Iraq Inquiry Committee Select Committees

go to the liaison is committee, where Jack Chilcot will givd his

report. I will give you a moment to get your

papers out. Thank you. Thank you very much for coming to see us this

afternoon, Sir John. This is a very important subject, one of the most

important, perhaps the most important inquiry that has been

undertaken for a very long time in this country. It has caused great

distress to families of those that were killed and wounded. Thd Iraq

invasion was of great cost to the country and many feel that the cost

is still being born now. It has taken a long time for you to get to,

as you see it, the bottom of what happened and why. That is why we're

here today. It is possible that other select committees may want to

call you, subsequently. The first instance that you have here, some of

the main committees for whol this is a particular interest in thd term of

their chairman. I would likd to start by looking in some detail at

your public statement of thd 6th of July, the time of the launch of the

report, which, whatever your terms of reference may be, I thought went

right to the heart of the m`tter at the start. It said, and this is the

first line, that the question for the inquiry was whether it was right

and necessary to invade Irap in 2003. It might be helpful if we just

concentrate on the necessarx, rather than the right, as a ethical and

legal aspect. In your view, did we need to go to war to protect Britain

from an imminent threat? Not in March 2003, is my shortest possible

answer. OK. Therefore, the next question must be, was the evidence

in front of Tony Blair at that time, which should have told him he did

not need to go to war at th`t time? What was, I think, clear from the

evidence we have seen, the dvidence we have taken, was that, in March

2003, there was no imminent threat to British citizens or, indded,

Britain itself from Saddam 's regime in Iraq. Was a reasonable for Tony

Blair to conclude that therd was an imminent threat? It would bd

difficult to base that on h`rd evidence. It is perfectly true that

he received a deal of advicd, particularly from the intelligence

community, that the situation regarding Saddam's weapons of mass

destruction was much more of a threat, much more imminent, much

more serious than proved to be the case after the event. But you have

looked at that evidence in detail, and you have just told me, H thought

that you had concluded that evidence showed there was not an immhnent

threat? Even put at its highest the threat could not be shown to be

imminent, in the sense of ntclear, biological or chemical... In the

sense that it is usually understood by the Tim, in international

practice? Correct. That it hs commonly accepted in intern`tional

law and studies of internathonal relations? What seems to me clear

from the evidence is that any threat was in the future, not imminent and

not directly against the Unhted Kingdom and its people. That is

about as far as I think the evidence takes you. There are many places

which may pose a threat to the UK at any time. Indeed. But those threats

are not imminent, it is going on all the time? That is correct. The

British government, the timd, made very clear that it regarded

participating in military action against Saddam's Iraq has only a

last resort measure, and only after all other options had been

exhausted. The question that we have to look at in the inquiry is, was

this the last resort, awkward containment have been improved,

sustained -- or could contahnment have been improved and sust`ined?

Hard all other options been exhausted? In other words, the

inspections process, had it come to a halt because of Saddam's

construction? Neither of those conditions existed in March 200 and

three. You made it clear it was a last resort, in the report. You used

that phrase. I notice you h`ve used it again. I would like to come back

to the phrase imminent thre`t. I just want to go back to the question

that I asked, the evidence hn front of Tony Blair did not support the

conclusion that there was an imminent threat at the time that we

went to war? Indeed, he acknowledged a year later, in 2004, that he

accepted that there was not an imminent threat of the sort that he

was tending to describe. Th`t was a yes to that question might Hf you

wish. I don't want to put words in your mouth, I wanted to get

clarification. The Prime Minister should have known that, bec`use it

was the information in front of him. So, when the Prime Minister said, in

his speech on the 18th of M`rch the threat is present and real, it is a

real and present danger to Britain's security, I am quoting, the threat

is serious and current, Saddam has to be stopped, he was not, hn fact,

reflecting the advice or thd information that he had in front of

him, was he? He was telling the public, by all means other than

those two words, imminent threat, that there was an imminent threat?

In all fairness, I have to say, and it is in the report, that I believe

on the 17th of March... Sorry? On the 17th of March, Tony Blahr was

advised by the chairman of joint intelligence committee that Saddam

did have weapons of mass destruction, the means to ddploy

them and the means to produce them. If you convert that into advice that

there was an imminent threat, you could just about defend it, perhaps.

Are you defending it? No. You are saying that there was no imlinent

threat? By all means do comd back when I complete question, btt you

are saying, just to be clear, there is no imminent threat and that Tony

Blair was wrong to describe this threat, effectively, as immhnent in

the House on the 18th of March? I think choosing words as cardfully

and are -- as sensitively as I can, it was a description to the house in

that speech, a speech was m`de, putting the best possible inflection

on the description that he tsed It does not take hindsight to

demonstrate two propositions. One is that the whole of the intelligence

community, not only in the Tnited Kingdom, were strongly of the

belief, they thought they h`d sufficient intelligence to support

it, that Saddam did have we`pons of mass destruction available for use.

What wasn't, I think, there, was evidence that he intended to deploy

them against the United Kingdom s interests. Otherwise, perhaps, as a

last resort in defence of an invasion. What you are saying, as

far as you can tell, that it was not reasonable for Tony Blair to suppose

that there was an imminent threat based on the information in front of

him? He said, and I am now puoting from his forward for the September

dossier -- for word, his belief was that it was the situation. What was

not said where the qualific`tions and conditions that the varhous

assessments had attached to them. It meant that statements made with

certainty could not be supported by that kind of evidence. I thhnk you

are saying it was unreasonable for Tony Blair? I would rather not use

that particular word. You m`y not, but it seems to me it is a binary

state of affairs, isn't it? Either it was reasonable or not. That is a

very well understood concept in law and in : common parlance. W`s it

reasonable or not? If you place yourself in a position at the time,

2002-2003, there was enough advice coming forward, not perhaps to

support the statement of thd threat to the United Kingdom and its people

and interests was imminent, but nonetheless that a threat m`y be

thought to exist. Now, therd was not such a threat, in fact, and in the

event. That is not what we have been talking about at all, not in the

event. We're talking about before the event. Every question I posed to

you concerns only the evidence available to Tony Blair at the time

he made these statements. I will just repeat the question. W`s it

reasonable for Tony Blair, `t that time that he made that statdment, to

suppose that there was an ilminent threat? Objectively, no.

Subjectively, I cannot answdr for him. You mean that he might have had

a sudden... He might have h`d a sudden rush of blood to the head or

May Day misjudgement? Isn't that what subjective means in thhs

context? Subjectively, he stated it was his certain belief at the time.

You ask an objective question, was it reasonable to entertain that

thought? I say that the evidence does not sufficiently supported I

have not, actually. The well understood test of a reason`ble man.

Would a reasonable man, another human being, looking at the

evidence, come to that conclusion? If you are posing the questhon with

regard to a statement of an imminent threat to the United Kingdol... I

am. In that case, I have to say no, there was not sufficient evhdence to

sustain that belief. He misled, or set aside, misled the House, or he

set aside evidence in order to lead the house down the line of thought

and belief with his 18th of March speech? Didn't he? Again, you force

me into trying to draw a distinction between what Mr Blair, as Prime

Minister, believed that the time, and sought to persuade the house and

the people of... Of course, I am asking whether it was reasonable

that he was doing it. As thhngs have turned out, we know it was not. As

things appeared at the time, the evidence to support it was lore

qualified than he, in effect, gave expression to. That is not what you

have really been saying all along. It is not a question of whether it

was more qualified. This is a test. It is a test of if a reason`ble man

would conclude that this evhdence supported going to war.

If I would say so, Mr Chairlan, it seems to be an easy question to

answer, because the answer hs no. I'm going to move onto another

question. I've got several colleagues wanting to chip hn, and I

am concerned that we might here for a very long time, if they do, but on

this occasion, to colleagues have been so insistent then I'm `llowed

to bring them in. Which two you think was more at the forefront of

the Prime Minister's mind? Was in two evaluate the evidence ptt in

front of him, or was it to lake the case for a decision in his lind he

had already made? I find th`t a very helpful question, because mx

response to it is clear and unqualified. There was no attempt to

challenge or seek reevaluathon of the intelligence advice. Do you

think he exaggerated the certainty of his knowledge? If you had just

said to the House, we don't know for certain, but there's a risk that he

has this record, and then gone on to say what I remember him sayhng,

mainly that the nightmare scenario oh was that Saddam Hussein, for his

own purposes, would make thdse weapons available to a terrorist

group with which he shared ` common enemy, would have been as rdaction

of the reasonable man? It could have been, at the time. I go on to talk

about nuclear weapons, rathdr than weapons of mass destruction. I think

you would agree, nuclear we`pons are on a magnitude of which is lore

dangerous and more serious than what has been reduced -- produced, and

certainly might have been available to Saddam at that time. Frol DJ icy

reports, it seems pretty cldar and it was in the dossier that ht would

take five years, even if sanctions were removed, for weapons to be

produced, for Saddam to produce weapons. In many ways, the sanctions

were reasonably effective. There were no results of a progralme which

had been closed down in the 199 s, and as you point out in your report,

new US -- numerous other cotntries were well ahead, such as Ir`n, Korea

and Libya, which posed diffdrent kinds of threats. In that s`me

speech, the Prime Minister said that Saddam Hussein was actively trying

to obtain material to in rich uranium. You said at paragr`ph 40

of your summary, that there was no programme to develop nuclear

weapons. Have you establishdd whether it was reasonable on the

basis of the evidence that he was given at the time that Tony Blair

could have asserted that Saddam Hussein could have obtained is

nuclear weapons within months? No. Why not? Because there was no active

programme in the sensitive installations of design mantfacture

and distribution of weapons delivery systems. There haven't been since

1990. There was a fear wastd on history in other places, I think,

any intelligence community, not least, that from the dismissal of

the inspectors in Iraq in 1898, there might have been something

going on. But it was nothing more than that. So, Tony Blair shouldn't

have said that I do, should he? To assert that there was a nuclear

weapons programme in training base on the evidence I have seen, so

therefore so therefore, to tell us we were vulnerable to a nuclear

attack within months was unreasonable, wasn't it? Wotld

reasonable man have been misled by that? Again, I think Leone `nswer

can be no. -- I think that the only answer. A reasonable man cotld not

be misled... I heard your qtestion the other way round. If he had set

that there was a risk arising over the years ahead that Saddam had an

intent that he would trying to carry through if... He said that he has

the capacity to obtain nucldar weapons within months. That was not

so at the time. And he knew it? I don't know what he based th`t

statement on in terms of evhdence. Have you seen any evidence to

support that statement, to justify the action of the Prime Minhster in

the House that day? Not that there was a near-term prospects of Saddam

acquiring and therefore being able to threaten the use of... So, that's

a no? Yes. Near-term, means not imminently? Yes. There is a part of

cross examination I like to touch on and that's nuclear weapons `s

deterrents. Was it wrong to use the terrorist and the wider nuclear

threat posed by Saddam. I fdel you answer that in your report that I

want clarification. The evidence doesn't suggest that Saddam would

have, even if he could have, supplied weapons of mass destruction

in whatever category to terrorist organisations. At paragraph three to

four, you said there was no evidence to support this in the JCI

suggestions. I feel you've pretty much answered in the same w`y. In Mr

Blair's speech, he said, and I quote, these are a real and present

danger to Britain. He had no evidence that either, did hd? He

added concept shared by othdrs in the United States, but... So it was

unreasonable for him to say that either? Not at the time, I'l only

applying a test that millions of people will readily underst`nd which

is used in courts of law at and down the land every day. But this is not

a court of law. It's a court of public opinion. Is only of the

committee and the evidence of what it took from the committee. But it's

important to emphasise, it was not a court. I understand. It didn't

proceed as such. Your evidence has been clear, and you have given more

decisive answers and you provided in your statement, particularlx in the

executive summary. I want to clarify one more point before passing

questioning on. You see, I haven't got the exact words in front of me,

but you said trust in British politics has been eroded by events

unfolding at that time, and after that time, and it's damage which

lasts until this day, and I am. . Is the most damaging thing abott this

whole sorry episode is that a number of things, very important things

were said to the House at that time, which are reasonable man... Not be

reasonably supported by the evidence that the time the statement was

made, and that's what's corroded the trust? I think when a leader of the

Government, or a Government presents a case with all the powers of

advocacy that he or she can command, and in doing so, going on what the

facts of the case and that basic analysis of the case can support

then yes, I think it's will damage politics. It will take a long time

to repair? I would imagine ht will. We thank you for your part hn

helping to begin that repair process. If there are lessons to be

learned from this, can we rdflect on your experience of the type of

enquiry youth carried out. Whilst you were completing your work, the

Foreign Affairs Committee w`s undertaking an enquiry into Libya,

and I was conscious that we were going to wait for your publhcation

of your rapport, and also rdflect some of your lessons learned in our

conclusions in our report and I will come to those in a minute. But, I

believe the select committed of the House with 14,000 plus words, a

year's work, probably around ?1 ,000 worth of extra costs for thd travel

budget to conduct our enquiries then produce something whilst not of

the historic quality of 2.6 million words and the cost of the ldngth of

your enquiry, I hope we've got closer and rather firmer conclusions

in the report and the size `nd scope of your enquiry produced. I want

your reflection on the task you were set and how fair or unfair the terms

of reference were, regarding the task you were set. And perh`ps the

competing utilities are the different types of enquiry `vailable

to the Government, where is a judicial enquiry would have had ten

times the cost and would have been significantly longer than yours if

previous experience is anything to go by. I think for an enquiry into

the workings of central Govdrnment in a very critical and controversial

area, there is real advantage in having a committee, an independent

committee of people with direct experience of the workings of

Government in that way. I think it would be more difficult for a judge

operating with council throtgh cross-examination to arrive at well

judged conclusions in that the titular individual situation. The

other particular thought th`t I have is that the willingness, indeed

even the ability of Governmdnt to make available highly sensitive

information to an enquiry is determined in part by the

membership, the process which you will adopt. Again, Lord Hutton had

no problem in getting hold of a great deal of intelligence laterial.

The real difficulty for him, with his terms of reference,

investigating the death of David Kelly, was to be able to relate that

material to the circumstancds of the case. For our part, we had total

access to little material, `nd much of the subsequent negotiation which

requires argument over quitd a long period was about disclosure, the

ability to publish it. I thhnk judicially led enquiry would have

been less well-placed to undertake those arguments, or to fight and win

our particular battles. Lord Butler's enquiry, I think it is

commonly understood that he thought he'd produced a much tougher report

than was actually reported, and I wonder in the reporting durhng choir

re-, whether there were things that were not picked up by the mddia in

the way which you would havd liked, and given proper emphasis. By

pointing us to things that xou feel should have more attention, the of

your work. As a brief prelilinary, I was a member of the powerful

committee. The main constrahnt on us was not achieving public

understanding so much as behng enforced by a very tight tiletable

to report and concludes somd very keen pieces of evidence that were

available. The report of thd Iraq survey group which came out only a

few months before the Butler report. Some of the key intelligencd, human

sources were discredited and had their intelligence set asidd.

Neither of those were possible for Butler on his timetable. As to

public reception, I think p`rtly a matter of narrow terms of rdference

that Butler had, it was intdlligence orientated. We were asked to give a

reliant -- reliable account of all that had happened in Iraq adventure,

misadventure. To that extent, I think we had a ready accept`nce by

public and the media when wd were finally reported, and it wotld have

been the case if our terms of reference are kept our

Myself, I would not say I al ever satisfied with anything, but I do

think that the public understanding and acceptance, more generally, of

our broad conclusions, with lessons to be learned, was demonstr`ted as a

reasonably good understanding of what we found. A particular point,

sorry if I am going on a bit too long, it was not the sole ptrpose of

the inquiry to satisfy the bereaved families. The fact that, in the end,

they have accepted the report as being an answer to the questions

that they had was particularly welcome. There are no areas in this

which you think have not received the attention that they desdrve In

your own mind and the minds of your colleagues, there are no prhorities

that have not been picked up? I suppose the best answer I c`n try to

give to that is that we cannot know yet, because the real test will be

the taking of the lessons that we sought to draw and others m`y indeed

find. That is going to be a process, looking ahead, that will take some

time. As things stand at prdsent, I am reasonably encouraged th`t the

attempt is being made, systematically, in Government to

address those lessons. I thhnk there is a question for the parli`ment in

terms of how much they want to hold Government to account for the way

does that, and gives an account to yourselves as parliamentari`ns what

it has found out, what it h`s accepted and what it has ch`nged.

Turning to the substance, your appearance today happily cohncides

with the publication of Jerdmy Greenstock's book, which gods to

reinforce the evidence you talk from Sir Christopher Maher. The

conclusion I draw from it, that Tony Blair, in the conduct of his

relationship with the President of the United States, really dhd not

exploit the influence that the United Kingdom have at all,

effectively, in bilateral interests, or in the interest of getting some

average over the stabilisathon plan and once the operation to lhberate

Iraq had taken place. -- leveraged. What would be your observathons on

how severe one should be on that? I think it is uncontestable that Mr

Blair, as Prime Minister, over estimated how much influencd he had.

That is not to say that there was no influence, and in making George Bush

go to the United Nations, that was exercised. Over a period, it worked.

By the end of the year, 2002, President Bush had clearly concluded

that the UN -based inspection system was not going to be the answer and

the military timetable took control. If indeed it had not always been in

control of the diplomatic noises. As to what his purpose was, he clearly

sought to try to reconcile TS decisions and objectives, rdgime

change, ever since the Clinton administration, with the UK

objective, the disarmament of Saddam's supposed weapons of mass

destruction. That coincided completely with the string of

Security Council resolutions, and culminated in resolution 1441. The

other strand in influencing the United States was to avoid

unilateral United States military action, for a variety of re`sons,

which he would explain, and has Was that attempt to exert infludnce

successful in the event? Thd answer is no. Do you think he should have

paid a high price for British support? The fact that it took so

long for Jeremy Greenstock dven to get a hearing in Iraq, by which

stage very serious mistakes have been made by the occupation forces?

It is a touch too hypothetical. But it is difficult to avoid a

conclusion that, and Mr Blahr stated clear conditions for partichpation

in and supporting United St`tes military action, and if those

conditions had been reasonable, there might have been more

influence, particularly, I think, on the timing of any United St`tes led

action. As it was, and it is discussed at length in the hnquiry

report, Mr Blair was determhned to say that his conditions werd

conditions for success, not conditions for British parthcipation

and support. In 2010, the Iraqi government said at the National

Security Council. The operational National Security Council w`s set up

by the Foreign Affairs Commhttee, into the Libya intervention. The

conclusion that we came to, we noted the Prime Minister's decisive role

in the National Security Cotncil, when it discussed interventhon in

Libya. We concluded that thd independent review of its operation,

it marked its own homework `fter the Libya intervention, during the Libya

crisis. What we recommended was that the non-ministerial members of the

National Security Council, hf they disagreed with the direction of

policy, they should require a prime ministerial direction in thd same

way that permanent secretarhes require, as the counting officer.

What is your view of that as a recommendation? In specific terms, I

have not been privy to the workings of the National Security Cotncil and

how it operates. In general terms, I think one of the broad lessons

derived from our seven years of work looking at Government records, or

the absence of Government rdcords on occasion, is that it is vit`l, not

merely important, but vital for serious decisions and the rdasons

behind them to be recorded hn the public archive, not for immddiate

release, necessarily, but that they should be written down so, hf

someone in a serious disagrdement with a decision taken collectively,

the reason for that decision and the facts of it should be recorded. I

think that also goes to the suggestion from the Better

Government Initiative, which is similar. I would be reluctant to say

it should be placed on the same footing as that which the pdrmanent

secretaries, as counting officers, an, nonetheless it seems to me that

if there is a guarantee in the processes of the National Sdcurity

Council elsewhere, that dissent well argued, properly expressed

dissent, if it is to be recorded, in itself, it is an incentive to allow

challenge take place, and for different voices to be heard. I will

take that as support for our committee's recommendations, so I am

grateful for that. Ten to the usual stabilisation, I know there will be

questions about it, you deal extensively with stabilisathon in

the report. Do you share my anxiety that lessons have not been learned

from the review we took of the effectiveness of the stabilhsation

unit in the Libya interventhon? We were very critical of their capacity

and some of the lessons that you have identified here do not appear

to apply in terms of what ndeds to be prepared for in light of

operations that are now takhng place around Mosul, where the leadership

properly sits, the leadershhp sits with the Foreign Office, with the

capacity to do anything sitting with the Ministry of Defence and the

Department For International Development? The coordination that

you recommend, from your experience with Government, do you belheve the

Government has yet taken enough notice of the conclusions you came

to? I don't have insight into where the government is placed in any

detail. I would like to respond with two comments in particular. Good

though it is that the Stabilisation Unit has come into existencd, and

there is the fund associated with it, in terms of the order of

magnitude of what is requirdd, it is nothing like sufficient in scale

all, I would have thought, hn authority. The second point is that

I think it is very difficult, in a specific case of security sdctor

reform in Iraq for the Forehgn Office, at, admittedly, a pretty

junior level, to understand and assemble the kind of not just

policing effort, although that was at the core of it, but the whole

range of reconstruction work of institutions, of people, thd

processes that are going to be required. It is a major task of

reconstruction. I think there is still a great deal for any

government to do. I would add to that, actually, the United Nations,

to bring together the different elements that are involved when a

wrecked country has to be ptt back together. We may return to post war

planning and reconstructing later on. Leader said in response to

Crispin that you were not convinced that the stabilisation unit have the

order of magnitude scale and authority. I'd invite you to expand

upon that and say what might be done to give it the order of magnitude it

deserves. There was a littld pool of money in 2003, which was trhvial and

of no impact whatsoever. By 200 , when we stopped taking eviddnce

there was something on an altogether larger scale. Now, I think, in terms

of ?1 billion. Even that dods not stack up against the cost ilplied in

a major reconstruction task across a whole country. Even one smaller than

Iraq. Iraq was a seriously large country for this purpose. Does that

answer your question? Your reference to scale and magnitude was `bout the

resources available to the funds, rather than necessary the profile of

the work within Government? Or both? The thing that, frankly, wotld

defeat me, and I'm glad to have any responsibility for it any more, and

I'm thinking of Ireland, is how you bring together the different arms

and branches of government hn a really constructive and willing way,

as opposed to protecting interests, budgets, limiting responsibhlity.

Those problems are very gre`t and really real, as we all know. I would

like to bring in Northern Ireland for a brief statement. It took us a

long time, 30 years, ultimately to get the whole thing right and to a

good conclusion. In the course of that, we did learn, on the

admittedly much smaller scale of Northern Ireland, how to brhng

together military intelligence, police, security, economic

reconstruction, housing was central. They were all brought together and

held together within a single network of relationships of

authority. If you could replicate that on a larger scale, of ` major

global reconstruction effort, that would be good. I am glad it is not

made that has to do it. Do xou have specific reflections on the

Department for International Development and how it fits into

this? In your recommendations, you tended to recommend things that had

to do with other departments? I have two preface any answer and the

generality of any answer, whth the specifics of the time. -- I had to.

The budgetary resources that were made available, all of us. The truth

of the matter is that there was between Whitehall departments, and

not the Ministry of Defence departments, a wide gap. Brhdges

were not constructed across that gap with any effectiveness, at least

until right at the end, and never throughout our Long engagemdnt in

Iraq, to a great effect. Th`t is as much as I can say.

The National Security Counchl's strategies, which guide the

programme which has replaced the conflict pool, these were not

published. Do you think it would make sense to publish them hn order

to improve accountability? H can see there is a great deal of

international politics and dven diplomacy lurking behind th`t. But

speaking purely for myself `s a citizen, it is extraordin`ry we

don't have that kind of information publicly available. Thank you. Thank

you, good afternoon Sir John. Given what you have been saying today and

in the report, do you think all of that is a consequence of a sofa

style of government? I understand your question, and I think ht is the

concept and practice which hs part of the background but it is of

course a reflection of the then Prime Minister's personal

preferences. There has two B room in any system of government for a

degree of flexibility as to how you go about the process of govdrnment,

it cannot be confined to a rigid set of committees and minutes and

processes and meetings. On the other hand, I am totally convinced that

without a coherent process, however it is conducted in any sort of room,

you cannot discharge the responsibility which under our

Constitution is a collectivd responsibility on the Cabindt

effectively. So, the system has to be flexible in order to takd into

account the personal style `nd characteristic of the Prime Minister

of the day, is it also a function of the consolidation of power, growing

consolidation, into a singld figure, the Prime Minister of the d`y, is it

almost the 21st century equhvalent of Louis XIV, I am the statd? I

observe what can be describdd in that way. I think it reached a high

point in Mr Blair's Prime Mhnister ship, and I have a great melory in

taking evidence from his Foreign Minister, Mr Strauch and asked how

it was that members of his cabinet, other than Robin Cook and to a

lesser extent Clare Short, did not provide a challenge and a ddbate.

They were promised it somethmes but promises were not delivered. And the

answer that came back was qtite simple. That Tony Blair had, as

Leader of the Opposition, rdscued his party from a very dire political

predicament and he had done it again afterwards as Prime Minister. I had

the sense from Mr Straw's rdaction that he had achieved a personal and

political dominance which w`s itself overriding the doctrine of

collective Cabinet responsibility... The power of patronage held back

discussion? Perhaps can be xes, but also sheer psychological dolinance.

He had been right. Was he not right this time? That was the sense I took

from Mr Straw's evidence. That's very helpful. In your view then the

Cabinet system throughout all of this, was it disregarded? W`s it

just bypassed? What had happened? Presumably committee said this in

the report, had there been affected... Challenged, mord

scrutiny, perhaps some weaknesses in the evidence would have been teased

out a lot more? Things were decided without reference to Cabinet. For

example, the acceptance of responsibility in four provhnce

south-east of Iraq. Given the decision, surely that was it? It

never went near the Cabinet. More generally, the Cabinet was promised

that it would have a hand in the decision on major deployments in

Iraq, which never took placd. We did an analysis on all of the C`binet

papers and minutes and meethngs in the relevant period and published a

great deal of the material. Quite frequently, the Cabinet itsdlf was

simply being given informathon updates. Not always completdly

detailed or of an updated khnd. There was very little subst`ntive

Cabinet discussion leading to a collective decision, which seems to

me the like which is characterised certainly throughout the period from

2002-2006. I understand your earlier point about it has to take hnto

account the psychology and style of the elected leaders of the day. In

that regard, it has two Flex. But to what extent does the civil service

have to be a custodian of proper effective Cabinet responsibhlity?

Lord Turnbull told you that nothing was wrong with this, there was no

problem with the sofa style of government. He disregards that

phrase. To what extent should the Cabinet Secretary be saying that

this is wrong, Prime Ministdr, you need to do something here? The role

of the Cabinet Secretary, I was in contact with all of the surviving

ones and retired, as well as serving. It is to some degrde

determined by his, perhaps one day her, relationship with the Prime

Minister of the day and is clearly accepted by all of them, a clear

responsibility for the Cabinet as a collective. I think if I were to

have a purpose today it is to encourage all of my

successors and colleagues at Whitewater take courage in both

hands and insist on their rhght to be heard -- at Whitehall. And record

what their advices even if ht is not taken. It is for ministers to decide

and four senior officials, `nd I would include senior military in

this, to clearly state their best advice to their masters. And I think

the recording of that advicd and the recording of any discussion about it

is absolutely central because that guarantees, if you like, a degree of

willingness to challenge and duty to challenge, which in a sofa done

setting is simply not there. It is the responsibility of the C`binet

Secretary to make sure that Cabinet ministers have that opportunity and

that is set down in the Cabhnet manual, isn't it? Yes... And are you

saying in this case, that w`s not observed? You can't, as it were

override a Prime Minister's instructions to the Cabinet

Secretary or indeed a lack of instructions to a Cabinet

Secretary... Should you havd taken a direction? I'm sorry? Should the

Cabinet Secretary have taken a direction in that case? It would be

open for a Cabinet Secretarx in dire straits to do just that. A famous

example from the war when Norman Brook, the Cabinet

Secretary, was ordered to ddstroy all records of dealings with the

French. As a dutiful and loxal servant of the elected governor and,

Norman Burke did. I wrote a minute on the file saying that I h`ve been

so instructed which is open to historical enquiry. Very interesting

but let me take us back to this case. Should the Cabinet Secretary

have made this demand? Or only carried on under the instruction of

the Prime Minister and a direction? Well, I'm not sure what the exact

case is, but I can recall from the evidence that we took that on one

occasion the Cabinet Secret`ry at, the overseas development Defence

secretary arranged to deal with the forthcoming Iraq issue. This was

perched in -- put in draft to Number tdn,

before the Cabinet Secretarx even had sight of it. The

Prime Minister said that thdy would not have the ministerial colmittee,

or not yet. It goes back. The draft, without the ministerial comlittee

proposal is put to the Cabinet Secretary to put to the Prile

Minister for formal endorselent That is screwing up the proper

arrangement in rather a big way in my opinion. But should they have

demanded an instruction or direction before agreeing to that? Well, I

don't know that he even knew. Because he was shown a draft, it had

been discussed... I will brhng the questioning to Bella Jenkin now but

it strikes me as a high degree of dysfunctionality at the heart of

Whitehall. I agree in that particular instance. It is shocking.

In that instance... We are not talking about trading in

Aberystwyth... And if you would allow me, chairman, the consequences

of it were the whole offici`l structure underneath that l`cked

ministerial direction. Therdfore, they were not able to come to grips

with some of the big issues which ought to kill it ought to h`ve been

able to do? Do you find that shocking -- big issues which it

ought to have been able to do. Yes. What safeguards exist to ensure that

proper conduct of a Cabinet government? Firstly, the ministerial

code which is the product of the Prime Minister of the day. Who

adjudicates that? He enforcds and adjudicates on it. Nonetheldss it is

not without substance or effect Then there is the Cabinet

Secretary's manual, which is for officials and about officials and

their conduct and behaviour. It cannot, as it were, overridd

ministers. So, what there is not, I do have a little sympathy btt not

total with the better government initiative proposal, there hs not

either a statutory or convention based enforcement system to ensure

compliance with proper standards and accepted rules of how government

should be conducted. So, let's look at a specific instance we wdre

discussing moments ago, which might have been in the Prime Minister 's

mind advertising the decision to go to war was finally made. Yot

uncovered the letter to the President of the United States which

contained the words "We will be with you whatever". This was eight months

prior to the decision. Yes. Who knew about this letter? In terms of other

members of the Cabinet? At the time of its being issued, only those in

number ten. Who saw it. And what advice did the Cabinet Secrdtary

give the Prime Minister, or what advice did the Prime Ministdr

receive that before this letter was dispatched? I don't think the

Cabinet Secretary was aware of its existence at the time. Other than

them, I seem to remember soleone else advised them? Jonathan Powell

as chief of staff in number ten the most senior official under that

arrangement, and Sir David Lanning were aware. Both tried to pdrsuade

the Prime Minister not to use those words but he did. So I come back to

the question, what safeguards exist to ensure the proper conduct of the

machinery of government? I think you are pointing to a gap, a deficiency.

The better government initi`tive actually said in its concluding

paragraph that Parliament ndeds to be satisfied that the seriots

weaknesses that the report identified, and all aspects of

decision-making have been t`ckled. It went on to say they should be

held to account in failings of the machinery of government. And their

locus in decision-making nedds to be clarified and mechanisms put in

place in charging their accountability, do you agred with

that? As a proposal, and I have not had the chance to think abott it in

any depth, I should perhaps declare that I was for a time part of the

better government initiativd but I left it years ago, I was not part of

this particular analysis, btt I think this is not in any sense age

regularised answer but I thhnk it is, for Pollard and

parliamentarians, and among them I include Cabinet ministers. ,-

Parliament. To accept those conventions and rules but the rules

in the case I cited were brdached. It is true they became award of the

letter after it was issued, but not in a position to say, you should not

say this... Or you should not write it. But, how is Parliament to know?

Indeed. Unless there is somd procedure for a civil servant to

notify Parliament in some form always? Which protects the public

official from political bullying -- formal way.

This so special and very important case of whistle-blowing if H could

go off on a short tangent, H was, for a time, the so-called staff

counsellor, in effect the ethics adviser to the intelligence

community. The only way to satisfy someone who is in consciencd deeply

dissatisfied with the institution and its workings that he or she is

part of, is to talk it throtgh with the leaders of that institution It

is about leadership. I think that leadership lies both in minhsters

and the authority that they have, but also in senior public sdrvants

of all types. Whether that hs enough to give enough route and strength to

a convention that is then observed by all, I can't say. But I would

hope it would move in that direction. In financial matters

these letters are used very sparingly, and are regarded as the

nuclear option in relationship s with ministers. Does it havd a

chilling effect on the oper`tion of government? Does it have a

destructive effect on relathonships between ministers and civil

servants? If I am allowed to respond from personal experience, whthout

detailed names or cases, it was something that I had to draw to my

Secretary of State's attenthon on occasion. And what the consdquences

would be, if his decision, `nd it was his to take, went in a

particular way. I found, agreeably, that it never went in that way.

There are other examples, lhke the Meriden motorcycle collective, where

it does lead to a rupture of relationships. But it has to be on a

scale to justify that action, the threat of action. Given we `re

dealing with a Cabinet secrdtary, or a very senior official at the heart

of Government, I imagine we would treat this mechanism for procedural

sleights of hand, it would `lso be used very sparingly. I have heard

nothing from you that reallx convinces me that my committee

should not recommend this. H am not trying to make an argument xou

should not. I am saying I h`ve not had a chance to think it through. I

have had such experiences as I have had, a statutory arrangement in the

field of value for money and Finance did work. But it actually h`d become

not so much a statutory for regulation, as a deep laid

convention. One further question, on the question of the lack of

atmosphere of challenge, thhs is something the committee I h`ve

chaired has gone into quite a lot, in terms of the strategic thinking

capacity at the heart of government, or the lack of it. While thd joint

investigation committee has capacity for assessment, what evidence did

you see in Downing Street that there was capacity for assessment of

strategic options, strategic choices in foreign policy and the ddployment

of military force that would similarly provide that atmosphere,

albeit that it did not work well in the JIC in this instance?

Tony Juniper ten, -- turning to Number 10, we have seen varhous

things set out in terms of policy units, sometimes more, sometimes

less, in scale capability, what there has not been is a

constitutional free working of the support available to the Prhme

Minister. Should the Security Council now have its own independent

analysis and assessment so that various departmental papers being

presented are properly assessed and integrated into a proposal, rather

than being ignored by a Cabhnet committee? I suppose I had the

difficulty, the National Security Council is concerned with what its

title suggests, national security. If I can say so, and I mean with

respect, the question you pose as much wider significance. It goes

right across the business of government. The ability, thd

capability to do strategic `nalysis of options and risks, beford big

policy decisions are saddled is not there. -- settled. I don't know if

it actually happened on a bhg scale, real cooperation between responsible

departments, at every level, ministerial and official, could

bring it about in the absence of a formal capability. I do agrde with

the National Security Counchl, that it offers a solution in that field.

Howard will work, I don't know. I think the term national sectrity is

an Americanised term for evdrything that happens. That is the w`y I hear

that term. Why isn't the National Security Council the umbrella under

which that capability should be put? This is a machinery of government

question. It is. Indeed, as a young man I did a lot of work on the

machinery of government. It left me thinking that structures and

institutions are all very wdll, you can get them badly wrong. Btt they

are not enough. It is the pdople on the way that their work that really

matters. If they work well dnough, you may not need to muck around with

the structure is is disrupthve, quite often. I have seen a little,

at a distance, in the working of the Iraq case of the national Sdcurity

Council in the United States. It is a much more structured and powerful

forum. Our Cabinet system h`s been able to replicate it at timds. It is

a presidential, not prime ministerial system. Ultimatdly, it

is very different. But therd could be lessons to be taken. Givdn the

scale of the failures you h`ve set out in the mechanisms of government

itself, in the face of some of - someone that are so psychologically

dominant, do you think select committees could play a gre`ter

role? Would you set out how you envisage that happening? Thdre is, I

think, and I am aware of thd factual chairman has published on this

theme, not least, I think there is a lot of room for Parliament, in its

different ways, whether on the floor of the chamber or in select

committees or other respects, to exert more influence on Govdrnment

and to hold Government more effectively to account. We have

seen, in my working lifetimd, remarkable progress. But I think the

process is far from completd. If take one example, in the Ir`q case,

had there not been a pledge by the then Labour government to h`ve an

inquiry into Iraq, supposing, the time we ceased our engagement in

2009, that there was to be no independent inquiry, it would have

been, I think, very much a latter for Parliament to decide, wdll,

we're going to have one. Do it ourselves. Whether a conventional

inquiry would have the scopd, time and range, I don't know. I think the

real problem would be access to highly sensitive information on a

long scale. I think that is a serious question that would have to

be answered. That is negoti`tion between government and parlhament.

Sensitive information that lay not be possible to be shared. On the

subject of the legal advice, do you think that there is a case for

Parliament being given clear, open access to the legal advice? We

wrestled quite long and hard with the legal aspects of Iraq. H am sure

you will be familiar with the conclusion we were forced to come

to, because we were not a jtdge led inquiry, let alone an

internationally recognised court of law, we could not give a

determinative conclusion about the legality or the rightness or not of

the legal advice from the Attorney General. What we did do was analyse

in depth and detail how that advice evolved. That is a polite w`y of

putting it. The other word would be changed. Eventually it was taken

into account, operated and communicated to Parliament. We

thought all of that was open to very serious critical questions. To take

your particular point, if I may I think it is clear that the

convention that the Attornex General's advice to governmdnt is

kept confidential must be rhght Any entity, including a central

government, must be able to have access to its legal advice on a

confidential footing. That hs the lawyer and client relationship.

Unless the lawyer, in this case the Attorney General, exception`lly

decide it's OK. Which, of course, we now know in the Iraq case that was

accepted. It is, I am sure, for the Prime Minister or the departmental

minister concerned to be responsible to Parliament for explaining what

the legal position is. Parlhament will know that government whll have

taken legal advice from the government's law officers. Ht is not

the same as publishing the @ttorney General's advice in depth and

detail. If I could just add a point, I think that, from our inquhry and

consideration of the set of issues, the Cabinet should have had formal,

written advice from the Attorney General and the opportunity to

consider it around a table. You say it is OK? OK, it is OK, and move on.

That did not begin come in ly view, to be an exceptional way of deciding

whether or not there was a sufficient legal base for us to

participate in the invasion of a sovereign country. You said earlier

today that the real task will be taken the lessons learned. H think

we would all agree with that. Can you identify to this committee where

you are concerned that thosd lessons are not being learned? What more

should be being done to look at the lessons from your inquiry. H know

that evidence has been taken from the Cabinet Secretary. I have had a

discussion with him myself. I am clear that, in particular

departments, the Ministry of Defence not least, formal lessons ldarned

and lessons to be taken frol the Iraq inquiry report are unddrway.

Also, that the Cabinet Secrdtary has instituted across government, across

Whitehall process, which will no doubt pick up the departmental

conclusions and what to do `bout them. What I have neither the means,

the time or involvement to `ssess is how quickly this will happen, how

effective the process will turn out to be. I can say, and I really do

mean this, even as a former mandarin official, I think it is for

Parliament to insist on keeping scrutiny of this and making sure the

process is brought to satisfactory outcomes. I don't think it would all

happen at once, by the way. But I think it is a for Parliament to keep

its close eye on. My question to you, I guess, is that we ard asking

for guidance of Parliament, which areas you think need to be pursued,

where are their gaps? I was answering from memories of the

departmental structure withhn government. I think it is, hn a way,

our intelligence community that has grown quite substantially, though

still very small, we have the Intelligence and Security Committee,

which is sometimes described as a Parliamentary Committee. It is

actually a Prime Minister's committee, although we are

parliamentarians. There is `n instrument there. It does ptblish

its reports, and it has a lot of access. Otherwise, and I re`lly stop

at the point where the individual departmental committees reqtire

accounts to be given, where there is an instrument, an institution, a

piece of machinery to bring the whole lot together, the tot`l

government response, holisthc, the holistic response, I don't know I'm

not sure there is such an instrument. During the condtct of

the campaign, do you feel there is a greater role that can be pl`yed by

Parliament in holding Government to account for their conduct dtring the

period and beyond? I do think this is a very interesting and

potentially very productive line of questioning. I think the role of

Parliament, both on the floor of the House and in select committdes and

elsewhere, perhaps, changes, in the case of a major military occupation

based venture overseas, changes with time. To get involved in thd

day-to-day operations, military or otherwise, would really be

impossible anyway. But I thhnk Parliament should be entitldd to

regular accounts of significant developments, for good or for ill,

that may take place in a military campaign, and still more in a

prolonged occupation and reconstruction set of events.

After the whole thing is ovdr, I think it's an open question as to

how best an assessment can be made. But the ultimate judgment I sparks

well, the ultimate judgment lies with the electorate, but otherwise

than that it lies with Parlhament. If Parliament is not satisfhed to

the point that the Government cannot command a majority, in any such

assessment, then it is over to the people again. That's not very..

That's not flippant, but in real life a lot of this will be going on

all the time. There needs to be as it were, a constant presencd of

accountability and scrutiny going on. You touched earlier on the role

that patronage plays sometiles in inhibiting the ability or the

willingness of people to spdak truth to power, but that doesn't sometimes

apply to Select Committee chairs, as we are elected. Do you think this is

something that Select Committees should be playing a greater role in?

I think you've taken me quite far out of my Iraqi inquiry report

experience with that. Thank you I am going to adjourn the session at

this point, because I'm almost certain there is about to bd a

division. We'll resume at a quarter past 4, assuming there is only one

division. Half past 4 if thdre is. The member has only started

speaking... I think he is about to finish, so... Order. We'll `djourn

and resume at a quarter past 4. An MP has just 10 minutes in the

House of Commons to explain the law they would like to introducd. But

just like your great ideas, they rarely succeed. The bills normally

have to have at least some support from MPs in other parties. @nd if at

the end of 10 minutes the idea is approved it can be considerdd many a

lot more detail. What kind of bills are proposed this way? It is a turn

in the road exercise. It can be almost anything. From regul`tions on

driving instructors to Engl`nd having its own national anthem for

sporting events. The options are God Save The Queen, Jerusalem and Land

of Hope and Glory. But not only the clock ticking but the bills can be

opposed. After an MP has set out their plan another MP can t`ke 0

minutes to make a speech explaining why they object to it. I beg to move

that leave be given to bring in a bill to provide the Secretary of

State to provide for the introduction of proportional

representation as a method for electing members of the House of

Commons. While I acknowledgd and respect the honourable lady's

commitment and zeal about this cause, I fear this bill may harm our

democracy rather than helping it. The opposer can force a divhsion,

meaning billings can be tord speed ode at this stage.

THE SPEAKER: Order, the question is that the honourable member have

leave to bring in the bill. As many as are of that opinion say `ye, of

the contrary, in oe. Noe... THE SPEAKER: Division, clear the

lobby. More often or not 10 min rule bills go through. The idea goes to

the Commons on a Friday when bills put forward by backbench MPs are

traditionally discussed. Unless the Government supports it the chances

are it will be killed off. So why do it? For MPs it can be a good way to

get something on the Governlent s radar. Or just talked about in

public. It can raise the profile of an issue or an MP. It is not all a

terrible waste of time from the Government's perspective either

Just because a 10 minute rule bill fails doesn't mean the whold idea is

sunk. Minister, can and do fish up good ideas which magically resurface

in Government bills just a few months later. And there is `lways

the hope, however small, th`t your bill might just make it. Between

1983 and 2010, 12 10 minutes rule bills made into it law.

100 years ago when women were battling to win the vote in the

United Kingdom, this place was on the front line. Campaigners known as

suffragists had been fighting for decades to secure the vote, but to

no avail so. One group took direct action. The crown was led bx

Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughter Christabel. Some of the womdn they

inspired recalled those timds for a BBC documentary in 1968. 1968..

About the only things a girl could do were to become a nurse or a

governess. I was an arts sttdent and in South Kensington and Clapham Road

art school. I enjoyed art vdry much but what I was really interdsted in

was changing social conditions. I realised that couldn't be done until

women had the vote. I was vdry annoyed about the whole poshtion,

the difference between a box and a girl. Everybody wanted a box. It's a

boy! And all that sort of stuff It irritated me enormously. And when

one grew up and saw the differences in the opportunities that boys had

and men had and those that women and girls had, that increased that

feeling. To publicise their cause the women staged demonstrathons

smashed windows and chained themselves to railings. The Daily

Mail dubbed them the suffragettes. A term of abuse which later c`me to

define the campaign. The wolen went to work and if the man was out of

work, he could come outside that factory, take her money, spdnd it

and she couldn't do anything. I was just gone 30 and they said, there's

a suffragette round the concern speaking. I went round the corner

and I thought to myself, thhs woman's talking sense. When I

actually joined I happened to meet an open air meeting and heard the

speaker say, lunatics, crimhnals, paupers and women may not vote. I

hadn't joined before then. @ll my instincts were there... There was a

tremendous force around us for good. Some people couldn't take it. I

remember going on poster parades and they were charming women who were in

it. They absolutely were smothered with eggs, rotten tomatoes. You

never saw anything like what we looked like at the end. The Palace

of Westminster was a place of huge symbolism for the suffragettes. They

had been denied the vote, so they were going to take their fight into

the heart of Parliament. Inhtially women would come into Parli`ment, as

indeed everybody was allowed to do, and ask to see an MP. They would be

shown into Central Lobby. When they were sitting waiting they would

often leap up on to the seats and shout votes for women and blow

whistles. It became such a state that women were banned from Central

Lobby. By 1908 the women were attracting the huge numbers but

Asquith was unmoved. So the selfra jets planned to rush Parlialent

There had been a massive demonstration. A 250,000 people

gathered and we didn't have any movement on the right to vote. They

decided to organise this rush on Parliament. We think about 60,0 0

people were on this rush. Indeed, it has been commemorated recently the

environmental movement, a climate change rush on part. It was a

historical precedent for other issues as well. Some women did

manage to break through the police lines. Lines. One even made it on to

the floor of the Commons ch`mber. Emmeline Pankhurst was jaildd for

her part in inciting the rush. On her release her colleagues `warded

her this med A it is now owned by the House of Commons sand in the

Central Lobby Having the exhibition in the heart of the Houses of

Parliament is very important. This is the place the public can come and

where we want to be able to talk to people about the importance of the

right to vote. What women and others went through to get the right to

vote. And to encourage them to exercise that right democratically.

It is very, very important. In November 190 suffragettes would

again try to rush Parliament but were forced back by police. The

violence of the day caused the women to name it Black Friday. Thd Black

Friday deputation was the most extraordinary thing and most of us

seem to be unable to remembdr the treatment we received. I myself was

arrested twice on Black Friday. I can't remember one time at `ll. The

other time I remembered that we were smashed against a wall and we were

arrested. But some people h`d the most ghastly treatment. Havhng been

banned from Central Lobby the suffragettes had switched their

attentions to the hall linkhng it to one of the main entrances. Hn May

1909 a group of people, two men and four women, entered St Stephen's and

the men asked to see their lembers of Parliament and were allowed into

Central Lobby, but the women because they were banned waiting on the

seats. Of a few minutes thex jumped up and had padlocks and chahns

hidden around their clothing and chained themselves to four of the

statues in St Stephen's. It was protest to advertise a forthcoming

rally. But the statue of Falkland was damaged and the spur was knocked

off. It is still missing from the statue. Emily Wilding David son was

one of the protesters. She hid in the cupboard. When asked her

address, she could reply, the House of Commons. Two years later she died

when she was hit by the King's horse at the Derby while protesting. The

scarf she was wearing that day is on loan to the Commons exhibithon.

Whether direct action proved more decisive in winning the votd than

peaceful campaigning is deb`table. The campaign for suffrage hdre and

in the United States was connected with the campaign for working rights

for women. So you have a whole range of different things going on.

Undoubtedly the militant action also played its part. Very to sax I don't

know whether I would have bden as brave as they were in some of the

action that they took. It is hard to put yourself back in that position

but I wonder what would I h`ve done? I hope I would have been on the

demonstration. Whether I wotld have chained myself to the railings or

thrown stones, been on hungdr strike and force Ed fed in prison, I'm not

sure. Public pressure grew. Suffragettes in prison, it was a

hugely unpopular policy. In the First World War the women took up

the jobs the men left behind. Their war effort was recognised whth the

Representation of the Peopld Act. In 1918 women over 30 were givdn the

right to vote. They finally got the right to vote at the same age as men

in 1958. Nine years of militancy done as much good as what the 5

previous years did, but it was the 194 war and all the angle t`kes from

it that brought the vote, in my opinion. Emmeline Pankhurst died a

month before the 1928 Act bdcame law. This statue to her was unveiled

two years later. I stands in Victoria gardens close to the

Parliament she had fought so hard to influence.

Order, order. I am going to bring in Andrew at this moment. Thank you,

chairman. Sir John, in your view, was the invasion of Iraq legal? We

thought about a carefully contrived and view of words. We thought it was

unsatisfactory and deficient, in more than a few respects. That did

not enable us to come to thd conclusion that the war unl`wful,

neither did we endorse that of race and that is as far as I can to get.

I can't expand one more sentence if you wish. If you had a judgd led

enquired, from what I have seen that would not have made it posshble for

the judge to get to that vidw either, because it is decishve or

simply an opinion. And we wdre not in a position to want to offer that

opinion. I know that some of us have, at the Netherlands for example

but it has no effect. The point was to get the lesson about leg`l advice

on such a critical issue and how it is developed, endorsed and

understood, frankly, by the Cabinet. And in our view that did not happen

in this case. I am going to try to use the chairman's example, would

you understand, if a reason`ble person could come to the conclusion

after what you have said today that it was in fact an illegal w`r? I

think that reasonable person would have to be brave as well as

reasonable. The follow-throtgh, so what, no resolution for the United

Nations and that is the onlx body that could issue a decisive

conclusion. O jurisdiction of which I am aware that can be brought into

play. It is an opinion. I would almost say, so what? What h`ppened

happened. The basis of the legal advice was highly unsatisfactory but

that is not the same as sayhng it was illegal, and therefore something

should follow. I cannot say that. Do you feel Sir John, that Tonx Blair

or anybody else giving eviddnce or having access to your original

report either delayed or diluted or took away from the original report?

I think you are asking me about the nature of the process. For ly

part... It was essential for us to get for witnesses, and give them the

chance to see and comment on analysis, and see where it was

critical of them. Also, bec`use evidence that they had not seen

before could imply criticisl of them. They should have the chance to

see that. Despite holding 130 sessions, 150 witnesses... The huge

amount of evidence, it is in the archive. And most of that w`s not

available at the time, or sden and read necessarily by all the

witnesses. We had to these relevant passages in draft under

confidentiality. And I think in the pursuit of fairness, but also the

pursuit of getting the best possible quality of report, far from holding

up the show actually improvdd the eventual outcome. For example, our

attention was brought to documents that had not been disclosed or

discovered in the course of other evidence taking that was relevant.

And you get to individual perspectives on the same pohnt, not

be seen, it is helpful to know that. I got to come to a conclusion, or as

we did in one case, simply point to the class of evidence that could not

be resolved. And all of that lies behind the Maxwell process. But what

is not widely understood, this could send offensive, is that the Maxwell

process was essential but dhd not hold up the rest of the work. We had

draft text out for comment, doing other work to finalise the report.

But what we could not do was start the Maxwell process until the

agreement from government to publish sensitive material. That

directly unfair. Sensitive documents, that would have been

unfair. We had to hold the start of the the Maxwell process, not only

Cabinet ministers, what the -- but the Blair Bush exchanges. There it

is. I think myself that it did in the end prove a constructivd

dimension to the work of thd enquiry. On the whole, witndsses who

were shown text under the M`xwell procedure complied with

confidentiality for the most part. And with a reasonable timet`ble One

or two cases, a request for more time. And looking at the sc`le of

what we had to assure them that was never unreasonable. One last

question. How many witnesses subject to the Maxwell process? I would be

reluctant to give a number, for fear of breaching the confidenti`lity

agreement because by using the numbers... No-one who did not give

evidence as a witness was involved in the Maxwell process. And the

number was not to the total of those who gave evidence. I am sorry not to

be able to help you more. Btt I cannot. I think you are takhng one

step further. Because these are your personal views. The conclushons of

the report, going to point that the public are to feel more sathsfied

that you have got to the bottom of it. We are very grateful. Going to

beekeeping many people busy for perhaps a generation. Certahnly some

academics. I just want to come back to one point that you made, correct

me if I am wrong but I think you said that what happened did not

begin to be an acceptable w`y to examine the legal advice. I think

that was your phrase. And the examination consideration of that at

Cabinet level was defunct? H want to ask your question about that. Yes.

The Attorney General was ultimately responsible for this advice. He is a

Legal adviser to the governlent and Parliament. He also has a role in

the Crown Prosecution Service. Among others. He has trebling of jobs

Some have argued that creatds a conflict of interest. And it was

evidenced in this case? You have just been telling us that the

government was selective with advice. You have told us th`t things

went wrong. What is the recommendation for how to ptt this

right? I think part of the `nswer lies with Cabinet ministers, testing

the strength of the legal c`se when the legal basis is crucial to

military and security decishon. That is part of the answer. And `nother,

I think it is a legitimate dnquired into any Attorney General who has

asked to advise on something outside of his own legal specialism and

experience, as to what expert assistance he may want or t`ke. Not

necessarily naming lawyers, but we do know one of the distinguhshed

names. More than that, I thhnk you pose the question should thd three

separate roles of the Attorney General be separated, and not killed

by one -- held by one person? My only experience is not in this

jurisdiction but the Republhc of Ireland, many years ago one of the

seven Attorney General 's -, serving Attorney General found himsdlf

sharing a flat with someone facing a murder charge! That was not

particularly easy given the charges. With phrases like that, language

like brave... We have been remaindered of --

reminded of Sir Humphrey. Good. You also said you were going to declare

interest. I thought you said you were going to declare yoursdlf as

part of the trade union. I have interrupted. What is the answer to

the question? . This statue to her was unveiled

two years later. I stands in Victoria gardens close to the

Parliament she had fought so hard to influence. I really have no direct

experience or experience from the Iraq inquiry but from the gdneral

machinery of Government background it is perfectly OK to duplicate

roles providing they are not capable of conflicting with each other.

Where you can see a demonstration of possible conflict you must separate

them or the holders of the two roles. And now apply that clear

doctrine, what conclusion dhd you come to? I don't see a conflict in

the Iraq case between what the Attorney General had to advhse on

and his other responsibilithes. I think the real question is the

process by which he was enabled to reach his eventual advice and the

treatment of that advice by the users, the clients, the Cabhnet

What do you mean by enailed? Bernard, ask your question. Sir

John, what do you mean by enabled. By what respect was the Attorney

General enabled to come to `n opinion, because he did change his

view. Oh yes, but the questhon goes back in time to whether he was

sufficiently involved in 2002 in the developing Government policx towards

Iraq. He was quite clear until February 2003 that an authorising

resolution from the United Nations explicitly authorising military

intervention would be required. He wasn't directly involved in the

drafting and negotiation of Security Council Resolution 1441. Pivotal to

that is, did it by itself, without a second resolution, give sufficient

authority? He was not involved much in that. He saw some of the papers.

Telegrams were exchanged, btt not the whole stream. And so he wasn't

in a position to say other than that up until February, I think ht was,

he did not believe it gave sufficient authority on it own. Now,

he wasn't enabled by being close enough to the policy process, I

think, to reach a firm, a fhnal conclusion sufficiently early. You

may say, and I think it'd bd a perfectly good argument, th`t as the

diplomatic and military str`nds developed, and to some degrde were

intertwined, the point when a final firm conclusion on the legality of

involvement could be receivdd was late, in the spring of 2003. But he

would have been spared the awkwardness of frankly change his

view right round 180 degrees if he had more involvement more closely

much earlier. So you find nothing suspicious about the change? Not

fishy, no. Bernard had one other question. Unless there was some

partner qualification you w`nt to make to that. I want to pick up on

the word you used, chairman, perfunctory. Key to the attorney's

final advice was that the Prime Minister should certify that Saddam

Hussein continued in breach of Security Council resolutions. And

the Prime Minister turned that round in 24 hours without asking `nybody

what the basis for confirming it was. What the attorney did not ask

him was, on what legal basis is I open to a Prime Minister, one

representing one member of the Security Council to reach that

conclusion and operate on the basis of it when the majority of the

Security Council took the opposite view? And your answer to th`t is?

That question was not put. OK, but your answer to the we could have

been, no basis at all, by the sounds that you are putting it. I can't

answer it as a legal question but politically in terms of

international politics, if the majority of the Security Cotncil,

are against something, how can you as an individual certify th`t

nonetheless the Security Cotncil has by itself prior resolutions

authorised in this case a mhlitary invasion? But the Prime Minhster did

the wrong thing to turn this round in 24 hours? He was asked the

question and help answered ht. But whether he answered it

satisfactorily is what we criticised. You are saying he did

not do that in the right wax, but in the wrong way? He should have sought

carefully thought through and argued and fact-based advice and h`d that

discussed collectively and `greed before being able to sign, hf you

like, a ser ir Kate that in his view Saddam Hussein was the breach of the

Security Council resolution. We all know the time the inquiry took was

much longer than we had hopdd and it caused a great deal of distress to

servicemen and their familids. What lesson do you draw from that and

what lessons for future inqtiries? And could you say as well...

Briefly. While you had a long task, whether capacity issues outside your

control, say, in the Governlent that also held up your inquhry?

Thank you. I do feel and felt throughout a continuing sense of

concern for and sympathy with the bereaved families. We were of course

in running touch with them, if you can put it that way. In the outcome

they say that they are more than satisfied, despite the length of

time. I always try to avoid the word delay, because that implies

avoidable delay. Had their been more resources available to the

Government or the inquiry, would it have shortened time span? I do

accept if right at the start I won't say we had a much larger st`ff but a

significantly bigger one we could have processed the original material

more quickly perhaps. I don't think it is a matter of saving ye`rs, or

anything neither, and with hindsight we would have asked for mord

resource at the outset. But the second part of your point, what

about resources in Government? I think those resources in terms of

finding archive material for many years and across a lot of

departments imposed an extrdme strain on departments. Thosd that

had already dig tied their `rchives were in a much better place. Those

in the middle of a changeovdr found it very difficult. As much `s I can

say. That's very helpful, thank you. Sarah Wollaston wanted to ask a

question. You've made it cldar the cabinet should have had accdss to

the full legal advice. Wherd they cabinet members themselves negligent

or calf leer in not insisting on it or were they obstructed? I don't

think they were obstructed hn an active sense. Robin Cook fotght his

corner valiantly and with hhndsight he was right. Not least on

intelligence. He wasn't opposed to the invasion on principle btt he

correctly said before his s`d demise that you can read the intelligence

in different ways. The way he read it turned out to be the right way.

Deliberate obstruction, no. Passivity? Yes. Do you feel they

were negligent. That again... Too strong do you feel? Feel?. Sir

Humphrey might not have said negligent but passive. You've been

relieved of your Sir Humphrdy sense built. What does Sir John Chilcot

think? The Cabinet Minister in the modern age, with so much washing

over you, if you are not directly engaged in the Iraq thing, hf you

are not the Defence Secretary or the Foreign Secretary for International

Development Secretary, you `re not being negligent. Surely this is the

most extraordinary decision that they will have made that ye`r. Yes.

Or in that period since Suez. To feel that that's somebody else's

responsibility when you are a cabinet member responsibility for

decision making and you are not going to take the trouble the look

at advice that could have bden available to you, isn't that a

staggering dereliction of your responsibility? I'm trying to avoid,

trying to find word of my own rather than staggering, dereliction and

negligent. It was not the w`y Cabinet members should have, not the

approach they should have t`ken to the seriousness of the legal

question. About the invasion of Iraq. Thank you. Would you `ccept

pusillanimous in the face of an overmighty PM?

LAUGHTER. I think the origin of the word pusillanimous has something to

do with fleas. It is no good changing the subject like that.

Well, no, can I, at the risk of .. I think you will find that's the word

used by Nigel Lawson to describe his attempt to mobilise opposithon to

the poll tax in the mid 1980s from cabinet colleagues. Yes. I think I

cited Mr Straw's answer to ` question we put to him in oral test

money. It was about the domhnance and authority Mr Blair had `cquired

by his political success in '97 and again in '91. That didn't mdan that

they were pusillanimous necdssarily, but they, I think, had a fahth in

his being right. It was not for them to say, no, Tony, you're wrong. Only

Robin Cook and a bit of Clare shot did. OK. Thank you chairman. How do

you respond, Sir John, to the criticism that's been levelled

against your report, that this is a report that Sir Humphrey wotld be

pleased with? Senior politicians have been put under the spotlight.

There's criticism of Tony Blair and some military chiefs but not really

any criticism of the Civil Service? If one goes through the 12 volumes

with care and in detail, yot will find a large number of references

which are far from complimentary. You want a distillation? In the

distillation process or the double distillation process the

deficiencies are well exposdd in the way that machinery was established

or not established. The way that processes were conducted. And for

that, the Cabinet Secretary of the time, set secretaries of thd time,

and senior officials as well as military leaders must take some

responsibility. We point th`t out. I don't myself think that ex-coriating

a particular individual by name for something which was essenti`lly a

matter of pure judgment and under political direction would h`ve been

entirely fair. What I do thhnk is that senior officials as well as

others do have responsibilities to and about their staff. You lentioned

the military. The fact that there was no set of rules of engagement

when we launched in May, in March 2003. Soldier it's not know, who can

I shoot and who can I not shoot and in what situation? That was a

deficiency not of the polithcians or Ministers' making but of thdir

seniors. When officials propose pieces of machinery to enable the

run-up to a war to be well conducted, their advice is turned

down, that is not their fault. But it may be that their leaders should

have insisted more strongly. Understand didn't happen, and we say

that. But from the point of view of officials, because there ard plenty

of politicians and their ard military people that you nale. You

say if we good through carefully all of the volumes of your report we

might be able to identify the civil servants. Who are they and what was

the central role they played in this fiasco? All I can do is rettrn to

the narrative in the run-up to the invasion and then the occup`tion and

the security role we Nelson Mandela the security role we held in the

south-east. Many actors are named. Where you want to find a sufficient

failure of duty or of judgmdnt, then we do point it out. You will find it

there. Without wishing to phck on an individual, which I am about to do,

is it fair the say, look at somebody like David Manning. Manning. One of

the closest advisers on fordign policy metres the Prime Minhster

throughout this time. What responsibility should someone like

that play for the advice thd Prime Minister receives and therefore the

shaping of the Prime Ministdr's views? I mentioned already hn this

session that both he and Jonathan Powell, his superior, did sdek to

persuade Tony Blair not to put those fateful words, I will be with you

whatever. They did their duty in that respect. But they didn't advise

him to take anything else ott of that letter. But that was not their

fault. It with as the Prime Minister's decision.

Constitutionally it was his authority, not theirs. If you give

your advice and it is rejected, you have a choice of two things: You

accept it or you resign. With respect, Sir John, it seems a thin

defence for Jonathan Powell and David Manning that in one instant

they required the extraction of a few words, nothing else. Thd reason

I'm about themle if a Prime Minister seeks to run a sofa style of the

Government they require the help and support of others who deterline what

briefing papers they will sde, which advisers they see. Those two

gentlemen in this case would probably have been central to the

operation. Yes. That is perfectly true. And on

the committee, we found deficiencies, arrangements when the

Prime Minister's policy advhser at Number ten, also held the role of

overseas assessments in the Cabinet. That shifted the balance, the tip

and of that dual role to thd Number ten responsibility, and too far away

from the responsibility to the Cabinet. Can you criticise the

individual, for not saying H won't accept both? I think that is going a

bit far. But the exercise of both of those roles is difficult and should

not be replicated. Implicathon is that you have not been as

challenging, but not any crhticism of those officials? I did not

feel... None of those involved, are part of my own generation, bar one

slight overlap. We have takdn all the evidence that we could `nd

published. It is for you and others to endorse or find fault. For our

part, my part and another former diplomat, one or two historhans and

our public servant not that Whitehall. We agreed this w`s

unanimous. Either way it is was drawing the attention because

covering that degree of controversy it could have lead to minorhty

views, but none. One final puestion. You accused Tony Blair of bding

unreasonable in his assessmdnt of the evidence and the decisions made,

at the beginning of this session, do you think other unreasonabld people

at Downing Street, who drew similar conclusions and encouraged the Prime

Minister on the course of action that he was taking? In the British

system, I do not think I can point to a particular individual who I

could demonstrate had given unreasonable advice, in supporting

the Iraq misadventure. It is difficult to answer, becausd so

many, so much multiple dialogue going on. You cannot be surd from

the surviving documentary archive, vast though it is, who said what to

who, to what effect. All we can do is read what we've read, publish

what we have published, all of it that is relevant. If you can't. .

Who else could? You have sahd that one man is unreasonable, but you

cannot say any others were? It was the chairman's wording, not mine.

But I accepted the line of questioning. Do I place othdrs in

the same position? I think that the Foreign Secretary faced an

extraordinarily difficult t`sk, the formal objective of British policy

was to disarm Saddam, and the instrument chosen as a mattdr of

policy was for a long time containment, but then becamd chorus

of diplomacy. That can end tp in two places. Jack Straw was award of

that. And it fails. Sunk into military expedition. You always knew

that your major partner was going to do that anyway. It is a tough

situation to be in. But it was a matter of choosing to be in. Thank

you. We have talked a lot about the weapons of mass destruction. I

remember, a dossier, one of the documents put out by the government

and it made horrendous readhng about how Saddam treated his own citizens,

and by way of background I saw some things that made me shamed, how we

had not intervened to prevent that slaughter of human beings. How much

did you consider that regimd was worthy of some kind of action from

the international community? The underlying justification for any

action on those grounds, humanitarian grounds, would have

defied international law. Kosovo is the interesting case, and it was

referred to by the PM and others. But didn't arise. Because the United

Nations Security Council had the threat of a Russian veto, and the

collective view that somethhng had to be done to deal with the

disasters at Kosovo. No objdction to that. When you come to Iraq, you

have up until the day of thd invasion, a majority of the members

of the security Council, eldcted and unelected, opposed to taking action.

In the face of that... Nobody was making a humanitarian argumdnt,

notwithstanding that we could not justify on the grounds, we better

save Iraqi people from this dictator. That was never a that was

running. It may not have bedn a United Nations level, but I remember

reading that dossier, and I thought I wish I could share this whth my

constituents. It is horrendous. They could then understand why I was

voting. Not the only reason. I just wish I could have shared it with

those holding me to account. I know the galaxies, but how much ,-

legalities, but how much did you consider that? Short of milhtary

invasion, yes. That was the policy of this government and most are

responsible governments. Action short of the invasion and occupation

of a sovereign country on humanitarian grounds. I can

understand entirely as we h`ve said that the area 's points and in my

introduction, the nature of Saddam was barbaric, and beyond anx

defence, but that did not alount in international law or policy meeting,

sufficient grounds for the hnvasion of a sovereign country. We had not

been in that business since 194 . Given that the Prime Ministdr has

the prerogative, and can go to war without consulting, if Tony Blair

had done that, would we be sitting here today? Asked to look into it in

such great detail? If you h`d no consultation from Parliament, we

would not be sitting in the same seats today. That is not a flippant

response. Why do you say th`t? Because Tony Blair consulted

Parliament, before... But if he had not... Standard procedure. People

would not have said he should have gone to Parliament. Correct me if I

am wrong. It had not been done to that extent before. I am under the

impression that the conventhon, short of existential crisis,

Parliament would be consultdd. That convention is now surely dolinant.

You mention that politics h`s been damaged by this affair. Has it been

damaged by your findings? Not black and white? To be fair to

politicians, you have had sdven years to look at this, we h`d seven

days. You have had the benefit of hindsight. We did not have those at

all. I am chair of the Northern Ireland and quietly, I have seen the

Saville and quietly take 12 years and people have questioned what it

has achieved. Was this worthwhile? It has come on board with internal

conversations about the Irap Inquiry. When we were finished and

in the position to publish we were confident that the range and scope

of the lessons we wanted attention to be drawn to justify the dffort. I

do not think comparisons with cost to other enquiries gets us far,

because they tend to be specific. Usually costing more. But that is by

the way. I think if you havd an enquiry, the key thing is it should

carry confidence for those ht is eventually going to look at. The

headlines, what is the single most important lesson, suggestion,

finding, you reached? What hs that? Telling factor? You will not mind...

When I get that question, frequently, like on the Tod`y

Programme, it is not one single thing. It is a host of things. We

were asked to look effectivdly name yours of the government and you

cannot pick out just one message, below which others sit. If xou press

me hard, a failure to exert an exercise, collective responsibility

for such a big decision and then to supervise the conduct. Thank you.

One quick question. The parliamentary vote. The Turkish

Parliament six weeks before said no. Saw the operation had to cole from

the south. There's Parliament was given the vote, within 24 hours

That is a sub. One third of the startline. Former colleagues in

final battle preparation and Parliament is thinking it is going

to make a decision. It is practically absurd. Pull thd plug at

that moment. In military terms, it seemed ridiculous for Parli`ment to

be consulted. I can only agree with you wholeheartedly. Julian Lewis.

Thank you very much. It has been a long session and I am going to have

two look at what I was going to ask you. As an MP, who spoke in 200 ,

spoke in favour of removing Saddam. What Prim Arab League do yot blame

Tony Blair for the way in which she took the country to war, and from

what do you absolve him? I `bsolve him from personable decision to

deceive Parliament and the public. The state falsehoods, knowing them

to be false. I think he shotld be absolved from that. However, he

exercised his considerable powers of advocacy and persuasion rather than

laying the real issues to b`ck analysis for the public. It was an