Security Threats and the British Army Lecture - General Sir Nick Carter Briefings

Good evening everybody. It is good

to be with you and it is

particularly good to see so many

friendly faces in the audience. In

Parliament last week, the Defence

Secretary explained that the

analysis and threats of the 2015

strategic defence and security

review remain... What he did observe

is that these threats have a

diversified and become more serious.

And at a faster pace than we

expected. Hence of the Government

initiated the national security

capability review last July which,

for defence, remains ongoing.

Contrary to speculation, no

decisions had yet been made. I am

very grateful therefore to be given

the chance is evening to elaborate

on the threats and what I believe we

should be doing about it. Hopefully,

to create some debate. A particular

thanks to our USI for hosting us. In

terms of that, I should start with

international terror prison. It

seems to me that significant

progress has been made against a

Daesh in Iraq and Syria the

prospects of pants that, and

prospects of the caliphates on the

ground has... We've seen the

phenomenon that Daesh represents

emerging in other parts of the

world. Of course, we have learned,

sadly, over the last few years, that

anyone can become terrorist these

days simply by renting a vehicle or

wielding a machete. Terrorism is

clearly a very significant factor to

our country. In the short term, it

is vital that we protect our

population while recognising that

the long-term solution is to fix the

causes of it which are invariably a

lack of education, lack of

opportunity and a growing feeling of

exclusion and isolation. Often, I

suspect, coupled with a lack of

opportunity and therefore a sense of

impotence. This is a sense of worry

in many European countries, but in

the Middle East and North Africa,

when local politics, regional

dynamics and the geopolitical

situation are overlaid, it becomes a

book a problem. Resulting, I

suspect, in a complicated tapestry

of factors with extremist groups

exploiting the chaos to seize

territory and carve out an even

larger foothold for themselves to

launch attacks, including recruiting

and inspiring our own citizens to of

terror. The next threat I will touch

on, I think, are the longer-term

implications of population movements

and how that might affect his

ability and the cohesion of our

society.

ability and the cohesion of our

society. Looking

ability and the cohesion of our

society. Looking

ability and the cohesion of our

society. Looking

ability and the cohesion of our

society. Looking specifically at

Africa, according to the United

Nations, Africa is expected to

account for more than half of the

world's population growth between

2015 and 2050. Nearly all of

world's population growth between

2015 and 2050. Nearly all of this

growth will be among the 49

countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

Some two billion people by 2025. By

then more than half of Africans will

be living in cities. People will be

connected by mobile devices. Without

economic growth matching population

growth, it is inevitable that we

will see more movement. But I think

it is the rising threats are from

states and the consequences that

stem from this for the military that

is of the most immediate concern and

particularly, to me, as the head of

the Army. We now live in a much more

competitive multipolar world. The

complex nature of the global system

has created the conditions in which

states are able to compete in new

ways short of what we would have

defined as war in the past. It is

quite US defence Secretary Mattis

described last week has great power

competition. I quote, "We will

continue to prosecute the campaign

against terrorists that we are

engaged in today, but great power

competition, not terrorism, is now a

primary focus of US national

security." And I think viewed from

his perspective, with increasing

competition in the South China Sea,

the potential grave consequences of

North Korea's nuclear programme, the

arms race in a proxy wars that you

see playing out in Yemen and Syria

that perhaps stem from Iran's

regional aspirations, with Russia,

the most complex and capable

security challenge we have faced

since the Cold War superimposed on

much of it, it would be difficult to

think on that basis not to agree

with Jim Mattis's assessment. We

reading, though, all of the states

have become masters at exploiting

the scenes between peace and war.

What constitutes a weapon in this

grey area no longer has to go Bango.

Energy, cash, as bribes, corrupt

business practises, cyber attacks,

assassinations, fake news,

propaganda, and military

intimidation are all examples of the

weapons used to gain advantage in

this era of constant competition.

The rules a base international

architecture that has assured our

stability and prosperity since 1945

is, I suggest, therefore threatened.

This is not a crisis. Or a series of

crises. Which we face. Rather, it is

a strategic challenge and I think it

requires a strategic response. The

deduction that we should draw from

this is that there is no longer to

clear distinct states of peace and

war. We now have several forms.

Indeed, the character of war and

peace is different for each of the

contexts in which the weapon systems

are applied. At the risk we run in

not defined as clearly and acting

accordingly is that rather like a

chronic contagious disease, it will

creep up on us and our ability to

act will be markedly constrained and

we will be the losers of this

competition. The arts exponent of

this is Russia, has described as the

Prime Minister in her speech at last

autumn. I said earlier I believe it

represents the most complex and

capable state the based at the to do

our country since the end of the

Cold War. My fellow chiefs of staff

from the United States, France and

Germany, shared this view at

Leicester's land warfare conference.

-- at last year's land warfare

conference. We analyse threats on

the basis of capability and intent.

Let's examine Russian capability for

a moment and how they are applying

it. We mustn't interpret what we see

as a revival of Russian Cold War

practise, of course. Nor look at the

Crimean operation alone. They use a

multimodal approach. Utilising

conventional, unconventional and

nuclear domains. A hybrid version

that might involve little green men,

big green tanks and huge green...

They are it -- in their thinking is

possible. The staff is able to

change and evolve. They know that

demography is not on their side. So

they are developing a capability

that needs fewer men. For example,

missiles, drones and two-man tanks.

They have developed coherent

concepts for training that are

focused on her vulnerabilities. For

example, our dependency on

communications and IT. Our lack of

masked files and perhaps our lack of

investment in your defence. They

apply the ruthless focus on

defeating their opponents, not

seizing ground for the sake of it,

but making sure that our vital

ground is denied to us and I should

return to missile capability in a

moment. Since 2016, we have seen a

marked shift to cyber, to subversion

and into coercion, as well as

sophisticated use of Samir campaigns

and fake news. Whether you believe

in interference and that democratic

process in United States or that

coup in Montenegro, they are

examples of this. Chris Donnelly, at

the Institute for statecraft,

suggest they are creating new

strategic conditions. Their current

influence and disinformation

campaign is a form of the system

warfare that seeks to delegitimize

the physical and social system on

which our military strengths is

based. This undermines our centre of

gravity, which they rightly assessed

as our political cohesion Tama

cohesion. -- political cohesion.

This systemic worker has to be

defeated. One has to recognise the

importance of messaging ones intent

and the importance of deterrence.

The doctrine for war utilises all of

the instruments of national power,

not just the military. They believe

that any shooting war must be

finished quickly if it is to be

successful. Their instinct will be

to escalate and to speed up the

tempo of operations. To avoid being

surprised, they believe in

preemption without log

neutralisation. They will do

something that their opponent least

expects. They have used Syria to

develop in expeditionary capability

to give a very large numbers of

their officers behind and were

fighting experience -- give their

large numbers of officers were

fighting experience. Their

conventional military posture gives

them a calculable military

advantage. They operate on interior

lines with a very capable rail and

transportation network. We saw that

during Leicester's exercise and how

effective it is. And they believe in

connecting to strategic zones, the

West, the Arctic, the Black Sea and

the far east. And rapidly switching

forces between them. In the last

five years, the number of air,

maritime and land based platforms

for longer-range missiles has

increased by a factor of 12. That is

in the last five years. Gerasimov

spoke last year about how they

increased the range of missiles by a

factor of 30. This gives them the

capability to create mobile missile

domes, shields which they can assure

their freedom to manoeuvre and to

deny us the ability to act. This is

what we call anti-access area

denial. We've seen this interior

with a capacity to seal airspace

over significant distances. The use

of electronic warfare at the scale

two Q precise targeting by large

numbers of drones. That enable very

accurate and instantaneous fires.

Including thermal baric warheads to

destroy opponents's forces. We have

seen this in Ukraine. During last

year's exercises, debuts the

opportunity to suppress and, more

worryingly, to distort the GPS

signal across much Scandinavia. Now,

a vivid indication of the skill of

the modernisation is clear from

three minute video clip I am now

going to show you. This was run on

Russian TV a couple of years ago.

You don't need to understand the

Russian, to simply listen to the

tone of the commentary. The key

point is that what you will see is

all new stuff and at the 20 17th

state plan that shows even more has

followed since this.

Of course we have to accept that

this is information warfare at its

best that you can agree it is an eye

watering quantity of capability. The

other part of the threat is how one

assesses intent. I'm not in any way

going to suggest that what Russia

wants to go toward the traditional

definition of the term but there are

factors that bear on the question of

intent and one needs to understand

Russian psyche, their culture and

their philosophy of preemption.

Brush I think could initiate

hostilities sooner than we expect

and sooner than we would in similar

circumstances. Must likely they will

use nefarious, Sabin Merino article

Article five actions to erode the

capability of Nato and erode... This

is a divide and rule which the

international order is designed to

prevent. I don't think we'll start

with little green men in will start

with something we don't expect, we

should not take what we have seen so

far as a template for the future.

There are some who might ask if

Russia sees itself in decline and

more able now to go to war than in

the future does this encourage them

to think of war? Perhaps compare the

situation today 21912 when the

Russian Imperial cabinet assessed

that it be better to fight now

because by 1925 Russia would be too

weak in comparison to a modernized

Germany and of course depend to a

similar conclusion in 1941. Russia

worries I think that the West will

achieve technological offset in the

next decade. I suspect though that

the greatest risk is the risk of

miscalculation. The recent false

alert in Hawaii that warned of an

incoming missile is an indication of

how easy would be to miscalculate.

Particularly when the level of

militarization is significant and we

saw this only to vividly with the

downing of flight MH 17 over Ukraine

in 2014. Speaking recently the

secretary of defence under Bill

Clinton was all-too-familiar with

false alerts, having been awakened

by a call from a night watch officer

in 1979I thought he was about to

experience the Holocaust, and of

course he also presided over the

dismantlement of nuclear weapons in

1990s he warned that it is back.

Because the US and Russia are

retraining the geopolitical dangers

of the Cold War and because US and

Russia are rebuilding their nuclear

arsenals that is retreating the

military dangers of the Cold War.

Now you can argue about the extent

to which the camera and -- Kremlin

is disinformation has influenced

Western countries but the main

impact has been to convince ordinary

Russians that the West as a threat.

We've been made to appear as an

enemy whether we like it or not and

whatever the real situation.

Moreover, we are sided don't have

the same level of understanding that

we had of each other in the Cold

War. And the tried and tested

systems and diplomatic instruments

are not what they once were.

Confidence building measures, arms

reduction negotiations, public

monitoring and inspection of each

other's military activity etc. So

when the ante was upped following

the Russian intervention in Ukraine,

conversation became difficult. Now

of course it doesn't have to be like

that. We now have to worry not about

asymmetric Lingfield, as once on the

Cold War, but an asymmetric one in

which there are far more players. So

we should not assume that evens in

the Pacific would not draw more US

attention than those in Europe. And

we should be careful of complacency.

The parallels of 1914 are stark. Our

generation has been used towards the

choices the Cold War we may not have

a choice about conflict with Russia.

And we should remember trustees to

him that you may not be interested

in more but war is interested in

you. So what should we be doing

differently? First of all I think we

should recognise that Russia

respects strength and people who

stand up to them. The original plan

for Ukraine had been to acquire

significantly more terrain however

Russia was surprised I Ukrainian

resistance and had to settle for

less. We should identify Russian

weaknesses and then manoeuvre

asymmetrically against them. First

of all we should be in the business

of building real institutional

capacity in neighbouring states so

that they have the strength and

confidence to stand up to Russia and

the internal resilience to withstand

pressures designed to bring them

down from within. We should be

making more progress on reducing

energy dependency on Russia. We

should retain the Russian population

what is really going on. We should

be protecting our critical

capabilities, hence the importance

of cyber. Bush ability to identify

our own lawn abilities to Russian

disinformation and act to reduce

them. Next I think we need to

demonstrate our preparedness to

commit boots on the ground is not a

positive term at the moment what our

allies on Nato's eastern flank

absently do appreciate that a

platoon of infantry is worth this

squadron of F is that F-16s when it

comes to commitment. The importance

we attach to alliance cohesion, that

is vital to us that is our centre of

gravity. And hence I think the words

about international by design are

actually right. Everything the

bridge Army is doing at the moment

is to work out how we can implement

international by design. We

recognise that our communications

systems have to be extrovert so that

our allies can plug into them. Hence

the vital importance of the high

interoperability -- interoperability

means that the a level not just a

you kill. It is important to have

shared situational awareness and to

be able to control fires digitally

in support of each other. For me

therefore the ability to bring into

service a new form of environment,

tactical communications is vital.

Our relationship with the UK IT

sector to deliver is also vital. It

is also vital that our human

relationships are maximised and for

example the combined engineering

Regiment that Weise share with

Germany is a very good example of

how you can burden share and deliver

war capability by a partnership. As

indeed we do with our French allies

through the see Jeff. We have to be

keyed to improving Nato. We have to

recognise the readiness is about

speed of recognition. Speed of

decision-making and speed of

assembly. I will say that again.

It's about speed of recognition,

speed of decision-making, and speed

of assembly. Our contributions to

the very high readiness joint task

force way and a Nato and the

enhanced forward resins to light in

Poland but more in Estonia are

starting points. I may are good ways

also of all the national development

in terms of our French involvement

in one and the Dean's in the other.

Their starting point because I would

suggest that we need the ability to

reinforce them rapidly. And to be

able to out manoeuvre the potential

anti-access area denial missile dome

that will be put in place as we seek

to reinforce them. We therefore need

I would suggest to be a will to

deploy overland by road and by rail.

And our strict concept, Street tube

project land keep Billy over

distances of up to 2000 km. That

brings with it questions about

logistics, sustainability as well as

well as combat and combat service

support. However we are testing at

the moment of a programme of

experimentation and we are learning

very good lessons. For example, we

are copying what the Germans do very

well and did very well in 1940 when

all of their prime movers in terms

of their tanks and armoured vehicles

had trainers and by doing that it

reduces your logistics tail. Those

sort of old-fashioned lessons

brought forward are definitely

improving our ability to deploy. We

will test this concept I driving to

the Nato exercise Trident juncture

which is taking place in Norway this

autumn. It's also important thing to

stress the need for a forward

mounting base and therefore we are

actively examining the retention our

infrastructure in Germany where we

store our vehicles.

Next I think it is important to get

back to my point of speed of

recognition and speed of

decision-making that we give policy

makers the opportunity to exercise

with military leaders as we need

during the cold war. This goes to

the heart of speed of recognition

and goes back to the point about how

it would be little green men next

time and when you think about how

difficult it is in this era of

constant competition, where is this

grey area between peace and war, the

first hostile act will be freight

difficult to wreck guys. What is a

young officer I said my trench AUMA

on the West German plane, it was

very clear to me what that very

first hostile act or look like I

always imagined a soldier from the

Soviet Union with wire cutters

cutting the fence before his tanking

here. How we exercise the next time

there and making decisions they may

need to make is vital. And a thing

to do all this we need to return to

an annual or biannual Nato exercise

rhythm in which all levels play from

the grand strategic level to the

tactical level. This would allow for

our resources to be properly use

targeted at for front-line countries

to act as mobilisation indeed allow

us to act train on private land and

to understand some of the

constraints associated with Job

points and bridges and railway

traffic and all that goes with it.

-- choke points. We need to prepare

ourselves to fight the war we might

have to fight. I think it is an

important point because in being

prepared to fight the war we might

have to fight there is a sporting

chance that we will prevent it from

happening. And I think the one of

anniversary of World War I gives us

a great chance to actually think

about what that war might look like.

Therefore in the Army at the moment

we have a project under way styled

as logic Henry Wilson. For the

historians amongst youth you'll know

that Henry Wilson was the Major

General who was the director of

mature operations in 1914 was able

to pull a mobilisation plan off the

shelf and send the British

expeditionary force to Flanders. To

be able to again I think is

important.

If it's important to understand

where we maximise the potential of

all of our manpower. That's why we

have invested significant effort in

a reserve component, but

increasingly, also, a regular

reserve component. I hasten to add

that a reserve component is not a

substitute for the regular

component, but it is the means to

all connected with particularly

specialists inasmuch that we are

doing in drawing pad talent from the

medical area, from cyber, and from

information warfare. It also, of

course, about augmenting the mass.

That recognises that the regular

components has never been as small

as this ugly since Napoleonic times.

But it also does for us is to

provide the basis for regeneration

and reconstitution. I have been very

impressed with the talent that has

come forward to join the Army

reserve, particularly on what he

called a terms of service. In our 77

brigade, which I should come back

too, we have some remarkable talent

when it comes to social media,

production design and indeed Arabic

poetry. Those skills we can't afford

to retain an regular components, but

there is elements of us delivering

capability in a much more

imaginative way then we might have

been able to do in the past. We now

have over 30,000 on the books in

terms of the reserve and they are

available to deploy the regular

components if they have got the time

and their employers can release them

whenever they want to. Turning to

the regular reserve potentially, we

have some 25-30,000 would make up

the regular reserve. This recognises

that 50% of the Army beefs before

the age of 30. Hence much of them

are younger and will qualify. At the

statutory reliability to be... The

trick is in retaining contact with

this force and we are working, at

the moment, to the data protection

issues to make sure that we

reinforce that. The goal, I think,

will be to build on a piloted that

we ran last year and to conduct a

full-blown mobilisation exercise for

all of the reserve and the regular

reserve just like we used to do in

the Cold War sometime in the middle

of next year. As part of this, we

were clearly is a priority of the

regular reserve on skis capabilities

like, for example, attack helicopter

pilots. It is a means of maximizing

the potential of all the manpower we

haven't it will potentially deliver

a total armed force of their winter

40,000 post mobilisation. Quite

clearly, if were going to do this,

we need to have support from the

policy level through lawyers to the

general public as a whole. I think

people can understand that perhaps

for a day in the year, it is logical

to be able to retain this

capability. Next observation I would

make is that we need to be able to

fight differently. Against the sorts

of stuff that I set out there. First

of all, we need a reversion, to

counter... And potentially having

the GPS system taking down. Good

night navigation and map reading

that I was possibly should clearly

be a feature of what we're talking

about here. Next, we have got to be

able to fight a more dispersed with

the ability to concentrate a rapidly

to achieve the mass you need. Next,

we have got to invest in junior

leadership, hence I talk much about

maximizing talent. I thought about

our command philosophy that enables

initiative and tactical habitation

at the lowest levels. And have

centre to further orders, enables

people to seize the initiative. That

is why we are investing in a brain

so based a general staff to

challenge, to think flexibly and to

place a premium on adaptability.

Recognising, of course, that's when

we go to war, we definitely will get

it right on day one and it is that

sense of adaptability and agility

which will give us a chance to

prevail.

Finally, in terms of fighting

differently, we need to recognise

that how and where we train and to

retrain with should be a surrogate

for warfare, as well, given the

nature of messaging that comes in

this era of constant competition

that I described. And then, last, in

terms of help we should do things

differently, we need to acknowledge

that we have some capability issues

that have to be addressed. I think

first, we have to recognise that

deterrence needs a set of graduated

responses to enable escalation. That

means that for me, as the CTS, it is

important that we recapitalize much

of the Army's of equipment. You have

to go back to 1985 the last time we

had a major recapitalization

programme and the capabilities we

see not, tank, the armoured fighting

vehicle, the attacking helicopter

vehicle, the South Dakota artillery

system, were all systems that came

in under him and under his thinking

with this concept at the front end

of it. Of course, what is happened

over the last 15 years is yet been

focused on counter urgency and

civilization. By the end of the

Afghan campaign -- counter

insurgency. Our challenge now is to

leap forward given the threats one I

described. I sense that involves

upgrading our armoured infantry.

Looking at active protection,

greater range for our Challenger

tank. Looking at upgrading Arborg or

armoured vehicle. Looking at

maximizing the potential of the Ajax

vehicle that looks like a medium

tank entry service at the moment.

Thinking to service a mechanized

vehicle to cover lamented. This will

be a transformation for the British

Army and will gets us to manoeuvre

in a very different way and to

protect power over land in a

different way. We need to improve

our... Recognizance. To be able to

target the fires because we have to

divert to an ever we are able to

focus on any enemy's uncommitted

forces, to do battle in which we

spoke about. Boss for doing that, to

protect ourselves from the air and

inbound missiles. I touched on

connectivity. We invest in our

ability. We also, then, need to

continue to improve our ability to

fight on this new battlefield. I

think it is important that we build

on the excellent foundation we have

created for information warfare to

our 77 brigade, which is now giving

us the capability to compete in the

war of narratives and the tactical

level. And as David Patrick care

costs put it in his recently

published book, were an hundred 40

characters, in which she observes on

the Wharton Ukraine, I was caught up

in two wars, one that was fight on

the ground with tanks and artillery,

and in information work for largely,

though not exclusively, to social

media. Counterintuitively, it

mattered more who won the war of

words and narratives than who had

the most important weaponry. He also

reports that social media is

covering up digital Superman, hyper

connected and hyper empowered online

individuals and I would like a few

of those in the 77 brigade, please.

So, in sum, I have inevitably looked

at this through a land of prism, but

you should recognise that what I am

describing is part of the joint

force. So, to conclude, I believe

our the -- our ability to respond

will be eroded if we don't take

enough or not. Weber present a clear

and present danger. They're not

thousands of miles away. They are

now on Europe's doorstep. The

character of warfare is making it

much harder for us to recognise true

intentions and thus distinguish

between what is peace and what is

bore. -- and what just one. Of

course, he doesn't have to be like

this. But we cannot afford to sit

back. We need to recognise that

credible deterrence must be

underpinned by a genuine capability

and genuine commitment that earns

the respect of potential opponents.

Thank you very much.

CHEERING AND