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Thank you. Good afternoon. You are watching BBC News. In just a few | :00:00. | :00:07. | |
minutes, we will be following an unprecedented event. The heads of | :00:08. | :00:11. | |
all three of Britain's intelligence agencies will be making that | :00:12. | :00:13. | |
appearance before a committee of MPs and it is of course all televised | :00:14. | :00:18. | |
which means we will be following it here. | :00:19. | :00:23. | |
There is a two minute delay, just in case any matters of national | :00:24. | :00:27. | |
security are mentioned, so we are two minutes behind in terms of what | :00:28. | :00:30. | |
we are going to be showing you but the GCHQ director, Sir Iain Lobban, | :00:31. | :00:39. | |
the MI5 director Sir Andrew Parker and the MI6 director will be quizzed | :00:40. | :00:46. | |
by a committee of MPs. There has been some criticism in the past that | :00:47. | :00:50. | |
the security agencies have not been held to account but Sir Malcolm | :00:51. | :00:54. | |
Rifkind says that new rules mean that, for example, members of the | :00:55. | :01:01. | |
ISC can send investigators into the intelligence agencies to carry out | :01:02. | :01:02. | |
spot checks. Certainly a moment of theatre. On | :01:03. | :01:22. | |
the other side of the Atlantic there is sometimes a snooze con `` | :01:23. | :01:29. | |
problem, but there are serious questions here. We have to get to | :01:30. | :01:32. | |
the bottom of where is the right balance in the spectrum between | :01:33. | :01:37. | |
those who inhabit the world of secrecy and intelligence, that | :01:38. | :01:40. | |
nothing should be revealed, and they should have maximum powers to | :01:41. | :01:44. | |
investigate everything, and snoop and eavesdrop. On the other side, | :01:45. | :01:49. | |
there are those who would say no, you can have maximum openness. | :01:50. | :01:55. | |
Somewhere within that spectrum is the right part of the pendulum, and | :01:56. | :01:58. | |
I hope we will get some kind of answer on that. I think the meeting | :01:59. | :02:03. | |
was planned before the revelations by Edward Snowden came out in the | :02:04. | :02:06. | |
Guardian and the New York Times, so it's been in the diary, but it has a | :02:07. | :02:13. | |
new and more potent boost. When you look at the other two of the three | :02:14. | :02:17. | |
people giving evidence today, is it perhaps Iain Lobban who we don't | :02:18. | :02:24. | |
know much about, from GCHQ, who will be under more pressure in terms of | :02:25. | :02:28. | |
what intelligence was shared with the prison programme? Definitely. He | :02:29. | :02:35. | |
and his agency are the most secretive. They hardly give anything | :02:36. | :02:45. | |
out the press. Yet they have 58,000 secret files missing that Snowden | :02:46. | :02:50. | |
has taken with him. A vast amount of their operation, their tactics, | :02:51. | :02:54. | |
names, all sorts of things are out there. Do you remember Mission | :02:55. | :03:01. | |
impossible, the list in the opening, the secret list of | :03:02. | :03:06. | |
operatives. It's a bit like that. But times 1000. People are very | :03:07. | :03:12. | |
concerned about this. Supporters of Edward Snowden would say, look, he | :03:13. | :03:16. | |
has started a valid debate because we have a right to know what is | :03:17. | :03:21. | |
being eavesdropped on, why they are listening in on potentially your | :03:22. | :03:27. | |
e`mails and conversations, because the extent of it, what was not known | :03:28. | :03:34. | |
even to MPs, I would expect that we would see tough questions from the | :03:35. | :03:37. | |
committee, because they have been a bit toothless in the past. They are | :03:38. | :03:42. | |
still perceived as being a bit too close to the establishment. The | :03:43. | :03:47. | |
chairman of the committee used to have authority over MI6 and GCHQ, | :03:48. | :03:50. | |
Malcolm Rifkind when he was Foreign Secretary. They answered to him. | :03:51. | :03:59. | |
Albeit in a different role now, he was a creature of the establishment. | :04:00. | :04:05. | |
We will see whether it measures up to that robustness that people are | :04:06. | :04:08. | |
searching for. It will be beginning very shortly, so Frank, talk is | :04:09. | :04:12. | |
through the three men we see behind this. People may know less or more | :04:13. | :04:20. | |
about all of them. Over in the left corner, overworked because his | :04:21. | :04:24. | |
jacket is off, is Sir Iain Lobban, director of GCHQ in Cheltenham. It | :04:25. | :04:33. | |
is basically a big round doughnut of a building. They are conducting the | :04:34. | :04:40. | |
Britain `` British defence against cyber espionage, but also proactive | :04:41. | :04:45. | |
cyber operations as well. In the middle is Andrew Parker, the only | :04:46. | :04:50. | |
one without a knighthood, and he has become the general director of MI5, | :04:51. | :04:53. | |
the Security service, at Thames house in London. He has been in the | :04:54. | :04:59. | |
service for over 30 years and was formerly deputy director. On the | :05:00. | :05:05. | |
right is Sir John Sawers, the chief of MI6, the secret intelligence | :05:06. | :05:09. | |
service, also with headquarters in London. They do the overseas spying. | :05:10. | :05:17. | |
He is a former diplomat. He has book ended it. He started in MI6, then | :05:18. | :05:22. | |
moved quickly. We will interrupt, Buddhist has just started. `` | :05:23. | :05:25. | |
because it has just started. This session, which has a committee | :05:26. | :05:34. | |
we first considered a year ago, is a significant step forward in the | :05:35. | :05:40. | |
transparency of our intelligence agencies. Having an open | :05:41. | :05:44. | |
parliamentary evidence session will be, I believe, a real dash of real | :05:45. | :05:51. | |
value. We will not be asking witnesses to reveal secret | :05:52. | :05:54. | |
information published `` of real value. Nor will we be able to | :05:55. | :05:58. | |
discuss the current investigation into the tragic death of Lee Rigby | :05:59. | :06:03. | |
in Woolwich, in May, because we cannot prejudice the trials of the | :06:04. | :06:06. | |
accused taking place in the near future. The intelligence and | :06:07. | :06:12. | |
Security committee with its new powers investigates the operations | :06:13. | :06:15. | |
and scrutinises the capabilities of the intelligence agencies. Those | :06:16. | :06:20. | |
sessions are held behind closed doors and must remain secret. This | :06:21. | :06:24. | |
evidence session is being broadcast with a short time delay. This is a | :06:25. | :06:30. | |
safety mechanism to allow us to pause the broadcast if anything is | :06:31. | :06:35. | |
inadvertently mentioned which might endanger national security, or the | :06:36. | :06:38. | |
safety of those involved in safeguarding it. I don't expect we | :06:39. | :06:43. | |
shall need to use it, but as with the Iraq enquiry, this is a | :06:44. | :06:48. | |
precaution. If I do need to suspend the session, we will resume as | :06:49. | :06:53. | |
quickly as we can. Today's open session, being the first`ever | :06:54. | :06:58. | |
Wimbledon examination of a number of issues in `` being the first ever | :06:59. | :07:04. | |
will involve examination of a number of issues. It will include | :07:05. | :07:08. | |
controversies, the threats the agency 's work to counter, the | :07:09. | :07:11. | |
threats faced in the performance of duties. The legal and policy | :07:12. | :07:15. | |
framework in which they operate. Whether they need special legal | :07:16. | :07:19. | |
powers, and whether it is right and necessary for them to receive each | :07:20. | :07:24. | |
year ?2 billion of public funding to carry out their work. After a short | :07:25. | :07:30. | |
introductory comment, let's move straight to the questions and | :07:31. | :07:35. | |
answers part of proceedings. My first question is do you, Sir John. | :07:36. | :07:41. | |
During the Cold War, the threat to the United Kingdom was pretty | :07:42. | :07:44. | |
clear. There was the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union on one side, NATO | :07:45. | :07:48. | |
on the other. Who poses the biggest threat to national security now? | :07:49. | :07:52. | |
Thank you, chairman, for the opportunity to give evidence. We are | :07:53. | :07:56. | |
conscious of the unprecedented nature of the occasion. We will do | :07:57. | :08:01. | |
our best to answer the committee's questions as best we can. You ask | :08:02. | :08:07. | |
about the threats to the UK. It's not like it was in the Cold War. | :08:08. | :08:11. | |
There are not states out there trying to destroy our government and | :08:12. | :08:16. | |
way of life. But there are a very wide range of diverse threats that | :08:17. | :08:21. | |
we face. The biggest is terrorism, the threat from Al`Qaeda and its | :08:22. | :08:27. | |
many branches. There are also states out there that are trying to do us | :08:28. | :08:31. | |
harm through cyber attacks, acquiring nuclear weapons, or | :08:32. | :08:35. | |
involved in generating instability in parts of the world that are | :08:36. | :08:40. | |
important to us. Of course, we work in support of the armed forces, | :08:41. | :08:46. | |
especially GCHQ and ourselves, and the Armed Forces have been acting in | :08:47. | :08:49. | |
the last decade, and we have been very supportive of them in helping | :08:50. | :08:52. | |
shape their operations and protecting soldiers lives. It is a | :08:53. | :08:59. | |
very volatile and changing world we live in, and we have do have the | :09:00. | :09:02. | |
skills and people and capabilities to be able to support and defend | :09:03. | :09:07. | |
this country's security interests where the threats arrive. Thank you | :09:08. | :09:14. | |
very much. This leads me to want to ask something supplementary. Andrew | :09:15. | :09:17. | |
Parker, maybe you can answer it. At the end of the Cold War people | :09:18. | :09:20. | |
thought we could reduce the size and cost of the intelligence agencies, | :09:21. | :09:23. | |
and it's gone the other way, they are larger and more expensive than | :09:24. | :09:28. | |
ever. As the head of one of the secret agency, but also as a | :09:29. | :09:32. | |
citizen, do you sometimes get nervous that the agencies are too | :09:33. | :09:38. | |
strong and powerful? You are asking both about scale and power, and I | :09:39. | :09:43. | |
will take them in that order. In scale, ?2 billion is a substantial | :09:44. | :09:47. | |
amount of taxpayers money and we take our responsibilities in | :09:48. | :09:49. | |
spending it seriously, which is closely overseen by the committee | :09:50. | :09:53. | |
and audited by the National Audit Office. The scale is set by | :09:54. | :09:56. | |
ministers against the backdrop of the whole of public spending. That | :09:57. | :10:01. | |
?2 billion is the equivalent of roughly 6% of the nation's defence | :10:02. | :10:08. | |
budget. At that scale, we would content and believe, and ministers | :10:09. | :10:12. | |
have been persuaded, that that is a proportion as investment against the | :10:13. | :10:18. | |
threats we face. As far as the power question, the question that somehow | :10:19. | :10:22. | |
what we do is somehow compromising freedom and democracy, of course we | :10:23. | :10:27. | |
believe the opposite to be the case. It is that this committee to oversee | :10:28. | :10:36. | |
the work. That is against threats to this country, the way of life, the | :10:37. | :10:39. | |
country and the people who live here. The work we do is | :10:40. | :10:43. | |
proportionally judged against the necessity of protecting against | :10:44. | :10:52. | |
those threats. The threats from terrorism and cyber terrorism | :10:53. | :10:53. | |
increasingly involved countries and players from across the globe. What | :10:54. | :10:57. | |
has that meant for the ways in which all agencies now work? The threats | :10:58. | :11:07. | |
we face are more complex, as you describe. We need to work more | :11:08. | :11:11. | |
closely together, and there is an unprecedented level of collaboration | :11:12. | :11:15. | |
between the three agencies. For example, for MI6, there is scarcely | :11:16. | :11:20. | |
an operation we do that is not supported by either GCHQ or MI5, or | :11:21. | :11:24. | |
both. And by partners overseas as well. In a resource scarce world, | :11:25. | :11:30. | |
and one where taken all `` technology has a greater part in our | :11:31. | :11:37. | |
work, we collaborate closely on developing the technological systems | :11:38. | :11:40. | |
we need in order to deliver on our responsibilities. Over the last 25 | :11:41. | :11:47. | |
years there have been three significant events which have had | :11:48. | :11:50. | |
implications for national security, namely the end of the Cold War, 911 | :11:51. | :11:57. | |
and the Arab uprisings, none of which were foreseen by the | :11:58. | :12:00. | |
intelligence community. Would you accept now that you could and should | :12:01. | :12:02. | |
have done more to have predicted these? We are not crystal ball | :12:03. | :12:08. | |
gazers, we are intelligence agencies. We need to understand | :12:09. | :12:17. | |
other `` foreign countries. We could all see the fault lines in Arab | :12:18. | :12:21. | |
society, to take the Arab Spring as an example, but no one predicted | :12:22. | :12:25. | |
when the earthquake would strike. There was not a secret in | :12:26. | :12:29. | |
somebody's safe in Cairo saying the Arab Spring was going to start in | :12:30. | :12:34. | |
January 2011. It was not something that was out there that we missed. | :12:35. | :12:38. | |
It was an analytical issue, which, frankly, governments, think tanks, | :12:39. | :12:42. | |
foreign services and intelligence agencies, we were all looking at it | :12:43. | :12:46. | |
and we could all see that there were tensions in the societies, but you | :12:47. | :12:50. | |
cannot say that this particular trigger would happen at this | :12:51. | :12:53. | |
particular time. It was the same with the collapse of the Cold War | :12:54. | :12:57. | |
and the same with 9/11. We identified Al`Qaeda is a serious | :12:58. | :13:01. | |
threat and we have learned a huge amount since then. `` as a serious | :13:02. | :13:06. | |
threat. But we need to understand what intelligence agencies do. We | :13:07. | :13:09. | |
acquire the secrets that other countries don't want us to know or | :13:10. | :13:13. | |
other organisations don't want us to know. We are not all knowing | :13:14. | :13:19. | |
specialist in what will happen next month or next year. There is surely | :13:20. | :13:26. | |
nothing new about this at all. If you look back at the history of the | :13:27. | :13:31. | |
20th`century conflicts, a majority of those rows entirely unexpectedly, | :13:32. | :13:35. | |
sometimes unexpectedly even by the people later as aggressors. That is | :13:36. | :13:42. | |
why we put a premium on agility and flexibility. We did not expect at | :13:43. | :13:47. | |
the beginning of 2011 we'd be engaged in military conflict in | :13:48. | :13:51. | |
Libya. All three services had to direct effort towards supporting | :13:52. | :13:54. | |
government policy, supporting the Armed Forces at very short notice. | :13:55. | :13:59. | |
That is why agility, flexibility and capability are the watchwords of | :14:00. | :14:03. | |
what we do. Let's move on to the issue of technology. | :14:04. | :14:07. | |
Changes in the type of technology available have obviously had a major | :14:08. | :14:16. | |
impact on the work that you do. Can you explain, perhaps, how it has | :14:17. | :14:20. | |
changed your role? Has it made your job harder or easier? And who does | :14:21. | :14:25. | |
it help most? The agencies or the terrorist? The global information | :14:26. | :14:37. | |
communication technology is a $3 trillion industry per year. It is | :14:38. | :14:41. | |
relentless and we have to focus our efforts. To take your question in | :14:42. | :14:45. | |
two parts, the first set of challenges we have is simply around | :14:46. | :14:49. | |
the Internet. It's a fantastic place for business, life and study. It is | :14:50. | :14:54. | |
global, diverse and complex. But there are threats to our security | :14:55. | :14:57. | |
and prosperity within that and I will come back to terrorism in a | :14:58. | :15:01. | |
moment, if I may. The point about discovering subjects of interest, | :15:02. | :15:05. | |
the intelligence targets within the soup of the Internet is difficult, | :15:06. | :15:08. | |
and there is an issue around people. We need good, innovative, | :15:09. | :15:14. | |
highly skilled people to keep up with that technological challenge. | :15:15. | :15:16. | |
In terms of what it means the business, it means we have to | :15:17. | :15:20. | |
anticipate, Discover, analyse, investigate and respond, and we have | :15:21. | :15:23. | |
to do so globally, because the threat comes out as globally and we | :15:24. | :15:29. | |
need a global, agile, flexible array of security capabilities. Therefore | :15:30. | :15:34. | |
we need global partnerships. On your questions about terrorists, I think | :15:35. | :15:37. | |
it has helped the terrorist. I think our job has got harder and is | :15:38. | :15:41. | |
getting harder. If you think about what the Internet does for | :15:42. | :15:47. | |
terrorists, it gives them a myriad ways to communicate covertly. It | :15:48. | :15:49. | |
gives them the opportunity to radicalise and spread propaganda. It | :15:50. | :15:53. | |
gives them the opportunity to planned, command and control. It | :15:54. | :15:58. | |
gives them the opportunity to spread and exhort violence. We have had | :15:59. | :16:01. | |
successes in turning that against them, and those are the best kept | :16:02. | :16:05. | |
secret. It's not just about terrorism, it's also about serious | :16:06. | :16:10. | |
crime. I could mention the work we do with a child exploitation agency | :16:11. | :16:16. | |
in terms of working with them to uncover the identities and track | :16:17. | :16:22. | |
down some of those who are involved in online sexual exploitation of | :16:23. | :16:25. | |
children in the UK, including overseas, where there was a recent | :16:26. | :16:30. | |
case that we managed to do that and used intelligence capabilities to | :16:31. | :16:34. | |
identify those and bring them to justice, and two people are now in | :16:35. | :16:45. | |
jail. There are two things that define the future before us. What is | :16:46. | :16:48. | |
the diversifying threat landscape that I spoke of recently and | :16:49. | :16:52. | |
publicly. The second is the technology issue. It is an | :16:53. | :16:56. | |
accelerating technology race which is defined by the changes and | :16:57. | :17:00. | |
advances in the Internet. This is not about the world of security and | :17:01. | :17:04. | |
intelligence alone. All of our lives are moving onto the Internet, and | :17:05. | :17:08. | |
it's important we are able to operate there, because the | :17:09. | :17:12. | |
terrorists do so as well. We need to have capability that lets us track | :17:13. | :17:16. | |
them and monitor their communications in the modern world. | :17:17. | :17:24. | |
If a junior clerk with a memory stick can copy and publish on the | :17:25. | :17:29. | |
internet, tens of thousands of highly classified documents, what | :17:30. | :17:33. | |
measures can be put in place to prevent such huge breaches of | :17:34. | :17:38. | |
security in the future? If I have a go at that one. The answer on | :17:39. | :17:42. | |
security is the range of security measures we take. It is tempting to | :17:43. | :17:47. | |
think that security relating to IT must have an IT solution, of course | :17:48. | :17:53. | |
that is part of it. We have tightly controlled IT access and | :17:54. | :17:57. | |
arrangements for who can download what, but those within the whole | :17:58. | :18:02. | |
range of security arrangements that we have, the security of our | :18:03. | :18:05. | |
facilities and the personnel security that we apply to the | :18:06. | :18:09. | |
vetting that our people have to the highest level, the way that they are | :18:10. | :18:14. | |
managed and the way that all of this majors together, make it very | :18:15. | :18:17. | |
difficult and extremely unlikely to have the breaches. | :18:18. | :18:21. | |
So, whaps what happened in America, you think could not happen here it | :18:22. | :18:25. | |
has happened there twice? For the UK, I cannot comment on the US. We | :18:26. | :18:32. | |
have stringent security arrangements, of course nothing is | :18:33. | :18:39. | |
ever possible, but there has only been one instance of one individual | :18:40. | :18:45. | |
attempting on a small scale this infiltration and he was sent to | :18:46. | :18:47. | |
jail. What about the hundreds of thousands | :18:48. | :18:51. | |
of people who appear to have access to your information in the United | :18:52. | :18:56. | |
Kingdom? All three of us are involved in those discussions. | :18:57. | :19:00. | |
We have returned to the use of technology, we shall return to that | :19:01. | :19:06. | |
later. We now move to a sensitive subject, working with foreign | :19:07. | :19:11. | |
subjects. Now the flair of your work is more | :19:12. | :19:16. | |
international. You have to work with equivalence overseas. This carries | :19:17. | :19:21. | |
risk, especially if the other countries don'ted a mere to the high | :19:22. | :19:26. | |
standards of human rights that we do in this country. Why don't you link | :19:27. | :19:30. | |
your relationships to the organisations that have the same | :19:31. | :19:33. | |
standards as we have in this country? We have good partnerships | :19:34. | :19:37. | |
with the European and the Americaned other Western partners. We work | :19:38. | :19:41. | |
closely with them against all of the issues we have described. | :19:42. | :19:47. | |
I'm not concerned about those countries it is the countries that | :19:48. | :19:49. | |
don't. The problem is that the threat does | :19:50. | :19:53. | |
not come from those countries. It comes from the countries which are | :19:54. | :19:57. | |
either secretive states or where there is ungoverned territory, where | :19:58. | :20:03. | |
terrorists can operate or countries which are pursuing nuclear weapons | :20:04. | :20:08. | |
programmes for example. If you wish to work in the areas you are talking | :20:09. | :20:14. | |
about, in the Middle East, south Asia, Africa, so on, we have to work | :20:15. | :20:18. | |
with the local security partners. They are often powerful and | :20:19. | :20:22. | |
important players. They carry weight. My agency carries the main | :20:23. | :20:26. | |
responsibility for our partnerships with those organisations. If there | :20:27. | :20:32. | |
is a terrorist, say a British extremist has gone to a foreign | :20:33. | :20:37. | |
country, it is important for our security in the UK that an eye is | :20:38. | :20:45. | |
kept on him. That he is sure veiled and monitored. And maybe he may need | :20:46. | :20:50. | |
to be detained at some point. We don't have the powers to do that. | :20:51. | :20:54. | |
The locals do. So we have to work in partnership in order to be able to | :20:55. | :20:59. | |
do things lawfully overseas. If that is the case, how are you | :21:00. | :21:07. | |
sure that the action you take is not as a resulting in somebody being | :21:08. | :21:10. | |
mistreated because of that relationship? That is important for | :21:11. | :21:14. | |
us. We are clear that we only operate within the framework of the | :21:15. | :21:17. | |
law. There are some countries that we | :21:18. | :21:22. | |
cannot work with at all. Take Syria, there is no rule of law, no partner. | :21:23. | :21:27. | |
We could not operate with a partner in that country in the Syrian | :21:28. | :21:32. | |
regime. There are other countries which have mixed human rights | :21:33. | :21:38. | |
records. With countries like that, we then seek clear assurances that | :21:39. | :21:42. | |
when we provide intelligence, it is used lawfully and if anybody is | :21:43. | :21:48. | |
detained or questioned as a consequence of our intelligence, | :21:49. | :21:55. | |
that it is done to our standards. Now the, there are sometimes some | :21:56. | :21:59. | |
fine balancing to be drawn here. Where there is a fine balance, we | :22:00. | :22:05. | |
submit the issue and compile the risks and seek the guidance of | :22:06. | :22:08. | |
ministers on that. There have been allegations in | :22:09. | :22:12. | |
relation to specific incidents that your organisation has been complice | :22:13. | :22:17. | |
it in torture taken against people. How can you be sure because of the | :22:18. | :22:21. | |
close relationships, you have talked about the guidance, that the fact | :22:22. | :22:25. | |
that you have this close relationship, does it not mean that | :22:26. | :22:31. | |
you may well be explicit or responsible in some way for some of | :22:32. | :22:35. | |
the dreadful events that have occurred? I don't accept the | :22:36. | :22:40. | |
allegations made against us. With the benefit of hindsight we were not | :22:41. | :22:45. | |
configured in 2001 for the scale of the terrorist threat that this | :22:46. | :22:49. | |
country faced after 9/11. Our people were not trained for it, we did not | :22:50. | :22:54. | |
have the experience nor the resources for it. It took time to | :22:55. | :22:59. | |
adapt. It took time to adapt to the scale of the threat we faced, but we | :23:00. | :23:05. | |
learned quickly. We have had glidance in place for seven or eight | :23:06. | :23:11. | |
years now. In 2010 it was pulled across the three agencies, across | :23:12. | :23:15. | |
the military. We have consolidated guidance, published by the | :23:16. | :23:19. | |
Government. That is giving clear direction to us as the heads of | :23:20. | :23:23. | |
agencies and to our staff in the field about what they can and cannot | :23:24. | :23:28. | |
do. If there is doubt we put it to ministers. There is a former High | :23:29. | :23:34. | |
Court judge, who is directed to oversea the implementation of the | :23:35. | :23:38. | |
guidance to ensure that what we are doing is in accordance with the law | :23:39. | :23:45. | |
and that guidance. The situations in which officers may | :23:46. | :23:50. | |
find themselves operating may be dynamic indeed, what kind of audit | :23:51. | :23:57. | |
do you perform in relation to circumstances where an officer may | :23:58. | :24:01. | |
come back and say that this was difficult but he made his decision | :24:02. | :24:05. | |
in a particular direction, for example not to have any part in what | :24:06. | :24:10. | |
was going on. Don't you need assessment of the effectiveness of | :24:11. | :24:17. | |
this? We do. I think, that it is more die thamic than you suggest. | :24:18. | :24:21. | |
The idea of sending an agent off into the field like James Bond and | :24:22. | :24:27. | |
he comes back to report... Or referring to ministers. | :24:28. | :24:30. | |
It does not work that way. Our people in the field have constant | :24:31. | :24:34. | |
communication with us through stations or directly to head office. | :24:35. | :24:44. | |
They communicate rapidly we have a 24/7 system. If something is | :24:45. | :24:47. | |
happening there is system to enable guidance from head office. If we | :24:48. | :24:51. | |
feel it does not fall clearly on one side of the line or the other, or | :24:52. | :24:57. | |
the facts are uncertain, then we all wake up the affect and ask him for a | :24:58. | :25:01. | |
view, one way or the other. Do you feel, Sir John, you can | :25:02. | :25:05. | |
guarantee, not to the Committee but to the public as well, that your | :25:06. | :25:11. | |
agency, is beyond reproach now in these matters and will not be | :25:12. | :25:16. | |
explicit? What I can say is that we have learned a huge amount over the | :25:17. | :25:21. | |
last 12 years. I am satisfied with the rigorous compliance procedures | :25:22. | :25:25. | |
that we have in place. There is no way that our members of | :25:26. | :25:32. | |
staff could be drawn into situations at this stage where there is doubt | :25:33. | :25:36. | |
about what they should be doing. There is a very strong ethical | :25:37. | :25:43. | |
standard in all of our services. When you are working in a secret | :25:44. | :25:48. | |
organisation, having a strong ethical and disciplined approach is | :25:49. | :25:51. | |
really, really important. That is one of the basis on which we recruit | :25:52. | :25:56. | |
people. I am confident to be able to answer your question, yes. | :25:57. | :26:01. | |
And you are happy that the large`scale pay`offs that have been | :26:02. | :26:06. | |
upsetting constituents that have been paid out to foreign prisoners | :26:07. | :26:12. | |
held under questionable circumstances, that those days are | :26:13. | :26:17. | |
past us? I wanted also to ask on a practical level, really, if you are | :26:18. | :26:22. | |
dealing on a day`to`day issue, what goes through your mind if you have | :26:23. | :26:26. | |
been made aware of someone overseas who had vital information and being | :26:27. | :26:33. | |
held by an overseas government, perhaps by a state we don't have | :26:34. | :26:37. | |
day`to`day relationships with, how do you feel and how would you | :26:38. | :26:44. | |
operate with that person, that there could be a eminent terrorist attack | :26:45. | :26:49. | |
on UK soil? We would do what we could to disrupt any such threat. As | :26:50. | :26:56. | |
I say, if he is held in a country, if this person is held in a country | :26:57. | :26:59. | |
where we have a partnership relationship, then we will seek with | :27:00. | :27:04. | |
that partner to ensure that the right questions are put to the rson | :27:05. | :27:07. | |
but in a lawful way. If there is a serious risk that our questions | :27:08. | :27:14. | |
would prompt the maltreatment or the torture of a detainee, we would | :27:15. | :27:18. | |
consultant the ministers about that. If we knew that was going to happen, | :27:19. | :27:25. | |
we would not even think of it in the first place, but we have been able | :27:26. | :27:29. | |
to find other ways to disrupt the threats. | :27:30. | :27:34. | |
I think that the record that we have, especially with MI5's lead of | :27:35. | :27:40. | |
disrupting threats in the UK with a footprint seas has been commendable. | :27:41. | :27:45. | |
Andrew will talk about that with more authority, but about the | :27:46. | :27:49. | |
pay`offs you mentioned Mr Field, it was not just your constituents but | :27:50. | :27:53. | |
our members of staff who were sickened about it. On many occasions | :27:54. | :27:58. | |
we had a strong defence to the allegations made against us but the | :27:59. | :28:02. | |
court system did not allow us to make the defences. We are glad to | :28:03. | :28:10. | |
see the Justice and the Security Act passed that will enable us to defend | :28:11. | :28:14. | |
ourselves against the allegations. I am not saying that all allegations | :28:15. | :28:19. | |
are manufactured or whatever, and there may be some cases that a court | :28:20. | :28:23. | |
should hear, where there is a case to be heard but now the courts can | :28:24. | :28:29. | |
hear. That is because of the Justice and the Security Act. | :28:30. | :28:34. | |
I appreciate this is a hypothetical question, where you are pushing to | :28:35. | :28:38. | |
the extremes of the policy but if your question is would we pursue a | :28:39. | :28:43. | |
situation that led and we knew it would lead to mistreatment or | :28:44. | :28:48. | |
torture of an individual to get intelligence, the answer is | :28:49. | :28:51. | |
absolutely not. There is a clear Government policy that applies | :28:52. | :28:55. | |
across the agencies and underpins the guidance, that is that we do not | :28:56. | :29:02. | |
participate in encouraging or condoning mistreatment or torture. | :29:03. | :29:04. | |
That is absolute. Thank you very much. The Committee | :29:05. | :29:08. | |
will be wanting to keep a close interest in this area. Now let's | :29:09. | :29:13. | |
move to the changing nature of the threat from Al`Qaeda and its allies. | :29:14. | :29:19. | |
After 9/11, the attention of the intelligence community was focussed | :29:20. | :29:23. | |
in Island in south Asia and Afghanistan but more recently that | :29:24. | :29:27. | |
attention seems to have shifted to the Middle East, to the Horn of | :29:28. | :29:31. | |
Africa. Over the last five years, what proportion of the plots that | :29:32. | :29:36. | |
have been uncovered have been linked to Al`Qaeda as opposed to | :29:37. | :29:40. | |
Al`Qaeda`affiliated groups in the other areas, including the Maghreb | :29:41. | :29:46. | |
areas as well? If you permit me, I take a step back to answer the | :29:47. | :29:49. | |
question. I would have to position it against the whole terrorist | :29:50. | :29:54. | |
threat landscape. Since 9/11, of course that appalling attack on the | :29:55. | :29:58. | |
United States in which almost 3,000 people were killed by Al`Qaeda, | :29:59. | :30:03. | |
began what seems to be the modern chapter of terrorism, though we have | :30:04. | :30:08. | |
had terrorism as an issue for much longer than that. Afghanistan, you | :30:09. | :30:14. | |
mentioned, of course throughout the time since 9/11 that we have had | :30:15. | :30:19. | |
coalition troops and British Forces included in Afghanistan, there has | :30:20. | :30:23. | |
been no terrorism projected against this country from there, due to the | :30:24. | :30:28. | |
work of our armed forces. As we are approaching arm city day and wearing | :30:29. | :30:34. | |
poppies, I would like to pay tribute to the 456 British serviceman who | :30:35. | :30:40. | |
have given their lives to that end. There has been no terrorism in this | :30:41. | :30:44. | |
country in that time. Now to the time, the period of after 9/11, in | :30:45. | :30:48. | |
terms of threat to this country, it has been dominated by threats from | :30:49. | :30:57. | |
south Asia, an almost monolithic phenomena, from people living here, | :30:58. | :31:02. | |
how the two have interacted, I can explain more on that later. That led | :31:03. | :31:07. | |
to a series of plots. Including the dreadful attack on the 7th of July | :31:08. | :31:13. | |
in 2005 in which 52 members of the public were murdered. | :31:14. | :31:19. | |
Now that moment signalled a shift in counterterrorist work in this | :31:20. | :31:23. | |
country. Much stronger resourcing was added by the Government and | :31:24. | :31:29. | |
counterterrorist work stepped up and it started to take the shape it is | :31:30. | :31:33. | |
today, the joint work of our agencies and of MI5. | :31:34. | :31:39. | |
Could you bring your answer together more quickly... Absolutely. The | :31:40. | :31:44. | |
threat since that time has started to bread out `` spread out, but the | :31:45. | :31:48. | |
diversecation of threat is not a shift or displacement from one area | :31:49. | :31:53. | |
to another it is the growth of the Al`Qaeda phenomena in the areas you | :31:54. | :31:58. | |
are referring to. In the north and the west of Africa. In East Africa, | :31:59. | :32:06. | |
in Syria and in Yemen, and in Syria, where the ideal ideal ology started | :32:07. | :32:11. | |
to take root there with the national and extremist groupings, we have | :32:12. | :32:15. | |
seen threats from all areas, and also still from south Asia. | :32:16. | :32:23. | |
As Al`Qaeda is seeking to exploit the vacuums, you mentioned Syria, | :32:24. | :32:27. | |
and Somalia, other countries of that kind, is there not a real risk that | :32:28. | :32:32. | |
the challenging terrain you are getting coverage on, that you are | :32:33. | :32:36. | |
spread too thinly, that you are missing things? We are deployed | :32:37. | :32:48. | |
overseas, and as Andrew says, we are having to deal with Al`Qaeda | :32:49. | :32:54. | |
emerging, forming and multiplying in a new range of countries. Of course | :32:55. | :32:58. | |
that poses extra challenges and extra threats to us. There is no | :32:59. | :33:05. | |
doubt, especially in the last 12 months, really, that threat has | :33:06. | :33:09. | |
emerged. More British citizens have been killed overseas in 2013 than in | :33:10. | :33:18. | |
the previous seven years combined. In Nairobi, the hostage killed in | :33:19. | :33:24. | |
Nigeria, and the events in Woolwich. There's no doubt that the | :33:25. | :33:30. | |
threat is rising. Now, deployed overseas, we work primarily with | :33:31. | :33:34. | |
partners in response to MI5 priorities about where the threat to | :33:35. | :33:37. | |
the UK is coming from, and we do what we can to disrupt terrorist | :33:38. | :33:41. | |
attacks overseas, and we foil a good number, but some get through. The | :33:42. | :33:48. | |
threat overseas is getting greater. Just picking up on the question of | :33:49. | :33:52. | |
threat, what is your assessment of the impact of what people might | :33:53. | :33:59. | |
describe as terrorist tourism, the fact there are people who go from | :34:00. | :34:04. | |
the UK to abroad, acquire capabilities, and then if they come | :34:05. | :34:07. | |
back to this country suitably motivated have the opportunity of | :34:08. | :34:14. | |
using what they learned abroad? It is a very important strand of the | :34:15. | :34:17. | |
threat we face, the way various interaction between people who live | :34:18. | :34:24. | |
in this country who sympathise with the Al`Qaeda authorities `` | :34:25. | :34:29. | |
ideology, and they travel to meet the groupings, either Al`Qaeda | :34:30. | :34:32. | |
itself in South Asia, or some of the other groupings I spoke about across | :34:33. | :34:36. | |
other regions. Because the attractiveness to these groupings is | :34:37. | :34:40. | |
that they meet British citizens willing to engage in terrorism, and | :34:41. | :34:45. | |
they tasked them to do so back at home where they have higher impact | :34:46. | :34:52. | |
than in this country, and we have seen it played out in various plots, | :34:53. | :35:01. | |
including 7/7. So the threat from abroad is less obvious than it might | :35:02. | :35:06. | |
have been in the past? It is a complex interaction. You anticipated | :35:07. | :35:13. | |
my next question. What about attacks on British citizens in public places | :35:14. | :35:16. | |
at home and abroad? What about the taking of British citizens as | :35:17. | :35:22. | |
hostages, at home and abroad? How do you assess the credibility of the | :35:23. | :35:27. | |
threats? To describe a threat as credible does not necessarily make | :35:28. | :35:32. | |
it so. What factors do you use in assessing the extent and credibility | :35:33. | :35:36. | |
of a particular threat in a particular area, geographically for | :35:37. | :35:40. | |
example? The responsibility for assessing threat in areas of the | :35:41. | :35:45. | |
world, and including the UK, setting the threat levels is part of my | :35:46. | :35:51. | |
service but is a multi`agency body that looks at the full range of | :35:52. | :35:56. | |
intelligence from all sources and is connected to international | :35:57. | :35:58. | |
intelligence agencies around the world, and they form a picture based | :35:59. | :36:02. | |
on all the available intelligence, balancing it, assessing it, and | :36:03. | :36:06. | |
coming out with rigorous judgements about threat levels. But as the | :36:07. | :36:15. | |
account holder, that ?2 billion, they will have the responsibility | :36:16. | :36:21. | |
for deciding on which way capabilities must go, and that must | :36:22. | :36:26. | |
rest with the heads of the agencies? So do you exercise your own | :36:27. | :36:29. | |
independent judgement based on this, or do you accept the ruling? This is | :36:30. | :36:36. | |
a collective effort. John and Ian might want to say something in a | :36:37. | :36:39. | |
minute. The way in which we work against counterterrorism is an | :36:40. | :36:43. | |
endeavour between the three of us as intelligence agencies, between | :36:44. | :36:50. | |
myself and the police, particularly the police national network, who are | :36:51. | :36:54. | |
excellent partners, who we work with toward arrest and prosecutions the | :36:55. | :36:57. | |
decisions we make around this based on the threat picture. This is led | :36:58. | :37:05. | |
by MI5, but it is a team effort in which the people in all of the | :37:06. | :37:08. | |
agencies who lead the counterterrorist work at the | :37:09. | :37:12. | |
operational level plan together the deployments and priorities | :37:13. | :37:18. | |
necessary. In answer to Sir Menzies Campbell, you are talking about | :37:19. | :37:22. | |
terrorist tourism, is it your assessment that that is growing or | :37:23. | :37:27. | |
decreasing? It is growing at the moment because of Syria. Syria has | :37:28. | :37:30. | |
become an attractive place for people to go for that reason, those | :37:31. | :37:37. | |
who support or sympathise with the Al`Qaeda ideological message that I | :37:38. | :37:43. | |
mentioned. We see low hundreds of people in this country go to Syria | :37:44. | :37:47. | |
for a period, then come back. There are some large numbers are still `` | :37:48. | :37:52. | |
still there, and they get involved in fighting. This is because of the | :37:53. | :37:55. | |
proximity and ease of travel, but also because it is attractive | :37:56. | :37:59. | |
because of what they see as the jihadist cause. Moving to the | :38:00. | :38:06. | |
home`grown threat, we have seen acts of terrorism and attempted in this | :38:07. | :38:07. | |
country. In the last decade, over 50 people | :38:08. | :38:16. | |
in the UK have been killed as a result of terrorist attacks. Do you | :38:17. | :38:21. | |
accept that as many people would argue that this represents a | :38:22. | :38:25. | |
significant failure of intelligence, and perhaps you could say a word | :38:26. | :38:28. | |
about the number of plots that have been uncovered during the course of | :38:29. | :38:33. | |
the last ten years, and to what extent does luck play a part in the | :38:34. | :38:37. | |
work that you do to try and cover them? You won't be surprised that I | :38:38. | :38:44. | |
reject the term intelligence failure in this area. The principal attack | :38:45. | :38:49. | |
that the UK suffered in terms of numbers of loss of life, and there | :38:50. | :38:53. | |
have been attacks this year, goes back to 2005 the 52 deaths I spoke. | :38:54. | :39:00. | |
Committee examined `` this committee examined what this agency and the | :39:01. | :39:03. | |
police did and concluded the actions we took were reasonable at the time. | :39:04. | :39:08. | |
I think I would adhere from that that that's not judged as a failure, | :39:09. | :39:14. | |
and I don't judge that it was. Since then there have been persistent | :39:15. | :39:20. | |
attempts of attacks in this country. You ask about the last ten years, so | :39:21. | :39:26. | |
if I go back to 2005, rather than ten years, the number since 7/7, | :39:27. | :39:31. | |
there have been 34 plots towards terrorism that have been disrupted | :39:32. | :39:37. | |
in this country, of all sizes and at all stages. I have referred | :39:38. | :39:41. | |
publicly, previously, and my predecessors have, that one of those | :39:42. | :39:45. | |
`` one or two of those are major plots aimed at mass casualties which | :39:46. | :39:50. | |
have been attempted each year. Of the 34, most of them, the vast | :39:51. | :39:55. | |
majority, have been disrupted by active detection and intervention by | :39:56. | :39:59. | |
the agencies and the police. One or two of them, a small number, have | :40:00. | :40:06. | |
failed because they just failed. The plans did not come together. But the | :40:07. | :40:13. | |
vast majority were by intervention. 7/7 came as a complete shock to the | :40:14. | :40:18. | |
nation's psyche, to think that people born and raised in Britain | :40:19. | :40:21. | |
could want to commit acts of terrorism. Clearly the best way to | :40:22. | :40:25. | |
protect the country is to prevent these plots being formed in the | :40:26. | :40:30. | |
first place. How important do you think the prevention programme is, | :40:31. | :40:33. | |
and do you think there is enough emphasis on trying to make sure | :40:34. | :40:38. | |
people are not radicalised and do not go down the path of home`grown | :40:39. | :40:42. | |
terrorism? Is the committee is aware, the bulk of the work that MI5 | :40:43. | :40:48. | |
and the bulk of the agencies do in this area is stopping people who are | :40:49. | :40:52. | |
supporting terrorism and working toward it, stopping plots, and that | :40:53. | :40:56. | |
is where the bulk of the effort is. But as you rightly say, Prevent is | :40:57. | :41:02. | |
also an important pillar as part of the strategy, and it is one that | :41:03. | :41:06. | |
gets at the point of dealing with the problem of vulnerable | :41:07. | :41:09. | |
individuals who are exposed to these toxic and twisted message of | :41:10. | :41:14. | |
violence. It is certainly part of what we do with the police, to refer | :41:15. | :41:18. | |
people into that programme, wherever we can and wherever it offers a | :41:19. | :41:21. | |
sensible way for dealing with the problem. So, between 7/7 and the | :41:22. | :41:31. | |
murder of Lee Rigby, there were 34 thwarted attacks? Out of the 34, how | :41:32. | :41:36. | |
many were being plotted by home`grown terrorists? Could we say | :41:37. | :41:42. | |
the vast majority? And how many were by foreigners, and how many by | :41:43. | :41:46. | |
people living here that were relatively recently `` recent | :41:47. | :41:55. | |
arrivals? The vast majority of the plots come from people who live | :41:56. | :41:58. | |
here. There are several thousand individuals in this country who are | :41:59. | :42:01. | |
described as supporting violent extremism or engagement in some | :42:02. | :42:07. | |
way, that we are aware. The terrorist plots we have dealt with | :42:08. | :42:11. | |
over the years have almost all come from amongst those people. Of the | :42:12. | :42:17. | |
two categories that live here, how many is it? Is it the vast majority | :42:18. | :42:23. | |
that are home`grown, people who have grown up here? Or is a significant | :42:24. | :42:26. | |
proportion of people who have recently come into the country? I go | :42:27. | :42:31. | |
back to the comment we almost got to a few moments ago. I'm not sure that | :42:32. | :42:35. | |
the term home`grown is a helpful one here in getting up the phenomenon `` | :42:36. | :42:40. | |
getting at the phenomenon because of the complex and rich links between | :42:41. | :42:45. | |
the individuals here and the Al`Qaeda group overseas. In almost | :42:46. | :42:49. | |
every instance of a plot, there are those links. It almost anticipates | :42:50. | :42:55. | |
what I was going to ask next. You have seen the shift from the | :42:56. | :43:01. | |
so`called spectacular plots, to the lone wolf attacks, so`called. Would | :43:02. | :43:08. | |
you say that that is a serious shift of reorientation of the terrorist | :43:09. | :43:13. | |
threat away from networks towards individuals making these attacks, | :43:14. | :43:19. | |
and planning to kill people on a low`level, individual basis? Or is | :43:20. | :43:24. | |
it, as I think you are saying to us now, more that the lone wolves have | :43:25. | :43:29. | |
some sort of outside influence? The answer to the first question is that | :43:30. | :43:33. | |
no, it's not so much a shift, that we seek `` but that we see different | :43:34. | :43:39. | |
methods of terrorism added to over the years. I go back to a case | :43:40. | :43:44. | |
earlier this year. 11 individuals were convicted in a case we called | :43:45. | :43:52. | |
Operation Examined, in which the terrorists were picked up on covert | :43:53. | :43:57. | |
microphones talking about a plot to exceed victims in terms of the | :43:58. | :44:05. | |
number of 7/7. Big casualties are still in the minds of the | :44:06. | :44:09. | |
terrorists, and we can expect that to persist. Amongst that, we've seen | :44:10. | :44:12. | |
a small rise in the cases of the number of individuals who have | :44:13. | :44:15. | |
become radicalised and sometimes move to violent action. This happens | :44:16. | :44:20. | |
because at the rise of the Internet and the presence of all kinds of | :44:21. | :44:23. | |
violent material that they can connect with. And also because some | :44:24. | :44:29. | |
of the linkages I spoke of, the complex linkages, particularly with | :44:30. | :44:33. | |
South Asia, are harder for the terrorists to have, so there is a | :44:34. | :44:37. | |
little bit more autonomy amongst some groupings and individuals than | :44:38. | :44:41. | |
we have seen in the past. But this is an added phenomenon rather than a | :44:42. | :44:46. | |
shift from one to another. Mr Parker, the Home Secretary on Monday | :44:47. | :44:50. | |
made a statement to the house, where he said that the Security service | :44:51. | :44:54. | |
had always advised her that there had been no substantial increase in | :44:55. | :44:58. | |
the overall risk since the introduction of terrorist prevention | :44:59. | :45:02. | |
and investigation measures. Now that we have two suspects on the run and | :45:03. | :45:05. | |
the prospect of a number of the order is coming to an end in | :45:06. | :45:08. | |
January, is that assessment still valid? I know you take a close | :45:09. | :45:15. | |
interest in this in the House, as do other members of the committee. I | :45:16. | :45:19. | |
listened to the Home Secretary speak in the debate on Monday and I think | :45:20. | :45:22. | |
she covered the issue is quite fully, but on the specifics of your | :45:23. | :45:26. | |
question, going back to what my predecessors said about this, and | :45:27. | :45:35. | |
the increase in risk, that is a judgement made against the whole of | :45:36. | :45:38. | |
the risk, so when I referred a few minutes ago to the several thousand | :45:39. | :45:41. | |
individuals who support violent extremism in one way or another, it | :45:42. | :45:45. | |
is a judgement about the whole target set, including these | :45:46. | :45:50. | |
individuals, not just on their own. And it remains true. Are you able to | :45:51. | :45:57. | |
tell us a trend of operations within your service in relation to counter | :45:58. | :46:03. | |
terrorism? Over the period since 7/7, has the number of operations | :46:04. | :46:08. | |
which you have had to carry out increased? In particular, was that | :46:09. | :46:14. | |
the case in and around the period of the Olympic games? The level of | :46:15. | :46:20. | |
counterterrorist operations that goes on has been even in recent | :46:21. | :46:24. | |
years. For the Olympics we put extra effort into it in case there were | :46:25. | :46:29. | |
extra threats, or attempts by Al`Qaeda or other groups to attack | :46:30. | :46:32. | |
the games or mount attacks during the games. As it happens, there were | :46:33. | :46:38. | |
some threats. But there were no serious ones that came forward | :46:39. | :46:41. | |
during the period. We were ready in case that there were, but they | :46:42. | :46:46. | |
didn't happen. Setting the Olympics aside for a moment, in terms of the | :46:47. | :46:51. | |
trends, we have seen more and more new methods added. We are dealing | :46:52. | :46:55. | |
with a diversifying source of threats from a range of different | :46:56. | :47:01. | |
countries now. As it broadens out, its year by year and it becomes a | :47:02. | :47:05. | |
more complex task. In terms of the numbers, maybe the best guide his | :47:06. | :47:10. | |
prosecution through the court, and since 7/7, that is 330 in cases to | :47:11. | :47:16. | |
do with international terrorism. In the first part of this year there | :47:17. | :47:22. | |
were 25 convictions in four major investigations that the police were | :47:23. | :47:25. | |
involved in and brought forward as operations, one of which was the | :47:26. | :47:33. | |
plot I mentioned. Terrorism is also to Northern Ireland. Let's move to | :47:34. | :47:36. | |
that situation. Has the prominence of the threat of | :47:37. | :47:40. | |
#14r578ist terrorism on the mainland, indeed, emanating from | :47:41. | :47:46. | |
abroad, has that meant you have taken your eye from Northern | :47:47. | :47:50. | |
Ireland? Not at all. We have a substantial commitment of effort in | :47:51. | :47:53. | |
Northern Ireland. It is based there, it is not distracted by the rest of | :47:54. | :47:57. | |
our work. We took over the intelligence lead for work against | :47:58. | :48:00. | |
terrorism in Northern Ireland six years ago. We have a heavy | :48:01. | :48:04. | |
commitment of resources there. It is partnered with PSNI. The situation | :48:05. | :48:09. | |
in Northern Ireland is one in which we see from time to time tragic | :48:10. | :48:13. | |
terrorism, a year ago the murder of a prison officer, David Black over | :48:14. | :48:16. | |
there. I think it was a disgraceful act. | :48:17. | :48:21. | |
The people we are talking about, the terrorists there, are a small number | :48:22. | :48:26. | |
of people. A residue of terrorism from what I would call a by`gone | :48:27. | :48:31. | |
era. Nearly, as you know very well, moved on 15 years ago with the Good | :48:32. | :48:36. | |
Friday Agreement. With the decision to move forward in a democratic way. | :48:37. | :48:41. | |
It has done so. Northern Ireland is now a modern and a conservativic | :48:42. | :48:46. | |
society where terrorism has no place. | :48:47. | :48:49. | |
You describe them as a residue but you mentioned the murder of David | :48:50. | :48:53. | |
Black. The Northern Ireland Secretary herself warned yesterday | :48:54. | :48:58. | |
of continuous planning and targeting by dissident Republicans. What are | :48:59. | :49:03. | |
the factors that lie behind the renewed level of threat in Northern | :49:04. | :49:07. | |
Ireland? I would `` I'm not sure I accept it is a renewed level of | :49:08. | :49:13. | |
threat. The number of attacks is diminishing. And the number of | :49:14. | :49:16. | |
people convicted in the courts is going up as we bring these people | :49:17. | :49:21. | |
before the courts. The threat persists in the way that the | :49:22. | :49:24. | |
Secretary of State said, I think she said: Likely for the foreseeable | :49:25. | :49:29. | |
future. I would agree with that assessment but it will not last | :49:30. | :49:34. | |
forever. These people will over time, either give up, or put before | :49:35. | :49:39. | |
the courts and put in jail. So you think there are prospects for | :49:40. | :49:43. | |
change? That this will not go on indefinitely? Over time it is | :49:44. | :49:49. | |
diminishing year on year. There will be a Northern Ireland without this | :49:50. | :49:53. | |
sort of terrorism. I am committed to working there with the police until | :49:54. | :49:55. | |
we see that day. Thank you very much. A short | :49:56. | :49:58. | |
discussion has been had on technology. Now let's move to the | :49:59. | :50:04. | |
cyber threat, in particular how GCHQ uses the internet. Can we begin with | :50:05. | :50:08. | |
a question on the general cyber threat? Could we start on the | :50:09. | :50:12. | |
international aspects of sieb I threat? We have been familiar for a | :50:13. | :50:19. | |
long time with state attacks on the Government and the attempt to get | :50:20. | :50:24. | |
military secrets. We now have corporate attacks. There are also | :50:25. | :50:29. | |
attacks on personal individuals to get their private information. | :50:30. | :50:35. | |
How do you assess the proportion of those and could you give us a again | :50:36. | :50:41. | |
ral description of how you see the cyber threat developing? It is | :50:42. | :50:47. | |
multi`facetted. Let me talk about the actors and impact. Hostile | :50:48. | :50:51. | |
intelligence services, it is important to remember that. | :50:52. | :50:56. | |
Organised groups stealing industrial secrets, academic secrets. | :50:57. | :51:01. | |
Terrorists, activists and criminals. It is seen that there has been | :51:02. | :51:07. | |
increasingly sophisticated criminal access. I would call out the | :51:08. | :51:15. | |
non`stage actors, at the top level, is the engagement by some states, | :51:16. | :51:21. | |
less sophisticated states in terms of strategic weaponry, using cyber | :51:22. | :51:27. | |
as an over the horizon means of projecting disruption. In terms of | :51:28. | :51:32. | |
the impact, I think that I would focus on that industrial espionage | :51:33. | :51:36. | |
aspect. We are seeing attacks against the | :51:37. | :51:43. | |
businesses that keep Britain going. So finances, transport, | :51:44. | :51:47. | |
communications, energy, we are seeing theft from over 20 industrial | :51:48. | :51:52. | |
sectors, research and invasion is targeted. Trade secrets, academic | :51:53. | :52:00. | |
research. Industrial espionage on an industrial scale stealing | :52:01. | :52:02. | |
intellectual property. The response to that has to be a cross`Government | :52:03. | :52:08. | |
one and even beyond Government. So working closely for the centre for | :52:09. | :52:12. | |
the protection of national infrastructure, with the business | :52:13. | :52:15. | |
and invasion and skills department. With the new National Crime Agency | :52:16. | :52:21. | |
and with the Cabinet Office, of course. If we get that team play | :52:22. | :52:25. | |
right, we can be world`class in terms of cyber for the UK. It is | :52:26. | :52:31. | |
about working with industry about building capability so that industry | :52:32. | :52:35. | |
can help. If they can cover some of the territory at home and in an | :52:36. | :52:41. | |
overseas market, we are helping by giving certain services and working | :52:42. | :52:45. | |
with academia to build a cyber generation, to build more skills | :52:46. | :52:48. | |
across the economy. Some would say that the real cyber | :52:49. | :52:59. | |
threat comes from GCHQ, not just from others, seeking to collecting | :53:00. | :53:04. | |
everyone's data and communications. Can I ask you why you think it | :53:05. | :53:08. | |
necessary to collect information on the majority of the public in order | :53:09. | :53:16. | |
to protect us from the minority of potential evil`doers. | :53:17. | :53:19. | |
Thank you. I will work up to that, if I may! To clarify we do not spend | :53:20. | :53:25. | |
our time listening to the telephone calls or reading the e`mails of the | :53:26. | :53:30. | |
vast majority. That would not be legal. We do not do it. It would be | :53:31. | :53:37. | |
nice if serious criminals use a particular method of communication | :53:38. | :53:40. | |
and everybody used something else. That is not the case. It would be | :53:41. | :53:45. | |
nice if we knew who the terrorists or the serious criminals were but | :53:46. | :53:50. | |
the internet is a great way to avoid identification. So we have to do | :53:51. | :53:54. | |
detective work. I will give an analogy. It has been used in the | :53:55. | :53:59. | |
press, but think of the internet as a huge hey field. What we are trying | :54:00. | :54:03. | |
to do is to collect hey from those parts of the field that we can get | :54:04. | :54:09. | |
access to and which may be Luke tif in terms of containing the fromming | :54:10. | :54:14. | |
ms of needles that we may be interested in to help us. When we | :54:15. | :54:19. | |
gather the haystack. It is not from the home field but from a tiny | :54:20. | :54:23. | |
proportion of that field, we are well aware in the haystack that | :54:24. | :54:28. | |
there is lots of hey that is innocent communications from | :54:29. | :54:31. | |
innocent people, not just British but foreign people as well. We have | :54:32. | :54:36. | |
to design the queries to draw out the needles. We do not intrude on | :54:37. | :54:41. | |
the surrounding hey. So we look at the content of the communications, | :54:42. | :54:46. | |
where there are specific legal thresholds and requirements that | :54:47. | :54:49. | |
have been met. That is the reality. We don't want to delve into innocent | :54:50. | :54:55. | |
e`mails and phone calls, and I don't employ the type of people who would | :54:56. | :55:00. | |
do. My people are motivated by saving lives on the lives of those | :55:01. | :55:06. | |
on the battlefield. By preventing terrorists and serious criminals, | :55:07. | :55:11. | |
and if they were asked to snoop, I would not have the workforce, they | :55:12. | :55:14. | |
would leave the building. You have given a very full response. | :55:15. | :55:19. | |
Can I ask if you are able to give that response today, why would the | :55:20. | :55:24. | |
British public not entitled to know you were sifting large amounts of | :55:25. | :55:28. | |
communications data for the kind of purpose that you have just | :55:29. | :55:35. | |
described? Well, I believe a Government's first duty is to | :55:36. | :55:39. | |
protect its people. In some ways it does it that a secret. I don't think | :55:40. | :55:46. | |
that secret manies unaccountable. I think that the affect appointed by | :55:47. | :55:54. | |
an elected government, authorses or operations. There is a Committee | :55:55. | :55:58. | |
that gives oversight. There are the interception of the communications | :55:59. | :56:06. | |
minister and... That is all... That is all within secrecy. | :56:07. | :56:10. | |
I am asking why the British public are not entitled to share with us | :56:11. | :56:15. | |
what you have shared this after noon? I believe that certain | :56:16. | :56:20. | |
information should be secret. I don't think secret means sinister. I | :56:21. | :56:24. | |
would like to hammer that home. It feels strange to say that we have | :56:25. | :56:28. | |
nothing to hide, given we work within the ring of secrecy but that | :56:29. | :56:34. | |
has the oversight, the safeguards in terms of the parliamentary | :56:35. | :56:39. | |
Committee, the minister eel masters, the commissioners and the | :56:40. | :56:44. | |
investigatory powers tribunal to exercise that on behalf of the | :56:45. | :56:47. | |
British public. Are you giving thought as to whether | :56:48. | :56:51. | |
the line you have drawn between the aspects of the way that you operate | :56:52. | :56:55. | |
which have to be kept secret and those that could be shared with the | :56:56. | :57:01. | |
wider public, not just with intelligence`related activities, are | :57:02. | :57:06. | |
you giving thought to whether or not the line can be redrawn, safely? | :57:07. | :57:12. | |
That has been an active debate even before the recent revelations. | :57:13. | :57:18. | |
When the Committee reviews us, with we give evidence, when you produce | :57:19. | :57:22. | |
your report, you seek to produce it in an unredakted report as possible. | :57:23. | :57:34. | |
That has happened over time. Some serious allegations have have | :57:35. | :57:39. | |
been made, many of them directed at GCHQ. Earlier there was an | :57:40. | :57:44. | |
allegations that you were using your relationships with the US services | :57:45. | :57:50. | |
in order to circumvent British law. We did an inquiry, we found it | :57:51. | :57:54. | |
unfounded. I think it important to be clear with the public. Can you | :57:55. | :57:58. | |
give us a guarantee that you do not conduct operations which are out | :57:59. | :58:03. | |
with the British legal framework? Yes, I can give you that guarantee. | :58:04. | :58:09. | |
I belief that is true with we are subject to the law. I am sure that | :58:10. | :58:14. | |
is true of my sister agencies as well. | :58:15. | :58:18. | |
I am aware of your capabilities in the past but not to the int cassis | :58:19. | :58:25. | |
to which Hazel Blears has referred. While we appreciate the co`operation | :58:26. | :58:31. | |
you have with the overseas agencies, can you give assurance that at the | :58:32. | :58:37. | |
earliest time of the closed session, you can give us an update of all | :58:38. | :58:46. | |
with whom you kol abrate with? I think so. | :58:47. | :58:51. | |
I think that the public, the vast majority think that you have the | :58:52. | :58:55. | |
right amount of powers or indeed some think you need more. As usual, | :58:56. | :59:02. | |
the public... That is not necessarily the view of this | :59:03. | :59:05. | |
Committee! I think that the public are sensible around this area, but | :59:06. | :59:09. | |
what the polling shows also is that yes, they support you having the | :59:10. | :59:14. | |
powers but they do want more transparency about the way that the | :59:15. | :59:18. | |
powers are exercised. This is the chairman's point about is there the | :59:19. | :59:21. | |
possibility that whilst maintaining security, absolutely but to have | :59:22. | :59:24. | |
perhaps a more informed dialogue with the public, who often exhibit | :59:25. | :59:31. | |
good common sense on the issues that provide people with the extra degree | :59:32. | :59:36. | |
of reassurance about what all of you are undertaking? Let me help now. | :59:37. | :59:42. | |
The pack answer is that there are good safeguards in place. I believe | :59:43. | :59:46. | |
that to be the truth, but if you are a terrorist, a serious criminal, a | :59:47. | :59:52. | |
prolife rare, a foreign intelligence target or if your activities pose a | :59:53. | :59:56. | |
genuine threat to the national or the economic security of the United | :59:57. | :00:02. | |
Kingdom, there is a possible that your communication will be | :00:03. | :00:06. | |
monitored. We will seek to listen to you. If not, if you are not in | :00:07. | :00:09. | |
contact with one of those people, you will not be. We are not entitled | :00:10. | :00:15. | |
to. That is true whether you are British, foreign and ever are in the | :00:16. | :00:20. | |
world. Would your colleagues like to add to | :00:21. | :00:23. | |
the points raised in this area so far? Andrew Parker? I think that | :00:24. | :00:29. | |
openness is something we are moving down the road of. It is now over 20 | :00:30. | :00:34. | |
years we have been open in increasing ways as agencies. The | :00:35. | :00:40. | |
issue about balancing powers and transparency and openness and | :00:41. | :00:46. | |
intrusion versus privacy, so on, all of the balances that are important | :00:47. | :00:49. | |
in a free society, in a domestic like the United Kingdom, these are | :00:50. | :00:55. | |
matters that mainly are for ministers to lead on and for | :00:56. | :00:59. | |
Parliament to set law about, that we then abide by and are overseen in | :01:00. | :01:05. | |
the work that we do. So, these are all live issues now. Of course they | :01:06. | :01:10. | |
are. So there is more openness. That is true for a Parliament and | :01:11. | :01:14. | |
for a Government to decide the matters but often the agencies seem | :01:15. | :01:19. | |
nervous about insisting that something cannot be said in public | :01:20. | :01:23. | |
because of the damage it may do. Do you feel you have taken that | :01:24. | :01:27. | |
argument too far? The reason things are secret is not because we are | :01:28. | :01:31. | |
embarrassed about them or wish to keep them from the public, it is | :01:32. | :01:35. | |
because we need to keep them from the people we are investigating or | :01:36. | :01:39. | |
carrying out operations against, the terrorists, the spies and the pro | :01:40. | :01:44. | |
life rares. If we make it public it is public to them too. Then we lose | :01:45. | :01:49. | |
important operational advantage. That can be fragile. That would | :01:50. | :01:54. | |
leave the UK less safe. The task we are paid to do is to keep the | :01:55. | :01:58. | |
country safe it is a challenging and a difficult work to do. The | :01:59. | :02:04. | |
techniques that we have, if they are compromised. It makes our work then | :02:05. | :02:10. | |
harder. There are always secrets. So the oversight mechanisms can operate | :02:11. | :02:15. | |
on behalf of Parliament and on behalf of the public. I would like | :02:16. | :02:29. | |
to support what they have just said. Every successful company in this | :02:30. | :02:33. | |
country is mastering modern technology. The Internet is an | :02:34. | :02:43. | |
important part of this. We are all trying to use technology to take | :02:44. | :02:49. | |
full advantage of the opportunities to achieve our goals. The safeguard | :02:50. | :02:59. | |
in place are very good. It would be bizarre to think the one area to be | :03:00. | :03:05. | |
excluded from taking full advantage of modern technology is keeping this | :03:06. | :03:11. | |
country safe. We have an extraordinarily difficult task, as | :03:12. | :03:17. | |
Andrew has described. We have to identify and recruit agents in the | :03:18. | :03:21. | |
most exposed places. In countries which are trying to do our country | :03:22. | :03:26. | |
harm. Secret states that are trying to do damage to others. We need to | :03:27. | :03:33. | |
have the possibility of examining intelligence, drawing on information | :03:34. | :03:37. | |
our partner agencies have been ordered to be able to identify those | :03:38. | :03:49. | |
very brave individuals. If you end up diminishing our ability to use | :03:50. | :03:55. | |
technology, you will be less able to have that advantage. You are | :03:56. | :04:05. | |
currently under some criticism. If babies a terrorist incident, you | :04:06. | :04:13. | |
will no doubt be under criticism for not having enough. ` ` if there is a | :04:14. | :04:28. | |
terrorist incident. I wonder whether you have any comments on where you | :04:29. | :04:36. | |
strike that very difficult balance. I think fundamentally, the resonant | :04:37. | :04:44. | |
denture of an organisation like MI5 is to protect the sort of country we | :04:45. | :04:57. | |
live in ` ` rasion d'etre. We pride our individual liberty and privacy. | :04:58. | :05:02. | |
They are extremely important values to the people who work in our | :05:03. | :05:15. | |
agency. Our job is to keep the balance. Sometimes I find MI5 and | :05:16. | :05:25. | |
other agencies being spoken of as if we were on the side of the seesaw. | :05:26. | :05:36. | |
We are trying to help government make balances. It is about keeping | :05:37. | :05:42. | |
this country the sort of country it is. There have been times when | :05:43. | :05:47. | |
successive governments have offered my service greater powers, and we | :05:48. | :05:52. | |
have said they were disproportionate and turned away from them. Making | :05:53. | :05:56. | |
the balances is critically important. Been no recent speech, he | :05:57. | :06:05. | |
said, it causes enormous damage to make public the reach and | :06:06. | :06:08. | |
limitations of GCHQ's techniques, and that such information to the | :06:09. | :06:17. | |
terrorists. You then, it, the gift they need to invade as an strike at | :06:18. | :06:25. | |
will. We appreciate you may be limited in the detail you can go | :06:26. | :06:29. | |
into today. I think the public are entitled to know more about this | :06:30. | :06:40. | |
enormous damage you talked about. Can you give examples, specific | :06:41. | :06:46. | |
examples of how it has been a gift to terrorist? It will be difficult | :06:47. | :06:58. | |
to give in a public session. We can do it in a private session later if | :06:59. | :07:16. | |
you like. It leads to was finding terrorist plots we would not | :07:17. | :07:21. | |
otherwise find, which we can them for walks and that leads to lies | :07:22. | :07:26. | |
being saved. There are real instances of that. If we lose it, we | :07:27. | :07:40. | |
are making a difficult task harder. That is what I meant in the speech. | :07:41. | :07:47. | |
I would like to come in. Going back to the Second World War and beyond, | :07:48. | :07:57. | |
they depend on our terrorist targets being unaware. If sources are | :07:58. | :08:10. | |
revealed, it is inexorable. What we have seen over the last five months | :08:11. | :08:19. | |
is nearly daily discussion. We have seen terrorist groups in the Middle | :08:20. | :08:25. | |
East discussing the revelations of specific terms in terms of | :08:26. | :08:35. | |
communications they use. Do you mean this is online? We have seen chat | :08:36. | :08:46. | |
around specific terrorist groups discussing how to avoid what they | :08:47. | :08:50. | |
now perceived to be communication methods, or how to select | :08:51. | :08:58. | |
communication methods. I will not compound damage by being specific in | :08:59. | :09:08. | |
public. We will ask you in private. Are you saying this is information | :09:09. | :09:12. | |
which refers to the revelations that have appeared in the press in the | :09:13. | :09:17. | |
last 12 months? Absolutely. It is a direct consequence. Bekele to have | :09:18. | :09:25. | |
effect of the media coverage, global media coverage, will make things | :09:26. | :09:43. | |
more difficult. It uncovers terrorist cells. It allows us to | :09:44. | :09:56. | |
reveal the identities of those involved in online sexual | :09:57. | :10:03. | |
exploitation of children. That mosaic is in a far week and place | :10:04. | :10:09. | |
and it was. I think most reasonable people would accept that if people | :10:10. | :10:25. | |
are using these kind of meetings for planning or whatever, we should have | :10:26. | :10:29. | |
access to it. I do not think we have got to the point that people feel | :10:30. | :10:56. | |
reassured. It might have been intercepted. We will not look at it | :10:57. | :11:02. | |
without specific authorisation. Going back to what has appeared in | :11:03. | :11:06. | |
the press here and abroad, it is sometimes argued that if people | :11:07. | :11:22. | |
responsible for these publications, is there any validity? I am not sure | :11:23. | :11:37. | |
the journalists who are managing this very sensitive information are | :11:38. | :11:41. | |
particularly well placed to make those judgements. What I can tell | :11:42. | :11:48. | |
you is that the leaks from Edward Snowden have been very damaging. | :11:49. | :11:52. | |
They have put our operations at risk. It is clear that our | :11:53. | :12:00. | |
adversaries are rubbing their hands in glee. Al`Qaeda is lapping it up. | :12:01. | :12:07. | |
I think we need to hear why you think you are entitled to say that. | :12:08. | :12:12. | |
Why do you believe that to be true? I do not want to repeat what my | :12:13. | :12:15. | |
colleagues have said. They have clearly set out how the alert enough | :12:16. | :12:23. | |
targets to our capabilities means it becomes more difficult to acquiring | :12:24. | :12:31. | |
intelligence we need. Is there any additional information you can share | :12:32. | :12:35. | |
with us is too hard evidence that terrorists or potential terrorists | :12:36. | :12:42. | |
have been looking at these reports or change these plans as a result? | :12:43. | :12:47. | |
Not in this public forum. You will be willing to share that with the | :12:48. | :12:51. | |
committee in a private session? Of course. We have had some discussion | :12:52. | :13:04. | |
about balance already. There was the ability to intervene, and their | :13:05. | :13:14. | |
anxiety about privacy in the public has become greater. One way it can | :13:15. | :13:19. | |
be dealt with is for the public to be satisfied there is a robust legal | :13:20. | :13:23. | |
framework. In that respect, is it the view of any of you that the | :13:24. | :13:30. | |
existing legal framework is adequate to deal with the enormous | :13:31. | :13:38. | |
consequences of the revolution in technology, and if there is to be a | :13:39. | :13:42. | |
public debate as to where the balance will be struck, is that a | :13:43. | :13:46. | |
debate you would be willing to participate in publicly? On that | :13:47. | :13:56. | |
last point, subject to administration, yes. We are not | :13:57. | :14:03. | |
lawmakers. There are strict criteria that provide safeguards to protect | :14:04. | :14:13. | |
privacy. I think it is a false choice. Our job is to provide | :14:14. | :14:22. | |
intelligence around security. Our internal rules reflect what is in | :14:23. | :14:33. | |
the laugh. The laws were drafted to be technology neutral. I think they | :14:34. | :14:43. | |
did a pretty good job. It insists upon necessity and proportionality. | :14:44. | :14:48. | |
They are as relevant now as when the drawers were drafted. They guide the | :14:49. | :14:51. | |
way we work, they guide the way we think. They are within our DNA. If | :14:52. | :14:58. | |
Parliamentary wants to have a debate, fine by me. Proportionality | :14:59. | :15:08. | |
necessarily involves value judgements. They may change. Is it | :15:09. | :15:25. | |
not necessary now to believe the public anxiety? I want to stress the | :15:26. | :15:41. | |
role of the commissioners. We talk to them about our methods, about the | :15:42. | :15:48. | |
way that we work, and this idea that technology has moved on beyond the | :15:49. | :15:52. | |
law, there are few will be important on that. These are the intelligence | :15:53. | :16:00. | |
commissioners who look at the specific legality of processes. Yes, | :16:01. | :16:07. | |
I am sorry. The commissioners, two former senior judges. Unlike us, | :16:08. | :16:14. | |
they do not sit in public. They produce a public report. There | :16:15. | :16:22. | |
is clearly a big debate going on in the united states. I think there is | :16:23. | :16:29. | |
evidence there is a change in behaviour from some of the global | :16:30. | :16:34. | |
communications companies. Are you concerned about the long`term | :16:35. | :16:39. | |
consequences, given the close partnership with the Americans? | :16:40. | :16:46. | |
Yes, I am concerned in terms of cooperation that we might receive. I | :16:47. | :16:57. | |
am concerned about the access that we can lawfully require of | :16:58. | :17:04. | |
communications companies, which is very difficult if they are based | :17:05. | :17:08. | |
overseas. Could I just come back to Sir | :17:09. | :17:12. | |
Menzies Campbell's point full stop people who work for us are public | :17:13. | :17:16. | |
servants. We are committed to working in accordance with the law | :17:17. | :17:23. | |
and of remarkable. We will certainly give some advice about what | :17:24. | :17:27. | |
implications of certain changes might be. But you said the law and | :17:28. | :17:32. | |
we will work within the framework of the law. There was an absolutely | :17:33. | :17:36. | |
clear commitment. When people refer to the legal basis | :17:37. | :17:40. | |
on which you operate, they are normally referring to the | :17:41. | :17:42. | |
intelligence services act, but the results of the Human Rights Act. | :17:43. | :17:46. | |
Could you say something to the extent to which that impacts on the | :17:47. | :17:49. | |
way you carry in your responsibilities? How do you make | :17:50. | :17:55. | |
sure you are complying with that? The founding statutes that our | :17:56. | :18:00. | |
services operate to the intelligence services act and the security | :18:01. | :18:02. | |
services act, are themselves based on the Human Rights Act, Article | :18:03. | :18:07. | |
eight of the right to privacy, but we are talking about for the | :18:08. | :18:11. | |
citizen. Which can only be transgressed for reasons of national | :18:12. | :18:15. | |
security and some other arrangements which are less central to what we're | :18:16. | :18:20. | |
talking about today. But the acts that we want to based on that, and | :18:21. | :18:23. | |
so the Human Rights Act is at the centre and at the foundation of our | :18:24. | :18:28. | |
work. It forms the guiding principles. | :18:29. | :18:31. | |
Before relieved this area of questioning, Lord Butler? | :18:32. | :18:38. | |
One final question on that. Can you see why it is that the public feel | :18:39. | :18:44. | |
that when the last bit of legislation on this was passed in | :18:45. | :18:47. | |
the year 2000, and technology has moved on so fast, and your | :18:48. | :18:51. | |
capabilities have developed so hugely, it is hardly credible that | :18:52. | :18:56. | |
that legislation is still fit for purpose for the modern world. | :18:57. | :19:03. | |
I can see why the question comes up, Lord Butler, of course. But the | :19:04. | :19:07. | |
real issue for us is whether the work we do is sufficiently covered | :19:08. | :19:14. | |
by the law, that it is lawful and we can be sure, there are staff can be | :19:15. | :19:18. | |
sure that what they do is lawful. That is properly overseen and that | :19:19. | :19:21. | |
is rigorous, and as you know, niche of arrangements there are Parliament | :19:22. | :19:27. | |
of the oversight of this committee and our Secretary of State reported | :19:28. | :19:31. | |
to Parliament, the judicial, through the commissioners have spoken of and | :19:32. | :19:36. | |
of course through these editors to ministers do we are accountable. | :19:37. | :19:41. | |
Sometimes it might be helped to bring to life a bit especially | :19:42. | :19:47. | |
publicly because on behalf of Parliament and the public, the | :19:48. | :19:50. | |
report to the public in various ways, but somehow it doesn't get | :19:51. | :19:55. | |
into the public mind that that operates. I can say for six months | :19:56. | :20:01. | |
as a director, this is my fourth formal appearance before the | :20:02. | :20:02. | |
committee giving evidence across a range of subjects, operational, | :20:03. | :20:09. | |
policy, finance, administration. As you all know, I have submitted to | :20:10. | :20:13. | |
you hundreds of pages of material about our work, you have received | :20:14. | :20:18. | |
briefings, I have three visits from the commissioners would have spoken | :20:19. | :20:20. | |
of in that period. I see the Home Secretary is her role as Secretary | :20:21. | :20:25. | |
of State, sometimes two or three times a week. This is very active | :20:26. | :20:29. | |
and rigorous oversight in this collection of arrangements. | :20:30. | :20:34. | |
Sometimes a dozen projected well to the public that this goes on. | :20:35. | :20:39. | |
Could we just switch to another aspect of If part of the role of MI6 | :20:40. | :22:16. | |
is to stop would`be terrorists joining organisations, what are you | :22:17. | :22:19. | |
doing to try to deal with this issue, especially because of the | :22:20. | :22:23. | |
risk of these people coming back to the United Kingdom? The agencies | :22:24. | :22:28. | |
work extremely closely together. We don't have the authority, we rely on | :22:29. | :22:36. | |
our partners in MI5 to notify those of individuals of concern. We work | :22:37. | :22:40. | |
with foreign partners in south`east Europe and the Arab world who may be | :22:41. | :22:46. | |
able to help us identify where people are moving to. We have our | :22:47. | :22:51. | |
own connections into the Syrian opposition, where we try to identify | :22:52. | :22:55. | |
where people might have gone to inside Syria. It is a very difficult | :22:56. | :23:01. | |
environment within which to operate. Our strategy to prevent | :23:02. | :23:05. | |
terrorism here in this country is to break the links between potential | :23:06. | :23:11. | |
extremists here and Al`Qaeda ranches overseas. We need a whole range of | :23:12. | :23:18. | |
partnerships to achieve that. Syria is particularly difficult. We have | :23:19. | :23:31. | |
got no partner there. To have any liable intelligence ` ` reliable | :23:32. | :23:40. | |
intelligence about the number of UK citizens who have returned from | :23:41. | :23:51. | |
Syria who have potentially fought in the Syrian war? I think we have a | :23:52. | :24:02. | |
reasonable understanding of that. Low hundreds is the number I think I | :24:03. | :24:07. | |
would use publicly. That is the total number of people who we | :24:08. | :24:10. | |
believe are have are now fighting and people who have come back. Those | :24:11. | :24:14. | |
who have been involved in fighting and combat, we need to take some | :24:15. | :24:19. | |
degree of interest in to check they are not intending to become involved | :24:20. | :24:23. | |
in violence here. Most of them will not put some might. When I asked | :24:24. | :24:36. | |
about the programme before, you said it was not necessarily your consent, | :24:37. | :24:41. | |
but isn't it the case at some of these people coming back from Syria, | :24:42. | :24:46. | |
will have a great kid of kudos in the country and will find it easy to | :24:47. | :24:50. | |
draw vulnerable young people to them and possibly radicalise them? Isn't | :24:51. | :24:55. | |
it really important your service has a role in interface with the present | :24:56. | :25:03. | |
programme? They will be looked up by others in | :25:04. | :25:08. | |
the community. That increases the threat. That may happen, and we have | :25:09. | :25:12. | |
discussed prevent threat matters in the past. | :25:13. | :25:16. | |
I think what you're saying is right in some cases. As far as our | :25:17. | :25:22. | |
interface with the event programme, it is more than that, we overlap | :25:23. | :25:26. | |
into it because these two pillars of contest, the counterterrorist | :25:27. | :25:32. | |
strategy that the government has, or overlapped of prevent and pursue. | :25:33. | :25:37. | |
They are overlapped because of the very phenomenon that you have | :25:38. | :25:39. | |
identified. There are radicalise his around. People who spend time trying | :25:40. | :25:46. | |
to persuade people of the arcade ideology and cause. Where there are | :25:47. | :25:50. | |
vulnerable people to that message, sometimes the joint because of | :25:51. | :25:57. | |
followers. Full to the prevent programme is designed at preventing | :25:58. | :26:02. | |
that. We refer numbers of people into the programme, sometimes with | :26:03. | :26:07. | |
success. Some of those who go to Syria will | :26:08. | :26:10. | |
go because of self`motivation, but others may have been recruited. Do | :26:11. | :26:18. | |
you exercise any surveillance over possible recruiting agents with any | :26:19. | :26:28. | |
more disrupting their activities. Of course we do, because these are | :26:29. | :26:31. | |
some of the people we need to be concerned about is a priority, those | :26:32. | :26:35. | |
are trying to recruit others to violence and terrorism whether | :26:36. | :26:40. | |
overseas or home. Let us move to Iran and North Korea. | :26:41. | :26:45. | |
Lord Butler. Last summer, you said publicly that | :26:46. | :26:50. | |
your assessment was that Iran was two years away from obtaining | :26:51. | :26:53. | |
nuclear weapons. We have now seen some advances and that, and | :26:54. | :26:59. | |
President Rohani saying he is prepared to discuss the programme. | :27:00. | :27:06. | |
That is a dramatic success. Do you regard the intelligence committee as | :27:07. | :27:08. | |
having made a contribution to that advance? | :27:09. | :27:14. | |
Yes, I do. I be careful of what I say because the negotiators are | :27:15. | :27:17. | |
going on in Geneva today as we speak. But I think that the | :27:18. | :27:22. | |
intelligence community has contributed to an understanding of | :27:23. | :27:28. | |
Iran's nuclear programme. It has given our politicians and our | :27:29. | :27:32. | |
negotiators a clear sense of what is actually happening. Some of it is | :27:33. | :27:38. | |
over and reported upon by the international atomic energy | :27:39. | :27:42. | |
authority for stop some of it is done in secret. We don't have a | :27:43. | :27:46. | |
complete picture, but our intelligence is certainly informed | :27:47. | :27:50. | |
that picture. Secondly, the reason why Iran has come back to | :27:51. | :27:53. | |
negotiations is because of the impact of sanctions. We have played | :27:54. | :27:58. | |
an important role in monitoring the sanctions and ensuring that the | :27:59. | :28:03. | |
attempt by Iran to evade the sanctions by using false flag | :28:04. | :28:11. | |
companies or false user certificates for technical equipment, but we are | :28:12. | :28:17. | |
able to disrupt that and work with foreign partners to do so. Thirdly, | :28:18. | :28:21. | |
we have a lot of expertise in the intelligence community, perhaps | :28:22. | :28:26. | |
especially in MI6 about Iran, and that expertise is available to | :28:27. | :28:29. | |
government to understand what is happening in terms of the politics. | :28:30. | :28:34. | |
Very conjugated politics between resident Rohani, the supreme leader, | :28:35. | :28:38. | |
the IR GC, and the various other elements in the complex uranium | :28:39. | :28:44. | |
picture. On Iran, if I may, one of the issues | :28:45. | :28:50. | |
is a serious lack of trust on the international community towards Iran | :28:51. | :28:55. | |
and the reverse. From the point of view of the intelligence agencies, | :28:56. | :28:59. | |
and not just the kingdom, your international allies in this matter, | :29:00. | :29:05. | |
how confident can you be that any commitments Iran might give arising | :29:06. | :29:08. | |
out of successful negotiations would be commitments that could be relied | :29:09. | :29:13. | |
upon? As we all know, the history of the intelligence assessments on | :29:14. | :29:16. | |
weapons of mass destruction elsewhere in the Middle East turned | :29:17. | :29:20. | |
out not to be good. I'm not just referring to the United Kingdom, but | :29:21. | :29:22. | |
the net states and other countries. Is there any reason to be confident | :29:23. | :29:28. | |
that commitments given by Iran to be seen to be enforceable? | :29:29. | :29:34. | |
One thing we can learn from the Iraq experience is that when the | :29:35. | :29:36. | |
International atomic and your authority are involved, that gives a | :29:37. | :29:40. | |
good framework on which to build an understanding. In terms of how you | :29:41. | :29:46. | |
monster sincerity with which commitments are made, we will rely | :29:47. | :29:51. | |
upon organisations like the IEEE to visit, inspect and track what the | :29:52. | :29:57. | |
Iranians are doing. We can do that with issues like the feel cycle. In | :29:58. | :30:04. | |
Richmond facilities, for example. It is more difficult with secret | :30:05. | :30:09. | |
military programmes. Both previous governments like South Africa in | :30:10. | :30:13. | |
1990 or Libya in 2003 dismantled their nuclear weapons programme, we | :30:14. | :30:16. | |
have very clear visibility about what was going on. It will be more | :30:17. | :30:21. | |
difficult in Iran. What is the main lessons you learn | :30:22. | :30:24. | |
from the failures of Iraqi intelligence? | :30:25. | :30:30. | |
The Butler is an expert on this. It is you are asking. | :30:31. | :30:36. | |
We have taken Lord Butler 's report, and it is a bible for us in the way | :30:37. | :30:40. | |
they manage intelligence, assess intelligence, evaluate our agents. | :30:41. | :30:43. | |
There were clearly shortcomings back in 2002, and we have learnt | :30:44. | :30:50. | |
enormously from that. Actually, you point to the Iraq failing, which is | :30:51. | :30:54. | |
very real, but when we look at Syria, Libya, North Korea, the | :30:55. | :30:59. | |
international network of proliferating concerns, the business | :31:00. | :31:05. | |
of proliferation, the record is very good. North Korea, Sir Menzies | :31:06. | :31:13. | |
Campbell. North Korea's nuclear ambitions and | :31:14. | :31:18. | |
ability to provide delivery systems, all that seems unabated. I'm not at | :31:19. | :31:25. | |
asking what resources you devote to North Korea, but may I ask, can I | :31:26. | :31:30. | |
take it it is a country of concern? And it is a country of concern in | :31:31. | :31:34. | |
which cooperative arrangements with other allies are extremely important | :31:35. | :31:43. | |
in allowing judgements to be made? You choose your words with care. Of | :31:44. | :31:48. | |
course North Korea is a very great concern to us and our partners, | :31:49. | :31:53. | |
especially close partners like Japan or the act states, Canada, Australia | :31:54. | :31:59. | |
in that part of the world. North Korea, is not as high and | :32:00. | :32:07. | |
operational priority as us other parts of the world, but we can play | :32:08. | :32:11. | |
a role, we do so, and we share that with the partners must concern. | :32:12. | :32:16. | |
Thank you. The final here are questioning, espionage in the UK. | :32:17. | :32:22. | |
A touch of nostalgia here from an old cold warrior. Does traditional | :32:23. | :32:26. | |
espionage, for example from Russia, still posed a threat that it once | :32:27. | :32:33. | |
did? And bearing in mind one of the more controversial revelations in | :32:34. | :32:37. | |
the press recently, and be true to say that everyone is still spying on | :32:38. | :32:44. | |
everybody else? I'll answer this one fairly briefly. | :32:45. | :32:49. | |
Roundabout 10% of my service's work is devoted to dealing with the | :32:50. | :32:55. | |
security threats that arrive from foreign states, that includes | :32:56. | :32:59. | |
espionage and a bit on counter proliferation and that is relevant | :33:00. | :33:05. | |
in the UK. Most of it is on espionage is by a range of foreign | :33:06. | :33:08. | |
states. It is still a lively business year because there are | :33:09. | :33:11. | |
plenty of countries around the world that take a close interest and an | :33:12. | :33:15. | |
improper one in a security sense, in military affairs here in stealing | :33:16. | :33:21. | |
technology and stealing economic advantage where they can. This is a | :33:22. | :33:26. | |
lively business will stop you mentioned Russia, but there are | :33:27. | :33:27. | |
range countries involved in this. Is there scope for cooperation with | :33:28. | :33:52. | |
Russia? Has that been impeded? Perhaps I could take that one. The | :33:53. | :34:08. | |
government took the series of measures. We have not had the | :34:09. | :34:13. | |
cooperation we sought for. There has been a gap. We have not altered the | :34:14. | :34:18. | |
Russians and they haven't talked to us. We have passed the Olympic flame | :34:19. | :34:45. | |
on from London to so chewy I didn't quite hit an answer about whether F1 | :34:46. | :34:51. | |
of spies on others. Question ` ` I didn't quite hear an answer about | :34:52. | :35:05. | |
whether others spy on us. This is the vast bulk of what we deal with. | :35:06. | :35:11. | |
Everything we do is in response to priorities laid down by | :35:12. | :35:13. | |
governments, authorised by government. We have limited | :35:14. | :35:19. | |
resources. There are very few countries where we actually have | :35:20. | :35:26. | |
operations. I am not going to go into detail. What I can tell you is | :35:27. | :35:31. | |
we are targeted against the highest priority challenges this government | :35:32. | :35:35. | |
and this country faces. Everything we do is authorised by ministers. | :35:36. | :35:40. | |
Thank you very much indeed. We are conscious we have not covered | :35:41. | :35:50. | |
everything I would like to thank our three witnesses for the evidence | :35:51. | :35:54. | |
they have given and the manner in which they have given it. We look | :35:55. | :35:58. | |
forward to further the liberations. Can we just one last word? | :35:59. | :36:04. | |
Certainly. You asked about the value of our services. We get great value | :36:05. | :36:14. | |
from the men and women who work for us. These are dedicated, loyal | :36:15. | :36:21. | |
people. They do this work because they believe in protecting the | :36:22. | :36:30. | |
values we have. These people are the backbone of what we do. I am sure we | :36:31. | :36:34. | |
can all happily endorse what you have said. I would be grateful if | :36:35. | :36:50. | |
the audience can remain seated. Remarkable to see Sir Iain Lobban, | :36:51. | :36:54. | |
Andrew Parker and Sir John Sawers giving evidence at Westminster. That | :36:55. | :37:04. | |
session has now finished at Westminster. Frank Gardner was | :37:05. | :37:11. | |
listening to that alongside us. It is a vast area to tackle in 90 | :37:12. | :37:15. | |
minutes, Frank. What stood out for you? On the surface of it, it was | :37:16. | :37:26. | |
fairly turgid. There were some very serious issues in there. One of the | :37:27. | :37:31. | |
most important being, let us get to the bottom of Edward Snowden. They | :37:32. | :37:38. | |
were pressed to justify that allegation that the leaks have | :37:39. | :37:45. | |
caused all this damage. They were reluctant to go into detail, at | :37:46. | :37:48. | |
least in front of the cameras. One thing they did give away was they | :37:49. | :37:53. | |
said they have effectively intercepted terrorist communications | :37:54. | :37:59. | |
in, to use their words, the Middle East, South Asia and Afghanistan, | :38:00. | :38:05. | |
work their targets are discussing ways of how to use different | :38:06. | :38:09. | |
communications. They say that is making their job that much harder. | :38:10. | :38:14. | |
The committee was, I think, more robust than it has been in the past. | :38:15. | :38:27. | |
One of the things they said, the GCHQ boss, a man we have never seen | :38:28. | :38:33. | |
in public before, he said, we don't want to delve into innocent e`mails | :38:34. | :38:38. | |
and phone calls, I don't think secret means a sinister. The problem | :38:39. | :38:43. | |
is, they are so secretive, and they have put a lid on everything, they | :38:44. | :38:48. | |
have almost cried wolf and people are not sure how much of this to | :38:49. | :38:53. | |
believe and trust. There was a fascinating insight from Sir John | :38:54. | :38:58. | |
Sawers, the MI6 boss, when he was being asked about difficult | :38:59. | :39:01. | |
decisions working with foreign governments and cooperating with | :39:02. | :39:04. | |
governments that have got perhaps not the same human rights standards | :39:05. | :39:12. | |
as this country, and he said agents overseas will wake up the Foreign | :39:13. | :39:15. | |
Secretary in the middle of the night. You make the point they did | :39:16. | :39:21. | |
not want to go into much detail about the impact of Edward | :39:22. | :39:27. | |
Snowden's leaks. Is it safe to a shame there will be plenty of | :39:28. | :39:31. | |
discussion behind closed doors about that? Will a career to be told more | :39:32. | :39:34. | |
about what they perceive to be the damage? They will. Whether it will | :39:35. | :39:40. | |
be enough to satisfy critics, I am not sure. The committee had been | :39:41. | :39:48. | |
accused of missing quite a few things in the past. They did not put | :39:49. | :39:57. | |
deeply enough about the 7/7 bombings. They had to go back and do | :39:58. | :40:13. | |
more questions. There were more times when more questions should | :40:14. | :40:20. | |
have been asked. The IOC committee now has new powers. It is no longer | :40:21. | :40:26. | |
pointed just by Number Ten. That is a good thing. It is still perceived | :40:27. | :40:36. | |
as a creature of the establishment. Sir Malcolm Rifkind was trying very | :40:37. | :40:42. | |
hard to be robust. He was Foreign Secretary, the man who had overall | :40:43. | :40:49. | |
responsibility under Sir John Major. He had responsibility for GCHQ. He | :40:50. | :40:54. | |
is not like a judge who comes in from outside. Still a lot of | :40:55. | :40:59. | |
questions. I hope they do ask them. I can understand why they do not | :41:00. | :41:03. | |
want to say some things in public. What we take away from this? They | :41:04. | :41:10. | |
kept saying they were public servants, and people are doing it to | :41:11. | :41:17. | |
defend this country. That is their message. And also the fact this was | :41:18. | :41:27. | |
not a fishing exercise. The big question is, is the legal framework | :41:28. | :41:34. | |
adequate, bearing in mind what they are up against now? We did not get | :41:35. | :41:41. | |
an answer. I will give you an answer, and the answer is no, it | :41:42. | :41:45. | |
clearly isn't, because technology is moving so fast. It is a $3 trillion | :41:46. | :41:54. | |
business. The head of GCHQ said the Internet is a challenge for them. | :41:55. | :42:02. | |
There are always going to be prone to people wanting to work outside | :42:03. | :42:06. | |
once they have worked there. MI5 was asked, what about all these links. | :42:07. | :42:17. | |
He said it was much less likely to happen here than in the United | :42:18. | :42:22. | |
States. They were asked, can you give a guarantee that your | :42:23. | :42:27. | |
operations are conducted within the British legal framework, and I think | :42:28. | :42:34. | |
it was the head of GCHQ who said yes, and I speak for the agencies. | :42:35. | :42:41. | |
Only they know that. `the problem is the legal framework has not caught | :42:42. | :42:43. | |
up with technology, and there is still a way to go on that. They need | :42:44. | :42:49. | |
to review it. Frank, thank you very much. Fascinating. It was really | :42:50. | :42:59. | |
interesting. Did you see Judi Dench at the back? I did, it was Margaret | :43:00. | :43:08. | |
Beckett, wasn't it? It was. We will turn our attention and take a look | :43:09. | :43:11. | |
at everything else that has been happening in the news today. And the | :43:12. | :43:15. | |
literary jury is considering its verdict in the court`martial of | :43:16. | :43:19. | |
three Royal Marines. All three deny murdering an Afghan insurgent as he | :43:20. | :43:23. | |
lay badly wounded in a field two years ago. Duncan, explain what has | :43:24. | :43:32. | |
been happening. What we are waiting for, Jane, other | :43:33. | :43:37. | |
verdicts to come back. All three Marines face murder charges. The | :43:38. | :43:43. | |
military board went out this morning. We do not know whether they | :43:44. | :43:50. | |
will come back today or tomorrow. Seven members on that panel deciding | :43:51. | :43:51. |