The Spy Chiefs on Camera BBC News Special


The Spy Chiefs on Camera

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Thank you. Good afternoon. You are watching BBC News. In just a few

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minutes, we will be following an unprecedented event. The heads of

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all three of Britain's intelligence agencies will be making that

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appearance before a committee of MPs and it is of course all televised

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which means we will be following it here.

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There is a two minute delay, just in case any matters of national

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security are mentioned, so we are two minutes behind in terms of what

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we are going to be showing you but the GCHQ director, Sir Iain Lobban,

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the MI5 director Sir Andrew Parker and the MI6 director will be quizzed

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by a committee of MPs. There has been some criticism in the past that

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the security agencies have not been held to account but Sir Malcolm

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Rifkind says that new rules mean that, for example, members of the

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ISC can send investigators into the intelligence agencies to carry out

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spot checks. Certainly a moment of theatre. On

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the other side of the Atlantic there is sometimes a snooze con ``

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problem, but there are serious questions here. We have to get to

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the bottom of where is the right balance in the spectrum between

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those who inhabit the world of secrecy and intelligence, that

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nothing should be revealed, and they should have maximum powers to

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investigate everything, and snoop and eavesdrop. On the other side,

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there are those who would say no, you can have maximum openness.

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Somewhere within that spectrum is the right part of the pendulum, and

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I hope we will get some kind of answer on that. I think the meeting

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was planned before the revelations by Edward Snowden came out in the

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Guardian and the New York Times, so it's been in the diary, but it has a

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new and more potent boost. When you look at the other two of the three

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people giving evidence today, is it perhaps Iain Lobban who we don't

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know much about, from GCHQ, who will be under more pressure in terms of

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what intelligence was shared with the prison programme? Definitely. He

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and his agency are the most secretive. They hardly give anything

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out the press. Yet they have 58,000 secret files missing that Snowden

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has taken with him. A vast amount of their operation, their tactics,

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names, all sorts of things are out there. Do you remember Mission

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impossible, the list in the opening, the secret list of

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operatives. It's a bit like that. But times 1000. People are very

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concerned about this. Supporters of Edward Snowden would say, look, he

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has started a valid debate because we have a right to know what is

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being eavesdropped on, why they are listening in on potentially your

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e`mails and conversations, because the extent of it, what was not known

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even to MPs, I would expect that we would see tough questions from the

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committee, because they have been a bit toothless in the past. They are

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still perceived as being a bit too close to the establishment. The

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chairman of the committee used to have authority over MI6 and GCHQ,

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Malcolm Rifkind when he was Foreign Secretary. They answered to him.

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Albeit in a different role now, he was a creature of the establishment.

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We will see whether it measures up to that robustness that people are

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searching for. It will be beginning very shortly, so Frank, talk is

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through the three men we see behind this. People may know less or more

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about all of them. Over in the left corner, overworked because his

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jacket is off, is Sir Iain Lobban, director of GCHQ in Cheltenham. It

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is basically a big round doughnut of a building. They are conducting the

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Britain `` British defence against cyber espionage, but also proactive

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cyber operations as well. In the middle is Andrew Parker, the only

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one without a knighthood, and he has become the general director of MI5,

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the Security service, at Thames house in London. He has been in the

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service for over 30 years and was formerly deputy director. On the

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right is Sir John Sawers, the chief of MI6, the secret intelligence

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service, also with headquarters in London. They do the overseas spying.

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He is a former diplomat. He has book ended it. He started in MI6, then

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moved quickly. We will interrupt, Buddhist has just started. ``

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because it has just started. This session, which has a committee

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we first considered a year ago, is a significant step forward in the

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transparency of our intelligence agencies. Having an open

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parliamentary evidence session will be, I believe, a real dash of real

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value. We will not be asking witnesses to reveal secret

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information published `` of real value. Nor will we be able to

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discuss the current investigation into the tragic death of Lee Rigby

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in Woolwich, in May, because we cannot prejudice the trials of the

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accused taking place in the near future. The intelligence and

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Security committee with its new powers investigates the operations

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and scrutinises the capabilities of the intelligence agencies. Those

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sessions are held behind closed doors and must remain secret. This

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evidence session is being broadcast with a short time delay. This is a

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safety mechanism to allow us to pause the broadcast if anything is

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inadvertently mentioned which might endanger national security, or the

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safety of those involved in safeguarding it. I don't expect we

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shall need to use it, but as with the Iraq enquiry, this is a

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precaution. If I do need to suspend the session, we will resume as

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quickly as we can. Today's open session, being the first`ever

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Wimbledon examination of a number of issues in `` being the first ever

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will involve examination of a number of issues. It will include

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controversies, the threats the agency 's work to counter, the

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threats faced in the performance of duties. The legal and policy

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framework in which they operate. Whether they need special legal

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powers, and whether it is right and necessary for them to receive each

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year ?2 billion of public funding to carry out their work. After a short

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introductory comment, let's move straight to the questions and

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answers part of proceedings. My first question is do you, Sir John.

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During the Cold War, the threat to the United Kingdom was pretty

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clear. There was the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union on one side, NATO

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on the other. Who poses the biggest threat to national security now?

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Thank you, chairman, for the opportunity to give evidence. We are

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conscious of the unprecedented nature of the occasion. We will do

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our best to answer the committee's questions as best we can. You ask

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about the threats to the UK. It's not like it was in the Cold War.

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There are not states out there trying to destroy our government and

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way of life. But there are a very wide range of diverse threats that

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we face. The biggest is terrorism, the threat from Al`Qaeda and its

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many branches. There are also states out there that are trying to do us

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harm through cyber attacks, acquiring nuclear weapons, or

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involved in generating instability in parts of the world that are

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important to us. Of course, we work in support of the armed forces,

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especially GCHQ and ourselves, and the Armed Forces have been acting in

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the last decade, and we have been very supportive of them in helping

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shape their operations and protecting soldiers lives. It is a

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very volatile and changing world we live in, and we have do have the

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skills and people and capabilities to be able to support and defend

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this country's security interests where the threats arrive. Thank you

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very much. This leads me to want to ask something supplementary. Andrew

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Parker, maybe you can answer it. At the end of the Cold War people

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thought we could reduce the size and cost of the intelligence agencies,

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and it's gone the other way, they are larger and more expensive than

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ever. As the head of one of the secret agency, but also as a

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citizen, do you sometimes get nervous that the agencies are too

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strong and powerful? You are asking both about scale and power, and I

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will take them in that order. In scale, ?2 billion is a substantial

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amount of taxpayers money and we take our responsibilities in

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spending it seriously, which is closely overseen by the committee

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and audited by the National Audit Office. The scale is set by

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ministers against the backdrop of the whole of public spending. That

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?2 billion is the equivalent of roughly 6% of the nation's defence

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budget. At that scale, we would content and believe, and ministers

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have been persuaded, that that is a proportion as investment against the

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threats we face. As far as the power question, the question that somehow

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what we do is somehow compromising freedom and democracy, of course we

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believe the opposite to be the case. It is that this committee to oversee

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the work. That is against threats to this country, the way of life, the

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country and the people who live here. The work we do is

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proportionally judged against the necessity of protecting against

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those threats. The threats from terrorism and cyber terrorism

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increasingly involved countries and players from across the globe. What

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has that meant for the ways in which all agencies now work? The threats

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we face are more complex, as you describe. We need to work more

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closely together, and there is an unprecedented level of collaboration

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between the three agencies. For example, for MI6, there is scarcely

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an operation we do that is not supported by either GCHQ or MI5, or

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both. And by partners overseas as well. In a resource scarce world,

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and one where taken all `` technology has a greater part in our

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work, we collaborate closely on developing the technological systems

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we need in order to deliver on our responsibilities. Over the last 25

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years there have been three significant events which have had

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implications for national security, namely the end of the Cold War, 911

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and the Arab uprisings, none of which were foreseen by the

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intelligence community. Would you accept now that you could and should

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have done more to have predicted these? We are not crystal ball

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gazers, we are intelligence agencies. We need to understand

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other `` foreign countries. We could all see the fault lines in Arab

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society, to take the Arab Spring as an example, but no one predicted

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when the earthquake would strike. There was not a secret in

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somebody's safe in Cairo saying the Arab Spring was going to start in

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January 2011. It was not something that was out there that we missed.

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It was an analytical issue, which, frankly, governments, think tanks,

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foreign services and intelligence agencies, we were all looking at it

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and we could all see that there were tensions in the societies, but you

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cannot say that this particular trigger would happen at this

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particular time. It was the same with the collapse of the Cold War

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and the same with 9/11. We identified Al`Qaeda is a serious

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threat and we have learned a huge amount since then. `` as a serious

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threat. But we need to understand what intelligence agencies do. We

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acquire the secrets that other countries don't want us to know or

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other organisations don't want us to know. We are not all knowing

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specialist in what will happen next month or next year. There is surely

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nothing new about this at all. If you look back at the history of the

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20th`century conflicts, a majority of those rows entirely unexpectedly,

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sometimes unexpectedly even by the people later as aggressors. That is

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why we put a premium on agility and flexibility. We did not expect at

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the beginning of 2011 we'd be engaged in military conflict in

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Libya. All three services had to direct effort towards supporting

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government policy, supporting the Armed Forces at very short notice.

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That is why agility, flexibility and capability are the watchwords of

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what we do. Let's move on to the issue of technology.

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Changes in the type of technology available have obviously had a major

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impact on the work that you do. Can you explain, perhaps, how it has

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changed your role? Has it made your job harder or easier? And who does

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it help most? The agencies or the terrorist? The global information

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communication technology is a $3 trillion industry per year. It is

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relentless and we have to focus our efforts. To take your question in

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two parts, the first set of challenges we have is simply around

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the Internet. It's a fantastic place for business, life and study. It is

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global, diverse and complex. But there are threats to our security

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and prosperity within that and I will come back to terrorism in a

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moment, if I may. The point about discovering subjects of interest,

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the intelligence targets within the soup of the Internet is difficult,

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and there is an issue around people. We need good, innovative,

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highly skilled people to keep up with that technological challenge.

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In terms of what it means the business, it means we have to

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anticipate, Discover, analyse, investigate and respond, and we have

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to do so globally, because the threat comes out as globally and we

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need a global, agile, flexible array of security capabilities. Therefore

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we need global partnerships. On your questions about terrorists, I think

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it has helped the terrorist. I think our job has got harder and is

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getting harder. If you think about what the Internet does for

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terrorists, it gives them a myriad ways to communicate covertly. It

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gives them the opportunity to radicalise and spread propaganda. It

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gives them the opportunity to planned, command and control. It

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gives them the opportunity to spread and exhort violence. We have had

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successes in turning that against them, and those are the best kept

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secret. It's not just about terrorism, it's also about serious

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crime. I could mention the work we do with a child exploitation agency

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in terms of working with them to uncover the identities and track

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down some of those who are involved in online sexual exploitation of

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children in the UK, including overseas, where there was a recent

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case that we managed to do that and used intelligence capabilities to

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identify those and bring them to justice, and two people are now in

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jail. There are two things that define the future before us. What is

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the diversifying threat landscape that I spoke of recently and

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publicly. The second is the technology issue. It is an

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accelerating technology race which is defined by the changes and

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advances in the Internet. This is not about the world of security and

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intelligence alone. All of our lives are moving onto the Internet, and

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it's important we are able to operate there, because the

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terrorists do so as well. We need to have capability that lets us track

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them and monitor their communications in the modern world.

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If a junior clerk with a memory stick can copy and publish on the

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internet, tens of thousands of highly classified documents, what

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measures can be put in place to prevent such huge breaches of

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security in the future? If I have a go at that one. The answer on

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security is the range of security measures we take. It is tempting to

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think that security relating to IT must have an IT solution, of course

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that is part of it. We have tightly controlled IT access and

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arrangements for who can download what, but those within the whole

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range of security arrangements that we have, the security of our

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facilities and the personnel security that we apply to the

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vetting that our people have to the highest level, the way that they are

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managed and the way that all of this majors together, make it very

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difficult and extremely unlikely to have the breaches.

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So, whaps what happened in America, you think could not happen here it

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has happened there twice? For the UK, I cannot comment on the US. We

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have stringent security arrangements, of course nothing is

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ever possible, but there has only been one instance of one individual

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attempting on a small scale this infiltration and he was sent to

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jail. What about the hundreds of thousands

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of people who appear to have access to your information in the United

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Kingdom? All three of us are involved in those discussions.

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We have returned to the use of technology, we shall return to that

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later. We now move to a sensitive subject, working with foreign

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subjects. Now the flair of your work is more

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international. You have to work with equivalence overseas. This carries

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risk, especially if the other countries don'ted a mere to the high

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standards of human rights that we do in this country. Why don't you link

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your relationships to the organisations that have the same

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standards as we have in this country? We have good partnerships

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with the European and the Americaned other Western partners. We work

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closely with them against all of the issues we have described.

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I'm not concerned about those countries it is the countries that

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don't. The problem is that the threat does

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not come from those countries. It comes from the countries which are

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either secretive states or where there is ungoverned territory, where

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terrorists can operate or countries which are pursuing nuclear weapons

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programmes for example. If you wish to work in the areas you are talking

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about, in the Middle East, south Asia, Africa, so on, we have to work

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with the local security partners. They are often powerful and

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important players. They carry weight. My agency carries the main

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responsibility for our partnerships with those organisations. If there

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is a terrorist, say a British extremist has gone to a foreign

:20:33.:20:37.

country, it is important for our security in the UK that an eye is

:20:38.:20:45.

kept on him. That he is sure veiled and monitored. And maybe he may need

:20:46.:20:50.

to be detained at some point. We don't have the powers to do that.

:20:51.:20:54.

The locals do. So we have to work in partnership in order to be able to

:20:55.:20:59.

do things lawfully overseas. If that is the case, how are you

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sure that the action you take is not as a resulting in somebody being

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mistreated because of that relationship? That is important for

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us. We are clear that we only operate within the framework of the

:21:15.:21:17.

law. There are some countries that we

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cannot work with at all. Take Syria, there is no rule of law, no partner.

:21:23.:21:27.

We could not operate with a partner in that country in the Syrian

:21:28.:21:32.

regime. There are other countries which have mixed human rights

:21:33.:21:38.

records. With countries like that, we then seek clear assurances that

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when we provide intelligence, it is used lawfully and if anybody is

:21:43.:21:48.

detained or questioned as a consequence of our intelligence,

:21:49.:21:55.

that it is done to our standards. Now the, there are sometimes some

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fine balancing to be drawn here. Where there is a fine balance, we

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submit the issue and compile the risks and seek the guidance of

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ministers on that. There have been allegations in

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relation to specific incidents that your organisation has been complice

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it in torture taken against people. How can you be sure because of the

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close relationships, you have talked about the guidance, that the fact

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that you have this close relationship, does it not mean that

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you may well be explicit or responsible in some way for some of

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the dreadful events that have occurred? I don't accept the

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allegations made against us. With the benefit of hindsight we were not

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configured in 2001 for the scale of the terrorist threat that this

:22:46.:22:49.

country faced after 9/11. Our people were not trained for it, we did not

:22:50.:22:54.

have the experience nor the resources for it. It took time to

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adapt. It took time to adapt to the scale of the threat we faced, but we

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learned quickly. We have had glidance in place for seven or eight

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years now. In 2010 it was pulled across the three agencies, across

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the military. We have consolidated guidance, published by the

:23:16.:23:19.

Government. That is giving clear direction to us as the heads of

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agencies and to our staff in the field about what they can and cannot

:23:24.:23:28.

do. If there is doubt we put it to ministers. There is a former High

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Court judge, who is directed to oversea the implementation of the

:23:35.:23:38.

guidance to ensure that what we are doing is in accordance with the law

:23:39.:23:45.

and that guidance. The situations in which officers may

:23:46.:23:50.

find themselves operating may be dynamic indeed, what kind of audit

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do you perform in relation to circumstances where an officer may

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come back and say that this was difficult but he made his decision

:24:02.:24:05.

in a particular direction, for example not to have any part in what

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was going on. Don't you need assessment of the effectiveness of

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this? We do. I think, that it is more die thamic than you suggest.

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The idea of sending an agent off into the field like James Bond and

:24:22.:24:27.

he comes back to report... Or referring to ministers.

:24:28.:24:30.

It does not work that way. Our people in the field have constant

:24:31.:24:34.

communication with us through stations or directly to head office.

:24:35.:24:44.

They communicate rapidly we have a 24/7 system. If something is

:24:45.:24:47.

happening there is system to enable guidance from head office. If we

:24:48.:24:51.

feel it does not fall clearly on one side of the line or the other, or

:24:52.:24:57.

the facts are uncertain, then we all wake up the affect and ask him for a

:24:58.:25:01.

view, one way or the other. Do you feel, Sir John, you can

:25:02.:25:05.

guarantee, not to the Committee but to the public as well, that your

:25:06.:25:11.

agency, is beyond reproach now in these matters and will not be

:25:12.:25:16.

explicit? What I can say is that we have learned a huge amount over the

:25:17.:25:21.

last 12 years. I am satisfied with the rigorous compliance procedures

:25:22.:25:25.

that we have in place. There is no way that our members of

:25:26.:25:32.

staff could be drawn into situations at this stage where there is doubt

:25:33.:25:36.

about what they should be doing. There is a very strong ethical

:25:37.:25:43.

standard in all of our services. When you are working in a secret

:25:44.:25:48.

organisation, having a strong ethical and disciplined approach is

:25:49.:25:51.

really, really important. That is one of the basis on which we recruit

:25:52.:25:56.

people. I am confident to be able to answer your question, yes.

:25:57.:26:01.

And you are happy that the large`scale pay`offs that have been

:26:02.:26:06.

upsetting constituents that have been paid out to foreign prisoners

:26:07.:26:12.

held under questionable circumstances, that those days are

:26:13.:26:17.

past us? I wanted also to ask on a practical level, really, if you are

:26:18.:26:22.

dealing on a day`to`day issue, what goes through your mind if you have

:26:23.:26:26.

been made aware of someone overseas who had vital information and being

:26:27.:26:33.

held by an overseas government, perhaps by a state we don't have

:26:34.:26:37.

day`to`day relationships with, how do you feel and how would you

:26:38.:26:44.

operate with that person, that there could be a eminent terrorist attack

:26:45.:26:49.

on UK soil? We would do what we could to disrupt any such threat. As

:26:50.:26:56.

I say, if he is held in a country, if this person is held in a country

:26:57.:26:59.

where we have a partnership relationship, then we will seek with

:27:00.:27:04.

that partner to ensure that the right questions are put to the rson

:27:05.:27:07.

but in a lawful way. If there is a serious risk that our questions

:27:08.:27:14.

would prompt the maltreatment or the torture of a detainee, we would

:27:15.:27:18.

consultant the ministers about that. If we knew that was going to happen,

:27:19.:27:25.

we would not even think of it in the first place, but we have been able

:27:26.:27:29.

to find other ways to disrupt the threats.

:27:30.:27:34.

I think that the record that we have, especially with MI5's lead of

:27:35.:27:40.

disrupting threats in the UK with a footprint seas has been commendable.

:27:41.:27:45.

Andrew will talk about that with more authority, but about the

:27:46.:27:49.

pay`offs you mentioned Mr Field, it was not just your constituents but

:27:50.:27:53.

our members of staff who were sickened about it. On many occasions

:27:54.:27:58.

we had a strong defence to the allegations made against us but the

:27:59.:28:02.

court system did not allow us to make the defences. We are glad to

:28:03.:28:10.

see the Justice and the Security Act passed that will enable us to defend

:28:11.:28:14.

ourselves against the allegations. I am not saying that all allegations

:28:15.:28:19.

are manufactured or whatever, and there may be some cases that a court

:28:20.:28:23.

should hear, where there is a case to be heard but now the courts can

:28:24.:28:29.

hear. That is because of the Justice and the Security Act.

:28:30.:28:34.

I appreciate this is a hypothetical question, where you are pushing to

:28:35.:28:38.

the extremes of the policy but if your question is would we pursue a

:28:39.:28:43.

situation that led and we knew it would lead to mistreatment or

:28:44.:28:48.

torture of an individual to get intelligence, the answer is

:28:49.:28:51.

absolutely not. There is a clear Government policy that applies

:28:52.:28:55.

across the agencies and underpins the guidance, that is that we do not

:28:56.:29:02.

participate in encouraging or condoning mistreatment or torture.

:29:03.:29:04.

That is absolute. Thank you very much. The Committee

:29:05.:29:08.

will be wanting to keep a close interest in this area. Now let's

:29:09.:29:13.

move to the changing nature of the threat from Al`Qaeda and its allies.

:29:14.:29:19.

After 9/11, the attention of the intelligence community was focussed

:29:20.:29:23.

in Island in south Asia and Afghanistan but more recently that

:29:24.:29:27.

attention seems to have shifted to the Middle East, to the Horn of

:29:28.:29:31.

Africa. Over the last five years, what proportion of the plots that

:29:32.:29:36.

have been uncovered have been linked to Al`Qaeda as opposed to

:29:37.:29:40.

Al`Qaeda`affiliated groups in the other areas, including the Maghreb

:29:41.:29:46.

areas as well? If you permit me, I take a step back to answer the

:29:47.:29:49.

question. I would have to position it against the whole terrorist

:29:50.:29:54.

threat landscape. Since 9/11, of course that appalling attack on the

:29:55.:29:58.

United States in which almost 3,000 people were killed by Al`Qaeda,

:29:59.:30:03.

began what seems to be the modern chapter of terrorism, though we have

:30:04.:30:08.

had terrorism as an issue for much longer than that. Afghanistan, you

:30:09.:30:14.

mentioned, of course throughout the time since 9/11 that we have had

:30:15.:30:19.

coalition troops and British Forces included in Afghanistan, there has

:30:20.:30:23.

been no terrorism projected against this country from there, due to the

:30:24.:30:28.

work of our armed forces. As we are approaching arm city day and wearing

:30:29.:30:34.

poppies, I would like to pay tribute to the 456 British serviceman who

:30:35.:30:40.

have given their lives to that end. There has been no terrorism in this

:30:41.:30:44.

country in that time. Now to the time, the period of after 9/11, in

:30:45.:30:48.

terms of threat to this country, it has been dominated by threats from

:30:49.:30:57.

south Asia, an almost monolithic phenomena, from people living here,

:30:58.:31:02.

how the two have interacted, I can explain more on that later. That led

:31:03.:31:07.

to a series of plots. Including the dreadful attack on the 7th of July

:31:08.:31:13.

in 2005 in which 52 members of the public were murdered.

:31:14.:31:19.

Now that moment signalled a shift in counterterrorist work in this

:31:20.:31:23.

country. Much stronger resourcing was added by the Government and

:31:24.:31:29.

counterterrorist work stepped up and it started to take the shape it is

:31:30.:31:33.

today, the joint work of our agencies and of MI5.

:31:34.:31:39.

Could you bring your answer together more quickly... Absolutely. The

:31:40.:31:44.

threat since that time has started to bread out `` spread out, but the

:31:45.:31:48.

diversecation of threat is not a shift or displacement from one area

:31:49.:31:53.

to another it is the growth of the Al`Qaeda phenomena in the areas you

:31:54.:31:58.

are referring to. In the north and the west of Africa. In East Africa,

:31:59.:32:06.

in Syria and in Yemen, and in Syria, where the ideal ideal ology started

:32:07.:32:11.

to take root there with the national and extremist groupings, we have

:32:12.:32:15.

seen threats from all areas, and also still from south Asia.

:32:16.:32:23.

As Al`Qaeda is seeking to exploit the vacuums, you mentioned Syria,

:32:24.:32:27.

and Somalia, other countries of that kind, is there not a real risk that

:32:28.:32:32.

the challenging terrain you are getting coverage on, that you are

:32:33.:32:36.

spread too thinly, that you are missing things? We are deployed

:32:37.:32:48.

overseas, and as Andrew says, we are having to deal with Al`Qaeda

:32:49.:32:54.

emerging, forming and multiplying in a new range of countries. Of course

:32:55.:32:58.

that poses extra challenges and extra threats to us. There is no

:32:59.:33:05.

doubt, especially in the last 12 months, really, that threat has

:33:06.:33:09.

emerged. More British citizens have been killed overseas in 2013 than in

:33:10.:33:18.

the previous seven years combined. In Nairobi, the hostage killed in

:33:19.:33:24.

Nigeria, and the events in Woolwich. There's no doubt that the

:33:25.:33:30.

threat is rising. Now, deployed overseas, we work primarily with

:33:31.:33:34.

partners in response to MI5 priorities about where the threat to

:33:35.:33:37.

the UK is coming from, and we do what we can to disrupt terrorist

:33:38.:33:41.

attacks overseas, and we foil a good number, but some get through. The

:33:42.:33:48.

threat overseas is getting greater. Just picking up on the question of

:33:49.:33:52.

threat, what is your assessment of the impact of what people might

:33:53.:33:59.

describe as terrorist tourism, the fact there are people who go from

:34:00.:34:04.

the UK to abroad, acquire capabilities, and then if they come

:34:05.:34:07.

back to this country suitably motivated have the opportunity of

:34:08.:34:14.

using what they learned abroad? It is a very important strand of the

:34:15.:34:17.

threat we face, the way various interaction between people who live

:34:18.:34:24.

in this country who sympathise with the Al`Qaeda authorities ``

:34:25.:34:29.

ideology, and they travel to meet the groupings, either Al`Qaeda

:34:30.:34:32.

itself in South Asia, or some of the other groupings I spoke about across

:34:33.:34:36.

other regions. Because the attractiveness to these groupings is

:34:37.:34:40.

that they meet British citizens willing to engage in terrorism, and

:34:41.:34:45.

they tasked them to do so back at home where they have higher impact

:34:46.:34:52.

than in this country, and we have seen it played out in various plots,

:34:53.:35:01.

including 7/7. So the threat from abroad is less obvious than it might

:35:02.:35:06.

have been in the past? It is a complex interaction. You anticipated

:35:07.:35:13.

my next question. What about attacks on British citizens in public places

:35:14.:35:16.

at home and abroad? What about the taking of British citizens as

:35:17.:35:22.

hostages, at home and abroad? How do you assess the credibility of the

:35:23.:35:27.

threats? To describe a threat as credible does not necessarily make

:35:28.:35:32.

it so. What factors do you use in assessing the extent and credibility

:35:33.:35:36.

of a particular threat in a particular area, geographically for

:35:37.:35:40.

example? The responsibility for assessing threat in areas of the

:35:41.:35:45.

world, and including the UK, setting the threat levels is part of my

:35:46.:35:51.

service but is a multi`agency body that looks at the full range of

:35:52.:35:56.

intelligence from all sources and is connected to international

:35:57.:35:58.

intelligence agencies around the world, and they form a picture based

:35:59.:36:02.

on all the available intelligence, balancing it, assessing it, and

:36:03.:36:06.

coming out with rigorous judgements about threat levels. But as the

:36:07.:36:15.

account holder, that ?2 billion, they will have the responsibility

:36:16.:36:21.

for deciding on which way capabilities must go, and that must

:36:22.:36:26.

rest with the heads of the agencies? So do you exercise your own

:36:27.:36:29.

independent judgement based on this, or do you accept the ruling? This is

:36:30.:36:36.

a collective effort. John and Ian might want to say something in a

:36:37.:36:39.

minute. The way in which we work against counterterrorism is an

:36:40.:36:43.

endeavour between the three of us as intelligence agencies, between

:36:44.:36:50.

myself and the police, particularly the police national network, who are

:36:51.:36:54.

excellent partners, who we work with toward arrest and prosecutions the

:36:55.:36:57.

decisions we make around this based on the threat picture. This is led

:36:58.:37:05.

by MI5, but it is a team effort in which the people in all of the

:37:06.:37:08.

agencies who lead the counterterrorist work at the

:37:09.:37:12.

operational level plan together the deployments and priorities

:37:13.:37:18.

necessary. In answer to Sir Menzies Campbell, you are talking about

:37:19.:37:22.

terrorist tourism, is it your assessment that that is growing or

:37:23.:37:27.

decreasing? It is growing at the moment because of Syria. Syria has

:37:28.:37:30.

become an attractive place for people to go for that reason, those

:37:31.:37:37.

who support or sympathise with the Al`Qaeda ideological message that I

:37:38.:37:43.

mentioned. We see low hundreds of people in this country go to Syria

:37:44.:37:47.

for a period, then come back. There are some large numbers are still ``

:37:48.:37:52.

still there, and they get involved in fighting. This is because of the

:37:53.:37:55.

proximity and ease of travel, but also because it is attractive

:37:56.:37:59.

because of what they see as the jihadist cause. Moving to the

:38:00.:38:06.

home`grown threat, we have seen acts of terrorism and attempted in this

:38:07.:38:07.

country. In the last decade, over 50 people

:38:08.:38:16.

in the UK have been killed as a result of terrorist attacks. Do you

:38:17.:38:21.

accept that as many people would argue that this represents a

:38:22.:38:25.

significant failure of intelligence, and perhaps you could say a word

:38:26.:38:28.

about the number of plots that have been uncovered during the course of

:38:29.:38:33.

the last ten years, and to what extent does luck play a part in the

:38:34.:38:37.

work that you do to try and cover them? You won't be surprised that I

:38:38.:38:44.

reject the term intelligence failure in this area. The principal attack

:38:45.:38:49.

that the UK suffered in terms of numbers of loss of life, and there

:38:50.:38:53.

have been attacks this year, goes back to 2005 the 52 deaths I spoke.

:38:54.:39:00.

Committee examined `` this committee examined what this agency and the

:39:01.:39:03.

police did and concluded the actions we took were reasonable at the time.

:39:04.:39:08.

I think I would adhere from that that that's not judged as a failure,

:39:09.:39:14.

and I don't judge that it was. Since then there have been persistent

:39:15.:39:20.

attempts of attacks in this country. You ask about the last ten years, so

:39:21.:39:26.

if I go back to 2005, rather than ten years, the number since 7/7,

:39:27.:39:31.

there have been 34 plots towards terrorism that have been disrupted

:39:32.:39:37.

in this country, of all sizes and at all stages. I have referred

:39:38.:39:41.

publicly, previously, and my predecessors have, that one of those

:39:42.:39:45.

`` one or two of those are major plots aimed at mass casualties which

:39:46.:39:50.

have been attempted each year. Of the 34, most of them, the vast

:39:51.:39:55.

majority, have been disrupted by active detection and intervention by

:39:56.:39:59.

the agencies and the police. One or two of them, a small number, have

:40:00.:40:06.

failed because they just failed. The plans did not come together. But the

:40:07.:40:13.

vast majority were by intervention. 7/7 came as a complete shock to the

:40:14.:40:18.

nation's psyche, to think that people born and raised in Britain

:40:19.:40:21.

could want to commit acts of terrorism. Clearly the best way to

:40:22.:40:25.

protect the country is to prevent these plots being formed in the

:40:26.:40:30.

first place. How important do you think the prevention programme is,

:40:31.:40:33.

and do you think there is enough emphasis on trying to make sure

:40:34.:40:38.

people are not radicalised and do not go down the path of home`grown

:40:39.:40:42.

terrorism? Is the committee is aware, the bulk of the work that MI5

:40:43.:40:48.

and the bulk of the agencies do in this area is stopping people who are

:40:49.:40:52.

supporting terrorism and working toward it, stopping plots, and that

:40:53.:40:56.

is where the bulk of the effort is. But as you rightly say, Prevent is

:40:57.:41:02.

also an important pillar as part of the strategy, and it is one that

:41:03.:41:06.

gets at the point of dealing with the problem of vulnerable

:41:07.:41:09.

individuals who are exposed to these toxic and twisted message of

:41:10.:41:14.

violence. It is certainly part of what we do with the police, to refer

:41:15.:41:18.

people into that programme, wherever we can and wherever it offers a

:41:19.:41:21.

sensible way for dealing with the problem. So, between 7/7 and the

:41:22.:41:31.

murder of Lee Rigby, there were 34 thwarted attacks? Out of the 34, how

:41:32.:41:36.

many were being plotted by home`grown terrorists? Could we say

:41:37.:41:42.

the vast majority? And how many were by foreigners, and how many by

:41:43.:41:46.

people living here that were relatively recently `` recent

:41:47.:41:55.

arrivals? The vast majority of the plots come from people who live

:41:56.:41:58.

here. There are several thousand individuals in this country who are

:41:59.:42:01.

described as supporting violent extremism or engagement in some

:42:02.:42:07.

way, that we are aware. The terrorist plots we have dealt with

:42:08.:42:11.

over the years have almost all come from amongst those people. Of the

:42:12.:42:17.

two categories that live here, how many is it? Is it the vast majority

:42:18.:42:23.

that are home`grown, people who have grown up here? Or is a significant

:42:24.:42:26.

proportion of people who have recently come into the country? I go

:42:27.:42:31.

back to the comment we almost got to a few moments ago. I'm not sure that

:42:32.:42:35.

the term home`grown is a helpful one here in getting up the phenomenon ``

:42:36.:42:40.

getting at the phenomenon because of the complex and rich links between

:42:41.:42:45.

the individuals here and the Al`Qaeda group overseas. In almost

:42:46.:42:49.

every instance of a plot, there are those links. It almost anticipates

:42:50.:42:55.

what I was going to ask next. You have seen the shift from the

:42:56.:43:01.

so`called spectacular plots, to the lone wolf attacks, so`called. Would

:43:02.:43:08.

you say that that is a serious shift of reorientation of the terrorist

:43:09.:43:13.

threat away from networks towards individuals making these attacks,

:43:14.:43:19.

and planning to kill people on a low`level, individual basis? Or is

:43:20.:43:24.

it, as I think you are saying to us now, more that the lone wolves have

:43:25.:43:29.

some sort of outside influence? The answer to the first question is that

:43:30.:43:33.

no, it's not so much a shift, that we seek `` but that we see different

:43:34.:43:39.

methods of terrorism added to over the years. I go back to a case

:43:40.:43:44.

earlier this year. 11 individuals were convicted in a case we called

:43:45.:43:52.

Operation Examined, in which the terrorists were picked up on covert

:43:53.:43:57.

microphones talking about a plot to exceed victims in terms of the

:43:58.:44:05.

number of 7/7. Big casualties are still in the minds of the

:44:06.:44:09.

terrorists, and we can expect that to persist. Amongst that, we've seen

:44:10.:44:12.

a small rise in the cases of the number of individuals who have

:44:13.:44:15.

become radicalised and sometimes move to violent action. This happens

:44:16.:44:20.

because at the rise of the Internet and the presence of all kinds of

:44:21.:44:23.

violent material that they can connect with. And also because some

:44:24.:44:29.

of the linkages I spoke of, the complex linkages, particularly with

:44:30.:44:33.

South Asia, are harder for the terrorists to have, so there is a

:44:34.:44:37.

little bit more autonomy amongst some groupings and individuals than

:44:38.:44:41.

we have seen in the past. But this is an added phenomenon rather than a

:44:42.:44:46.

shift from one to another. Mr Parker, the Home Secretary on Monday

:44:47.:44:50.

made a statement to the house, where he said that the Security service

:44:51.:44:54.

had always advised her that there had been no substantial increase in

:44:55.:44:58.

the overall risk since the introduction of terrorist prevention

:44:59.:45:02.

and investigation measures. Now that we have two suspects on the run and

:45:03.:45:05.

the prospect of a number of the order is coming to an end in

:45:06.:45:08.

January, is that assessment still valid? I know you take a close

:45:09.:45:15.

interest in this in the House, as do other members of the committee. I

:45:16.:45:19.

listened to the Home Secretary speak in the debate on Monday and I think

:45:20.:45:22.

she covered the issue is quite fully, but on the specifics of your

:45:23.:45:26.

question, going back to what my predecessors said about this, and

:45:27.:45:35.

the increase in risk, that is a judgement made against the whole of

:45:36.:45:38.

the risk, so when I referred a few minutes ago to the several thousand

:45:39.:45:41.

individuals who support violent extremism in one way or another, it

:45:42.:45:45.

is a judgement about the whole target set, including these

:45:46.:45:50.

individuals, not just on their own. And it remains true. Are you able to

:45:51.:45:57.

tell us a trend of operations within your service in relation to counter

:45:58.:46:03.

terrorism? Over the period since 7/7, has the number of operations

:46:04.:46:08.

which you have had to carry out increased? In particular, was that

:46:09.:46:14.

the case in and around the period of the Olympic games? The level of

:46:15.:46:20.

counterterrorist operations that goes on has been even in recent

:46:21.:46:24.

years. For the Olympics we put extra effort into it in case there were

:46:25.:46:29.

extra threats, or attempts by Al`Qaeda or other groups to attack

:46:30.:46:32.

the games or mount attacks during the games. As it happens, there were

:46:33.:46:38.

some threats. But there were no serious ones that came forward

:46:39.:46:41.

during the period. We were ready in case that there were, but they

:46:42.:46:46.

didn't happen. Setting the Olympics aside for a moment, in terms of the

:46:47.:46:51.

trends, we have seen more and more new methods added. We are dealing

:46:52.:46:55.

with a diversifying source of threats from a range of different

:46:56.:47:01.

countries now. As it broadens out, its year by year and it becomes a

:47:02.:47:05.

more complex task. In terms of the numbers, maybe the best guide his

:47:06.:47:10.

prosecution through the court, and since 7/7, that is 330 in cases to

:47:11.:47:16.

do with international terrorism. In the first part of this year there

:47:17.:47:22.

were 25 convictions in four major investigations that the police were

:47:23.:47:25.

involved in and brought forward as operations, one of which was the

:47:26.:47:33.

plot I mentioned. Terrorism is also to Northern Ireland. Let's move to

:47:34.:47:36.

that situation. Has the prominence of the threat of

:47:37.:47:40.

#14r578ist terrorism on the mainland, indeed, emanating from

:47:41.:47:46.

abroad, has that meant you have taken your eye from Northern

:47:47.:47:50.

Ireland? Not at all. We have a substantial commitment of effort in

:47:51.:47:53.

Northern Ireland. It is based there, it is not distracted by the rest of

:47:54.:47:57.

our work. We took over the intelligence lead for work against

:47:58.:48:00.

terrorism in Northern Ireland six years ago. We have a heavy

:48:01.:48:04.

commitment of resources there. It is partnered with PSNI. The situation

:48:05.:48:09.

in Northern Ireland is one in which we see from time to time tragic

:48:10.:48:13.

terrorism, a year ago the murder of a prison officer, David Black over

:48:14.:48:16.

there. I think it was a disgraceful act.

:48:17.:48:21.

The people we are talking about, the terrorists there, are a small number

:48:22.:48:26.

of people. A residue of terrorism from what I would call a by`gone

:48:27.:48:31.

era. Nearly, as you know very well, moved on 15 years ago with the Good

:48:32.:48:36.

Friday Agreement. With the decision to move forward in a democratic way.

:48:37.:48:41.

It has done so. Northern Ireland is now a modern and a conservativic

:48:42.:48:46.

society where terrorism has no place.

:48:47.:48:49.

You describe them as a residue but you mentioned the murder of David

:48:50.:48:53.

Black. The Northern Ireland Secretary herself warned yesterday

:48:54.:48:58.

of continuous planning and targeting by dissident Republicans. What are

:48:59.:49:03.

the factors that lie behind the renewed level of threat in Northern

:49:04.:49:07.

Ireland? I would `` I'm not sure I accept it is a renewed level of

:49:08.:49:13.

threat. The number of attacks is diminishing. And the number of

:49:14.:49:16.

people convicted in the courts is going up as we bring these people

:49:17.:49:21.

before the courts. The threat persists in the way that the

:49:22.:49:24.

Secretary of State said, I think she said: Likely for the foreseeable

:49:25.:49:29.

future. I would agree with that assessment but it will not last

:49:30.:49:34.

forever. These people will over time, either give up, or put before

:49:35.:49:39.

the courts and put in jail. So you think there are prospects for

:49:40.:49:43.

change? That this will not go on indefinitely? Over time it is

:49:44.:49:49.

diminishing year on year. There will be a Northern Ireland without this

:49:50.:49:53.

sort of terrorism. I am committed to working there with the police until

:49:54.:49:55.

we see that day. Thank you very much. A short

:49:56.:49:58.

discussion has been had on technology. Now let's move to the

:49:59.:50:04.

cyber threat, in particular how GCHQ uses the internet. Can we begin with

:50:05.:50:08.

a question on the general cyber threat? Could we start on the

:50:09.:50:12.

international aspects of sieb I threat? We have been familiar for a

:50:13.:50:19.

long time with state attacks on the Government and the attempt to get

:50:20.:50:24.

military secrets. We now have corporate attacks. There are also

:50:25.:50:29.

attacks on personal individuals to get their private information.

:50:30.:50:35.

How do you assess the proportion of those and could you give us a again

:50:36.:50:41.

ral description of how you see the cyber threat developing? It is

:50:42.:50:47.

multi`facetted. Let me talk about the actors and impact. Hostile

:50:48.:50:51.

intelligence services, it is important to remember that.

:50:52.:50:56.

Organised groups stealing industrial secrets, academic secrets.

:50:57.:51:01.

Terrorists, activists and criminals. It is seen that there has been

:51:02.:51:07.

increasingly sophisticated criminal access. I would call out the

:51:08.:51:15.

non`stage actors, at the top level, is the engagement by some states,

:51:16.:51:21.

less sophisticated states in terms of strategic weaponry, using cyber

:51:22.:51:27.

as an over the horizon means of projecting disruption. In terms of

:51:28.:51:32.

the impact, I think that I would focus on that industrial espionage

:51:33.:51:36.

aspect. We are seeing attacks against the

:51:37.:51:43.

businesses that keep Britain going. So finances, transport,

:51:44.:51:47.

communications, energy, we are seeing theft from over 20 industrial

:51:48.:51:52.

sectors, research and invasion is targeted. Trade secrets, academic

:51:53.:52:00.

research. Industrial espionage on an industrial scale stealing

:52:01.:52:02.

intellectual property. The response to that has to be a cross`Government

:52:03.:52:08.

one and even beyond Government. So working closely for the centre for

:52:09.:52:12.

the protection of national infrastructure, with the business

:52:13.:52:15.

and invasion and skills department. With the new National Crime Agency

:52:16.:52:21.

and with the Cabinet Office, of course. If we get that team play

:52:22.:52:25.

right, we can be world`class in terms of cyber for the UK. It is

:52:26.:52:31.

about working with industry about building capability so that industry

:52:32.:52:35.

can help. If they can cover some of the territory at home and in an

:52:36.:52:41.

overseas market, we are helping by giving certain services and working

:52:42.:52:45.

with academia to build a cyber generation, to build more skills

:52:46.:52:48.

across the economy. Some would say that the real cyber

:52:49.:52:59.

threat comes from GCHQ, not just from others, seeking to collecting

:53:00.:53:04.

everyone's data and communications. Can I ask you why you think it

:53:05.:53:08.

necessary to collect information on the majority of the public in order

:53:09.:53:16.

to protect us from the minority of potential evil`doers.

:53:17.:53:19.

Thank you. I will work up to that, if I may! To clarify we do not spend

:53:20.:53:25.

our time listening to the telephone calls or reading the e`mails of the

:53:26.:53:30.

vast majority. That would not be legal. We do not do it. It would be

:53:31.:53:37.

nice if serious criminals use a particular method of communication

:53:38.:53:40.

and everybody used something else. That is not the case. It would be

:53:41.:53:45.

nice if we knew who the terrorists or the serious criminals were but

:53:46.:53:50.

the internet is a great way to avoid identification. So we have to do

:53:51.:53:54.

detective work. I will give an analogy. It has been used in the

:53:55.:53:59.

press, but think of the internet as a huge hey field. What we are trying

:54:00.:54:03.

to do is to collect hey from those parts of the field that we can get

:54:04.:54:09.

access to and which may be Luke tif in terms of containing the fromming

:54:10.:54:14.

ms of needles that we may be interested in to help us. When we

:54:15.:54:19.

gather the haystack. It is not from the home field but from a tiny

:54:20.:54:23.

proportion of that field, we are well aware in the haystack that

:54:24.:54:28.

there is lots of hey that is innocent communications from

:54:29.:54:31.

innocent people, not just British but foreign people as well. We have

:54:32.:54:36.

to design the queries to draw out the needles. We do not intrude on

:54:37.:54:41.

the surrounding hey. So we look at the content of the communications,

:54:42.:54:46.

where there are specific legal thresholds and requirements that

:54:47.:54:49.

have been met. That is the reality. We don't want to delve into innocent

:54:50.:54:55.

e`mails and phone calls, and I don't employ the type of people who would

:54:56.:55:00.

do. My people are motivated by saving lives on the lives of those

:55:01.:55:06.

on the battlefield. By preventing terrorists and serious criminals,

:55:07.:55:11.

and if they were asked to snoop, I would not have the workforce, they

:55:12.:55:14.

would leave the building. You have given a very full response.

:55:15.:55:19.

Can I ask if you are able to give that response today, why would the

:55:20.:55:24.

British public not entitled to know you were sifting large amounts of

:55:25.:55:28.

communications data for the kind of purpose that you have just

:55:29.:55:35.

described? Well, I believe a Government's first duty is to

:55:36.:55:39.

protect its people. In some ways it does it that a secret. I don't think

:55:40.:55:46.

that secret manies unaccountable. I think that the affect appointed by

:55:47.:55:54.

an elected government, authorses or operations. There is a Committee

:55:55.:55:58.

that gives oversight. There are the interception of the communications

:55:59.:56:06.

minister and... That is all... That is all within secrecy.

:56:07.:56:10.

I am asking why the British public are not entitled to share with us

:56:11.:56:15.

what you have shared this after noon? I believe that certain

:56:16.:56:20.

information should be secret. I don't think secret means sinister. I

:56:21.:56:24.

would like to hammer that home. It feels strange to say that we have

:56:25.:56:28.

nothing to hide, given we work within the ring of secrecy but that

:56:29.:56:34.

has the oversight, the safeguards in terms of the parliamentary

:56:35.:56:39.

Committee, the minister eel masters, the commissioners and the

:56:40.:56:44.

investigatory powers tribunal to exercise that on behalf of the

:56:45.:56:47.

British public. Are you giving thought as to whether

:56:48.:56:51.

the line you have drawn between the aspects of the way that you operate

:56:52.:56:55.

which have to be kept secret and those that could be shared with the

:56:56.:57:01.

wider public, not just with intelligence`related activities, are

:57:02.:57:06.

you giving thought to whether or not the line can be redrawn, safely?

:57:07.:57:12.

That has been an active debate even before the recent revelations.

:57:13.:57:18.

When the Committee reviews us, with we give evidence, when you produce

:57:19.:57:22.

your report, you seek to produce it in an unredakted report as possible.

:57:23.:57:34.

That has happened over time. Some serious allegations have have

:57:35.:57:39.

been made, many of them directed at GCHQ. Earlier there was an

:57:40.:57:44.

allegations that you were using your relationships with the US services

:57:45.:57:50.

in order to circumvent British law. We did an inquiry, we found it

:57:51.:57:54.

unfounded. I think it important to be clear with the public. Can you

:57:55.:57:58.

give us a guarantee that you do not conduct operations which are out

:57:59.:58:03.

with the British legal framework? Yes, I can give you that guarantee.

:58:04.:58:09.

I belief that is true with we are subject to the law. I am sure that

:58:10.:58:14.

is true of my sister agencies as well.

:58:15.:58:18.

I am aware of your capabilities in the past but not to the int cassis

:58:19.:58:25.

to which Hazel Blears has referred. While we appreciate the co`operation

:58:26.:58:31.

you have with the overseas agencies, can you give assurance that at the

:58:32.:58:37.

earliest time of the closed session, you can give us an update of all

:58:38.:58:46.

with whom you kol abrate with? I think so.

:58:47.:58:51.

I think that the public, the vast majority think that you have the

:58:52.:58:55.

right amount of powers or indeed some think you need more. As usual,

:58:56.:59:02.

the public... That is not necessarily the view of this

:59:03.:59:05.

Committee! I think that the public are sensible around this area, but

:59:06.:59:09.

what the polling shows also is that yes, they support you having the

:59:10.:59:14.

powers but they do want more transparency about the way that the

:59:15.:59:18.

powers are exercised. This is the chairman's point about is there the

:59:19.:59:21.

possibility that whilst maintaining security, absolutely but to have

:59:22.:59:24.

perhaps a more informed dialogue with the public, who often exhibit

:59:25.:59:31.

good common sense on the issues that provide people with the extra degree

:59:32.:59:36.

of reassurance about what all of you are undertaking? Let me help now.

:59:37.:59:42.

The pack answer is that there are good safeguards in place. I believe

:59:43.:59:46.

that to be the truth, but if you are a terrorist, a serious criminal, a

:59:47.:59:52.

prolife rare, a foreign intelligence target or if your activities pose a

:59:53.:59:56.

genuine threat to the national or the economic security of the United

:59:57.:00:02.

Kingdom, there is a possible that your communication will be

:00:03.:00:06.

monitored. We will seek to listen to you. If not, if you are not in

:00:07.:00:09.

contact with one of those people, you will not be. We are not entitled

:00:10.:00:15.

to. That is true whether you are British, foreign and ever are in the

:00:16.:00:20.

world. Would your colleagues like to add to

:00:21.:00:23.

the points raised in this area so far? Andrew Parker? I think that

:00:24.:00:29.

openness is something we are moving down the road of. It is now over 20

:00:30.:00:34.

years we have been open in increasing ways as agencies. The

:00:35.:00:40.

issue about balancing powers and transparency and openness and

:00:41.:00:46.

intrusion versus privacy, so on, all of the balances that are important

:00:47.:00:49.

in a free society, in a domestic like the United Kingdom, these are

:00:50.:00:55.

matters that mainly are for ministers to lead on and for

:00:56.:00:59.

Parliament to set law about, that we then abide by and are overseen in

:01:00.:01:05.

the work that we do. So, these are all live issues now. Of course they

:01:06.:01:10.

are. So there is more openness. That is true for a Parliament and

:01:11.:01:14.

for a Government to decide the matters but often the agencies seem

:01:15.:01:19.

nervous about insisting that something cannot be said in public

:01:20.:01:23.

because of the damage it may do. Do you feel you have taken that

:01:24.:01:27.

argument too far? The reason things are secret is not because we are

:01:28.:01:31.

embarrassed about them or wish to keep them from the public, it is

:01:32.:01:35.

because we need to keep them from the people we are investigating or

:01:36.:01:39.

carrying out operations against, the terrorists, the spies and the pro

:01:40.:01:44.

life rares. If we make it public it is public to them too. Then we lose

:01:45.:01:49.

important operational advantage. That can be fragile. That would

:01:50.:01:54.

leave the UK less safe. The task we are paid to do is to keep the

:01:55.:01:58.

country safe it is a challenging and a difficult work to do. The

:01:59.:02:04.

techniques that we have, if they are compromised. It makes our work then

:02:05.:02:10.

harder. There are always secrets. So the oversight mechanisms can operate

:02:11.:02:15.

on behalf of Parliament and on behalf of the public. I would like

:02:16.:02:29.

to support what they have just said. Every successful company in this

:02:30.:02:33.

country is mastering modern technology. The Internet is an

:02:34.:02:43.

important part of this. We are all trying to use technology to take

:02:44.:02:49.

full advantage of the opportunities to achieve our goals. The safeguard

:02:50.:02:59.

in place are very good. It would be bizarre to think the one area to be

:03:00.:03:05.

excluded from taking full advantage of modern technology is keeping this

:03:06.:03:11.

country safe. We have an extraordinarily difficult task, as

:03:12.:03:17.

Andrew has described. We have to identify and recruit agents in the

:03:18.:03:21.

most exposed places. In countries which are trying to do our country

:03:22.:03:26.

harm. Secret states that are trying to do damage to others. We need to

:03:27.:03:33.

have the possibility of examining intelligence, drawing on information

:03:34.:03:37.

our partner agencies have been ordered to be able to identify those

:03:38.:03:49.

very brave individuals. If you end up diminishing our ability to use

:03:50.:03:55.

technology, you will be less able to have that advantage. You are

:03:56.:04:05.

currently under some criticism. If babies a terrorist incident, you

:04:06.:04:13.

will no doubt be under criticism for not having enough. ` ` if there is a

:04:14.:04:28.

terrorist incident. I wonder whether you have any comments on where you

:04:29.:04:36.

strike that very difficult balance. I think fundamentally, the resonant

:04:37.:04:44.

denture of an organisation like MI5 is to protect the sort of country we

:04:45.:04:57.

live in ` ` rasion d'etre. We pride our individual liberty and privacy.

:04:58.:05:02.

They are extremely important values to the people who work in our

:05:03.:05:15.

agency. Our job is to keep the balance. Sometimes I find MI5 and

:05:16.:05:25.

other agencies being spoken of as if we were on the side of the seesaw.

:05:26.:05:36.

We are trying to help government make balances. It is about keeping

:05:37.:05:42.

this country the sort of country it is. There have been times when

:05:43.:05:47.

successive governments have offered my service greater powers, and we

:05:48.:05:52.

have said they were disproportionate and turned away from them. Making

:05:53.:05:56.

the balances is critically important. Been no recent speech, he

:05:57.:06:05.

said, it causes enormous damage to make public the reach and

:06:06.:06:08.

limitations of GCHQ's techniques, and that such information to the

:06:09.:06:17.

terrorists. You then, it, the gift they need to invade as an strike at

:06:18.:06:25.

will. We appreciate you may be limited in the detail you can go

:06:26.:06:29.

into today. I think the public are entitled to know more about this

:06:30.:06:40.

enormous damage you talked about. Can you give examples, specific

:06:41.:06:46.

examples of how it has been a gift to terrorist? It will be difficult

:06:47.:06:58.

to give in a public session. We can do it in a private session later if

:06:59.:07:16.

you like. It leads to was finding terrorist plots we would not

:07:17.:07:21.

otherwise find, which we can them for walks and that leads to lies

:07:22.:07:26.

being saved. There are real instances of that. If we lose it, we

:07:27.:07:40.

are making a difficult task harder. That is what I meant in the speech.

:07:41.:07:47.

I would like to come in. Going back to the Second World War and beyond,

:07:48.:07:57.

they depend on our terrorist targets being unaware. If sources are

:07:58.:08:10.

revealed, it is inexorable. What we have seen over the last five months

:08:11.:08:19.

is nearly daily discussion. We have seen terrorist groups in the Middle

:08:20.:08:25.

East discussing the revelations of specific terms in terms of

:08:26.:08:35.

communications they use. Do you mean this is online? We have seen chat

:08:36.:08:46.

around specific terrorist groups discussing how to avoid what they

:08:47.:08:50.

now perceived to be communication methods, or how to select

:08:51.:08:58.

communication methods. I will not compound damage by being specific in

:08:59.:09:08.

public. We will ask you in private. Are you saying this is information

:09:09.:09:12.

which refers to the revelations that have appeared in the press in the

:09:13.:09:17.

last 12 months? Absolutely. It is a direct consequence. Bekele to have

:09:18.:09:25.

effect of the media coverage, global media coverage, will make things

:09:26.:09:43.

more difficult. It uncovers terrorist cells. It allows us to

:09:44.:09:56.

reveal the identities of those involved in online sexual

:09:57.:10:03.

exploitation of children. That mosaic is in a far week and place

:10:04.:10:09.

and it was. I think most reasonable people would accept that if people

:10:10.:10:25.

are using these kind of meetings for planning or whatever, we should have

:10:26.:10:29.

access to it. I do not think we have got to the point that people feel

:10:30.:10:56.

reassured. It might have been intercepted. We will not look at it

:10:57.:11:02.

without specific authorisation. Going back to what has appeared in

:11:03.:11:06.

the press here and abroad, it is sometimes argued that if people

:11:07.:11:22.

responsible for these publications, is there any validity? I am not sure

:11:23.:11:37.

the journalists who are managing this very sensitive information are

:11:38.:11:41.

particularly well placed to make those judgements. What I can tell

:11:42.:11:48.

you is that the leaks from Edward Snowden have been very damaging.

:11:49.:11:52.

They have put our operations at risk. It is clear that our

:11:53.:12:00.

adversaries are rubbing their hands in glee. Al`Qaeda is lapping it up.

:12:01.:12:07.

I think we need to hear why you think you are entitled to say that.

:12:08.:12:12.

Why do you believe that to be true? I do not want to repeat what my

:12:13.:12:15.

colleagues have said. They have clearly set out how the alert enough

:12:16.:12:23.

targets to our capabilities means it becomes more difficult to acquiring

:12:24.:12:31.

intelligence we need. Is there any additional information you can share

:12:32.:12:35.

with us is too hard evidence that terrorists or potential terrorists

:12:36.:12:42.

have been looking at these reports or change these plans as a result?

:12:43.:12:47.

Not in this public forum. You will be willing to share that with the

:12:48.:12:51.

committee in a private session? Of course. We have had some discussion

:12:52.:13:04.

about balance already. There was the ability to intervene, and their

:13:05.:13:14.

anxiety about privacy in the public has become greater. One way it can

:13:15.:13:19.

be dealt with is for the public to be satisfied there is a robust legal

:13:20.:13:23.

framework. In that respect, is it the view of any of you that the

:13:24.:13:30.

existing legal framework is adequate to deal with the enormous

:13:31.:13:38.

consequences of the revolution in technology, and if there is to be a

:13:39.:13:42.

public debate as to where the balance will be struck, is that a

:13:43.:13:46.

debate you would be willing to participate in publicly? On that

:13:47.:13:56.

last point, subject to administration, yes. We are not

:13:57.:14:03.

lawmakers. There are strict criteria that provide safeguards to protect

:14:04.:14:13.

privacy. I think it is a false choice. Our job is to provide

:14:14.:14:22.

intelligence around security. Our internal rules reflect what is in

:14:23.:14:33.

the laugh. The laws were drafted to be technology neutral. I think they

:14:34.:14:43.

did a pretty good job. It insists upon necessity and proportionality.

:14:44.:14:48.

They are as relevant now as when the drawers were drafted. They guide the

:14:49.:14:51.

way we work, they guide the way we think. They are within our DNA. If

:14:52.:14:58.

Parliamentary wants to have a debate, fine by me. Proportionality

:14:59.:15:08.

necessarily involves value judgements. They may change. Is it

:15:09.:15:25.

not necessary now to believe the public anxiety? I want to stress the

:15:26.:15:41.

role of the commissioners. We talk to them about our methods, about the

:15:42.:15:48.

way that we work, and this idea that technology has moved on beyond the

:15:49.:15:52.

law, there are few will be important on that. These are the intelligence

:15:53.:16:00.

commissioners who look at the specific legality of processes. Yes,

:16:01.:16:07.

I am sorry. The commissioners, two former senior judges. Unlike us,

:16:08.:16:14.

they do not sit in public. They produce a public report. There

:16:15.:16:22.

is clearly a big debate going on in the united states. I think there is

:16:23.:16:29.

evidence there is a change in behaviour from some of the global

:16:30.:16:34.

communications companies. Are you concerned about the long`term

:16:35.:16:39.

consequences, given the close partnership with the Americans?

:16:40.:16:46.

Yes, I am concerned in terms of cooperation that we might receive. I

:16:47.:16:57.

am concerned about the access that we can lawfully require of

:16:58.:17:04.

communications companies, which is very difficult if they are based

:17:05.:17:08.

overseas. Could I just come back to Sir

:17:09.:17:12.

Menzies Campbell's point full stop people who work for us are public

:17:13.:17:16.

servants. We are committed to working in accordance with the law

:17:17.:17:23.

and of remarkable. We will certainly give some advice about what

:17:24.:17:27.

implications of certain changes might be. But you said the law and

:17:28.:17:32.

we will work within the framework of the law. There was an absolutely

:17:33.:17:36.

clear commitment. When people refer to the legal basis

:17:37.:17:40.

on which you operate, they are normally referring to the

:17:41.:17:42.

intelligence services act, but the results of the Human Rights Act.

:17:43.:17:46.

Could you say something to the extent to which that impacts on the

:17:47.:17:49.

way you carry in your responsibilities? How do you make

:17:50.:17:55.

sure you are complying with that? The founding statutes that our

:17:56.:18:00.

services operate to the intelligence services act and the security

:18:01.:18:02.

services act, are themselves based on the Human Rights Act, Article

:18:03.:18:07.

eight of the right to privacy, but we are talking about for the

:18:08.:18:11.

citizen. Which can only be transgressed for reasons of national

:18:12.:18:15.

security and some other arrangements which are less central to what we're

:18:16.:18:20.

talking about today. But the acts that we want to based on that, and

:18:21.:18:23.

so the Human Rights Act is at the centre and at the foundation of our

:18:24.:18:28.

work. It forms the guiding principles.

:18:29.:18:31.

Before relieved this area of questioning, Lord Butler?

:18:32.:18:38.

One final question on that. Can you see why it is that the public feel

:18:39.:18:44.

that when the last bit of legislation on this was passed in

:18:45.:18:47.

the year 2000, and technology has moved on so fast, and your

:18:48.:18:51.

capabilities have developed so hugely, it is hardly credible that

:18:52.:18:56.

that legislation is still fit for purpose for the modern world.

:18:57.:19:03.

I can see why the question comes up, Lord Butler, of course. But the

:19:04.:19:07.

real issue for us is whether the work we do is sufficiently covered

:19:08.:19:14.

by the law, that it is lawful and we can be sure, there are staff can be

:19:15.:19:18.

sure that what they do is lawful. That is properly overseen and that

:19:19.:19:21.

is rigorous, and as you know, niche of arrangements there are Parliament

:19:22.:19:27.

of the oversight of this committee and our Secretary of State reported

:19:28.:19:31.

to Parliament, the judicial, through the commissioners have spoken of and

:19:32.:19:36.

of course through these editors to ministers do we are accountable.

:19:37.:19:41.

Sometimes it might be helped to bring to life a bit especially

:19:42.:19:47.

publicly because on behalf of Parliament and the public, the

:19:48.:19:50.

report to the public in various ways, but somehow it doesn't get

:19:51.:19:55.

into the public mind that that operates. I can say for six months

:19:56.:20:01.

as a director, this is my fourth formal appearance before the

:20:02.:20:02.

committee giving evidence across a range of subjects, operational,

:20:03.:20:09.

policy, finance, administration. As you all know, I have submitted to

:20:10.:20:13.

you hundreds of pages of material about our work, you have received

:20:14.:20:18.

briefings, I have three visits from the commissioners would have spoken

:20:19.:20:20.

of in that period. I see the Home Secretary is her role as Secretary

:20:21.:20:25.

of State, sometimes two or three times a week. This is very active

:20:26.:20:29.

and rigorous oversight in this collection of arrangements.

:20:30.:20:34.

Sometimes a dozen projected well to the public that this goes on.

:20:35.:20:39.

Could we just switch to another aspect of If part of the role of MI6

:20:40.:22:16.

is to stop would`be terrorists joining organisations, what are you

:22:17.:22:19.

doing to try to deal with this issue, especially because of the

:22:20.:22:23.

risk of these people coming back to the United Kingdom? The agencies

:22:24.:22:28.

work extremely closely together. We don't have the authority, we rely on

:22:29.:22:36.

our partners in MI5 to notify those of individuals of concern. We work

:22:37.:22:40.

with foreign partners in south`east Europe and the Arab world who may be

:22:41.:22:46.

able to help us identify where people are moving to. We have our

:22:47.:22:51.

own connections into the Syrian opposition, where we try to identify

:22:52.:22:55.

where people might have gone to inside Syria. It is a very difficult

:22:56.:23:01.

environment within which to operate. Our strategy to prevent

:23:02.:23:05.

terrorism here in this country is to break the links between potential

:23:06.:23:11.

extremists here and Al`Qaeda ranches overseas. We need a whole range of

:23:12.:23:18.

partnerships to achieve that. Syria is particularly difficult. We have

:23:19.:23:31.

got no partner there. To have any liable intelligence ` ` reliable

:23:32.:23:40.

intelligence about the number of UK citizens who have returned from

:23:41.:23:51.

Syria who have potentially fought in the Syrian war? I think we have a

:23:52.:24:02.

reasonable understanding of that. Low hundreds is the number I think I

:24:03.:24:07.

would use publicly. That is the total number of people who we

:24:08.:24:10.

believe are have are now fighting and people who have come back. Those

:24:11.:24:14.

who have been involved in fighting and combat, we need to take some

:24:15.:24:19.

degree of interest in to check they are not intending to become involved

:24:20.:24:23.

in violence here. Most of them will not put some might. When I asked

:24:24.:24:36.

about the programme before, you said it was not necessarily your consent,

:24:37.:24:41.

but isn't it the case at some of these people coming back from Syria,

:24:42.:24:46.

will have a great kid of kudos in the country and will find it easy to

:24:47.:24:50.

draw vulnerable young people to them and possibly radicalise them? Isn't

:24:51.:24:55.

it really important your service has a role in interface with the present

:24:56.:25:03.

programme? They will be looked up by others in

:25:04.:25:08.

the community. That increases the threat. That may happen, and we have

:25:09.:25:12.

discussed prevent threat matters in the past.

:25:13.:25:16.

I think what you're saying is right in some cases. As far as our

:25:17.:25:22.

interface with the event programme, it is more than that, we overlap

:25:23.:25:26.

into it because these two pillars of contest, the counterterrorist

:25:27.:25:32.

strategy that the government has, or overlapped of prevent and pursue.

:25:33.:25:37.

They are overlapped because of the very phenomenon that you have

:25:38.:25:39.

identified. There are radicalise his around. People who spend time trying

:25:40.:25:46.

to persuade people of the arcade ideology and cause. Where there are

:25:47.:25:50.

vulnerable people to that message, sometimes the joint because of

:25:51.:25:57.

followers. Full to the prevent programme is designed at preventing

:25:58.:26:02.

that. We refer numbers of people into the programme, sometimes with

:26:03.:26:07.

success. Some of those who go to Syria will

:26:08.:26:10.

go because of self`motivation, but others may have been recruited. Do

:26:11.:26:18.

you exercise any surveillance over possible recruiting agents with any

:26:19.:26:28.

more disrupting their activities. Of course we do, because these are

:26:29.:26:31.

some of the people we need to be concerned about is a priority, those

:26:32.:26:35.

are trying to recruit others to violence and terrorism whether

:26:36.:26:40.

overseas or home. Let us move to Iran and North Korea.

:26:41.:26:45.

Lord Butler. Last summer, you said publicly that

:26:46.:26:50.

your assessment was that Iran was two years away from obtaining

:26:51.:26:53.

nuclear weapons. We have now seen some advances and that, and

:26:54.:26:59.

President Rohani saying he is prepared to discuss the programme.

:27:00.:27:06.

That is a dramatic success. Do you regard the intelligence committee as

:27:07.:27:08.

having made a contribution to that advance?

:27:09.:27:14.

Yes, I do. I be careful of what I say because the negotiators are

:27:15.:27:17.

going on in Geneva today as we speak. But I think that the

:27:18.:27:22.

intelligence community has contributed to an understanding of

:27:23.:27:28.

Iran's nuclear programme. It has given our politicians and our

:27:29.:27:32.

negotiators a clear sense of what is actually happening. Some of it is

:27:33.:27:38.

over and reported upon by the international atomic energy

:27:39.:27:42.

authority for stop some of it is done in secret. We don't have a

:27:43.:27:46.

complete picture, but our intelligence is certainly informed

:27:47.:27:50.

that picture. Secondly, the reason why Iran has come back to

:27:51.:27:53.

negotiations is because of the impact of sanctions. We have played

:27:54.:27:58.

an important role in monitoring the sanctions and ensuring that the

:27:59.:28:03.

attempt by Iran to evade the sanctions by using false flag

:28:04.:28:11.

companies or false user certificates for technical equipment, but we are

:28:12.:28:17.

able to disrupt that and work with foreign partners to do so. Thirdly,

:28:18.:28:21.

we have a lot of expertise in the intelligence community, perhaps

:28:22.:28:26.

especially in MI6 about Iran, and that expertise is available to

:28:27.:28:29.

government to understand what is happening in terms of the politics.

:28:30.:28:34.

Very conjugated politics between resident Rohani, the supreme leader,

:28:35.:28:38.

the IR GC, and the various other elements in the complex uranium

:28:39.:28:44.

picture. On Iran, if I may, one of the issues

:28:45.:28:50.

is a serious lack of trust on the international community towards Iran

:28:51.:28:55.

and the reverse. From the point of view of the intelligence agencies,

:28:56.:28:59.

and not just the kingdom, your international allies in this matter,

:29:00.:29:05.

how confident can you be that any commitments Iran might give arising

:29:06.:29:08.

out of successful negotiations would be commitments that could be relied

:29:09.:29:13.

upon? As we all know, the history of the intelligence assessments on

:29:14.:29:16.

weapons of mass destruction elsewhere in the Middle East turned

:29:17.:29:20.

out not to be good. I'm not just referring to the United Kingdom, but

:29:21.:29:22.

the net states and other countries. Is there any reason to be confident

:29:23.:29:28.

that commitments given by Iran to be seen to be enforceable?

:29:29.:29:34.

One thing we can learn from the Iraq experience is that when the

:29:35.:29:36.

International atomic and your authority are involved, that gives a

:29:37.:29:40.

good framework on which to build an understanding. In terms of how you

:29:41.:29:46.

monster sincerity with which commitments are made, we will rely

:29:47.:29:51.

upon organisations like the IEEE to visit, inspect and track what the

:29:52.:29:57.

Iranians are doing. We can do that with issues like the feel cycle. In

:29:58.:30:04.

Richmond facilities, for example. It is more difficult with secret

:30:05.:30:09.

military programmes. Both previous governments like South Africa in

:30:10.:30:13.

1990 or Libya in 2003 dismantled their nuclear weapons programme, we

:30:14.:30:16.

have very clear visibility about what was going on. It will be more

:30:17.:30:21.

difficult in Iran. What is the main lessons you learn

:30:22.:30:24.

from the failures of Iraqi intelligence?

:30:25.:30:30.

The Butler is an expert on this. It is you are asking.

:30:31.:30:36.

We have taken Lord Butler 's report, and it is a bible for us in the way

:30:37.:30:40.

they manage intelligence, assess intelligence, evaluate our agents.

:30:41.:30:43.

There were clearly shortcomings back in 2002, and we have learnt

:30:44.:30:50.

enormously from that. Actually, you point to the Iraq failing, which is

:30:51.:30:54.

very real, but when we look at Syria, Libya, North Korea, the

:30:55.:30:59.

international network of proliferating concerns, the business

:31:00.:31:05.

of proliferation, the record is very good. North Korea, Sir Menzies

:31:06.:31:13.

Campbell. North Korea's nuclear ambitions and

:31:14.:31:18.

ability to provide delivery systems, all that seems unabated. I'm not at

:31:19.:31:25.

asking what resources you devote to North Korea, but may I ask, can I

:31:26.:31:30.

take it it is a country of concern? And it is a country of concern in

:31:31.:31:34.

which cooperative arrangements with other allies are extremely important

:31:35.:31:43.

in allowing judgements to be made? You choose your words with care. Of

:31:44.:31:48.

course North Korea is a very great concern to us and our partners,

:31:49.:31:53.

especially close partners like Japan or the act states, Canada, Australia

:31:54.:31:59.

in that part of the world. North Korea, is not as high and

:32:00.:32:07.

operational priority as us other parts of the world, but we can play

:32:08.:32:11.

a role, we do so, and we share that with the partners must concern.

:32:12.:32:16.

Thank you. The final here are questioning, espionage in the UK.

:32:17.:32:22.

A touch of nostalgia here from an old cold warrior. Does traditional

:32:23.:32:26.

espionage, for example from Russia, still posed a threat that it once

:32:27.:32:33.

did? And bearing in mind one of the more controversial revelations in

:32:34.:32:37.

the press recently, and be true to say that everyone is still spying on

:32:38.:32:44.

everybody else? I'll answer this one fairly briefly.

:32:45.:32:49.

Roundabout 10% of my service's work is devoted to dealing with the

:32:50.:32:55.

security threats that arrive from foreign states, that includes

:32:56.:32:59.

espionage and a bit on counter proliferation and that is relevant

:33:00.:33:05.

in the UK. Most of it is on espionage is by a range of foreign

:33:06.:33:08.

states. It is still a lively business year because there are

:33:09.:33:11.

plenty of countries around the world that take a close interest and an

:33:12.:33:15.

improper one in a security sense, in military affairs here in stealing

:33:16.:33:21.

technology and stealing economic advantage where they can. This is a

:33:22.:33:26.

lively business will stop you mentioned Russia, but there are

:33:27.:33:27.

range countries involved in this. Is there scope for cooperation with

:33:28.:33:52.

Russia? Has that been impeded? Perhaps I could take that one. The

:33:53.:34:08.

government took the series of measures. We have not had the

:34:09.:34:13.

cooperation we sought for. There has been a gap. We have not altered the

:34:14.:34:18.

Russians and they haven't talked to us. We have passed the Olympic flame

:34:19.:34:45.

on from London to so chewy I didn't quite hit an answer about whether F1

:34:46.:34:51.

of spies on others. Question ` ` I didn't quite hear an answer about

:34:52.:35:05.

whether others spy on us. This is the vast bulk of what we deal with.

:35:06.:35:11.

Everything we do is in response to priorities laid down by

:35:12.:35:13.

governments, authorised by government. We have limited

:35:14.:35:19.

resources. There are very few countries where we actually have

:35:20.:35:26.

operations. I am not going to go into detail. What I can tell you is

:35:27.:35:31.

we are targeted against the highest priority challenges this government

:35:32.:35:35.

and this country faces. Everything we do is authorised by ministers.

:35:36.:35:40.

Thank you very much indeed. We are conscious we have not covered

:35:41.:35:50.

everything I would like to thank our three witnesses for the evidence

:35:51.:35:54.

they have given and the manner in which they have given it. We look

:35:55.:35:58.

forward to further the liberations. Can we just one last word?

:35:59.:36:04.

Certainly. You asked about the value of our services. We get great value

:36:05.:36:14.

from the men and women who work for us. These are dedicated, loyal

:36:15.:36:21.

people. They do this work because they believe in protecting the

:36:22.:36:30.

values we have. These people are the backbone of what we do. I am sure we

:36:31.:36:34.

can all happily endorse what you have said. I would be grateful if

:36:35.:36:50.

the audience can remain seated. Remarkable to see Sir Iain Lobban,

:36:51.:36:54.

Andrew Parker and Sir John Sawers giving evidence at Westminster. That

:36:55.:37:04.

session has now finished at Westminster. Frank Gardner was

:37:05.:37:11.

listening to that alongside us. It is a vast area to tackle in 90

:37:12.:37:15.

minutes, Frank. What stood out for you? On the surface of it, it was

:37:16.:37:26.

fairly turgid. There were some very serious issues in there. One of the

:37:27.:37:31.

most important being, let us get to the bottom of Edward Snowden. They

:37:32.:37:38.

were pressed to justify that allegation that the leaks have

:37:39.:37:45.

caused all this damage. They were reluctant to go into detail, at

:37:46.:37:48.

least in front of the cameras. One thing they did give away was they

:37:49.:37:53.

said they have effectively intercepted terrorist communications

:37:54.:37:59.

in, to use their words, the Middle East, South Asia and Afghanistan,

:38:00.:38:05.

work their targets are discussing ways of how to use different

:38:06.:38:09.

communications. They say that is making their job that much harder.

:38:10.:38:14.

The committee was, I think, more robust than it has been in the past.

:38:15.:38:27.

One of the things they said, the GCHQ boss, a man we have never seen

:38:28.:38:33.

in public before, he said, we don't want to delve into innocent e`mails

:38:34.:38:38.

and phone calls, I don't think secret means a sinister. The problem

:38:39.:38:43.

is, they are so secretive, and they have put a lid on everything, they

:38:44.:38:48.

have almost cried wolf and people are not sure how much of this to

:38:49.:38:53.

believe and trust. There was a fascinating insight from Sir John

:38:54.:38:58.

Sawers, the MI6 boss, when he was being asked about difficult

:38:59.:39:01.

decisions working with foreign governments and cooperating with

:39:02.:39:04.

governments that have got perhaps not the same human rights standards

:39:05.:39:12.

as this country, and he said agents overseas will wake up the Foreign

:39:13.:39:15.

Secretary in the middle of the night. You make the point they did

:39:16.:39:21.

not want to go into much detail about the impact of Edward

:39:22.:39:27.

Snowden's leaks. Is it safe to a shame there will be plenty of

:39:28.:39:31.

discussion behind closed doors about that? Will a career to be told more

:39:32.:39:34.

about what they perceive to be the damage? They will. Whether it will

:39:35.:39:40.

be enough to satisfy critics, I am not sure. The committee had been

:39:41.:39:48.

accused of missing quite a few things in the past. They did not put

:39:49.:39:57.

deeply enough about the 7/7 bombings. They had to go back and do

:39:58.:40:13.

more questions. There were more times when more questions should

:40:14.:40:20.

have been asked. The IOC committee now has new powers. It is no longer

:40:21.:40:26.

pointed just by Number Ten. That is a good thing. It is still perceived

:40:27.:40:36.

as a creature of the establishment. Sir Malcolm Rifkind was trying very

:40:37.:40:42.

hard to be robust. He was Foreign Secretary, the man who had overall

:40:43.:40:49.

responsibility under Sir John Major. He had responsibility for GCHQ. He

:40:50.:40:54.

is not like a judge who comes in from outside. Still a lot of

:40:55.:40:59.

questions. I hope they do ask them. I can understand why they do not

:41:00.:41:03.

want to say some things in public. What we take away from this? They

:41:04.:41:10.

kept saying they were public servants, and people are doing it to

:41:11.:41:17.

defend this country. That is their message. And also the fact this was

:41:18.:41:27.

not a fishing exercise. The big question is, is the legal framework

:41:28.:41:34.

adequate, bearing in mind what they are up against now? We did not get

:41:35.:41:41.

an answer. I will give you an answer, and the answer is no, it

:41:42.:41:45.

clearly isn't, because technology is moving so fast. It is a $3 trillion

:41:46.:41:54.

business. The head of GCHQ said the Internet is a challenge for them.

:41:55.:42:02.

There are always going to be prone to people wanting to work outside

:42:03.:42:06.

once they have worked there. MI5 was asked, what about all these links.

:42:07.:42:17.

He said it was much less likely to happen here than in the United

:42:18.:42:22.

States. They were asked, can you give a guarantee that your

:42:23.:42:27.

operations are conducted within the British legal framework, and I think

:42:28.:42:34.

it was the head of GCHQ who said yes, and I speak for the agencies.

:42:35.:42:41.

Only they know that. `the problem is the legal framework has not caught

:42:42.:42:43.

up with technology, and there is still a way to go on that. They need

:42:44.:42:49.

to review it. Frank, thank you very much. Fascinating. It was really

:42:50.:42:59.

interesting. Did you see Judi Dench at the back? I did, it was Margaret

:43:00.:43:08.

Beckett, wasn't it? It was. We will turn our attention and take a look

:43:09.:43:11.

at everything else that has been happening in the news today. And the

:43:12.:43:15.

literary jury is considering its verdict in the court`martial of

:43:16.:43:19.

three Royal Marines. All three deny murdering an Afghan insurgent as he

:43:20.:43:23.

lay badly wounded in a field two years ago. Duncan, explain what has

:43:24.:43:32.

been happening. What we are waiting for, Jane, other

:43:33.:43:37.

verdicts to come back. All three Marines face murder charges. The

:43:38.:43:43.

military board went out this morning. We do not know whether they

:43:44.:43:50.

will come back today or tomorrow. Seven members on that panel deciding

:43:51.:43:51.

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