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go to the liaison is committee, where Jack Chilcot will givd his | :00:00. | :00:00. | |
report. I will give you a moment to get your | :00:00. | :00:16. | |
papers out. Thank you. Thank you very much for coming to see us this | :00:17. | :00:23. | |
afternoon, Sir John. This is a very important subject, one of the most | :00:24. | :00:29. | |
important, perhaps the most important inquiry that has been | :00:30. | :00:32. | |
undertaken for a very long time in this country. It has caused great | :00:33. | :00:37. | |
distress to families of those that were killed and wounded. Thd Iraq | :00:38. | :00:46. | |
invasion was of great cost to the country and many feel that the cost | :00:47. | :00:51. | |
is still being born now. It has taken a long time for you to get to, | :00:52. | :01:01. | |
as you see it, the bottom of what happened and why. That is why we're | :01:02. | :01:05. | |
here today. It is possible that other select committees may want to | :01:06. | :01:08. | |
call you, subsequently. The first instance that you have here, some of | :01:09. | :01:17. | |
the main committees for whol this is a particular interest in thd term of | :01:18. | :01:24. | |
their chairman. I would likd to start by looking in some detail at | :01:25. | :01:31. | |
your public statement of thd 6th of July, the time of the launch of the | :01:32. | :01:36. | |
report, which, whatever your terms of reference may be, I thought went | :01:37. | :01:44. | |
right to the heart of the m`tter at the start. It said, and this is the | :01:45. | :01:51. | |
first line, that the question for the inquiry was whether it was right | :01:52. | :01:56. | |
and necessary to invade Irap in 2003. It might be helpful if we just | :01:57. | :02:04. | |
concentrate on the necessarx, rather than the right, as a ethical and | :02:05. | :02:17. | |
legal aspect. In your view, did we need to go to war to protect Britain | :02:18. | :02:26. | |
from an imminent threat? Not in March 2003, is my shortest possible | :02:27. | :02:30. | |
answer. OK. Therefore, the next question must be, was the evidence | :02:31. | :02:38. | |
in front of Tony Blair at that time, which should have told him he did | :02:39. | :02:46. | |
not need to go to war at th`t time? What was, I think, clear from the | :02:47. | :02:49. | |
evidence we have seen, the dvidence we have taken, was that, in March | :02:50. | :02:57. | |
2003, there was no imminent threat to British citizens or, indded, | :02:58. | :03:04. | |
Britain itself from Saddam 's regime in Iraq. Was a reasonable for Tony | :03:05. | :03:09. | |
Blair to conclude that therd was an imminent threat? It would bd | :03:10. | :03:12. | |
difficult to base that on h`rd evidence. It is perfectly true that | :03:13. | :03:19. | |
he received a deal of advicd, particularly from the intelligence | :03:20. | :03:24. | |
community, that the situation regarding Saddam's weapons of mass | :03:25. | :03:29. | |
destruction was much more of a threat, much more imminent, much | :03:30. | :03:36. | |
more serious than proved to be the case after the event. But you have | :03:37. | :03:40. | |
looked at that evidence in detail, and you have just told me, H thought | :03:41. | :03:46. | |
that you had concluded that evidence showed there was not an immhnent | :03:47. | :03:52. | |
threat? Even put at its highest the threat could not be shown to be | :03:53. | :04:00. | |
imminent, in the sense of ntclear, biological or chemical... In the | :04:01. | :04:06. | |
sense that it is usually understood by the Tim, in international | :04:07. | :04:17. | |
practice? Correct. That it hs commonly accepted in intern`tional | :04:18. | :04:21. | |
law and studies of internathonal relations? What seems to me clear | :04:22. | :04:28. | |
from the evidence is that any threat was in the future, not imminent and | :04:29. | :04:33. | |
not directly against the Unhted Kingdom and its people. That is | :04:34. | :04:39. | |
about as far as I think the evidence takes you. There are many places | :04:40. | :04:44. | |
which may pose a threat to the UK at any time. Indeed. But those threats | :04:45. | :04:50. | |
are not imminent, it is going on all the time? That is correct. The | :04:51. | :04:54. | |
British government, the timd, made very clear that it regarded | :04:55. | :04:58. | |
participating in military action against Saddam's Iraq has only a | :04:59. | :05:05. | |
last resort measure, and only after all other options had been | :05:06. | :05:08. | |
exhausted. The question that we have to look at in the inquiry is, was | :05:09. | :05:14. | |
this the last resort, awkward containment have been improved, | :05:15. | :05:20. | |
sustained -- or could contahnment have been improved and sust`ined? | :05:21. | :05:25. | |
Hard all other options been exhausted? In other words, the | :05:26. | :05:30. | |
inspections process, had it come to a halt because of Saddam's | :05:31. | :05:37. | |
construction? Neither of those conditions existed in March 200 and | :05:38. | :05:41. | |
three. You made it clear it was a last resort, in the report. You used | :05:42. | :05:48. | |
that phrase. I notice you h`ve used it again. I would like to come back | :05:49. | :05:52. | |
to the phrase imminent thre`t. I just want to go back to the question | :05:53. | :05:58. | |
that I asked, the evidence hn front of Tony Blair did not support the | :05:59. | :06:02. | |
conclusion that there was an imminent threat at the time that we | :06:03. | :06:09. | |
went to war? Indeed, he acknowledged a year later, in 2004, that he | :06:10. | :06:16. | |
accepted that there was not an imminent threat of the sort that he | :06:17. | :06:21. | |
was tending to describe. Th`t was a yes to that question might Hf you | :06:22. | :06:24. | |
wish. I don't want to put words in your mouth, I wanted to get | :06:25. | :06:31. | |
clarification. The Prime Minister should have known that, bec`use it | :06:32. | :06:34. | |
was the information in front of him. So, when the Prime Minister said, in | :06:35. | :06:40. | |
his speech on the 18th of M`rch the threat is present and real, it is a | :06:41. | :06:48. | |
real and present danger to Britain's security, I am quoting, the threat | :06:49. | :06:52. | |
is serious and current, Saddam has to be stopped, he was not, hn fact, | :06:53. | :06:59. | |
reflecting the advice or thd information that he had in front of | :07:00. | :07:04. | |
him, was he? He was telling the public, by all means other than | :07:05. | :07:08. | |
those two words, imminent threat, that there was an imminent threat? | :07:09. | :07:13. | |
In all fairness, I have to say, and it is in the report, that I believe | :07:14. | :07:20. | |
on the 17th of March... Sorry? On the 17th of March, Tony Blahr was | :07:21. | :07:23. | |
advised by the chairman of joint intelligence committee that Saddam | :07:24. | :07:27. | |
did have weapons of mass destruction, the means to ddploy | :07:28. | :07:35. | |
them and the means to produce them. If you convert that into advice that | :07:36. | :07:38. | |
there was an imminent threat, you could just about defend it, perhaps. | :07:39. | :07:45. | |
Are you defending it? No. You are saying that there was no imlinent | :07:46. | :07:52. | |
threat? By all means do comd back when I complete question, btt you | :07:53. | :07:55. | |
are saying, just to be clear, there is no imminent threat and that Tony | :07:56. | :08:04. | |
Blair was wrong to describe this threat, effectively, as immhnent in | :08:05. | :08:13. | |
the House on the 18th of March? I think choosing words as cardfully | :08:14. | :08:22. | |
and are -- as sensitively as I can, it was a description to the house in | :08:23. | :08:33. | |
that speech, a speech was m`de, putting the best possible inflection | :08:34. | :08:36. | |
on the description that he tsed It does not take hindsight to | :08:37. | :08:43. | |
demonstrate two propositions. One is that the whole of the intelligence | :08:44. | :08:46. | |
community, not only in the Tnited Kingdom, were strongly of the | :08:47. | :08:53. | |
belief, they thought they h`d sufficient intelligence to support | :08:54. | :08:59. | |
it, that Saddam did have we`pons of mass destruction available for use. | :09:00. | :09:03. | |
What wasn't, I think, there, was evidence that he intended to deploy | :09:04. | :09:11. | |
them against the United Kingdom s interests. Otherwise, perhaps, as a | :09:12. | :09:16. | |
last resort in defence of an invasion. What you are saying, as | :09:17. | :09:21. | |
far as you can tell, that it was not reasonable for Tony Blair to suppose | :09:22. | :09:24. | |
that there was an imminent threat based on the information in front of | :09:25. | :09:32. | |
him? He said, and I am now puoting from his forward for the September | :09:33. | :09:44. | |
dossier -- for word, his belief was that it was the situation. What was | :09:45. | :09:54. | |
not said where the qualific`tions and conditions that the varhous | :09:55. | :09:58. | |
assessments had attached to them. It meant that statements made with | :09:59. | :10:02. | |
certainty could not be supported by that kind of evidence. I thhnk you | :10:03. | :10:05. | |
are saying it was unreasonable for Tony Blair? I would rather not use | :10:06. | :10:14. | |
that particular word. You m`y not, but it seems to me it is a binary | :10:15. | :10:18. | |
state of affairs, isn't it? Either it was reasonable or not. That is a | :10:19. | :10:25. | |
very well understood concept in law and in : common parlance. W`s it | :10:26. | :10:34. | |
reasonable or not? If you place yourself in a position at the time, | :10:35. | :10:40. | |
2002-2003, there was enough advice coming forward, not perhaps to | :10:41. | :10:44. | |
support the statement of thd threat to the United Kingdom and its people | :10:45. | :10:47. | |
and interests was imminent, but nonetheless that a threat m`y be | :10:48. | :10:51. | |
thought to exist. Now, therd was not such a threat, in fact, and in the | :10:52. | :10:58. | |
event. That is not what we have been talking about at all, not in the | :10:59. | :11:02. | |
event. We're talking about before the event. Every question I posed to | :11:03. | :11:07. | |
you concerns only the evidence available to Tony Blair at the time | :11:08. | :11:10. | |
he made these statements. I will just repeat the question. W`s it | :11:11. | :11:14. | |
reasonable for Tony Blair, `t that time that he made that statdment, to | :11:15. | :11:19. | |
suppose that there was an ilminent threat? Objectively, no. | :11:20. | :11:25. | |
Subjectively, I cannot answdr for him. You mean that he might have had | :11:26. | :11:30. | |
a sudden... He might have h`d a sudden rush of blood to the head or | :11:31. | :11:35. | |
May Day misjudgement? Isn't that what subjective means in thhs | :11:36. | :11:43. | |
context? Subjectively, he stated it was his certain belief at the time. | :11:44. | :11:50. | |
You ask an objective question, was it reasonable to entertain that | :11:51. | :11:53. | |
thought? I say that the evidence does not sufficiently supported I | :11:54. | :12:02. | |
have not, actually. The well understood test of a reason`ble man. | :12:03. | :12:06. | |
Would a reasonable man, another human being, looking at the | :12:07. | :12:15. | |
evidence, come to that conclusion? If you are posing the questhon with | :12:16. | :12:19. | |
regard to a statement of an imminent threat to the United Kingdol... I | :12:20. | :12:26. | |
am. In that case, I have to say no, there was not sufficient evhdence to | :12:27. | :12:34. | |
sustain that belief. He misled, or set aside, misled the House, or he | :12:35. | :12:38. | |
set aside evidence in order to lead the house down the line of thought | :12:39. | :12:46. | |
and belief with his 18th of March speech? Didn't he? Again, you force | :12:47. | :12:51. | |
me into trying to draw a distinction between what Mr Blair, as Prime | :12:52. | :12:57. | |
Minister, believed that the time, and sought to persuade the house and | :12:58. | :13:02. | |
the people of... Of course, I am asking whether it was reasonable | :13:03. | :13:05. | |
that he was doing it. As thhngs have turned out, we know it was not. As | :13:06. | :13:10. | |
things appeared at the time, the evidence to support it was lore | :13:11. | :13:13. | |
qualified than he, in effect, gave expression to. That is not what you | :13:14. | :13:18. | |
have really been saying all along. It is not a question of whether it | :13:19. | :13:22. | |
was more qualified. This is a test. It is a test of if a reason`ble man | :13:23. | :13:25. | |
would conclude that this evhdence supported going to war. | :13:26. | :13:31. | |
If I would say so, Mr Chairlan, it seems to be an easy question to | :13:32. | :13:39. | |
answer, because the answer hs no. I'm going to move onto another | :13:40. | :13:44. | |
question. I've got several colleagues wanting to chip hn, and I | :13:45. | :13:48. | |
am concerned that we might here for a very long time, if they do, but on | :13:49. | :13:56. | |
this occasion, to colleagues have been so insistent then I'm `llowed | :13:57. | :14:00. | |
to bring them in. Which two you think was more at the forefront of | :14:01. | :14:09. | |
the Prime Minister's mind? Was in two evaluate the evidence ptt in | :14:10. | :14:14. | |
front of him, or was it to lake the case for a decision in his lind he | :14:15. | :14:21. | |
had already made? I find th`t a very helpful question, because mx | :14:22. | :14:27. | |
response to it is clear and unqualified. There was no attempt to | :14:28. | :14:34. | |
challenge or seek reevaluathon of the intelligence advice. Do you | :14:35. | :14:41. | |
think he exaggerated the certainty of his knowledge? If you had just | :14:42. | :14:46. | |
said to the House, we don't know for certain, but there's a risk that he | :14:47. | :14:53. | |
has this record, and then gone on to say what I remember him sayhng, | :14:54. | :14:59. | |
mainly that the nightmare scenario oh was that Saddam Hussein, for his | :15:00. | :15:05. | |
own purposes, would make thdse weapons available to a terrorist | :15:06. | :15:09. | |
group with which he shared ` common enemy, would have been as rdaction | :15:10. | :15:18. | |
of the reasonable man? It could have been, at the time. I go on to talk | :15:19. | :15:26. | |
about nuclear weapons, rathdr than weapons of mass destruction. I think | :15:27. | :15:33. | |
you would agree, nuclear we`pons are on a magnitude of which is lore | :15:34. | :15:38. | |
dangerous and more serious than what has been reduced -- produced, and | :15:39. | :15:46. | |
certainly might have been available to Saddam at that time. Frol DJ icy | :15:47. | :15:55. | |
reports, it seems pretty cldar and it was in the dossier that ht would | :15:56. | :16:01. | |
take five years, even if sanctions were removed, for weapons to be | :16:02. | :16:07. | |
produced, for Saddam to produce weapons. In many ways, the sanctions | :16:08. | :16:13. | |
were reasonably effective. There were no results of a progralme which | :16:14. | :16:18. | |
had been closed down in the 199 s, and as you point out in your report, | :16:19. | :16:27. | |
new US -- numerous other cotntries were well ahead, such as Ir`n, Korea | :16:28. | :16:34. | |
and Libya, which posed diffdrent kinds of threats. In that s`me | :16:35. | :16:39. | |
speech, the Prime Minister said that Saddam Hussein was actively trying | :16:40. | :16:45. | |
to obtain material to in rich uranium. You said at paragr`ph 40 | :16:46. | :16:51. | |
of your summary, that there was no programme to develop nuclear | :16:52. | :16:56. | |
weapons. Have you establishdd whether it was reasonable on the | :16:57. | :17:00. | |
basis of the evidence that he was given at the time that Tony Blair | :17:01. | :17:06. | |
could have asserted that Saddam Hussein could have obtained is | :17:07. | :17:14. | |
nuclear weapons within months? No. Why not? Because there was no active | :17:15. | :17:20. | |
programme in the sensitive installations of design mantfacture | :17:21. | :17:28. | |
and distribution of weapons delivery systems. There haven't been since | :17:29. | :17:36. | |
1990. There was a fear wastd on history in other places, I think, | :17:37. | :17:41. | |
any intelligence community, not least, that from the dismissal of | :17:42. | :17:47. | |
the inspectors in Iraq in 1898, there might have been something | :17:48. | :17:50. | |
going on. But it was nothing more than that. So, Tony Blair shouldn't | :17:51. | :17:57. | |
have said that I do, should he? To assert that there was a nuclear | :17:58. | :18:01. | |
weapons programme in training base on the evidence I have seen, so | :18:02. | :18:10. | |
therefore so therefore, to tell us we were vulnerable to a nuclear | :18:11. | :18:20. | |
attack within months was unreasonable, wasn't it? Wotld | :18:21. | :18:23. | |
reasonable man have been misled by that? Again, I think Leone `nswer | :18:24. | :18:36. | |
can be no. -- I think that the only answer. A reasonable man cotld not | :18:37. | :18:46. | |
be misled... I heard your qtestion the other way round. If he had set | :18:47. | :18:54. | |
that there was a risk arising over the years ahead that Saddam had an | :18:55. | :19:03. | |
intent that he would trying to carry through if... He said that he has | :19:04. | :19:07. | |
the capacity to obtain nucldar weapons within months. That was not | :19:08. | :19:12. | |
so at the time. And he knew it? I don't know what he based th`t | :19:13. | :19:17. | |
statement on in terms of evhdence. Have you seen any evidence to | :19:18. | :19:21. | |
support that statement, to justify the action of the Prime Minhster in | :19:22. | :19:26. | |
the House that day? Not that there was a near-term prospects of Saddam | :19:27. | :19:34. | |
acquiring and therefore being able to threaten the use of... So, that's | :19:35. | :19:48. | |
a no? Yes. Near-term, means not imminently? Yes. There is a part of | :19:49. | :20:01. | |
cross examination I like to touch on and that's nuclear weapons `s | :20:02. | :20:07. | |
deterrents. Was it wrong to use the terrorist and the wider nuclear | :20:08. | :20:12. | |
threat posed by Saddam. I fdel you answer that in your report that I | :20:13. | :20:17. | |
want clarification. The evidence doesn't suggest that Saddam would | :20:18. | :20:25. | |
have, even if he could have, supplied weapons of mass destruction | :20:26. | :20:29. | |
in whatever category to terrorist organisations. At paragraph three to | :20:30. | :20:36. | |
four, you said there was no evidence to support this in the JCI | :20:37. | :20:39. | |
suggestions. I feel you've pretty much answered in the same w`y. In Mr | :20:40. | :20:52. | |
Blair's speech, he said, and I quote, these are a real and present | :20:53. | :20:56. | |
danger to Britain. He had no evidence that either, did hd? He | :20:57. | :21:02. | |
added concept shared by othdrs in the United States, but... So it was | :21:03. | :21:08. | |
unreasonable for him to say that either? Not at the time, I'l only | :21:09. | :21:15. | |
applying a test that millions of people will readily underst`nd which | :21:16. | :21:19. | |
is used in courts of law at and down the land every day. But this is not | :21:20. | :21:30. | |
a court of law. It's a court of public opinion. Is only of the | :21:31. | :21:39. | |
committee and the evidence of what it took from the committee. But it's | :21:40. | :21:45. | |
important to emphasise, it was not a court. I understand. It didn't | :21:46. | :21:58. | |
proceed as such. Your evidence has been clear, and you have given more | :21:59. | :22:07. | |
decisive answers and you provided in your statement, particularlx in the | :22:08. | :22:12. | |
executive summary. I want to clarify one more point before passing | :22:13. | :22:16. | |
questioning on. You see, I haven't got the exact words in front of me, | :22:17. | :22:21. | |
but you said trust in British politics has been eroded by events | :22:22. | :22:25. | |
unfolding at that time, and after that time, and it's damage which | :22:26. | :22:36. | |
lasts until this day, and I am. . Is the most damaging thing abott this | :22:37. | :22:43. | |
whole sorry episode is that a number of things, very important things | :22:44. | :22:46. | |
were said to the House at that time, which are reasonable man... Not be | :22:47. | :22:56. | |
reasonably supported by the evidence that the time the statement was | :22:57. | :23:01. | |
made, and that's what's corroded the trust? I think when a leader of the | :23:02. | :23:06. | |
Government, or a Government presents a case with all the powers of | :23:07. | :23:11. | |
advocacy that he or she can command, and in doing so, going on what the | :23:12. | :23:18. | |
facts of the case and that basic analysis of the case can support | :23:19. | :23:23. | |
then yes, I think it's will damage politics. It will take a long time | :23:24. | :23:30. | |
to repair? I would imagine ht will. We thank you for your part hn | :23:31. | :23:38. | |
helping to begin that repair process. If there are lessons to be | :23:39. | :23:44. | |
learned from this, can we rdflect on your experience of the type of | :23:45. | :23:49. | |
enquiry youth carried out. Whilst you were completing your work, the | :23:50. | :23:52. | |
Foreign Affairs Committee w`s undertaking an enquiry into Libya, | :23:53. | :24:00. | |
and I was conscious that we were going to wait for your publhcation | :24:01. | :24:03. | |
of your rapport, and also rdflect some of your lessons learned in our | :24:04. | :24:09. | |
conclusions in our report and I will come to those in a minute. But, I | :24:10. | :24:15. | |
believe the select committed of the House with 14,000 plus words, a | :24:16. | :24:22. | |
year's work, probably around ?1 ,000 worth of extra costs for thd travel | :24:23. | :24:30. | |
budget to conduct our enquiries then produce something whilst not of | :24:31. | :24:38. | |
the historic quality of 2.6 million words and the cost of the ldngth of | :24:39. | :24:46. | |
your enquiry, I hope we've got closer and rather firmer conclusions | :24:47. | :24:50. | |
in the report and the size `nd scope of your enquiry produced. I want | :24:51. | :25:00. | |
your reflection on the task you were set and how fair or unfair the terms | :25:01. | :25:04. | |
of reference were, regarding the task you were set. And perh`ps the | :25:05. | :25:09. | |
competing utilities are the different types of enquiry `vailable | :25:10. | :25:17. | |
to the Government, where is a judicial enquiry would have had ten | :25:18. | :25:21. | |
times the cost and would have been significantly longer than yours if | :25:22. | :25:26. | |
previous experience is anything to go by. I think for an enquiry into | :25:27. | :25:34. | |
the workings of central Govdrnment in a very critical and controversial | :25:35. | :25:41. | |
area, there is real advantage in having a committee, an independent | :25:42. | :25:44. | |
committee of people with direct experience of the workings of | :25:45. | :25:48. | |
Government in that way. I think it would be more difficult for a judge | :25:49. | :25:53. | |
operating with council throtgh cross-examination to arrive at well | :25:54. | :26:01. | |
judged conclusions in that the titular individual situation. The | :26:02. | :26:05. | |
other particular thought th`t I have is that the willingness, indeed | :26:06. | :26:10. | |
even the ability of Governmdnt to make available highly sensitive | :26:11. | :26:16. | |
information to an enquiry is determined in part by the | :26:17. | :26:21. | |
membership, the process which you will adopt. Again, Lord Hutton had | :26:22. | :26:27. | |
no problem in getting hold of a great deal of intelligence laterial. | :26:28. | :26:32. | |
The real difficulty for him, with his terms of reference, | :26:33. | :26:36. | |
investigating the death of David Kelly, was to be able to relate that | :26:37. | :26:40. | |
material to the circumstancds of the case. For our part, we had total | :26:41. | :26:53. | |
access to little material, `nd much of the subsequent negotiation which | :26:54. | :27:01. | |
requires argument over quitd a long period was about disclosure, the | :27:02. | :27:05. | |
ability to publish it. I thhnk judicially led enquiry would have | :27:06. | :27:09. | |
been less well-placed to undertake those arguments, or to fight and win | :27:10. | :27:18. | |
our particular battles. Lord Butler's enquiry, I think it is | :27:19. | :27:23. | |
commonly understood that he thought he'd produced a much tougher report | :27:24. | :27:30. | |
than was actually reported, and I wonder in the reporting durhng choir | :27:31. | :27:34. | |
re-, whether there were things that were not picked up by the mddia in | :27:35. | :27:38. | |
the way which you would havd liked, and given proper emphasis. By | :27:39. | :27:49. | |
pointing us to things that xou feel should have more attention, the of | :27:50. | :27:55. | |
your work. As a brief prelilinary, I was a member of the powerful | :27:56. | :27:59. | |
committee. The main constrahnt on us was not achieving public | :28:00. | :28:03. | |
understanding so much as behng enforced by a very tight tiletable | :28:04. | :28:08. | |
to report and concludes somd very keen pieces of evidence that were | :28:09. | :28:14. | |
available. The report of thd Iraq survey group which came out only a | :28:15. | :28:22. | |
few months before the Butler report. Some of the key intelligencd, human | :28:23. | :28:30. | |
sources were discredited and had their intelligence set asidd. | :28:31. | :28:34. | |
Neither of those were possible for Butler on his timetable. As to | :28:35. | :28:38. | |
public reception, I think p`rtly a matter of narrow terms of rdference | :28:39. | :28:46. | |
that Butler had, it was intdlligence orientated. We were asked to give a | :28:47. | :28:50. | |
reliant -- reliable account of all that had happened in Iraq adventure, | :28:51. | :28:56. | |
misadventure. To that extent, I think we had a ready accept`nce by | :28:57. | :29:01. | |
public and the media when wd were finally reported, and it wotld have | :29:02. | :29:06. | |
been the case if our terms of reference are kept our | :29:07. | :29:15. | |
Myself, I would not say I al ever satisfied with anything, but I do | :29:16. | :29:20. | |
think that the public understanding and acceptance, more generally, of | :29:21. | :29:26. | |
our broad conclusions, with lessons to be learned, was demonstr`ted as a | :29:27. | :29:34. | |
reasonably good understanding of what we found. A particular point, | :29:35. | :29:37. | |
sorry if I am going on a bit too long, it was not the sole ptrpose of | :29:38. | :29:41. | |
the inquiry to satisfy the bereaved families. The fact that, in the end, | :29:42. | :29:46. | |
they have accepted the report as being an answer to the questions | :29:47. | :29:49. | |
that they had was particularly welcome. There are no areas in this | :29:50. | :29:54. | |
which you think have not received the attention that they desdrve In | :29:55. | :30:01. | |
your own mind and the minds of your colleagues, there are no prhorities | :30:02. | :30:06. | |
that have not been picked up? I suppose the best answer I c`n try to | :30:07. | :30:11. | |
give to that is that we cannot know yet, because the real test will be | :30:12. | :30:17. | |
the taking of the lessons that we sought to draw and others m`y indeed | :30:18. | :30:21. | |
find. That is going to be a process, looking ahead, that will take some | :30:22. | :30:27. | |
time. As things stand at prdsent, I am reasonably encouraged th`t the | :30:28. | :30:31. | |
attempt is being made, systematically, in Government to | :30:32. | :30:33. | |
address those lessons. I thhnk there is a question for the parli`ment in | :30:34. | :30:40. | |
terms of how much they want to hold Government to account for the way | :30:41. | :30:44. | |
does that, and gives an account to yourselves as parliamentari`ns what | :30:45. | :30:46. | |
it has found out, what it h`s accepted and what it has ch`nged. | :30:47. | :30:52. | |
Turning to the substance, your appearance today happily cohncides | :30:53. | :30:54. | |
with the publication of Jerdmy Greenstock's book, which gods to | :30:55. | :31:01. | |
reinforce the evidence you talk from Sir Christopher Maher. The | :31:02. | :31:12. | |
conclusion I draw from it, that Tony Blair, in the conduct of his | :31:13. | :31:16. | |
relationship with the President of the United States, really dhd not | :31:17. | :31:18. | |
exploit the influence that the United Kingdom have at all, | :31:19. | :31:25. | |
effectively, in bilateral interests, or in the interest of getting some | :31:26. | :31:33. | |
average over the stabilisathon plan and once the operation to lhberate | :31:34. | :31:37. | |
Iraq had taken place. -- leveraged. What would be your observathons on | :31:38. | :31:49. | |
how severe one should be on that? I think it is uncontestable that Mr | :31:50. | :32:00. | |
Blair, as Prime Minister, over estimated how much influencd he had. | :32:01. | :32:05. | |
That is not to say that there was no influence, and in making George Bush | :32:06. | :32:12. | |
go to the United Nations, that was exercised. Over a period, it worked. | :32:13. | :32:18. | |
By the end of the year, 2002, President Bush had clearly concluded | :32:19. | :32:21. | |
that the UN -based inspection system was not going to be the answer and | :32:22. | :32:26. | |
the military timetable took control. If indeed it had not always been in | :32:27. | :32:31. | |
control of the diplomatic noises. As to what his purpose was, he clearly | :32:32. | :32:38. | |
sought to try to reconcile TS decisions and objectives, rdgime | :32:39. | :32:45. | |
change, ever since the Clinton administration, with the UK | :32:46. | :32:50. | |
objective, the disarmament of Saddam's supposed weapons of mass | :32:51. | :32:55. | |
destruction. That coincided completely with the string of | :32:56. | :33:00. | |
Security Council resolutions, and culminated in resolution 1441. The | :33:01. | :33:11. | |
other strand in influencing the United States was to avoid | :33:12. | :33:16. | |
unilateral United States military action, for a variety of re`sons, | :33:17. | :33:23. | |
which he would explain, and has Was that attempt to exert infludnce | :33:24. | :33:30. | |
successful in the event? Thd answer is no. Do you think he should have | :33:31. | :33:39. | |
paid a high price for British support? The fact that it took so | :33:40. | :33:45. | |
long for Jeremy Greenstock dven to get a hearing in Iraq, by which | :33:46. | :33:52. | |
stage very serious mistakes have been made by the occupation forces? | :33:53. | :33:58. | |
It is a touch too hypothetical. But it is difficult to avoid a | :33:59. | :34:05. | |
conclusion that, and Mr Blahr stated clear conditions for partichpation | :34:06. | :34:11. | |
in and supporting United St`tes military action, and if those | :34:12. | :34:15. | |
conditions had been reasonable, there might have been more | :34:16. | :34:19. | |
influence, particularly, I think, on the timing of any United St`tes led | :34:20. | :34:25. | |
action. As it was, and it is discussed at length in the hnquiry | :34:26. | :34:34. | |
report, Mr Blair was determhned to say that his conditions werd | :34:35. | :34:38. | |
conditions for success, not conditions for British parthcipation | :34:39. | :34:45. | |
and support. In 2010, the Iraqi government said at the National | :34:46. | :34:47. | |
Security Council. The operational National Security Council w`s set up | :34:48. | :34:59. | |
by the Foreign Affairs Commhttee, into the Libya intervention. The | :35:00. | :35:04. | |
conclusion that we came to, we noted the Prime Minister's decisive role | :35:05. | :35:07. | |
in the National Security Cotncil, when it discussed interventhon in | :35:08. | :35:14. | |
Libya. We concluded that thd independent review of its operation, | :35:15. | :35:17. | |
it marked its own homework `fter the Libya intervention, during the Libya | :35:18. | :35:27. | |
crisis. What we recommended was that the non-ministerial members of the | :35:28. | :35:31. | |
National Security Council, hf they disagreed with the direction of | :35:32. | :35:37. | |
policy, they should require a prime ministerial direction in thd same | :35:38. | :35:41. | |
way that permanent secretarhes require, as the counting officer. | :35:42. | :35:45. | |
What is your view of that as a recommendation? In specific terms, I | :35:46. | :35:54. | |
have not been privy to the workings of the National Security Cotncil and | :35:55. | :35:58. | |
how it operates. In general terms, I think one of the broad lessons | :35:59. | :36:06. | |
derived from our seven years of work looking at Government records, or | :36:07. | :36:10. | |
the absence of Government rdcords on occasion, is that it is vit`l, not | :36:11. | :36:15. | |
merely important, but vital for serious decisions and the rdasons | :36:16. | :36:21. | |
behind them to be recorded hn the public archive, not for immddiate | :36:22. | :36:26. | |
release, necessarily, but that they should be written down so, hf | :36:27. | :36:30. | |
someone in a serious disagrdement with a decision taken collectively, | :36:31. | :36:37. | |
the reason for that decision and the facts of it should be recorded. I | :36:38. | :36:43. | |
think that also goes to the suggestion from the Better | :36:44. | :36:47. | |
Government Initiative, which is similar. I would be reluctant to say | :36:48. | :36:50. | |
it should be placed on the same footing as that which the pdrmanent | :36:51. | :36:54. | |
secretaries, as counting officers, an, nonetheless it seems to me that | :36:55. | :37:09. | |
if there is a guarantee in the processes of the National Sdcurity | :37:10. | :37:12. | |
Council elsewhere, that dissent well argued, properly expressed | :37:13. | :37:20. | |
dissent, if it is to be recorded, in itself, it is an incentive to allow | :37:21. | :37:25. | |
challenge take place, and for different voices to be heard. I will | :37:26. | :37:31. | |
take that as support for our committee's recommendations, so I am | :37:32. | :37:40. | |
grateful for that. Ten to the usual stabilisation, I know there will be | :37:41. | :37:45. | |
questions about it, you deal extensively with stabilisathon in | :37:46. | :38:00. | |
the report. Do you share my anxiety that lessons have not been learned | :38:01. | :38:05. | |
from the review we took of the effectiveness of the stabilhsation | :38:06. | :38:09. | |
unit in the Libya interventhon? We were very critical of their capacity | :38:10. | :38:16. | |
and some of the lessons that you have identified here do not appear | :38:17. | :38:22. | |
to apply in terms of what ndeds to be prepared for in light of | :38:23. | :38:25. | |
operations that are now takhng place around Mosul, where the leadership | :38:26. | :38:30. | |
properly sits, the leadershhp sits with the Foreign Office, with the | :38:31. | :38:37. | |
capacity to do anything sitting with the Ministry of Defence and the | :38:38. | :38:42. | |
Department For International Development? The coordination that | :38:43. | :38:47. | |
you recommend, from your experience with Government, do you belheve the | :38:48. | :38:51. | |
Government has yet taken enough notice of the conclusions you came | :38:52. | :38:56. | |
to? I don't have insight into where the government is placed in any | :38:57. | :39:00. | |
detail. I would like to respond with two comments in particular. Good | :39:01. | :39:08. | |
though it is that the Stabilisation Unit has come into existencd, and | :39:09. | :39:11. | |
there is the fund associated with it, in terms of the order of | :39:12. | :39:14. | |
magnitude of what is requirdd, it is nothing like sufficient in scale | :39:15. | :39:19. | |
all, I would have thought, hn authority. The second point is that | :39:20. | :39:25. | |
I think it is very difficult, in a specific case of security sdctor | :39:26. | :39:30. | |
reform in Iraq for the Forehgn Office, at, admittedly, a pretty | :39:31. | :39:34. | |
junior level, to understand and assemble the kind of not just | :39:35. | :39:40. | |
policing effort, although that was at the core of it, but the whole | :39:41. | :39:45. | |
range of reconstruction work of institutions, of people, thd | :39:46. | :39:48. | |
processes that are going to be required. It is a major task of | :39:49. | :39:55. | |
reconstruction. I think there is still a great deal for any | :39:56. | :40:00. | |
government to do. I would add to that, actually, the United Nations, | :40:01. | :40:05. | |
to bring together the different elements that are involved when a | :40:06. | :40:08. | |
wrecked country has to be ptt back together. We may return to post war | :40:09. | :40:15. | |
planning and reconstructing later on. Leader said in response to | :40:16. | :40:23. | |
Crispin that you were not convinced that the stabilisation unit have the | :40:24. | :40:25. | |
order of magnitude scale and authority. I'd invite you to expand | :40:26. | :40:31. | |
upon that and say what might be done to give it the order of magnitude it | :40:32. | :40:39. | |
deserves. There was a littld pool of money in 2003, which was trhvial and | :40:40. | :40:44. | |
of no impact whatsoever. By 200 , when we stopped taking eviddnce | :40:45. | :40:47. | |
there was something on an altogether larger scale. Now, I think, in terms | :40:48. | :40:55. | |
of ?1 billion. Even that dods not stack up against the cost ilplied in | :40:56. | :40:59. | |
a major reconstruction task across a whole country. Even one smaller than | :41:00. | :41:05. | |
Iraq. Iraq was a seriously large country for this purpose. Does that | :41:06. | :41:09. | |
answer your question? Your reference to scale and magnitude was `bout the | :41:10. | :41:13. | |
resources available to the funds, rather than necessary the profile of | :41:14. | :41:20. | |
the work within Government? Or both? The thing that, frankly, wotld | :41:21. | :41:23. | |
defeat me, and I'm glad to have any responsibility for it any more, and | :41:24. | :41:28. | |
I'm thinking of Ireland, is how you bring together the different arms | :41:29. | :41:32. | |
and branches of government hn a really constructive and willing way, | :41:33. | :41:38. | |
as opposed to protecting interests, budgets, limiting responsibhlity. | :41:39. | :41:45. | |
Those problems are very gre`t and really real, as we all know. I would | :41:46. | :41:51. | |
like to bring in Northern Ireland for a brief statement. It took us a | :41:52. | :41:55. | |
long time, 30 years, ultimately to get the whole thing right and to a | :41:56. | :41:59. | |
good conclusion. In the course of that, we did learn, on the | :42:00. | :42:03. | |
admittedly much smaller scale of Northern Ireland, how to brhng | :42:04. | :42:11. | |
together military intelligence, police, security, economic | :42:12. | :42:13. | |
reconstruction, housing was central. They were all brought together and | :42:14. | :42:18. | |
held together within a single network of relationships of | :42:19. | :42:20. | |
authority. If you could replicate that on a larger scale, of ` major | :42:21. | :42:25. | |
global reconstruction effort, that would be good. I am glad it is not | :42:26. | :42:34. | |
made that has to do it. Do xou have specific reflections on the | :42:35. | :42:35. | |
Department for International Development and how it fits into | :42:36. | :42:39. | |
this? In your recommendations, you tended to recommend things that had | :42:40. | :42:45. | |
to do with other departments? I have two preface any answer and the | :42:46. | :42:55. | |
generality of any answer, whth the specifics of the time. -- I had to. | :42:56. | :43:01. | |
The budgetary resources that were made available, all of us. The truth | :43:02. | :43:11. | |
of the matter is that there was between Whitehall departments, and | :43:12. | :43:14. | |
not the Ministry of Defence departments, a wide gap. Brhdges | :43:15. | :43:19. | |
were not constructed across that gap with any effectiveness, at least | :43:20. | :43:25. | |
until right at the end, and never throughout our Long engagemdnt in | :43:26. | :43:29. | |
Iraq, to a great effect. Th`t is as much as I can say. | :43:30. | :43:35. | |
The National Security Counchl's strategies, which guide the | :43:36. | :43:42. | |
programme which has replaced the conflict pool, these were not | :43:43. | :43:46. | |
published. Do you think it would make sense to publish them hn order | :43:47. | :43:50. | |
to improve accountability? H can see there is a great deal of | :43:51. | :43:53. | |
international politics and dven diplomacy lurking behind th`t. But | :43:54. | :43:55. | |
speaking purely for myself `s a citizen, it is extraordin`ry we | :43:56. | :44:04. | |
don't have that kind of information publicly available. Thank you. Thank | :44:05. | :44:12. | |
you, good afternoon Sir John. Given what you have been saying today and | :44:13. | :44:17. | |
in the report, do you think all of that is a consequence of a sofa | :44:18. | :44:23. | |
style of government? I understand your question, and I think ht is the | :44:24. | :44:33. | |
concept and practice which hs part of the background but it is of | :44:34. | :44:39. | |
course a reflection of the then Prime Minister's personal | :44:40. | :44:42. | |
preferences. There has two B room in any system of government for a | :44:43. | :44:45. | |
degree of flexibility as to how you go about the process of govdrnment, | :44:46. | :44:52. | |
it cannot be confined to a rigid set of committees and minutes and | :44:53. | :44:56. | |
processes and meetings. On the other hand, I am totally convinced that | :44:57. | :45:02. | |
without a coherent process, however it is conducted in any sort of room, | :45:03. | :45:07. | |
you cannot discharge the responsibility which under our | :45:08. | :45:10. | |
Constitution is a collectivd responsibility on the Cabindt | :45:11. | :45:17. | |
effectively. So, the system has to be flexible in order to takd into | :45:18. | :45:21. | |
account the personal style `nd characteristic of the Prime Minister | :45:22. | :45:25. | |
of the day, is it also a function of the consolidation of power, growing | :45:26. | :45:31. | |
consolidation, into a singld figure, the Prime Minister of the d`y, is it | :45:32. | :45:36. | |
almost the 21st century equhvalent of Louis XIV, I am the statd? I | :45:37. | :45:42. | |
observe what can be describdd in that way. I think it reached a high | :45:43. | :45:49. | |
point in Mr Blair's Prime Mhnister ship, and I have a great melory in | :45:50. | :45:59. | |
taking evidence from his Foreign Minister, Mr Strauch and asked how | :46:00. | :46:03. | |
it was that members of his cabinet, other than Robin Cook and to a | :46:04. | :46:06. | |
lesser extent Clare Short, did not provide a challenge and a ddbate. | :46:07. | :46:12. | |
They were promised it somethmes but promises were not delivered. And the | :46:13. | :46:17. | |
answer that came back was qtite simple. That Tony Blair had, as | :46:18. | :46:22. | |
Leader of the Opposition, rdscued his party from a very dire political | :46:23. | :46:31. | |
predicament and he had done it again afterwards as Prime Minister. I had | :46:32. | :46:34. | |
the sense from Mr Straw's rdaction that he had achieved a personal and | :46:35. | :46:41. | |
political dominance which w`s itself overriding the doctrine of | :46:42. | :46:45. | |
collective Cabinet responsibility... The power of patronage held back | :46:46. | :46:50. | |
discussion? Perhaps can be xes, but also sheer psychological dolinance. | :46:51. | :46:57. | |
He had been right. Was he not right this time? That was the sense I took | :46:58. | :47:01. | |
from Mr Straw's evidence. That's very helpful. In your view then the | :47:02. | :47:07. | |
Cabinet system throughout all of this, was it disregarded? W`s it | :47:08. | :47:12. | |
just bypassed? What had happened? Presumably committee said this in | :47:13. | :47:16. | |
the report, had there been affected... Challenged, mord | :47:17. | :47:19. | |
scrutiny, perhaps some weaknesses in the evidence would have been teased | :47:20. | :47:25. | |
out a lot more? Things were decided without reference to Cabinet. For | :47:26. | :47:32. | |
example, the acceptance of responsibility in four provhnce | :47:33. | :47:37. | |
south-east of Iraq. Given the decision, surely that was it? It | :47:38. | :47:42. | |
never went near the Cabinet. More generally, the Cabinet was promised | :47:43. | :47:48. | |
that it would have a hand in the decision on major deployments in | :47:49. | :47:56. | |
Iraq, which never took placd. We did an analysis on all of the C`binet | :47:57. | :48:00. | |
papers and minutes and meethngs in the relevant period and published a | :48:01. | :48:05. | |
great deal of the material. Quite frequently, the Cabinet itsdlf was | :48:06. | :48:07. | |
simply being given informathon updates. Not always completdly | :48:08. | :48:14. | |
detailed or of an updated khnd. There was very little subst`ntive | :48:15. | :48:17. | |
Cabinet discussion leading to a collective decision, which seems to | :48:18. | :48:22. | |
me the like which is characterised certainly throughout the period from | :48:23. | :48:30. | |
2002-2006. I understand your earlier point about it has to take hnto | :48:31. | :48:37. | |
account the psychology and style of the elected leaders of the day. In | :48:38. | :48:42. | |
that regard, it has two Flex. But to what extent does the civil service | :48:43. | :48:48. | |
have to be a custodian of proper effective Cabinet responsibhlity? | :48:49. | :48:51. | |
Lord Turnbull told you that nothing was wrong with this, there was no | :48:52. | :48:55. | |
problem with the sofa style of government. He disregards that | :48:56. | :48:59. | |
phrase. To what extent should the Cabinet Secretary be saying that | :49:00. | :49:02. | |
this is wrong, Prime Ministdr, you need to do something here? The role | :49:03. | :49:08. | |
of the Cabinet Secretary, I was in contact with all of the surviving | :49:09. | :49:15. | |
ones and retired, as well as serving. It is to some degrde | :49:16. | :49:20. | |
determined by his, perhaps one day her, relationship with the Prime | :49:21. | :49:24. | |
Minister of the day and is clearly accepted by all of them, a clear | :49:25. | :49:30. | |
responsibility for the Cabinet as a collective. I think if I were to | :49:31. | :49:37. | |
have a purpose today it is to encourage all of my | :49:38. | :49:43. | |
successors and colleagues at Whitewater take courage in both | :49:44. | :49:49. | |
hands and insist on their rhght to be heard -- at Whitehall. And record | :49:50. | :49:56. | |
what their advices even if ht is not taken. It is for ministers to decide | :49:57. | :50:00. | |
and four senior officials, `nd I would include senior military in | :50:01. | :50:03. | |
this, to clearly state their best advice to their masters. And I think | :50:04. | :50:10. | |
the recording of that advicd and the recording of any discussion about it | :50:11. | :50:14. | |
is absolutely central because that guarantees, if you like, a degree of | :50:15. | :50:21. | |
willingness to challenge and duty to challenge, which in a sofa done | :50:22. | :50:30. | |
setting is simply not there. It is the responsibility of the C`binet | :50:31. | :50:34. | |
Secretary to make sure that Cabinet ministers have that opportunity and | :50:35. | :50:38. | |
that is set down in the Cabhnet manual, isn't it? Yes... And are you | :50:39. | :50:42. | |
saying in this case, that w`s not observed? You can't, as it were | :50:43. | :50:50. | |
override a Prime Minister's instructions to the Cabinet | :50:51. | :50:54. | |
Secretary or indeed a lack of instructions to a Cabinet | :50:55. | :50:58. | |
Secretary... Should you havd taken a direction? I'm sorry? Should the | :50:59. | :51:02. | |
Cabinet Secretary have taken a direction in that case? It would be | :51:03. | :51:05. | |
open for a Cabinet Secretarx in dire straits to do just that. A famous | :51:06. | :51:07. | |
example from the war when Norman Brook, the Cabinet | :51:08. | :51:20. | |
Secretary, was ordered to ddstroy all records of dealings with the | :51:21. | :51:25. | |
French. As a dutiful and loxal servant of the elected governor and, | :51:26. | :51:29. | |
Norman Burke did. I wrote a minute on the file saying that I h`ve been | :51:30. | :51:36. | |
so instructed which is open to historical enquiry. Very interesting | :51:37. | :51:39. | |
but let me take us back to this case. Should the Cabinet Secretary | :51:40. | :51:46. | |
have made this demand? Or only carried on under the instruction of | :51:47. | :51:51. | |
the Prime Minister and a direction? Well, I'm not sure what the exact | :51:52. | :51:57. | |
case is, but I can recall from the evidence that we took that on one | :51:58. | :52:02. | |
occasion the Cabinet Secret`ry at, the overseas development Defence | :52:03. | :52:09. | |
secretary arranged to deal with the forthcoming Iraq issue. This was | :52:10. | :52:16. | |
perched in -- put in draft to Number tdn, | :52:17. | :52:23. | |
before the Cabinet Secretarx even had sight of it. The | :52:24. | :52:28. | |
Prime Minister said that thdy would not have the ministerial colmittee, | :52:29. | :52:35. | |
or not yet. It goes back. The draft, without the ministerial comlittee | :52:36. | :52:38. | |
proposal is put to the Cabinet Secretary to put to the Prile | :52:39. | :52:42. | |
Minister for formal endorselent That is screwing up the proper | :52:43. | :52:46. | |
arrangement in rather a big way in my opinion. But should they have | :52:47. | :52:50. | |
demanded an instruction or direction before agreeing to that? Well, I | :52:51. | :52:56. | |
don't know that he even knew. Because he was shown a draft, it had | :52:57. | :53:01. | |
been discussed... I will brhng the questioning to Bella Jenkin now but | :53:02. | :53:06. | |
it strikes me as a high degree of dysfunctionality at the heart of | :53:07. | :53:10. | |
Whitehall. I agree in that particular instance. It is shocking. | :53:11. | :53:14. | |
In that instance... We are not talking about trading in | :53:15. | :53:19. | |
Aberystwyth... And if you would allow me, chairman, the consequences | :53:20. | :53:24. | |
of it were the whole offici`l structure underneath that l`cked | :53:25. | :53:27. | |
ministerial direction. Therdfore, they were not able to come to grips | :53:28. | :53:32. | |
with some of the big issues which ought to kill it ought to h`ve been | :53:33. | :53:36. | |
able to do? Do you find that shocking -- big issues which it | :53:37. | :53:41. | |
ought to have been able to do. Yes. What safeguards exist to ensure that | :53:42. | :53:49. | |
proper conduct of a Cabinet government? Firstly, the ministerial | :53:50. | :53:52. | |
code which is the product of the Prime Minister of the day. Who | :53:53. | :53:57. | |
adjudicates that? He enforcds and adjudicates on it. Nonetheldss it is | :53:58. | :54:02. | |
not without substance or effect Then there is the Cabinet | :54:03. | :54:06. | |
Secretary's manual, which is for officials and about officials and | :54:07. | :54:11. | |
their conduct and behaviour. It cannot, as it were, overridd | :54:12. | :54:16. | |
ministers. So, what there is not, I do have a little sympathy btt not | :54:17. | :54:21. | |
total with the better government initiative proposal, there hs not | :54:22. | :54:28. | |
either a statutory or convention based enforcement system to ensure | :54:29. | :54:32. | |
compliance with proper standards and accepted rules of how government | :54:33. | :54:36. | |
should be conducted. So, let's look at a specific instance we wdre | :54:37. | :54:42. | |
discussing moments ago, which might have been in the Prime Minister 's | :54:43. | :54:46. | |
mind advertising the decision to go to war was finally made. Yot | :54:47. | :54:55. | |
uncovered the letter to the President of the United States which | :54:56. | :54:59. | |
contained the words "We will be with you whatever". This was eight months | :55:00. | :55:08. | |
prior to the decision. Yes. Who knew about this letter? In terms of other | :55:09. | :55:15. | |
members of the Cabinet? At the time of its being issued, only those in | :55:16. | :55:21. | |
number ten. Who saw it. And what advice did the Cabinet Secrdtary | :55:22. | :55:24. | |
give the Prime Minister, or what advice did the Prime Ministdr | :55:25. | :55:28. | |
receive that before this letter was dispatched? I don't think the | :55:29. | :55:31. | |
Cabinet Secretary was aware of its existence at the time. Other than | :55:32. | :55:36. | |
them, I seem to remember soleone else advised them? Jonathan Powell | :55:37. | :55:40. | |
as chief of staff in number ten the most senior official under that | :55:41. | :55:43. | |
arrangement, and Sir David Lanning were aware. Both tried to pdrsuade | :55:44. | :55:49. | |
the Prime Minister not to use those words but he did. So I come back to | :55:50. | :55:53. | |
the question, what safeguards exist to ensure the proper conduct of the | :55:54. | :55:58. | |
machinery of government? I think you are pointing to a gap, a deficiency. | :55:59. | :56:05. | |
The better government initi`tive actually said in its concluding | :56:06. | :56:12. | |
paragraph that Parliament ndeds to be satisfied that the seriots | :56:13. | :56:16. | |
weaknesses that the report identified, and all aspects of | :56:17. | :56:19. | |
decision-making have been t`ckled. It went on to say they should be | :56:20. | :56:26. | |
held to account in failings of the machinery of government. And their | :56:27. | :56:32. | |
locus in decision-making nedds to be clarified and mechanisms put in | :56:33. | :56:36. | |
place in charging their accountability, do you agred with | :56:37. | :56:40. | |
that? As a proposal, and I have not had the chance to think abott it in | :56:41. | :56:45. | |
any depth, I should perhaps declare that I was for a time part of the | :56:46. | :56:52. | |
better government initiativd but I left it years ago, I was not part of | :56:53. | :57:00. | |
this particular analysis, btt I think this is not in any sense age | :57:01. | :57:08. | |
regularised answer but I thhnk it is, for Pollard and | :57:09. | :57:11. | |
parliamentarians, and among them I include Cabinet ministers. ,- | :57:12. | :57:16. | |
Parliament. To accept those conventions and rules but the rules | :57:17. | :57:28. | |
in the case I cited were brdached. It is true they became award of the | :57:29. | :57:33. | |
letter after it was issued, but not in a position to say, you should not | :57:34. | :57:37. | |
say this... Or you should not write it. But, how is Parliament to know? | :57:38. | :57:43. | |
Indeed. Unless there is somd procedure for a civil servant to | :57:44. | :57:48. | |
notify Parliament in some form always? Which protects the public | :57:49. | :57:55. | |
official from political bullying -- formal way. | :57:56. | :57:59. | |
This so special and very important case of whistle-blowing if H could | :58:00. | :58:10. | |
go off on a short tangent, H was, for a time, the so-called staff | :58:11. | :58:13. | |
counsellor, in effect the ethics adviser to the intelligence | :58:14. | :58:20. | |
community. The only way to satisfy someone who is in consciencd deeply | :58:21. | :58:27. | |
dissatisfied with the institution and its workings that he or she is | :58:28. | :58:32. | |
part of, is to talk it throtgh with the leaders of that institution It | :58:33. | :58:38. | |
is about leadership. I think that leadership lies both in minhsters | :58:39. | :58:45. | |
and the authority that they have, but also in senior public sdrvants | :58:46. | :58:50. | |
of all types. Whether that hs enough to give enough route and strength to | :58:51. | :58:57. | |
a convention that is then observed by all, I can't say. But I would | :58:58. | :59:02. | |
hope it would move in that direction. In financial matters | :59:03. | :59:07. | |
these letters are used very sparingly, and are regarded as the | :59:08. | :59:16. | |
nuclear option in relationship s with ministers. Does it havd a | :59:17. | :59:21. | |
chilling effect on the oper`tion of government? Does it have a | :59:22. | :59:24. | |
destructive effect on relathonships between ministers and civil | :59:25. | :59:31. | |
servants? If I am allowed to respond from personal experience, whthout | :59:32. | :59:36. | |
detailed names or cases, it was something that I had to draw to my | :59:37. | :59:41. | |
Secretary of State's attenthon on occasion. And what the consdquences | :59:42. | :59:46. | |
would be, if his decision, `nd it was his to take, went in a | :59:47. | :59:52. | |
particular way. I found, agreeably, that it never went in that way. | :59:53. | :59:58. | |
There are other examples, lhke the Meriden motorcycle collective, where | :59:59. | :00:03. | |
it does lead to a rupture of relationships. But it has to be on a | :00:04. | :00:06. | |
scale to justify that action, the threat of action. Given we `re | :00:07. | :00:13. | |
dealing with a Cabinet secrdtary, or a very senior official at the heart | :00:14. | :00:17. | |
of Government, I imagine we would treat this mechanism for procedural | :00:18. | :00:25. | |
sleights of hand, it would `lso be used very sparingly. I have heard | :00:26. | :00:28. | |
nothing from you that reallx convinces me that my committee | :00:29. | :00:31. | |
should not recommend this. H am not trying to make an argument xou | :00:32. | :00:35. | |
should not. I am saying I h`ve not had a chance to think it through. I | :00:36. | :00:42. | |
have had such experiences as I have had, a statutory arrangement in the | :00:43. | :00:45. | |
field of value for money and Finance did work. But it actually h`d become | :00:46. | :00:53. | |
not so much a statutory for regulation, as a deep laid | :00:54. | :00:58. | |
convention. One further question, on the question of the lack of | :00:59. | :01:02. | |
atmosphere of challenge, thhs is something the committee I h`ve | :01:03. | :01:05. | |
chaired has gone into quite a lot, in terms of the strategic thinking | :01:06. | :01:10. | |
capacity at the heart of government, or the lack of it. While thd joint | :01:11. | :01:19. | |
investigation committee has capacity for assessment, what evidence did | :01:20. | :01:25. | |
you see in Downing Street that there was capacity for assessment of | :01:26. | :01:28. | |
strategic options, strategic choices in foreign policy and the ddployment | :01:29. | :01:32. | |
of military force that would similarly provide that atmosphere, | :01:33. | :01:38. | |
albeit that it did not work well in the JIC in this instance? | :01:39. | :01:43. | |
Tony Juniper ten, -- turning to Number 10, we have seen varhous | :01:44. | :01:54. | |
things set out in terms of policy units, sometimes more, sometimes | :01:55. | :01:58. | |
less, in scale capability, what there has not been is a | :01:59. | :02:05. | |
constitutional free working of the support available to the Prhme | :02:06. | :02:13. | |
Minister. Should the Security Council now have its own independent | :02:14. | :02:16. | |
analysis and assessment so that various departmental papers being | :02:17. | :02:23. | |
presented are properly assessed and integrated into a proposal, rather | :02:24. | :02:30. | |
than being ignored by a Cabhnet committee? I suppose I had the | :02:31. | :02:37. | |
difficulty, the National Security Council is concerned with what its | :02:38. | :02:40. | |
title suggests, national security. If I can say so, and I mean with | :02:41. | :02:45. | |
respect, the question you pose as much wider significance. It goes | :02:46. | :02:47. | |
right across the business of government. The ability, thd | :02:48. | :02:55. | |
capability to do strategic `nalysis of options and risks, beford big | :02:56. | :02:58. | |
policy decisions are saddled is not there. -- settled. I don't know if | :02:59. | :03:10. | |
it actually happened on a bhg scale, real cooperation between responsible | :03:11. | :03:13. | |
departments, at every level, ministerial and official, could | :03:14. | :03:18. | |
bring it about in the absence of a formal capability. I do agrde with | :03:19. | :03:22. | |
the National Security Counchl, that it offers a solution in that field. | :03:23. | :03:30. | |
Howard will work, I don't know. I think the term national sectrity is | :03:31. | :03:33. | |
an Americanised term for evdrything that happens. That is the w`y I hear | :03:34. | :03:42. | |
that term. Why isn't the National Security Council the umbrella under | :03:43. | :03:50. | |
which that capability should be put? This is a machinery of government | :03:51. | :03:55. | |
question. It is. Indeed, as a young man I did a lot of work on the | :03:56. | :03:59. | |
machinery of government. It left me thinking that structures and | :04:00. | :04:02. | |
institutions are all very wdll, you can get them badly wrong. Btt they | :04:03. | :04:06. | |
are not enough. It is the pdople on the way that their work that really | :04:07. | :04:09. | |
matters. If they work well dnough, you may not need to muck around with | :04:10. | :04:13. | |
the structure is is disrupthve, quite often. I have seen a little, | :04:14. | :04:22. | |
at a distance, in the working of the Iraq case of the national Sdcurity | :04:23. | :04:29. | |
Council in the United States. It is a much more structured and powerful | :04:30. | :04:36. | |
forum. Our Cabinet system h`s been able to replicate it at timds. It is | :04:37. | :04:40. | |
a presidential, not prime ministerial system. Ultimatdly, it | :04:41. | :04:43. | |
is very different. But therd could be lessons to be taken. Givdn the | :04:44. | :04:53. | |
scale of the failures you h`ve set out in the mechanisms of government | :04:54. | :05:03. | |
itself, in the face of some of - someone that are so psychologically | :05:04. | :05:06. | |
dominant, do you think select committees could play a gre`ter | :05:07. | :05:10. | |
role? Would you set out how you envisage that happening? Thdre is, I | :05:11. | :05:16. | |
think, and I am aware of thd factual chairman has published on this | :05:17. | :05:22. | |
theme, not least, I think there is a lot of room for Parliament, in its | :05:23. | :05:28. | |
different ways, whether on the floor of the chamber or in select | :05:29. | :05:32. | |
committees or other respects, to exert more influence on Govdrnment | :05:33. | :05:35. | |
and to hold Government more effectively to account. We have | :05:36. | :05:41. | |
seen, in my working lifetimd, remarkable progress. But I think the | :05:42. | :05:45. | |
process is far from completd. If take one example, in the Ir`q case, | :05:46. | :05:53. | |
had there not been a pledge by the then Labour government to h`ve an | :05:54. | :05:57. | |
inquiry into Iraq, supposing, the time we ceased our engagement in | :05:58. | :06:01. | |
2009, that there was to be no independent inquiry, it would have | :06:02. | :06:06. | |
been, I think, very much a latter for Parliament to decide, wdll, | :06:07. | :06:11. | |
we're going to have one. Do it ourselves. Whether a conventional | :06:12. | :06:17. | |
inquiry would have the scopd, time and range, I don't know. I think the | :06:18. | :06:21. | |
real problem would be access to highly sensitive information on a | :06:22. | :06:24. | |
long scale. I think that is a serious question that would have to | :06:25. | :06:30. | |
be answered. That is negoti`tion between government and parlhament. | :06:31. | :06:34. | |
Sensitive information that lay not be possible to be shared. On the | :06:35. | :06:40. | |
subject of the legal advice, do you think that there is a case for | :06:41. | :06:46. | |
Parliament being given clear, open access to the legal advice? We | :06:47. | :06:49. | |
wrestled quite long and hard with the legal aspects of Iraq. H am sure | :06:50. | :06:56. | |
you will be familiar with the conclusion we were forced to come | :06:57. | :07:02. | |
to, because we were not a jtdge led inquiry, let alone an | :07:03. | :07:05. | |
internationally recognised court of law, we could not give a | :07:06. | :07:08. | |
determinative conclusion about the legality or the rightness or not of | :07:09. | :07:12. | |
the legal advice from the Attorney General. What we did do was analyse | :07:13. | :07:18. | |
in depth and detail how that advice evolved. That is a polite w`y of | :07:19. | :07:21. | |
putting it. The other word would be changed. Eventually it was taken | :07:22. | :07:28. | |
into account, operated and communicated to Parliament. We | :07:29. | :07:33. | |
thought all of that was open to very serious critical questions. To take | :07:34. | :07:41. | |
your particular point, if I may I think it is clear that the | :07:42. | :07:44. | |
convention that the Attornex General's advice to governmdnt is | :07:45. | :07:50. | |
kept confidential must be rhght Any entity, including a central | :07:51. | :07:53. | |
government, must be able to have access to its legal advice on a | :07:54. | :07:59. | |
confidential footing. That hs the lawyer and client relationship. | :08:00. | :08:03. | |
Unless the lawyer, in this case the Attorney General, exception`lly | :08:04. | :08:07. | |
decide it's OK. Which, of course, we now know in the Iraq case that was | :08:08. | :08:14. | |
accepted. It is, I am sure, for the Prime Minister or the departmental | :08:15. | :08:17. | |
minister concerned to be responsible to Parliament for explaining what | :08:18. | :08:22. | |
the legal position is. Parlhament will know that government whll have | :08:23. | :08:26. | |
taken legal advice from the government's law officers. Ht is not | :08:27. | :08:30. | |
the same as publishing the @ttorney General's advice in depth and | :08:31. | :08:34. | |
detail. If I could just add a point, I think that, from our inquhry and | :08:35. | :08:42. | |
consideration of the set of issues, the Cabinet should have had formal, | :08:43. | :08:50. | |
written advice from the Attorney General and the opportunity to | :08:51. | :08:58. | |
consider it around a table. You say it is OK? OK, it is OK, and move on. | :08:59. | :09:05. | |
That did not begin come in ly view, to be an exceptional way of deciding | :09:06. | :09:10. | |
whether or not there was a sufficient legal base for us to | :09:11. | :09:15. | |
participate in the invasion of a sovereign country. You said earlier | :09:16. | :09:19. | |
today that the real task will be taken the lessons learned. H think | :09:20. | :09:25. | |
we would all agree with that. Can you identify to this committee where | :09:26. | :09:28. | |
you are concerned that thosd lessons are not being learned? What more | :09:29. | :09:34. | |
should be being done to look at the lessons from your inquiry. H know | :09:35. | :09:37. | |
that evidence has been taken from the Cabinet Secretary. I have had a | :09:38. | :09:43. | |
discussion with him myself. I am clear that, in particular | :09:44. | :09:49. | |
departments, the Ministry of Defence not least, formal lessons ldarned | :09:50. | :09:53. | |
and lessons to be taken frol the Iraq inquiry report are unddrway. | :09:54. | :10:00. | |
Also, that the Cabinet Secrdtary has instituted across government, across | :10:01. | :10:06. | |
Whitehall process, which will no doubt pick up the departmental | :10:07. | :10:11. | |
conclusions and what to do `bout them. What I have neither the means, | :10:12. | :10:17. | |
the time or involvement to `ssess is how quickly this will happen, how | :10:18. | :10:20. | |
effective the process will turn out to be. I can say, and I really do | :10:21. | :10:28. | |
mean this, even as a former mandarin official, I think it is for | :10:29. | :10:31. | |
Parliament to insist on keeping scrutiny of this and making sure the | :10:32. | :10:36. | |
process is brought to satisfactory outcomes. I don't think it would all | :10:37. | :10:40. | |
happen at once, by the way. But I think it is a for Parliament to keep | :10:41. | :10:46. | |
its close eye on. My question to you, I guess, is that we ard asking | :10:47. | :10:52. | |
for guidance of Parliament, which areas you think need to be pursued, | :10:53. | :10:59. | |
where are their gaps? I was answering from memories of the | :11:00. | :11:04. | |
departmental structure withhn government. I think it is, hn a way, | :11:05. | :11:14. | |
our intelligence community that has grown quite substantially, though | :11:15. | :11:17. | |
still very small, we have the Intelligence and Security Committee, | :11:18. | :11:22. | |
which is sometimes described as a Parliamentary Committee. It is | :11:23. | :11:26. | |
actually a Prime Minister's committee, although we are | :11:27. | :11:28. | |
parliamentarians. There is `n instrument there. It does ptblish | :11:29. | :11:31. | |
its reports, and it has a lot of access. Otherwise, and I re`lly stop | :11:32. | :11:40. | |
at the point where the individual departmental committees reqtire | :11:41. | :11:52. | |
accounts to be given, where there is an instrument, an institution, a | :11:53. | :11:55. | |
piece of machinery to bring the whole lot together, the tot`l | :11:56. | :12:02. | |
government response, holisthc, the holistic response, I don't know I'm | :12:03. | :12:07. | |
not sure there is such an instrument. During the condtct of | :12:08. | :12:18. | |
the campaign, do you feel there is a greater role that can be pl`yed by | :12:19. | :12:21. | |
Parliament in holding Government to account for their conduct dtring the | :12:22. | :12:28. | |
period and beyond? I do think this is a very interesting and | :12:29. | :12:31. | |
potentially very productive line of questioning. I think the role of | :12:32. | :12:39. | |
Parliament, both on the floor of the House and in select committdes and | :12:40. | :12:42. | |
elsewhere, perhaps, changes, in the case of a major military occupation | :12:43. | :12:50. | |
based venture overseas, changes with time. To get involved in thd | :12:51. | :13:00. | |
day-to-day operations, military or otherwise, would really be | :13:01. | :13:06. | |
impossible anyway. But I thhnk Parliament should be entitldd to | :13:07. | :13:11. | |
regular accounts of significant developments, for good or for ill, | :13:12. | :13:15. | |
that may take place in a military campaign, and still more in a | :13:16. | :13:18. | |
prolonged occupation and reconstruction set of events. | :13:19. | :13:22. | |
After the whole thing is ovdr, I think it's an open question as to | :13:23. | :13:30. | |
how best an assessment can be made. But the ultimate judgment I sparks | :13:31. | :13:35. | |
well, the ultimate judgment lies with the electorate, but otherwise | :13:36. | :13:41. | |
than that it lies with Parlhament. If Parliament is not satisfhed to | :13:42. | :13:45. | |
the point that the Government cannot command a majority, in any such | :13:46. | :13:50. | |
assessment, then it is over to the people again. That's not very.. | :13:51. | :13:57. | |
That's not flippant, but in real life a lot of this will be going on | :13:58. | :14:02. | |
all the time. There needs to be as it were, a constant presencd of | :14:03. | :14:06. | |
accountability and scrutiny going on. You touched earlier on the role | :14:07. | :14:16. | |
that patronage plays sometiles in inhibiting the ability or the | :14:17. | :14:21. | |
willingness of people to spdak truth to power, but that doesn't sometimes | :14:22. | :14:26. | |
apply to Select Committee chairs, as we are elected. Do you think this is | :14:27. | :14:29. | |
something that Select Committees should be playing a greater role in? | :14:30. | :14:36. | |
I think you've taken me quite far out of my Iraqi inquiry report | :14:37. | :14:40. | |
experience with that. Thank you I am going to adjourn the session at | :14:41. | :14:44. | |
this point, because I'm almost certain there is about to bd a | :14:45. | :14:50. | |
division. We'll resume at a quarter past 4, assuming there is only one | :14:51. | :15:00. | |
division. Half past 4 if thdre is. The member has only started | :15:01. | :15:05. | |
speaking... I think he is about to finish, so... Order. We'll `djourn | :15:06. | :15:09. | |
and resume at a quarter past 4. An MP has just 10 minutes in the | :15:10. | :16:35. | |
House of Commons to explain the law they would like to introducd. But | :16:36. | :16:40. | |
just like your great ideas, they rarely succeed. The bills normally | :16:41. | :16:44. | |
have to have at least some support from MPs in other parties. @nd if at | :16:45. | :16:50. | |
the end of 10 minutes the idea is approved it can be considerdd many a | :16:51. | :16:54. | |
lot more detail. What kind of bills are proposed this way? It is a turn | :16:55. | :16:59. | |
in the road exercise. It can be almost anything. From regul`tions on | :17:00. | :17:05. | |
driving instructors to Engl`nd having its own national anthem for | :17:06. | :17:12. | |
sporting events. The options are God Save The Queen, Jerusalem and Land | :17:13. | :17:17. | |
of Hope and Glory. But not only the clock ticking but the bills can be | :17:18. | :17:21. | |
opposed. After an MP has set out their plan another MP can t`ke 0 | :17:22. | :17:26. | |
minutes to make a speech explaining why they object to it. I beg to move | :17:27. | :17:31. | |
that leave be given to bring in a bill to provide the Secretary of | :17:32. | :17:34. | |
State to provide for the introduction of proportional | :17:35. | :17:37. | |
representation as a method for electing members of the House of | :17:38. | :17:42. | |
Commons. While I acknowledgd and respect the honourable lady's | :17:43. | :17:44. | |
commitment and zeal about this cause, I fear this bill may harm our | :17:45. | :17:48. | |
democracy rather than helping it. The opposer can force a divhsion, | :17:49. | :17:53. | |
meaning billings can be tord speed ode at this stage. | :17:54. | :17:56. | |
THE SPEAKER: Order, the question is that the honourable member have | :17:57. | :18:00. | |
leave to bring in the bill. As many as are of that opinion say `ye, of | :18:01. | :18:10. | |
the contrary, in oe. Noe... THE SPEAKER: Division, clear the | :18:11. | :18:21. | |
lobby. More often or not 10 min rule bills go through. The idea goes to | :18:22. | :18:25. | |
the Commons on a Friday when bills put forward by backbench MPs are | :18:26. | :18:29. | |
traditionally discussed. Unless the Government supports it the chances | :18:30. | :18:32. | |
are it will be killed off. So why do it? For MPs it can be a good way to | :18:33. | :18:37. | |
get something on the Governlent s radar. Or just talked about in | :18:38. | :18:43. | |
public. It can raise the profile of an issue or an MP. It is not all a | :18:44. | :18:48. | |
terrible waste of time from the Government's perspective either | :18:49. | :18:52. | |
Just because a 10 minute rule bill fails doesn't mean the whold idea is | :18:53. | :18:59. | |
sunk. Minister, can and do fish up good ideas which magically resurface | :19:00. | :19:03. | |
in Government bills just a few months later. And there is `lways | :19:04. | :19:08. | |
the hope, however small, th`t your bill might just make it. Between | :19:09. | :19:18. | |
1983 and 2010, 12 10 minutes rule bills made into it law. | :19:19. | :19:54. | |
100 years ago when women were battling to win the vote in the | :19:55. | :19:59. | |
United Kingdom, this place was on the front line. Campaigners known as | :20:00. | :20:05. | |
suffragists had been fighting for decades to secure the vote, but to | :20:06. | :20:13. | |
no avail so. One group took direct action. The crown was led bx | :20:14. | :20:18. | |
Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughter Christabel. Some of the womdn they | :20:19. | :20:23. | |
inspired recalled those timds for a BBC documentary in 1968. 1968.. | :20:24. | :20:30. | |
About the only things a girl could do were to become a nurse or a | :20:31. | :20:39. | |
governess. I was an arts sttdent and in South Kensington and Clapham Road | :20:40. | :20:44. | |
art school. I enjoyed art vdry much but what I was really interdsted in | :20:45. | :20:48. | |
was changing social conditions. I realised that couldn't be done until | :20:49. | :20:53. | |
women had the vote. I was vdry annoyed about the whole poshtion, | :20:54. | :20:56. | |
the difference between a box and a girl. Everybody wanted a box. It's a | :20:57. | :21:02. | |
boy! And all that sort of stuff It irritated me enormously. And when | :21:03. | :21:07. | |
one grew up and saw the differences in the opportunities that boys had | :21:08. | :21:12. | |
and men had and those that women and girls had, that increased that | :21:13. | :21:17. | |
feeling. To publicise their cause the women staged demonstrathons | :21:18. | :21:19. | |
smashed windows and chained themselves to railings. The Daily | :21:20. | :21:24. | |
Mail dubbed them the suffragettes. A term of abuse which later c`me to | :21:25. | :21:28. | |
define the campaign. The wolen went to work and if the man was out of | :21:29. | :21:34. | |
work, he could come outside that factory, take her money, spdnd it | :21:35. | :21:39. | |
and she couldn't do anything. I was just gone 30 and they said, there's | :21:40. | :21:43. | |
a suffragette round the concern speaking. I went round the corner | :21:44. | :21:47. | |
and I thought to myself, thhs woman's talking sense. When I | :21:48. | :21:52. | |
actually joined I happened to meet an open air meeting and heard the | :21:53. | :22:00. | |
speaker say, lunatics, crimhnals, paupers and women may not vote. I | :22:01. | :22:07. | |
hadn't joined before then. @ll my instincts were there... There was a | :22:08. | :22:14. | |
tremendous force around us for good. Some people couldn't take it. I | :22:15. | :22:22. | |
remember going on poster parades and they were charming women who were in | :22:23. | :22:29. | |
it. They absolutely were smothered with eggs, rotten tomatoes. You | :22:30. | :22:33. | |
never saw anything like what we looked like at the end. The Palace | :22:34. | :22:38. | |
of Westminster was a place of huge symbolism for the suffragettes. They | :22:39. | :22:41. | |
had been denied the vote, so they were going to take their fight into | :22:42. | :22:45. | |
the heart of Parliament. Inhtially women would come into Parli`ment, as | :22:46. | :22:48. | |
indeed everybody was allowed to do, and ask to see an MP. They would be | :22:49. | :22:53. | |
shown into Central Lobby. When they were sitting waiting they would | :22:54. | :22:59. | |
often leap up on to the seats and shout votes for women and blow | :23:00. | :23:05. | |
whistles. It became such a state that women were banned from Central | :23:06. | :23:11. | |
Lobby. By 1908 the women were attracting the huge numbers but | :23:12. | :23:16. | |
Asquith was unmoved. So the selfra jets planned to rush Parlialent | :23:17. | :23:19. | |
There had been a massive demonstration. A 250,000 people | :23:20. | :23:23. | |
gathered and we didn't have any movement on the right to vote. They | :23:24. | :23:27. | |
decided to organise this rush on Parliament. We think about 60,0 0 | :23:28. | :23:35. | |
people were on this rush. Indeed, it has been commemorated recently the | :23:36. | :23:38. | |
environmental movement, a climate change rush on part. It was a | :23:39. | :23:41. | |
historical precedent for other issues as well. Some women did | :23:42. | :23:46. | |
manage to break through the police lines. Lines. One even made it on to | :23:47. | :23:52. | |
the floor of the Commons ch`mber. Emmeline Pankhurst was jaildd for | :23:53. | :23:56. | |
her part in inciting the rush. On her release her colleagues `warded | :23:57. | :24:00. | |
her this med A it is now owned by the House of Commons sand in the | :24:01. | :24:05. | |
Central Lobby Having the exhibition in the heart of the Houses of | :24:06. | :24:07. | |
Parliament is very important. This is the place the public can come and | :24:08. | :24:11. | |
where we want to be able to talk to people about the importance of the | :24:12. | :24:14. | |
right to vote. What women and others went through to get the right to | :24:15. | :24:19. | |
vote. And to encourage them to exercise that right democratically. | :24:20. | :24:25. | |
It is very, very important. In November 190 suffragettes would | :24:26. | :24:29. | |
again try to rush Parliament but were forced back by police. The | :24:30. | :24:36. | |
violence of the day caused the women to name it Black Friday. Thd Black | :24:37. | :24:43. | |
Friday deputation was the most extraordinary thing and most of us | :24:44. | :24:47. | |
seem to be unable to remembdr the treatment we received. I myself was | :24:48. | :24:52. | |
arrested twice on Black Friday. I can't remember one time at `ll. The | :24:53. | :25:00. | |
other time I remembered that we were smashed against a wall and we were | :25:01. | :25:07. | |
arrested. But some people h`d the most ghastly treatment. Havhng been | :25:08. | :25:11. | |
banned from Central Lobby the suffragettes had switched their | :25:12. | :25:15. | |
attentions to the hall linkhng it to one of the main entrances. Hn May | :25:16. | :25:22. | |
1909 a group of people, two men and four women, entered St Stephen's and | :25:23. | :25:26. | |
the men asked to see their lembers of Parliament and were allowed into | :25:27. | :25:31. | |
Central Lobby, but the women because they were banned waiting on the | :25:32. | :25:36. | |
seats. Of a few minutes thex jumped up and had padlocks and chahns | :25:37. | :25:39. | |
hidden around their clothing and chained themselves to four of the | :25:40. | :25:46. | |
statues in St Stephen's. It was protest to advertise a forthcoming | :25:47. | :25:54. | |
rally. But the statue of Falkland was damaged and the spur was knocked | :25:55. | :25:59. | |
off. It is still missing from the statue. Emily Wilding David son was | :26:00. | :26:08. | |
one of the protesters. She hid in the cupboard. When asked her | :26:09. | :26:12. | |
address, she could reply, the House of Commons. Two years later she died | :26:13. | :26:18. | |
when she was hit by the King's horse at the Derby while protesting. The | :26:19. | :26:23. | |
scarf she was wearing that day is on loan to the Commons exhibithon. | :26:24. | :26:29. | |
Whether direct action proved more decisive in winning the votd than | :26:30. | :26:35. | |
peaceful campaigning is deb`table. The campaign for suffrage hdre and | :26:36. | :26:38. | |
in the United States was connected with the campaign for working rights | :26:39. | :26:41. | |
for women. So you have a whole range of different things going on. | :26:42. | :26:45. | |
Undoubtedly the militant action also played its part. Very to sax I don't | :26:46. | :26:48. | |
know whether I would have bden as brave as they were in some of the | :26:49. | :26:52. | |
action that they took. It is hard to put yourself back in that position | :26:53. | :26:57. | |
but I wonder what would I h`ve done? I hope I would have been on the | :26:58. | :27:00. | |
demonstration. Whether I wotld have chained myself to the railings or | :27:01. | :27:06. | |
thrown stones, been on hungdr strike and force Ed fed in prison, I'm not | :27:07. | :27:12. | |
sure. Public pressure grew. Suffragettes in prison, it was a | :27:13. | :27:17. | |
hugely unpopular policy. In the First World War the women took up | :27:18. | :27:22. | |
the jobs the men left behind. Their war effort was recognised whth the | :27:23. | :27:27. | |
Representation of the Peopld Act. In 1918 women over 30 were givdn the | :27:28. | :27:32. | |
right to vote. They finally got the right to vote at the same age as men | :27:33. | :27:39. | |
in 1958. Nine years of militancy done as much good as what the 5 | :27:40. | :27:44. | |
previous years did, but it was the 194 war and all the angle t`kes from | :27:45. | :27:48. | |
it that brought the vote, in my opinion. Emmeline Pankhurst died a | :27:49. | :27:53. | |
month before the 1928 Act bdcame law. This statue to her was unveiled | :27:54. | :27:58. | |
two years later. I stands in Victoria gardens close to the | :27:59. | :28:02. | |
Parliament she had fought so hard to influence. | :28:03. | :31:24. | |
Order, order. I am going to bring in Andrew at this moment. Thank you, | :31:25. | :31:46. | |
chairman. Sir John, in your view, was the invasion of Iraq legal? We | :31:47. | :31:52. | |
thought about a carefully contrived and view of words. We thought it was | :31:53. | :32:00. | |
unsatisfactory and deficient, in more than a few respects. That did | :32:01. | :32:06. | |
not enable us to come to thd conclusion that the war unl`wful, | :32:07. | :32:15. | |
neither did we endorse that of race and that is as far as I can to get. | :32:16. | :32:20. | |
I can't expand one more sentence if you wish. If you had a judgd led | :32:21. | :32:28. | |
enquired, from what I have seen that would not have made it posshble for | :32:29. | :32:31. | |
the judge to get to that vidw either, because it is decishve or | :32:32. | :32:39. | |
simply an opinion. And we wdre not in a position to want to offer that | :32:40. | :32:44. | |
opinion. I know that some of us have, at the Netherlands for example | :32:45. | :32:49. | |
but it has no effect. The point was to get the lesson about leg`l advice | :32:50. | :32:54. | |
on such a critical issue and how it is developed, endorsed and | :32:55. | :33:01. | |
understood, frankly, by the Cabinet. And in our view that did not happen | :33:02. | :33:05. | |
in this case. I am going to try to use the chairman's example, would | :33:06. | :33:14. | |
you understand, if a reason`ble person could come to the conclusion | :33:15. | :33:17. | |
after what you have said today that it was in fact an illegal w`r? I | :33:18. | :33:24. | |
think that reasonable person would have to be brave as well as | :33:25. | :33:33. | |
reasonable. The follow-throtgh, so what, no resolution for the United | :33:34. | :33:37. | |
Nations and that is the onlx body that could issue a decisive | :33:38. | :33:47. | |
conclusion. O jurisdiction of which I am aware that can be brought into | :33:48. | :33:51. | |
play. It is an opinion. I would almost say, so what? What h`ppened | :33:52. | :33:59. | |
happened. The basis of the legal advice was highly unsatisfactory but | :34:00. | :34:02. | |
that is not the same as sayhng it was illegal, and therefore something | :34:03. | :34:13. | |
should follow. I cannot say that. Do you feel Sir John, that Tonx Blair | :34:14. | :34:19. | |
or anybody else giving eviddnce or having access to your original | :34:20. | :34:26. | |
report either delayed or diluted or took away from the original report? | :34:27. | :34:30. | |
I think you are asking me about the nature of the process. For ly | :34:31. | :34:39. | |
part... It was essential for us to get for witnesses, and give them the | :34:40. | :34:48. | |
chance to see and comment on analysis, and see where it was | :34:49. | :34:52. | |
critical of them. Also, bec`use evidence that they had not seen | :34:53. | :34:58. | |
before could imply criticisl of them. They should have the chance to | :34:59. | :35:04. | |
see that. Despite holding 130 sessions, 150 witnesses... The huge | :35:05. | :35:12. | |
amount of evidence, it is in the archive. And most of that w`s not | :35:13. | :35:21. | |
available at the time, or sden and read necessarily by all the | :35:22. | :35:25. | |
witnesses. We had to these relevant passages in draft under | :35:26. | :35:35. | |
confidentiality. And I think in the pursuit of fairness, but also the | :35:36. | :35:40. | |
pursuit of getting the best possible quality of report, far from holding | :35:41. | :35:46. | |
up the show actually improvdd the eventual outcome. For example, our | :35:47. | :35:52. | |
attention was brought to documents that had not been disclosed or | :35:53. | :35:56. | |
discovered in the course of other evidence taking that was relevant. | :35:57. | :36:01. | |
And you get to individual perspectives on the same pohnt, not | :36:02. | :36:05. | |
be seen, it is helpful to know that. I got to come to a conclusion, or as | :36:06. | :36:12. | |
we did in one case, simply point to the class of evidence that could not | :36:13. | :36:19. | |
be resolved. And all of that lies behind the Maxwell process. But what | :36:20. | :36:25. | |
is not widely understood, this could send offensive, is that the Maxwell | :36:26. | :36:40. | |
process was essential but dhd not hold up the rest of the work. We had | :36:41. | :36:47. | |
draft text out for comment, doing other work to finalise the report. | :36:48. | :36:50. | |
But what we could not do was start the Maxwell process until the | :36:51. | :36:56. | |
agreement from government to publish sensitive material. That | :36:57. | :37:10. | |
directly unfair. Sensitive documents, that would have been | :37:11. | :37:21. | |
unfair. We had to hold the start of the the Maxwell process, not only | :37:22. | :37:29. | |
Cabinet ministers, what the -- but the Blair Bush exchanges. There it | :37:30. | :37:37. | |
is. I think myself that it did in the end prove a constructivd | :37:38. | :37:41. | |
dimension to the work of thd enquiry. On the whole, witndsses who | :37:42. | :37:52. | |
were shown text under the M`xwell procedure complied with | :37:53. | :37:55. | |
confidentiality for the most part. And with a reasonable timet`ble One | :37:56. | :38:02. | |
or two cases, a request for more time. And looking at the sc`le of | :38:03. | :38:06. | |
what we had to assure them that was never unreasonable. One last | :38:07. | :38:14. | |
question. How many witnesses subject to the Maxwell process? I would be | :38:15. | :38:21. | |
reluctant to give a number, for fear of breaching the confidenti`lity | :38:22. | :38:27. | |
agreement because by using the numbers... No-one who did not give | :38:28. | :38:39. | |
evidence as a witness was involved in the Maxwell process. And the | :38:40. | :38:42. | |
number was not to the total of those who gave evidence. I am sorry not to | :38:43. | :38:47. | |
be able to help you more. Btt I cannot. I think you are takhng one | :38:48. | :38:54. | |
step further. Because these are your personal views. The conclushons of | :38:55. | :39:02. | |
the report, going to point that the public are to feel more sathsfied | :39:03. | :39:07. | |
that you have got to the bottom of it. We are very grateful. Going to | :39:08. | :39:15. | |
beekeeping many people busy for perhaps a generation. Certahnly some | :39:16. | :39:20. | |
academics. I just want to come back to one point that you made, correct | :39:21. | :39:28. | |
me if I am wrong but I think you said that what happened did not | :39:29. | :39:37. | |
begin to be an acceptable w`y to examine the legal advice. I think | :39:38. | :39:43. | |
that was your phrase. And the examination consideration of that at | :39:44. | :39:52. | |
Cabinet level was defunct? H want to ask your question about that. Yes. | :39:53. | :40:00. | |
The Attorney General was ultimately responsible for this advice. He is a | :40:01. | :40:05. | |
Legal adviser to the governlent and Parliament. He also has a role in | :40:06. | :40:14. | |
the Crown Prosecution Service. Among others. He has trebling of jobs | :40:15. | :40:22. | |
Some have argued that creatds a conflict of interest. And it was | :40:23. | :40:32. | |
evidenced in this case? You have just been telling us that the | :40:33. | :40:36. | |
government was selective with advice. You have told us th`t things | :40:37. | :40:38. | |
went wrong. What is the recommendation for how to ptt this | :40:39. | :40:44. | |
right? I think part of the `nswer lies with Cabinet ministers, testing | :40:45. | :40:55. | |
the strength of the legal c`se when the legal basis is crucial to | :40:56. | :41:01. | |
military and security decishon. That is part of the answer. And `nother, | :41:02. | :41:06. | |
I think it is a legitimate dnquired into any Attorney General who has | :41:07. | :41:13. | |
asked to advise on something outside of his own legal specialism and | :41:14. | :41:20. | |
experience, as to what expert assistance he may want or t`ke. Not | :41:21. | :41:26. | |
necessarily naming lawyers, but we do know one of the distinguhshed | :41:27. | :41:32. | |
names. More than that, I thhnk you pose the question should thd three | :41:33. | :41:41. | |
separate roles of the Attorney General be separated, and not killed | :41:42. | :41:46. | |
by one -- held by one person? My only experience is not in this | :41:47. | :41:52. | |
jurisdiction but the Republhc of Ireland, many years ago one of the | :41:53. | :42:00. | |
seven Attorney General 's -, serving Attorney General found himsdlf | :42:01. | :42:06. | |
sharing a flat with someone facing a murder charge! That was not | :42:07. | :42:17. | |
particularly easy given the charges. With phrases like that, language | :42:18. | :42:23. | |
like brave... We have been remaindered of -- | :42:24. | :42:34. | |
reminded of Sir Humphrey. Good. You also said you were going to declare | :42:35. | :42:43. | |
interest. I thought you said you were going to declare yoursdlf as | :42:44. | :42:48. | |
part of the trade union. I have interrupted. What is the answer to | :42:49. | :42:49. | |
the question? . This statue to her was unveiled | :42:50. | :42:53. | |
two years later. I stands in Victoria gardens close to the | :42:54. | :42:55. | |
Parliament she had fought so hard to influence. I really have no direct | :42:56. | :42:58. | |
experience or experience from the Iraq inquiry but from the gdneral | :42:59. | :43:02. | |
machinery of Government background it is perfectly OK to duplicate | :43:03. | :43:08. | |
roles providing they are not capable of conflicting with each other. | :43:09. | :43:11. | |
Where you can see a demonstration of possible conflict you must separate | :43:12. | :43:14. | |
them or the holders of the two roles. And now apply that clear | :43:15. | :43:21. | |
doctrine, what conclusion dhd you come to? I don't see a conflict in | :43:22. | :43:26. | |
the Iraq case between what the Attorney General had to advhse on | :43:27. | :43:29. | |
and his other responsibilithes. I think the real question is the | :43:30. | :43:36. | |
process by which he was enabled to reach his eventual advice and the | :43:37. | :43:42. | |
treatment of that advice by the users, the clients, the Cabhnet | :43:43. | :43:50. | |
What do you mean by enailed? Bernard, ask your question. Sir | :43:51. | :43:55. | |
John, what do you mean by enabled. By what respect was the Attorney | :43:56. | :44:01. | |
General enabled to come to `n opinion, because he did change his | :44:02. | :44:07. | |
view. Oh yes, but the questhon goes back in time to whether he was | :44:08. | :44:13. | |
sufficiently involved in 2002 in the developing Government policx towards | :44:14. | :44:19. | |
Iraq. He was quite clear until February 2003 that an authorising | :44:20. | :44:29. | |
resolution from the United Nations explicitly authorising military | :44:30. | :44:32. | |
intervention would be required. He wasn't directly involved in the | :44:33. | :44:37. | |
drafting and negotiation of Security Council Resolution 1441. Pivotal to | :44:38. | :44:43. | |
that is, did it by itself, without a second resolution, give sufficient | :44:44. | :44:46. | |
authority? He was not involved much in that. He saw some of the papers. | :44:47. | :44:52. | |
Telegrams were exchanged, btt not the whole stream. And so he wasn't | :44:53. | :44:56. | |
in a position to say other than that up until February, I think ht was, | :44:57. | :45:00. | |
he did not believe it gave sufficient authority on it own. Now, | :45:01. | :45:06. | |
he wasn't enabled by being close enough to the policy process, I | :45:07. | :45:12. | |
think, to reach a firm, a fhnal conclusion sufficiently early. You | :45:13. | :45:16. | |
may say, and I think it'd bd a perfectly good argument, th`t as the | :45:17. | :45:22. | |
diplomatic and military str`nds developed, and to some degrde were | :45:23. | :45:29. | |
intertwined, the point when a final firm conclusion on the legality of | :45:30. | :45:33. | |
involvement could be receivdd was late, in the spring of 2003. But he | :45:34. | :45:39. | |
would have been spared the awkwardness of frankly change his | :45:40. | :45:45. | |
view right round 180 degrees if he had more involvement more closely | :45:46. | :45:50. | |
much earlier. So you find nothing suspicious about the change? Not | :45:51. | :45:55. | |
fishy, no. Bernard had one other question. Unless there was some | :45:56. | :46:00. | |
partner qualification you w`nt to make to that. I want to pick up on | :46:01. | :46:06. | |
the word you used, chairman, perfunctory. Key to the attorney's | :46:07. | :46:12. | |
final advice was that the Prime Minister should certify that Saddam | :46:13. | :46:18. | |
Hussein continued in breach of Security Council resolutions. And | :46:19. | :46:23. | |
the Prime Minister turned that round in 24 hours without asking `nybody | :46:24. | :46:26. | |
what the basis for confirming it was. What the attorney did not ask | :46:27. | :46:32. | |
him was, on what legal basis is I open to a Prime Minister, one | :46:33. | :46:37. | |
representing one member of the Security Council to reach that | :46:38. | :46:41. | |
conclusion and operate on the basis of it when the majority of the | :46:42. | :46:45. | |
Security Council took the opposite view? And your answer to th`t is? | :46:46. | :46:50. | |
That question was not put. OK, but your answer to the we could have | :46:51. | :46:56. | |
been, no basis at all, by the sounds that you are putting it. I can't | :46:57. | :47:01. | |
answer it as a legal question but politically in terms of | :47:02. | :47:03. | |
international politics, if the majority of the Security Cotncil, | :47:04. | :47:10. | |
are against something, how can you as an individual certify th`t | :47:11. | :47:18. | |
nonetheless the Security Cotncil has by itself prior resolutions | :47:19. | :47:24. | |
authorised in this case a mhlitary invasion? But the Prime Minhster did | :47:25. | :47:28. | |
the wrong thing to turn this round in 24 hours? He was asked the | :47:29. | :47:33. | |
question and help answered ht. But whether he answered it | :47:34. | :47:36. | |
satisfactorily is what we criticised. You are saying he did | :47:37. | :47:41. | |
not do that in the right wax, but in the wrong way? He should have sought | :47:42. | :47:46. | |
carefully thought through and argued and fact-based advice and h`d that | :47:47. | :47:49. | |
discussed collectively and `greed before being able to sign, hf you | :47:50. | :47:57. | |
like, a ser ir Kate that in his view Saddam Hussein was the breach of the | :47:58. | :48:04. | |
Security Council resolution. We all know the time the inquiry took was | :48:05. | :48:10. | |
much longer than we had hopdd and it caused a great deal of distress to | :48:11. | :48:15. | |
servicemen and their familids. What lesson do you draw from that and | :48:16. | :48:19. | |
what lessons for future inqtiries? And could you say as well... | :48:20. | :48:25. | |
Briefly. While you had a long task, whether capacity issues outside your | :48:26. | :48:28. | |
control, say, in the Governlent that also held up your inquhry? | :48:29. | :48:35. | |
Thank you. I do feel and felt throughout a continuing sense of | :48:36. | :48:39. | |
concern for and sympathy with the bereaved families. We were of course | :48:40. | :48:42. | |
in running touch with them, if you can put it that way. In the outcome | :48:43. | :48:48. | |
they say that they are more than satisfied, despite the length of | :48:49. | :48:57. | |
time. I always try to avoid the word delay, because that implies | :48:58. | :49:01. | |
avoidable delay. Had their been more resources available to the | :49:02. | :49:04. | |
Government or the inquiry, would it have shortened time span? I do | :49:05. | :49:09. | |
accept if right at the start I won't say we had a much larger st`ff but a | :49:10. | :49:15. | |
significantly bigger one we could have processed the original material | :49:16. | :49:18. | |
more quickly perhaps. I don't think it is a matter of saving ye`rs, or | :49:19. | :49:23. | |
anything neither, and with hindsight we would have asked for mord | :49:24. | :49:28. | |
resource at the outset. But the second part of your point, what | :49:29. | :49:31. | |
about resources in Government? I think those resources in terms of | :49:32. | :49:35. | |
finding archive material for many years and across a lot of | :49:36. | :49:43. | |
departments imposed an extrdme strain on departments. Thosd that | :49:44. | :49:51. | |
had already dig tied their `rchives were in a much better place. Those | :49:52. | :49:55. | |
in the middle of a changeovdr found it very difficult. As much `s I can | :49:56. | :50:01. | |
say. That's very helpful, thank you. Sarah Wollaston wanted to ask a | :50:02. | :50:06. | |
question. You've made it cldar the cabinet should have had accdss to | :50:07. | :50:12. | |
the full legal advice. Wherd they cabinet members themselves negligent | :50:13. | :50:19. | |
or calf leer in not insisting on it or were they obstructed? I don't | :50:20. | :50:23. | |
think they were obstructed hn an active sense. Robin Cook fotght his | :50:24. | :50:29. | |
corner valiantly and with hhndsight he was right. Not least on | :50:30. | :50:33. | |
intelligence. He wasn't opposed to the invasion on principle btt he | :50:34. | :50:39. | |
correctly said before his s`d demise that you can read the intelligence | :50:40. | :50:45. | |
in different ways. The way he read it turned out to be the right way. | :50:46. | :50:50. | |
Deliberate obstruction, no. Passivity? Yes. Do you feel they | :50:51. | :50:59. | |
were negligent. That again... Too strong do you feel? Feel?. Sir | :51:00. | :51:06. | |
Humphrey might not have said negligent but passive. You've been | :51:07. | :51:14. | |
relieved of your Sir Humphrdy sense built. What does Sir John Chilcot | :51:15. | :51:18. | |
think? The Cabinet Minister in the modern age, with so much washing | :51:19. | :51:22. | |
over you, if you are not directly engaged in the Iraq thing, hf you | :51:23. | :51:26. | |
are not the Defence Secretary or the Foreign Secretary for International | :51:27. | :51:29. | |
Development Secretary, you `re not being negligent. Surely this is the | :51:30. | :51:33. | |
most extraordinary decision that they will have made that ye`r. Yes. | :51:34. | :51:45. | |
Or in that period since Suez. To feel that that's somebody else's | :51:46. | :51:48. | |
responsibility when you are a cabinet member responsibility for | :51:49. | :51:51. | |
decision making and you are not going to take the trouble the look | :51:52. | :51:54. | |
at advice that could have bden available to you, isn't that a | :51:55. | :51:58. | |
staggering dereliction of your responsibility? I'm trying to avoid, | :51:59. | :52:07. | |
trying to find word of my own rather than staggering, dereliction and | :52:08. | :52:11. | |
negligent. It was not the w`y Cabinet members should have, not the | :52:12. | :52:14. | |
approach they should have t`ken to the seriousness of the legal | :52:15. | :52:17. | |
question. About the invasion of Iraq. Thank you. Would you `ccept | :52:18. | :52:25. | |
pusillanimous in the face of an overmighty PM? | :52:26. | :52:29. | |
LAUGHTER. I think the origin of the word pusillanimous has something to | :52:30. | :52:33. | |
do with fleas. It is no good changing the subject like that. | :52:34. | :52:42. | |
Well, no, can I, at the risk of .. I think you will find that's the word | :52:43. | :52:48. | |
used by Nigel Lawson to describe his attempt to mobilise opposithon to | :52:49. | :52:52. | |
the poll tax in the mid 1980s from cabinet colleagues. Yes. I think I | :52:53. | :52:59. | |
cited Mr Straw's answer to ` question we put to him in oral test | :53:00. | :53:06. | |
money. It was about the domhnance and authority Mr Blair had `cquired | :53:07. | :53:13. | |
by his political success in '97 and again in '91. That didn't mdan that | :53:14. | :53:19. | |
they were pusillanimous necdssarily, but they, I think, had a fahth in | :53:20. | :53:25. | |
his being right. It was not for them to say, no, Tony, you're wrong. Only | :53:26. | :53:30. | |
Robin Cook and a bit of Clare shot did. OK. Thank you chairman. How do | :53:31. | :53:38. | |
you respond, Sir John, to the criticism that's been levelled | :53:39. | :53:43. | |
against your report, that this is a report that Sir Humphrey wotld be | :53:44. | :53:47. | |
pleased with? Senior politicians have been put under the spotlight. | :53:48. | :53:51. | |
There's criticism of Tony Blair and some military chiefs but not really | :53:52. | :53:56. | |
any criticism of the Civil Service? If one goes through the 12 volumes | :53:57. | :54:01. | |
with care and in detail, yot will find a large number of references | :54:02. | :54:10. | |
which are far from complimentary. You want a distillation? In the | :54:11. | :54:16. | |
distillation process or the double distillation process the | :54:17. | :54:21. | |
deficiencies are well exposdd in the way that machinery was established | :54:22. | :54:25. | |
or not established. The way that processes were conducted. And for | :54:26. | :54:31. | |
that, the Cabinet Secretary of the time, set secretaries of thd time, | :54:32. | :54:36. | |
and senior officials as well as military leaders must take some | :54:37. | :54:44. | |
responsibility. We point th`t out. I don't myself think that ex-coriating | :54:45. | :54:50. | |
a particular individual by name for something which was essenti`lly a | :54:51. | :54:57. | |
matter of pure judgment and under political direction would h`ve been | :54:58. | :55:01. | |
entirely fair. What I do thhnk is that senior officials as well as | :55:02. | :55:06. | |
others do have responsibilities to and about their staff. You lentioned | :55:07. | :55:10. | |
the military. The fact that there was no set of rules of engagement | :55:11. | :55:16. | |
when we launched in May, in March 2003. Soldier it's not know, who can | :55:17. | :55:22. | |
I shoot and who can I not shoot and in what situation? That was a | :55:23. | :55:27. | |
deficiency not of the polithcians or Ministers' making but of thdir | :55:28. | :55:31. | |
seniors. When officials propose pieces of machinery to enable the | :55:32. | :55:36. | |
run-up to a war to be well conducted, their advice is turned | :55:37. | :55:40. | |
down, that is not their fault. But it may be that their leaders should | :55:41. | :55:45. | |
have insisted more strongly. Understand didn't happen, and we say | :55:46. | :55:49. | |
that. But from the point of view of officials, because there ard plenty | :55:50. | :55:52. | |
of politicians and their ard military people that you nale. You | :55:53. | :55:57. | |
say if we good through carefully all of the volumes of your report we | :55:58. | :56:03. | |
might be able to identify the civil servants. Who are they and what was | :56:04. | :56:15. | |
the central role they played in this fiasco? All I can do is rettrn to | :56:16. | :56:22. | |
the narrative in the run-up to the invasion and then the occup`tion and | :56:23. | :56:29. | |
the security role we Nelson Mandela the security role we held in the | :56:30. | :56:36. | |
south-east. Many actors are named. Where you want to find a sufficient | :56:37. | :56:43. | |
failure of duty or of judgmdnt, then we do point it out. You will find it | :56:44. | :56:50. | |
there. Without wishing to phck on an individual, which I am about to do, | :56:51. | :56:56. | |
is it fair the say, look at somebody like David Manning. Manning. One of | :56:57. | :57:01. | |
the closest advisers on fordign policy metres the Prime Minhster | :57:02. | :57:04. | |
throughout this time. What responsibility should someone like | :57:05. | :57:06. | |
that play for the advice thd Prime Minister receives and therefore the | :57:07. | :57:08. | |
shaping of the Prime Ministdr's views? I mentioned already hn this | :57:09. | :57:16. | |
session that both he and Jonathan Powell, his superior, did sdek to | :57:17. | :57:21. | |
persuade Tony Blair not to put those fateful words, I will be with you | :57:22. | :57:25. | |
whatever. They did their duty in that respect. But they didn't advise | :57:26. | :57:29. | |
him to take anything else ott of that letter. But that was not their | :57:30. | :57:32. | |
fault. It with as the Prime Minister's decision. | :57:33. | :57:34. | |
Constitutionally it was his authority, not theirs. If you give | :57:35. | :57:38. | |
your advice and it is rejected, you have a choice of two things: You | :57:39. | :57:44. | |
accept it or you resign. With respect, Sir John, it seems a thin | :57:45. | :57:49. | |
defence for Jonathan Powell and David Manning that in one instant | :57:50. | :57:55. | |
they required the extraction of a few words, nothing else. Thd reason | :57:56. | :58:01. | |
I'm about themle if a Prime Minister seeks to run a sofa style of the | :58:02. | :58:05. | |
Government they require the help and support of others who deterline what | :58:06. | :58:09. | |
briefing papers they will sde, which advisers they see. Those two | :58:10. | :58:12. | |
gentlemen in this case would probably have been central to the | :58:13. | :58:14. | |
operation. Yes. That is perfectly true. And on | :58:15. | :58:26. | |
the committee, we found deficiencies, arrangements when the | :58:27. | :58:30. | |
Prime Minister's policy advhser at Number ten, also held the role of | :58:31. | :58:41. | |
overseas assessments in the Cabinet. That shifted the balance, the tip | :58:42. | :58:48. | |
and of that dual role to thd Number ten responsibility, and too far away | :58:49. | :58:54. | |
from the responsibility to the Cabinet. Can you criticise the | :58:55. | :59:01. | |
individual, for not saying H won't accept both? I think that is going a | :59:02. | :59:08. | |
bit far. But the exercise of both of those roles is difficult and should | :59:09. | :59:14. | |
not be replicated. Implicathon is that you have not been as | :59:15. | :59:19. | |
challenging, but not any crhticism of those officials? I did not | :59:20. | :59:31. | |
feel... None of those involved, are part of my own generation, bar one | :59:32. | :59:34. | |
slight overlap. We have takdn all the evidence that we could `nd | :59:35. | :59:41. | |
published. It is for you and others to endorse or find fault. For our | :59:42. | :59:55. | |
part, my part and another former diplomat, one or two historhans and | :59:56. | :00:00. | |
our public servant not that Whitehall. We agreed this w`s | :00:01. | :00:04. | |
unanimous. Either way it is was drawing the attention because | :00:05. | :00:09. | |
covering that degree of controversy it could have lead to minorhty | :00:10. | :00:19. | |
views, but none. One final puestion. You accused Tony Blair of bding | :00:20. | :00:25. | |
unreasonable in his assessmdnt of the evidence and the decisions made, | :00:26. | :00:29. | |
at the beginning of this session, do you think other unreasonabld people | :00:30. | :00:35. | |
at Downing Street, who drew similar conclusions and encouraged the Prime | :00:36. | :00:37. | |
Minister on the course of action that he was taking? In the British | :00:38. | :00:46. | |
system, I do not think I can point to a particular individual who I | :00:47. | :00:55. | |
could demonstrate had given unreasonable advice, in supporting | :00:56. | :01:04. | |
the Iraq misadventure. It is difficult to answer, becausd so | :01:05. | :01:10. | |
many, so much multiple dialogue going on. You cannot be surd from | :01:11. | :01:20. | |
the surviving documentary archive, vast though it is, who said what to | :01:21. | :01:29. | |
who, to what effect. All we can do is read what we've read, publish | :01:30. | :01:32. | |
what we have published, all of it that is relevant. If you can't. . | :01:33. | :01:40. | |
Who else could? You have sahd that one man is unreasonable, but you | :01:41. | :01:48. | |
cannot say any others were? It was the chairman's wording, not mine. | :01:49. | :01:53. | |
But I accepted the line of questioning. Do I place othdrs in | :01:54. | :02:03. | |
the same position? I think that the Foreign Secretary faced an | :02:04. | :02:06. | |
extraordinarily difficult t`sk, the formal objective of British policy | :02:07. | :02:13. | |
was to disarm Saddam, and the instrument chosen as a mattdr of | :02:14. | :02:21. | |
policy was for a long time containment, but then becamd chorus | :02:22. | :02:30. | |
of diplomacy. That can end tp in two places. Jack Straw was award of | :02:31. | :02:35. | |
that. And it fails. Sunk into military expedition. You always knew | :02:36. | :02:38. | |
that your major partner was going to do that anyway. It is a tough | :02:39. | :02:44. | |
situation to be in. But it was a matter of choosing to be in. Thank | :02:45. | :02:54. | |
you. We have talked a lot about the weapons of mass destruction. I | :02:55. | :02:59. | |
remember, a dossier, one of the documents put out by the government | :03:00. | :03:09. | |
and it made horrendous readhng about how Saddam treated his own citizens, | :03:10. | :03:12. | |
and by way of background I saw some things that made me shamed, how we | :03:13. | :03:19. | |
had not intervened to prevent that slaughter of human beings. How much | :03:20. | :03:30. | |
did you consider that regimd was worthy of some kind of action from | :03:31. | :03:35. | |
the international community? The underlying justification for any | :03:36. | :03:37. | |
action on those grounds, humanitarian grounds, would have | :03:38. | :03:48. | |
defied international law. Kosovo is the interesting case, and it was | :03:49. | :03:55. | |
referred to by the PM and others. But didn't arise. Because the United | :03:56. | :04:03. | |
Nations Security Council had the threat of a Russian veto, and the | :04:04. | :04:08. | |
collective view that somethhng had to be done to deal with the | :04:09. | :04:14. | |
disasters at Kosovo. No objdction to that. When you come to Iraq, you | :04:15. | :04:21. | |
have up until the day of thd invasion, a majority of the members | :04:22. | :04:25. | |
of the security Council, eldcted and unelected, opposed to taking action. | :04:26. | :04:37. | |
In the face of that... Nobody was making a humanitarian argumdnt, | :04:38. | :04:40. | |
notwithstanding that we could not justify on the grounds, we better | :04:41. | :04:44. | |
save Iraqi people from this dictator. That was never a that was | :04:45. | :04:49. | |
running. It may not have bedn a United Nations level, but I remember | :04:50. | :04:56. | |
reading that dossier, and I thought I wish I could share this whth my | :04:57. | :05:03. | |
constituents. It is horrendous. They could then understand why I was | :05:04. | :05:09. | |
voting. Not the only reason. I just wish I could have shared it with | :05:10. | :05:18. | |
those holding me to account. I know the galaxies, but how much ,- | :05:19. | :05:29. | |
legalities, but how much did you consider that? Short of milhtary | :05:30. | :05:37. | |
invasion, yes. That was the policy of this government and most are | :05:38. | :05:47. | |
responsible governments. Action short of the invasion and occupation | :05:48. | :05:50. | |
of a sovereign country on humanitarian grounds. I can | :05:51. | :06:02. | |
understand entirely as we h`ve said that the area 's points and in my | :06:03. | :06:07. | |
introduction, the nature of Saddam was barbaric, and beyond anx | :06:08. | :06:16. | |
defence, but that did not alount in international law or policy meeting, | :06:17. | :06:18. | |
sufficient grounds for the hnvasion of a sovereign country. We had not | :06:19. | :06:27. | |
been in that business since 194 . Given that the Prime Ministdr has | :06:28. | :06:35. | |
the prerogative, and can go to war without consulting, if Tony Blair | :06:36. | :06:38. | |
had done that, would we be sitting here today? Asked to look into it in | :06:39. | :06:48. | |
such great detail? If you h`d no consultation from Parliament, we | :06:49. | :06:51. | |
would not be sitting in the same seats today. That is not a flippant | :06:52. | :06:57. | |
response. Why do you say th`t? Because Tony Blair consulted | :06:58. | :07:05. | |
Parliament, before... But if he had not... Standard procedure. People | :07:06. | :07:12. | |
would not have said he should have gone to Parliament. Correct me if I | :07:13. | :07:16. | |
am wrong. It had not been done to that extent before. I am under the | :07:17. | :07:27. | |
impression that the conventhon, short of existential crisis, | :07:28. | :07:31. | |
Parliament would be consultdd. That convention is now surely dolinant. | :07:32. | :07:39. | |
You mention that politics h`s been damaged by this affair. Has it been | :07:40. | :07:53. | |
damaged by your findings? Not black and white? To be fair to | :07:54. | :07:56. | |
politicians, you have had sdven years to look at this, we h`d seven | :07:57. | :08:01. | |
days. You have had the benefit of hindsight. We did not have those at | :08:02. | :08:10. | |
all. I am chair of the Northern Ireland and quietly, I have seen the | :08:11. | :08:14. | |
Saville and quietly take 12 years and people have questioned what it | :08:15. | :08:21. | |
has achieved. Was this worthwhile? It has come on board with internal | :08:22. | :08:25. | |
conversations about the Irap Inquiry. When we were finished and | :08:26. | :08:30. | |
in the position to publish we were confident that the range and scope | :08:31. | :08:40. | |
of the lessons we wanted attention to be drawn to justify the dffort. I | :08:41. | :08:48. | |
do not think comparisons with cost to other enquiries gets us far, | :08:49. | :08:54. | |
because they tend to be specific. Usually costing more. But that is by | :08:55. | :09:04. | |
the way. I think if you havd an enquiry, the key thing is it should | :09:05. | :09:08. | |
carry confidence for those ht is eventually going to look at. The | :09:09. | :09:20. | |
headlines, what is the single most important lesson, suggestion, | :09:21. | :09:24. | |
finding, you reached? What hs that? Telling factor? You will not mind... | :09:25. | :09:35. | |
When I get that question, frequently, like on the Tod`y | :09:36. | :09:38. | |
Programme, it is not one single thing. It is a host of things. We | :09:39. | :09:43. | |
were asked to look effectivdly name yours of the government and you | :09:44. | :09:59. | |
cannot pick out just one message, below which others sit. If xou press | :10:00. | :10:05. | |
me hard, a failure to exert an exercise, collective responsibility | :10:06. | :10:08. | |
for such a big decision and then to supervise the conduct. Thank you. | :10:09. | :10:17. | |
One quick question. The parliamentary vote. The Turkish | :10:18. | :10:25. | |
Parliament six weeks before said no. Saw the operation had to cole from | :10:26. | :10:29. | |
the south. There's Parliament was given the vote, within 24 hours | :10:30. | :10:38. | |
That is a sub. One third of the startline. Former colleagues in | :10:39. | :10:40. | |
final battle preparation and Parliament is thinking it is going | :10:41. | :10:45. | |
to make a decision. It is practically absurd. Pull thd plug at | :10:46. | :10:56. | |
that moment. In military terms, it seemed ridiculous for Parli`ment to | :10:57. | :11:00. | |
be consulted. I can only agree with you wholeheartedly. Julian Lewis. | :11:01. | :11:11. | |
Thank you very much. It has been a long session and I am going to have | :11:12. | :11:21. | |
two look at what I was going to ask you. As an MP, who spoke in 200 , | :11:22. | :11:33. | |
spoke in favour of removing Saddam. What Prim Arab League do yot blame | :11:34. | :11:37. | |
Tony Blair for the way in which she took the country to war, and from | :11:38. | :11:47. | |
what do you absolve him? I `bsolve him from personable decision to | :11:48. | :11:52. | |
deceive Parliament and the public. The state falsehoods, knowing them | :11:53. | :12:00. | |
to be false. I think he shotld be absolved from that. However, he | :12:01. | :12:06. | |
exercised his considerable powers of advocacy and persuasion rather than | :12:07. | :12:17. | |
laying the real issues to b`ck analysis for the public. It was an | :12:18. | :12:24. | |
exercise, not in sharing crtcial judgments. One of the most hmportant | :12:25. | :12:29. | |
since 1945. Who do you think should have stood up to him, in respect of | :12:30. | :12:37. | |
those aspects that you find him blameworthy? Who should havd stood | :12:38. | :12:43. | |
up to him, so that he did not do what he did? I suppose my short | :12:44. | :12:53. | |
answer is that Cabinet ministers, and they are not naming indhviduals, | :12:54. | :12:59. | |
were given promises by him hn Cabinet that they would havd the | :13:00. | :13:03. | |
opportunity to consider and reflect and therefore decide on a ntmber of | :13:04. | :13:16. | |
big decisions in the course of the Iraq case. He did not give them the | :13:17. | :13:19. | |
opportunity, and that I think is a failing. Who else out of thhs big | :13:20. | :13:28. | |
cast of characters do you shngle out for blame, other than Tony Blair? It | :13:29. | :13:37. | |
is inescapable key that minhsters, along with the Prime Ministdr | :13:38. | :13:41. | |
involved what the Foreign Sdcretary and the Defence Secretary. To a | :13:42. | :13:46. | |
lesser extent, the Internathonal Home Secretary. I think the crucial | :13:47. | :13:55. | |
triangle was clearly the Prhme Minister, foreign affairs, `nd | :13:56. | :14:03. | |
defence. And of those, the Prime Minister and Mr Straw Ardmore | :14:04. | :14:12. | |
signora T -- seniority, and I believe you stated that she found no | :14:13. | :14:24. | |
evidence. How can Tony Blair's I will be with you whatever mdssage be | :14:25. | :14:28. | |
interpreted any other way? He interpreted that in the sense of, Mr | :14:29. | :14:38. | |
Bush's mind, he could trust the British for the support. Not | :14:39. | :14:41. | |
necessarily for the militarx adventure, but generally. In other | :14:42. | :14:46. | |
words, an exercise in persu`sion and relationship management. | :14:47. | :14:49. | |
Do you accept that explanathon by Mr Blair? I think, respectfullx, how | :14:50. | :14:57. | |
did Mr Bush take it is the hard question, and he would have taken | :14:58. | :15:01. | |
it, I think, as an uncondithonal commitment. And so going back to the | :15:02. | :15:05. | |
chairman's initial approach to these matters, would you not say that any | :15:06. | :15:10. | |
reasonable recipient of such a message would have taken it as an | :15:11. | :15:15. | |
unconditional commitment, and therefore it was really a sdcret | :15:16. | :15:22. | |
commitment to him? I think can accept the first part withott | :15:23. | :15:25. | |
quibbling. I think the third part, which hasn't been put, is what were | :15:26. | :15:30. | |
the effect on American policy and decisions have been if therd had | :15:31. | :15:33. | |
been either a doubt or indedd a refusal on the part of the British | :15:34. | :15:37. | |
to support an invasion? Would it have delayed them? Would it have | :15:38. | :15:41. | |
actually discouraged them completely, or would it havd had no | :15:42. | :15:49. | |
effect at all? And that was my next but one question. What is your | :15:50. | :15:53. | |
answer to it? Depending when conditions had been tabled by the | :15:54. | :15:57. | |
British side to the American President, if it had happendd early | :15:58. | :16:01. | |
enough in the course of 2002, it might well have had the effdct of | :16:02. | :16:08. | |
delaying the date of an inv`sion until perhaps the autumn of 200 . If | :16:09. | :16:12. | |
it was going to happen at all, it would've been a much better time, | :16:13. | :16:17. | |
for all sorts of reasons, climate and the rest of it, preparations and | :16:18. | :16:23. | |
so on. And it would have ch`nged, this is speculation, the internal | :16:24. | :16:27. | |
dynamics of the Security Cotncil. Colin Powell may have found himself | :16:28. | :16:31. | |
back in a state of more ascdndancy. Thank you. Was Mr Blair's ddcision | :16:32. | :16:37. | |
based then more on solidarity than on strategy? I think, if I lay say | :16:38. | :16:46. | |
so, that's an admirably con size statement which I really... Thank | :16:47. | :16:52. | |
you. Now, is it true to say that Saddam Hussein behaved as though he | :16:53. | :16:58. | |
still had chemical and biological weapons, and if chemical and | :16:59. | :17:02. | |
biological weapons had been found in any significant quantities, would we | :17:03. | :17:07. | |
be judging Mr Blair very differently now? I find that one very dhfficult | :17:08. | :17:12. | |
to answer. Partly because it is hypothetical and also because it was | :17:13. | :17:18. | |
pretty clear from the intelligence assessments that the suspichon as it | :17:19. | :17:21. | |
turned out to be pretty unfounded was that he did have chemic`l and | :17:22. | :17:26. | |
biological weapons, but that they were battlefield use. These weren't | :17:27. | :17:29. | |
strategic weapons that. Changes the whole nature of the analysis as to | :17:30. | :17:32. | |
whether or not invasion shotld take place. As to Saddam Hussein, he was | :17:33. | :17:38. | |
playing all three ends against the middle all the time. For obvious | :17:39. | :17:42. | |
reasons that we all know. And part of his plan was deception. Part of | :17:43. | :17:47. | |
it was to parade his Iranian enemy and the gulf states that he did | :17:48. | :17:53. | |
possibly have something or other and they had better be careful. Because | :17:54. | :17:56. | |
they wanted to defend themsdlves. Themselves.. And sustain a balance | :17:57. | :18:01. | |
of power in the region. Thank you. Now, looking at some of the original | :18:02. | :18:08. | |
documentation reproduced and disclosed by your inquiry, we know | :18:09. | :18:14. | |
from documents from the Joint Intelligence Committee in J`nuary | :18:15. | :18:19. | |
2003, the one entitled Iraq, The Emerging View from Baghdad. And from | :18:20. | :18:26. | |
another document drawn up after a discussion at the JIC on 19th March | :18:27. | :18:33. | |
2003 by the assessment staff entitled dam, the Beginning of the | :18:34. | :18:38. | |
End that the intelligence sdrvices judged that Iraq had a usable CBW | :18:39. | :18:45. | |
strategy, so I think it is probably true to say that this clearly shows | :18:46. | :18:51. | |
that the intelligence services believed and Mr Blair had rdason to | :18:52. | :18:57. | |
believe that such a capabilhty existed. Is there any possibility | :18:58. | :19:04. | |
that the Joint Intelligence Committee's assessments werd right | :19:05. | :19:09. | |
and that, as is still allegdd from time to time, his chemical `nd | :19:10. | :19:14. | |
biological arsenal was moved to somewhere such as Syria? And if | :19:15. | :19:18. | |
that's not believed to be the case, when and how would you belidve that | :19:19. | :19:26. | |
Saddam Hussein destroyed his stocks? Well, on the butler committde we | :19:27. | :19:31. | |
discussed quite long and quhte hard whether we could say firmly that no | :19:32. | :19:38. | |
weapons of mass destruction, whether tactical or strategic were found. We | :19:39. | :19:42. | |
were not able to do it in the 2 04. I think now with the passagd of time | :19:43. | :19:46. | |
and events in the recently ht is quite extraordinary, follow on as we | :19:47. | :19:51. | |
do of course the Iraq survex reports and works, be quite extraordinary if | :19:52. | :19:54. | |
something was discovered on any scale at all. The odd hollowed out | :19:55. | :20:01. | |
shell that once held mustard is one thing, but a systemic set of | :20:02. | :20:05. | |
deployable battlefield weapons. . Studio do you this I he destroyed | :20:06. | :20:09. | |
them or gave them to somebody else? I don't believe for one momdnt they | :20:10. | :20:13. | |
were passed held mustard is one thing, but a systemic set of | :20:14. | :20:14. | |
deployable battlefield weapons. . Studio do you this I he destroyed | :20:15. | :20:17. | |
them or gave them to somebody else? I don't believe for one momdnt they | :20:18. | :20:20. | |
were passed on to anybody else. # You don't? It would be ag`inst his | :20:21. | :20:23. | |
interest. Syria? While the Ba'athist regime is a sad regime in Sxria it | :20:24. | :20:32. | |
is at odds with Saddam's form of Ba'athism. But what happened to them | :20:33. | :20:36. | |
is this that's the fair question. I think the answer for a long time has | :20:37. | :20:41. | |
been quite easy to get to. H think the Iraq survey group does, which is | :20:42. | :20:50. | |
that undocumented dispatch of materials and destruction of | :20:51. | :20:52. | |
materials took place on a considerable scale after thd first | :20:53. | :20:56. | |
Gulf War and before the inspectors got back in. I think, if I lay just | :20:57. | :21:03. | |
as an important corollary to that, it is important, and I think some | :21:04. | :21:16. | |
people were misled in the 2000 to 2003 period, the so-called laterial | :21:17. | :21:20. | |
balance between what he was known to have had and what was discovered and | :21:21. | :21:26. | |
documented who've been destroyed represented a hidden arsenal when it | :21:27. | :21:32. | |
was nothing of the sort. It was an account option. Thank you. When I | :21:33. | :21:38. | |
intervened near the beginning of this session, we seem to be willing | :21:39. | :21:43. | |
to acquit Mr Blair about lyhng about his belief in WMD or at least | :21:44. | :21:50. | |
chemical and biological weapons But convict him of exaggerating the | :21:51. | :21:54. | |
certainty of the basis for that belief. I just want to check with | :21:55. | :22:00. | |
that then that it is correct to say that that is your conclusion and | :22:01. | :22:06. | |
that, as I asked you earlier on if he had actually been more open and | :22:07. | :22:12. | |
disclosed to Parliament the uncertainty of the basis of his | :22:13. | :22:18. | |
belief, that argued that we could not take the risk that he, that | :22:19. | :22:23. | |
Saddam Hussein might still have this arsenal and might for reasons of his | :22:24. | :22:27. | |
own make them available to ` terrorist group, which is what Mr | :22:28. | :22:33. | |
Blair I remember hearing hil say to us described as his nightmare | :22:34. | :22:37. | |
scenario, we would not again be judging him so harshly if hd hadn't | :22:38. | :22:43. | |
exaggerated the certainty. Exaggeration, placing more weight on | :22:44. | :22:46. | |
the intelligence than it cotld possibly bear is a conclusion that | :22:47. | :22:51. | |
we reached on the Butler Colmittee and reached with even more dvidence | :22:52. | :22:55. | |
in the Iraq Inquiry. On the other hand, I don't know that in putting | :22:56. | :23:01. | |
forward the fusion argument Mr Blair related it very directly and | :23:02. | :23:06. | |
specifically to Saddam Hussdin passing terrorist weapons to | :23:07. | :23:09. | |
terrorist... Passing weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups The | :23:10. | :23:13. | |
intelligence analysis say that if the regime collapsed in ruins there | :23:14. | :23:18. | |
might be a risk of the spillage of any remaining weapons. That was a | :23:19. | :23:22. | |
different thing. But the fusion case as made by Mr Blair was not about | :23:23. | :23:27. | |
Iraq. I do remember him sayhng that if by some means these weapons were | :23:28. | :23:31. | |
to be passed to terrorist groups, that would be his nightmare | :23:32. | :23:35. | |
scenario, but the regime was hardly likely to collapse if we didn't | :23:36. | :23:40. | |
overthrow him. It steamed bd an argument that he was using this as | :23:41. | :23:43. | |
an argument that Saddam Hussein might pass these weapons to such a | :23:44. | :23:47. | |
group. That was a telling argument made on the floor of the Hotse of | :23:48. | :23:55. | |
Commons. Yes. OK. Was the procurement of protective epuipment | :23:56. | :24:03. | |
for the troops in particular against IED it's, improvised exploshve | :24:04. | :24:07. | |
devices, delayed as a result of the Prime Minister wishing to kdep | :24:08. | :24:11. | |
private his early decision to go to war? I don't believe the two things | :24:12. | :24:16. | |
can be put together. I think there's a criticism to be made of holding up | :24:17. | :24:23. | |
the some of the preparations, particularly with industry for | :24:24. | :24:28. | |
equipment in the latter part of 2002 in order to preserve the diplomatic | :24:29. | :24:33. | |
strand and not giving the global community the sense that military | :24:34. | :24:36. | |
action was inevitable. I thhnk there was a delay there. That didn't go | :24:37. | :24:41. | |
directly to the IED and protective patrol vehicle questions. Those I | :24:42. | :24:48. | |
think arise later. And finally, but this is a big one, in my ophnion | :24:49. | :24:54. | |
anyway. The issue for which many of us, including me, were culp`ble at | :24:55. | :25:01. | |
that time for voting as we did was a naive belief that if the | :25:02. | :25:06. | |
dictatorship were removed, some form of democracy might emerge in Iraq. | :25:07. | :25:10. | |
And that, above all, is the reason in the light of what happendd that I | :25:11. | :25:15. | |
and I'm sure many others ch`nged their minds. Yes. In relation to | :25:16. | :25:21. | |
subsequent conflicts. Now, H would like you to tell us to what extent | :25:22. | :25:29. | |
Mr Blair was warned of the danger that far from democracy emerging, | :25:30. | :25:33. | |
Sunni-Shia religious strife would follow the removal of the sdcular | :25:34. | :25:38. | |
dictator? Who gave these warnings and how and why were they ignored? | :25:39. | :25:44. | |
And in particular, I would just quote back to you a briefing note | :25:45. | :25:52. | |
from your report which Mr Blair himself sent in January 2003 to | :25:53. | :25:56. | |
President Bush. And the then Prime Minister wrote, and I quote, the | :25:57. | :26:02. | |
biggest risk we face is intdrnecine fighting between all the rival | :26:03. | :26:07. | |
groups, ridges, tribes et cdtera in Iraq when the military strike | :26:08. | :26:12. | |
destabilises the regime. Thdy are perfectly capable on previots form | :26:13. | :26:18. | |
of killing each other in large numbers. Now, Mr Blair knew that and | :26:19. | :26:27. | |
he said it to President Bush. So, why did he ignore that terrhble | :26:28. | :26:33. | |
possibility that he himself apparently recognised? I cannot give | :26:34. | :26:37. | |
you the answer as to why. Would have to ask him. But, what is cldar, from | :26:38. | :26:43. | |
all the evidence we've colldcted, is that this risk and other associated | :26:44. | :26:50. | |
risks of instability and collapse were clearly identified and | :26:51. | :26:54. | |
available to Ministers and to Mr Blair before the invasion. H can | :26:55. | :26:58. | |
cite all sorts of point but you won't want me to go into th`t detail | :26:59. | :27:03. | |
now. It's in the report. Thdre are other signals too from other | :27:04. | :27:07. | |
quarters. Our ambassador in Cairo for example was able to report that | :27:08. | :27:13. | |
the Egyptian President had said Iraq was at risk of and was populated by | :27:14. | :27:19. | |
people who were extremely fond of killing each other. Destabilisation | :27:20. | :27:29. | |
would bring that about. Mr Blair said and has said on other | :27:30. | :27:35. | |
occasions that it would havd taken hindsight to understand the risks. | :27:36. | :27:40. | |
That set of risks. We concltded that it would not take hindsight because | :27:41. | :27:45. | |
preinvasion evidence is cle`r that this advice was available to him. | :27:46. | :27:49. | |
And that he got the advice `nd that he even passed that advice to | :27:50. | :27:54. | |
President Bush himself. Indded. So isn't this in a way far worse than | :27:55. | :28:00. | |
the exaggeration of the certainty about the chemical and biological | :28:01. | :28:05. | |
weapons was the fact that in the full knowledge that the likdlihood | :28:06. | :28:09. | |
would be that if you removed the dictatorship of Saddam Hussdin, you | :28:10. | :28:16. | |
would have the 1,000-year-old Shia Sunni hatred reemerging and mass | :28:17. | :28:19. | |
killings of these communitids by each other. Mr Blair nevertheless | :28:20. | :28:26. | |
went ahead. The appalling and tragic contemporary history suggests that | :28:27. | :28:32. | |
what was foreseeable and advised did indeed happen and, arguably, could | :28:33. | :28:37. | |
and should have been avoided. It enables me, if I'm loud bridfly to | :28:38. | :28:43. | |
make a more general point, which is we, the United Kingdom, had in our | :28:44. | :28:49. | |
intelligence, diplomatic and other communities, a great deal of deep | :28:50. | :28:53. | |
knowledge about Iraq, its population, its strains and stresses | :28:54. | :29:00. | |
as well as its history. Was that expertise brought to bear on the | :29:01. | :29:04. | |
decision making process and the answer is clearly not. But should | :29:05. | :29:12. | |
have been and was available. I think that is a tragic aspect. | :29:13. | :29:17. | |
Surely it was brought to be`r but it was ignored? If you like. It was not | :29:18. | :29:24. | |
brought to bear in any effective sense. Who is responsible for that. | :29:25. | :29:29. | |
I don't think you can pin that on a single person more a single | :29:30. | :29:32. | |
structure but if you considdr for example, it is not a phrase used | :29:33. | :29:37. | |
with anything like great respect but the camel corps in the diplomatic | :29:38. | :29:41. | |
service, those with great experience in the Arab speaking world, and | :29:42. | :29:46. | |
there are many of them with a lot of expertise, one of them, then in | :29:47. | :29:53. | |
Cairo, sent a memo around to fellow ambassadors expressing some of these | :29:54. | :29:59. | |
judgments, and was told to shut up and keep quiet. By Number Tdn. So | :30:00. | :30:07. | |
when you say Number Ten, yot mean the Prime Minister? I don't know | :30:08. | :30:12. | |
whether I mean the Prime Minister or not. Have you asked? Why did you not | :30:13. | :30:18. | |
ask? Because we know who gave the instruction. And it was Jon`than | :30:19. | :30:24. | |
Powell, as chief of staff. Now we have found no evidence of written | :30:25. | :30:30. | |
instruction but then there were no written instructions from the Prime | :30:31. | :30:33. | |
Minister to Jonathan Powell except occasionally scribbles on bhts of | :30:34. | :30:38. | |
paper. Could you have asked Tony Blair? Well, we did not. It seems to | :30:39. | :30:44. | |
me that the post war reconstruction issue and the issue of what the | :30:45. | :30:47. | |
effect would be of an invashon is the most catastrophic aspect of all | :30:48. | :30:56. | |
of this. Judging by your report I think although one needs to draw | :30:57. | :30:58. | |
together several different paragraphs and places, that is | :30:59. | :31:06. | |
pretty clear. You make clear that at no stage did ministers or sdnior | :31:07. | :31:09. | |
officials commissioned the systematic evaluation of different | :31:10. | :31:12. | |
options incorporating detailed analysis of risk or capabilhties and | :31:13. | :31:16. | |
so on, but whose responsibility was it to commission that? Ultilately. | :31:17. | :31:24. | |
Ultimately it must come back to the centre and head of government. Which | :31:25. | :31:27. | |
is the Prime Minister? Ultilately the Prime Minister. The thing that I | :31:28. | :31:32. | |
think has surprised so many people about this report in so manx places | :31:33. | :31:37. | |
is that this last sentence has not been made clear, because thhs looks | :31:38. | :31:41. | |
like a war that was pushed through to a large degree by one man and | :31:42. | :31:50. | |
that therefore you need, whdre appropriate, to apportion this | :31:51. | :31:52. | |
possibility for the feelings that led up to it and the feelings that | :31:53. | :31:57. | |
flow from it. Although that has not been done. It is a central criticism | :31:58. | :32:03. | |
that has been made. So is its Tony Blair who is responsible for that | :32:04. | :32:07. | |
feeling in paragraph 617 whhch you are very familiar with, I al sure? | :32:08. | :32:11. | |
Is this in the executive sulmary. Yes. May I look at up to relind | :32:12. | :32:19. | |
myself? Yes, of course. -- look it up. We say that at no stage did | :32:20. | :32:27. | |
ministers or senior officials commissioned a systematic evaluation | :32:28. | :32:30. | |
of the risks and options. I am asking who is really responsible. I | :32:31. | :32:36. | |
think you would say all of those involved but ultimately it has to | :32:37. | :32:41. | |
be... You were telling me that some of these officials were told to shut | :32:42. | :32:46. | |
up? I was reporting what is on the record that the ambassador hn Cairo | :32:47. | :32:57. | |
sent a telegram to the centre of Whitehall and various of his | :32:58. | :32:59. | |
colleagues who were relevant and was told for reasons of securitx and | :33:00. | :33:03. | |
sensitivity, rather than because he was wholly wrong and what hd said, | :33:04. | :33:05. | |
that he should not do that `gain under any such -- and that `ny such | :33:06. | :33:11. | |
messages should go direct from the concerned ambassador to the head of | :33:12. | :33:14. | |
the diplomatic service personally. That was what happened. But as to | :33:15. | :33:21. | |
the commissioning of a revidw, you can blame, if you wish, all of those | :33:22. | :33:27. | |
who failed to initiate such a review, but the fact is that it | :33:28. | :33:31. | |
should have happened and it did not happen and the consequences of it | :33:32. | :33:34. | |
not happening are there and plain for all to see. If I am allowed | :33:35. | :33:43. | |
another moment on this, it hs that for me, personally, given mx own | :33:44. | :33:48. | |
history, the failure of the security sector was one of the very worst | :33:49. | :33:51. | |
aspects of the whole field enterprise. If security could have | :33:52. | :34:00. | |
been and arguably might havd been with greater exertion of effort and | :34:01. | :34:02. | |
planning and preparation, if security could have been put in | :34:03. | :34:07. | |
place either in the south-e`st, in our area, let alone more generally | :34:08. | :34:11. | |
across Iraq, then the whole process of reconstruction, making of new | :34:12. | :34:18. | |
institutions rather than, they never had them before, but putting new and | :34:19. | :34:24. | |
better government institutions in place, it might have had a chance. | :34:25. | :34:29. | |
Can I take you over the pagd from 617 to 623, to which has already | :34:30. | :34:41. | |
been alluded, which says th`t Tony Blair, with hindsight, we sde that | :34:42. | :34:48. | |
the campaign to remove Sadd`m Hussein was relatively easy but the | :34:49. | :34:50. | |
aftermath was very hard and at the time we could not know that because | :34:51. | :34:54. | |
the prime focus was the milhtary campaign. Your conclusion is | :34:55. | :35:01. | |
decisive, the -- that the conclusion reached by Mr Blair did not require | :35:02. | :35:05. | |
the benefit of hindsight. That is the point and I have spelt that out | :35:06. | :35:09. | |
because I think it is so cldar. If you will allow me a half sentence, I | :35:10. | :35:13. | |
know time is tight but I have read read the report by Lord Franks when | :35:14. | :35:18. | |
he said that we were careful not to apply hindsight to any of otr | :35:19. | :35:23. | |
judgments about the Argentinian defence. We on the a ruck enquiry | :35:24. | :35:28. | |
made the same pledge to ourselves. We were very determined not to use | :35:29. | :35:33. | |
hindsight to reach judgments, but to take the contemporary best dvidence | :35:34. | :35:40. | |
at the time. -- the a ruck dnquiry. I have one last question about that | :35:41. | :35:46. | |
crucial paragraph. Why, givdn that you are stating that the Prhme | :35:47. | :35:49. | |
Minister did know what he ndeded to know about that aftermath, why do | :35:50. | :35:58. | |
you think that the Prime Minister pushed on regardless? What did he | :35:59. | :36:07. | |
tell you? Only that he insisted that he could not have been award without | :36:08. | :36:12. | |
hindsight of those particul`r risks. So he denied your conclusion? Well | :36:13. | :36:18. | |
he resisted our conclusion. What I would like to say is that in the | :36:19. | :36:29. | |
context of the exercise of hindsight, we were scrupulots to | :36:30. | :36:33. | |
look at contemporary evidence at the time, and to recite it in the full | :36:34. | :36:40. | |
body of the report. I think you would have to look inside Mr Blair's | :36:41. | :36:45. | |
mind and heart to know what he felt, but at the time. -- thought at the | :36:46. | :36:53. | |
time. It goes to a quite large question and a possible lesson that | :36:54. | :36:56. | |
we do draw attention to witches can a modern British Prime Minister | :36:57. | :37:02. | |
with a 24-hour day, seven d`ys a week pressure coming in frol all | :37:03. | :37:05. | |
sides, be expected to retain a running consciousness of very | :37:06. | :37:13. | |
important but nonetheless ddtailed, about one thing, along with | :37:14. | :37:16. | |
everything else at the same time? We came quite close to saying that you | :37:17. | :37:21. | |
really should have a senior nodded and will minister working to the | :37:22. | :37:25. | |
Prime Minister with nothing else to distract, on an enterprise of the | :37:26. | :37:32. | |
scale. And the rather old and admittedly nonetheless succdssful... | :37:33. | :37:35. | |
Is that not what the Foreign Secretary should be doing? He is | :37:36. | :37:38. | |
travelling a great deal, and has many other things to do. It is an | :37:39. | :37:43. | |
example of the resident Minhster in the middle East in 1940s, and that | :37:44. | :37:47. | |
worked. Because those basic conditions were satisfied. Do you | :37:48. | :37:53. | |
think that the Prime Ministdr's setting aside of whatever w`s | :37:54. | :37:58. | |
working and going along in his mind, do you think that it was reckless to | :37:59. | :38:05. | |
set aside the information that he was provided with, which showed him | :38:06. | :38:08. | |
that the aftermath would be gruesome? I think he came, on his | :38:09. | :38:20. | |
own admission, quite late to realising the absolutely crtcial | :38:21. | :38:24. | |
nature of security and achidving security in Iraq after an invasion. | :38:25. | :38:29. | |
He says it in one of those notes to Mr Bush, which by the way, never | :38:30. | :38:37. | |
received a written reply, so we know from written telephone records that | :38:38. | :38:43. | |
heat they discussed them but Mr Bush never put his name to a written | :38:44. | :38:47. | |
response, but Tony Blair cale to a realisation in 2003 that security | :38:48. | :38:49. | |
was the basis for everything else and without nothing could stcceed. | :38:50. | :38:56. | |
And it was not secured. My puestion was, though, do you think it was | :38:57. | :39:00. | |
reckless to go ahead, even `t that late stage, once he had in front of | :39:01. | :39:05. | |
them information that he nedded to know, what the aftermath cotld or | :39:06. | :39:07. | |
would be like telling that likely to be? I am always easy about `ccepting | :39:08. | :39:14. | |
a word that has come naturally to my own mind because would Preshdent | :39:15. | :39:23. | |
Bush have gone ahead anyway? We have bashed that around a bit today. | :39:24. | :39:27. | |
We're talking about UK involvement. We cannot control everything but we | :39:28. | :39:31. | |
can control that. If there was going to be an American invasion, with or | :39:32. | :39:35. | |
without sufficient global or UN backing, could it have been reckless | :39:36. | :39:40. | |
to associate the United Kingdom with that, knowing that there were risks, | :39:41. | :39:44. | |
which he had pointed out at one point to Mr Bush? In the belief and | :39:45. | :39:48. | |
I think this is important, that somehow or other American scale | :39:49. | :39:56. | |
might and resources would overcome these resources. I do think that the | :39:57. | :40:01. | |
failure to fully plan and prepare in London before the invasion was based | :40:02. | :40:09. | |
first on the realisation th`t the State Department's consider`ble | :40:10. | :40:11. | |
planning effort had been ditched, but nonetheless when it camd to the | :40:12. | :40:15. | |
action, the Americans would provide an supply all the resources that | :40:16. | :40:19. | |
would be needed. Thank you very much for given evidence to us thhs | :40:20. | :40:23. | |
afternoon. We are very gratdful for the outstanding... Excuse md, Mr | :40:24. | :40:31. | |
Chairman. Mr Chairman, may H ask another question? I really think | :40:32. | :40:37. | |
that we have taxed Sir John enough. I think he has been extremely | :40:38. | :40:41. | |
helpful but just coming back to 617, it is just a question, I me`n I | :40:42. | :40:47. | |
fully accept everything that you say about the willingness of ministers | :40:48. | :40:53. | |
to challenge and having the right relationships in place. There is no | :40:54. | :40:59. | |
substitute for that but what machine 80 -- machinery was there that could | :41:00. | :41:02. | |
have provided that? It does not exist. We do not go to war dvery | :41:03. | :41:08. | |
decade. It doesn't exist. So what procedural machinery should be put | :41:09. | :41:13. | |
in place? At least something for the system to bump against. A brief | :41:14. | :41:17. | |
reply, if you would. Both the permanent secretaries of thd | :41:18. | :41:20. | |
department for international that element and the Ministry of Defence | :41:21. | :41:23. | |
made urgent requests for such machinery to be put in placd. A | :41:24. | :41:28. | |
draft was proposed and went up to Number Ten and came back without the | :41:29. | :41:31. | |
crucial element, namely an oversight committee of ministers. Thex give | :41:32. | :41:38. | |
very much, Sir John. I am not sure you're thanks should be dirdcted | :41:39. | :41:41. | |
towards me but I am directing my thanks to what you for coming in and | :41:42. | :41:46. | |
giving us such a thorough and detailed reply to a number of | :41:47. | :41:49. | |
questions that take further what we understand to be your concltsions | :41:50. | :41:53. | |
from this extremely thorough piece of work that you have done over the | :41:54. | :41:57. | |
last seven years and on beh`lf of Parliament, we are grateful to you | :41:58. | :42:01. | |
for having done the job. Th`nk you very much indeed, chairman. Thank | :42:02. | :42:01. | |
you. Giving people space to grieve and | :42:02. | :42:28. | |
mourn together was a kindness appreciated by all of this house and | :42:29. | :42:34. | |
beyond. I'm honoured to havd the opportunity to do my bit and | :42:35. | :42:36. |