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judgment than there was in the run-up to the Iraq war. We wait now | :00:00. | :00:00. | |
for Sir John Chilcot to deliver his findings in the next few minutes. | :00:00. | :00:15. | |
I'm Ben Brown in Westminster - where Sir John Chilcot will finally | :00:16. | :00:20. | |
deliver his long-awaited report into the Iraq War | :00:21. | :00:22. | |
It will pass judgement on Britain's decision to join the war to topple | :00:23. | :00:27. | |
Saddam Hussein more than 13 years ago. | :00:28. | :00:31. | |
179 Britons lost their lives in the Iraq War - | :00:32. | :00:35. | |
the families of those killed will be giving their reaction | :00:36. | :00:40. | |
Individuals and institutions are expected to be criticised, | :00:41. | :00:42. | |
among them the then Prime Minister Tony Blair. | :00:43. | :00:50. | |
Sir John Chilcot will set out his findings in full in a moment - | :00:51. | :00:55. | |
last night he said he hoped greater care would be taken before | :00:56. | :00:58. | |
the country goes to war again in the future. | :00:59. | :01:04. | |
This is the scene now inside the building behind me - | :01:05. | :01:07. | |
where Sir John Chilcot is about to speak. | :01:08. | :01:14. | |
outside is a demonstration by Stop the War, who always opposed the war | :01:15. | :01:29. | |
and they are protesting now outside Westminster. | :01:30. | :01:49. | |
More than 13 years after the Iraq war began - | :01:50. | :01:51. | |
Sir John Chilcot is preparing to deliver his report into how | :01:52. | :01:59. | |
the decision was taken for Britain to join the the United States | :02:00. | :02:04. | |
in intervening against Saddam Hussein. | :02:05. | :02:05. | |
Tens of thousands of Iraqis died - along with 179 UK service personnel. | :02:06. | :02:09. | |
Claims that the Iraqi leader had weapons of mass destruction proved | :02:10. | :02:11. | |
unfounded - but the then Prime Minister Tony Blair has said | :02:12. | :02:14. | |
he does not regret removing a brutal dictator. | :02:15. | :02:25. | |
It was one of the most controversial and the size of wars or the British | :02:26. | :02:35. | |
yesterday. Perhaps not since the Suez conflict has a conflict so | :02:36. | :02:38. | |
controversial. My colleague Annita McVeigh | :02:39. | :02:40. | |
is at the start of the Stop the War Demonstration | :02:41. | :02:42. | |
in Parliament Square. I'm just either the opposite Central | :02:43. | :02:54. | |
Hall in Westminster where the Stop the War coalition is holding this | :02:55. | :02:58. | |
demonstration to coincide with the publication of the Chilcot Report. | :02:59. | :03:04. | |
Behind me on that platform there has been a naming of the dead ceremony | :03:05. | :03:09. | |
with each speaker reading out the names of ten people killed in the | :03:10. | :03:15. | |
Iraq war, five but soldiers as well as five Iraqi nationals. -- five | :03:16. | :03:23. | |
British soldiers. In 2000 when Stop the War organised the biggest | :03:24. | :03:28. | |
demonstration in history to try and oppose the UK becoming involved in | :03:29. | :03:34. | |
the Iraq war as now, 13 years later, 70 years since the then Prime | :03:35. | :03:38. | |
Minister Gordon Brown ordered the Chilcot Report they are waiting for | :03:39. | :03:43. | |
its findings and asking the question is will this be a moment of truth? | :03:44. | :03:46. | |
-- seven years since. Very noisy here at Westminster as we | :03:47. | :03:58. | |
wait to hear from Sir John chilcot. Let's talk to Doctor John Davies. | :03:59. | :04:06. | |
You have specialised in studying the Blair Government. There has been | :04:07. | :04:11. | |
such a long wait for this report, seven years, and we will finally | :04:12. | :04:16. | |
hear it. A momentous day. It is the third of the big investigations into | :04:17. | :04:22. | |
Iraq and layer. Butler, half-hearted about this is by far the biggest. | :04:23. | :04:31. | |
2.5 million words. Some people will see almost too comprehensive. Very | :04:32. | :04:35. | |
different to the inquest into the Falklands War which was more to the | :04:36. | :04:40. | |
points and more in lessons to learn exercise. And the families have huge | :04:41. | :04:48. | |
expectations, many of whom are very angry and have said this could be a | :04:49. | :04:54. | |
whitewash and Tony Blair is a war criminal. They have high | :04:55. | :04:59. | |
expectations. Sir John chilcot has said he will try to give them some | :05:00. | :05:04. | |
of the answers they are looking for. And hotter and hotter and were very | :05:05. | :05:08. | |
good at Newport but this is much bigger. I am looking for -- Butler | :05:09. | :05:15. | |
and hotter. I am looking for a focus on the UK and US relationship and | :05:16. | :05:23. | |
also, we heard in the enquiry civil servant versus civil servant so it | :05:24. | :05:27. | |
will be intriguing to find out how much resistance that was within the | :05:28. | :05:33. | |
system. And the intelligence received in the build up that | :05:34. | :05:38. | |
convinced Tony Blair there were weapons of mass destruction. That is | :05:39. | :05:44. | |
crucial because the failures of that intelligence and to check and | :05:45. | :05:47. | |
double-check the sources of what proved to be wrong intelligence. I | :05:48. | :05:54. | |
do not question the integrity of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet or the | :05:55. | :05:58. | |
intelligence services. But they got things wrong. There will be greater | :05:59. | :06:05. | |
focus on the intelligence failures. It is very interesting to see the | :06:06. | :06:08. | |
division in the intelligence services. As one intelligence | :06:09. | :06:13. | |
officer in this room said secret intelligence or what underdelivered. | :06:14. | :06:19. | |
It will be interesting to see the nuts and bolts. -- overpromised and | :06:20. | :06:28. | |
underdelivered. Was not getting a second resolution from the UN | :06:29. | :06:34. | |
critical? It'll very surprising if a man who was on the Butler enquiry, | :06:35. | :06:39. | |
Sir John Chilcot, comes to a different conclusion. The report | :06:40. | :06:46. | |
will look at the aftermath and the failures and planning and the | :06:47. | :06:51. | |
quagmire we are still in Iraq. But also the feelings of equipment for | :06:52. | :06:55. | |
British troops which is one of the things the families are very | :06:56. | :06:59. | |
interested in. Such as the land Rovers are so many British service | :07:00. | :07:06. | |
person died in. Questions need to be asked and people aren't responsible | :07:07. | :07:11. | |
for these things... I think Sir John Chilcot is walking in now to deliver | :07:12. | :07:18. | |
his comments. We expect it to last roughly half an hour. Us listen in. | :07:19. | :07:30. | |
We would like to welcome you to the Queen Elizabeth II centre. I should | :07:31. | :07:35. | |
record how much we appreciate the support provided by the Centre and | :07:36. | :07:40. | |
its staff during our public hearings and again today. Before I begin my | :07:41. | :07:47. | |
statement perhaps we should all recall the continuing suffering of | :07:48. | :07:52. | |
innocent people in Iraq. And those who have been killed and injured in | :07:53. | :07:56. | |
terrorist attacks, including the latest attack last Sunday, which | :07:57. | :08:05. | |
killed more than 250 people. We were appointed to consider the UK's | :08:06. | :08:12. | |
policy on Iraq from 2001 until 2009. And to identify lessons for the | :08:13. | :08:19. | |
future. Our report will be published on enquiry's website after I have | :08:20. | :08:26. | |
finished speaking. In 2003, for the first time since the Second World | :08:27. | :08:31. | |
War, the United Kingdom took part in an invasion and a full-scale | :08:32. | :08:37. | |
occupation of a sovereign states. That was the decision of the utmost | :08:38. | :08:43. | |
gravity. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who | :08:44. | :08:47. | |
have attacked Iraq's neighbours, repressed until many of his own | :08:48. | :08:52. | |
people and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN | :08:53. | :08:57. | |
security council. But the questions for the enquiry work, whether it was | :08:58. | :09:04. | |
right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003? And whether the UK | :09:05. | :09:12. | |
could and should have been better prepared for what follows? We have | :09:13. | :09:17. | |
concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the | :09:18. | :09:25. | |
peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at | :09:26. | :09:33. | |
that time was not a last resort. We have also concluded that the | :09:34. | :09:36. | |
judgment about the severity of the threats posed by Iraq's weapons of | :09:37. | :09:42. | |
mass destruction is, WMD, were presented with the certainty that | :09:43. | :09:48. | |
was not justified. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the | :09:49. | :09:52. | |
invasion were underestimated, the planning and preparation for Iraq | :09:53. | :09:57. | |
after Saddam Hussein were very inadequate. The Government fails to | :09:58. | :10:05. | |
achieve its stated objectives. I want to set out some of the key | :10:06. | :10:13. | |
point in the report. First, the formal decision to invade Iraq, if | :10:14. | :10:18. | |
Saddam did not accept the US ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 | :10:19. | :10:25. | |
hours was taken by Cabinet on March the 17th 2003. Parliament voted the | :10:26. | :10:29. | |
following day to support the decision. The decision was shaped by | :10:30. | :10:35. | |
key choices made by Mr Blair's Government over the previous 18 | :10:36. | :10:41. | |
months. I will now briefly set these out. After the attacks on September | :10:42. | :10:47. | |
11 2001 Mr Blair urged President Bush not to take hasty action on | :10:48. | :10:54. | |
Iraq. By early December US policy had begun to shift and Mr Blair | :10:55. | :11:01. | |
suggested the US and the UK should work on what he described as, a | :11:02. | :11:07. | |
clever strategy for regime change in Iraq which would build over time. | :11:08. | :11:14. | |
When Mr Blair met President Bush in Texas in early April 2002 the formal | :11:15. | :11:22. | |
policy was still to contain Saddam Hussein. By then there have been a | :11:23. | :11:29. | |
profound change in the UK's thinking. The joint intelligence | :11:30. | :11:33. | |
committee has concluded that Saddam Hussein could not be removed without | :11:34. | :11:40. | |
an invasion. The Government was stating that Iraq was a threat that | :11:41. | :11:46. | |
had to be dealt with, it had to disarm or be disarmed. That implied | :11:47. | :11:51. | |
the use of force if Iraq did not comply. An internal contingency | :11:52. | :11:57. | |
planning for a large contribution to a military invasion had begun. At | :11:58. | :12:05. | |
Crawford, Mr Blair sought a partnership as our way of | :12:06. | :12:09. | |
influencing Mr Bush. He proposed a UN ultimatum to Iraq to readmit | :12:10. | :12:17. | |
inspectors or face the consequences. On July the 28th Mr Blair wrote to | :12:18. | :12:22. | |
President Bush with an assurance that he would be with him, whatever. | :12:23. | :12:29. | |
But if the US wanted the coalition for military action changes would be | :12:30. | :12:34. | |
needed in three key areas, these were, progress on the middle east | :12:35. | :12:43. | |
peace process, UN authority and a shift in public opinion in the UK, | :12:44. | :12:51. | |
Europe and the Arab world. Mr Blair also pointed out there would be a | :12:52. | :12:55. | |
need to come at to Iraq for the long-term. That -- comics to Iraq. | :12:56. | :13:04. | |
Mr Blair and Mr Straw urged the US to take the issue back to the UN. On | :13:05. | :13:10. | |
September the 7th President Bush decided to to do so. On November the | :13:11. | :13:17. | |
8th of resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously by the security Council. | :13:18. | :13:23. | |
It gave Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face serious consequences. | :13:24. | :13:29. | |
It provided for any further breaches by Iraq to be reported to the | :13:30. | :13:35. | |
security Council for assessment. The weapons inspectors returned to Iraq | :13:36. | :13:42. | |
later that month. During December, however, President Bush decided that | :13:43. | :13:46. | |
inspectors would not achieve the desired result and the US would take | :13:47. | :13:54. | |
military action in early 2003. At the end of January Mr Blair accepted | :13:55. | :13:58. | |
the US timetable for military action by mid March, having also concluded | :13:59. | :14:08. | |
the likelihood was war. To help Mr Blair President Bush agreed to seek | :14:09. | :14:14. | |
a further UN resolution, the second resolution. Determining Iraq have | :14:15. | :14:17. | |
failed to take its final opportunity to comply with its obligations. By | :14:18. | :14:24. | |
March the 12th it was clear there was no chance of securing a majority | :14:25. | :14:28. | |
support for a second resolution before the US military action. | :14:29. | :14:38. | |
Without evidence of major new Iraqi violations or reports from the | :14:39. | :14:42. | |
inspectors that Iraq was failing to cooperate, and they could not carry | :14:43. | :14:47. | |
out the task, most members of the security Council could not be | :14:48. | :14:50. | |
convinced that peaceful options to disarm Iraq had been exhausted for | :14:51. | :14:54. | |
them and military action was justified. . Mr Blair and Mr Straw | :14:55. | :15:03. | |
blamed France for the impasse in the UN and claimed the UK Government was | :15:04. | :15:08. | |
acting on behalf of the international community to uphold | :15:09. | :15:11. | |
the authority of the security Council. In the absence of a | :15:12. | :15:19. | |
majority in support of military action we consider the UK was in | :15:20. | :15:23. | |
fact undermining the security council's authority. Second, the | :15:24. | :15:30. | |
enquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was illegal. | :15:31. | :15:37. | |
That could only be resolved by a properly constituted an | :15:38. | :15:41. | |
internationally recognised court. We however have concluded the | :15:42. | :15:47. | |
circumstances in which it was decided there was a legal basis for | :15:48. | :15:51. | |
UK military action were far from satisfactory. In mid-January 2003 | :15:52. | :16:00. | |
Lord Goldsmith told Mr Blair that a further security Council resolution | :16:01. | :16:04. | |
would be necessary to provide a legal basis for military action. He | :16:05. | :16:10. | |
did not advise number ten and told the end of February that while a | :16:11. | :16:16. | |
second resolution would be preferable, a reasonable case could | :16:17. | :16:19. | |
be made that resolution 1441 was sufficient. He said that out and | :16:20. | :16:28. | |
written advice on March the seven. -- heat set that out. The military | :16:29. | :16:33. | |
and the civil servant both asked for more clarity of force would be | :16:34. | :16:39. | |
legal. Lord Goldsmith advised the better view was there was, on | :16:40. | :16:46. | |
balance, a secure legal basis for military action without a further | :16:47. | :16:52. | |
security Council resolution. On March the 14th he asked Mr Blair to | :16:53. | :16:58. | |
confirm that Iraq had committed further material breaches, as | :16:59. | :17:02. | |
specified in a resolution 1441. Mr Blair did so the next day. However, | :17:03. | :17:08. | |
the precise basis on which Mr Blair made that decision is not clear. | :17:09. | :17:15. | |
Given the gravity of the decision, Lord Goldsmith should have been | :17:16. | :17:19. | |
asked to provide written advice explaining how, in the absence of a | :17:20. | :17:24. | |
majority in the security Council, Mr Blair could take that decision. This | :17:25. | :17:30. | |
is one of a number of occasions identified by the enquiry when a | :17:31. | :17:34. | |
policy should have been considered by a cabinet committee and then | :17:35. | :17:43. | |
discussed by Cabinet itself. I want to address the assessment of Iraq's | :17:44. | :17:47. | |
weapons of mass destruction and how they were presented to support the | :17:48. | :17:53. | |
case for action. There was an ingrained belief in the UK policy | :17:54. | :17:59. | |
and intelligence communities that Iraq had retained some chemical and | :18:00. | :18:04. | |
biological capabilities. It was determined to preserve and if | :18:05. | :18:09. | |
possible enhance and in the future to acquire a nuclear capability. And | :18:10. | :18:16. | |
it was able to conceal its activities from the UN inspectors. | :18:17. | :18:22. | |
In the House of Commons on September the 24th 2002, Mr Blair presented | :18:23. | :18:28. | |
Iraq's past, current and future capabilities as evidence of the | :18:29. | :18:32. | |
security than the Mac said ability of the potential threat from Iraq's | :18:33. | :18:39. | |
WMD. He said, at some point in the future that Britain would become a | :18:40. | :18:46. | |
reality. The judgments -- that threat would become a reality. The | :18:47. | :18:50. | |
judgments about the dossier published in the statement were | :18:51. | :18:53. | |
presented with a certainty that was not justified. The joint | :18:54. | :18:58. | |
intelligence committee should have made clear to Mr Blair the assessed | :18:59. | :19:03. | |
intelligence had not established beyond doubt either that Iraq had | :19:04. | :19:08. | |
continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts | :19:09. | :19:12. | |
to develop nuclear weapons continued. The committee has also | :19:13. | :19:21. | |
judged that as long as sanctions remain effective Iraq could not | :19:22. | :19:25. | |
develop a nuclear weapons and it would take several years to develop | :19:26. | :19:33. | |
and deploy long-range missiles. Any House of Commons the 18th 2003 Mr | :19:34. | :19:39. | |
Blair stated he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in | :19:40. | :19:44. | |
possession of WMD was, in real and present danger to Britain and its | :19:45. | :19:50. | |
national security. And the threat from Saddam Hussein's Arsenal could | :19:51. | :19:55. | |
not be contained and it posed a clear danger to British citizens. Mr | :19:56. | :20:02. | |
Blair had been warned that military action would increase the threat | :20:03. | :20:06. | |
from Al-Qaeda to the UK and UK interests. He had also been warned | :20:07. | :20:14. | |
that an invasion might lead to Iraq's weapons and capabilities | :20:15. | :20:16. | |
being transferred into the hands of terrorists. The Government's | :20:17. | :20:23. | |
strategy reflected its confidence in the joint intelligence committee's | :20:24. | :20:26. | |
assessments. Those assessments provided the benchmark against which | :20:27. | :20:34. | |
Iraq's conduct and denials and the reports of the inspectors were | :20:35. | :20:41. | |
judged. As late as March the 17th 2003 Mr Blair was being advised by | :20:42. | :20:47. | |
the chairman of the joint intelligence committee that Iraq | :20:48. | :20:49. | |
possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them | :20:50. | :20:56. | |
and the capacity to produce them. He was also told the evidence pointed | :20:57. | :21:01. | |
to Saddam Hussein's view that the capability was military to neglect | :21:02. | :21:09. | |
-- militarily significant and letters on devices are built up | :21:10. | :21:14. | |
further. It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of | :21:15. | :21:18. | |
flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged and they | :21:19. | :21:27. | |
should have been. The findings on Iraq's WMD capabilities set out in | :21:28. | :21:33. | |
the report of the Iraq survey group in October 2004 were significant. | :21:34. | :21:37. | |
But they did not support the invasion statements by the UK | :21:38. | :21:43. | |
Government which are focused on Iraq's current capabilities -- | :21:44. | :21:51. | |
summit-mac invasion statement. The work described as vast stocks and an | :21:52. | :21:55. | |
urgent and growing effect. In response to those findings Mr Blair | :21:56. | :21:58. | |
told the House of Commons that although Iraq might not have had | :21:59. | :22:02. | |
stockpiles of deployable weapons Saddam Hussein retained the intent | :22:03. | :22:11. | |
and capability and was in breach of United Nations obligations. That was | :22:12. | :22:16. | |
not, however, the explanation for military action he had given before | :22:17. | :22:22. | |
the conflict. In our report we have identified a number of lessons to | :22:23. | :22:27. | |
inform the way in which intelligence may be used publicly for in the | :22:28. | :22:34. | |
future to support Government policy. Fourth, I want to address the | :22:35. | :22:38. | |
shortcomings in planning and preparation. The British military | :22:39. | :22:47. | |
contribution was not settled in 2003 when Mr Blair and Mr hoon agreed the | :22:48. | :22:54. | |
proposals for the increase in the number of brigades to be deployed | :22:55. | :22:59. | |
and they would operate in southern, not northern Iraq. There was little | :23:00. | :23:05. | |
time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly | :23:06. | :23:08. | |
identified not for the exposed to ministers. The resulting in | :23:09. | :23:12. | |
Quack-mac shortfalls are addressed in the report. -- resulting | :23:13. | :23:22. | |
equipment shortfalls. Despite saying the Cabinet would discuss the | :23:23. | :23:29. | |
military contributions they did not discuss their implications. In early | :23:30. | :23:33. | |
January 2003 when the Government published its objectives for | :23:34. | :23:39. | |
post-conflict Iraq it intended the interim post-conflict administration | :23:40. | :23:44. | |
should be UN legs. By March 2003 were having failed to persuade the | :23:45. | :23:50. | |
US of the advantages of the UN led administration, the Government had | :23:51. | :23:55. | |
set the less ambitious goal of persuading the US to accept UN | :23:56. | :24:00. | |
organisation of a coalition led interim administration. When the | :24:01. | :24:07. | |
invasion began UK policy rested on an assumption that there would be a | :24:08. | :24:14. | |
well executed US led and UN authorised operation in the | :24:15. | :24:17. | |
relatively benign security environments. Mr Blair told the | :24:18. | :24:24. | |
enquiry that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the | :24:25. | :24:27. | |
invasion could not have been knowing in advance. We do not agree that | :24:28. | :24:35. | |
hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active | :24:36. | :24:43. | |
everyday in pursuit of its interests, regional instability and | :24:44. | :24:48. | |
Al-Qaeda activity were each explicitly identified. -- Iranians | :24:49. | :24:55. | |
pursuit of interests. Ministers were aware of the inadequacy of US plans | :24:56. | :25:01. | |
and concern about the inability to exert significant influence on US | :25:02. | :25:07. | |
planning. Mr Blair eventually succeeded only in the narrow goal of | :25:08. | :25:12. | |
securing President Bush's agreement that there should be UN | :25:13. | :25:18. | |
authorisation of the post-conflict role. Furthermore, he did not | :25:19. | :25:23. | |
establish clear ministerial oversight of UK planning and | :25:24. | :25:31. | |
preparation. He did not ensure there was a flexible, realistic and fully | :25:32. | :25:38. | |
resourced plan that integrated UK military and civilian contributions | :25:39. | :25:45. | |
and addressed the known risks. The failures in the planning and | :25:46. | :25:49. | |
preparation continued to have an effect after the invasion. That | :25:50. | :25:58. | |
brings me to the Government's failure to achieve the objectives it | :25:59. | :26:03. | |
set itself in Iraq. The Armed Forces fought a successful military | :26:04. | :26:09. | |
campaign which took Basra and help to achieve the departure of Saddam | :26:10. | :26:13. | |
Hussein and the fall of Baghdad is in less than one month. Service | :26:14. | :26:21. | |
personnel, said were deployed to Iraq, and Iraqis who worked for the | :26:22. | :26:28. | |
UK showed great courage in the face of considerable risk. -- civilians | :26:29. | :26:36. | |
deployed to Iraq. More than 200 British citizens died as a result of | :26:37. | :26:41. | |
the conflict in Iraq, many more were injured. This has meant deep anguish | :26:42. | :26:46. | |
for many families, including those here today. The invasion and | :26:47. | :26:55. | |
subsequent instability in Iraq had by July 2009 also resulted in the | :26:56. | :27:03. | |
deaths of at least 150,000 Iraqis and probably many more. Most of them | :27:04. | :27:09. | |
civilians. More than 1 million people were displaced. The people of | :27:10. | :27:18. | |
Iraq have suffered greatly. The vision for Iraq and its people | :27:19. | :27:25. | |
issued by the US, UK, Spain and Portugal at the summit on March the | :27:26. | :27:31. | |
16th 2003 included a solemn obligation to help the Iraqi people | :27:32. | :27:35. | |
build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours. The | :27:36. | :27:42. | |
declaration look forward to a united Iraq in which its people would enjoy | :27:43. | :27:48. | |
security, freedom, prosperity and equality. But a Government that | :27:49. | :27:52. | |
would uphold human rights and the rule of law. They would be | :27:53. | :28:00. | |
cornerstones of democracy. We have considered the post-conflict period | :28:01. | :28:06. | |
in Iraq in great detail. Including efforts to reconstruct the country | :28:07. | :28:11. | |
and rebuild the security services. In this short statement I can only | :28:12. | :28:18. | |
address a a few key points. After the invasion the UK and the US | :28:19. | :28:24. | |
became joint occupying powers. For the year that followed Iraq was | :28:25. | :28:26. | |
governed by the Cornish and provisional authority -- coalition | :28:27. | :28:37. | |
provisional authority. The UK struggle to have a decisive effect | :28:38. | :28:41. | |
on policy. The Government's reparations bill to take account of | :28:42. | :28:45. | |
the magnitude of the task of stabilising and ministering and | :28:46. | :28:52. | |
reconstructing Iraq and of the responsibilities which were likely | :28:53. | :29:01. | |
to fall to the UK. The UK to particular responsibility for four | :29:02. | :29:06. | |
provinces in the south-east. It did so without a formal ministerial | :29:07. | :29:12. | |
decision and without ensuring acts had the necessary military and | :29:13. | :29:15. | |
civilian capabilities to discharge its obligations, including, | :29:16. | :29:23. | |
crucially, to provide security. The scale of the UK effort in | :29:24. | :29:27. | |
post-conflict Iraq never match the scale of the challenge. Whitehall | :29:28. | :29:34. | |
departments and their ministers failed to put collective weight | :29:35. | :29:40. | |
behind the task. In practice, the UK's most consistent strategic | :29:41. | :29:45. | |
objective in relation to Iraq was to reduce the level of its deployed | :29:46. | :29:52. | |
forces. The security situation in both Baghdad and the south-east | :29:53. | :29:59. | |
began to deteriorate soon after the invasion. We have found the Ministry | :30:00. | :30:05. | |
of Defence was slow in responding to the threat from improvised explosive | :30:06. | :30:10. | |
devices and that delays in providing adequate medium which protect the | :30:11. | :30:13. | |
patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated. It is not clear which | :30:14. | :30:19. | |
person or department within the Ministry of Defence was responsible | :30:20. | :30:23. | |
for identifying and articulating such capability gaps, but it should | :30:24. | :30:25. | |
have been. in all from 2006, the United Kingdom | :30:26. | :30:41. | |
military was conducting two distinct military campaigns in Iraq and | :30:42. | :30:47. | |
Afghanistan. It did not have significant resources to do such. | :30:48. | :31:01. | |
For example, the employment to Afghanistan without essential | :31:02. | :31:07. | |
equipment, particularly helicopters and equipment for surveillance. By | :31:08. | :31:19. | |
2007, militia dominance in Basra meant United Kingdom commanders were | :31:20. | :31:23. | |
unable to challenge, led to the United Kingdom exchanging detainee | :31:24. | :31:37. | |
releases in exchange for non-targeting of its personnel. It | :31:38. | :31:45. | |
was a humiliating outcome, but one which the military decided was the | :31:46. | :31:53. | |
best option. We have sought to set out the government actions in Iraq. | :31:54. | :31:59. | |
The evidence is there for all to see. The account of an intervention | :32:00. | :32:07. | |
which went badly wrong. The consequences of that are still felt | :32:08. | :32:14. | |
today. It is the unanimous view that military action in Iraq may have | :32:15. | :32:20. | |
been necessary at some point, but in March 2003, there was no imminent | :32:21. | :32:29. | |
threat. The strategy of containment could have been continued for some | :32:30. | :32:34. | |
time. The majority of the Security Council supported continuing United | :32:35. | :32:41. | |
Nations inspections. Military intervention elsewhere may be | :32:42. | :32:47. | |
required in the future. A vital purpose of the enquiry is to find | :32:48. | :32:53. | |
out what lessons has to be learned from this experience and Eric. | :32:54. | :33:03. | |
Someone about the management of relations with other countries, | :33:04. | :33:14. | |
particularly the United States. The United Kingdom 's relationship with | :33:15. | :33:21. | |
the United States has to be the weight of honest disagreement. It | :33:22. | :33:27. | |
not offer unconditional support where our interests differ. Other | :33:28. | :33:36. | |
interests also are collecting the material discussion, which ask for | :33:37. | :33:40. | |
Frank and informed debate and challenge. Risks need to be a cysts | :33:41. | :33:47. | |
and a realistic strategy has to be set out. It is vital that there is | :33:48. | :33:56. | |
also ministerial leadership. There is also the need to ensure both | :33:57. | :34:05. | |
civilian and military arms of government are we are of the tasks. | :34:06. | :34:14. | |
Above all, all aspects need to be calculated, debated and challenge. | :34:15. | :34:24. | |
When decisions are made commonly need to be implemented thoroughly. | :34:25. | :34:32. | |
Sadly, this was not always the case with the conflict in Iraq. In | :34:33. | :34:36. | |
conclusion, I would like to thank my colleagues. I would like to thank | :34:37. | :34:42. | |
them for their commitment to this difficult task. I also want to pay | :34:43. | :34:49. | |
tribute to Sir Martin Gilbert, who died last year. He was one of the | :34:50. | :34:55. | |
pre-eminent historians. He brought perspective to our work. We have | :34:56. | :35:07. | |
missed him greatly. We miss him as a colleague and a friend. | :35:08. | :35:19. | |
There was the delivery of the long-awaited report. Seven years it | :35:20. | :35:27. | |
has taken him and his team. They have come up with the final verdict | :35:28. | :35:34. | |
on the British involvement in the conflict in Iraq. The delay was | :35:35. | :35:41. | |
severely criticised. But he cannot be criticised for not being fun. 2.6 | :35:42. | :35:50. | |
million warrants in the report. We can talk to our assistant political | :35:51. | :35:58. | |
editor. The report has been embargoed until this point. But you | :35:59. | :36:02. | |
have been reading it since eight o'clock this morning. A stronger | :36:03. | :36:09. | |
criticism of the Tony Blair government than maybe some people | :36:10. | :36:22. | |
were expecting? It seems to be the pronunciation of virtually every | :36:23. | :36:25. | |
aspect of the war. Going from the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, the | :36:26. | :36:36. | |
idea that he had weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence | :36:37. | :36:44. | |
provided by the security services. Right up until the point we're the | :36:45. | :36:50. | |
troops were sent into Iraq without the proper equipment, to the | :36:51. | :36:53. | |
post-war planning. But what a thing is most striking is one central | :36:54. | :37:00. | |
figure driving through all of this is Tony Blair. It is of a man who | :37:01. | :37:07. | |
was convinced many months before the conflict that Saddam Hussein had to | :37:08. | :37:24. | |
be removed. In the report, it says in September 2001 he is already | :37:25. | :37:30. | |
sending memos to President Bush about the need for change in Iraq. | :37:31. | :37:38. | |
At that point, he is looking at possibly the idea of assisting some | :37:39. | :37:45. | |
sort of raising the country. He then met the president in April 2002 were | :37:46. | :37:54. | |
the two men basically from up the military options. Then, we see this | :37:55. | :38:03. | |
memo that Tony Blair sent to him. He is talking directly to the president | :38:04. | :38:07. | |
and says we will be with you whatever. He says they will be with | :38:08. | :38:23. | |
you whatever. This is where the planning and in most difficult. | :38:24. | :38:34. | |
He goes on to say, "This is the moment to assess | :38:35. | :38:37. | |
The planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet. | :38:38. | :38:40. | |
This is not Kosovo, this is not Afghanistan. | :38:41. | :38:42. | |
In three months before the war, Tony Blair, it's too flying if necessary | :38:43. | :38:56. | |
three divisions to the south of Iraq and he says to President Bush that | :38:57. | :39:02. | |
the military option is now the likeliest Op option. The report | :39:03. | :39:09. | |
suggests that Tony Blair was driving this process. Although it does not | :39:10. | :39:23. | |
blame Tony Blair, it certainly has the ammunition, in many peoples eyes | :39:24. | :39:28. | |
for it to do that. Thank you for picking out some of the most | :39:29. | :39:30. | |
important wanes. Given the sheer size of the report, | :39:31. | :39:39. | |
it is going to take days, maybe even weeks, to digest its full | :39:40. | :39:42. | |
contents, but here are some Sir John Chilcot has concluded | :39:43. | :39:45. | |
that the circumstances in which it was decided | :39:46. | :39:49. | |
that there was a legal basis for UK military action | :39:50. | :39:51. | |
were far from satisfactory. It also says that the judgements | :39:52. | :39:56. | |
about the severity of threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass | :39:57. | :39:58. | |
destruction were presented with With regard to the options | :39:59. | :40:01. | |
on the table for dealing with Iraq, the report says that the UK chose | :40:02. | :40:09. | |
to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament | :40:10. | :40:12. | |
had been exhausted and that military action at that time | :40:13. | :40:16. | |
was not a last resort. Also released in the report | :40:17. | :40:26. | |
is a memo, written by Tony Blair to President Bush, on the 28 July, | :40:27. | :40:30. | |
2002, eight months In the memo, entitled | :40:31. | :40:32. | |
Note On Iraq, Tony Blair says, He goes on to say, "This | :40:33. | :40:40. | |
is the moment to assess The planning on this and | :40:41. | :40:48. | |
the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not Kosovo, | :40:49. | :40:51. | |
this is not Afghanistan. Further down the six-page memo, | :40:52. | :40:53. | |
he goes on to say how he feels that, "Getting rid of Saddam | :40:54. | :41:08. | |
is the right thing to do". He says that, while he could be | :41:09. | :41:10. | |
contained, the containment could be risky, as they had already | :41:11. | :41:13. | |
learned with Al-Qaeda. It is fascinating just read that one | :41:14. | :41:29. | |
memo alone from 2002. We can now discuss this with Doctor John | :41:30. | :41:36. | |
Davidson from Kings College and an expert on international law. What is | :41:37. | :41:42. | |
your view about the findings in terms of the legal basis for the | :41:43. | :41:50. | |
conflict itself? I have just seen the summary. He is basically seeing | :41:51. | :42:02. | |
that the way in which legal advice was given was unsatisfactory. He | :42:03. | :42:07. | |
said the always fitted around the policy rather than the other way | :42:08. | :42:11. | |
around than there serious concerns. It was pretty strong. Some of the | :42:12. | :42:17. | |
protesters jeer want Tony Blair to be prosecuted by some sort of war | :42:18. | :42:25. | |
crimes tribunal? Is there anything which make an ammunition to that? He | :42:26. | :42:34. | |
has not addressed the legality or otherwise of the conflict. They were | :42:35. | :42:41. | |
not in a position to do that is the not lawyers. It is the question as | :42:42. | :42:46. | |
to whether the way in which Tony Blair got advice was satisfactory. | :42:47. | :42:58. | |
He has concluded that was not. It is how Sir John explains the changes | :42:59. | :43:07. | |
which took place. At first, it was totally illegal without a United | :43:08. | :43:11. | |
Nations resolution. A few months later, that seems to have changed. A | :43:12. | :43:19. | |
total change of position. I will build looking for the detail of that | :43:20. | :43:25. | |
position. You are an expert on the Tony Blair government. This memo | :43:26. | :43:33. | |
that he wrote in 2002 with the President Bush, I will be with you | :43:34. | :43:39. | |
whatever. It suggests it was a personal decision, as opposed to a | :43:40. | :43:46. | |
Cabinet decision. One man cannot take a country to war. That Wayne, I | :43:47. | :44:00. | |
will be with you forever -- whatever, it is not anything new. | :44:01. | :44:11. | |
The Parliamentary vote for a mistaken, something which no | :44:12. | :44:14. | |
previous Prime Minister would have themselves through. The Foreign | :44:15. | :44:26. | |
Secretary at the time, none of them seem to be particularly surprised. I | :44:27. | :44:30. | |
got the impression they all knew exactly where Tony Blair | :44:31. | :44:36. | |
Ystradgynlais. For me, there is nothing new in that particular line. | :44:37. | :44:41. | |
It is something we suspected all along. What is different is that you | :44:42. | :44:50. | |
are expressing a view and a system which is not presidential. Those | :44:51. | :45:00. | |
memo should have been shared with the Cabinet and whatnot. The legal | :45:01. | :45:07. | |
advice given was not shared with the Cabinet, which it should have been. | :45:08. | :45:15. | |
It brings even more uncertainty and the Cabinet could see that they | :45:16. | :45:20. | |
voted on the basis of insufficient evidence. This is of huge magnitude, | :45:21. | :45:33. | |
taking a country to war. Every Prime Minister decides whether to release | :45:34. | :45:40. | |
information hold it back. While we can debate this, it is not new for | :45:41. | :45:49. | |
Prime Minister to act on their own. And keel laying is that during the | :45:50. | :45:56. | |
invasion, if only peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted, | :45:57. | :46:04. | |
it would be understandable, but this gives rise to the idea that this was | :46:05. | :46:14. | |
a last resort. The report says it was certainly not a last resort. It | :46:15. | :46:22. | |
underwent the United Nations Security Council. It brings back to | :46:23. | :46:28. | |
question as to what the Prime Minister shared with the Cabinet. We | :46:29. | :46:38. | |
have a ministerial system which says they will provide a certain amount | :46:39. | :46:44. | |
of information and that was information was not provided. The | :46:45. | :46:53. | |
ministerial code, the Prime Minister should share everything? But every | :46:54. | :46:56. | |
Prime Minister chooses what they want to share them what they do not. | :46:57. | :47:03. | |
We will just pause a moment to see pictures of some of the families of | :47:04. | :47:09. | |
the 179 servicemen and women killed in Iraq. We will hear the reaction | :47:10. | :47:15. | |
to the report. They are going to have a news conference in just a few | :47:16. | :47:20. | |
minutes. There will be interesting to hear their reaction. Some of them | :47:21. | :47:25. | |
had already said they feared it would be a whitewash. Many of the | :47:26. | :47:28. | |
journalists went through some of the findings and believe it is stronger | :47:29. | :47:33. | |
than mate been expected. Very interesting to hear what the family | :47:34. | :47:39. | |
's reaction to this is. As far as delays in providing military | :47:40. | :47:46. | |
equipment to replace the controversial snatch land Rovers. | :47:47. | :47:51. | |
The report said the delays could not have been tolerated. | :47:52. | :47:55. | |
My colleague Annita McVeigh is at the start of the Stop The War | :47:56. | :47:58. | |
You have probably been able to hear the protesters in the background. | :47:59. | :48:17. | |
What is the scene. The demonstrators are saying they want to make | :48:18. | :48:21. | |
themselves heard. They are outside the enquiry. They are accusing Tony | :48:22. | :48:35. | |
Blair of being a war criminal. As lanes from the enquiry started to | :48:36. | :48:41. | |
come out, they said it was fairly significant and a very significant | :48:42. | :48:45. | |
day for British democracy. They are calling for sanctions against Tony | :48:46. | :48:58. | |
Blair. We also hear from the Green party, Caroline Lucas, who said that | :48:59. | :49:05. | |
Tony Blair had been cavalier in his attitude towards war. The report | :49:06. | :49:17. | |
confirmed the code 's worst fears. They said Tony Blair had made | :49:18. | :49:22. | |
commitments to George Bush a number of months before the invasion. She | :49:23. | :49:30. | |
told the code that he should not have been doing that. On Beaver of | :49:31. | :49:39. | |
all those who were injured and all other relatives who were affected. | :49:40. | :49:45. | |
Never again must so many mistakes be allowed to sacrifice British lives. | :49:46. | :49:51. | |
And read to the destruction of our country for no positive end. We were | :49:52. | :49:59. | |
proud of our husbands, sons and daughters when they signed up to | :50:00. | :50:04. | |
serve our country. But we cannot be proud of the way our government has | :50:05. | :50:11. | |
treated them. We must use this report to make sure that all aspects | :50:12. | :50:18. | |
of the Iraq fiasco are not repeated again. Novell and the theatre of war | :50:19. | :50:28. | |
ordering the seat of Westminster and Whitehall. We call on the British | :50:29. | :50:32. | |
government to follow the findings of the report and ensure that the | :50:33. | :50:44. | |
legality of going to war is never again twisted. Democracy cannot be | :50:45. | :50:54. | |
trampled over. And to ensure that the internal politics of Whitehall, | :50:55. | :51:03. | |
from the Ministry of Defence to security and intelligence services | :51:04. | :51:05. | |
are never allowed to feel so legally. After sufficient time of | :51:06. | :51:11. | |
analysis of the report, we reserve the right to call specific parties | :51:12. | :51:21. | |
to answer for their actions if such a process is found to be viable. We | :51:22. | :51:28. | |
thank Sir John for such a detailed report. It is truly an exhausting | :51:29. | :51:36. | |
and exhaustive process. In honour of the memory of our loved ones, we | :51:37. | :51:47. | |
trust that all parties will learn the lessons of the Iraq war. We have | :51:48. | :51:59. | |
only had 180 minutes, one minute for every gift, today suggest these | :52:00. | :52:08. | |
findings. If such a process is found to be viable, we will call for | :52:09. | :52:12. | |
people to account for themselves in court if the is viable. The families | :52:13. | :52:23. | |
have waited a long time. We have acted with patience, courage and | :52:24. | :52:29. | |
dignity throughout this time. Those who the report has criticised had | :52:30. | :52:37. | |
been warned of the criticism in advance. We knew what was coming. | :52:38. | :52:42. | |
The CI was the family were given this morning is not long enough for | :52:43. | :52:48. | |
them to take into account over two and a half million warrants. Today | :52:49. | :52:52. | |
is the day the family should be at the forefront of everyone's minds. | :52:53. | :52:59. | |
We should be remembering those who died there, the thousands who were | :53:00. | :53:04. | |
injured in fear and those who've died in that country since. The | :53:05. | :53:12. | |
families are delighted that the report delivers without fear of, | :53:13. | :53:19. | |
fever or prejudice. But it confirms that many of them died unnecessarily | :53:20. | :53:23. | |
without just cause or purpose. In the coming days and weeks, the | :53:24. | :53:28. | |
families will take a fool and forensic review of the report and | :53:29. | :53:34. | |
its conclusions. Estate of festivals are shown to have acted unlawfully, | :53:35. | :53:40. | |
the families will then decide whether to take any necessary or | :53:41. | :53:43. | |
appropriate action. All options will be open. Just as importantly, as | :53:44. | :53:52. | |
well as examining the culpability of individual state of visuals, we have | :53:53. | :53:56. | |
to also look at the process which led to the conflict, so we do not | :53:57. | :53:59. | |
make such tragic mistakes in the future. Thank you. You talk about | :54:00. | :54:18. | |
certain people, state officials, can you tell us, having heard three | :54:19. | :54:22. | |
horse to read the summary, who these people may be? The difficulty is we | :54:23. | :54:30. | |
have just heard the executive summary. The executive summary does | :54:31. | :54:37. | |
not name names at the moment. I am not really in a position, therefore, | :54:38. | :54:44. | |
to actually see who. With the exception of the former Prime | :54:45. | :54:48. | |
Minister, of course, Tony Blair, who is mentioned in the report. Did your | :54:49. | :55:02. | |
son die in vain? When I look at Iraq on my television screen today, I can | :55:03. | :55:10. | |
only conclude that, unfortunately, my son did die in vain. | :55:11. | :55:22. | |
Can I ask if you regard Tony Blair has been ultimately responsible for | :55:23. | :55:35. | |
all of this? We need to have a proper assessment of what is | :55:36. | :55:42. | |
available to as. There needs to be a fool and forensic analysis of the | :55:43. | :55:52. | |
report first. We have the report today, that is what is important. In | :55:53. | :55:56. | |
the coming weeks and months, the families will decide what is | :55:57. | :56:08. | |
necessary. Could I ask Selah and Rose what you're upgrading emotions | :56:09. | :56:18. | |
have been through this? What we have been reading has been really hard. I | :56:19. | :56:25. | |
have seen a lot of the families in tears today. Of them have killed it | :56:26. | :56:35. | |
back for a long time. Sadness, anger, that healing. All those years | :56:36. | :56:43. | |
I have worked for, I have gone back to that time. I know that my brother | :56:44. | :56:52. | |
had been killed and there was one terrorist that the world needs to be | :56:53. | :57:02. | |
aware of and that is Tony Blair. What changes with the publication of | :57:03. | :57:12. | |
this report? What does it mean in practical terms? It is difficult. | :57:13. | :57:20. | |
The government itself has to look at itself if it wants to change the way | :57:21. | :57:28. | |
it does this kind of business. This must never happen ever again. It is | :57:29. | :57:33. | |
how you actually achieve the changes which are required to make sure it | :57:34. | :57:40. | |
does not happen again. Perhaps, we do not know yet, and will not know | :57:41. | :57:50. | |
for some time, but if we go into court to have some sort of sanction, | :57:51. | :57:56. | |
maybe that could motivate government into making sure that the change | :57:57. | :58:08. | |
their way they do business. They're all this constitutional issues with | :58:09. | :58:17. | |
regard to how one goes to war. Governments have two recognise that | :58:18. | :58:28. | |
we have voices and we will be the voices of those who are no longer | :58:29. | :58:37. | |
rustlers. And we be here. I think this is a sad that are very thorough | :58:38. | :58:41. | |
enquiry of which is confront many of the things that we thought. We have | :58:42. | :58:47. | |
no had the backing of St John. It has been documented. But we want to | :58:48. | :58:57. | |
find more answers and bring those who are responsible need to be | :58:58. | :59:05. | |
brought to boot. We will look at what is appropriate after we have | :59:06. | :59:07. | |
thoroughly looked out all the findings. We need to see if we have | :59:08. | :59:21. | |
the evidence to go forward with. It seemed indelicate language, that Sir | :59:22. | :59:29. | |
John was almost pointing someone towards court. He was pretty clear | :59:30. | :59:38. | |
that there was an indication that someone probably should have a look | :59:39. | :59:43. | |
at it. He did explain that the process of going to war was | :59:44. | :59:48. | |
unsatisfactory. We will look at this and decide what is necessary and | :59:49. | :59:53. | |
appropriate, given the reception to the findings. Is there an idea that | :59:54. | :00:05. | |
you should maybe be getting someone on the phone, seeing someone with | :00:06. | :00:08. | |
the legal brain should be looking at this? If appropriate, that would be | :00:09. | :00:19. | |
appropriate for a court, to look at the actions of individuals. Whatever | :00:20. | :00:27. | |
is appropriate. We need to take the time to look at these findings, what | :00:28. | :00:34. | |
the content is and what is appropriate in the future. | :00:35. | :00:40. | |
Do you think Mr Mr Blair believed he knew what he was doing? I believed | :00:41. | :00:51. | |
he knew he was misleading and that has become clear from the 150 page | :00:52. | :01:02. | |
summary. He has misled the people, he obviously had a previous view. | :01:03. | :01:09. | |
Over the past few weeks he has been covering his back. He made a | :01:10. | :01:16. | |
decision and he made... As everybody else has said I only got this this | :01:17. | :01:22. | |
morning and I will have to sit down and read it properly but from what I | :01:23. | :01:26. | |
have read he knew exactly what he was doing. And averaged out to Tony | :01:27. | :01:36. | |
Blair's reaction. I will take full responsibility for any mistakes, | :01:37. | :01:41. | |
without exception or excuse and none I believe it was better to remove | :01:42. | :01:47. | |
Saddam Hussein. I pay tribute to our Armed Forces and express my profound | :01:48. | :01:53. | |
regret at the loss of life and set out the lessons of future leaders | :01:54. | :02:05. | |
can learn. That is just a PR patter. We have talked for a long time about | :02:06. | :02:11. | |
the legal decision to go to war and one of the things that, wouldn't | :02:12. | :02:20. | |
that legal advice, you cannot go to war for regime change. Out of his | :02:21. | :02:31. | |
own mouth he condemns himself. Hopefully this is the evidence we | :02:32. | :02:45. | |
need. But he has condemned himself. The fact that | :02:46. | :02:46. | |
these enquiries and we have been through several, no blame as a | :02:47. | :02:55. | |
portion from any one of them, it is likely get out of free card. They | :02:56. | :03:02. | |
have to look at these things in the future and point fingers at the | :03:03. | :03:12. | |
people responsible. Mr Blair also says today that he | :03:13. | :03:17. | |
took his decisions in good faith and there was no falsification or | :03:18. | :03:23. | |
improper use of intelligence or deception and no secret commitment | :03:24. | :03:28. | |
to war. Do you accept his observations? Why is he not you're | :03:29. | :03:37. | |
looking at us? If he is so sure of his decision why is he not here | :03:38. | :03:43. | |
looking at us and seeing our faces. We ask to meet him and he walked | :03:44. | :03:49. | |
away. This is his opportunity. He thinks he is the puppet master | :03:50. | :03:55. | |
pulling the strings. We approved and wrong because everything we have | :03:56. | :04:03. | |
said from the start has came out today. What would you say to him if | :04:04. | :04:09. | |
he was here? Exactly what I have been saying to the world. Look me in | :04:10. | :04:18. | |
the eye? Are you responsible for the murder of my son. Would say look me | :04:19. | :04:25. | |
in the eye and tell me you did not mislead the nation. And the response | :04:26. | :04:33. | |
of the gentleman there, what we must bear in mind is the intelligence | :04:34. | :04:40. | |
reports were coming back which were sporadic, and thrive, untested and | :04:41. | :04:43. | |
not to be relied upon and by the time saw it Blair and Alastair | :04:44. | :04:49. | |
Campbell had finished with it it was detail, authoritative, and available | :04:50. | :04:53. | |
to be deployed within 45 minutes. I believe Tony Blair knew that was a | :04:54. | :04:58. | |
lie and that was perpetrated on the British public and he knew it was | :04:59. | :05:04. | |
manufactured and he was massaging the intelligence reports. He changed | :05:05. | :05:11. | |
it from F, but maybe to get it up and running now. The report says as | :05:12. | :05:18. | |
much, when you actually start reading into it. If it is found | :05:19. | :05:33. | |
appropriate to take that further, legally, what is the process for | :05:34. | :05:40. | |
doing so? I will not comment at this stage on that. I am not been | :05:41. | :05:44. | |
difficult, I promise you, in answering that is what this is such | :05:45. | :05:50. | |
a matter of great seriousness and gravity, not only 40 families but | :05:51. | :05:57. | |
the nation that it requires a proper period of reflection. -- not only | :05:58. | :06:03. | |
for the families. Legal actions are possible. The report is full, | :06:04. | :06:11. | |
comprehensive. If you take those two things together you can speculate | :06:12. | :06:15. | |
but we need days, if not weeks, to come to a final conclusion. Thank | :06:16. | :06:24. | |
you. There have been a fair of criticism that Sir John Chilcot and | :06:25. | :06:27. | |
his team were taking a long time and they were not focused on doing their | :06:28. | :06:33. | |
job properly. Do you think, now you have seen, however shortly, in | :06:34. | :06:38. | |
detail this report, the weights was worth it and you have had a | :06:39. | :06:42. | |
comprehensive report you can now address and I? It still took too | :06:43. | :06:48. | |
long, there is no question about that. But, from what we have seen | :06:49. | :06:55. | |
today, and we have not seen much, we have not had a great deal of time to | :06:56. | :06:59. | |
really dig into it and you need to be locked away in a room by yourself | :07:00. | :07:04. | |
in order to do that, but from what we have seen, it is a very thorough. | :07:05. | :07:10. | |
Therefore, in that sense, worth the wait. | :07:11. | :07:21. | |
Can I ask one more question of Matthew? A simple yes or no. Is a | :07:22. | :07:30. | |
legal action against one or more people, Tony Blair and others, more | :07:31. | :07:35. | |
or less likely after a two-day? It's possible. | :07:36. | :07:38. | |
LAUGHTER Same question, different words. Who | :07:39. | :07:50. | |
are you from? Sky News. I do not have sky at home. | :07:51. | :08:09. | |
That was a news conference they are of some of the family members of | :08:10. | :08:17. | |
some of the 179 but a service men and women who lost their lives in | :08:18. | :08:24. | |
the Iraq conflict between 2003 and 2009. Interesting to hear Roger | :08:25. | :08:31. | |
Bacon, whose son was killed in Iraq, saying, he thought the Chilcot | :08:32. | :08:35. | |
enquiry published today has been extremely thorough and has been | :08:36. | :08:39. | |
worth the wait. Huge controversy over the seven years it took the | :08:40. | :08:45. | |
report to be published but that father saying it was worth the wait. | :08:46. | :08:51. | |
Another relative saying Tony Blair was the terrorist. In parent saying | :08:52. | :08:57. | |
my son died in vain. It was at times a very emotional news conference. | :08:58. | :09:03. | |
Roger Bacon also saying he had been proud of our troops in Iraq cannot | :09:04. | :09:07. | |
be proud of how our Government behaved towards our troops. The | :09:08. | :09:16. | |
solicitor for that family, Matthew, Judy, all options on legal action | :09:17. | :09:21. | |
against state officials, Government ministers and so on, will be | :09:22. | :09:26. | |
considered. Interesting that lawyers for some of the families talking | :09:27. | :09:31. | |
about the need over the next few days, when they have read through | :09:32. | :09:34. | |
the report, to consider if legal action should be taken against | :09:35. | :09:40. | |
Government ministers, state officials. Let's go to Baghdad, | :09:41. | :09:45. | |
where there is still violent chaos and we saw that car on Sunday, the | :09:46. | :09:53. | |
deadliest car bomb since the invasion, with 250 people killed. As | :09:54. | :10:02. | |
I say, the repercussions of what happens back when Tony Blair and | :10:03. | :10:07. | |
George Bush were considering to go to war is still being felt in Iraq | :10:08. | :10:14. | |
today. Yes indeed. Many Iraqis or the Iraq | :10:15. | :10:27. | |
war responsible for their agony and the deteriorating security and | :10:28. | :10:32. | |
economic conditions. And even at the political level because they say, | :10:33. | :10:37. | |
had it not been for the invasion, the Iraqi politicians who used to | :10:38. | :10:41. | |
live in exile, would not have gone to Iraq and they hold them | :10:42. | :10:47. | |
responsible for their misery, the Iraqi politicians, according to many | :10:48. | :10:54. | |
Iraqis, have lost touch with the people. So the repercussions and | :10:55. | :11:01. | |
consequences are quite felt 13 years after the US led war on Iraq. | :11:02. | :11:12. | |
What are people there saying specifically about Tony Blair and | :11:13. | :11:16. | |
has a role that has been under the spotlight with this Chilcot Report | :11:17. | :11:28. | |
two-day? There is a hostile sentiments here in Baghdad and in | :11:29. | :11:34. | |
Iraq, not just for the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony | :11:35. | :11:38. | |
Blair, but for also George W Bush, the former US presidents and the | :11:39. | :11:49. | |
Iraqi politicians who took part, as many Iraqis here say, in misleading | :11:50. | :11:56. | |
the international community and the Iraqis themselves and the | :11:57. | :12:05. | |
neighbouring countries in misleading them into justifying this war. | :12:06. | :12:11. | |
However, some Iraqis, and there are a lot, believe that the Americans or | :12:12. | :12:18. | |
the US Administration of George W Bush and his closest ally Tony Blair | :12:19. | :12:25. | |
were resolved and determined to invade Iraq no matter what. As we | :12:26. | :12:33. | |
heard from Sir John Chilcot today, he said that Tony Blair, he | :12:34. | :12:43. | |
mentioned some of the memos and correspondence between Tony Blair | :12:44. | :12:47. | |
and George W Bush, and from these memos it is evident and clear that | :12:48. | :12:54. | |
the suggestion to go to war with Iraq -- in Iraq dates back to 2001. | :12:55. | :13:01. | |
The first male mentions in this report is -- the first memo dated | :13:02. | :13:07. | |
December 2001 suggesting to go to Iraq. Many Iraqis are convinced that | :13:08. | :13:14. | |
the US administration and the UK Government at that time were | :13:15. | :13:19. | |
resolved to go to war and topple Saddam the matter what. | :13:20. | :13:27. | |
Thank you very much indeed for being with us. Let us give you the | :13:28. | :13:37. | |
response from Tony Blair. He says, I will take full responsibility for | :13:38. | :13:41. | |
any mistakes, without exception or excuse. He says he took the decision | :13:42. | :13:48. | |
on going to war in Iraq in good faith" what I believe to be the best | :13:49. | :13:54. | |
interests of the country. He also says the Chilcot Report should lay | :13:55. | :13:59. | |
to rest allegations against him of bad faith, lies and deceit. And Tony | :14:00. | :14:07. | |
Blair saying he does not believe that the decision to remove Saddam | :14:08. | :14:11. | |
Hussein from power in Iraq is the cause of terrorism today in the | :14:12. | :14:17. | |
Middle East and elsewhere. Those just some early reactions from Tony | :14:18. | :14:23. | |
Blair himself to the Chilcot Report which is generate a creed is pretty | :14:24. | :14:28. | |
damning of the way he and his Government conducted themselves -- | :14:29. | :14:34. | |
it is generally agreed is a pretty damning of heaven. We can top the | :14:35. | :14:38. | |
former member of this Government, Clare Short, Labour MP. -- damning | :14:39. | :14:46. | |
of his Government. Clare, what is your initial reaction to the report? | :14:47. | :14:53. | |
The report gives the damning list of all the criticisms the critics are | :14:54. | :14:58. | |
made and says they are all true. Blair gave his word long before, | :14:59. | :15:04. | |
there was no need to hurry, the diplomatic options were not | :15:05. | :15:10. | |
exhausted, we did not have to go on a US timetable, preparations were | :15:11. | :15:16. | |
not properly made. It is all there and damning but the situation in | :15:17. | :15:21. | |
Iraq and the Middle East remains terrible at making the criticism | :15:22. | :15:28. | |
does not put any of that right. One thing the report highlight is how | :15:29. | :15:33. | |
presidential the Blair Government was. For example, that memo to | :15:34. | :15:39. | |
George Bush in July of 2002, saying, I will be with you, whatever. I, | :15:40. | :15:45. | |
will be with you. He did not show back to you or other cabinet | :15:46. | :15:50. | |
members. What do you make of that? It does not surprise me. He did not | :15:51. | :15:57. | |
even decide things at the Cabinet, he had a few people in his room with | :15:58. | :16:03. | |
no minutes taken and then normally in Whitehall that the Prime Minister | :16:04. | :16:06. | |
talks to another country in Norton is taken and it is circulated. But | :16:07. | :16:11. | |
when we went into Iraq everything froze up. -- eight notes is taken. | :16:12. | :16:16. | |
That helped to create the confusion of planning for afterwards. We did | :16:17. | :16:21. | |
not know if we would properly go through the UN and that's meant, I | :16:22. | :16:27. | |
have been reading over the years the confusion and mess and worthy of its | :16:28. | :16:32. | |
as I read the description of how the events unfolded. It is a damning | :16:33. | :16:39. | |
indictment of the British system of Government. The informality of its | :16:40. | :16:42. | |
means this thing can be done and what must be learned is to tighten | :16:43. | :16:47. | |
up conditions for decision-making, if that is to be another war because | :16:48. | :16:51. | |
this way of doing things, but how many lives are destroyed, countries | :16:52. | :16:56. | |
destroyed. We must never do this again. You were a member of the | :16:57. | :17:02. | |
Government. Do you have regrets about your role in Government? I | :17:03. | :17:08. | |
regret massively we went to war when we dead and everything that | :17:09. | :17:17. | |
unfolded. -- when we did. I tried as a Cabinet member to try a hold on | :17:18. | :17:23. | |
the Tony Blair's and ankles and we might find a better way of dealing | :17:24. | :17:33. | |
with Iraq. I know I tried my damnedest but for wide Field and for | :17:34. | :17:37. | |
that I feel terrible. Do you think you should have resigned earlier. I | :17:38. | :17:44. | |
EDF place to make my resignation speech before the vote but then -- I | :17:45. | :17:52. | |
booked my place. That was not much fighting any very early invasion and | :17:53. | :17:56. | |
a lot of people in Iraq hoped for something better for them and if | :17:57. | :18:01. | |
there had been an international leads and more trust and not an | :18:02. | :18:06. | |
occupation Iraq might be in a much better place so that is why I stayed | :18:07. | :18:11. | |
until it was clear that promise would not be kept. It drew a lot of | :18:12. | :18:15. | |
flack on to me but it was good to try for that and in the end it | :18:16. | :18:21. | |
didn't help. Some of the family members of British troops who died | :18:22. | :18:26. | |
in Iraq are been saying they reserve the right to think about whether to | :18:27. | :18:31. | |
take legal action against members of the then British Government. What do | :18:32. | :18:36. | |
you think about that? I think they have a right to do that but I think | :18:37. | :18:41. | |
it unlikely they will find the roots to get the kind of legal | :18:42. | :18:46. | |
accountability they would like. If I am proved wrong, that is fine. Clare | :18:47. | :18:56. | |
Short, thank you very much indeed. Clare Short, International | :18:57. | :18:58. | |
Development Secretary in the Blair Government. Prime Minister's | :18:59. | :19:06. | |
Questions is underway. We can hear from the SNP's Westminster leader | :19:07. | :19:10. | |
Angus Robertson a short time ago. The Chilcot Report confirms that on | :19:11. | :19:17. | |
the 28th of July 2002 Tony Blair wrote to President Bush saying, I | :19:18. | :19:23. | |
will be with you whatever. Does the Prime Minister understand Whitely | :19:24. | :19:26. | |
families of the dead and injured UK service personnel -- why the | :19:27. | :19:33. | |
families of the dead and hundreds of thousands Iraqis feel they were | :19:34. | :19:35. | |
deceived about the reasons for going war? Let me join the Right | :19:36. | :19:44. | |
Honourable gentleman in wishing... In terms of the report dribble | :19:45. | :19:48. | |
discussed it in detail later and I don't want to pre-empt all other | :19:49. | :19:54. | |
things I want to say but we need to learn the lessons, study it | :19:55. | :19:59. | |
carefully. It is millions of words, thousands of pages and I think we | :20:00. | :20:03. | |
should save our remarks for debating it after the statement in the house. | :20:04. | :20:16. | |
The Chilcot is sport -- Chilcot disport -- Chilcot Report concludes | :20:17. | :20:19. | |
the UK did not achieve its objectives. That lack of planning | :20:20. | :20:26. | |
has also been evident in relation to Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and, most | :20:27. | :20:31. | |
recently, with no plan whatsoever for Brexit. When will the UK | :20:32. | :20:36. | |
Government actually start learning from the mistakes of the past so we | :20:37. | :20:43. | |
are not condemned to repeat them? He is right that what Sir John | :20:44. | :20:47. | |
Chilcot says about the failure to plan is clear and I can read from | :20:48. | :20:51. | |
his statement because he says when the invasion began UK policy | :20:52. | :20:54. | |
arrested on an assumption that would be a well executed... Security | :20:55. | :21:01. | |
environment. Mr Blair told the enquiry the difficulties encountered | :21:02. | :21:05. | |
after the invasion could not have been known in advance. He says, we | :21:06. | :21:09. | |
do not agree hindsight is required and he is clear on that point. What | :21:10. | :21:14. | |
I would say, in terms of planning, what I put in place as Prime | :21:15. | :21:19. | |
Minister following Iraq is proper legal advice pop-up reconstituted | :21:20. | :21:25. | |
meetings -- properly constituted meetings. All those things including | :21:26. | :21:30. | |
the proper listening to expert advice on the security Council, all | :21:31. | :21:33. | |
of that is designed to avoid the problems the Government had in the | :21:34. | :21:40. | |
case of Iraq. The only point I would make if there is actually no set of | :21:41. | :21:45. | |
arrangements and plans that can provide protection in any of these | :21:46. | :21:49. | |
cases. Military intervention, we can argue whether it is ever justified, | :21:50. | :21:54. | |
I believe it is. It is always difficult. Planning for the | :21:55. | :21:58. | |
aftermath is always difficult and I do not believe we should be naive | :21:59. | :22:03. | |
that is a perfect set of plans an arrangement that can solve these | :22:04. | :22:06. | |
problems in perpetuity. There are not. | :22:07. | :22:13. | |
That was the Prime Minister and the Westminster leader of the SNP Angus | :22:14. | :22:20. | |
Robertson in the Commons. You can see pictures of some of the families | :22:21. | :22:29. | |
giving their reaction already. One of those family members describing | :22:30. | :22:35. | |
Tony Blair, emotionally, as a terrorist. And the lawyer for that | :22:36. | :22:39. | |
group saying they will be reading the report in detail and seeing | :22:40. | :22:44. | |
whether they think there is a case for taking legal action against what | :22:45. | :22:48. | |
they called State officials, in other words members of the Blair | :22:49. | :22:51. | |
Government. Let's get some more reaction. I am joined here by a | :22:52. | :23:01. | |
leading expert on international law, Tim Ripley, an expert in the | :23:02. | :23:06. | |
military and military strategy and also David Godfrey, father of Daniel | :23:07. | :23:13. | |
who guides in Iraq. -- who died in Iraq. Let me ask you, David, we had | :23:14. | :23:20. | |
some of the family's reaction, tell your reaction to what Sir John said? | :23:21. | :23:36. | |
Just my grandson. My reaction... I've got to the end of a journey and | :23:37. | :23:40. | |
the start of another one. The journey started with the loss of | :23:41. | :23:49. | |
Daniel in Basra in February 2007. The next stage of my journey started | :23:50. | :23:56. | |
at the launch of the Chilcot enquiry report. It has been a journey of | :23:57. | :24:08. | |
heart ache, pain, not just bought my family but every other family you | :24:09. | :24:12. | |
have seen here today. For modular scene of the report are you | :24:13. | :24:18. | |
satisfied with the findings? I said to one of your colleagues | :24:19. | :24:24. | |
previously, I had come here with the possibility and woods probably Dev | :24:25. | :24:33. | |
Sir John -- get Sir John Chilcot have a stick but I must say, I owe | :24:34. | :24:41. | |
him an apology. -- give him have a stick. The report was well made out. | :24:42. | :24:47. | |
Was it worth the wait is? I cannot say... Yes, I would think so, but | :24:48. | :25:01. | |
the report has not gone far enough and I have not seen the report | :25:02. | :25:09. | |
statement from Tony Blair earlier on, but from a brief glimpse from | :25:10. | :25:17. | |
one of your colleagues, ... I totally disagree with some of the | :25:18. | :25:23. | |
things he said in that statement. Tim Ripley, you are a military | :25:24. | :25:28. | |
expert. In terms of what the report says about British equipment, and | :25:29. | :25:31. | |
that is one of the key issues for the families of those who died, for | :25:32. | :25:37. | |
example the land Rovers in which a lot of British troops died in Basra | :25:38. | :25:42. | |
and in the south of Iraq, they were not replaced quickly enough by the | :25:43. | :25:46. | |
MOD. What does the report tell us about that? The report is one of the | :25:47. | :25:53. | |
most damning indictments of the British military campaign since | :25:54. | :25:59. | |
1916. It is damning endpaper the preparedness of the Armed Forces and | :26:00. | :26:01. | |
their leadership during the campaign. -- it is damning of the | :26:02. | :26:10. | |
military preparedness. It says this was a military failure. There is a | :26:11. | :26:17. | |
lot of blame for arounds and talk about the preparations, but in terms | :26:18. | :26:22. | |
of the leadership of the British Armed Forces, they are accused of | :26:23. | :26:27. | |
being more interested in leaving Iraq than ensuring mission success. | :26:28. | :26:32. | |
The land Rover incident you spoke about, the report identifies a | :26:33. | :26:37. | |
four-year delay in identifying and selecting and procuring | :26:38. | :26:42. | |
replacements. It claims that on the leadership of the British Army being | :26:43. | :26:46. | |
more interested in business as usual back home in their barracks. It is | :26:47. | :26:53. | |
very damning of the direction of the campaign and says they did not | :26:54. | :26:56. | |
achieve what they set out to do which is very damning and has not | :26:57. | :27:00. | |
been seen in a British military report campaign for 100 years. | :27:01. | :27:06. | |
Let me take you back to what Tony Blair has been saying in response. | :27:07. | :27:11. | |
We just had that statement in the last few minutes. He says, the | :27:12. | :27:16. | |
report should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies and | :27:17. | :27:21. | |
deceit. Whether people agree or disagree with my decision to take | :27:22. | :27:24. | |
military action against Saddam Hussein, I took it in good faith and | :27:25. | :27:30. | |
in what I believe to be the best interests of the country. | :27:31. | :27:33. | |
That was Tony Blair with his immediate response to the Chilcot | :27:34. | :27:39. | |
enquiry. He also says he does not believe the removal of Saddam | :27:40. | :27:41. | |
Hussein is the cause of terrorism in the middle East today or elsewhere. | :27:42. | :27:48. | |
Tony Blair with his immediate reaction to the Chilcot enquiry. | :27:49. | :27:54. | |
Let's talk to them develop Sands, international law expert. What do | :27:55. | :27:57. | |
you make of the report and Tony Blair's response. The legal planning | :27:58. | :28:07. | |
was found to be unsatisfactory. The security Council was undermined. It | :28:08. | :28:13. | |
was not a situation of last resort. It is pretty devastating stuff. Is | :28:14. | :28:19. | |
that stronger than you expected? I did my best to keep an open mind. I | :28:20. | :28:25. | |
was concerned about the level of the questioning in the hearings and if | :28:26. | :28:29. | |
he had the capacity to assess the evidence. From what I have read so | :28:30. | :28:35. | |
far up my concerns are misplaced. It appears to be thorough and fair and | :28:36. | :28:39. | |
balanced. In relation to what Mr Blair said, it isn't about good | :28:40. | :28:43. | |
faith of bad faith, what we are bidding here is a document | :28:44. | :28:47. | |
essentially making an allegation of gross recklessness. Going to a war, | :28:48. | :28:53. | |
the more serious than a Government can do. When war is not needed off | :28:54. | :28:59. | |
the back of unsatisfactory legal advice. That is pretty devastating. | :29:00. | :29:06. | |
What is your view of what why Tony Blair took that course? What drove | :29:07. | :29:14. | |
him to that? I have studied this for ten years and wrote a book in 2006 | :29:15. | :29:20. | |
and he had decided very early in 2002 and that is now established | :29:21. | :29:24. | |
beyond any doubt. He took a decision and did not share it with cabinets | :29:25. | :29:30. | |
and in fact repeatedly told them no decision had been taken and we now | :29:31. | :29:35. | |
see in black and white evidence that shows Mr Blair writing to President | :29:36. | :29:41. | |
Bush saying, I am with you whatever. When you are in that situation as | :29:42. | :29:45. | |
Prime Minister and you have in your back pocket legal advice from the | :29:46. | :29:49. | |
Attorney General which says you cannot do this, you need a second | :29:50. | :29:54. | |
resolution and you tell the president of the United States I am | :29:55. | :29:58. | |
still with you, despite that legal advice, you have got a problem in | :29:59. | :30:02. | |
decision-making. It is not a good faith of bad faith but not relying | :30:03. | :30:08. | |
on the legal advice we had in taking the country in a direction his own | :30:09. | :30:12. | |
legal adviser told him he could not do. | :30:13. | :30:18. | |
Do you think the report is stronger or more devastating with regard to | :30:19. | :30:25. | |
the Tony Blair government than you might have been expecting? The most | :30:26. | :30:33. | |
devastating thing as there is no glimmer of hope that anything was | :30:34. | :30:41. | |
achieved in this war. He was pretty clear that the situation in Iraq is | :30:42. | :30:46. | |
abysmal. It is not going anywhere soon. It is soon -- still a | :30:47. | :30:53. | |
nightmare for the people of Iraq for many years to come. And our | :30:54. | :30:56. | |
intervention certainly did not make things any better. Would you like to | :30:57. | :31:03. | |
see some sort of legal action in the courts against members of the | :31:04. | :31:08. | |
government at that time, including Tony Blair? It has to happen. I | :31:09. | :31:16. | |
agree with your colleagues here that we were ill-equipped and Tony Blair | :31:17. | :31:30. | |
took the decision with President Bush to go together, to force the | :31:31. | :31:35. | |
role on the British government. They did that without proper legal | :31:36. | :31:43. | |
backing. We did not go back to the United Nations, because they should | :31:44. | :31:50. | |
have given that time to the weapons inspectors. They were pushed to get | :31:51. | :32:00. | |
this sorted. One thing that sticks in my mind is the weapons | :32:01. | :32:12. | |
inspectors. The supposedly said of Doctor David Kelly. Sorry we have | :32:13. | :32:14. | |
two interrupt you. We can go live now to the House | :32:15. | :32:17. | |
of Commons, where a statement will be made, in response | :32:18. | :32:20. | |
to the Chilcot Inquiry This is a difficult day for all of | :32:21. | :32:30. | |
those who have lost loved ones. This has been far too long coming. I hope | :32:31. | :32:35. | |
we can draw some solace from the depth and vigour of this report and | :32:36. | :32:40. | |
some solace that we will not forget the incredible sacrifice. 179 | :32:41. | :32:48. | |
British servicemen and women. They give everything for our country. We | :32:49. | :32:53. | |
must never forget the thousands who suffered life changing industry -- | :32:54. | :33:02. | |
injured injuries. This report would have begun sooner if it had begun | :33:03. | :33:08. | |
sooner French people on the side of the host first goal for it back in | :33:09. | :33:14. | |
2006. But a fool everyone will join me in thanking St John and also Mr | :33:15. | :33:21. | |
Gilbert, who passed away recently. Government ministers did not see the | :33:22. | :33:31. | |
report until yesterday. He gave Sir John fool access to government | :33:32. | :33:37. | |
papers. This has been an unprecedented access and insight. It | :33:38. | :33:46. | |
also took into account 31 personal memos from the then Prime Minister | :33:47. | :33:53. | |
Tony Blair to President Bush. It amounts to 2.6 million words. It | :33:54. | :34:00. | |
cost nearly ?10 million to produce. Everyone in the host will love the | :34:01. | :34:05. | |
chance to study it in debt. We will have two full days of the beat next | :34:06. | :34:11. | |
week. And on a number of key questions were asked. Did we go to | :34:12. | :34:19. | |
war on a false promise? Was legal advice properly taken? Was the | :34:20. | :34:24. | |
operation well planned? Where are we prepared for the aftermath? And did | :34:25. | :34:30. | |
our forces have adequate funding and equipment? I will try and summarise | :34:31. | :34:34. | |
the key findings and lessons that I believe have to be levelled. Another | :34:35. | :34:38. | |
of reasons were put forward for going to war in Iraq. Including the | :34:39. | :34:48. | |
danger that Saddam Hussein posed to his people and the region. Central | :34:49. | :34:53. | |
to the argument was the issue of weapons of mass disruption. Sir John | :34:54. | :34:57. | |
said there was an ingrained belief, genuinely held in the United Kingdom | :34:58. | :35:04. | |
and elsewhere, that Saddam Hussein possessed a biological capability | :35:05. | :35:08. | |
and that he wanted to redevelop its nuclear capabilities. He was | :35:09. | :35:14. | |
actively pursuing that. He had built up chemical weapons in the past and | :35:15. | :35:18. | |
had used them against Kurdish militants and the Iranians military. | :35:19. | :35:26. | |
The advice given to the government by the international policy | :35:27. | :35:32. | |
community that Saddam Hussein did possess these capabilities. As we | :35:33. | :35:36. | |
know Noel, by 2003, this long-held belief that all longer reflected the | :35:37. | :35:48. | |
reality. St John says, at no stage was the belief that Saddam Hussein | :35:49. | :35:54. | |
continued to have weapons of mass destruction. This was not fully | :35:55. | :36:04. | |
examined. It was possible to come to a different conclusion about the | :36:05. | :36:06. | |
existence of fuel that other intelligence. The results of the | :36:07. | :36:15. | |
worry about weapons of mass destruction finding a reason to the | :36:16. | :36:19. | |
hands of terrorists. Roll St John agrees that that was the worry, but | :36:20. | :36:26. | |
the original one basis to suggest that Iraq represented such a threat. | :36:27. | :36:32. | |
On the question of intelligence, the report says intelligence was | :36:33. | :36:42. | |
improperly concluded. He does say that the use of the joint | :36:43. | :36:47. | |
intelligence committee material in the public presentation did not make | :36:48. | :36:50. | |
reading of the limitations of the assessments. He says the | :36:51. | :36:57. | |
intelligence had not established beyond doubt that either that Saddam | :36:58. | :37:01. | |
Hussain was producing chemical or biological weapons. It says the | :37:02. | :37:07. | |
joint in kelp intelligence committee should have made that very clear to | :37:08. | :37:13. | |
the Prime Minister. They could of conveyed more certainty than the | :37:14. | :37:17. | |
joint intelligence committee assessments. There was a lack of | :37:18. | :37:22. | |
clarity between what they said and what Tony Blair believed. With | :37:23. | :37:30. | |
regard to the 2002 last year, the famed difference between the | :37:31. | :37:35. | |
inspection the judgment. But he does not question the belief of Mr lawyer | :37:36. | :37:48. | |
that they had. There is no legality expressed with regard to the | :37:49. | :37:52. | |
involvement of the United Kingdom in the war. But the dude talk about the | :37:53. | :37:58. | |
legal advice the government was given. St John is highly critical of | :37:59. | :38:06. | |
the process by which legal advice was arranged that and discussed. He | :38:07. | :38:10. | |
said the circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there | :38:11. | :38:14. | |
was a legal basis for military action were far from satisfactory. | :38:15. | :38:21. | |
He also finds that the diplomatic options had not been exhausted. He | :38:22. | :38:29. | |
says military action was therefore not the last resort. He said the | :38:30. | :38:33. | |
second resolution of the United Nations, the United Nations -- | :38:34. | :38:37. | |
kingdom should have done more to exhaust all options, including | :38:38. | :38:42. | |
allowing weapons inspectors to conclude the work in Iraq. He then | :38:43. | :38:50. | |
looks at the processor which was then forward. A number of ministers | :38:51. | :38:56. | |
were involved in the decision-making. He then looks at | :38:57. | :39:08. | |
the process of decision-making. He says the idea of military action was | :39:09. | :39:11. | |
never properly discussed that Cabinet level. It inevitably reduced | :39:12. | :39:18. | |
the small group of people, often without records being kept. He also | :39:19. | :39:26. | |
says that Tony Blair made important commitments to President Bush, which | :39:27. | :39:29. | |
had not been discussed with Cabinet colleagues. But he says at no stage | :39:30. | :39:39. | |
the sea was nearly killed a attempt to mislead people. The initial | :39:40. | :39:46. | |
invasion proceeded rapidly and we should be proud of what our Armed | :39:47. | :39:58. | |
Forces achieved. This is despite not been planning to take part in an | :39:59. | :40:06. | |
invasion from the south, which came at short notice after the Turkish | :40:07. | :40:09. | |
gunmen refused access from the North. It says satisfactory plans | :40:10. | :40:29. | |
had not been made for the challenges and risks in Iraq. He says the | :40:30. | :40:34. | |
government lacked clear ministerial oversight in planning and | :40:35. | :40:42. | |
coordination and field to manage the risks adequately. The government and | :40:43. | :40:51. | |
ministers remained to fixed on the idea that the United States had a | :40:52. | :40:56. | |
plan and that the United Kingdom rule would take part for 34 months | :40:57. | :41:08. | |
after the conflict ended. He concludes that the anticipated that | :41:09. | :41:17. | |
the post-war problems did not require the benefits of hindsight. | :41:18. | :41:23. | |
On the issue of equipment and troops, the government feel to | :41:24. | :41:29. | |
provide adequate patrol vehicles, feel your to meet the needs of | :41:30. | :41:36. | |
United Kingdom forces should not have been tolerated. He says the | :41:37. | :41:43. | |
Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat posed by | :41:44. | :41:52. | |
improvised explosive devices. The sole many opportunities for a | :41:53. | :41:55. | |
strategic reappraisal to have taken place with regard to the resources. | :41:56. | :42:02. | |
He phoned that no such reappraisal of took place. During the first four | :42:03. | :42:07. | |
years there was no clear statement of policy setting out exactly the | :42:08. | :42:13. | |
acceptable amount of risk and who was at responsible for managing the | :42:14. | :42:18. | |
risk. He says the military were too focused on withdrawing from Iraq and | :42:19. | :42:26. | |
focused on the deployment to Afghanistan. He concludes that | :42:27. | :42:31. | |
although Tony Blair succeeded in persuading the United States to go | :42:32. | :42:36. | |
back to the United Nations in 2002, he was unsuccessful in changing the | :42:37. | :42:42. | |
United States position. The absence of a majority in the Security | :42:43. | :42:48. | |
Council of military action, at that point, the united kingdom was | :42:49. | :42:51. | |
therefore undermining the authority of the Security Council. He said it | :42:52. | :43:01. | |
was clear that there was a worry that the relationship between the | :43:02. | :43:04. | |
United States and the United Kingdom may be damaged if support was not | :43:05. | :43:12. | |
given. But there was a gap between the ambitious United Kingdom | :43:13. | :43:15. | |
objectives and the equipment for the trips that that would allow. On the | :43:16. | :43:27. | |
territorial integrity of Iraq remained, thousands of innocent | :43:28. | :43:30. | |
Iraqi citizens lost their lives. While these conditions were not | :43:31. | :43:36. | |
created by the coalition, they were exacerbated by it. They were not | :43:37. | :43:43. | |
addressed by a effective programme. He says the policy of the United | :43:44. | :43:50. | |
Kingdom government failed to meet its achieved objectives and. Those | :43:51. | :44:01. | |
who voted for military action will have to take the fear share of | :44:02. | :44:07. | |
responsibility. We cannot turn the clock back, but we can make sure | :44:08. | :44:15. | |
that these aspects of the report are taken into account for the future. | :44:16. | :44:22. | |
Getting all these things rate do not guarantee the success of the | :44:23. | :44:26. | |
military intervention. I believe it was great to intervene in Libya to | :44:27. | :44:37. | |
stop the slaughter there. We did have a United Nations mandate the. | :44:38. | :44:44. | |
But getting these things rate does not make the challenges any less | :44:45. | :44:50. | |
formidable. The difficulties in Libya today at playing for everyone | :44:51. | :44:54. | |
to see. As the Prime Minister for the last six years, I believe there | :44:55. | :44:59. | |
are lessons need to be learnt. First, taking the country to war | :45:00. | :45:04. | |
should always be a last resort and should only be done when all other | :45:05. | :45:08. | |
credible alternatives have been exhausted. On my first year of | :45:09. | :45:17. | |
office I established the National Security Council so that | :45:18. | :45:19. | |
decision-making would be taken across the whole of that group. The | :45:20. | :45:23. | |
council was not just a meeting of ministers. It has the chief of the | :45:24. | :45:32. | |
defence staff, the head of the intelligence staff and other | :45:33. | :45:39. | |
relevant officials. I also appointed the first National Security adviser | :45:40. | :45:42. | |
with a properly constituted team and the cabinet so that all aspects of | :45:43. | :45:48. | |
the National security are joined up. They also tap into the experience | :45:49. | :45:52. | |
and knowledge of experts and with government. This helps us | :45:53. | :45:58. | |
confidently challenge problems. It is inconceivable today that we could | :45:59. | :46:05. | |
take a premeditated decision to boot, trips in any free without a | :46:06. | :46:17. | |
National Security Council agreement. I would argue that the culture | :46:18. | :46:24. | |
established by the Prime Minister matters. It is crucial that the | :46:25. | :46:29. | |
decision-making meat establishes a climate so that ministers can | :46:30. | :46:34. | |
challenge existing policy and question the Cabinet and the Prime | :46:35. | :46:42. | |
Minister without fear or favour. Everyone at that table is genuinely | :46:43. | :46:45. | |
free to speak their mind. If we are to take difficult decisions, | :46:46. | :46:50. | |
planning for what follows is fatal. We know the task of rebuilding | :46:51. | :46:59. | |
effectively is so important. That is why we created the stabilisation | :47:00. | :47:05. | |
fund so that experts are able to deploy at short notice any freer in | :47:06. | :47:09. | |
the world. None of this would be possible without those decisions | :47:10. | :47:17. | |
were points of our gross national product not spent on overseas aid. | :47:18. | :47:24. | |
We also want to plan for the aftermath of conflicts, but just as | :47:25. | :47:28. | |
importantly, prevent these conflicts taking place in the first place. We | :47:29. | :47:34. | |
know conduct a regular strategic security review so that the | :47:35. | :47:41. | |
consistent with our review strategy. We plan to invest at least ?117 | :47:42. | :47:47. | |
billion in new equipment over the next decade. We have also enshrine | :47:48. | :47:56. | |
the Armed Forces covenant in the law so that Armed Forces receive the | :47:57. | :48:02. | |
respect they deserve. Sending troops onto the battlefield without the | :48:03. | :48:05. | |
proper equipment was unacceptable and that should never happen again. | :48:06. | :48:09. | |
There will be further lessons to be learnt. That is what we will do. Mr | :48:10. | :48:16. | |
Speaker, on reflecting on this, there are also some lessons that | :48:17. | :48:22. | |
they do not think we should draw. It would be wrong to conclude that we | :48:23. | :48:27. | |
should not stand with our American allies when our common interests are | :48:28. | :48:31. | |
threatened. We should never be afraid to speak frankly and | :48:32. | :48:36. | |
honestly. When we commit our troops together, there needs to be a | :48:37. | :48:40. | |
structure so that our opinions can be properly conveyed. But Britain | :48:41. | :48:45. | |
and America share the same fundamental allies and our | :48:46. | :48:53. | |
partnership remains as it has been in the last decade as it has ever | :48:54. | :48:57. | |
been. It would be wrong to conclude that we cannot rely on the judgments | :48:58. | :49:03. | |
of brilliant and hard-working intelligence agencies. Since | :49:04. | :49:09. | |
November 2014, they have enabled us to foil seven terrorist attacks on | :49:10. | :49:16. | |
the streets of Great Britain. The needs to be proper separation | :49:17. | :49:20. | |
between the process of assessing intelligence and the policy-making | :49:21. | :49:26. | |
that comes from that. That is what we know have in place. It would be | :49:27. | :49:32. | |
wrong to conclude that our military are not capable of intervening | :49:33. | :49:35. | |
successfully around the world. Many of the feelings were not related to | :49:36. | :49:43. | |
the fielders of the soldiers going into Iraq, but the feelings of | :49:44. | :49:48. | |
post-war planning after those initial shot had been fired. | :49:49. | :49:55. | |
Finally, we should not conclude that intervention is always wrong. There | :49:56. | :49:58. | |
are unquestionably times when it is right to intervene as this country | :49:59. | :50:09. | |
did successfully and Kosovo. There are times that we should maybe have | :50:10. | :50:13. | |
intervened and did not. The likes of the genus Aidan the Balkans. Often | :50:14. | :50:26. | |
it is the state building after watch which is the biggest challenge, as | :50:27. | :50:32. | |
opposed to the initial conflict itself. Just because intervention is | :50:33. | :50:36. | |
difficult, it does not mean there are not things when it is not rate | :50:37. | :50:40. | |
and necessary. We will need to learn the lessons of this report and with | :50:41. | :50:47. | |
our interventions in the Middle East at the moment, we will not treat all | :50:48. | :50:56. | |
without always thinking of trying to protect the people. Before | :50:57. | :51:03. | |
addressing the issues raised in the report I would like to remember and | :51:04. | :51:09. | |
honour the 179 British service men and women killed and the thousands | :51:10. | :51:14. | |
maimed and injured during the Iraq war and their families as well as | :51:15. | :51:18. | |
the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who have died. Yesterday, | :51:19. | :51:27. | |
I had the private meeting with some of the families. I have done over | :51:28. | :51:34. | |
the past 12 years. It is always a humbling experience to witness the | :51:35. | :51:38. | |
resolve and resilience of these families and their unwavering | :51:39. | :51:40. | |
commitment to seek truth and justice. They have waited seven | :51:41. | :51:52. | |
years for this report. It was right that the enquiry took evidence from | :51:53. | :52:00. | |
such a wide range of origins and that the conduct of the war and its | :52:01. | :52:04. | |
aftermath should have been examined in full detail. But the | :52:05. | :52:09. | |
extraordinary length of time this has taken as a matter of regret. I | :52:10. | :52:23. | |
was only given access this morning meaning today's response can only be | :52:24. | :52:27. | |
a provisional one. To invade and occupy Iraq in 2003 was the biggest | :52:28. | :52:36. | |
foreign policy decision taken by a British government in modern times. | :52:37. | :52:41. | |
It divided the size and said the government of the day against the | :52:42. | :52:45. | |
majority of the British people as well as the weight of global | :52:46. | :52:52. | |
opinion. The war was not in anyway last resort. It was a military | :52:53. | :52:59. | |
intervention launched on a false pretext. It has long been regarded | :53:00. | :53:05. | |
as illegal by the overwhelming weight of international opinion. It | :53:06. | :53:09. | |
led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and the | :53:10. | :53:13. | |
displacement of millions of refugees. It devastated the | :53:14. | :53:19. | |
infrastructure in Iraq and its society. It forced deal with all | :53:20. | :53:26. | |
sectarianism that turned into a civil war. Instead of protecting | :53:27. | :53:30. | |
security at home and abroad, it fuelled terrorism across the region. | :53:31. | :53:38. | |
To the sandy suicide bombing attack in Baghdad which killed over 250 | :53:39. | :53:45. | |
people, it was carried out by the people whose origins lie in the | :53:46. | :53:49. | |
aftermath of the invasion. By any measure, the occupation of Iraq has | :53:50. | :54:01. | |
been catastrophic. The decision to invade Iraq on flawed intelligence | :54:02. | :54:09. | |
has had a devastating impact. It has led to a fundamental breakdown in | :54:10. | :54:15. | |
the trust of politics and the institutions of government. The | :54:16. | :54:19. | |
tragedy is that probably government got horrifically wrong, many people | :54:20. | :54:30. | |
actually got it right. In February 2003, when 1.5 million people and | :54:31. | :54:38. | |
millions of others across the world marched against the impending | :54:39. | :54:43. | |
conflict. It was the biggest demonstration in British study. It | :54:44. | :54:51. | |
was not that those of us who opposed the war and the brutality or the | :54:52. | :54:58. | |
claims of Saddam Hussein and his dictatorship. Indeed, many of | :54:59. | :55:04. | |
campaigned against the Iraqi regime during its most bloody period when | :55:05. | :55:08. | |
the British government and the United States administration | :55:09. | :55:18. | |
actually supported that resume. -- regime. The weapons of mass | :55:19. | :55:27. | |
destruction evidence was flimsy at best. We went to war without United | :55:28. | :55:33. | |
Nations authorisation and that was profoundly dangerous. We knew it | :55:34. | :55:40. | |
would be resisted by force and set off a series of uncontrollable and | :55:41. | :55:44. | |
destructive events. Only this house had been able to listen to the | :55:45. | :55:48. | |
wisdom of many of our members of Parliament when he voted against | :55:49. | :55:54. | |
waiting for United Nations authorisation. The course of events | :55:55. | :56:00. | |
may have been different. All but 16 members of the official opposition | :56:01. | :56:04. | |
supported the conflict while many in my party voted against that as did | :56:05. | :56:09. | |
others in other opposition parties. The members here today on all | :56:10. | :56:15. | |
benchers who voted against the conflict but none others should take | :56:16. | :56:26. | |
any satisfaction in this report. All offers. We cannot have a running | :56:27. | :56:31. | |
commentary on statements made from the front bench. Members of this | :56:32. | :56:36. | |
house know me well enough that I want all opinions to be expressed. | :56:37. | :56:42. | |
The Prime Minister gets a lot of time he is accustomed to that. The | :56:43. | :56:48. | |
Right Honourable gentleman is quite entitled to be here. If you want to | :56:49. | :56:53. | |
talk away, please leave the chamber. We have to be saddened and no | :56:54. | :57:01. | |
reflect on that. In addition to the British servicemen and civilians | :57:02. | :57:13. | |
killed, those who voted against the war have not lived long enough to be | :57:14. | :57:19. | |
vindicated. First, let us remember Robin Cook. He stood up 13 years ago | :57:20. | :57:29. | |
and said in a few hundred words, he foresaw the tragedy to come. The | :57:30. | :57:35. | |
report has rightfully dug deep into the litany of feel your of the | :57:36. | :57:41. | |
occupation, the calamitous decision to stand down the Iraqi army and to | :57:42. | :57:49. | |
dissolve the entire Iraqi state. The reality is that it was the original | :57:50. | :57:54. | |
decision to follow the United States president into this war in the most | :57:55. | :58:01. | |
volatile region in the world. This is what led to every other disaster. | :58:02. | :58:12. | |
This government dossier that Iraq possessed weapons of mass | :58:13. | :58:14. | |
destruction which could be deployed in 45 minutes is one of the most | :58:15. | :58:22. | |
notable of the deceptions. As we helped in the enquiry, we knew that | :58:23. | :58:29. | |
the claim of the dossier was to make the case for war rather than set out | :58:30. | :58:34. | |
the case for requiring more intelligence. It not only sparked | :58:35. | :58:43. | |
off the disaster in Iraq, but also in the surrounding region. We have | :58:44. | :58:50. | |
seen a rise in the region of warring militias and terrorist groups. The | :58:51. | :59:02. | |
former head of MI5 me clear to the enquiry, there are many other | :59:03. | :59:08. | |
lessons which need to be learned by our government, our Parliament, as | :59:09. | :59:14. | |
well as my party in every other party. We need to be more open and | :59:15. | :59:19. | |
independent relationship with the united nations -- states. We need to | :59:20. | :59:26. | |
uphold international law and the authority of the United Nations. It | :59:27. | :59:32. | |
always seeks peaceful solutions to international problems. We also need | :59:33. | :59:38. | |
a much stronger oversight of security and intelligence services. | :59:39. | :59:45. | |
We need Parliament APSAC over future decisions to go to war based on | :59:46. | :59:51. | |
information, not just that given at the government 's discretion. In the | :59:52. | :00:00. | |
wake of Iraq, our own and other Western governments increasingly | :00:01. | :00:11. | |
resort to hybrid forces, we need to ensure that the use of the likes of | :00:12. | :00:15. | |
drones is subject to proper Parliamentary scrutiny. There are no | :00:16. | :00:22. | |
more important decisions that a member of Parliament would get asked | :00:23. | :00:23. | |
to make. The very least the country should | :00:24. | :00:34. | |
expect that a vigorous and objective evidence on which to base decisions. | :00:35. | :00:40. | |
We know the house was misled in the run-up to war and the house must now | :00:41. | :00:44. | |
decide how it shall deal with it. Just as all those who took the | :00:45. | :00:49. | |
decision is laid bare in a Chilcot Report must face up to the | :00:50. | :00:53. | |
consequences of their actions. Later today I will meet a group of | :00:54. | :00:57. | |
families of military service men and women who lost loved ones, Iraqi | :00:58. | :01:03. | |
veterans and Iraqi citizens who lost loved ones during the war. I will be | :01:04. | :01:12. | |
discussing with them the decisions taken by the Government that led the | :01:13. | :01:17. | |
country to war with the terrible consequences. Quite bluntly, there | :01:18. | :01:21. | |
are huge lessons for every single one of us. We make decisions that | :01:22. | :01:27. | |
have consequences that don't just go on for the immediate years, they go | :01:28. | :01:31. | |
on for decades and decades afterwards. We need to reflect | :01:32. | :01:36. | |
seriously before we take any decisions again to take military | :01:37. | :01:41. | |
action without realising the consequences of those will live with | :01:42. | :01:45. | |
all of us for many decades to come and have often incalculable | :01:46. | :01:51. | |
consequences. Let me briefly respond. I want to | :01:52. | :01:54. | |
leave as much time for colleagues to make the points. He is right to | :01:55. | :01:59. | |
praise the families for the dignity. I understand the regret of the time | :02:00. | :02:03. | |
taken and we all feel that. The point I would be is when you have an | :02:04. | :02:08. | |
independent report you must allow it to be independent and let the German | :02:09. | :02:12. | |
make their own decisions so while it has been frustrating the frustration | :02:13. | :02:18. | |
is better than intervention. -- let the chair man make their own | :02:19. | :02:22. | |
decisions. In terms of the timer read to make the report that I can | :02:23. | :02:27. | |
really the bought and did not want politicians to be given more time | :02:28. | :02:31. | |
than the families themselves which is why the ATM deadline was set. He | :02:32. | :02:38. | |
is right to say -- 8am deadline. He is like to see the report finds that | :02:39. | :02:44. | |
the intervention MySpace or Al-Qaeda. But violent Islamist | :02:45. | :02:54. | |
extremism -- intervention left space for. It is important for us to | :02:55. | :03:01. | |
remember that. In terms of the litany of failures I urge him, I | :03:02. | :03:06. | |
have been able to read the executive summary and some other bits and I'm | :03:07. | :03:10. | |
sure colleagues well and there are litany of failures such as the | :03:11. | :03:15. | |
disbanding of the Army, the failure to plan for the aftermath. I think | :03:16. | :03:21. | |
they are powerful point made by Sir John Chilcot. In terms of lessons to | :03:22. | :03:26. | |
learn, I thought many of his points we have already put in place. Proper | :03:27. | :03:32. | |
Cabinet discussion, parliamentary votes, oversight of the intelligence | :03:33. | :03:36. | |
agency. I would urge him, before calling up with even more ways to | :03:37. | :03:40. | |
oversee our intelligence agencies, I urged colleagues from around the | :03:41. | :03:47. | |
house to look at the way the intelligence and security -- | :03:48. | :03:50. | |
intelligence and security committee now works. We do need to read, I | :03:51. | :03:54. | |
think, our intelligence services was a clear set of instructions rather | :03:55. | :04:00. | |
than change them every five minutes. The War Powers act, I think this is | :04:01. | :04:05. | |
something discussed in the two day debate. I have looked at it | :04:06. | :04:08. | |
carefully and have concluded that is not the right thing to do and I | :04:09. | :04:13. | |
believe we would get into a legal mess. Clearly, the house should be | :04:14. | :04:19. | |
beat it. On the issue of the US, he calls for an open partnership -- | :04:20. | :04:26. | |
should debate it. I do not believe the USA is always right but our | :04:27. | :04:31. | |
partnership with them is vital to national security and I feel his | :04:32. | :04:35. | |
approach is the USA is always wrong and while they are not always right | :04:36. | :04:38. | |
they are our best partner and we should work with them. I don't think | :04:39. | :04:47. | |
any of us will have time for 3.8 million words but it is very | :04:48. | :04:52. | |
carefully judged and thought through and you should read it in | :04:53. | :04:55. | |
conjunction with this statement Sir John get a date which is a birdie at | :04:56. | :05:02. | |
the of this 200 page summary. -- which is an articulate. We all need | :05:03. | :05:09. | |
time to study the many damning conclusions in this report and what | :05:10. | :05:13. | |
how this catastrophic decision was reached. But the Prime Minister | :05:14. | :05:17. | |
doesn't say we should read it and the light of future lessons for the | :05:18. | :05:21. | |
machinery of Government. -- the Prime Minister doesn't say. What I | :05:22. | :05:31. | |
know my next -- does say. What I know the introduction of the | :05:32. | :05:33. | |
security Council was a good innovation and his successor should | :05:34. | :05:36. | |
be recommended whether or not we should return to the pre-Blair time | :05:37. | :05:43. | |
of fool collective Cabinet responsibility. With proper time for | :05:44. | :05:48. | |
meetings proper information and studied conclusions and whether we | :05:49. | :05:53. | |
should not also look at whether parliamentary accountability of | :05:54. | :05:56. | |
these things should be reconsidered so there are full and properly | :05:57. | :06:02. | |
informed debate is here held in good time for, in this case, the military | :06:03. | :06:08. | |
are deployed and everything is set and the position is irreversible. We | :06:09. | :06:15. | |
need to go back to a much more collective and accountable form of | :06:16. | :06:20. | |
Government. Might right honourable friend make | :06:21. | :06:23. | |
some good points. In terms of Cabinet responsibility you need to | :06:24. | :06:26. | |
have a Cabinet meeting and discussion but I would not try and | :06:27. | :06:34. | |
substitute that for what the work the security Council does. Having | :06:35. | :06:38. | |
sitting around you the head of MI5, MI6, chief of the defence staff, | :06:39. | :06:42. | |
they are sitting there as equal members, able to tell you what they | :06:43. | :06:47. | |
think. That debate is more valuable than simply listening to other | :06:48. | :06:52. | |
secretaries of state, although they are also there as well. I still | :06:53. | :06:56. | |
think that is the best place to do that. In terms of the parliamentary | :06:57. | :07:01. | |
debate, we should happen and it is good to have a reasonable time. One | :07:02. | :07:06. | |
of the issue with Iraq was it was so close to the point of decision many | :07:07. | :07:10. | |
colleagues felt to vote in a different weight was somehow to let | :07:11. | :07:14. | |
down our troops on the eve of the going vitally important decision. -- | :07:15. | :07:21. | |
a vitally important decision. You can I thank the Prime Minister for a | :07:22. | :07:26. | |
fast sight of his statements and a a few short hours this morning to look | :07:27. | :07:29. | |
at the millions of words in the report. Today we remember the | :07:30. | :07:34. | |
hundreds of thousands of people who died in Iraq, Iraqi civilians, and | :07:35. | :07:39. | |
of course the 179 UK service personnel who lost their lives. It | :07:40. | :07:45. | |
is a sombre day for their families and our hearts go out to them. The | :07:46. | :07:50. | |
report we are considering now will be pored over in the days and weeks | :07:51. | :07:55. | |
and months ahead is and it should be the first step in learning the | :07:56. | :07:59. | |
lessons from the UKbut most shameful foreign policy action in decades. In | :08:00. | :08:08. | |
paragraph 416 of the executive summary the Chilcot Report confirms | :08:09. | :08:14. | |
on the 28th of July 2002 Tony Blair wrote to President Bush saying, I | :08:15. | :08:22. | |
will be with you whatever. Frankly, it is remarkable that the primer | :08:23. | :08:30. | |
Minister did not think that was even noteworthy to mention in his | :08:31. | :08:35. | |
statement to the house. My first question to the primer Minister is | :08:36. | :08:42. | |
why? Given much of the debates rests about the rationale of the Prime | :08:43. | :08:46. | |
Minister of the time signing up to whatever course of action in the | :08:47. | :08:50. | |
United States was prepared to pursue. On intelligence, the report | :08:51. | :08:57. | |
concludes, paragraph 807, the assessed intelligence had not | :08:58. | :09:02. | |
established beyond doubt either Saddam Hussein had continued to | :09:03. | :09:07. | |
produce chemical and biological weapons or efforts to develop | :09:08. | :09:10. | |
nuclear weapons continued. I completely understand why the | :09:11. | :09:15. | |
families of dead and injured UK service personnel and hundreds of | :09:16. | :09:21. | |
thousands of Iraqis will feel they were deceived about the reasons for | :09:22. | :09:28. | |
going to war. I completely understand why they also feel let | :09:29. | :09:31. | |
down when it came to the post-conflict situation and the | :09:32. | :09:37. | |
Chilcot Report catalogues in graphic detail the fielders in planning for | :09:38. | :09:44. | |
post-conflict Iraq. In paragraph 630 of the executive summary, when Mr | :09:45. | :09:48. | |
Blair set out the UK's vision for the future of Iraq and the House of | :09:49. | :09:53. | |
Commons on the 18th of March 2003, nor assessment had been made of | :09:54. | :09:57. | |
whether that vision was achievable, no agreement had been reached with | :09:58. | :10:00. | |
the United States only workable post-conflict plan, you are in | :10:01. | :10:06. | |
opposition had not been secured and there had been no decision on the UN | :10:07. | :10:15. | |
role in post-conflict Iraq. Paragraph 814 says Mr Blair, who | :10:16. | :10:19. | |
recognise the significance of the post-conflict phase, did not press | :10:20. | :10:23. | |
President Bush for definite assurances about US plans and he did | :10:24. | :10:28. | |
not consider or seek advice on whether the absence of a | :10:29. | :10:31. | |
satisfactory plan called for reassessment of the terms of the | :10:32. | :10:35. | |
UK's engagement and did not make agreement on such a plan at | :10:36. | :10:40. | |
condition of UK participation in militant action. In fact, the | :10:41. | :10:46. | |
Chilcot Report concludes, I quote from paragraph 857, the UK did not | :10:47. | :10:55. | |
achieve its objectives. The lack of planning has also been evident since | :10:56. | :11:00. | |
in relation to Afghanistan, to Libya, Syria and most recently with | :11:01. | :11:08. | |
absolutely no plan whatsoever in regards to Brexit. The web at UK | :11:09. | :11:15. | |
governments of either Tory or Labour issue actually start learning from | :11:16. | :11:19. | |
the mistakes of the past so we are not condemned to repeat them? I hope | :11:20. | :11:24. | |
and I expect in the months ahead there will be the opportunity to | :11:25. | :11:29. | |
hold to account those who are associated and responsible for | :11:30. | :11:35. | |
taking the UK to war in Iraq. There is -- that has only caused hundreds | :11:36. | :11:40. | |
of thousands of deaths. Not just that, it has undermined people's | :11:41. | :11:42. | |
faith in Parliament and Government in the UK and left an indelible | :11:43. | :11:47. | |
stain on Britain's standing in the world. | :11:48. | :11:51. | |
But the fact the right honourable gentlemen for his remarks. He | :11:52. | :11:54. | |
rightly says it is a sombre P and Q is correct to do that. He | :11:55. | :12:00. | |
highlighted -- a sombre day and he is correct. He highlighted that... | :12:01. | :12:07. | |
He asked me specifically about why I did not mention the specific Tony | :12:08. | :12:14. | |
Blair notes to President Bush. I was trying to be careful in my statement | :12:15. | :12:19. | |
to accurately summarise what Sir John Chilcot has said and I did have | :12:20. | :12:23. | |
a whole section in my statement saying about the processes and | :12:24. | :12:28. | |
Senator John Fiennes, crucial point where made personal commitments to | :12:29. | :12:35. | |
Mr Bush that had not been discussed with Cabinet colleagues. It is worth | :12:36. | :12:39. | |
reading Sir John Chilcot's statement this morning about that. He focuses | :12:40. | :12:45. | |
on paragraph 630 which says Mr Blair said that the UK's vision for the | :12:46. | :12:49. | |
future of the back though assessment had made if that was achievable and | :12:50. | :12:56. | |
no plan that I post-conflict plan with the USA. That is what of the | :12:57. | :13:00. | |
most powerful passages in the report and he's right to draw attention to | :13:01. | :13:08. | |
it. I do not accept that all the same failures are apparent in some | :13:09. | :13:12. | |
weight when it comes to planning in Afghanistan. I do not accept that. | :13:13. | :13:16. | |
Afghanistan there was a very clear connection between a Caliban regime | :13:17. | :13:23. | |
that was playing host to Al-Qaeda that a Caliban. And the goal of | :13:24. | :13:27. | |
Government policy which I supported which was to make sure that conflict | :13:28. | :13:33. | |
could not become a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and there was some | :13:34. | :13:37. | |
considerable success in pursuing that. There was a huge amount of | :13:38. | :13:41. | |
planning into the post-conflict situation in Afghanistan and we are | :13:42. | :13:46. | |
still engaged in that. There is a plan, it UK an officer training | :13:47. | :13:50. | |
academy to strengthen the army. As I said earlier, you can all be planned | :13:51. | :13:54. | |
in the world but these are very difficult things to get right. These | :13:55. | :13:58. | |
saying there is no point in ever taking part in these interventions | :13:59. | :14:02. | |
are trying to help these countries that is a different position and he | :14:03. | :14:06. | |
should be honest and say that. But I would argue that with Afghanistan, | :14:07. | :14:12. | |
Libya and Brexit we have set out what the alternatives are, that does | :14:13. | :14:18. | |
not mean they are easy. The Foreign Affairs Committee stage | :14:19. | :14:24. | |
an enquiry into the conduct and Libya to take into the -- into | :14:25. | :14:29. | |
account the conclusions into the Iraq enquiry. Given the central | :14:30. | :14:33. | |
conclusions could be said to apply to some degree on the other to | :14:34. | :14:41. | |
Libya, not least the central stabilisation planning been | :14:42. | :14:44. | |
described by a colleague as danceable rot and as under desktop | :14:45. | :14:57. | |
exercise -- rot. So the reaching of the analysis of machinery of | :14:58. | :15:00. | |
Government changes he outlined earlier to the member for Angus can | :15:01. | :15:10. | |
be properly assessed. I think the Foreign Secretary will | :15:11. | :15:14. | |
be giving evidence. The Prime Minister is always asked to give | :15:15. | :15:18. | |
evidence to every select committee and I try to stick to answering | :15:19. | :15:22. | |
questions here and the Liaison Committee and also the national | :15:23. | :15:25. | |
security committee because that brings together a number of | :15:26. | :15:29. | |
committees so I do not think it will be possible but I always consider | :15:30. | :15:32. | |
any requests. Can I first wholeheartedly endorse | :15:33. | :15:35. | |
the game at the Prime Minister needs about those who lost their lives -- | :15:36. | :15:42. | |
wholeheartedly endorse. But I wholeheartedly endorse the remark. | :15:43. | :15:47. | |
Does he agree each of us in Cabinet or in this house who are responsible | :15:48. | :15:52. | |
and who should take responsibility for our individual decisions, | :15:53. | :15:56. | |
albeit, taken in good faith on the basis of evidence before us. | :15:57. | :16:01. | |
Equally, does he agree the men of hatred and death in Al-Qaeda and | :16:02. | :16:08. | |
Isil should take responsibility for their actions and the hall art they | :16:09. | :16:12. | |
inflict on others? The honourable lady is right. I | :16:13. | :16:19. | |
speak as someone who was a relatively new backbencher listening | :16:20. | :16:22. | |
to the arguments and I think everyone who voted for the conflict | :16:23. | :16:26. | |
has to take their share of responsibility. I do not choose to | :16:27. | :16:32. | |
go back and see if I knew now what I know now that I knew then what are | :16:33. | :16:36. | |
you now and all the rest of it. I believe you must take responsibility | :16:37. | :16:42. | |
and liberty consequences. She makes a good point about the evil of his | :16:43. | :16:48. | |
violent extremists that I live with the consequences. This problem and | :16:49. | :16:53. | |
are worlds -- love with the consequences. The problem existed | :16:54. | :16:58. | |
before the Iraq and we are doing all sorts of things to combat it. While | :16:59. | :17:03. | |
the debate about Iraq is vital we must not let it sapped our energy | :17:04. | :17:08. | |
for dealing with this cancer in our world which is killing us and our | :17:09. | :17:13. | |
own country. The Prime Minister referred to the | :17:14. | :17:20. | |
aim of this war as weapons of mass destruction but if I can for his | :17:21. | :17:23. | |
attention back to the document from Tony Blair to the American | :17:24. | :17:33. | |
president, it goes on later to say, the reason for this is getting a bit | :17:34. | :17:38. | |
of Saddam Hussein is the right thing to do. Regime change, not WMD. This | :17:39. | :17:46. | |
fact and the fact that, as Sir John Chilcot said, player's, Smith made | :17:47. | :17:51. | |
it difficult for the UK to withdraw support later on. -- player's | :17:52. | :17:59. | |
commitment. This leads to a deceit of the House of Commons. Sir John | :18:00. | :18:05. | |
has been careful about avoiding accusing the previous Prime Minister | :18:06. | :18:09. | |
of lying to the house but this evidence suggests he did. What | :18:10. | :18:15. | |
action can he take about that? He makes an important point. I have had | :18:16. | :18:19. | |
longer than anyone else to do this report but it is trying to get to | :18:20. | :18:24. | |
the bottom of this particular issue is difficult. What Sir John Chilcot | :18:25. | :18:28. | |
seems to say if British Government had a policy of coercive diplomacy | :18:29. | :18:33. | |
and wanting to use the threat of military action to get Saddam to | :18:34. | :18:37. | |
comprehensively asylum. Everyone will have to read the report and | :18:38. | :18:42. | |
come to their own conclusions. -- comprehensively disarm. From my | :18:43. | :18:48. | |
reading, Sir John Chilcot is not accusing anyone of deliberate | :18:49. | :18:54. | |
deceit. But everyone got the wrong conclusions. Today today we stand | :18:55. | :18:59. | |
alongside -- their own conclusions. We stand alongside the British | :19:00. | :19:09. | |
servicemen and women died and many more who suffered injuries serving | :19:10. | :19:14. | |
their country. We are proud of them and honour them. The Chilcot Report | :19:15. | :19:18. | |
makes clear the absolute determination of the former Prime | :19:19. | :19:22. | |
Minister to pursue war in Iraq no matter the evidence. There is a | :19:23. | :19:26. | |
stark contrast between that single-minded determination to go to | :19:27. | :19:31. | |
war and the reckless and complete absence of any plan for what would | :19:32. | :19:37. | |
come next. What came next is 179 but the service men and women killed. | :19:38. | :19:42. | |
What came next is 100,000 or more Iraqi civilians killed. And what | :19:43. | :19:50. | |
came next is the fuelling of what is now Isis which threatens the safety | :19:51. | :19:55. | |
of all of us. The much missed Charles Kennedy said in this house | :19:56. | :20:00. | |
in 2003, the big fear many of us have is this will simply agree to | :20:01. | :20:03. | |
further generations of suicide bombers. When the Prime Minister now | :20:04. | :20:07. | |
take the opportunity because of party and is house to acknowledge | :20:08. | :20:12. | |
Charles Kennedy was right all along in ridding the opposition across | :20:13. | :20:15. | |
this country against the culpable dog of war and should not those who | :20:16. | :20:25. | |
accuse Charles Kennedy of appeasement apologised to his | :20:26. | :20:27. | |
family, our servicemen and women and the people of Iraq. | :20:28. | :20:33. | |
My recollection of the debates as there were honest disagreements | :20:34. | :20:36. | |
between colleagues and making the decisions. I do not think anyone | :20:37. | :20:40. | |
should be accused of appeasement for voting against the war, not sure | :20:41. | :20:46. | |
people who voted in favour of it, in good faith, and evidence they had, | :20:47. | :20:50. | |
be subject to unfair criticism either. People who voted for the | :20:51. | :20:59. | |
four, like me, must it was sure of responsibility but it is not right | :21:00. | :21:05. | |
to accuse people of appeasement. I was Shadow International | :21:06. | :21:08. | |
Development Secretary and asked 91 written questions of the Government | :21:09. | :21:11. | |
culminating in an opposition they debate on the 30th of January 2003 | :21:12. | :21:16. | |
because I had not received any satisfactory answers. With the Prime | :21:17. | :21:23. | |
Minister, for the sake of the many, many victims are the house we have | :21:24. | :21:28. | |
truly learnt a lesson on a failure to plan for contingency. | :21:29. | :21:33. | |
I remember how affected might honourable friend was an holding | :21:34. | :21:37. | |
those debates, many debates. People say we did not be great post-war | :21:38. | :21:41. | |
reconstruction but we did a debate it endlessly. -- people say we did | :21:42. | :21:52. | |
not debate. There was an assumption the UN with moving compounds of late | :21:53. | :21:56. | |
when it did not or the US had a plan when it didn't order the assumption | :21:57. | :21:59. | |
British troops would be out in a three or four months. It is one of | :22:00. | :22:07. | |
the cleanest areas of criticism and should be accepted most clearly and | :22:08. | :22:11. | |
won for any future conflict we must plan for most carefully. | :22:12. | :22:18. | |
I thank the Prime Minister for summing up the main findings | :22:19. | :22:23. | |
although, unlike him, I have not had the opportunity to read the summary. | :22:24. | :22:30. | |
Would he agree that in 2003 when I voted for before and he voted for | :22:31. | :22:34. | |
the war and many of our colleagues voted for the war, we did it on the | :22:35. | :22:41. | |
basis of the we had. Iraq was in breach of 17 UN resolutions in 2003. | :22:42. | :22:52. | |
Saddam Hussein in 1988, already had killed 500,000 of his own people. He | :22:53. | :22:58. | |
went on to kill more and more, this year and the South, the currents in | :22:59. | :23:12. | |
the north -- Shai in the south. If you stood by the mass grave were | :23:13. | :23:18. | |
many thousands of Iraqi bodies lie undiscovered, those of us who | :23:19. | :23:22. | |
campaign for human rights over many years in Iraq and myself for over 30 | :23:23. | :23:27. | |
years, were well aware of the torture and horrors happening in | :23:28. | :23:32. | |
that country and I wish people would ask Iraqis what they think of the | :23:33. | :23:38. | |
invasion. Because many Iraqis are grateful, Mr Speaker, we took the | :23:39. | :23:44. | |
action we did at that time. I hope we have greater opportunity to | :23:45. | :23:48. | |
discuss these matters because that was sought planning, not enough, I | :23:49. | :23:55. | |
agree, but there was some. -- some planning. The horrors of Saddam | :23:56. | :24:00. | |
Hussein and what he did to his own people were clearly documented and I | :24:01. | :24:07. | |
think we will -- we were right to take part in that invasion. | :24:08. | :24:11. | |
I well remember the speeches of the right honourable lady. She made very | :24:12. | :24:16. | |
powerful speeches about the appalling things Saddam Hussein did | :24:17. | :24:22. | |
to his own people. That is a fair point. I also think, when the case | :24:23. | :24:26. | |
was made and people were acting on the knowledge in front of them and | :24:27. | :24:30. | |
it was not just on weapons of mass destruction but a sense we were | :24:31. | :24:33. | |
trying to uphold the position of the United Nations and the massive | :24:34. | :24:37. | |
danger he posters on people. But we must be frank, the consequences of | :24:38. | :24:45. | |
what follows have been truly very poor and that is what Sir John | :24:46. | :24:50. | |
finds. And in this section when he talks about the objectives of the | :24:51. | :24:53. | |
Government not being met and that far from dealing with the problem of | :24:54. | :24:58. | |
potential the linking up with terrorists which Tony Blair talked | :24:59. | :25:03. | |
about at this dispatch box, this dead end up creating a space for | :25:04. | :25:06. | |
Al-Qaeda. We must learn all of the lessons. -- this dead end up | :25:07. | :25:12. | |
creating. Would my right honourable friend | :25:13. | :25:16. | |
agree there are lessons for every member of this house and every | :25:17. | :25:20. | |
member of the media as to how we assess evidence. We can no longer | :25:21. | :25:24. | |
take refuge in the pretence we did not know the evidence about the | :25:25. | :25:31. | |
nonexistence weapons of mass destruction the report says the | :25:32. | :25:34. | |
incest intelligence did not established beyond doubt Saddam | :25:35. | :25:38. | |
Hussein continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or | :25:39. | :25:41. | |
efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. But evidence was set out | :25:42. | :25:46. | |
in the dossier and as I showed in evidence to the Chilcot Report, if | :25:47. | :25:50. | |
you read the dossier line by line you could not fail to reach the same | :25:51. | :25:54. | |
conclusion as Robin Cook, that they were no weapons of mass destruction. | :25:55. | :25:59. | |
The fact we did not or are very largely did not reach that | :26:00. | :26:03. | |
conclusion is because we ceased to look at evidence and rely on | :26:04. | :26:11. | |
briefings from spin doctors and front benches. If this house is to | :26:12. | :26:14. | |
get a grip of issues in the future it must go back to looking at the | :26:15. | :26:18. | |
evidence itself and so do journalists. | :26:19. | :26:20. | |
What I would say to my right honourable friend is a lot of things | :26:21. | :26:25. | |
have changed since that evidence was produced in the way it was an one of | :26:26. | :26:29. | |
the most important things is the renewed independence of the joint | :26:30. | :26:36. | |
intelligence committee. Ministers do still see individual pieces of | :26:37. | :26:41. | |
intelligence and one wants to have a regular updates, but the process of | :26:42. | :26:46. | |
producing reports and assessments is incredibly rigorous so I do not | :26:47. | :26:50. | |
think that what happens could happen again in the same way because the | :26:51. | :26:55. | |
report you would get from the joint intelligence committee, I think, are | :26:56. | :27:01. | |
now much clearer about what they do know and what they think and what | :27:02. | :27:04. | |
they conjecture, rather than anything else. That does not solve | :27:05. | :27:10. | |
the problem for the house because it is impossible to share all of that | :27:11. | :27:15. | |
information widely with every Member of Parliament. | :27:16. | :27:20. | |
Can I join others in paying tribute to the ex-service personnel who died | :27:21. | :27:24. | |
in Iraq and the hundreds of thousands of civilians. One of the | :27:25. | :27:29. | |
greatest scandals out of this whole episode is the lack of resources for | :27:30. | :27:33. | |
our troops sent into battle without the equipment is the needed and this | :27:34. | :27:39. | |
was never -- must never be allowed to happen again. Can the Prime | :27:40. | :27:44. | |
Minister set out why he believes the National security machinery he has | :27:45. | :27:47. | |
established would have forced all the evidence mistakes made in | :27:48. | :27:52. | |
Whitehall -- forestalled the mistakes in the run-up to Iraq. | :27:53. | :27:59. | |
On the issue of equipment, the money for our armed services is not | :28:00. | :28:03. | |
infinite but what we have done is get rid of the black hole in the | :28:04. | :28:08. | |
defence budgets and resources and commitment are more in balance and | :28:09. | :28:11. | |
also by having a security and defence review every five years. | :28:12. | :28:17. | |
Means you are matching what you spend to the things your forces and | :28:18. | :28:22. | |
security actually require. That is a big improvement but it depends on | :28:23. | :28:28. | |
having the resources. I try to explain by the National security | :28:29. | :28:31. | |
Council architecture helps solve some of these problems but I am not | :28:32. | :28:35. | |
saying you can completely reduce any risk of mistake or planning because | :28:36. | :28:39. | |
these things are very complicated by their nature. | :28:40. | :28:46. | |
Human institutions will never be perfect nor are the perfect role. | :28:47. | :28:52. | |
But the conclusions of the Chilcot enquiry as to the way in which legal | :28:53. | :28:57. | |
advice was processed, intelligence was processed and intelligence was | :28:58. | :29:01. | |
used to inform policy are pretty damning. Mr Speaker, my right | :29:02. | :29:08. | |
honourable friend has rightly highlighted that much has changed | :29:09. | :29:13. | |
since then and certain I can vouch for the fact that the processes are | :29:14. | :29:21. | |
rather different from those that Sir John identified. When it comes to | :29:22. | :29:26. | |
the coalition of intelligence which is an extremely difficult skill, is | :29:27. | :29:32. | |
my right honourable friend satisfied this is subject to enough scrutiny | :29:33. | :29:39. | |
and review, subsequent, to ensure lessons can be learned when mistakes | :29:40. | :29:43. | |
in intelligence assessment and made? Because this seems to me to be one | :29:44. | :29:49. | |
of the key areas in which future decision-making is capable of | :29:50. | :29:50. | |
continuing improvement. Firstly, there we legal advice is | :29:51. | :30:04. | |
produced is very different to the then it was. We have the National | :30:05. | :30:07. | |
Security Council. Before decisions are made, written legal advice has | :30:08. | :30:24. | |
to be produced. With regard to the collation of evidence is difficult | :30:25. | :30:36. | |
to answer. They are incredibly rigorous about reaching judgments | :30:37. | :30:43. | |
and not pretending to know things it does not know. How do we test that? | :30:44. | :30:58. | |
There is maybe a rule for the IOC end that. But with all the | :30:59. | :31:03. | |
intelligence and briefings in the world, you have to make a decision. | :31:04. | :31:09. | |
You clearly really have perfect information. You are weighing up a | :31:10. | :31:19. | |
balance of risks. In the end, you have to do this defend yourself on | :31:20. | :31:25. | |
the grounds of the decision you have made. The epitaph on Robin Cook 's | :31:26. | :31:29. | |
headstone in Edinburgh reads as follows, I mean not have stopped the | :31:30. | :31:41. | |
war, but I did manage to get the parliament to decide on it. Does the | :31:42. | :31:55. | |
Prime Minister agree that the main element in the debate in which | :31:56. | :32:03. | |
Parliament decided was not the 45 minute claim. It was the fact that | :32:04. | :32:13. | |
Saddam Hussein and his murderous regime had spent 13 years running | :32:14. | :32:21. | |
rings around the United Nations, ignoring 17 resolutions. Including | :32:22. | :32:26. | |
those calling for all necessary means to stop him. Was that not the | :32:27. | :32:33. | |
main issue? As the Prime Minister found any evidence whatsoever of any | :32:34. | :32:42. | |
lies told to Parliament on that day? My name any of the debate is that it | :32:43. | :32:48. | |
was about the balance of risk between action and inaction and a | :32:49. | :32:52. | |
case made by the then Prime Minister was that there was a real risk of | :32:53. | :32:59. | |
inaction. You had someone denying the United Nations who had done | :33:00. | :33:03. | |
terrible things to his own people. That coming together with a | :33:04. | :33:07. | |
potential programme for weapons of mass destruction and this is all | :33:08. | :33:15. | |
taking place in a climate -- claim that of post 9/11. Weapons of mass | :33:16. | :33:24. | |
destruction was part of the picture, but not the whole picture. With | :33:25. | :33:30. | |
regard to deceit, I do not see in here he accusation of the audit the | :33:31. | :33:37. | |
seat but there is information that was not properly presented, | :33:38. | :33:40. | |
different justifications given before for the action that was taken | :33:41. | :33:44. | |
and another of other criticisms of the processors. I do not think the | :33:45. | :33:55. | |
Prime Minister who voted for this war should in any way feel ashamed | :33:56. | :34:07. | |
of what the dead. The factors that we believe the Prime Minister at the | :34:08. | :34:18. | |
time. Frankly, some others walked into the no lobby and it was a | :34:19. | :34:22. | |
neural decision. But there is no point having recriminations know. | :34:23. | :34:26. | |
Can we draw a lesson for the future, should we distinguish between | :34:27. | :34:33. | |
authoritarian regimes that we must can tear declare and contain them | :34:34. | :34:41. | |
and totalitarian and terrorist regimes which we must be prepared to | :34:42. | :34:51. | |
destroy? On this argument, I think he is absolutely right. That is a | :34:52. | :35:00. | |
difference between pre-emptive action when there is a direct | :35:01. | :35:07. | |
threat. It is very important that we distinguish when we are thinking of | :35:08. | :35:12. | |
the sort of interventions. There is also a third option. There is also | :35:13. | :35:25. | |
the situation with regards to a resume running out of control, which | :35:26. | :35:32. | |
is why I voted for us to take action in Libya. Many of us do not regret | :35:33. | :35:40. | |
the fact that Saddam Hussein was no longer in power. As was powerfully | :35:41. | :35:47. | |
set out a moment ago, does the Prime Minister recognise that one of the | :35:48. | :35:53. | |
wider lessons is that we need a United Nations that is capable of | :35:54. | :36:00. | |
giving effect to the responsibility to protect so that brutal dictators | :36:01. | :36:03. | |
who modelled and terrorise their own people can and will be held to | :36:04. | :36:11. | |
account? The rate honourable gentleman speaks with great clarity | :36:12. | :36:16. | |
on these issues. We need the United Nations to be able to do that. That | :36:17. | :36:22. | |
is why be sometimes end up in a situation with a right to take | :36:23. | :36:27. | |
action because of easy tool in the United Nations Council are some | :36:28. | :36:39. | |
things becomes morally right. We need to keep informing the United | :36:40. | :36:41. | |
Nations so we bring these two things together. We all agree that war is a | :36:42. | :36:47. | |
last resort once other options have been exhausted, the publication of | :36:48. | :36:55. | |
the report, will the Prime Minister now do something which no government | :36:56. | :37:00. | |
has done since 2003 finely and unequivocally admit that the | :37:01. | :37:05. | |
intervention was wrong and the mistake. I think we need to beat the | :37:06. | :37:12. | |
report and come to our own conclusions. The aftermath of the | :37:13. | :37:17. | |
conflict was profoundly disastrous in so many ways. I do not move away | :37:18. | :37:23. | |
from that. I take the view that if you fought it, you cannot turn the | :37:24. | :37:28. | |
clock back and the best you can do is learn the lessons of what went | :37:29. | :37:44. | |
wrong. At .20, in March 2003, diplomatic options had not been | :37:45. | :37:50. | |
exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort. We are | :37:51. | :38:07. | |
going to leave the House of Commons. They are responding to a statement | :38:08. | :38:10. | |
from the Prime Minister on the Chilcot Report. It is a report | :38:11. | :38:19. | |
backing codes there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein before | :38:20. | :38:26. | |
the war. The decision to take military action was taken before all | :38:27. | :38:36. | |
other options have been exhausted. The documents in the report were | :38:37. | :38:42. | |
previously classified. One of the important memos is that Tony Blair | :38:43. | :38:47. | |
rates to President Bush saying I will be with you whatever. He also | :38:48. | :38:57. | |
says that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction capability. It goes on | :38:58. | :39:10. | |
to say any link to 9/11 is tenuous. In another, he rates this is the | :39:11. | :39:18. | |
moment when you can define international politics and the new | :39:19. | :39:29. | |
post-cold war world order. A lot of criticism of Tony Blair and his | :39:30. | :39:35. | |
government. Reading it very carefully this morning or at least | :39:36. | :39:41. | |
part of it, many of the relatives of the 179 service personnel from the | :39:42. | :39:45. | |
United Kingdom who died in Iraq. I am joined by a couple of the | :39:46. | :39:47. | |
relatives. You famously stood relatives. You famously stood | :39:48. | :39:58. | |
against Tony Blair in his constituency back in 2005. Are you | :39:59. | :40:05. | |
pleased by the report. We have waited seven years for it? We have | :40:06. | :40:11. | |
waited too long but it is well worth the wait. It is decisive. I was | :40:12. | :40:21. | |
expecting a lightweight report. But Sir John Chilcot a sunny thoroughly | :40:22. | :40:29. | |
good job. The first dozen pages says it all. There was put intelligent, | :40:30. | :40:39. | |
cultivation between Tony Blair and President Bush, equipment problems. | :40:40. | :40:46. | |
Nor planning in place for the post-war Iraq. He has done a | :40:47. | :40:49. | |
thoroughly good job. I am pleasantly surprised. Roger, we are waiting for | :40:50. | :41:00. | |
Tony Blair to give a statement. We have here at he will take | :41:01. | :41:03. | |
responsibility for any mistakes without exception or excuse. We are | :41:04. | :41:08. | |
expecting a press conference with them in a few minutes. But did you | :41:09. | :41:18. | |
think of the report, will you impressed, as well? Yes, I did come | :41:19. | :41:30. | |
in with reservations, as well. One would like to have been locked in a | :41:31. | :41:35. | |
little room with it by oneself about whale. That was not possible | :41:36. | :41:42. | |
obviously. But I think he has done a very thorough job. There are all | :41:43. | :41:45. | |
sorts of criticisms about intelligence gathering, the decision | :41:46. | :41:53. | |
to go to wear, the lack of planning in the aftermath. What struck you | :41:54. | :41:59. | |
most? The one thing that stood out and he made a point of it in his | :42:00. | :42:08. | |
speech, was over the snatch Land Rover. The failure to replace it. To | :42:09. | :42:19. | |
explain to viewers, this was the tape of Land Rover that British | :42:20. | :42:26. | |
troops used to patrol Basra. They did not have adequate protection. | :42:27. | :42:36. | |
When a bomb goes off, it was like a knife through butter. You could not | :42:37. | :42:50. | |
prevent a hit on a snatch Land Rover. The two of done something | :42:51. | :42:57. | |
about it. As soon as they get out there and realise we are being | :42:58. | :43:01. | |
attacked by these improvised explosive devices and people are | :43:02. | :43:03. | |
being killed, something needs to be done about it. They did far too | :43:04. | :43:12. | |
little and too late. That was the thing for me which really came out. | :43:13. | :43:19. | |
That was the standout product. What happens though? In terms of the | :43:20. | :43:23. | |
families, you have said that everyone really needs to digest the | :43:24. | :43:29. | |
report. It will take your foil to do that. What do you do know as | :43:30. | :43:35. | |
families going ahead? Do you want to pursue legal action against members | :43:36. | :43:43. | |
of the Tony Blair government? We cannot ever be taken into war on | :43:44. | :43:50. | |
this sort of situation. Needs to be accountability before these are | :43:51. | :44:00. | |
taken. It was a shambolic episode. We know who all these people are and | :44:01. | :44:04. | |
we want them to see some sort of accountability. We want action which | :44:05. | :44:14. | |
is appropriate. It has been passed over to lawyers. Can I just draw | :44:15. | :44:21. | |
your attention to one area where Sir John Chilcot alludes to the fact | :44:22. | :44:29. | |
that we have concluded that the circumstances in which it was | :44:30. | :44:35. | |
justified that there was a legal basis for action are far from | :44:36. | :44:42. | |
satisfactory. That is the sort of thing we have to address. Thank you | :44:43. | :44:49. | |
both very much for your time. We can talk to the former weapons inspector | :44:50. | :44:55. | |
who was a key player at the time. This was at the time when they were | :44:56. | :44:59. | |
trying to decide whether Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass | :45:00. | :45:05. | |
destruction. He was the former chief weapons inspector for the United | :45:06. | :45:09. | |
Nations. I do not know if you have managed to see some of the key | :45:10. | :45:13. | |
findings in the report, but I wonder what your reaction is to it? It is | :45:14. | :45:21. | |
very good at is finally been made public. It is being compiled by a | :45:22. | :45:32. | |
very respected person. I have only had a chance to see the highlights. | :45:33. | :45:38. | |
At the time, in the build-up to the war, I remember being in Iraq | :45:39. | :45:44. | |
following some of your inspectors as they try to find these weapons of | :45:45. | :45:48. | |
mass destruction but could not find any. At the time, did you think | :45:49. | :45:57. | |
Saddam Hussein still had some? We carried out about 700 inspections at | :45:58. | :46:01. | |
various sites in Iraq. We did not find any. We told Tony Blair and | :46:02. | :46:09. | |
they security council that we had not found any. I had conversation on | :46:10. | :46:24. | |
the telephone with Tony Blair and I talked about this intelligence they | :46:25. | :46:33. | |
were referring to. I said we had found very little but he was | :46:34. | :46:37. | |
convinced that the weapons existed, which turned out to be wrong. Do you | :46:38. | :46:45. | |
have do you think Tony Blair and George Bush were intent on going to | :46:46. | :46:59. | |
war, regardless of the evidence? I do not have any evidence that they | :47:00. | :47:06. | |
were acting in bad faith. But it was remarkably bad political judgment. | :47:07. | :47:11. | |
When you're weapons inspectors were looking for the weapons, they were | :47:12. | :47:18. | |
following reports from British and American intelligence. We now know | :47:19. | :47:29. | |
that these were flawed. Yes, they give as many dozens of different | :47:30. | :47:36. | |
sites and we carried out the inspections at these places without | :47:37. | :47:45. | |
finding anything. The inspectors on the ground did not find what these | :47:46. | :47:53. | |
reports at Taunton. Was your advice to the British and American | :47:54. | :47:57. | |
governments that the need to take more time and not invade when | :47:58. | :48:03. | |
needed. Perhaps postpone it until the end of the year of the following | :48:04. | :48:12. | |
year? Really guarded ourselves as international civil servants. We | :48:13. | :48:18. | |
just carried out the inspections. It was for the Security Council and the | :48:19. | :48:21. | |
governments to work out the future action. You cannot prove a negative. | :48:22. | :48:32. | |
We could see was we have carried out all the inspections as | :48:33. | :48:34. | |
professionally as possible and have not found anything. The majority of | :48:35. | :48:48. | |
the sick Security Council did not want to accept a second resolution | :48:49. | :48:57. | |
accepting the war. I think that was the major flaw with that. If the | :48:58. | :49:03. | |
Security Council had authorised the war, everyone would've been very | :49:04. | :49:10. | |
critical of the United Nations. Thank you very much for joining us. | :49:11. | :49:18. | |
The former chief weapons inspector for the United Nations. We are | :49:19. | :49:21. | |
expecting to hear from Tony Blair in the next few minutes. We can go over | :49:22. | :49:26. | |
to the House of Commons to join Vicky Young. David Cameron has had | :49:27. | :49:34. | |
more time than most read this huge report. He has been laying out the | :49:35. | :49:39. | |
findings. He has been talking about the lessons which need to be a way. | :49:40. | :49:45. | |
He says changes have already been made. The implementation of the | :49:46. | :49:49. | |
National Security Council. The needs to be a climate where officials can | :49:50. | :49:52. | |
challenge what politicians are saying. He says the legacy of the | :49:53. | :50:03. | |
report should not be that people should feel unable to trust security | :50:04. | :50:10. | |
or intelligence services. Having made the decision, do you feel | :50:11. | :50:18. | |
deceived at all of what was put in front of you as evidence? No, I do | :50:19. | :50:27. | |
not. It says very clearly was that what the Prime Minister said to the | :50:28. | :50:30. | |
Cabinet was what he genuinely believed. That is what we believe | :50:31. | :50:37. | |
that the team. David Davis came closest to seeing the Prime Minister | :50:38. | :50:42. | |
lied and deceived the House of Commons. I was sorry to hear that. | :50:43. | :50:50. | |
He was assuming that the Chilcot Report would back him up and it did | :50:51. | :50:56. | |
not. It is about time he acknowledged it. Jeremy Corbyn of | :50:57. | :51:06. | |
course, we know his strong views. But some MPs while he was speaking | :51:07. | :51:11. | |
without telling him to sit down. They were calling him a disgrace. He | :51:12. | :51:21. | |
repeated what his views and he is perfectly entitled to do that. What | :51:22. | :51:27. | |
will be the legacy of the Iraq war and the report? Two things, that is | :51:28. | :51:33. | |
no doubt he highlights the devastating effects which up arose | :51:34. | :51:38. | |
after works. Also, he makes it plain that, actually, there was no attempt | :51:39. | :51:48. | |
to deceive. There was no interference with intelligence. I | :51:49. | :51:55. | |
hope that people will, to a degree, accept that. People have taken it | :51:56. | :52:01. | |
for granted that there was a different outcome. He also said | :52:02. | :52:07. | |
there was no collusion with President Bush. He does not find | :52:08. | :52:13. | |
that to be the case. The way decisions were made? He is sceptical | :52:14. | :52:22. | |
about that. My own view is that the Cabinet was kept much better | :52:23. | :52:25. | |
informed than perhaps you get the flavour of the report. I have not | :52:26. | :52:30. | |
had a chance to beat it quite in-depth. We had a number of the key | :52:31. | :52:36. | |
conversations about that, but I accept there was not the degree of | :52:37. | :52:44. | |
formality you might normally expect. The House of Commons will have the | :52:45. | :52:51. | |
two-day debate on this next week. Thank you very much, that is Vicky | :52:52. | :53:01. | |
Young, our political correspondent. We can go to our Sheffield studio. | :53:02. | :53:07. | |
How much of the report have you been able to take on? I am extremely | :53:08. | :53:17. | |
disappointed and demoralised from the bits I can pick up. In force | :53:18. | :53:25. | |
since? Other relatives seem actually that Sir John Chilcot has done the | :53:26. | :53:31. | |
family is proud. Many of them are very positive about it. I am not | :53:32. | :53:43. | |
arguing that he has done a thorough job, but I am concerned that people | :53:44. | :53:49. | |
who took inappropriate decisions at the time were not up to the job. | :53:50. | :53:56. | |
People in government at the time and people in intelligence, taking the | :53:57. | :54:05. | |
decision to go to war based on that. They did not even plan for the | :54:06. | :54:12. | |
future beyond that. Pilot is good that is exposed, it is disappointing | :54:13. | :54:19. | |
to me that none of the people involved appear to actually have | :54:20. | :54:25. | |
been exposed. There are a lot of silly 12 take time to read the | :54:26. | :54:34. | |
report and, but I'm not rule out taking action against Tony Blair in | :54:35. | :54:41. | |
court. No one has actually stated that Tony Blair acted illegally. But | :54:42. | :54:52. | |
I need time for this to sink in. As for going to court, I have no time | :54:53. | :54:59. | |
or interest in that. Tell us about how your son died. Also, the huge | :55:00. | :55:10. | |
grief you have heard since then. He was supporting a convoy and a sniper | :55:11. | :55:19. | |
hit him under the arm. Because he was wearing armour, the shell and | :55:20. | :55:28. | |
say post and did not leave much. Everything changes. To me | :55:29. | :55:38. | |
personally, it getting intensified as the shortcomings with regard to | :55:39. | :55:45. | |
the military action which has been highlighted in the report. Thank you | :55:46. | :55:52. | |
very much for joining us. We can speak to the Cabinet member who was | :55:53. | :56:04. | |
culture Minister back then. There are some very strong criticism of | :56:05. | :56:09. | |
the Tony Blair government. With regard to the legality of the war | :56:10. | :56:18. | |
and the aftermath, in relation really to the scale of the Tony | :56:19. | :56:25. | |
Blair government. It seems to be a very presidential style of | :56:26. | :56:27. | |
government. Is that how you remember that? I would say two things. It is | :56:28. | :56:42. | |
a very long report. Before making a judgment, those of us who were part | :56:43. | :56:47. | |
of it will need to read it thoroughly. I hope the publication | :56:48. | :56:52. | |
brings some comfort to the families who lost their loved ones. Going | :56:53. | :56:57. | |
back to your point about judgment, the important thing, although I have | :56:58. | :57:09. | |
not read the report, I have seen the major points, there is no accusation | :57:10. | :57:15. | |
of falsification of intelligence. There is a judgment that the war was | :57:16. | :57:27. | |
legal and the Cabinet was not misled. There was feel your in the | :57:28. | :57:38. | |
aftermath. The team who compiled the report have highlighted that. This | :57:39. | :57:46. | |
has cast a long shadow over military policy. I am very glad this has been | :57:47. | :57:53. | |
published. I hope it will set out a constructive framework in the future | :57:54. | :58:00. | |
in areas of conflict where Britain may be involved. This is a | :58:01. | :58:05. | |
devastating critique of the Tony Blair government. Let me read the | :58:06. | :58:09. | |
report. I think it rests on judgments made. Not an illegal war, | :58:10. | :58:20. | |
no deception of Cabinet and no question of there being a war plan | :58:21. | :58:25. | |
with President Bush. Indeed, Tony Blair and the whole Cabinet saw the | :58:26. | :58:35. | |
engagement of the United Nations and try to set up peace negotiations as | :58:36. | :58:41. | |
part of it. Thank you for joining us. Tony Blair is going to be giving | :58:42. | :58:48. | |
a news conference very shortly. We will bring you the live. In the | :58:49. | :58:53. | |
meantime, letters take a look at the weather. | :58:54. | :58:55. |