s to get it out of the situation so ` | :37:58. | :38:00. | |
peaceful transition could t`ke place. Were you doing so as a | :38:01. | :38:07. | |
concerned private citizen or an the half of some of the else? I was | :38:08. | :38:11. | |
doing it because I was a concerned private citizen and I had the | :38:12. | :38:16. | |
relationship and, as I say, having gone through my own experience in | :38:17. | :38:21. | |
office, I was aware of what the risks are. So you did this of your | :38:22. | :38:27. | |
own volition? Yes, absolutely. And was this the only phone call you had | :38:28. | :38:33. | |
with Colonel Gaddafi at that time? I had two or three but all to the same | :38:34. | :38:36. | |
effect. So there were more calls than the one that we have? Xes but | :38:37. | :38:42. | |
this was all over the space of about 24 hours. And I had two or three | :38:43. | :38:50. | |
calls with him, I think. Thdy were all basically saying, there is going | :38:51. | :38:57. | |
to be action unless you comd up with an agreed process of change, if you | :38:58. | :39:00. | |
do not do that they are going to come and get you out. Did anyone | :39:01. | :39:06. | |
else, even though you were doing it as a private citizen, did anyone ask | :39:07. | :39:12. | |
you to make that call? Now, I suggested I make it, and I cleared | :39:13. | :39:16. | |
it with the Secretary of St`te in the US and I think I spoke one time | :39:17. | :39:20. | |
to our Prime Minister here, the David Cameron. They were colpletely | :39:21. | :39:26. | |
noncommittal, but prepared to listen to what I have to say. It m`kes you | :39:27. | :39:30. | |
made it clear to the pre-minister and the Secretary of State of the | :39:31. | :39:33. | |
United States and then you just phoned him up? Yes. What was your | :39:34. | :39:41. | |
objective for that call? Yot have touched on it a little bit but what | :39:42. | :39:44. | |
did you want to see at the dnd of that? What I wanted to see was a | :39:45. | :39:49. | |
situation where he agreed that there would be a process of changd and my | :39:50. | :39:57. | |
idea was actually, we never got far enough into detail of this but my | :39:58. | :40:01. | |
idea was that he step aside, that there was then a form of | :40:02. | :40:09. | |
international, UN led commission that would see what the sittation | :40:10. | :40:13. | |
was in the country and could then bring the different factions | :40:14. | :40:17. | |
together including the one that he represented, because it is not like | :40:18. | :40:20. | |
he had no representation in the country, and see if it was possible | :40:21. | :40:25. | |
to agree a transition but in the end events took over as the dead. And | :40:26. | :40:30. | |
given there was a series of phone calls, I am wondering if yot can | :40:31. | :40:33. | |
tell me how you left it and was there a note-taking of the other | :40:34. | :40:38. | |
phone calls that took place? I do not know whether there was ` note of | :40:39. | :40:42. | |
the other calls, there was ` note of the calls with him. So therd was a | :40:43. | :40:48. | |
note of the other phone calls with Colonel Qaddafi? Yes, they were all | :40:49. | :40:56. | |
to the same effect. We have lots and I am very happy to show thel. That | :40:57. | :41:03. | |
would be very helpful. It is as set out in the e-mail that is ptblished. | :41:04. | :41:11. | |
Those 24 hours, was that yot only stab at engagement or where their | :41:12. | :41:14. | |
subsequent efforts over the next six months or so? My only utility was to | :41:15. | :41:22. | |
use the religion ship I had with him to get him to do something. And once | :41:23. | :41:28. | |
it became clear that there was no appetite to do this then evdnts has | :41:29. | :41:35. | |
to take their course and as I see in the end it became clear that he was | :41:36. | :41:42. | |
going to be... Were you try to help with, in the period video to his | :41:43. | :41:46. | |
death, when you engaged in `ny other discussions with any other lembers | :41:47. | :41:54. | |
of the family regime, where people seem to engage you and try `nd find | :41:55. | :42:00. | |
a way out of it? Your Mac now, I think I was clear there was no other | :42:01. | :42:05. | |
way out of it. Once it becale clear there was a conflict in my own | :42:06. | :42:09. | |
country I did not want to gdt in the middle of that. Given your | :42:10. | :42:12. | |
relationship, where you surprised that number ten did not use you | :42:13. | :42:20. | |
more? They were perfectly open to my having the conversation with him, as | :42:21. | :42:26. | |
I recall, there was never a problem with that at all but there was a | :42:27. | :42:30. | |
very strong feeling particularly in the US that he just had to go and | :42:31. | :42:37. | |
that was, the point is, these things are very difficult. The practical | :42:38. | :42:46. | |
business of politics comes hnto play. One of the reasons whx even | :42:47. | :42:51. | |
though I had a terrible rel`tionship with Assad, I said when this began | :42:52. | :42:58. | |
in Syria, if you can agree. So transition then do it, becatse of | :42:59. | :43:06. | |
the consequence of not doing it But certainly do not leave them in | :43:07. | :43:11. | |
place, tell and he has to go and not get him out. You mentioned darlier | :43:12. | :43:17. | |
that the dealings especiallx in terms of WMD, made any deal with | :43:18. | :43:25. | |
Assad much more difficult. Did you feed in that regard and what lessons | :43:26. | :43:30. | |
did you draw? Not really, again you just can't tell whether it would | :43:31. | :43:33. | |
have have been possible to have done a deal with Assad, if you would go | :43:34. | :43:40. | |
under a process of transition. But to my point, that evolution is | :43:41. | :43:42. | |
better than revolution, even when you have an uprising if you can | :43:43. | :43:46. | |
agree the process of transition it is better because you have ` better | :43:47. | :43:52. | |
chance of holding the stability of the country together. It is | :43:53. | :43:57. | |
perfectly possible that even if you, even if he has said yes and everyone | :43:58. | :44:01. | |
wanted it that you still cotld not have made it happen and you might | :44:02. | :44:05. | |
still have had the situation of civil war. As I see one of the | :44:06. | :44:10. | |
problems is there are peopld with very different agendas who want | :44:11. | :44:16. | |
these regimes to fall. Some of the agendas that we would recognise | :44:17. | :44:20. | |
some have agendas that we would find very difficult to compromisd with. | :44:21. | :44:25. | |
And this is why it is difficult This is why it is difficult, as I | :44:26. | :44:33. | |
keep saying, you have two areas of policy making, the policy-m`king of | :44:34. | :44:38. | |
September 2001, as it were, through Afghanistan and Iraq and thdn you | :44:39. | :44:42. | |
have the policy-making period post added spring. And what they show is | :44:43. | :44:49. | |
it is difficult. It is very, very difficult because you have got these | :44:50. | :44:55. | |
radical forces, and external actors and even if you want to stabilise, | :44:56. | :44:59. | |
even if you want the best thing is possible for that country, dven if | :45:00. | :45:03. | |
you people do by the way, as a majority of people in all of these | :45:04. | :45:06. | |
countries probably what decdnt stable government and rule-based | :45:07. | :45:11. | |
economy and a gorgeously coloured society but unfortunately their | :45:12. | :45:14. | |
actors in the region and eldments within those countries who do not | :45:15. | :45:17. | |
want those things and that hs the problem. That is why giving with the | :45:18. | :45:19. | |
situations is a world away from dealing with Kosovo or other | :45:20. | :45:25. | |
situations, Bosnia are other situations of intervention. | :45:26. | :45:36. | |
Was it in your initiative to speak to Colonel Qaddafi or did they | :45:37. | :45:47. | |
contact you? I decided to contact them. It was your initiativd. Let me | :45:48. | :45:56. | |
check on that on whether thdre were calls from those people first. Where | :45:57. | :46:02. | |
you asked by anyone else to act as a go-between or to liaise with Gaddafi | :46:03. | :46:08. | |
by the US government or anyone in the British government? I w`s not | :46:09. | :46:13. | |
asked to do that but I obviously cleared the fact I was doing it I | :46:14. | :46:17. | |
didn't want to have these conversations without peopld saying | :46:18. | :46:21. | |
OK. But they were not committing themselves, either the US or British | :46:22. | :46:29. | |
governments, to any outcome. Did we get a few regime to exercisd any | :46:30. | :46:36. | |
influence you might have -- of the Gaddafi regime ask you to exercise | :46:37. | :46:48. | |
any influence you might havd had? It never got far enough to get into a | :46:49. | :46:54. | |
detailed discussion. But of course they were wanting me to use my | :46:55. | :46:59. | |
influence whether the other governments and also wanted me to | :47:00. | :47:07. | |
explain their case, which is they were not attacking their population. | :47:08. | :47:11. | |
That was his claim throughott, it was not true, not happening. I | :47:12. | :47:16. | |
couldn't tell whether it was true or not. At what point did you give up | :47:17. | :47:22. | |
any hope of a transition or an air pollution? It -- F Aleutian -- | :47:23. | :47:35. | |
evolution. It happened quickly, over a couple of days. Was Mr Caleron | :47:36. | :47:42. | |
positive about your intervention and initiative in doing this? You would | :47:43. | :47:48. | |
have to ask him about that but I think he was perfectly contdnt | :47:49. | :47:53. | |
without any commitment at all, Beasley and perfectly properly, for | :47:54. | :47:56. | |
the conversation to happen. But don't let me put words in hhs mouth. | :47:57. | :48:02. | |
He was not agreeing or advocating it but merely listening. You m`de the | :48:03. | :48:10. | |
point earlier that evolution is better than revolution but xou | :48:11. | :48:16. | |
suggested that view was that he had to go. In Europe discussions, trying | :48:17. | :48:22. | |
to make the case for transition What sort of reception digit at to | :48:23. | :48:27. | |
that line of inquiry? Was the problem not just wrapped thd West's | :48:28. | :48:32. | |
lack of understanding but actually you are speaking to a regimd that | :48:33. | :48:40. | |
did not agree with you and would cling on to the end regardldss? | :48:41. | :48:50. | |
Obviously what was felt was that this is somebody who will try to | :48:51. | :48:54. | |
cling on to power matter wh`t. There is a real risk he will kill large | :48:55. | :48:57. | |
numbers of people we have to stop that. Which I understand. If the | :48:58. | :49:08. | |
opening had been there it would probably have been worth | :49:09. | :49:12. | |
investigating but things ch`nged quickly and I did not make `ny | :49:13. | :49:16. | |
criticism of the Prime Minister for the decision he took, which I think | :49:17. | :49:19. | |
you took in good faith for the reasons he gave. Once the mhlitary | :49:20. | :49:28. | |
action started, did you belheve that the military action exceeded the | :49:29. | :49:36. | |
terms allowed within UN resolution 1973 which did not authorisd, it was | :49:37. | :49:52. | |
quite clear in its an ambigtity And if you look at their action on the | :49:53. | :49:55. | |
ground, it well exceeded thd resolution. My take on thesd | :49:56. | :50:01. | |
situations is that sometimes people come and agree UN resolutions with | :50:02. | :50:08. | |
slightly different agendas, as it were, and different underst`ndings | :50:09. | :50:11. | |
of those resolutions but my take was once you engage in a military action | :50:12. | :50:18. | |
to protect people against a regime, the line between that and rdgime | :50:19. | :50:29. | |
change becomes pretty thin. Do you think UN resolution 1973 was | :50:30. | :50:38. | |
exceeded. I am not... You are not going to answer the question? I am | :50:39. | :50:46. | |
answering as best I can. Obviously the committee is going to look at | :50:47. | :50:52. | |
this absolutely properly and make up your own mind but I'm very lindful | :50:53. | :50:57. | |
of the fact that having been Prime Minister for ten years and taking | :50:58. | :51:01. | |
decisions which were subject to a lot of criticism that I know how | :51:02. | :51:05. | |
difficult it is so I am not come to get into a position of crithcising | :51:06. | :51:09. | |
my successor. I understand the reasons why they did what they did | :51:10. | :51:17. | |
and I have not... Since I w`sn't personally involved in the | :51:18. | :51:21. | |
decision-making process, I have learnt enough during my timd not to | :51:22. | :51:27. | |
be speculative. I accept th`t but one also accepts there are very few | :51:28. | :51:33. | |
easy decisions in foreign policy. We are not asking you to criticise we | :51:34. | :51:39. | |
just want your assessment as to whether the military action that | :51:40. | :51:42. | |
came from that resolution actually exceeded the resolution. I don't | :51:43. | :51:47. | |
think it did because once you get to a certain point the line between | :51:48. | :51:51. | |
regime change in protecting people is thin. Just another reason very | :51:52. | :52:00. | |
briefly that there was concdrn in the house at the time of thd vote | :52:01. | :52:07. | |
was there seems to be a lack of understanding as to events on the | :52:08. | :52:14. | |
ground, the forces at play, not just Labour but Conservative govdrnments, | :52:15. | :52:25. | |
but the concern was once yot remove the common enemy, Gaddafi, the | :52:26. | :52:34. | |
alliance facing him, we did not understand how easily it cotld | :52:35. | :52:37. | |
fragment into 100 millage is and actually in the end that is roughly | :52:38. | :52:43. | |
what turned out to be the c`se. Can you give us your take? You knew the | :52:44. | :52:52. | |
region probably better than most in Whitehall. Why was there a lack of | :52:53. | :52:56. | |
understanding as to what wotld happen when the common enemx was | :52:57. | :53:00. | |
removed and what perhaps cotld have been done differently, moving aside | :53:01. | :53:08. | |
that evolution point? Frankly, nowadays are understanding should be | :53:09. | :53:14. | |
pretty good so... Because wd have a lot of experience of that. The | :53:15. | :53:21. | |
problem is, and I think this is always clear, because you h`ve in | :53:22. | :53:33. | |
North Africa and the Middle East, this very toxic mix of bad politics | :53:34. | :53:40. | |
and abuse of religion over ` long period of time so whenever xou | :53:41. | :53:52. | |
remove the lid, as it were, then you are going to have a situation in | :53:53. | :53:58. | |
which there are these activhties happen and because of this, and I | :53:59. | :54:04. | |
stress this because I think this is the fundamental thing I havd come to | :54:05. | :54:08. | |
understand about the whole region, where you have Islamist extremism as | :54:09. | :54:15. | |
a factor, you are going to have a degree of instability more than just | :54:16. | :54:19. | |
militias and more than just aren't groups -- armed groups. Thex have a | :54:20. | :54:26. | |
view of the world in which they don't mind how many people they kill | :54:27. | :54:33. | |
and they don't mind dying so it makes them actually very difficult | :54:34. | :54:40. | |
to deal with in a situation where you are going to be trying to create | :54:41. | :54:44. | |
stability when they're trying to stop it so what happens in these | :54:45. | :54:49. | |
countries, and you notice this each time, which is why it is important | :54:50. | :54:54. | |
to learn the lessons of all the interventions, when you first get | :54:55. | :54:58. | |
rid of the dictator there is general support. I agree, and then ht | :54:59. | :55:07. | |
fragments. Should we have bden aware? One of the criticism was we | :55:08. | :55:11. | |
spent a lot of money kicking down the door but little money following | :55:12. | :55:20. | |
through with reconstruction and we misunderstood events on the ground, | :55:21. | :55:27. | |
example, thinking the National Council were moderates. I think we | :55:28. | :55:37. | |
would have had a plan but the issue is if you underestimate the security | :55:38. | :55:45. | |
problem because planning is... My experience of these situations is | :55:46. | :55:50. | |
that planning as two parts. Security, reconstruction,, social | :55:51. | :55:57. | |
and economic building. If you have a problem with that planning xou can | :55:58. | :56:04. | |
create that -- correct it. But it is the first bit, the security, that is | :56:05. | :56:10. | |
a problem. If you can't handle the security then you can't do this | :56:11. | :56:19. | |
reconstruction so... We knew that before we intervened that there was | :56:20. | :56:23. | |
going to be a security issud because if you are right in what yot tell us | :56:24. | :56:28. | |
that we knew it would fragmdnt into 100 militias, there simply was no | :56:29. | :56:32. | |
proper response then by the West. Should that have been a factor | :56:33. | :56:36. | |
before we went in? If we kndw it would splinter into that security | :56:37. | :56:41. | |
situation, should that not have been uppermost in our minds before making | :56:42. | :56:47. | |
the decision, knowing it wotld degenerate into a civil war? You | :56:48. | :56:53. | |
will have to write your own report. I understand your point and I think | :56:54. | :56:57. | |
there's a real aspect and dhmension of this which isn't just applied to | :56:58. | :57:04. | |
Libya, but a range of situations, where one central part of planning | :57:05. | :57:12. | |
is you have to decide how to deal with the security aspect because | :57:13. | :57:16. | |
that will be your problem and if there is not ordered... What is it | :57:17. | :57:19. | |
that the previous press of regime that? It probably did everything | :57:20. | :57:25. | |
wrong but the one thing these repressive regimes do is kedp a lid | :57:26. | :57:29. | |
on the security problem to ` degree. Until you find that the eruptions of | :57:30. | :57:41. | |
the Arab spring and so on... Unless you have security as part of your | :57:42. | :57:44. | |
planning, even though lots of people will tell you in the opposition it | :57:45. | :57:50. | |
will be great, we will come together and work together, it will be good, | :57:51. | :57:55. | |
and by the way, many of thel will be hoping that will be so and wanting | :57:56. | :58:05. | |
to make it so, but it is whdre you intervene and Islamist extrdmism | :58:06. | :58:08. | |
will be an element, you will have to have a major security components to | :58:09. | :58:12. | |
anything you do. We will face the same problem in Syria. Supposing we | :58:13. | :58:17. | |
end up with an agreement as to what should happen in future, who will | :58:18. | :58:22. | |
impose the order that allows that new constitution to take sh`pe and | :58:23. | :58:31. | |
be implemented? That is where were trying to divert the Prime | :58:32. | :58:35. | |
Minister's attention through this committee and we have made some | :58:36. | :58:40. | |
progress. Back to 2011 and ` report on the UN security council. | :58:41. | :58:47. | |
Disagreements between peopld concerned about the Prime Mhnister's | :58:48. | :58:51. | |
enthusiasm to be seen to be doing the right thing and taking out the | :58:52. | :58:58. | |
dictator of a regime without there being a sense that there was a | :58:59. | :59:05. | |
follow-on strategy and this was coherent and within the British | :59:06. | :59:08. | |
national interest and the whder security interest, and with all the | :59:09. | :59:13. | |
lessons you will have learndd and the country has learned through the | :59:14. | :59:22. | |
experience we had, and trying to put you in the position of David Cameron | :59:23. | :59:30. | |
at that time, in that discussion in the national Security Counchl, I | :59:31. | :59:32. | |
think you would have taken rather more notice of the head of the | :59:33. | :59:40. | |
secret intelligence and defdnce I am not here to criticise thd Prime | :59:41. | :59:41. | |
Minister. I do not need to be, in a sdnse I do | :59:42. | :59:51. | |
mean to be avoiding the question because I do not think it is a fair | :59:52. | :59:56. | |
question to put to me. I was not in that situation, I do not know the | :59:57. | :00:00. | |
facts that he would have known. I have been in that situation myself | :00:01. | :00:03. | |
but there could have been other factors, I will not be in that | :00:04. | :00:11. | |
position. But you are probably the most informed witness in terms of | :00:12. | :00:18. | |
dealing with the Gaddafi regime and indeed the re-engagement of the | :00:19. | :00:25. | |
Gaddafi regime with the whole world, is a single achievement of xour | :00:26. | :00:30. | |
foreign policy under your premiership. So I did not think it | :00:31. | :00:34. | |
is unreasonable for us to sde what your reaction was in 2011 when you | :00:35. | :00:42. | |
did try to take a hand off xour own back and you witnessed this with all | :00:43. | :00:47. | |
of that experience, whether Juba quietly weeping into your phllow at | :00:48. | :00:52. | |
night thinking why on earth have they not thought this through | :00:53. | :00:54. | |
properly? Why update not trxing to find another way out of this, | :00:55. | :01:01. | |
largely followed the French had with American reluctance following this | :01:02. | :01:11. | |
British and French exercise. I am curious what your views are. You are | :01:12. | :01:16. | |
a privileged witness in that sense. We have got to learn the lessons for | :01:17. | :01:23. | |
our report and your views are authoritative. I think, if H had | :01:24. | :01:29. | |
been there at the time it obviously would have been different bdcause | :01:30. | :01:33. | |
the relationship with him, `nd that would have been one dimensional the | :01:34. | :01:37. | |
approach that would have bedn different. If we could have got | :01:38. | :01:44. | |
another way out that would have been preferable but I understand why the | :01:45. | :01:47. | |
Prime Minister took the view that ultimately that was impossible, and | :01:48. | :01:53. | |
I do not think I have anythhng more to say. Just one very brief | :01:54. | :01:58. | |
question, an important question I think Mr Blair, Colonel Gaddafi did | :01:59. | :02:04. | |
some pretty atrocious things. Did at any point, I know why you dhd it, I | :02:05. | :02:10. | |
know why you felt the need to build that relationship with them, but did | :02:11. | :02:14. | |
you at any point fuel doubld that having to deal with the man that had | :02:15. | :02:21. | |
murdered so many people and committed so many atrocities, did | :02:22. | :02:26. | |
you at any point fuel that was agricultural position to be in? Did | :02:27. | :02:31. | |
you feel the ends justify the means? I do not think the ends justified | :02:32. | :02:36. | |
the means, and when I was ghven with him I was completely cognis`nt of | :02:37. | :02:39. | |
the history and the terribld things that had been done. But I dhd think | :02:40. | :02:48. | |
the prize was significant so, at a certain point you take that decision | :02:49. | :02:52. | |
as to whether it is right to do it or not and I felt it was in the | :02:53. | :02:55. | |
cooperation that we got was not just the giving up of the nuclear | :02:56. | :03:00. | |
chemical weapons programmes but the cooperation we got on terrorism was | :03:01. | :03:04. | |
really important for us, thhs was part of keeping our own country | :03:05. | :03:14. | |
safe. So, it is... If you fdel you should not do it, you should not do | :03:15. | :03:19. | |
it. If you feel it is the rhght thing to do then you should do it | :03:20. | :03:22. | |
and that is, but I did not do it weeping to one side the thing he had | :03:23. | :03:28. | |
done before, indeed the reason why as I say I only met him aftdr a | :03:29. | :03:37. | |
year's worth of intense in Gatewood because he first got in touch with | :03:38. | :03:47. | |
our people in March 2000 three. About their chemical and nuclear | :03:48. | :03:51. | |
programmes. That is when thdy got in touch, March 2000 three. And after | :03:52. | :03:57. | |
that there was some ten different steps before I finally went to see | :03:58. | :04:02. | |
her mind when I went to see him Lockerbie, Yvonne Fletcher, these | :04:03. | :04:07. | |
were absolutely in my mind `nd part of the conversation but I fdlt | :04:08. | :04:10. | |
ultimately that the game was worth it and I do believe it was worth it. | :04:11. | :04:15. | |
That is not to say that I approve of what either he did before or the way | :04:16. | :04:21. | |
he runs his country. But I felt the benefit for our country and for the | :04:22. | :04:25. | |
wider world of him shifting his position on those two questhons was | :04:26. | :04:31. | |
great and I had in the hope that it was probably missed place, but I had | :04:32. | :04:35. | |
the hope that he would also get ultimately in political and economic | :04:36. | :04:38. | |
reform. In those conversations you had with Gaddafi at the timd, did | :04:39. | :04:48. | |
he, presumably he was asking you to help him and to make a case for He | :04:49. | :04:56. | |
was asking, if you did thesd things, would he be... Would he survive | :04:57. | :05:03. | |
Would he be able to rejoin the international community as ht were | :05:04. | :05:06. | |
and we were spelling out thd steps he had to take so it was all about | :05:07. | :05:10. | |
trying to get him into a different place but of course he knew that the | :05:11. | :05:16. | |
carrot, if you like, for th`t is that he would then come back into | :05:17. | :05:19. | |
the international community and one of the things that happened with | :05:20. | :05:25. | |
someone like that and, you know in the conversations I had, | :05:26. | :05:30. | |
conversations with him about the things that he wanted to have happen | :05:31. | :05:37. | |
and then you would have... Because I was the only... I was not the only | :05:38. | :05:41. | |
leader who was seeing him, he was seeing other Europeans but for some | :05:42. | :05:45. | |
reason he felt that I was hhs route into the, you know, into thd West | :05:46. | :05:51. | |
and being able to re-engage with the Americans entered the past behind | :05:52. | :05:54. | |
him until he would speak very frankly to me about his views that | :05:55. | :05:57. | |
he was an individual who had shut off from the world for about 30 | :05:58. | :06:04. | |
years. In the sense of our world. And so he had theories on rdsolving | :06:05. | :06:11. | |
the Israeli-Palestinian isste, he had theories on third Way politics, | :06:12. | :06:23. | |
he had theories about Islam and how it should develop so he was somebody | :06:24. | :06:30. | |
who a lot of the time, this is the issue with some of these people | :06:31. | :06:33. | |
they have been so isolated that they really have not heard sensible | :06:34. | :06:39. | |
arguments and their system does not allow many people to come and talk | :06:40. | :06:46. | |
to them so of course he wanted to benefit by re-engaging with the West | :06:47. | :06:50. | |
and to me that is fair enough, that is the point, if he's prepared to | :06:51. | :06:53. | |
come into compliance with international rules on WMD, | :06:54. | :06:58. | |
terrorism and so on, then hd can be engaged with and the engagelent was | :06:59. | :07:04. | |
and I stress this, it was invaluable for our security services. Hn terms | :07:05. | :07:12. | |
of your three conversations that we look forward to seeing thosd | :07:13. | :07:15. | |
transcripts as part of an enquiry, but in terms of those conversations, | :07:16. | :07:20. | |
did he give you a specific lessage that he was asking you to t`ke back | :07:21. | :07:24. | |
the David Cameron or anyone else, as you were saying, as his conduit In | :07:25. | :07:31. | |
2011? His basic message was you have to tell them it is not true that I | :07:32. | :07:36. | |
am exercising this violence against my people, I am attacking Islamist | :07:37. | :07:40. | |
side they are your enemy as well as my enemy. That was pretty mtch it? I | :07:41. | :07:46. | |
am not saying that is true by the labour that is what he said. | :07:47. | :07:51. | |
Finally, a final question, was he a rational actor? Given the | :07:52. | :07:56. | |
limitations of his worldview and isolated few but in your medtings | :07:57. | :08:04. | |
with them as a leader? That is a very good question and hard to | :08:05. | :08:12. | |
answer. He was unusual. That is for sure. I don't... I don't know. I do | :08:13. | :08:26. | |
not lie rational he would h`ve been in the circumstances, was hd | :08:27. | :08:29. | |
rational enough to realise he had to step aside? To see a way to rid It | :08:30. | :08:37. | |
is very hard to judge but I think he did... He said, at any rate, that he | :08:38. | :08:48. | |
did have a very clear view that this Islamism that he had at one time | :08:49. | :08:54. | |
supported plate with -- and played with was a profound threat that we | :08:55. | :08:57. | |
do not understand how deep this that was and how severe but when you talk | :08:58. | :09:04. | |
to him about, for example Israel and Palestine he had this, I relember | :09:05. | :09:10. | |
getting a presentation on hhs Israel team solution which was, let's say, | :09:11. | :09:19. | |
on the eccentric end of the Israeli-Palestinian discusshon. I do | :09:20. | :09:27. | |
not know. He governed his country for a long period of time so I guess | :09:28. | :09:30. | |
there must have been a cert`in amount of rationality in th`t but it | :09:31. | :09:35. | |
is very hard to judge with someone like that. Very hard to judge. Thank | :09:36. | :09:41. | |
you very much indeed for coling together as evidence. If yotr team | :09:42. | :09:45. | |
can give is the transcript of the things you have offered us `nd | :09:46. | :09:48. | |
indeed anything else you thhnk would help us with the enquiry, obviously | :09:49. | :09:52. | |
we would like to draw the rhght lessons out of this as well as | :09:53. | :09:56. | |
examining the context in whhch the decision was taken. If you can let | :09:57. | :10:01. | |
us have that by the year and that would be... I am very happy to send | :10:02. | :10:05. | |
you a transcripts of conversations and one or two points in my evidence | :10:06. | :10:09. | |
where I said I had to check things up. I will let you know. Th`nk you | :10:10. | :10:15. | |
very much. Order, order. | :10:16. | :10:18. |