The Iraq Inquiry BBC News Special


The Iraq Inquiry

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judgment than there was in the run-up to the Iraq war. We wait now

:00:00.:00:00.

for Sir John Chilcot to deliver his findings in the next few minutes.

:00:00.:00:15.

I'm Ben Brown in Westminster - where Sir John Chilcot will finally

:00:16.:00:20.

deliver his long-awaited report into the Iraq War

:00:21.:00:22.

It will pass judgement on Britain's decision to join the war to topple

:00:23.:00:27.

Saddam Hussein more than 13 years ago.

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179 Britons lost their lives in the Iraq War -

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the families of those killed will be giving their reaction

:00:36.:00:40.

Individuals and institutions are expected to be criticised,

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among them the then Prime Minister Tony Blair.

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Sir John Chilcot will set out his findings in full in a moment -

:00:51.:00:55.

last night he said he hoped greater care would be taken before

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the country goes to war again in the future.

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This is the scene now inside the building behind me -

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where Sir John Chilcot is about to speak.

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outside is a demonstration by Stop the War, who always opposed the war

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and they are protesting now outside Westminster.

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More than 13 years after the Iraq war began -

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Sir John Chilcot is preparing to deliver his report into how

:01:52.:01:59.

the decision was taken for Britain to join the the United States

:02:00.:02:04.

in intervening against Saddam Hussein.

:02:05.:02:05.

Tens of thousands of Iraqis died - along with 179 UK service personnel.

:02:06.:02:09.

Claims that the Iraqi leader had weapons of mass destruction proved

:02:10.:02:11.

unfounded - but the then Prime Minister Tony Blair has said

:02:12.:02:14.

he does not regret removing a brutal dictator.

:02:15.:02:25.

It was one of the most controversial and the size of wars or the British

:02:26.:02:35.

yesterday. Perhaps not since the Suez conflict has a conflict so

:02:36.:02:38.

controversial. My colleague Annita McVeigh

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is at the start of the Stop the War Demonstration

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in Parliament Square. I'm just either the opposite Central

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Hall in Westminster where the Stop the War coalition is holding this

:02:55.:02:58.

demonstration to coincide with the publication of the Chilcot Report.

:02:59.:03:04.

Behind me on that platform there has been a naming of the dead ceremony

:03:05.:03:09.

with each speaker reading out the names of ten people killed in the

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Iraq war, five but soldiers as well as five Iraqi nationals. -- five

:03:16.:03:23.

British soldiers. In 2000 when Stop the War organised the biggest

:03:24.:03:28.

demonstration in history to try and oppose the UK becoming involved in

:03:29.:03:34.

the Iraq war as now, 13 years later, 70 years since the then Prime

:03:35.:03:38.

Minister Gordon Brown ordered the Chilcot Report they are waiting for

:03:39.:03:43.

its findings and asking the question is will this be a moment of truth?

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-- seven years since. Very noisy here at Westminster as we

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wait to hear from Sir John chilcot. Let's talk to Doctor John Davies.

:03:59.:04:06.

You have specialised in studying the Blair Government. There has been

:04:07.:04:11.

such a long wait for this report, seven years, and we will finally

:04:12.:04:16.

hear it. A momentous day. It is the third of the big investigations into

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Iraq and layer. Butler, half-hearted about this is by far the biggest.

:04:23.:04:31.

2.5 million words. Some people will see almost too comprehensive. Very

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different to the inquest into the Falklands War which was more to the

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points and more in lessons to learn exercise. And the families have huge

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expectations, many of whom are very angry and have said this could be a

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whitewash and Tony Blair is a war criminal. They have high

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expectations. Sir John chilcot has said he will try to give them some

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of the answers they are looking for. And hotter and hotter and were very

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good at Newport but this is much bigger. I am looking for -- Butler

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and hotter. I am looking for a focus on the UK and US relationship and

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also, we heard in the enquiry civil servant versus civil servant so it

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will be intriguing to find out how much resistance that was within the

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system. And the intelligence received in the build up that

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convinced Tony Blair there were weapons of mass destruction. That is

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crucial because the failures of that intelligence and to check and

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double-check the sources of what proved to be wrong intelligence. I

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do not question the integrity of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet or the

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intelligence services. But they got things wrong. There will be greater

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focus on the intelligence failures. It is very interesting to see the

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division in the intelligence services. As one intelligence

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officer in this room said secret intelligence or what underdelivered.

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It will be interesting to see the nuts and bolts. -- overpromised and

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underdelivered. Was not getting a second resolution from the UN

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critical? It'll very surprising if a man who was on the Butler enquiry,

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Sir John Chilcot, comes to a different conclusion. The report

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will look at the aftermath and the failures and planning and the

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quagmire we are still in Iraq. But also the feelings of equipment for

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British troops which is one of the things the families are very

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interested in. Such as the land Rovers are so many British service

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person died in. Questions need to be asked and people aren't responsible

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for these things... I think Sir John Chilcot is walking in now to deliver

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his comments. We expect it to last roughly half an hour. Us listen in.

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We would like to welcome you to the Queen Elizabeth II centre. I should

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record how much we appreciate the support provided by the Centre and

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its staff during our public hearings and again today. Before I begin my

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statement perhaps we should all recall the continuing suffering of

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innocent people in Iraq. And those who have been killed and injured in

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terrorist attacks, including the latest attack last Sunday, which

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killed more than 250 people. We were appointed to consider the UK's

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policy on Iraq from 2001 until 2009. And to identify lessons for the

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future. Our report will be published on enquiry's website after I have

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finished speaking. In 2003, for the first time since the Second World

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War, the United Kingdom took part in an invasion and a full-scale

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occupation of a sovereign states. That was the decision of the utmost

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gravity. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who

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have attacked Iraq's neighbours, repressed until many of his own

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people and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN

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security council. But the questions for the enquiry work, whether it was

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right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003? And whether the UK

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could and should have been better prepared for what follows? We have

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concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the

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peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at

:09:26.:09:33.

that time was not a last resort. We have also concluded that the

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judgment about the severity of the threats posed by Iraq's weapons of

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mass destruction is, WMD, were presented with the certainty that

:09:43.:09:48.

was not justified. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the

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invasion were underestimated, the planning and preparation for Iraq

:09:53.:09:57.

after Saddam Hussein were very inadequate. The Government fails to

:09:58.:10:05.

achieve its stated objectives. I want to set out some of the key

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point in the report. First, the formal decision to invade Iraq, if

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Saddam did not accept the US ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48

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hours was taken by Cabinet on March the 17th 2003. Parliament voted the

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following day to support the decision. The decision was shaped by

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key choices made by Mr Blair's Government over the previous 18

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months. I will now briefly set these out. After the attacks on September

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11 2001 Mr Blair urged President Bush not to take hasty action on

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Iraq. By early December US policy had begun to shift and Mr Blair

:10:55.:11:01.

suggested the US and the UK should work on what he described as, a

:11:02.:11:07.

clever strategy for regime change in Iraq which would build over time.

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When Mr Blair met President Bush in Texas in early April 2002 the formal

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policy was still to contain Saddam Hussein. By then there have been a

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profound change in the UK's thinking. The joint intelligence

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committee has concluded that Saddam Hussein could not be removed without

:11:34.:11:40.

an invasion. The Government was stating that Iraq was a threat that

:11:41.:11:46.

had to be dealt with, it had to disarm or be disarmed. That implied

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the use of force if Iraq did not comply. An internal contingency

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planning for a large contribution to a military invasion had begun. At

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Crawford, Mr Blair sought a partnership as our way of

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influencing Mr Bush. He proposed a UN ultimatum to Iraq to readmit

:12:10.:12:17.

inspectors or face the consequences. On July the 28th Mr Blair wrote to

:12:18.:12:22.

President Bush with an assurance that he would be with him, whatever.

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But if the US wanted the coalition for military action changes would be

:12:30.:12:34.

needed in three key areas, these were, progress on the middle east

:12:35.:12:43.

peace process, UN authority and a shift in public opinion in the UK,

:12:44.:12:51.

Europe and the Arab world. Mr Blair also pointed out there would be a

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need to come at to Iraq for the long-term. That -- comics to Iraq.

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Mr Blair and Mr Straw urged the US to take the issue back to the UN. On

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September the 7th President Bush decided to to do so. On November the

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8th of resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously by the security Council.

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It gave Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face serious consequences.

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It provided for any further breaches by Iraq to be reported to the

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security Council for assessment. The weapons inspectors returned to Iraq

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later that month. During December, however, President Bush decided that

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inspectors would not achieve the desired result and the US would take

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military action in early 2003. At the end of January Mr Blair accepted

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the US timetable for military action by mid March, having also concluded

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the likelihood was war. To help Mr Blair President Bush agreed to seek

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a further UN resolution, the second resolution. Determining Iraq have

:14:15.:14:17.

failed to take its final opportunity to comply with its obligations. By

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March the 12th it was clear there was no chance of securing a majority

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support for a second resolution before the US military action.

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Without evidence of major new Iraqi violations or reports from the

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inspectors that Iraq was failing to cooperate, and they could not carry

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out the task, most members of the security Council could not be

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convinced that peaceful options to disarm Iraq had been exhausted for

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them and military action was justified. . Mr Blair and Mr Straw

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blamed France for the impasse in the UN and claimed the UK Government was

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acting on behalf of the international community to uphold

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the authority of the security Council. In the absence of a

:15:12.:15:19.

majority in support of military action we consider the UK was in

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fact undermining the security council's authority. Second, the

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enquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was illegal.

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That could only be resolved by a properly constituted an

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internationally recognised court. We however have concluded the

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circumstances in which it was decided there was a legal basis for

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UK military action were far from satisfactory. In mid-January 2003

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Lord Goldsmith told Mr Blair that a further security Council resolution

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would be necessary to provide a legal basis for military action. He

:16:05.:16:10.

did not advise number ten and told the end of February that while a

:16:11.:16:16.

second resolution would be preferable, a reasonable case could

:16:17.:16:19.

be made that resolution 1441 was sufficient. He said that out and

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written advice on March the seven. -- heat set that out. The military

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and the civil servant both asked for more clarity of force would be

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legal. Lord Goldsmith advised the better view was there was, on

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balance, a secure legal basis for military action without a further

:16:47.:16:52.

security Council resolution. On March the 14th he asked Mr Blair to

:16:53.:16:58.

confirm that Iraq had committed further material breaches, as

:16:59.:17:02.

specified in a resolution 1441. Mr Blair did so the next day. However,

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the precise basis on which Mr Blair made that decision is not clear.

:17:09.:17:15.

Given the gravity of the decision, Lord Goldsmith should have been

:17:16.:17:19.

asked to provide written advice explaining how, in the absence of a

:17:20.:17:24.

majority in the security Council, Mr Blair could take that decision. This

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is one of a number of occasions identified by the enquiry when a

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policy should have been considered by a cabinet committee and then

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discussed by Cabinet itself. I want to address the assessment of Iraq's

:17:44.:17:47.

weapons of mass destruction and how they were presented to support the

:17:48.:17:53.

case for action. There was an ingrained belief in the UK policy

:17:54.:17:59.

and intelligence communities that Iraq had retained some chemical and

:18:00.:18:04.

biological capabilities. It was determined to preserve and if

:18:05.:18:09.

possible enhance and in the future to acquire a nuclear capability. And

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it was able to conceal its activities from the UN inspectors.

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In the House of Commons on September the 24th 2002, Mr Blair presented

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Iraq's past, current and future capabilities as evidence of the

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security than the Mac said ability of the potential threat from Iraq's

:18:33.:18:39.

WMD. He said, at some point in the future that Britain would become a

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reality. The judgments -- that threat would become a reality. The

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judgments about the dossier published in the statement were

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presented with a certainty that was not justified. The joint

:18:54.:18:58.

intelligence committee should have made clear to Mr Blair the assessed

:18:59.:19:03.

intelligence had not established beyond doubt either that Iraq had

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continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts

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to develop nuclear weapons continued. The committee has also

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judged that as long as sanctions remain effective Iraq could not

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develop a nuclear weapons and it would take several years to develop

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and deploy long-range missiles. Any House of Commons the 18th 2003 Mr

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Blair stated he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in

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possession of WMD was, in real and present danger to Britain and its

:19:45.:19:50.

national security. And the threat from Saddam Hussein's Arsenal could

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not be contained and it posed a clear danger to British citizens. Mr

:19:56.:20:02.

Blair had been warned that military action would increase the threat

:20:03.:20:06.

from Al-Qaeda to the UK and UK interests. He had also been warned

:20:07.:20:14.

that an invasion might lead to Iraq's weapons and capabilities

:20:15.:20:16.

being transferred into the hands of terrorists. The Government's

:20:17.:20:23.

strategy reflected its confidence in the joint intelligence committee's

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assessments. Those assessments provided the benchmark against which

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Iraq's conduct and denials and the reports of the inspectors were

:20:35.:20:41.

judged. As late as March the 17th 2003 Mr Blair was being advised by

:20:42.:20:47.

the chairman of the joint intelligence committee that Iraq

:20:48.:20:49.

possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them

:20:50.:20:56.

and the capacity to produce them. He was also told the evidence pointed

:20:57.:21:01.

to Saddam Hussein's view that the capability was military to neglect

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-- militarily significant and letters on devices are built up

:21:10.:21:14.

further. It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of

:21:15.:21:18.

flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged and they

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should have been. The findings on Iraq's WMD capabilities set out in

:21:28.:21:33.

the report of the Iraq survey group in October 2004 were significant.

:21:34.:21:37.

But they did not support the invasion statements by the UK

:21:38.:21:43.

Government which are focused on Iraq's current capabilities --

:21:44.:21:51.

summit-mac invasion statement. The work described as vast stocks and an

:21:52.:21:55.

urgent and growing effect. In response to those findings Mr Blair

:21:56.:21:58.

told the House of Commons that although Iraq might not have had

:21:59.:22:02.

stockpiles of deployable weapons Saddam Hussein retained the intent

:22:03.:22:11.

and capability and was in breach of United Nations obligations. That was

:22:12.:22:16.

not, however, the explanation for military action he had given before

:22:17.:22:22.

the conflict. In our report we have identified a number of lessons to

:22:23.:22:27.

inform the way in which intelligence may be used publicly for in the

:22:28.:22:34.

future to support Government policy. Fourth, I want to address the

:22:35.:22:38.

shortcomings in planning and preparation. The British military

:22:39.:22:47.

contribution was not settled in 2003 when Mr Blair and Mr hoon agreed the

:22:48.:22:54.

proposals for the increase in the number of brigades to be deployed

:22:55.:22:59.

and they would operate in southern, not northern Iraq. There was little

:23:00.:23:05.

time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly

:23:06.:23:08.

identified not for the exposed to ministers. The resulting in

:23:09.:23:12.

Quack-mac shortfalls are addressed in the report. -- resulting

:23:13.:23:22.

equipment shortfalls. Despite saying the Cabinet would discuss the

:23:23.:23:29.

military contributions they did not discuss their implications. In early

:23:30.:23:33.

January 2003 when the Government published its objectives for

:23:34.:23:39.

post-conflict Iraq it intended the interim post-conflict administration

:23:40.:23:44.

should be UN legs. By March 2003 were having failed to persuade the

:23:45.:23:50.

US of the advantages of the UN led administration, the Government had

:23:51.:23:55.

set the less ambitious goal of persuading the US to accept UN

:23:56.:24:00.

organisation of a coalition led interim administration. When the

:24:01.:24:07.

invasion began UK policy rested on an assumption that there would be a

:24:08.:24:14.

well executed US led and UN authorised operation in the

:24:15.:24:17.

relatively benign security environments. Mr Blair told the

:24:18.:24:24.

enquiry that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the

:24:25.:24:27.

invasion could not have been knowing in advance. We do not agree that

:24:28.:24:35.

hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active

:24:36.:24:43.

everyday in pursuit of its interests, regional instability and

:24:44.:24:48.

Al-Qaeda activity were each explicitly identified. -- Iranians

:24:49.:24:55.

pursuit of interests. Ministers were aware of the inadequacy of US plans

:24:56.:25:01.

and concern about the inability to exert significant influence on US

:25:02.:25:07.

planning. Mr Blair eventually succeeded only in the narrow goal of

:25:08.:25:12.

securing President Bush's agreement that there should be UN

:25:13.:25:18.

authorisation of the post-conflict role. Furthermore, he did not

:25:19.:25:23.

establish clear ministerial oversight of UK planning and

:25:24.:25:31.

preparation. He did not ensure there was a flexible, realistic and fully

:25:32.:25:38.

resourced plan that integrated UK military and civilian contributions

:25:39.:25:45.

and addressed the known risks. The failures in the planning and

:25:46.:25:49.

preparation continued to have an effect after the invasion. That

:25:50.:25:58.

brings me to the Government's failure to achieve the objectives it

:25:59.:26:03.

set itself in Iraq. The Armed Forces fought a successful military

:26:04.:26:09.

campaign which took Basra and help to achieve the departure of Saddam

:26:10.:26:13.

Hussein and the fall of Baghdad is in less than one month. Service

:26:14.:26:21.

personnel, said were deployed to Iraq, and Iraqis who worked for the

:26:22.:26:28.

UK showed great courage in the face of considerable risk. -- civilians

:26:29.:26:36.

deployed to Iraq. More than 200 British citizens died as a result of

:26:37.:26:41.

the conflict in Iraq, many more were injured. This has meant deep anguish

:26:42.:26:46.

for many families, including those here today. The invasion and

:26:47.:26:55.

subsequent instability in Iraq had by July 2009 also resulted in the

:26:56.:27:03.

deaths of at least 150,000 Iraqis and probably many more. Most of them

:27:04.:27:09.

civilians. More than 1 million people were displaced. The people of

:27:10.:27:18.

Iraq have suffered greatly. The vision for Iraq and its people

:27:19.:27:25.

issued by the US, UK, Spain and Portugal at the summit on March the

:27:26.:27:31.

16th 2003 included a solemn obligation to help the Iraqi people

:27:32.:27:35.

build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours. The

:27:36.:27:42.

declaration look forward to a united Iraq in which its people would enjoy

:27:43.:27:48.

security, freedom, prosperity and equality. But a Government that

:27:49.:27:52.

would uphold human rights and the rule of law. They would be

:27:53.:28:00.

cornerstones of democracy. We have considered the post-conflict period

:28:01.:28:06.

in Iraq in great detail. Including efforts to reconstruct the country

:28:07.:28:11.

and rebuild the security services. In this short statement I can only

:28:12.:28:18.

address a a few key points. After the invasion the UK and the US

:28:19.:28:24.

became joint occupying powers. For the year that followed Iraq was

:28:25.:28:26.

governed by the Cornish and provisional authority -- coalition

:28:27.:28:37.

provisional authority. The UK struggle to have a decisive effect

:28:38.:28:41.

on policy. The Government's reparations bill to take account of

:28:42.:28:45.

the magnitude of the task of stabilising and ministering and

:28:46.:28:52.

reconstructing Iraq and of the responsibilities which were likely

:28:53.:29:01.

to fall to the UK. The UK to particular responsibility for four

:29:02.:29:06.

provinces in the south-east. It did so without a formal ministerial

:29:07.:29:12.

decision and without ensuring acts had the necessary military and

:29:13.:29:15.

civilian capabilities to discharge its obligations, including,

:29:16.:29:23.

crucially, to provide security. The scale of the UK effort in

:29:24.:29:27.

post-conflict Iraq never match the scale of the challenge. Whitehall

:29:28.:29:34.

departments and their ministers failed to put collective weight

:29:35.:29:40.

behind the task. In practice, the UK's most consistent strategic

:29:41.:29:45.

objective in relation to Iraq was to reduce the level of its deployed

:29:46.:29:52.

forces. The security situation in both Baghdad and the south-east

:29:53.:29:59.

began to deteriorate soon after the invasion. We have found the Ministry

:30:00.:30:05.

of Defence was slow in responding to the threat from improvised explosive

:30:06.:30:10.

devices and that delays in providing adequate medium which protect the

:30:11.:30:13.

patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated. It is not clear which

:30:14.:30:19.

person or department within the Ministry of Defence was responsible

:30:20.:30:23.

for identifying and articulating such capability gaps, but it should

:30:24.:30:25.

have been. in all from 2006, the United Kingdom

:30:26.:30:41.

military was conducting two distinct military campaigns in Iraq and

:30:42.:30:47.

Afghanistan. It did not have significant resources to do such.

:30:48.:31:01.

For example, the employment to Afghanistan without essential

:31:02.:31:07.

equipment, particularly helicopters and equipment for surveillance. By

:31:08.:31:19.

2007, militia dominance in Basra meant United Kingdom commanders were

:31:20.:31:23.

unable to challenge, led to the United Kingdom exchanging detainee

:31:24.:31:37.

releases in exchange for non-targeting of its personnel. It

:31:38.:31:45.

was a humiliating outcome, but one which the military decided was the

:31:46.:31:53.

best option. We have sought to set out the government actions in Iraq.

:31:54.:31:59.

The evidence is there for all to see. The account of an intervention

:32:00.:32:07.

which went badly wrong. The consequences of that are still felt

:32:08.:32:14.

today. It is the unanimous view that military action in Iraq may have

:32:15.:32:20.

been necessary at some point, but in March 2003, there was no imminent

:32:21.:32:29.

threat. The strategy of containment could have been continued for some

:32:30.:32:34.

time. The majority of the Security Council supported continuing United

:32:35.:32:41.

Nations inspections. Military intervention elsewhere may be

:32:42.:32:47.

required in the future. A vital purpose of the enquiry is to find

:32:48.:32:53.

out what lessons has to be learned from this experience and Eric.

:32:54.:33:03.

Someone about the management of relations with other countries,

:33:04.:33:14.

particularly the United States. The United Kingdom 's relationship with

:33:15.:33:21.

the United States has to be the weight of honest disagreement. It

:33:22.:33:27.

not offer unconditional support where our interests differ. Other

:33:28.:33:36.

interests also are collecting the material discussion, which ask for

:33:37.:33:40.

Frank and informed debate and challenge. Risks need to be a cysts

:33:41.:33:47.

and a realistic strategy has to be set out. It is vital that there is

:33:48.:33:56.

also ministerial leadership. There is also the need to ensure both

:33:57.:34:05.

civilian and military arms of government are we are of the tasks.

:34:06.:34:14.

Above all, all aspects need to be calculated, debated and challenge.

:34:15.:34:24.

When decisions are made commonly need to be implemented thoroughly.

:34:25.:34:32.

Sadly, this was not always the case with the conflict in Iraq. In

:34:33.:34:36.

conclusion, I would like to thank my colleagues. I would like to thank

:34:37.:34:42.

them for their commitment to this difficult task. I also want to pay

:34:43.:34:49.

tribute to Sir Martin Gilbert, who died last year. He was one of the

:34:50.:34:55.

pre-eminent historians. He brought perspective to our work. We have

:34:56.:35:07.

missed him greatly. We miss him as a colleague and a friend.

:35:08.:35:19.

There was the delivery of the long-awaited report. Seven years it

:35:20.:35:27.

has taken him and his team. They have come up with the final verdict

:35:28.:35:34.

on the British involvement in the conflict in Iraq. The delay was

:35:35.:35:41.

severely criticised. But he cannot be criticised for not being fun. 2.6

:35:42.:35:50.

million warrants in the report. We can talk to our assistant political

:35:51.:35:58.

editor. The report has been embargoed until this point. But you

:35:59.:36:02.

have been reading it since eight o'clock this morning. A stronger

:36:03.:36:09.

criticism of the Tony Blair government than maybe some people

:36:10.:36:22.

were expecting? It seems to be the pronunciation of virtually every

:36:23.:36:25.

aspect of the war. Going from the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, the

:36:26.:36:36.

idea that he had weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence

:36:37.:36:44.

provided by the security services. Right up until the point we're the

:36:45.:36:50.

troops were sent into Iraq without the proper equipment, to the

:36:51.:36:53.

post-war planning. But what a thing is most striking is one central

:36:54.:37:00.

figure driving through all of this is Tony Blair. It is of a man who

:37:01.:37:07.

was convinced many months before the conflict that Saddam Hussein had to

:37:08.:37:24.

be removed. In the report, it says in September 2001 he is already

:37:25.:37:30.

sending memos to President Bush about the need for change in Iraq.

:37:31.:37:38.

At that point, he is looking at possibly the idea of assisting some

:37:39.:37:45.

sort of raising the country. He then met the president in April 2002 were

:37:46.:37:54.

the two men basically from up the military options. Then, we see this

:37:55.:38:03.

memo that Tony Blair sent to him. He is talking directly to the president

:38:04.:38:07.

and says we will be with you whatever. He says they will be with

:38:08.:38:23.

you whatever. This is where the planning and in most difficult.

:38:24.:38:34.

He goes on to say, "This is the moment to assess

:38:35.:38:37.

The planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet.

:38:38.:38:40.

This is not Kosovo, this is not Afghanistan.

:38:41.:38:42.

In three months before the war, Tony Blair, it's too flying if necessary

:38:43.:38:56.

three divisions to the south of Iraq and he says to President Bush that

:38:57.:39:02.

the military option is now the likeliest Op option. The report

:39:03.:39:09.

suggests that Tony Blair was driving this process. Although it does not

:39:10.:39:23.

blame Tony Blair, it certainly has the ammunition, in many peoples eyes

:39:24.:39:28.

for it to do that. Thank you for picking out some of the most

:39:29.:39:30.

important wanes. Given the sheer size of the report,

:39:31.:39:39.

it is going to take days, maybe even weeks, to digest its full

:39:40.:39:42.

contents, but here are some Sir John Chilcot has concluded

:39:43.:39:45.

that the circumstances in which it was decided

:39:46.:39:49.

that there was a legal basis for UK military action

:39:50.:39:51.

were far from satisfactory. It also says that the judgements

:39:52.:39:56.

about the severity of threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass

:39:57.:39:58.

destruction were presented with With regard to the options

:39:59.:40:01.

on the table for dealing with Iraq, the report says that the UK chose

:40:02.:40:09.

to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament

:40:10.:40:12.

had been exhausted and that military action at that time

:40:13.:40:16.

was not a last resort. Also released in the report

:40:17.:40:26.

is a memo, written by Tony Blair to President Bush, on the 28 July,

:40:27.:40:30.

2002, eight months In the memo, entitled

:40:31.:40:32.

Note On Iraq, Tony Blair says, He goes on to say, "This

:40:33.:40:40.

is the moment to assess The planning on this and

:40:41.:40:48.

the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not Kosovo,

:40:49.:40:51.

this is not Afghanistan. Further down the six-page memo,

:40:52.:40:53.

he goes on to say how he feels that, "Getting rid of Saddam

:40:54.:41:08.

is the right thing to do". He says that, while he could be

:41:09.:41:10.

contained, the containment could be risky, as they had already

:41:11.:41:13.

learned with Al-Qaeda. It is fascinating just read that one

:41:14.:41:29.

memo alone from 2002. We can now discuss this with Doctor John

:41:30.:41:36.

Davidson from Kings College and an expert on international law. What is

:41:37.:41:42.

your view about the findings in terms of the legal basis for the

:41:43.:41:50.

conflict itself? I have just seen the summary. He is basically seeing

:41:51.:42:02.

that the way in which legal advice was given was unsatisfactory. He

:42:03.:42:07.

said the always fitted around the policy rather than the other way

:42:08.:42:11.

around than there serious concerns. It was pretty strong. Some of the

:42:12.:42:17.

protesters jeer want Tony Blair to be prosecuted by some sort of war

:42:18.:42:25.

crimes tribunal? Is there anything which make an ammunition to that? He

:42:26.:42:34.

has not addressed the legality or otherwise of the conflict. They were

:42:35.:42:41.

not in a position to do that is the not lawyers. It is the question as

:42:42.:42:46.

to whether the way in which Tony Blair got advice was satisfactory.

:42:47.:42:58.

He has concluded that was not. It is how Sir John explains the changes

:42:59.:43:07.

which took place. At first, it was totally illegal without a United

:43:08.:43:11.

Nations resolution. A few months later, that seems to have changed. A

:43:12.:43:19.

total change of position. I will build looking for the detail of that

:43:20.:43:25.

position. You are an expert on the Tony Blair government. This memo

:43:26.:43:33.

that he wrote in 2002 with the President Bush, I will be with you

:43:34.:43:39.

whatever. It suggests it was a personal decision, as opposed to a

:43:40.:43:46.

Cabinet decision. One man cannot take a country to war. That Wayne, I

:43:47.:44:00.

will be with you forever -- whatever, it is not anything new.

:44:01.:44:11.

The Parliamentary vote for a mistaken, something which no

:44:12.:44:14.

previous Prime Minister would have themselves through. The Foreign

:44:15.:44:26.

Secretary at the time, none of them seem to be particularly surprised. I

:44:27.:44:30.

got the impression they all knew exactly where Tony Blair

:44:31.:44:36.

Ystradgynlais. For me, there is nothing new in that particular line.

:44:37.:44:41.

It is something we suspected all along. What is different is that you

:44:42.:44:50.

are expressing a view and a system which is not presidential. Those

:44:51.:45:00.

memo should have been shared with the Cabinet and whatnot. The legal

:45:01.:45:07.

advice given was not shared with the Cabinet, which it should have been.

:45:08.:45:15.

It brings even more uncertainty and the Cabinet could see that they

:45:16.:45:20.

voted on the basis of insufficient evidence. This is of huge magnitude,

:45:21.:45:33.

taking a country to war. Every Prime Minister decides whether to release

:45:34.:45:40.

information hold it back. While we can debate this, it is not new for

:45:41.:45:49.

Prime Minister to act on their own. And keel laying is that during the

:45:50.:45:56.

invasion, if only peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted,

:45:57.:46:04.

it would be understandable, but this gives rise to the idea that this was

:46:05.:46:14.

a last resort. The report says it was certainly not a last resort. It

:46:15.:46:22.

underwent the United Nations Security Council. It brings back to

:46:23.:46:28.

question as to what the Prime Minister shared with the Cabinet. We

:46:29.:46:38.

have a ministerial system which says they will provide a certain amount

:46:39.:46:44.

of information and that was information was not provided. The

:46:45.:46:53.

ministerial code, the Prime Minister should share everything? But every

:46:54.:46:56.

Prime Minister chooses what they want to share them what they do not.

:46:57.:47:03.

We will just pause a moment to see pictures of some of the families of

:47:04.:47:09.

the 179 servicemen and women killed in Iraq. We will hear the reaction

:47:10.:47:15.

to the report. They are going to have a news conference in just a few

:47:16.:47:20.

minutes. There will be interesting to hear their reaction. Some of them

:47:21.:47:25.

had already said they feared it would be a whitewash. Many of the

:47:26.:47:28.

journalists went through some of the findings and believe it is stronger

:47:29.:47:33.

than mate been expected. Very interesting to hear what the family

:47:34.:47:39.

's reaction to this is. As far as delays in providing military

:47:40.:47:46.

equipment to replace the controversial snatch land Rovers.

:47:47.:47:51.

The report said the delays could not have been tolerated.

:47:52.:47:55.

My colleague Annita McVeigh is at the start of the Stop The War

:47:56.:47:58.

You have probably been able to hear the protesters in the background.

:47:59.:48:17.

What is the scene. The demonstrators are saying they want to make

:48:18.:48:21.

themselves heard. They are outside the enquiry. They are accusing Tony

:48:22.:48:35.

Blair of being a war criminal. As lanes from the enquiry started to

:48:36.:48:41.

come out, they said it was fairly significant and a very significant

:48:42.:48:45.

day for British democracy. They are calling for sanctions against Tony

:48:46.:48:58.

Blair. We also hear from the Green party, Caroline Lucas, who said that

:48:59.:49:05.

Tony Blair had been cavalier in his attitude towards war. The report

:49:06.:49:17.

confirmed the code 's worst fears. They said Tony Blair had made

:49:18.:49:22.

commitments to George Bush a number of months before the invasion. She

:49:23.:49:30.

told the code that he should not have been doing that. On Beaver of

:49:31.:49:39.

all those who were injured and all other relatives who were affected.

:49:40.:49:45.

Never again must so many mistakes be allowed to sacrifice British lives.

:49:46.:49:51.

And read to the destruction of our country for no positive end. We were

:49:52.:49:59.

proud of our husbands, sons and daughters when they signed up to

:50:00.:50:04.

serve our country. But we cannot be proud of the way our government has

:50:05.:50:11.

treated them. We must use this report to make sure that all aspects

:50:12.:50:18.

of the Iraq fiasco are not repeated again. Novell and the theatre of war

:50:19.:50:28.

ordering the seat of Westminster and Whitehall. We call on the British

:50:29.:50:32.

government to follow the findings of the report and ensure that the

:50:33.:50:44.

legality of going to war is never again twisted. Democracy cannot be

:50:45.:50:54.

trampled over. And to ensure that the internal politics of Whitehall,

:50:55.:51:03.

from the Ministry of Defence to security and intelligence services

:51:04.:51:05.

are never allowed to feel so legally. After sufficient time of

:51:06.:51:11.

analysis of the report, we reserve the right to call specific parties

:51:12.:51:21.

to answer for their actions if such a process is found to be viable. We

:51:22.:51:28.

thank Sir John for such a detailed report. It is truly an exhausting

:51:29.:51:36.

and exhaustive process. In honour of the memory of our loved ones, we

:51:37.:51:47.

trust that all parties will learn the lessons of the Iraq war. We have

:51:48.:51:59.

only had 180 minutes, one minute for every gift, today suggest these

:52:00.:52:08.

findings. If such a process is found to be viable, we will call for

:52:09.:52:12.

people to account for themselves in court if the is viable. The families

:52:13.:52:23.

have waited a long time. We have acted with patience, courage and

:52:24.:52:29.

dignity throughout this time. Those who the report has criticised had

:52:30.:52:37.

been warned of the criticism in advance. We knew what was coming.

:52:38.:52:42.

The CI was the family were given this morning is not long enough for

:52:43.:52:48.

them to take into account over two and a half million warrants. Today

:52:49.:52:52.

is the day the family should be at the forefront of everyone's minds.

:52:53.:52:59.

We should be remembering those who died there, the thousands who were

:53:00.:53:04.

injured in fear and those who've died in that country since. The

:53:05.:53:12.

families are delighted that the report delivers without fear of,

:53:13.:53:19.

fever or prejudice. But it confirms that many of them died unnecessarily

:53:20.:53:23.

without just cause or purpose. In the coming days and weeks, the

:53:24.:53:28.

families will take a fool and forensic review of the report and

:53:29.:53:34.

its conclusions. Estate of festivals are shown to have acted unlawfully,

:53:35.:53:40.

the families will then decide whether to take any necessary or

:53:41.:53:43.

appropriate action. All options will be open. Just as importantly, as

:53:44.:53:52.

well as examining the culpability of individual state of visuals, we have

:53:53.:53:56.

to also look at the process which led to the conflict, so we do not

:53:57.:53:59.

make such tragic mistakes in the future. Thank you. You talk about

:54:00.:54:18.

certain people, state officials, can you tell us, having heard three

:54:19.:54:22.

horse to read the summary, who these people may be? The difficulty is we

:54:23.:54:30.

have just heard the executive summary. The executive summary does

:54:31.:54:37.

not name names at the moment. I am not really in a position, therefore,

:54:38.:54:44.

to actually see who. With the exception of the former Prime

:54:45.:54:48.

Minister, of course, Tony Blair, who is mentioned in the report. Did your

:54:49.:55:02.

son die in vain? When I look at Iraq on my television screen today, I can

:55:03.:55:10.

only conclude that, unfortunately, my son did die in vain.

:55:11.:55:22.

Can I ask if you regard Tony Blair has been ultimately responsible for

:55:23.:55:35.

all of this? We need to have a proper assessment of what is

:55:36.:55:42.

available to as. There needs to be a fool and forensic analysis of the

:55:43.:55:52.

report first. We have the report today, that is what is important. In

:55:53.:55:56.

the coming weeks and months, the families will decide what is

:55:57.:56:08.

necessary. Could I ask Selah and Rose what you're upgrading emotions

:56:09.:56:18.

have been through this? What we have been reading has been really hard. I

:56:19.:56:25.

have seen a lot of the families in tears today. Of them have killed it

:56:26.:56:35.

back for a long time. Sadness, anger, that healing. All those years

:56:36.:56:43.

I have worked for, I have gone back to that time. I know that my brother

:56:44.:56:52.

had been killed and there was one terrorist that the world needs to be

:56:53.:57:02.

aware of and that is Tony Blair. What changes with the publication of

:57:03.:57:12.

this report? What does it mean in practical terms? It is difficult.

:57:13.:57:20.

The government itself has to look at itself if it wants to change the way

:57:21.:57:28.

it does this kind of business. This must never happen ever again. It is

:57:29.:57:33.

how you actually achieve the changes which are required to make sure it

:57:34.:57:40.

does not happen again. Perhaps, we do not know yet, and will not know

:57:41.:57:50.

for some time, but if we go into court to have some sort of sanction,

:57:51.:57:56.

maybe that could motivate government into making sure that the change

:57:57.:58:08.

their way they do business. They're all this constitutional issues with

:58:09.:58:17.

regard to how one goes to war. Governments have two recognise that

:58:18.:58:28.

we have voices and we will be the voices of those who are no longer

:58:29.:58:37.

rustlers. And we be here. I think this is a sad that are very thorough

:58:38.:58:41.

enquiry of which is confront many of the things that we thought. We have

:58:42.:58:47.

no had the backing of St John. It has been documented. But we want to

:58:48.:58:57.

find more answers and bring those who are responsible need to be

:58:58.:59:05.

brought to boot. We will look at what is appropriate after we have

:59:06.:59:07.

thoroughly looked out all the findings. We need to see if we have

:59:08.:59:21.

the evidence to go forward with. It seemed indelicate language, that Sir

:59:22.:59:29.

John was almost pointing someone towards court. He was pretty clear

:59:30.:59:38.

that there was an indication that someone probably should have a look

:59:39.:59:43.

at it. He did explain that the process of going to war was

:59:44.:59:48.

unsatisfactory. We will look at this and decide what is necessary and

:59:49.:59:53.

appropriate, given the reception to the findings. Is there an idea that

:59:54.:00:05.

you should maybe be getting someone on the phone, seeing someone with

:00:06.:00:08.

the legal brain should be looking at this? If appropriate, that would be

:00:09.:00:19.

appropriate for a court, to look at the actions of individuals. Whatever

:00:20.:00:27.

is appropriate. We need to take the time to look at these findings, what

:00:28.:00:34.

the content is and what is appropriate in the future.

:00:35.:00:40.

Do you think Mr Mr Blair believed he knew what he was doing? I believed

:00:41.:00:51.

he knew he was misleading and that has become clear from the 150 page

:00:52.:01:02.

summary. He has misled the people, he obviously had a previous view.

:01:03.:01:09.

Over the past few weeks he has been covering his back. He made a

:01:10.:01:16.

decision and he made... As everybody else has said I only got this this

:01:17.:01:22.

morning and I will have to sit down and read it properly but from what I

:01:23.:01:26.

have read he knew exactly what he was doing. And averaged out to Tony

:01:27.:01:36.

Blair's reaction. I will take full responsibility for any mistakes,

:01:37.:01:41.

without exception or excuse and none I believe it was better to remove

:01:42.:01:47.

Saddam Hussein. I pay tribute to our Armed Forces and express my profound

:01:48.:01:53.

regret at the loss of life and set out the lessons of future leaders

:01:54.:02:05.

can learn. That is just a PR patter. We have talked for a long time about

:02:06.:02:11.

the legal decision to go to war and one of the things that, wouldn't

:02:12.:02:20.

that legal advice, you cannot go to war for regime change. Out of his

:02:21.:02:31.

own mouth he condemns himself. Hopefully this is the evidence we

:02:32.:02:45.

need. But he has condemned himself. The fact that

:02:46.:02:46.

these enquiries and we have been through several, no blame as a

:02:47.:02:55.

portion from any one of them, it is likely get out of free card. They

:02:56.:03:02.

have to look at these things in the future and point fingers at the

:03:03.:03:12.

people responsible. Mr Blair also says today that he

:03:13.:03:17.

took his decisions in good faith and there was no falsification or

:03:18.:03:23.

improper use of intelligence or deception and no secret commitment

:03:24.:03:28.

to war. Do you accept his observations? Why is he not you're

:03:29.:03:37.

looking at us? If he is so sure of his decision why is he not here

:03:38.:03:43.

looking at us and seeing our faces. We ask to meet him and he walked

:03:44.:03:49.

away. This is his opportunity. He thinks he is the puppet master

:03:50.:03:55.

pulling the strings. We approved and wrong because everything we have

:03:56.:04:03.

said from the start has came out today. What would you say to him if

:04:04.:04:09.

he was here? Exactly what I have been saying to the world. Look me in

:04:10.:04:18.

the eye? Are you responsible for the murder of my son. Would say look me

:04:19.:04:25.

in the eye and tell me you did not mislead the nation. And the response

:04:26.:04:33.

of the gentleman there, what we must bear in mind is the intelligence

:04:34.:04:40.

reports were coming back which were sporadic, and thrive, untested and

:04:41.:04:43.

not to be relied upon and by the time saw it Blair and Alastair

:04:44.:04:49.

Campbell had finished with it it was detail, authoritative, and available

:04:50.:04:53.

to be deployed within 45 minutes. I believe Tony Blair knew that was a

:04:54.:04:58.

lie and that was perpetrated on the British public and he knew it was

:04:59.:05:04.

manufactured and he was massaging the intelligence reports. He changed

:05:05.:05:11.

it from F, but maybe to get it up and running now. The report says as

:05:12.:05:18.

much, when you actually start reading into it. If it is found

:05:19.:05:33.

appropriate to take that further, legally, what is the process for

:05:34.:05:40.

doing so? I will not comment at this stage on that. I am not been

:05:41.:05:44.

difficult, I promise you, in answering that is what this is such

:05:45.:05:50.

a matter of great seriousness and gravity, not only 40 families but

:05:51.:05:57.

the nation that it requires a proper period of reflection. -- not only

:05:58.:06:03.

for the families. Legal actions are possible. The report is full,

:06:04.:06:11.

comprehensive. If you take those two things together you can speculate

:06:12.:06:15.

but we need days, if not weeks, to come to a final conclusion. Thank

:06:16.:06:24.

you. There have been a fair of criticism that Sir John Chilcot and

:06:25.:06:27.

his team were taking a long time and they were not focused on doing their

:06:28.:06:33.

job properly. Do you think, now you have seen, however shortly, in

:06:34.:06:38.

detail this report, the weights was worth it and you have had a

:06:39.:06:42.

comprehensive report you can now address and I? It still took too

:06:43.:06:48.

long, there is no question about that. But, from what we have seen

:06:49.:06:55.

today, and we have not seen much, we have not had a great deal of time to

:06:56.:06:59.

really dig into it and you need to be locked away in a room by yourself

:07:00.:07:04.

in order to do that, but from what we have seen, it is a very thorough.

:07:05.:07:10.

Therefore, in that sense, worth the wait.

:07:11.:07:21.

Can I ask one more question of Matthew? A simple yes or no. Is a

:07:22.:07:30.

legal action against one or more people, Tony Blair and others, more

:07:31.:07:35.

or less likely after a two-day? It's possible.

:07:36.:07:38.

LAUGHTER Same question, different words. Who

:07:39.:07:50.

are you from? Sky News. I do not have sky at home.

:07:51.:08:09.

That was a news conference they are of some of the family members of

:08:10.:08:17.

some of the 179 but a service men and women who lost their lives in

:08:18.:08:24.

the Iraq conflict between 2003 and 2009. Interesting to hear Roger

:08:25.:08:31.

Bacon, whose son was killed in Iraq, saying, he thought the Chilcot

:08:32.:08:35.

enquiry published today has been extremely thorough and has been

:08:36.:08:39.

worth the wait. Huge controversy over the seven years it took the

:08:40.:08:45.

report to be published but that father saying it was worth the wait.

:08:46.:08:51.

Another relative saying Tony Blair was the terrorist. In parent saying

:08:52.:08:57.

my son died in vain. It was at times a very emotional news conference.

:08:58.:09:03.

Roger Bacon also saying he had been proud of our troops in Iraq cannot

:09:04.:09:07.

be proud of how our Government behaved towards our troops. The

:09:08.:09:16.

solicitor for that family, Matthew, Judy, all options on legal action

:09:17.:09:21.

against state officials, Government ministers and so on, will be

:09:22.:09:26.

considered. Interesting that lawyers for some of the families talking

:09:27.:09:31.

about the need over the next few days, when they have read through

:09:32.:09:34.

the report, to consider if legal action should be taken against

:09:35.:09:40.

Government ministers, state officials. Let's go to Baghdad,

:09:41.:09:45.

where there is still violent chaos and we saw that car on Sunday, the

:09:46.:09:53.

deadliest car bomb since the invasion, with 250 people killed. As

:09:54.:10:02.

I say, the repercussions of what happens back when Tony Blair and

:10:03.:10:07.

George Bush were considering to go to war is still being felt in Iraq

:10:08.:10:14.

today. Yes indeed. Many Iraqis or the Iraq

:10:15.:10:27.

war responsible for their agony and the deteriorating security and

:10:28.:10:32.

economic conditions. And even at the political level because they say,

:10:33.:10:37.

had it not been for the invasion, the Iraqi politicians who used to

:10:38.:10:41.

live in exile, would not have gone to Iraq and they hold them

:10:42.:10:47.

responsible for their misery, the Iraqi politicians, according to many

:10:48.:10:54.

Iraqis, have lost touch with the people. So the repercussions and

:10:55.:11:01.

consequences are quite felt 13 years after the US led war on Iraq.

:11:02.:11:12.

What are people there saying specifically about Tony Blair and

:11:13.:11:16.

has a role that has been under the spotlight with this Chilcot Report

:11:17.:11:28.

two-day? There is a hostile sentiments here in Baghdad and in

:11:29.:11:34.

Iraq, not just for the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony

:11:35.:11:38.

Blair, but for also George W Bush, the former US presidents and the

:11:39.:11:49.

Iraqi politicians who took part, as many Iraqis here say, in misleading

:11:50.:11:56.

the international community and the Iraqis themselves and the

:11:57.:12:05.

neighbouring countries in misleading them into justifying this war.

:12:06.:12:11.

However, some Iraqis, and there are a lot, believe that the Americans or

:12:12.:12:18.

the US Administration of George W Bush and his closest ally Tony Blair

:12:19.:12:25.

were resolved and determined to invade Iraq no matter what. As we

:12:26.:12:33.

heard from Sir John Chilcot today, he said that Tony Blair, he

:12:34.:12:43.

mentioned some of the memos and correspondence between Tony Blair

:12:44.:12:47.

and George W Bush, and from these memos it is evident and clear that

:12:48.:12:54.

the suggestion to go to war with Iraq -- in Iraq dates back to 2001.

:12:55.:13:01.

The first male mentions in this report is -- the first memo dated

:13:02.:13:07.

December 2001 suggesting to go to Iraq. Many Iraqis are convinced that

:13:08.:13:14.

the US administration and the UK Government at that time were

:13:15.:13:19.

resolved to go to war and topple Saddam the matter what.

:13:20.:13:27.

Thank you very much indeed for being with us. Let us give you the

:13:28.:13:37.

response from Tony Blair. He says, I will take full responsibility for

:13:38.:13:41.

any mistakes, without exception or excuse. He says he took the decision

:13:42.:13:48.

on going to war in Iraq in good faith" what I believe to be the best

:13:49.:13:54.

interests of the country. He also says the Chilcot Report should lay

:13:55.:13:59.

to rest allegations against him of bad faith, lies and deceit. And Tony

:14:00.:14:07.

Blair saying he does not believe that the decision to remove Saddam

:14:08.:14:11.

Hussein from power in Iraq is the cause of terrorism today in the

:14:12.:14:17.

Middle East and elsewhere. Those just some early reactions from Tony

:14:18.:14:23.

Blair himself to the Chilcot Report which is generate a creed is pretty

:14:24.:14:28.

damning of the way he and his Government conducted themselves --

:14:29.:14:34.

it is generally agreed is a pretty damning of heaven. We can top the

:14:35.:14:38.

former member of this Government, Clare Short, Labour MP. -- damning

:14:39.:14:46.

of his Government. Clare, what is your initial reaction to the report?

:14:47.:14:53.

The report gives the damning list of all the criticisms the critics are

:14:54.:14:58.

made and says they are all true. Blair gave his word long before,

:14:59.:15:04.

there was no need to hurry, the diplomatic options were not

:15:05.:15:10.

exhausted, we did not have to go on a US timetable, preparations were

:15:11.:15:16.

not properly made. It is all there and damning but the situation in

:15:17.:15:21.

Iraq and the Middle East remains terrible at making the criticism

:15:22.:15:28.

does not put any of that right. One thing the report highlight is how

:15:29.:15:33.

presidential the Blair Government was. For example, that memo to

:15:34.:15:39.

George Bush in July of 2002, saying, I will be with you, whatever. I,

:15:40.:15:45.

will be with you. He did not show back to you or other cabinet

:15:46.:15:50.

members. What do you make of that? It does not surprise me. He did not

:15:51.:15:57.

even decide things at the Cabinet, he had a few people in his room with

:15:58.:16:03.

no minutes taken and then normally in Whitehall that the Prime Minister

:16:04.:16:06.

talks to another country in Norton is taken and it is circulated. But

:16:07.:16:11.

when we went into Iraq everything froze up. -- eight notes is taken.

:16:12.:16:16.

That helped to create the confusion of planning for afterwards. We did

:16:17.:16:21.

not know if we would properly go through the UN and that's meant, I

:16:22.:16:27.

have been reading over the years the confusion and mess and worthy of its

:16:28.:16:32.

as I read the description of how the events unfolded. It is a damning

:16:33.:16:39.

indictment of the British system of Government. The informality of its

:16:40.:16:42.

means this thing can be done and what must be learned is to tighten

:16:43.:16:47.

up conditions for decision-making, if that is to be another war because

:16:48.:16:51.

this way of doing things, but how many lives are destroyed, countries

:16:52.:16:56.

destroyed. We must never do this again. You were a member of the

:16:57.:17:02.

Government. Do you have regrets about your role in Government? I

:17:03.:17:08.

regret massively we went to war when we dead and everything that

:17:09.:17:17.

unfolded. -- when we did. I tried as a Cabinet member to try a hold on

:17:18.:17:23.

the Tony Blair's and ankles and we might find a better way of dealing

:17:24.:17:33.

with Iraq. I know I tried my damnedest but for wide Field and for

:17:34.:17:37.

that I feel terrible. Do you think you should have resigned earlier. I

:17:38.:17:44.

EDF place to make my resignation speech before the vote but then -- I

:17:45.:17:52.

booked my place. That was not much fighting any very early invasion and

:17:53.:17:56.

a lot of people in Iraq hoped for something better for them and if

:17:57.:18:01.

there had been an international leads and more trust and not an

:18:02.:18:06.

occupation Iraq might be in a much better place so that is why I stayed

:18:07.:18:11.

until it was clear that promise would not be kept. It drew a lot of

:18:12.:18:15.

flack on to me but it was good to try for that and in the end it

:18:16.:18:21.

didn't help. Some of the family members of British troops who died

:18:22.:18:26.

in Iraq are been saying they reserve the right to think about whether to

:18:27.:18:31.

take legal action against members of the then British Government. What do

:18:32.:18:36.

you think about that? I think they have a right to do that but I think

:18:37.:18:41.

it unlikely they will find the roots to get the kind of legal

:18:42.:18:46.

accountability they would like. If I am proved wrong, that is fine. Clare

:18:47.:18:56.

Short, thank you very much indeed. Clare Short, International

:18:57.:18:58.

Development Secretary in the Blair Government. Prime Minister's

:18:59.:19:06.

Questions is underway. We can hear from the SNP's Westminster leader

:19:07.:19:10.

Angus Robertson a short time ago. The Chilcot Report confirms that on

:19:11.:19:17.

the 28th of July 2002 Tony Blair wrote to President Bush saying, I

:19:18.:19:23.

will be with you whatever. Does the Prime Minister understand Whitely

:19:24.:19:26.

families of the dead and injured UK service personnel -- why the

:19:27.:19:33.

families of the dead and hundreds of thousands Iraqis feel they were

:19:34.:19:35.

deceived about the reasons for going war? Let me join the Right

:19:36.:19:44.

Honourable gentleman in wishing... In terms of the report dribble

:19:45.:19:48.

discussed it in detail later and I don't want to pre-empt all other

:19:49.:19:54.

things I want to say but we need to learn the lessons, study it

:19:55.:19:59.

carefully. It is millions of words, thousands of pages and I think we

:20:00.:20:03.

should save our remarks for debating it after the statement in the house.

:20:04.:20:16.

The Chilcot is sport -- Chilcot disport -- Chilcot Report concludes

:20:17.:20:19.

the UK did not achieve its objectives. That lack of planning

:20:20.:20:26.

has also been evident in relation to Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and, most

:20:27.:20:31.

recently, with no plan whatsoever for Brexit. When will the UK

:20:32.:20:36.

Government actually start learning from the mistakes of the past so we

:20:37.:20:43.

are not condemned to repeat them? He is right that what Sir John

:20:44.:20:47.

Chilcot says about the failure to plan is clear and I can read from

:20:48.:20:51.

his statement because he says when the invasion began UK policy

:20:52.:20:54.

arrested on an assumption that would be a well executed... Security

:20:55.:21:01.

environment. Mr Blair told the enquiry the difficulties encountered

:21:02.:21:05.

after the invasion could not have been known in advance. He says, we

:21:06.:21:09.

do not agree hindsight is required and he is clear on that point. What

:21:10.:21:14.

I would say, in terms of planning, what I put in place as Prime

:21:15.:21:19.

Minister following Iraq is proper legal advice pop-up reconstituted

:21:20.:21:25.

meetings -- properly constituted meetings. All those things including

:21:26.:21:30.

the proper listening to expert advice on the security Council, all

:21:31.:21:33.

of that is designed to avoid the problems the Government had in the

:21:34.:21:40.

case of Iraq. The only point I would make if there is actually no set of

:21:41.:21:45.

arrangements and plans that can provide protection in any of these

:21:46.:21:49.

cases. Military intervention, we can argue whether it is ever justified,

:21:50.:21:54.

I believe it is. It is always difficult. Planning for the

:21:55.:21:58.

aftermath is always difficult and I do not believe we should be naive

:21:59.:22:03.

that is a perfect set of plans an arrangement that can solve these

:22:04.:22:06.

problems in perpetuity. There are not.

:22:07.:22:13.

That was the Prime Minister and the Westminster leader of the SNP Angus

:22:14.:22:20.

Robertson in the Commons. You can see pictures of some of the families

:22:21.:22:29.

giving their reaction already. One of those family members describing

:22:30.:22:35.

Tony Blair, emotionally, as a terrorist. And the lawyer for that

:22:36.:22:39.

group saying they will be reading the report in detail and seeing

:22:40.:22:44.

whether they think there is a case for taking legal action against what

:22:45.:22:48.

they called State officials, in other words members of the Blair

:22:49.:22:51.

Government. Let's get some more reaction. I am joined here by a

:22:52.:23:01.

leading expert on international law, Tim Ripley, an expert in the

:23:02.:23:06.

military and military strategy and also David Godfrey, father of Daniel

:23:07.:23:13.

who guides in Iraq. -- who died in Iraq. Let me ask you, David, we had

:23:14.:23:20.

some of the family's reaction, tell your reaction to what Sir John said?

:23:21.:23:36.

Just my grandson. My reaction... I've got to the end of a journey and

:23:37.:23:40.

the start of another one. The journey started with the loss of

:23:41.:23:49.

Daniel in Basra in February 2007. The next stage of my journey started

:23:50.:23:56.

at the launch of the Chilcot enquiry report. It has been a journey of

:23:57.:24:08.

heart ache, pain, not just bought my family but every other family you

:24:09.:24:12.

have seen here today. For modular scene of the report are you

:24:13.:24:18.

satisfied with the findings? I said to one of your colleagues

:24:19.:24:24.

previously, I had come here with the possibility and woods probably Dev

:24:25.:24:33.

Sir John -- get Sir John Chilcot have a stick but I must say, I owe

:24:34.:24:41.

him an apology. -- give him have a stick. The report was well made out.

:24:42.:24:47.

Was it worth the wait is? I cannot say... Yes, I would think so, but

:24:48.:25:01.

the report has not gone far enough and I have not seen the report

:25:02.:25:09.

statement from Tony Blair earlier on, but from a brief glimpse from

:25:10.:25:17.

one of your colleagues, ... I totally disagree with some of the

:25:18.:25:23.

things he said in that statement. Tim Ripley, you are a military

:25:24.:25:28.

expert. In terms of what the report says about British equipment, and

:25:29.:25:31.

that is one of the key issues for the families of those who died, for

:25:32.:25:37.

example the land Rovers in which a lot of British troops died in Basra

:25:38.:25:42.

and in the south of Iraq, they were not replaced quickly enough by the

:25:43.:25:46.

MOD. What does the report tell us about that? The report is one of the

:25:47.:25:53.

most damning indictments of the British military campaign since

:25:54.:25:59.

1916. It is damning endpaper the preparedness of the Armed Forces and

:26:00.:26:01.

their leadership during the campaign. -- it is damning of the

:26:02.:26:10.

military preparedness. It says this was a military failure. There is a

:26:11.:26:17.

lot of blame for arounds and talk about the preparations, but in terms

:26:18.:26:22.

of the leadership of the British Armed Forces, they are accused of

:26:23.:26:27.

being more interested in leaving Iraq than ensuring mission success.

:26:28.:26:32.

The land Rover incident you spoke about, the report identifies a

:26:33.:26:37.

four-year delay in identifying and selecting and procuring

:26:38.:26:42.

replacements. It claims that on the leadership of the British Army being

:26:43.:26:46.

more interested in business as usual back home in their barracks. It is

:26:47.:26:53.

very damning of the direction of the campaign and says they did not

:26:54.:26:56.

achieve what they set out to do which is very damning and has not

:26:57.:27:00.

been seen in a British military report campaign for 100 years.

:27:01.:27:06.

Let me take you back to what Tony Blair has been saying in response.

:27:07.:27:11.

We just had that statement in the last few minutes. He says, the

:27:12.:27:16.

report should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies and

:27:17.:27:21.

deceit. Whether people agree or disagree with my decision to take

:27:22.:27:24.

military action against Saddam Hussein, I took it in good faith and

:27:25.:27:30.

in what I believe to be the best interests of the country.

:27:31.:27:33.

That was Tony Blair with his immediate response to the Chilcot

:27:34.:27:39.

enquiry. He also says he does not believe the removal of Saddam

:27:40.:27:41.

Hussein is the cause of terrorism in the middle East today or elsewhere.

:27:42.:27:48.

Tony Blair with his immediate reaction to the Chilcot enquiry.

:27:49.:27:54.

Let's talk to them develop Sands, international law expert. What do

:27:55.:27:57.

you make of the report and Tony Blair's response. The legal planning

:27:58.:28:07.

was found to be unsatisfactory. The security Council was undermined. It

:28:08.:28:13.

was not a situation of last resort. It is pretty devastating stuff. Is

:28:14.:28:19.

that stronger than you expected? I did my best to keep an open mind. I

:28:20.:28:25.

was concerned about the level of the questioning in the hearings and if

:28:26.:28:29.

he had the capacity to assess the evidence. From what I have read so

:28:30.:28:35.

far up my concerns are misplaced. It appears to be thorough and fair and

:28:36.:28:39.

balanced. In relation to what Mr Blair said, it isn't about good

:28:40.:28:43.

faith of bad faith, what we are bidding here is a document

:28:44.:28:47.

essentially making an allegation of gross recklessness. Going to a war,

:28:48.:28:53.

the more serious than a Government can do. When war is not needed off

:28:54.:28:59.

the back of unsatisfactory legal advice. That is pretty devastating.

:29:00.:29:06.

What is your view of what why Tony Blair took that course? What drove

:29:07.:29:14.

him to that? I have studied this for ten years and wrote a book in 2006

:29:15.:29:20.

and he had decided very early in 2002 and that is now established

:29:21.:29:24.

beyond any doubt. He took a decision and did not share it with cabinets

:29:25.:29:30.

and in fact repeatedly told them no decision had been taken and we now

:29:31.:29:35.

see in black and white evidence that shows Mr Blair writing to President

:29:36.:29:41.

Bush saying, I am with you whatever. When you are in that situation as

:29:42.:29:45.

Prime Minister and you have in your back pocket legal advice from the

:29:46.:29:49.

Attorney General which says you cannot do this, you need a second

:29:50.:29:54.

resolution and you tell the president of the United States I am

:29:55.:29:58.

still with you, despite that legal advice, you have got a problem in

:29:59.:30:02.

decision-making. It is not a good faith of bad faith but not relying

:30:03.:30:08.

on the legal advice we had in taking the country in a direction his own

:30:09.:30:12.

legal adviser told him he could not do.

:30:13.:30:18.

Do you think the report is stronger or more devastating with regard to

:30:19.:30:25.

the Tony Blair government than you might have been expecting? The most

:30:26.:30:33.

devastating thing as there is no glimmer of hope that anything was

:30:34.:30:41.

achieved in this war. He was pretty clear that the situation in Iraq is

:30:42.:30:46.

abysmal. It is not going anywhere soon. It is soon -- still a

:30:47.:30:53.

nightmare for the people of Iraq for many years to come. And our

:30:54.:30:56.

intervention certainly did not make things any better. Would you like to

:30:57.:31:03.

see some sort of legal action in the courts against members of the

:31:04.:31:08.

government at that time, including Tony Blair? It has to happen. I

:31:09.:31:16.

agree with your colleagues here that we were ill-equipped and Tony Blair

:31:17.:31:30.

took the decision with President Bush to go together, to force the

:31:31.:31:35.

role on the British government. They did that without proper legal

:31:36.:31:43.

backing. We did not go back to the United Nations, because they should

:31:44.:31:50.

have given that time to the weapons inspectors. They were pushed to get

:31:51.:32:00.

this sorted. One thing that sticks in my mind is the weapons

:32:01.:32:12.

inspectors. The supposedly said of Doctor David Kelly. Sorry we have

:32:13.:32:14.

two interrupt you. We can go live now to the House

:32:15.:32:17.

of Commons, where a statement will be made, in response

:32:18.:32:20.

to the Chilcot Inquiry This is a difficult day for all of

:32:21.:32:30.

those who have lost loved ones. This has been far too long coming. I hope

:32:31.:32:35.

we can draw some solace from the depth and vigour of this report and

:32:36.:32:40.

some solace that we will not forget the incredible sacrifice. 179

:32:41.:32:48.

British servicemen and women. They give everything for our country. We

:32:49.:32:53.

must never forget the thousands who suffered life changing industry --

:32:54.:33:02.

injured injuries. This report would have begun sooner if it had begun

:33:03.:33:08.

sooner French people on the side of the host first goal for it back in

:33:09.:33:14.

2006. But a fool everyone will join me in thanking St John and also Mr

:33:15.:33:21.

Gilbert, who passed away recently. Government ministers did not see the

:33:22.:33:31.

report until yesterday. He gave Sir John fool access to government

:33:32.:33:37.

papers. This has been an unprecedented access and insight. It

:33:38.:33:46.

also took into account 31 personal memos from the then Prime Minister

:33:47.:33:53.

Tony Blair to President Bush. It amounts to 2.6 million words. It

:33:54.:34:00.

cost nearly ?10 million to produce. Everyone in the host will love the

:34:01.:34:05.

chance to study it in debt. We will have two full days of the beat next

:34:06.:34:11.

week. And on a number of key questions were asked. Did we go to

:34:12.:34:19.

war on a false promise? Was legal advice properly taken? Was the

:34:20.:34:24.

operation well planned? Where are we prepared for the aftermath? And did

:34:25.:34:30.

our forces have adequate funding and equipment? I will try and summarise

:34:31.:34:34.

the key findings and lessons that I believe have to be levelled. Another

:34:35.:34:38.

of reasons were put forward for going to war in Iraq. Including the

:34:39.:34:48.

danger that Saddam Hussein posed to his people and the region. Central

:34:49.:34:53.

to the argument was the issue of weapons of mass disruption. Sir John

:34:54.:34:57.

said there was an ingrained belief, genuinely held in the United Kingdom

:34:58.:35:04.

and elsewhere, that Saddam Hussein possessed a biological capability

:35:05.:35:08.

and that he wanted to redevelop its nuclear capabilities. He was

:35:09.:35:14.

actively pursuing that. He had built up chemical weapons in the past and

:35:15.:35:18.

had used them against Kurdish militants and the Iranians military.

:35:19.:35:26.

The advice given to the government by the international policy

:35:27.:35:32.

community that Saddam Hussein did possess these capabilities. As we

:35:33.:35:36.

know Noel, by 2003, this long-held belief that all longer reflected the

:35:37.:35:48.

reality. St John says, at no stage was the belief that Saddam Hussein

:35:49.:35:54.

continued to have weapons of mass destruction. This was not fully

:35:55.:36:04.

examined. It was possible to come to a different conclusion about the

:36:05.:36:06.

existence of fuel that other intelligence. The results of the

:36:07.:36:15.

worry about weapons of mass destruction finding a reason to the

:36:16.:36:19.

hands of terrorists. Roll St John agrees that that was the worry, but

:36:20.:36:26.

the original one basis to suggest that Iraq represented such a threat.

:36:27.:36:32.

On the question of intelligence, the report says intelligence was

:36:33.:36:42.

improperly concluded. He does say that the use of the joint

:36:43.:36:47.

intelligence committee material in the public presentation did not make

:36:48.:36:50.

reading of the limitations of the assessments. He says the

:36:51.:36:57.

intelligence had not established beyond doubt that either that Saddam

:36:58.:37:01.

Hussain was producing chemical or biological weapons. It says the

:37:02.:37:07.

joint in kelp intelligence committee should have made that very clear to

:37:08.:37:13.

the Prime Minister. They could of conveyed more certainty than the

:37:14.:37:17.

joint intelligence committee assessments. There was a lack of

:37:18.:37:22.

clarity between what they said and what Tony Blair believed. With

:37:23.:37:30.

regard to the 2002 last year, the famed difference between the

:37:31.:37:35.

inspection the judgment. But he does not question the belief of Mr lawyer

:37:36.:37:48.

that they had. There is no legality expressed with regard to the

:37:49.:37:52.

involvement of the United Kingdom in the war. But the dude talk about the

:37:53.:37:58.

legal advice the government was given. St John is highly critical of

:37:59.:38:06.

the process by which legal advice was arranged that and discussed. He

:38:07.:38:10.

said the circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there

:38:11.:38:14.

was a legal basis for military action were far from satisfactory.

:38:15.:38:21.

He also finds that the diplomatic options had not been exhausted. He

:38:22.:38:29.

says military action was therefore not the last resort. He said the

:38:30.:38:33.

second resolution of the United Nations, the United Nations --

:38:34.:38:37.

kingdom should have done more to exhaust all options, including

:38:38.:38:42.

allowing weapons inspectors to conclude the work in Iraq. He then

:38:43.:38:50.

looks at the processor which was then forward. A number of ministers

:38:51.:38:56.

were involved in the decision-making. He then looks at

:38:57.:39:08.

the process of decision-making. He says the idea of military action was

:39:09.:39:11.

never properly discussed that Cabinet level. It inevitably reduced

:39:12.:39:18.

the small group of people, often without records being kept. He also

:39:19.:39:26.

says that Tony Blair made important commitments to President Bush, which

:39:27.:39:29.

had not been discussed with Cabinet colleagues. But he says at no stage

:39:30.:39:39.

the sea was nearly killed a attempt to mislead people. The initial

:39:40.:39:46.

invasion proceeded rapidly and we should be proud of what our Armed

:39:47.:39:58.

Forces achieved. This is despite not been planning to take part in an

:39:59.:40:06.

invasion from the south, which came at short notice after the Turkish

:40:07.:40:09.

gunmen refused access from the North. It says satisfactory plans

:40:10.:40:29.

had not been made for the challenges and risks in Iraq. He says the

:40:30.:40:34.

government lacked clear ministerial oversight in planning and

:40:35.:40:42.

coordination and field to manage the risks adequately. The government and

:40:43.:40:51.

ministers remained to fixed on the idea that the United States had a

:40:52.:40:56.

plan and that the United Kingdom rule would take part for 34 months

:40:57.:41:08.

after the conflict ended. He concludes that the anticipated that

:41:09.:41:17.

the post-war problems did not require the benefits of hindsight.

:41:18.:41:23.

On the issue of equipment and troops, the government feel to

:41:24.:41:29.

provide adequate patrol vehicles, feel your to meet the needs of

:41:30.:41:36.

United Kingdom forces should not have been tolerated. He says the

:41:37.:41:43.

Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat posed by

:41:44.:41:52.

improvised explosive devices. The sole many opportunities for a

:41:53.:41:55.

strategic reappraisal to have taken place with regard to the resources.

:41:56.:42:02.

He phoned that no such reappraisal of took place. During the first four

:42:03.:42:07.

years there was no clear statement of policy setting out exactly the

:42:08.:42:13.

acceptable amount of risk and who was at responsible for managing the

:42:14.:42:18.

risk. He says the military were too focused on withdrawing from Iraq and

:42:19.:42:26.

focused on the deployment to Afghanistan. He concludes that

:42:27.:42:31.

although Tony Blair succeeded in persuading the United States to go

:42:32.:42:36.

back to the United Nations in 2002, he was unsuccessful in changing the

:42:37.:42:42.

United States position. The absence of a majority in the Security

:42:43.:42:48.

Council of military action, at that point, the united kingdom was

:42:49.:42:51.

therefore undermining the authority of the Security Council. He said it

:42:52.:43:01.

was clear that there was a worry that the relationship between the

:43:02.:43:04.

United States and the United Kingdom may be damaged if support was not

:43:05.:43:12.

given. But there was a gap between the ambitious United Kingdom

:43:13.:43:15.

objectives and the equipment for the trips that that would allow. On the

:43:16.:43:27.

territorial integrity of Iraq remained, thousands of innocent

:43:28.:43:30.

Iraqi citizens lost their lives. While these conditions were not

:43:31.:43:36.

created by the coalition, they were exacerbated by it. They were not

:43:37.:43:43.

addressed by a effective programme. He says the policy of the United

:43:44.:43:50.

Kingdom government failed to meet its achieved objectives and. Those

:43:51.:44:01.

who voted for military action will have to take the fear share of

:44:02.:44:07.

responsibility. We cannot turn the clock back, but we can make sure

:44:08.:44:15.

that these aspects of the report are taken into account for the future.

:44:16.:44:22.

Getting all these things rate do not guarantee the success of the

:44:23.:44:26.

military intervention. I believe it was great to intervene in Libya to

:44:27.:44:37.

stop the slaughter there. We did have a United Nations mandate the.

:44:38.:44:44.

But getting these things rate does not make the challenges any less

:44:45.:44:50.

formidable. The difficulties in Libya today at playing for everyone

:44:51.:44:54.

to see. As the Prime Minister for the last six years, I believe there

:44:55.:44:59.

are lessons need to be learnt. First, taking the country to war

:45:00.:45:04.

should always be a last resort and should only be done when all other

:45:05.:45:08.

credible alternatives have been exhausted. On my first year of

:45:09.:45:17.

office I established the National Security Council so that

:45:18.:45:19.

decision-making would be taken across the whole of that group. The

:45:20.:45:23.

council was not just a meeting of ministers. It has the chief of the

:45:24.:45:32.

defence staff, the head of the intelligence staff and other

:45:33.:45:39.

relevant officials. I also appointed the first National Security adviser

:45:40.:45:42.

with a properly constituted team and the cabinet so that all aspects of

:45:43.:45:48.

the National security are joined up. They also tap into the experience

:45:49.:45:52.

and knowledge of experts and with government. This helps us

:45:53.:45:58.

confidently challenge problems. It is inconceivable today that we could

:45:59.:46:05.

take a premeditated decision to boot, trips in any free without a

:46:06.:46:17.

National Security Council agreement. I would argue that the culture

:46:18.:46:24.

established by the Prime Minister matters. It is crucial that the

:46:25.:46:29.

decision-making meat establishes a climate so that ministers can

:46:30.:46:34.

challenge existing policy and question the Cabinet and the Prime

:46:35.:46:42.

Minister without fear or favour. Everyone at that table is genuinely

:46:43.:46:45.

free to speak their mind. If we are to take difficult decisions,

:46:46.:46:50.

planning for what follows is fatal. We know the task of rebuilding

:46:51.:46:59.

effectively is so important. That is why we created the stabilisation

:47:00.:47:05.

fund so that experts are able to deploy at short notice any freer in

:47:06.:47:09.

the world. None of this would be possible without those decisions

:47:10.:47:17.

were points of our gross national product not spent on overseas aid.

:47:18.:47:24.

We also want to plan for the aftermath of conflicts, but just as

:47:25.:47:28.

importantly, prevent these conflicts taking place in the first place. We

:47:29.:47:34.

know conduct a regular strategic security review so that the

:47:35.:47:41.

consistent with our review strategy. We plan to invest at least ?117

:47:42.:47:47.

billion in new equipment over the next decade. We have also enshrine

:47:48.:47:56.

the Armed Forces covenant in the law so that Armed Forces receive the

:47:57.:48:02.

respect they deserve. Sending troops onto the battlefield without the

:48:03.:48:05.

proper equipment was unacceptable and that should never happen again.

:48:06.:48:09.

There will be further lessons to be learnt. That is what we will do. Mr

:48:10.:48:16.

Speaker, on reflecting on this, there are also some lessons that

:48:17.:48:22.

they do not think we should draw. It would be wrong to conclude that we

:48:23.:48:27.

should not stand with our American allies when our common interests are

:48:28.:48:31.

threatened. We should never be afraid to speak frankly and

:48:32.:48:36.

honestly. When we commit our troops together, there needs to be a

:48:37.:48:40.

structure so that our opinions can be properly conveyed. But Britain

:48:41.:48:45.

and America share the same fundamental allies and our

:48:46.:48:53.

partnership remains as it has been in the last decade as it has ever

:48:54.:48:57.

been. It would be wrong to conclude that we cannot rely on the judgments

:48:58.:49:03.

of brilliant and hard-working intelligence agencies. Since

:49:04.:49:09.

November 2014, they have enabled us to foil seven terrorist attacks on

:49:10.:49:16.

the streets of Great Britain. The needs to be proper separation

:49:17.:49:20.

between the process of assessing intelligence and the policy-making

:49:21.:49:26.

that comes from that. That is what we know have in place. It would be

:49:27.:49:32.

wrong to conclude that our military are not capable of intervening

:49:33.:49:35.

successfully around the world. Many of the feelings were not related to

:49:36.:49:43.

the fielders of the soldiers going into Iraq, but the feelings of

:49:44.:49:48.

post-war planning after those initial shot had been fired.

:49:49.:49:55.

Finally, we should not conclude that intervention is always wrong. There

:49:56.:49:58.

are unquestionably times when it is right to intervene as this country

:49:59.:50:09.

did successfully and Kosovo. There are times that we should maybe have

:50:10.:50:13.

intervened and did not. The likes of the genus Aidan the Balkans. Often

:50:14.:50:26.

it is the state building after watch which is the biggest challenge, as

:50:27.:50:32.

opposed to the initial conflict itself. Just because intervention is

:50:33.:50:36.

difficult, it does not mean there are not things when it is not rate

:50:37.:50:40.

and necessary. We will need to learn the lessons of this report and with

:50:41.:50:47.

our interventions in the Middle East at the moment, we will not treat all

:50:48.:50:56.

without always thinking of trying to protect the people. Before

:50:57.:51:03.

addressing the issues raised in the report I would like to remember and

:51:04.:51:09.

honour the 179 British service men and women killed and the thousands

:51:10.:51:14.

maimed and injured during the Iraq war and their families as well as

:51:15.:51:18.

the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who have died. Yesterday,

:51:19.:51:27.

I had the private meeting with some of the families. I have done over

:51:28.:51:34.

the past 12 years. It is always a humbling experience to witness the

:51:35.:51:38.

resolve and resilience of these families and their unwavering

:51:39.:51:40.

commitment to seek truth and justice. They have waited seven

:51:41.:51:52.

years for this report. It was right that the enquiry took evidence from

:51:53.:52:00.

such a wide range of origins and that the conduct of the war and its

:52:01.:52:04.

aftermath should have been examined in full detail. But the

:52:05.:52:09.

extraordinary length of time this has taken as a matter of regret. I

:52:10.:52:23.

was only given access this morning meaning today's response can only be

:52:24.:52:27.

a provisional one. To invade and occupy Iraq in 2003 was the biggest

:52:28.:52:36.

foreign policy decision taken by a British government in modern times.

:52:37.:52:41.

It divided the size and said the government of the day against the

:52:42.:52:45.

majority of the British people as well as the weight of global

:52:46.:52:52.

opinion. The war was not in anyway last resort. It was a military

:52:53.:52:59.

intervention launched on a false pretext. It has long been regarded

:53:00.:53:05.

as illegal by the overwhelming weight of international opinion. It

:53:06.:53:09.

led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and the

:53:10.:53:13.

displacement of millions of refugees. It devastated the

:53:14.:53:19.

infrastructure in Iraq and its society. It forced deal with all

:53:20.:53:26.

sectarianism that turned into a civil war. Instead of protecting

:53:27.:53:30.

security at home and abroad, it fuelled terrorism across the region.

:53:31.:53:38.

To the sandy suicide bombing attack in Baghdad which killed over 250

:53:39.:53:45.

people, it was carried out by the people whose origins lie in the

:53:46.:53:49.

aftermath of the invasion. By any measure, the occupation of Iraq has

:53:50.:54:01.

been catastrophic. The decision to invade Iraq on flawed intelligence

:54:02.:54:09.

has had a devastating impact. It has led to a fundamental breakdown in

:54:10.:54:15.

the trust of politics and the institutions of government. The

:54:16.:54:19.

tragedy is that probably government got horrifically wrong, many people

:54:20.:54:30.

actually got it right. In February 2003, when 1.5 million people and

:54:31.:54:38.

millions of others across the world marched against the impending

:54:39.:54:43.

conflict. It was the biggest demonstration in British study. It

:54:44.:54:51.

was not that those of us who opposed the war and the brutality or the

:54:52.:54:58.

claims of Saddam Hussein and his dictatorship. Indeed, many of

:54:59.:55:04.

campaigned against the Iraqi regime during its most bloody period when

:55:05.:55:08.

the British government and the United States administration

:55:09.:55:18.

actually supported that resume. -- regime. The weapons of mass

:55:19.:55:27.

destruction evidence was flimsy at best. We went to war without United

:55:28.:55:33.

Nations authorisation and that was profoundly dangerous. We knew it

:55:34.:55:40.

would be resisted by force and set off a series of uncontrollable and

:55:41.:55:44.

destructive events. Only this house had been able to listen to the

:55:45.:55:48.

wisdom of many of our members of Parliament when he voted against

:55:49.:55:54.

waiting for United Nations authorisation. The course of events

:55:55.:56:00.

may have been different. All but 16 members of the official opposition

:56:01.:56:04.

supported the conflict while many in my party voted against that as did

:56:05.:56:09.

others in other opposition parties. The members here today on all

:56:10.:56:15.

benchers who voted against the conflict but none others should take

:56:16.:56:26.

any satisfaction in this report. All offers. We cannot have a running

:56:27.:56:31.

commentary on statements made from the front bench. Members of this

:56:32.:56:36.

house know me well enough that I want all opinions to be expressed.

:56:37.:56:42.

The Prime Minister gets a lot of time he is accustomed to that. The

:56:43.:56:48.

Right Honourable gentleman is quite entitled to be here. If you want to

:56:49.:56:53.

talk away, please leave the chamber. We have to be saddened and no

:56:54.:57:01.

reflect on that. In addition to the British servicemen and civilians

:57:02.:57:13.

killed, those who voted against the war have not lived long enough to be

:57:14.:57:19.

vindicated. First, let us remember Robin Cook. He stood up 13 years ago

:57:20.:57:29.

and said in a few hundred words, he foresaw the tragedy to come. The

:57:30.:57:35.

report has rightfully dug deep into the litany of feel your of the

:57:36.:57:41.

occupation, the calamitous decision to stand down the Iraqi army and to

:57:42.:57:49.

dissolve the entire Iraqi state. The reality is that it was the original

:57:50.:57:54.

decision to follow the United States president into this war in the most

:57:55.:58:01.

volatile region in the world. This is what led to every other disaster.

:58:02.:58:12.

This government dossier that Iraq possessed weapons of mass

:58:13.:58:14.

destruction which could be deployed in 45 minutes is one of the most

:58:15.:58:22.

notable of the deceptions. As we helped in the enquiry, we knew that

:58:23.:58:29.

the claim of the dossier was to make the case for war rather than set out

:58:30.:58:34.

the case for requiring more intelligence. It not only sparked

:58:35.:58:43.

off the disaster in Iraq, but also in the surrounding region. We have

:58:44.:58:50.

seen a rise in the region of warring militias and terrorist groups. The

:58:51.:59:02.

former head of MI5 me clear to the enquiry, there are many other

:59:03.:59:08.

lessons which need to be learned by our government, our Parliament, as

:59:09.:59:14.

well as my party in every other party. We need to be more open and

:59:15.:59:19.

independent relationship with the united nations -- states. We need to

:59:20.:59:26.

uphold international law and the authority of the United Nations. It

:59:27.:59:32.

always seeks peaceful solutions to international problems. We also need

:59:33.:59:38.

a much stronger oversight of security and intelligence services.

:59:39.:59:45.

We need Parliament APSAC over future decisions to go to war based on

:59:46.:59:51.

information, not just that given at the government 's discretion. In the

:59:52.:00:00.

wake of Iraq, our own and other Western governments increasingly

:00:01.:00:11.

resort to hybrid forces, we need to ensure that the use of the likes of

:00:12.:00:15.

drones is subject to proper Parliamentary scrutiny. There are no

:00:16.:00:22.

more important decisions that a member of Parliament would get asked

:00:23.:00:23.

to make. The very least the country should

:00:24.:00:34.

expect that a vigorous and objective evidence on which to base decisions.

:00:35.:00:40.

We know the house was misled in the run-up to war and the house must now

:00:41.:00:44.

decide how it shall deal with it. Just as all those who took the

:00:45.:00:49.

decision is laid bare in a Chilcot Report must face up to the

:00:50.:00:53.

consequences of their actions. Later today I will meet a group of

:00:54.:00:57.

families of military service men and women who lost loved ones, Iraqi

:00:58.:01:03.

veterans and Iraqi citizens who lost loved ones during the war. I will be

:01:04.:01:12.

discussing with them the decisions taken by the Government that led the

:01:13.:01:17.

country to war with the terrible consequences. Quite bluntly, there

:01:18.:01:21.

are huge lessons for every single one of us. We make decisions that

:01:22.:01:27.

have consequences that don't just go on for the immediate years, they go

:01:28.:01:31.

on for decades and decades afterwards. We need to reflect

:01:32.:01:36.

seriously before we take any decisions again to take military

:01:37.:01:41.

action without realising the consequences of those will live with

:01:42.:01:45.

all of us for many decades to come and have often incalculable

:01:46.:01:51.

consequences. Let me briefly respond. I want to

:01:52.:01:54.

leave as much time for colleagues to make the points. He is right to

:01:55.:01:59.

praise the families for the dignity. I understand the regret of the time

:02:00.:02:03.

taken and we all feel that. The point I would be is when you have an

:02:04.:02:08.

independent report you must allow it to be independent and let the German

:02:09.:02:12.

make their own decisions so while it has been frustrating the frustration

:02:13.:02:18.

is better than intervention. -- let the chair man make their own

:02:19.:02:22.

decisions. In terms of the timer read to make the report that I can

:02:23.:02:27.

really the bought and did not want politicians to be given more time

:02:28.:02:31.

than the families themselves which is why the ATM deadline was set. He

:02:32.:02:38.

is right to say -- 8am deadline. He is like to see the report finds that

:02:39.:02:44.

the intervention MySpace or Al-Qaeda. But violent Islamist

:02:45.:02:54.

extremism -- intervention left space for. It is important for us to

:02:55.:03:01.

remember that. In terms of the litany of failures I urge him, I

:03:02.:03:06.

have been able to read the executive summary and some other bits and I'm

:03:07.:03:10.

sure colleagues well and there are litany of failures such as the

:03:11.:03:15.

disbanding of the Army, the failure to plan for the aftermath. I think

:03:16.:03:21.

they are powerful point made by Sir John Chilcot. In terms of lessons to

:03:22.:03:26.

learn, I thought many of his points we have already put in place. Proper

:03:27.:03:32.

Cabinet discussion, parliamentary votes, oversight of the intelligence

:03:33.:03:36.

agency. I would urge him, before calling up with even more ways to

:03:37.:03:40.

oversee our intelligence agencies, I urged colleagues from around the

:03:41.:03:47.

house to look at the way the intelligence and security --

:03:48.:03:50.

intelligence and security committee now works. We do need to read, I

:03:51.:03:54.

think, our intelligence services was a clear set of instructions rather

:03:55.:04:00.

than change them every five minutes. The War Powers act, I think this is

:04:01.:04:05.

something discussed in the two day debate. I have looked at it

:04:06.:04:08.

carefully and have concluded that is not the right thing to do and I

:04:09.:04:13.

believe we would get into a legal mess. Clearly, the house should be

:04:14.:04:19.

beat it. On the issue of the US, he calls for an open partnership --

:04:20.:04:26.

should debate it. I do not believe the USA is always right but our

:04:27.:04:31.

partnership with them is vital to national security and I feel his

:04:32.:04:35.

approach is the USA is always wrong and while they are not always right

:04:36.:04:38.

they are our best partner and we should work with them. I don't think

:04:39.:04:47.

any of us will have time for 3.8 million words but it is very

:04:48.:04:52.

carefully judged and thought through and you should read it in

:04:53.:04:55.

conjunction with this statement Sir John get a date which is a birdie at

:04:56.:05:02.

the of this 200 page summary. -- which is an articulate. We all need

:05:03.:05:09.

time to study the many damning conclusions in this report and what

:05:10.:05:13.

how this catastrophic decision was reached. But the Prime Minister

:05:14.:05:17.

doesn't say we should read it and the light of future lessons for the

:05:18.:05:21.

machinery of Government. -- the Prime Minister doesn't say. What I

:05:22.:05:31.

know my next -- does say. What I know the introduction of the

:05:32.:05:33.

security Council was a good innovation and his successor should

:05:34.:05:36.

be recommended whether or not we should return to the pre-Blair time

:05:37.:05:43.

of fool collective Cabinet responsibility. With proper time for

:05:44.:05:48.

meetings proper information and studied conclusions and whether we

:05:49.:05:53.

should not also look at whether parliamentary accountability of

:05:54.:05:56.

these things should be reconsidered so there are full and properly

:05:57.:06:02.

informed debate is here held in good time for, in this case, the military

:06:03.:06:08.

are deployed and everything is set and the position is irreversible. We

:06:09.:06:15.

need to go back to a much more collective and accountable form of

:06:16.:06:20.

Government. Might right honourable friend make

:06:21.:06:23.

some good points. In terms of Cabinet responsibility you need to

:06:24.:06:26.

have a Cabinet meeting and discussion but I would not try and

:06:27.:06:34.

substitute that for what the work the security Council does. Having

:06:35.:06:38.

sitting around you the head of MI5, MI6, chief of the defence staff,

:06:39.:06:42.

they are sitting there as equal members, able to tell you what they

:06:43.:06:47.

think. That debate is more valuable than simply listening to other

:06:48.:06:52.

secretaries of state, although they are also there as well. I still

:06:53.:06:56.

think that is the best place to do that. In terms of the parliamentary

:06:57.:07:01.

debate, we should happen and it is good to have a reasonable time. One

:07:02.:07:06.

of the issue with Iraq was it was so close to the point of decision many

:07:07.:07:10.

colleagues felt to vote in a different weight was somehow to let

:07:11.:07:14.

down our troops on the eve of the going vitally important decision. --

:07:15.:07:21.

a vitally important decision. You can I thank the Prime Minister for a

:07:22.:07:26.

fast sight of his statements and a a few short hours this morning to look

:07:27.:07:29.

at the millions of words in the report. Today we remember the

:07:30.:07:34.

hundreds of thousands of people who died in Iraq, Iraqi civilians, and

:07:35.:07:39.

of course the 179 UK service personnel who lost their lives. It

:07:40.:07:45.

is a sombre day for their families and our hearts go out to them. The

:07:46.:07:50.

report we are considering now will be pored over in the days and weeks

:07:51.:07:55.

and months ahead is and it should be the first step in learning the

:07:56.:07:59.

lessons from the UKbut most shameful foreign policy action in decades. In

:08:00.:08:08.

paragraph 416 of the executive summary the Chilcot Report confirms

:08:09.:08:14.

on the 28th of July 2002 Tony Blair wrote to President Bush saying, I

:08:15.:08:22.

will be with you whatever. Frankly, it is remarkable that the primer

:08:23.:08:30.

Minister did not think that was even noteworthy to mention in his

:08:31.:08:35.

statement to the house. My first question to the primer Minister is

:08:36.:08:42.

why? Given much of the debates rests about the rationale of the Prime

:08:43.:08:46.

Minister of the time signing up to whatever course of action in the

:08:47.:08:50.

United States was prepared to pursue. On intelligence, the report

:08:51.:08:57.

concludes, paragraph 807, the assessed intelligence had not

:08:58.:09:02.

established beyond doubt either Saddam Hussein had continued to

:09:03.:09:07.

produce chemical and biological weapons or efforts to develop

:09:08.:09:10.

nuclear weapons continued. I completely understand why the

:09:11.:09:15.

families of dead and injured UK service personnel and hundreds of

:09:16.:09:21.

thousands of Iraqis will feel they were deceived about the reasons for

:09:22.:09:28.

going to war. I completely understand why they also feel let

:09:29.:09:31.

down when it came to the post-conflict situation and the

:09:32.:09:37.

Chilcot Report catalogues in graphic detail the fielders in planning for

:09:38.:09:44.

post-conflict Iraq. In paragraph 630 of the executive summary, when Mr

:09:45.:09:48.

Blair set out the UK's vision for the future of Iraq and the House of

:09:49.:09:53.

Commons on the 18th of March 2003, nor assessment had been made of

:09:54.:09:57.

whether that vision was achievable, no agreement had been reached with

:09:58.:10:00.

the United States only workable post-conflict plan, you are in

:10:01.:10:06.

opposition had not been secured and there had been no decision on the UN

:10:07.:10:15.

role in post-conflict Iraq. Paragraph 814 says Mr Blair, who

:10:16.:10:19.

recognise the significance of the post-conflict phase, did not press

:10:20.:10:23.

President Bush for definite assurances about US plans and he did

:10:24.:10:28.

not consider or seek advice on whether the absence of a

:10:29.:10:31.

satisfactory plan called for reassessment of the terms of the

:10:32.:10:35.

UK's engagement and did not make agreement on such a plan at

:10:36.:10:40.

condition of UK participation in militant action. In fact, the

:10:41.:10:46.

Chilcot Report concludes, I quote from paragraph 857, the UK did not

:10:47.:10:55.

achieve its objectives. The lack of planning has also been evident since

:10:56.:11:00.

in relation to Afghanistan, to Libya, Syria and most recently with

:11:01.:11:08.

absolutely no plan whatsoever in regards to Brexit. The web at UK

:11:09.:11:15.

governments of either Tory or Labour issue actually start learning from

:11:16.:11:19.

the mistakes of the past so we are not condemned to repeat them? I hope

:11:20.:11:24.

and I expect in the months ahead there will be the opportunity to

:11:25.:11:29.

hold to account those who are associated and responsible for

:11:30.:11:35.

taking the UK to war in Iraq. There is -- that has only caused hundreds

:11:36.:11:40.

of thousands of deaths. Not just that, it has undermined people's

:11:41.:11:42.

faith in Parliament and Government in the UK and left an indelible

:11:43.:11:47.

stain on Britain's standing in the world.

:11:48.:11:51.

But the fact the right honourable gentlemen for his remarks. He

:11:52.:11:54.

rightly says it is a sombre P and Q is correct to do that. He

:11:55.:12:00.

highlighted -- a sombre day and he is correct. He highlighted that...

:12:01.:12:07.

He asked me specifically about why I did not mention the specific Tony

:12:08.:12:14.

Blair notes to President Bush. I was trying to be careful in my statement

:12:15.:12:19.

to accurately summarise what Sir John Chilcot has said and I did have

:12:20.:12:23.

a whole section in my statement saying about the processes and

:12:24.:12:28.

Senator John Fiennes, crucial point where made personal commitments to

:12:29.:12:35.

Mr Bush that had not been discussed with Cabinet colleagues. It is worth

:12:36.:12:39.

reading Sir John Chilcot's statement this morning about that. He focuses

:12:40.:12:45.

on paragraph 630 which says Mr Blair said that the UK's vision for the

:12:46.:12:49.

future of the back though assessment had made if that was achievable and

:12:50.:12:56.

no plan that I post-conflict plan with the USA. That is what of the

:12:57.:13:00.

most powerful passages in the report and he's right to draw attention to

:13:01.:13:08.

it. I do not accept that all the same failures are apparent in some

:13:09.:13:12.

weight when it comes to planning in Afghanistan. I do not accept that.

:13:13.:13:16.

Afghanistan there was a very clear connection between a Caliban regime

:13:17.:13:23.

that was playing host to Al-Qaeda that a Caliban. And the goal of

:13:24.:13:27.

Government policy which I supported which was to make sure that conflict

:13:28.:13:33.

could not become a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and there was some

:13:34.:13:37.

considerable success in pursuing that. There was a huge amount of

:13:38.:13:41.

planning into the post-conflict situation in Afghanistan and we are

:13:42.:13:46.

still engaged in that. There is a plan, it UK an officer training

:13:47.:13:50.

academy to strengthen the army. As I said earlier, you can all be planned

:13:51.:13:54.

in the world but these are very difficult things to get right. These

:13:55.:13:58.

saying there is no point in ever taking part in these interventions

:13:59.:14:02.

are trying to help these countries that is a different position and he

:14:03.:14:06.

should be honest and say that. But I would argue that with Afghanistan,

:14:07.:14:12.

Libya and Brexit we have set out what the alternatives are, that does

:14:13.:14:18.

not mean they are easy. The Foreign Affairs Committee stage

:14:19.:14:24.

an enquiry into the conduct and Libya to take into the -- into

:14:25.:14:29.

account the conclusions into the Iraq enquiry. Given the central

:14:30.:14:33.

conclusions could be said to apply to some degree on the other to

:14:34.:14:41.

Libya, not least the central stabilisation planning been

:14:42.:14:44.

described by a colleague as danceable rot and as under desktop

:14:45.:14:57.

exercise -- rot. So the reaching of the analysis of machinery of

:14:58.:15:00.

Government changes he outlined earlier to the member for Angus can

:15:01.:15:10.

be properly assessed. I think the Foreign Secretary will

:15:11.:15:14.

be giving evidence. The Prime Minister is always asked to give

:15:15.:15:18.

evidence to every select committee and I try to stick to answering

:15:19.:15:22.

questions here and the Liaison Committee and also the national

:15:23.:15:25.

security committee because that brings together a number of

:15:26.:15:29.

committees so I do not think it will be possible but I always consider

:15:30.:15:32.

any requests. Can I first wholeheartedly endorse

:15:33.:15:35.

the game at the Prime Minister needs about those who lost their lives --

:15:36.:15:42.

wholeheartedly endorse. But I wholeheartedly endorse the remark.

:15:43.:15:47.

Does he agree each of us in Cabinet or in this house who are responsible

:15:48.:15:52.

and who should take responsibility for our individual decisions,

:15:53.:15:56.

albeit, taken in good faith on the basis of evidence before us.

:15:57.:16:01.

Equally, does he agree the men of hatred and death in Al-Qaeda and

:16:02.:16:08.

Isil should take responsibility for their actions and the hall art they

:16:09.:16:12.

inflict on others? The honourable lady is right. I

:16:13.:16:19.

speak as someone who was a relatively new backbencher listening

:16:20.:16:22.

to the arguments and I think everyone who voted for the conflict

:16:23.:16:26.

has to take their share of responsibility. I do not choose to

:16:27.:16:32.

go back and see if I knew now what I know now that I knew then what are

:16:33.:16:36.

you now and all the rest of it. I believe you must take responsibility

:16:37.:16:42.

and liberty consequences. She makes a good point about the evil of his

:16:43.:16:48.

violent extremists that I live with the consequences. This problem and

:16:49.:16:53.

are worlds -- love with the consequences. The problem existed

:16:54.:16:58.

before the Iraq and we are doing all sorts of things to combat it. While

:16:59.:17:03.

the debate about Iraq is vital we must not let it sapped our energy

:17:04.:17:08.

for dealing with this cancer in our world which is killing us and our

:17:09.:17:13.

own country. The Prime Minister referred to the

:17:14.:17:20.

aim of this war as weapons of mass destruction but if I can for his

:17:21.:17:23.

attention back to the document from Tony Blair to the American

:17:24.:17:33.

president, it goes on later to say, the reason for this is getting a bit

:17:34.:17:38.

of Saddam Hussein is the right thing to do. Regime change, not WMD. This

:17:39.:17:46.

fact and the fact that, as Sir John Chilcot said, player's, Smith made

:17:47.:17:51.

it difficult for the UK to withdraw support later on. -- player's

:17:52.:17:59.

commitment. This leads to a deceit of the House of Commons. Sir John

:18:00.:18:05.

has been careful about avoiding accusing the previous Prime Minister

:18:06.:18:09.

of lying to the house but this evidence suggests he did. What

:18:10.:18:15.

action can he take about that? He makes an important point. I have had

:18:16.:18:19.

longer than anyone else to do this report but it is trying to get to

:18:20.:18:24.

the bottom of this particular issue is difficult. What Sir John Chilcot

:18:25.:18:28.

seems to say if British Government had a policy of coercive diplomacy

:18:29.:18:33.

and wanting to use the threat of military action to get Saddam to

:18:34.:18:37.

comprehensively asylum. Everyone will have to read the report and

:18:38.:18:42.

come to their own conclusions. -- comprehensively disarm. From my

:18:43.:18:48.

reading, Sir John Chilcot is not accusing anyone of deliberate

:18:49.:18:54.

deceit. But everyone got the wrong conclusions. Today today we stand

:18:55.:18:59.

alongside -- their own conclusions. We stand alongside the British

:19:00.:19:09.

servicemen and women died and many more who suffered injuries serving

:19:10.:19:14.

their country. We are proud of them and honour them. The Chilcot Report

:19:15.:19:18.

makes clear the absolute determination of the former Prime

:19:19.:19:22.

Minister to pursue war in Iraq no matter the evidence. There is a

:19:23.:19:26.

stark contrast between that single-minded determination to go to

:19:27.:19:31.

war and the reckless and complete absence of any plan for what would

:19:32.:19:37.

come next. What came next is 179 but the service men and women killed.

:19:38.:19:42.

What came next is 100,000 or more Iraqi civilians killed. And what

:19:43.:19:50.

came next is the fuelling of what is now Isis which threatens the safety

:19:51.:19:55.

of all of us. The much missed Charles Kennedy said in this house

:19:56.:20:00.

in 2003, the big fear many of us have is this will simply agree to

:20:01.:20:03.

further generations of suicide bombers. When the Prime Minister now

:20:04.:20:07.

take the opportunity because of party and is house to acknowledge

:20:08.:20:12.

Charles Kennedy was right all along in ridding the opposition across

:20:13.:20:15.

this country against the culpable dog of war and should not those who

:20:16.:20:25.

accuse Charles Kennedy of appeasement apologised to his

:20:26.:20:27.

family, our servicemen and women and the people of Iraq.

:20:28.:20:33.

My recollection of the debates as there were honest disagreements

:20:34.:20:36.

between colleagues and making the decisions. I do not think anyone

:20:37.:20:40.

should be accused of appeasement for voting against the war, not sure

:20:41.:20:46.

people who voted in favour of it, in good faith, and evidence they had,

:20:47.:20:50.

be subject to unfair criticism either. People who voted for the

:20:51.:20:59.

four, like me, must it was sure of responsibility but it is not right

:21:00.:21:05.

to accuse people of appeasement. I was Shadow International

:21:06.:21:08.

Development Secretary and asked 91 written questions of the Government

:21:09.:21:11.

culminating in an opposition they debate on the 30th of January 2003

:21:12.:21:16.

because I had not received any satisfactory answers. With the Prime

:21:17.:21:23.

Minister, for the sake of the many, many victims are the house we have

:21:24.:21:28.

truly learnt a lesson on a failure to plan for contingency.

:21:29.:21:33.

I remember how affected might honourable friend was an holding

:21:34.:21:37.

those debates, many debates. People say we did not be great post-war

:21:38.:21:41.

reconstruction but we did a debate it endlessly. -- people say we did

:21:42.:21:52.

not debate. There was an assumption the UN with moving compounds of late

:21:53.:21:56.

when it did not or the US had a plan when it didn't order the assumption

:21:57.:21:59.

British troops would be out in a three or four months. It is one of

:22:00.:22:07.

the cleanest areas of criticism and should be accepted most clearly and

:22:08.:22:11.

won for any future conflict we must plan for most carefully.

:22:12.:22:18.

I thank the Prime Minister for summing up the main findings

:22:19.:22:23.

although, unlike him, I have not had the opportunity to read the summary.

:22:24.:22:30.

Would he agree that in 2003 when I voted for before and he voted for

:22:31.:22:34.

the war and many of our colleagues voted for the war, we did it on the

:22:35.:22:41.

basis of the we had. Iraq was in breach of 17 UN resolutions in 2003.

:22:42.:22:52.

Saddam Hussein in 1988, already had killed 500,000 of his own people. He

:22:53.:22:58.

went on to kill more and more, this year and the South, the currents in

:22:59.:23:12.

the north -- Shai in the south. If you stood by the mass grave were

:23:13.:23:18.

many thousands of Iraqi bodies lie undiscovered, those of us who

:23:19.:23:22.

campaign for human rights over many years in Iraq and myself for over 30

:23:23.:23:27.

years, were well aware of the torture and horrors happening in

:23:28.:23:32.

that country and I wish people would ask Iraqis what they think of the

:23:33.:23:38.

invasion. Because many Iraqis are grateful, Mr Speaker, we took the

:23:39.:23:44.

action we did at that time. I hope we have greater opportunity to

:23:45.:23:48.

discuss these matters because that was sought planning, not enough, I

:23:49.:23:55.

agree, but there was some. -- some planning. The horrors of Saddam

:23:56.:24:00.

Hussein and what he did to his own people were clearly documented and I

:24:01.:24:07.

think we will -- we were right to take part in that invasion.

:24:08.:24:11.

I well remember the speeches of the right honourable lady. She made very

:24:12.:24:16.

powerful speeches about the appalling things Saddam Hussein did

:24:17.:24:22.

to his own people. That is a fair point. I also think, when the case

:24:23.:24:26.

was made and people were acting on the knowledge in front of them and

:24:27.:24:30.

it was not just on weapons of mass destruction but a sense we were

:24:31.:24:33.

trying to uphold the position of the United Nations and the massive

:24:34.:24:37.

danger he posters on people. But we must be frank, the consequences of

:24:38.:24:45.

what follows have been truly very poor and that is what Sir John

:24:46.:24:50.

finds. And in this section when he talks about the objectives of the

:24:51.:24:53.

Government not being met and that far from dealing with the problem of

:24:54.:24:58.

potential the linking up with terrorists which Tony Blair talked

:24:59.:25:03.

about at this dispatch box, this dead end up creating a space for

:25:04.:25:06.

Al-Qaeda. We must learn all of the lessons. -- this dead end up

:25:07.:25:12.

creating. Would my right honourable friend

:25:13.:25:16.

agree there are lessons for every member of this house and every

:25:17.:25:20.

member of the media as to how we assess evidence. We can no longer

:25:21.:25:24.

take refuge in the pretence we did not know the evidence about the

:25:25.:25:31.

nonexistence weapons of mass destruction the report says the

:25:32.:25:34.

incest intelligence did not established beyond doubt Saddam

:25:35.:25:38.

Hussein continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or

:25:39.:25:41.

efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. But evidence was set out

:25:42.:25:46.

in the dossier and as I showed in evidence to the Chilcot Report, if

:25:47.:25:50.

you read the dossier line by line you could not fail to reach the same

:25:51.:25:54.

conclusion as Robin Cook, that they were no weapons of mass destruction.

:25:55.:25:59.

The fact we did not or are very largely did not reach that

:26:00.:26:03.

conclusion is because we ceased to look at evidence and rely on

:26:04.:26:11.

briefings from spin doctors and front benches. If this house is to

:26:12.:26:14.

get a grip of issues in the future it must go back to looking at the

:26:15.:26:18.

evidence itself and so do journalists.

:26:19.:26:20.

What I would say to my right honourable friend is a lot of things

:26:21.:26:25.

have changed since that evidence was produced in the way it was an one of

:26:26.:26:29.

the most important things is the renewed independence of the joint

:26:30.:26:36.

intelligence committee. Ministers do still see individual pieces of

:26:37.:26:41.

intelligence and one wants to have a regular updates, but the process of

:26:42.:26:46.

producing reports and assessments is incredibly rigorous so I do not

:26:47.:26:50.

think that what happens could happen again in the same way because the

:26:51.:26:55.

report you would get from the joint intelligence committee, I think, are

:26:56.:27:01.

now much clearer about what they do know and what they think and what

:27:02.:27:04.

they conjecture, rather than anything else. That does not solve

:27:05.:27:10.

the problem for the house because it is impossible to share all of that

:27:11.:27:15.

information widely with every Member of Parliament.

:27:16.:27:20.

Can I join others in paying tribute to the ex-service personnel who died

:27:21.:27:24.

in Iraq and the hundreds of thousands of civilians. One of the

:27:25.:27:29.

greatest scandals out of this whole episode is the lack of resources for

:27:30.:27:33.

our troops sent into battle without the equipment is the needed and this

:27:34.:27:39.

was never -- must never be allowed to happen again. Can the Prime

:27:40.:27:44.

Minister set out why he believes the National security machinery he has

:27:45.:27:47.

established would have forced all the evidence mistakes made in

:27:48.:27:52.

Whitehall -- forestalled the mistakes in the run-up to Iraq.

:27:53.:27:59.

On the issue of equipment, the money for our armed services is not

:28:00.:28:03.

infinite but what we have done is get rid of the black hole in the

:28:04.:28:08.

defence budgets and resources and commitment are more in balance and

:28:09.:28:11.

also by having a security and defence review every five years.

:28:12.:28:17.

Means you are matching what you spend to the things your forces and

:28:18.:28:22.

security actually require. That is a big improvement but it depends on

:28:23.:28:28.

having the resources. I try to explain by the National security

:28:29.:28:31.

Council architecture helps solve some of these problems but I am not

:28:32.:28:35.

saying you can completely reduce any risk of mistake or planning because

:28:36.:28:39.

these things are very complicated by their nature.

:28:40.:28:46.

Human institutions will never be perfect nor are the perfect role.

:28:47.:28:52.

But the conclusions of the Chilcot enquiry as to the way in which legal

:28:53.:28:57.

advice was processed, intelligence was processed and intelligence was

:28:58.:29:01.

used to inform policy are pretty damning. Mr Speaker, my right

:29:02.:29:08.

honourable friend has rightly highlighted that much has changed

:29:09.:29:13.

since then and certain I can vouch for the fact that the processes are

:29:14.:29:21.

rather different from those that Sir John identified. When it comes to

:29:22.:29:26.

the coalition of intelligence which is an extremely difficult skill, is

:29:27.:29:32.

my right honourable friend satisfied this is subject to enough scrutiny

:29:33.:29:39.

and review, subsequent, to ensure lessons can be learned when mistakes

:29:40.:29:43.

in intelligence assessment and made? Because this seems to me to be one

:29:44.:29:49.

of the key areas in which future decision-making is capable of

:29:50.:29:50.

continuing improvement. Firstly, there we legal advice is

:29:51.:30:04.

produced is very different to the then it was. We have the National

:30:05.:30:07.

Security Council. Before decisions are made, written legal advice has

:30:08.:30:24.

to be produced. With regard to the collation of evidence is difficult

:30:25.:30:36.

to answer. They are incredibly rigorous about reaching judgments

:30:37.:30:43.

and not pretending to know things it does not know. How do we test that?

:30:44.:30:58.

There is maybe a rule for the IOC end that. But with all the

:30:59.:31:03.

intelligence and briefings in the world, you have to make a decision.

:31:04.:31:09.

You clearly really have perfect information. You are weighing up a

:31:10.:31:19.

balance of risks. In the end, you have to do this defend yourself on

:31:20.:31:25.

the grounds of the decision you have made. The epitaph on Robin Cook 's

:31:26.:31:29.

headstone in Edinburgh reads as follows, I mean not have stopped the

:31:30.:31:41.

war, but I did manage to get the parliament to decide on it. Does the

:31:42.:31:55.

Prime Minister agree that the main element in the debate in which

:31:56.:32:03.

Parliament decided was not the 45 minute claim. It was the fact that

:32:04.:32:13.

Saddam Hussein and his murderous regime had spent 13 years running

:32:14.:32:21.

rings around the United Nations, ignoring 17 resolutions. Including

:32:22.:32:26.

those calling for all necessary means to stop him. Was that not the

:32:27.:32:33.

main issue? As the Prime Minister found any evidence whatsoever of any

:32:34.:32:42.

lies told to Parliament on that day? My name any of the debate is that it

:32:43.:32:48.

was about the balance of risk between action and inaction and a

:32:49.:32:52.

case made by the then Prime Minister was that there was a real risk of

:32:53.:32:59.

inaction. You had someone denying the United Nations who had done

:33:00.:33:03.

terrible things to his own people. That coming together with a

:33:04.:33:07.

potential programme for weapons of mass destruction and this is all

:33:08.:33:15.

taking place in a climate -- claim that of post 9/11. Weapons of mass

:33:16.:33:24.

destruction was part of the picture, but not the whole picture. With

:33:25.:33:30.

regard to deceit, I do not see in here he accusation of the audit the

:33:31.:33:37.

seat but there is information that was not properly presented,

:33:38.:33:40.

different justifications given before for the action that was taken

:33:41.:33:44.

and another of other criticisms of the processors. I do not think the

:33:45.:33:55.

Prime Minister who voted for this war should in any way feel ashamed

:33:56.:34:07.

of what the dead. The factors that we believe the Prime Minister at the

:34:08.:34:18.

time. Frankly, some others walked into the no lobby and it was a

:34:19.:34:22.

neural decision. But there is no point having recriminations know.

:34:23.:34:26.

Can we draw a lesson for the future, should we distinguish between

:34:27.:34:33.

authoritarian regimes that we must can tear declare and contain them

:34:34.:34:41.

and totalitarian and terrorist regimes which we must be prepared to

:34:42.:34:51.

destroy? On this argument, I think he is absolutely right. That is a

:34:52.:35:00.

difference between pre-emptive action when there is a direct

:35:01.:35:07.

threat. It is very important that we distinguish when we are thinking of

:35:08.:35:12.

the sort of interventions. There is also a third option. There is also

:35:13.:35:25.

the situation with regards to a resume running out of control, which

:35:26.:35:32.

is why I voted for us to take action in Libya. Many of us do not regret

:35:33.:35:40.

the fact that Saddam Hussein was no longer in power. As was powerfully

:35:41.:35:47.

set out a moment ago, does the Prime Minister recognise that one of the

:35:48.:35:53.

wider lessons is that we need a United Nations that is capable of

:35:54.:36:00.

giving effect to the responsibility to protect so that brutal dictators

:36:01.:36:03.

who modelled and terrorise their own people can and will be held to

:36:04.:36:11.

account? The rate honourable gentleman speaks with great clarity

:36:12.:36:16.

on these issues. We need the United Nations to be able to do that. That

:36:17.:36:22.

is why be sometimes end up in a situation with a right to take

:36:23.:36:27.

action because of easy tool in the United Nations Council are some

:36:28.:36:39.

things becomes morally right. We need to keep informing the United

:36:40.:36:41.

Nations so we bring these two things together. We all agree that war is a

:36:42.:36:47.

last resort once other options have been exhausted, the publication of

:36:48.:36:55.

the report, will the Prime Minister now do something which no government

:36:56.:37:00.

has done since 2003 finely and unequivocally admit that the

:37:01.:37:05.

intervention was wrong and the mistake. I think we need to beat the

:37:06.:37:12.

report and come to our own conclusions. The aftermath of the

:37:13.:37:17.

conflict was profoundly disastrous in so many ways. I do not move away

:37:18.:37:23.

from that. I take the view that if you fought it, you cannot turn the

:37:24.:37:28.

clock back and the best you can do is learn the lessons of what went

:37:29.:37:44.

wrong. At .20, in March 2003, diplomatic options had not been

:37:45.:37:50.

exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort. We are

:37:51.:38:07.

going to leave the House of Commons. They are responding to a statement

:38:08.:38:10.

from the Prime Minister on the Chilcot Report. It is a report

:38:11.:38:19.

backing codes there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein before

:38:20.:38:26.

the war. The decision to take military action was taken before all

:38:27.:38:36.

other options have been exhausted. The documents in the report were

:38:37.:38:42.

previously classified. One of the important memos is that Tony Blair

:38:43.:38:47.

rates to President Bush saying I will be with you whatever. He also

:38:48.:38:57.

says that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction capability. It goes on

:38:58.:39:10.

to say any link to 9/11 is tenuous. In another, he rates this is the

:39:11.:39:18.

moment when you can define international politics and the new

:39:19.:39:29.

post-cold war world order. A lot of criticism of Tony Blair and his

:39:30.:39:35.

government. Reading it very carefully this morning or at least

:39:36.:39:41.

part of it, many of the relatives of the 179 service personnel from the

:39:42.:39:45.

United Kingdom who died in Iraq. I am joined by a couple of the

:39:46.:39:47.

relatives. You famously stood relatives. You famously stood

:39:48.:39:58.

against Tony Blair in his constituency back in 2005. Are you

:39:59.:40:05.

pleased by the report. We have waited seven years for it? We have

:40:06.:40:11.

waited too long but it is well worth the wait. It is decisive. I was

:40:12.:40:21.

expecting a lightweight report. But Sir John Chilcot a sunny thoroughly

:40:22.:40:29.

good job. The first dozen pages says it all. There was put intelligent,

:40:30.:40:39.

cultivation between Tony Blair and President Bush, equipment problems.

:40:40.:40:46.

Nor planning in place for the post-war Iraq. He has done a

:40:47.:40:49.

thoroughly good job. I am pleasantly surprised. Roger, we are waiting for

:40:50.:41:00.

Tony Blair to give a statement. We have here at he will take

:41:01.:41:03.

responsibility for any mistakes without exception or excuse. We are

:41:04.:41:08.

expecting a press conference with them in a few minutes. But did you

:41:09.:41:18.

think of the report, will you impressed, as well? Yes, I did come

:41:19.:41:30.

in with reservations, as well. One would like to have been locked in a

:41:31.:41:35.

little room with it by oneself about whale. That was not possible

:41:36.:41:42.

obviously. But I think he has done a very thorough job. There are all

:41:43.:41:45.

sorts of criticisms about intelligence gathering, the decision

:41:46.:41:53.

to go to wear, the lack of planning in the aftermath. What struck you

:41:54.:41:59.

most? The one thing that stood out and he made a point of it in his

:42:00.:42:08.

speech, was over the snatch Land Rover. The failure to replace it. To

:42:09.:42:19.

explain to viewers, this was the tape of Land Rover that British

:42:20.:42:26.

troops used to patrol Basra. They did not have adequate protection.

:42:27.:42:36.

When a bomb goes off, it was like a knife through butter. You could not

:42:37.:42:50.

prevent a hit on a snatch Land Rover. The two of done something

:42:51.:42:57.

about it. As soon as they get out there and realise we are being

:42:58.:43:01.

attacked by these improvised explosive devices and people are

:43:02.:43:03.

being killed, something needs to be done about it. They did far too

:43:04.:43:12.

little and too late. That was the thing for me which really came out.

:43:13.:43:19.

That was the standout product. What happens though? In terms of the

:43:20.:43:23.

families, you have said that everyone really needs to digest the

:43:24.:43:29.

report. It will take your foil to do that. What do you do know as

:43:30.:43:35.

families going ahead? Do you want to pursue legal action against members

:43:36.:43:43.

of the Tony Blair government? We cannot ever be taken into war on

:43:44.:43:50.

this sort of situation. Needs to be accountability before these are

:43:51.:44:00.

taken. It was a shambolic episode. We know who all these people are and

:44:01.:44:04.

we want them to see some sort of accountability. We want action which

:44:05.:44:14.

is appropriate. It has been passed over to lawyers. Can I just draw

:44:15.:44:21.

your attention to one area where Sir John Chilcot alludes to the fact

:44:22.:44:29.

that we have concluded that the circumstances in which it was

:44:30.:44:35.

justified that there was a legal basis for action are far from

:44:36.:44:42.

satisfactory. That is the sort of thing we have to address. Thank you

:44:43.:44:49.

both very much for your time. We can talk to the former weapons inspector

:44:50.:44:55.

who was a key player at the time. This was at the time when they were

:44:56.:44:59.

trying to decide whether Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass

:45:00.:45:05.

destruction. He was the former chief weapons inspector for the United

:45:06.:45:09.

Nations. I do not know if you have managed to see some of the key

:45:10.:45:13.

findings in the report, but I wonder what your reaction is to it? It is

:45:14.:45:21.

very good at is finally been made public. It is being compiled by a

:45:22.:45:32.

very respected person. I have only had a chance to see the highlights.

:45:33.:45:38.

At the time, in the build-up to the war, I remember being in Iraq

:45:39.:45:44.

following some of your inspectors as they try to find these weapons of

:45:45.:45:48.

mass destruction but could not find any. At the time, did you think

:45:49.:45:57.

Saddam Hussein still had some? We carried out about 700 inspections at

:45:58.:46:01.

various sites in Iraq. We did not find any. We told Tony Blair and

:46:02.:46:09.

they security council that we had not found any. I had conversation on

:46:10.:46:24.

the telephone with Tony Blair and I talked about this intelligence they

:46:25.:46:33.

were referring to. I said we had found very little but he was

:46:34.:46:37.

convinced that the weapons existed, which turned out to be wrong. Do you

:46:38.:46:45.

have do you think Tony Blair and George Bush were intent on going to

:46:46.:46:59.

war, regardless of the evidence? I do not have any evidence that they

:47:00.:47:06.

were acting in bad faith. But it was remarkably bad political judgment.

:47:07.:47:11.

When you're weapons inspectors were looking for the weapons, they were

:47:12.:47:18.

following reports from British and American intelligence. We now know

:47:19.:47:29.

that these were flawed. Yes, they give as many dozens of different

:47:30.:47:36.

sites and we carried out the inspections at these places without

:47:37.:47:45.

finding anything. The inspectors on the ground did not find what these

:47:46.:47:53.

reports at Taunton. Was your advice to the British and American

:47:54.:47:57.

governments that the need to take more time and not invade when

:47:58.:48:03.

needed. Perhaps postpone it until the end of the year of the following

:48:04.:48:12.

year? Really guarded ourselves as international civil servants. We

:48:13.:48:18.

just carried out the inspections. It was for the Security Council and the

:48:19.:48:21.

governments to work out the future action. You cannot prove a negative.

:48:22.:48:32.

We could see was we have carried out all the inspections as

:48:33.:48:34.

professionally as possible and have not found anything. The majority of

:48:35.:48:48.

the sick Security Council did not want to accept a second resolution

:48:49.:48:57.

accepting the war. I think that was the major flaw with that. If the

:48:58.:49:03.

Security Council had authorised the war, everyone would've been very

:49:04.:49:10.

critical of the United Nations. Thank you very much for joining us.

:49:11.:49:18.

The former chief weapons inspector for the United Nations. We are

:49:19.:49:21.

expecting to hear from Tony Blair in the next few minutes. We can go over

:49:22.:49:26.

to the House of Commons to join Vicky Young. David Cameron has had

:49:27.:49:34.

more time than most read this huge report. He has been laying out the

:49:35.:49:39.

findings. He has been talking about the lessons which need to be a way.

:49:40.:49:45.

He says changes have already been made. The implementation of the

:49:46.:49:49.

National Security Council. The needs to be a climate where officials can

:49:50.:49:52.

challenge what politicians are saying. He says the legacy of the

:49:53.:50:03.

report should not be that people should feel unable to trust security

:50:04.:50:10.

or intelligence services. Having made the decision, do you feel

:50:11.:50:18.

deceived at all of what was put in front of you as evidence? No, I do

:50:19.:50:27.

not. It says very clearly was that what the Prime Minister said to the

:50:28.:50:30.

Cabinet was what he genuinely believed. That is what we believe

:50:31.:50:37.

that the team. David Davis came closest to seeing the Prime Minister

:50:38.:50:42.

lied and deceived the House of Commons. I was sorry to hear that.

:50:43.:50:50.

He was assuming that the Chilcot Report would back him up and it did

:50:51.:50:56.

not. It is about time he acknowledged it. Jeremy Corbyn of

:50:57.:51:06.

course, we know his strong views. But some MPs while he was speaking

:51:07.:51:11.

without telling him to sit down. They were calling him a disgrace. He

:51:12.:51:21.

repeated what his views and he is perfectly entitled to do that. What

:51:22.:51:27.

will be the legacy of the Iraq war and the report? Two things, that is

:51:28.:51:33.

no doubt he highlights the devastating effects which up arose

:51:34.:51:38.

after works. Also, he makes it plain that, actually, there was no attempt

:51:39.:51:48.

to deceive. There was no interference with intelligence. I

:51:49.:51:55.

hope that people will, to a degree, accept that. People have taken it

:51:56.:52:01.

for granted that there was a different outcome. He also said

:52:02.:52:07.

there was no collusion with President Bush. He does not find

:52:08.:52:13.

that to be the case. The way decisions were made? He is sceptical

:52:14.:52:22.

about that. My own view is that the Cabinet was kept much better

:52:23.:52:25.

informed than perhaps you get the flavour of the report. I have not

:52:26.:52:30.

had a chance to beat it quite in-depth. We had a number of the key

:52:31.:52:36.

conversations about that, but I accept there was not the degree of

:52:37.:52:44.

formality you might normally expect. The House of Commons will have the

:52:45.:52:51.

two-day debate on this next week. Thank you very much, that is Vicky

:52:52.:53:01.

Young, our political correspondent. We can go to our Sheffield studio.

:53:02.:53:07.

How much of the report have you been able to take on? I am extremely

:53:08.:53:17.

disappointed and demoralised from the bits I can pick up. In force

:53:18.:53:25.

since? Other relatives seem actually that Sir John Chilcot has done the

:53:26.:53:31.

family is proud. Many of them are very positive about it. I am not

:53:32.:53:43.

arguing that he has done a thorough job, but I am concerned that people

:53:44.:53:49.

who took inappropriate decisions at the time were not up to the job.

:53:50.:53:56.

People in government at the time and people in intelligence, taking the

:53:57.:54:05.

decision to go to war based on that. They did not even plan for the

:54:06.:54:12.

future beyond that. Pilot is good that is exposed, it is disappointing

:54:13.:54:19.

to me that none of the people involved appear to actually have

:54:20.:54:25.

been exposed. There are a lot of silly 12 take time to read the

:54:26.:54:34.

report and, but I'm not rule out taking action against Tony Blair in

:54:35.:54:41.

court. No one has actually stated that Tony Blair acted illegally. But

:54:42.:54:52.

I need time for this to sink in. As for going to court, I have no time

:54:53.:54:59.

or interest in that. Tell us about how your son died. Also, the huge

:55:00.:55:10.

grief you have heard since then. He was supporting a convoy and a sniper

:55:11.:55:19.

hit him under the arm. Because he was wearing armour, the shell and

:55:20.:55:28.

say post and did not leave much. Everything changes. To me

:55:29.:55:38.

personally, it getting intensified as the shortcomings with regard to

:55:39.:55:45.

the military action which has been highlighted in the report. Thank you

:55:46.:55:52.

very much for joining us. We can speak to the Cabinet member who was

:55:53.:56:04.

culture Minister back then. There are some very strong criticism of

:56:05.:56:09.

the Tony Blair government. With regard to the legality of the war

:56:10.:56:18.

and the aftermath, in relation really to the scale of the Tony

:56:19.:56:25.

Blair government. It seems to be a very presidential style of

:56:26.:56:27.

government. Is that how you remember that? I would say two things. It is

:56:28.:56:42.

a very long report. Before making a judgment, those of us who were part

:56:43.:56:47.

of it will need to read it thoroughly. I hope the publication

:56:48.:56:52.

brings some comfort to the families who lost their loved ones. Going

:56:53.:56:57.

back to your point about judgment, the important thing, although I have

:56:58.:57:09.

not read the report, I have seen the major points, there is no accusation

:57:10.:57:15.

of falsification of intelligence. There is a judgment that the war was

:57:16.:57:27.

legal and the Cabinet was not misled. There was feel your in the

:57:28.:57:38.

aftermath. The team who compiled the report have highlighted that. This

:57:39.:57:46.

has cast a long shadow over military policy. I am very glad this has been

:57:47.:57:53.

published. I hope it will set out a constructive framework in the future

:57:54.:58:00.

in areas of conflict where Britain may be involved. This is a

:58:01.:58:05.

devastating critique of the Tony Blair government. Let me read the

:58:06.:58:09.

report. I think it rests on judgments made. Not an illegal war,

:58:10.:58:20.

no deception of Cabinet and no question of there being a war plan

:58:21.:58:25.

with President Bush. Indeed, Tony Blair and the whole Cabinet saw the

:58:26.:58:35.

engagement of the United Nations and try to set up peace negotiations as

:58:36.:58:41.

part of it. Thank you for joining us. Tony Blair is going to be giving

:58:42.:58:48.

a news conference very shortly. We will bring you the live. In the

:58:49.:58:53.

meantime, letters take a look at the weather.

:58:54.:58:55.

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