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It is frustrating when the FBI refuses to answer this committee's | :00:22. | :00:30. | |
questions. But leaks relevant information to the media. In other | :00:31. | :00:33. | |
words, they don't talk to us, but somebody talks to the media. | :00:34. | :00:38. | |
Director Comey, have you ever been an anonymous source in news reports | :00:39. | :00:44. | |
about matters relating to the Trump investigation or the Clinton | :00:45. | :00:55. | |
investigation? Never. Question two on relatively related... Have few | :00:56. | :00:59. | |
other authorised somebody else at the FBI to be an anonymous source in | :01:00. | :01:05. | |
news reports about the Trump investigation or by investigation? | :01:06. | :01:11. | |
No. Has any classified information relating to President Trump or his | :01:12. | :01:19. | |
associates being declassified and shared with the media? Not to my | :01:20. | :01:29. | |
knowledge. You testified the four by House intelligence committee -- | :01:30. | :01:34. | |
before the House intelligence committee that a lot of classified | :01:35. | :01:38. | |
matters have ended up in the media recently. Without getting into any | :01:39. | :01:42. | |
particular article, and I want to emphasise that, without getting into | :01:43. | :01:47. | |
any particular article, is there an investigation of any leaks of | :01:48. | :01:52. | |
classified information relating to Mr Trump or his associates? I don't | :01:53. | :01:58. | |
want to answer that question, Senator, for reasons I think you | :01:59. | :02:04. | |
know. There have been a variety of leaks, leaks are always a problem, | :02:05. | :02:08. | |
but especially in the last 3-6 months. And where there is a league | :02:09. | :02:12. | |
of classified information, the FBI, if that is our information, makes a | :02:13. | :02:16. | |
referral to the Department of Justice, or if it is another | :02:17. | :02:20. | |
agency's information, they do the same, and the DOJ authorises an open | :02:21. | :02:25. | |
of an investigation. I don't want to confirm if there are any | :02:26. | :02:29. | |
investigations open. I want to challenge you on that. The | :02:30. | :02:32. | |
Government regularly acknowledges when it is investigating classified | :02:33. | :02:38. | |
leaks. You did that in the Valerie plane case, what is the difference | :02:39. | :02:41. | |
here? The most important difference is that I don't have authorisation | :02:42. | :02:45. | |
from the Department to confirm any of the investigations they have | :02:46. | :02:48. | |
authorised. It may be that we can get that at some point, but I'm not | :02:49. | :02:51. | |
going to do that in the open setting without having talked to them. You | :02:52. | :02:56. | |
can expect me to follow up on that offer. Sure. There are several | :02:57. | :03:03. | |
senior FBI officials who would have had access to the classified | :03:04. | :03:06. | |
information that was leaked, including yourself and the deputy | :03:07. | :03:13. | |
director. So how can the Justice Department guarantee the integrity | :03:14. | :03:17. | |
of the investigations without designating an agency of than the | :03:18. | :03:24. | |
FBI to gather the facts and illuminate senior FBI officials? | :03:25. | :03:28. | |
Well, I'm not going to once about any particular investigations, but I | :03:29. | :03:31. | |
know of situations in the past where if you think the FBI or its | :03:32. | :03:37. | |
leadership are suspect, you have another investigative agencies abort | :03:38. | :03:39. | |
the investigation by federal prosecutors. It could be done, and | :03:40. | :03:44. | |
it has been done in the past -- support the investigation. Moving on | :03:45. | :03:48. | |
to another subject. The New York Times recently reported that the FBI | :03:49. | :03:53. | |
had found a crumbling e-mail among the ones -- a troubling e-mail among | :03:54. | :04:00. | |
the ones found from Democratic operatives. The e-mail reportedly | :04:01. | :04:04. | |
provided assurances that Attorney General Lynch would project academic | :04:05. | :04:11. | |
written by making sure that -- would protect Secretary Clinton by making | :04:12. | :04:13. | |
sure that the investigation did not go too far. How and when did you | :04:14. | :04:18. | |
first learn of this document? Also, who sent it and who received it? | :04:19. | :04:22. | |
That is not a question I can answer in this forum, Mr Chairman, it would | :04:23. | :04:27. | |
call for a classified response. I have briefly to ship the | :04:28. | :04:29. | |
intelligence committees on that particular issue, but I cannot talk | :04:30. | :04:33. | |
about it here so I have briefed leadership. You can expect me to | :04:34. | :04:36. | |
follow up with you on that point. Sure. What is that that did the FBI | :04:37. | :04:43. | |
take to determine -- what steps did the FBI take to determine if | :04:44. | :04:51. | |
Attorney General Lynch had... Did the FBI interview the person who | :04:52. | :04:56. | |
wrote the e-mail? I cannot talk about that in an unclassified | :04:57. | :05:00. | |
setting. OK, then you can expect me to follow up on that. I asked the | :05:01. | :05:05. | |
FBI to provide this e-mail to the committee before today's hearing. | :05:06. | :05:10. | |
Why haven't you done so? And were you provided by the end of this | :05:11. | :05:14. | |
weeks -- will you provide it? To react to that, I have to give a | :05:15. | :05:18. | |
classified answer, and I can't give it sitting here. So that means you | :05:19. | :05:25. | |
called give me the e-mail? I'm not confirming there was an e-mail, | :05:26. | :05:30. | |
surf. The subject is classified. In an appropriate forum, I would be | :05:31. | :05:33. | |
happy to brief you on it, but I can't do it in an open hearing. I | :05:34. | :05:39. | |
issue that other members of the committee can have access to that | :05:40. | :05:43. | |
briefing if they want -- I assume. I want to talk about going dark, a few | :05:44. | :05:50. | |
years ago you testified before the committee about going dark problem | :05:51. | :05:54. | |
and the inability of law enforcement to access encrypted data despite the | :05:55. | :05:59. | |
existence of a lawfully issued court order. You continue to raise this | :06:00. | :06:06. | |
issue in your public speeches, most recently at Boston College. My | :06:07. | :06:10. | |
question, you mentioned at the beginning in your testimony briefly, | :06:11. | :06:15. | |
but can you provide the committee with a more detailed update on the | :06:16. | :06:19. | |
status of the going dark problem, and how it has affected the FBI's | :06:20. | :06:24. | |
ability to access encrypted data. Has there been any progress | :06:25. | :06:28. | |
collaborating with the technology sector to overcome any problems, at | :06:29. | :06:33. | |
our hearing in 2015 you said you didn't think legislation was | :06:34. | :06:37. | |
necessary. At that time. Is that still your view? Thank you, Mr | :06:38. | :06:42. | |
Chairman. The shadow created by the problem we call going dark continues | :06:43. | :06:45. | |
to fall across more and more of our work. Take devices, for example. The | :06:46. | :06:54. | |
ubiquitous default for this encryption devices is affecting now | :06:55. | :06:58. | |
about half of our work. The first it's months of this fiscal year, FBI | :06:59. | :07:03. | |
examiners were presented with over 6000 devices, forward we have lawful | :07:04. | :07:07. | |
authority, search warrant a court order to open, and 46% of those | :07:08. | :07:11. | |
cases we could not open those devices with any technique. That | :07:12. | :07:16. | |
means half of the devices that we encounter in terrorism cases, in | :07:17. | :07:21. | |
counterintelligence cases, in gang cases, cannot be opened with any | :07:22. | :07:25. | |
technique. That is a big problem. And so the shadow continues to fall. | :07:26. | :07:30. | |
I'm determined to continue to make sure the American people and | :07:31. | :07:33. | |
Congress know about it. I know this is important to the president and | :07:34. | :07:37. | |
the new Attorney General. I don't know yet how the new administration | :07:38. | :07:40. | |
intends to approach it, but it is something we have to talk about, | :07:41. | :07:45. | |
because like you, I care a lot about privacy, I also care a lot about | :07:46. | :07:48. | |
public safety. And there continues to be a huge collision between those | :07:49. | :08:00. | |
two things we care about. I look forward to continuing that | :08:01. | :08:01. | |
conversation, Mr Chairman. You didn't respond to the part about you | :08:02. | :08:04. | |
still have the view that legislation is not needed? I don't know the | :08:05. | :08:07. | |
answer yet. I hope I said last time I talked about this, it may require | :08:08. | :08:09. | |
a legislative solution at some point. The Obama administration was | :08:10. | :08:12. | |
not in a position where they were seeking legislation. I don't know | :08:13. | :08:15. | |
yet how President Trump intends to approach this. I know he spoke about | :08:16. | :08:18. | |
it during the campaign and he cares about it, but it is per for me to | :08:19. | :08:25. | |
say. -- it is premature for me to say. Director, I have one question | :08:26. | :08:30. | |
regarding my opening comment. And I view it as the most important | :08:31. | :08:35. | |
question. And I hope you will answer it. Why was it necessary to announce | :08:36. | :08:42. | |
11 days before a presidential election that you were opening an | :08:43. | :08:46. | |
investigation on a new computer without any knowledge of what was in | :08:47. | :08:53. | |
that computer? Why didn't you just do the investigation, as you would | :08:54. | :08:57. | |
normally, with no public announcement? A great question, | :08:58. | :09:04. | |
Senator, thank you. October 27, the investigative team that had finished | :09:05. | :09:06. | |
the investigation into life focused on Secretary Clinton's e-mail, I met | :09:07. | :09:13. | |
with them later that morning in my conference room. They laid out to me | :09:14. | :09:18. | |
what they could see from the meta data on Anthony Weiner's laptop, | :09:19. | :09:22. | |
that had been seized in an unrelated case. What they could see from the | :09:23. | :09:25. | |
meta data was that there were thousands of Secretary Clinton's | :09:26. | :09:30. | |
e-mails on that device. Including what they thought might be the | :09:31. | :09:33. | |
missing e-mails from her first three months as Secretary of State. We | :09:34. | :09:37. | |
never found any e-mails from her first three months. She was using | :09:38. | :09:41. | |
Akers and blackberry then, that is very important. If there was | :09:42. | :09:45. | |
evidence that she was acting with intent, that is where it would be. | :09:46. | :09:53. | |
But they were not there? , I finish my answer, Senator? They said, we | :09:54. | :09:55. | |
can see thousands of e-mails from the Clinton e-mail domain, including | :09:56. | :09:58. | |
many from the rise and blackberry domain. They said, we think we have | :09:59. | :10:04. | |
to get a search warrant. -- from the Verizon. The Department of Justice | :10:05. | :10:08. | |
agrees, and by authorised them to seek a search warrant, I faced my | :10:09. | :10:12. | |
choice. I have lived my entire career by the solution that you can | :10:13. | :10:16. | |
possibly avoid it, you avoid any action in the run-up to an election, | :10:17. | :10:20. | |
why you might have an impact, but I sat there that morning and I could | :10:21. | :10:24. | |
not see a door labelled no action here. I could see two doors, and | :10:25. | :10:28. | |
they were both actions. One was labelled speaks, the other was | :10:29. | :10:32. | |
labelled conceal. Here is how I thought about it, I want you to know | :10:33. | :10:37. | |
my thinking. Having repeatedly told this Congress, we are done, there is | :10:38. | :10:42. | |
nothing there, there is no case there, to restart in a hugely | :10:43. | :10:47. | |
significant way, potentially finding the e-mails that would like to her | :10:48. | :10:51. | |
intent from the beginning, and not speak about it, that would acquire | :10:52. | :10:56. | |
an active concealment, in my view. I stared at speak and conceal. Speak | :10:57. | :10:59. | |
would be really bad, there is an election in 11 days, that would be | :11:00. | :11:04. | |
bad. Concealing in my view would be catastrophic, not just to the FBI | :11:05. | :11:08. | |
but well beyond. And honestly, between really bad and catastrophic, | :11:09. | :11:16. | |
I said to my team, we've got to walk into the world of really bad, I've | :11:17. | :11:18. | |
got to tell Congress that we are restarting this. Not in some | :11:19. | :11:21. | |
burglars way, in a hugely significant way. -- not in a | :11:22. | :11:25. | |
frivolous way. The team worked night after night and they filed thousands | :11:26. | :11:30. | |
of new e-mails. They found classified information on Anthony | :11:31. | :11:34. | |
Weiner, somehow her e-mails had been forwarded to Anthony Weiner, | :11:35. | :11:38. | |
including classified information, by her assistant, Huma Abedin. They | :11:39. | :11:41. | |
found thousands of new e-mails, they called me the Saturday night before | :11:42. | :11:45. | |
the election and said, thanks to the wizardry of our technology, we have | :11:46. | :11:50. | |
only had to personally read 6000. We think we can finish tomorrow | :11:51. | :11:57. | |
morning, Sunday. I met with them and they said, we found a lot of new | :11:58. | :12:00. | |
stuff. We did not find anything that changes our view of her intent. We | :12:01. | :12:03. | |
are in the same place we were in July. It hasn't changed our view. I | :12:04. | :12:07. | |
asked them lots of questions. I said, OK, if that's where you are I | :12:08. | :12:11. | |
have to tell Congress this is done. This is terrible, it makes me | :12:12. | :12:15. | |
nauseous to think that we might have had impact on the election, but it | :12:16. | :12:19. | |
would not change the decision. Everybody who disagrees with me has | :12:20. | :12:22. | |
to come back to October the 28th with me and stare at this and tell | :12:23. | :12:31. | |
me what you would do. Would you speak or would you conceal? I could | :12:32. | :12:33. | |
be wrong, but we honestly made a decision between those two choices | :12:34. | :12:36. | |
that even in hindsight, this has been one of the world's painful | :12:37. | :12:38. | |
experiences, I would make the same decision, I would not conceal it on | :12:39. | :12:42. | |
October 28 from the Congress. I sent a letter to Congress, I did not make | :12:43. | :12:46. | |
a public announcement, I send a private letter to the chairs on the | :12:47. | :12:49. | |
rankings of the oversight committees. I know it is a | :12:50. | :12:52. | |
distinction without a difference in the world of leaks, but it was very | :12:53. | :12:55. | |
important that I tell them instead of consuming. Reasonable people can | :12:56. | :13:04. | |
disagree, but that is the reason that I made that choice, and it was | :13:05. | :13:07. | |
a hard choice. I still believe in retrospect it was the right choice, | :13:08. | :13:09. | |
as painful as this has been. I'm sorry for the long answer. That you | :13:10. | :13:12. | |
respond, on the letter it was just a matter of minutes before the world | :13:13. | :13:15. | |
knew about it. Secondly, my understanding and the staff has just | :13:16. | :13:19. | |
said to me that you didn't get a search warrant before making the | :13:20. | :13:20. | |
announcement. That is right. We are going to seek | :13:21. | :13:28. | |
a search warrant. I don't see it as a meaningful distinction. It is very | :13:29. | :13:39. | |
hard. You took an enormous gamble, the gamble was that there was | :13:40. | :13:43. | |
something there that would invalidate her candidacy and there | :13:44. | :13:52. | |
wasn't. So one has to look at that action in and say did it affect the | :13:53. | :13:57. | |
campaign? I think most people who have looked at this say, yes it did | :13:58. | :14:02. | |
affect the campaign, why would he do it? Was there any conflict among | :14:03. | :14:09. | |
your staff, people saying do it, people saying don't do it, as has | :14:10. | :14:15. | |
been reported? No. There was a great debate. I have a fabulous staff at | :14:16. | :14:19. | |
all levels and one of my junior lawyers said should you consider | :14:20. | :14:27. | |
that what you are about to do elect Donald Trump president. Hanky for | :14:28. | :14:33. | |
raising that, but I can't consider for a second whose political | :14:34. | :14:39. | |
fortunes will be affected in which way. I had to ask what is the right | :14:40. | :14:44. | |
thing to do. I am proud of the way debated it and everyone on my team | :14:45. | :14:48. | |
agreed that we have to tell Congress that we are restarting this in a | :14:49. | :14:53. | |
hugely significant way. There is a way to do that. I don't know whether | :14:54. | :14:57. | |
it would work, but certainly in a classified way, carrying out your | :14:58. | :15:00. | |
tradition of not announcing investigations. I look at this | :15:01. | :15:09. | |
exactly the opposite way you do. Everybody knew it would influence | :15:10. | :15:17. | |
the investigation before. But there was a very large percentage of | :15:18. | :15:21. | |
chance that it would. And that percentage of chance was taken. | :15:22. | :15:27. | |
There was no information and the election was lost. It seems to me | :15:28. | :15:35. | |
that before your department does something like this, you really | :15:36. | :15:47. | |
ought to... Because another senator began to talk about other | :15:48. | :15:50. | |
investigations and this theory does not hold up when you look at other | :15:51. | :15:57. | |
investigations. Let me go on to 702 because you began your comments | :15:58. | :16:00. | |
saying how important it is and coming yes, it is,. We've got a | :16:01. | :16:13. | |
problem the issue that we need to address as the FBI's practice of | :16:14. | :16:18. | |
searching 702 data using you as person identifiers as query terms | :16:19. | :16:27. | |
and some have called this a unconstitutional back door search. | :16:28. | :16:34. | |
Others see it as essential in ensuring terrorists don't slip | :16:35. | :16:36. | |
through the cracks as they did before. Could you give us your views | :16:37. | :16:41. | |
on that and how it could be handled to avoid the charge which may bring | :16:42. | :16:47. | |
down 702? Thank you, Senator. An important issue. The way 702 works | :16:48. | :16:52. | |
is that under the provision of the statute, the Pfizer Court, federal | :16:53. | :16:58. | |
judges, authorised us as US agencies to collect information overseas if | :16:59. | :17:07. | |
they are using American infrastructure. The criticism we | :17:08. | :17:10. | |
have got since 911 is you have to make sure you are in a position to | :17:11. | :17:14. | |
connect the dots. You can't have stove piped information. We have | :17:15. | :17:23. | |
responded to that, mostly the great work of my process, we collect | :17:24. | :17:28. | |
information under 702, it does not sit in a separate stovepipe. It sits | :17:29. | :17:32. | |
on a single cloud type environment, so that if I am opening an | :17:33. | :17:37. | |
investigation in the United States on a terrorism, criminal matter and | :17:38. | :17:43. | |
I have the name of the suspect, telephone, e-mail addresses, I | :17:44. | :17:48. | |
searched the FBI databases. That search necessarily will also touch | :17:49. | :17:51. | |
the information that is collected by 702 so that we don't miss a dot, but | :17:52. | :17:56. | |
nobody gets access to the information that sits in the 702 | :17:57. | :18:00. | |
database unless they have been trained correctly. If there is, | :18:01. | :18:05. | |
let's imagine that terrorists overseas were talking about a | :18:06. | :18:08. | |
suspect in the knighted States, or were Connacht someone's --... We | :18:09. | :18:16. | |
open the case in the United States and put in that name that e-mail | :18:17. | :18:21. | |
address, it will touch that data and tell us that there is information in | :18:22. | :18:25. | |
the 702 database that is relevant. If the agent doing the query is | :18:26. | :18:32. | |
properly trained, they can see that information. If they are trained, | :18:33. | :18:37. | |
they will be alerted and they will have to get the appropriate training | :18:38. | :18:42. | |
to see it. To do it otherwise is to risk asked where it matters most in | :18:43. | :18:46. | |
the United States failing to connect dots. My view is that the | :18:47. | :18:51. | |
information that is the 702 database has been lawfully collected, | :18:52. | :18:54. | |
carefully overseen and checked and our use of it is also appropriate | :18:55. | :19:02. | |
and overseen and checked. You are an masking the data. -- unmasking. I | :19:03. | :19:09. | |
don't know what that means in this context. We collect data collected | :19:10. | :19:17. | |
from a lawful source all on place and we don't miss a dot. What we | :19:18. | :19:21. | |
make sure is that no one can see the information unless they have the | :19:22. | :19:27. | |
appropriate training and oversight. My time is up. Thank you. Senator | :19:28. | :19:34. | |
Hatch. In January I introduced the rapid DNA act. It is bipartisan. | :19:35. | :19:49. | |
Chairman, I want to thank you for putting this bill on the agenda for | :19:50. | :19:53. | |
tomorrow's business meeting. This is the same build that the Senate | :19:54. | :19:58. | |
unanimously passed last year and this technology allows developing a | :19:59. | :20:02. | |
DNA profile and performing database comparisons in less than two hours. | :20:03. | :20:09. | |
The following standards and procedures will allow law | :20:10. | :20:14. | |
enforcement to solve crimes and innocent advocates to exonerate the | :20:15. | :20:17. | |
wrongfully accused. You came before this committee in December 2015 and | :20:18. | :20:22. | |
I asked you then about this legislation. You said it would help | :20:23. | :20:25. | |
us change the world in a very exciting way. Is that still your | :20:26. | :20:31. | |
view of the value of this legislation and do you believe that | :20:32. | :20:36. | |
Congress should act on this without getting tangled up another criminal | :20:37. | :20:39. | |
justice reform issues? I agree very much. Rapid DNA will materially | :20:40. | :20:45. | |
advance the safety of the American people. If the police officer in the | :20:46. | :20:50. | |
United States has in their custody someone who is a rapist, before | :20:51. | :20:53. | |
letting them go on some lesser offence, they will be able to | :20:54. | :20:56. | |
quickly check the DNA database and get a hit that will save lives, that | :20:57. | :21:00. | |
will protect all kinds of people from pain. It is a great thing. | :21:01. | :21:05. | |
Thank you. You're prepared statement touches on what the FBI is doing to | :21:06. | :21:10. | |
protect children from predators. Personnel and youth serving | :21:11. | :21:14. | |
organisation such as employees, coaches, volunteers, often work with | :21:15. | :21:21. | |
unsupervised use. That magnifies the need for a thorough evaluating when | :21:22. | :21:31. | |
they join. I introduced a child protection improvement act which | :21:32. | :21:35. | |
gives youth serving organisation greater access to the nationwide FBI | :21:36. | :21:40. | |
fingerprint background checks system. Do you believe that | :21:41. | :21:45. | |
providing organisations like the YMCA and the Girl Scouts of America | :21:46. | :21:48. | |
greater access to the FBI fingerprint background checks is an | :21:49. | :21:53. | |
important step in keeping child predators and violent criminal away | :21:54. | :22:01. | |
from our children. I do. I think the more information you can put in the | :22:02. | :22:05. | |
hands of the people who are vetting the better. We have an exciting new | :22:06. | :22:08. | |
feature of the FBI's fingerprint system called wrap back, once you | :22:09. | :22:14. | |
check someone was Mike identification, check they have no | :22:15. | :22:17. | |
record. They later develop one, you can be alerted to it if it happens | :22:18. | :22:23. | |
later. That makes a big difference. Thank you for sub is broken at | :22:24. | :22:25. | |
length about the so-called going dark programme. Strong encryption | :22:26. | :22:32. | |
technology enters the ability of law enforcement to access the personal | :22:33. | :22:36. | |
data on smartphones and similar devices. You're prepared testimony | :22:37. | :22:41. | |
for today's hearing addresses this issue. I have expressed significant | :22:42. | :22:48. | |
concern about proposals that would require devices or software | :22:49. | :22:50. | |
manufacturers to build a back door into their programming to allow law | :22:51. | :22:57. | |
enforcement to access a cryptic data in the course of investigations. I | :22:58. | :23:01. | |
remain convinced that such back doors can be created without | :23:02. | :23:08. | |
seriously compromising the security of cryptic devices. I believe this | :23:09. | :23:13. | |
is an issue where law enforcement and stakeholders need to work | :23:14. | :23:18. | |
together to find solutions rather than coming to Congress with one | :23:19. | :23:22. | |
size fits all legislative fixes. What are you doing to engage with | :23:23. | :23:27. | |
stakeholders in this issue and what kind of progress are you making if | :23:28. | :23:30. | |
you can tell us? Thank you. Good news on that front. We have had very | :23:31. | :23:35. | |
open and productive conversations with the private sector over the | :23:36. | :23:40. | |
last 18 months. Everybody realises that we care about the same things. | :23:41. | :23:44. | |
We all love and care about privacy and public safety. None of us want | :23:45. | :23:51. | |
back doors. We don't want access to devices built in in some way. What | :23:52. | :23:55. | |
we want to work with the manufacturers on is to figure out | :23:56. | :23:59. | |
how can we accommodate both interests in a sensitive way? How | :24:00. | :24:03. | |
can we optimise the privacy, security features of their devices | :24:04. | :24:05. | |
and allow court owners to be complied with? We are having good | :24:06. | :24:11. | |
conversations. I don't know where they will end up. If you're going to | :24:12. | :24:15. | |
make devices of the United States is, you figure out how to sort it | :24:16. | :24:29. | |
out. We now have almost a decade of experience using a statute so we | :24:30. | :24:38. | |
have more to go on. The gamut intelligence value of 702 is | :24:39. | :24:45. | |
documented and it has never been intentionally misused or abused. | :24:46. | :24:49. | |
Every federal court has addressed the issue has concluded that 702 is | :24:50. | :24:56. | |
lawful and that both parties have strongly supported it. Describe the | :24:57. | :24:59. | |
targeting and minimisation procedures or section 702 and how | :25:00. | :25:07. | |
each agency's procedures oversee the executive branch. They said my | :25:08. | :25:11. | |
opening, 702 is a critical tool to protect this country. The way it | :25:12. | :25:16. | |
works is we are allowed to conduct surveillance under the supervision | :25:17. | :25:22. | |
of the foreign intelligence court on non-US persons who are outside the | :25:23. | :25:25. | |
net United States if they are using American infrastructure. It does not | :25:26. | :25:33. | |
involve US persons or activity in the United States. Each agency as | :25:34. | :25:37. | |
you said has detailed procedures as to how we will handle this | :25:38. | :25:42. | |
information. It is approved by the Pfizer court. Not only will we | :25:43. | :25:47. | |
overseen the Pfizer court, we are being overseen by the US general. | :25:48. | :25:53. | |
There have been no abuses. Every court that has used this has said | :25:54. | :25:59. | |
this is appropriate under the fourth Amendment, under the statute, it was | :26:00. | :26:05. | |
an act passed by a democratically controlled Congress and then renewed | :26:06. | :26:09. | |
by a Republican-controlled Congress and upheld by every court that has | :26:10. | :26:12. | |
looked at it. I am telling you what the rest of the intelligence | :26:13. | :26:15. | |
community has said, we need this to protect the country. This should be | :26:16. | :26:19. | |
an easy conversation to have, but often people get confused about the | :26:20. | :26:22. | |
details and mix it up with other things. It is our job to make sure | :26:23. | :26:28. | |
we expend it clearly. My time is up. I will turn to you. Welcome back. | :26:29. | :26:40. | |
You mentioned you like the annual meeting. We didn't have one last | :26:41. | :26:45. | |
year. Last year was the first one in 15 years that the FBI did not | :26:46. | :26:53. | |
testify for this committee. A lot has happened in the last year and a | :26:54. | :27:02. | |
half. Senator Feinstein noted that Americans across the country have | :27:03. | :27:08. | |
been confused and disappointed by your judgment in having an | :27:09. | :27:13. | |
investigation into Secretary Clinton's e-mails. On a number of | :27:14. | :27:18. | |
occasions, you chose to comment rectally and extensively on that | :27:19. | :27:21. | |
investigation. You even released internal FBI memos and notes. I have | :27:22. | :27:32. | |
missed this may be, but I have never seen anything like this. You said | :27:33. | :27:36. | |
nothing about the investigation into the Trump campaign into Russia. Was | :27:37. | :27:49. | |
it appropriate for you to comment on one investigation repeatedly and not | :27:50. | :27:55. | |
say anything about the other? I think so. Can I explain? I only have | :27:56. | :27:59. | |
so much time. People forget, we would not confirm | :28:00. | :28:11. | |
the existence of the Hillary Clinton e-mail investigation until three | :28:12. | :28:14. | |
months after it began, even though it began with a public referral and | :28:15. | :28:18. | |
the candidate herself talked about it. In October of 2015, we confirmed | :28:19. | :28:23. | |
it existed and then said not another word, not a peep about it until we | :28:24. | :28:28. | |
were finished. It was a critical time, a couple of weeks before the | :28:29. | :28:32. | |
election. I think there are other things involved in that election. | :28:33. | :28:40. | |
But there is no question that that had a great effect. Historians can | :28:41. | :28:43. | |
debate what kind of an effect it was. But you did do it. In October, | :28:44. | :28:57. | |
the FBI was investigating the Trump campaign's connection to Russia. You | :28:58. | :29:01. | |
sent a letter informing the Senate House that you were reviewing | :29:02. | :29:05. | |
additional e-mails. It could be relevant to this. But both | :29:06. | :29:09. | |
investigations were open but you still only commented on one. I | :29:10. | :29:14. | |
commentated, as I explained earlier, in a letter I sent to the chair and | :29:15. | :29:18. | |
rankings of the oversight committees that we were taking additional steps | :29:19. | :29:21. | |
in the Clinton e-mail investigation because I had passed the fight under | :29:22. | :29:25. | |
oath repeatedly that we were done, that we were finished. -- I had | :29:26. | :29:31. | |
testified under oath. We treated the Trump investigation like the Clinton | :29:32. | :29:34. | |
investigation, we didn't say a word about it until months into it, and | :29:35. | :29:38. | |
we only confirmed that we were investigating. We are not going to | :29:39. | :29:42. | |
say anything about it until we are done, and I don't know when that | :29:43. | :29:45. | |
will be, but that is the way we handled the Clinton investigation as | :29:46. | :29:50. | |
well. That we ask you this, during the investigation into Hillary | :29:51. | :29:56. | |
Clinton's e-mail, a number of people like Rudy Giuliani claimed to have a | :29:57. | :30:01. | |
pipeline to the FBI. Numerous agents talk to them all the time, and I | :30:02. | :30:06. | |
quote. Regarding the investigation. He even said that he had insinuated | :30:07. | :30:12. | |
he had advanced warning about the e-mails described in your October | :30:13. | :30:18. | |
letter. A former FBI agent made similar claims. Either they are | :30:19. | :30:26. | |
lying, or this is a serious problem within the bureau. The FBI during | :30:27. | :30:33. | |
this 2016 campaign have contact with Rudy Giuliani about the Clinton | :30:34. | :30:40. | |
investigation -- did anybody from the FBI? I don't know yet. But if I | :30:41. | :30:46. | |
found out that people were making information about our investigation | :30:47. | :30:51. | |
there will be severe consequence -- that people were leaking. I don't | :30:52. | :30:56. | |
know yet. Do you know anything about other former agents? I don't know | :30:57. | :31:00. | |
yet. But it is a matter that I am very, very interested in. But you | :31:01. | :31:05. | |
are looking into it? Correct. And once you have found that answer, | :31:06. | :31:08. | |
will be provide it to ask was young I will provide it to the committee | :31:09. | :31:13. | |
in some form. I don't know whether I will be able to say it publicly, but | :31:14. | :31:19. | |
I will let you know. There are reports that senior officials in the | :31:20. | :31:21. | |
Trump campaign of penetration are connected to the Russian | :31:22. | :31:26. | |
investigation. Like the Attorney General. Many members of this | :31:27. | :31:34. | |
committee have urged the deputy Attorney General, and he has that | :31:35. | :31:39. | |
authority, to appoint a special console to protect the independence | :31:40. | :31:43. | |
of the investigation. I recall, and I was here in December 2003 shortly | :31:44. | :31:50. | |
after you were confirmed as Deputy Attorney General, then Attorney | :31:51. | :31:56. | |
General Ashcroft accused himself in the investigation of the Valerie | :31:57. | :32:00. | |
plainly. You immediately appointed a special council, I think you | :32:01. | :32:06. | |
appointed... What led you to that decision? In that particular | :32:07. | :32:12. | |
investigation, my judgment was that the appearance of fairness and | :32:13. | :32:16. | |
independence required that it be removed from the political chain of | :32:17. | :32:19. | |
command within the Department of Justice because, as you recall, it | :32:20. | :32:23. | |
seems like a lifetime ago, but that involved the conduct of people, | :32:24. | :32:25. | |
senior level people in the White House. And my judgment was that even | :32:26. | :32:34. | |
I, as an independent minded person, was a political appointee, and I | :32:35. | :32:37. | |
should give it to a career person like Pat Fitzgerald. What about the | :32:38. | :32:42. | |
situation now? We have a Deputy Attorney General, I voted for his | :32:43. | :32:45. | |
confirmation, but should he be not the one to be investigating campaign | :32:46. | :32:52. | |
contacts when his boss, the Attorney General, was a central figure in | :32:53. | :32:56. | |
that campaign? That is a judgment you will have to make. He is, as I | :32:57. | :33:01. | |
hoped I was as deputy Attorney General, is very independent minded | :33:02. | :33:06. | |
career oriented person. It would be premature for me to comment on that. | :33:07. | :33:11. | |
President Trump said that the hacking on the DNC and other efforts | :33:12. | :33:15. | |
to influence the election could have been a lot of different groups. Is | :33:16. | :33:19. | |
that contrary to what the intelligence community has said? The | :33:20. | :33:24. | |
intelligence community with high confidence concluded it was Russian. | :33:25. | :33:27. | |
In many circumstances it is hard to do attribution of a hack. But | :33:28. | :33:31. | |
sometimes the intelligence is there. We have high confidence that the | :33:32. | :33:37. | |
North Koreans hacked Sony, and that the Russians that the hacking of the | :33:38. | :33:41. | |
DNC and other organisations. I have a lot of other questions that I will | :33:42. | :33:49. | |
submit. I want to praise the response of the FBI and South | :33:50. | :33:59. | |
Burlington, for -- Vermont. We had anonymous e-mails coming in, | :34:00. | :34:05. | |
threatening serious action against students at a high school. | :34:06. | :34:11. | |
Escalating cyber threats, including detailed death threats, multiple | :34:12. | :34:15. | |
lockdowns and all. The FBI were close to the college for digital | :34:16. | :34:21. | |
investigation, which you visited a number of years ago. It was a | :34:22. | :34:24. | |
textbook example collaboration between state, local and federal | :34:25. | :34:28. | |
authorities. And I want to thank all of those, it turned out to be very | :34:29. | :34:34. | |
disturbed young man who was doing it. But you only had to turn on the | :34:35. | :34:38. | |
TV and see what happens in different parts of the country, how worried we | :34:39. | :34:42. | |
were in Beaumont. I just want to thank you FBI agents for their help. | :34:43. | :34:47. | |
Thank you, Senator. Senator Graham will be next. Good morning, director | :34:48. | :34:56. | |
Comey. I'm disappointed to see that former Secretary of State Hillary | :34:57. | :35:00. | |
Clinton was in the news yesterday, essentially blaming you and blaming | :35:01. | :35:02. | |
everything other than herself for her loss on November the 8th. I find | :35:03. | :35:09. | |
it ironic, because you're not the one who made the decision to handle | :35:10. | :35:14. | |
classified information on a private e-mail server. You're not the one | :35:15. | :35:20. | |
who decided to have a private meeting with Secretary Clinton's | :35:21. | :35:24. | |
husband in the of the Justice Department's ongoing investigation | :35:25. | :35:28. | |
into Secretary Clinton's server. I use the word investigation here | :35:29. | :35:31. | |
because according to a recent piece in the New York Times you were | :35:32. | :35:34. | |
forbidden from using the word investigation and were instead told | :35:35. | :35:38. | |
to refer to the investigation, which it was, as a matter. Of course, it | :35:39. | :35:42. | |
was the former Attorney General Loretta Lynch who up until that | :35:43. | :35:47. | |
meeting with President Clinton was the person responsible for making | :35:48. | :35:52. | |
the decision of whether to convene a grand jury involved in key | :35:53. | :35:55. | |
allegations against Secretary Clinton. It was former Attorney | :35:56. | :35:59. | |
General Loretta Lynch who apparently forbade you from using the word | :36:00. | :36:03. | |
investigation. Indeed, if the New York Times' story is true, a | :36:04. | :36:07. | |
Democratic operative expressed confidence that the former Attorney | :36:08. | :36:10. | |
General would keep that investigation from going very far. I | :36:11. | :36:17. | |
think you were given an impossible choice to make. And you did the best | :36:18. | :36:21. | |
you could in light of the situation that you were presented with. And it | :36:22. | :36:28. | |
strikes me as somewhat sad for people here and elsewhere to condemn | :36:29. | :36:31. | |
the queue for notifying Congress shortly before the election -- to | :36:32. | :36:42. | |
condemn you. Secretary Clinton had made the decision to use a private | :36:43. | :36:46. | |
e-mail server. And I think it is important to remind folks that you | :36:47. | :36:49. | |
are not the one who decided to do business this way and keep State | :36:50. | :36:54. | |
Department e-mails on a computer of someone suspected of child | :36:55. | :36:57. | |
pornography. Again, I believe you were placed in and incredibly | :36:58. | :37:03. | |
difficult position and did the best you could. I was one of those who | :37:04. | :37:07. | |
felt that given the nature of the investigation and concerns that a | :37:08. | :37:10. | |
special council should have been appointed to conduct the | :37:11. | :37:13. | |
investigation, but of course the Attorney General Lynch and the Obama | :37:14. | :37:18. | |
administration opposed that effort. So I just wanted to express to you | :37:19. | :37:25. | |
my disappointment that this continued seeking of a reason, any | :37:26. | :37:29. | |
reason, other than the flawed campaign of the candidate herself | :37:30. | :37:32. | |
for Secretary Clinton losing the presidential election. If I can turn | :37:33. | :37:38. | |
to a couple of other substantive items here. You have mentioned 702, | :37:39. | :37:44. | |
the reauthorisation. I believe you referred to this is the Crown Jewels | :37:45. | :37:50. | |
of the FBI and counterterrorism investigations. Could you explain | :37:51. | :37:56. | |
why this provides such a unique to all, and why you regard it as | :37:57. | :38:00. | |
literally the Crown jewels of the FBI -- unique to all. Thank you, | :38:01. | :38:06. | |
Senator. Every time I talk about this publicly and went a little bit | :38:07. | :38:09. | |
because I don't want bad people around the world to focus on this | :38:10. | :38:12. | |
team at. It really bad people around the world, because of the genius of | :38:13. | :38:17. | |
American innovation, use our products and infrastructure, for | :38:18. | :38:22. | |
their e-mails and communications. What 702 allows us to do is quickly | :38:23. | :38:31. | |
target terrorists, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, spies, | :38:32. | :38:35. | |
cyber hackers, non-Americans who are using our infrastructure to | :38:36. | :38:38. | |
communicate, target than quickly and collect information on them. It is | :38:39. | :38:42. | |
vital to all parts of the intelligence community because of | :38:43. | :38:46. | |
its agility, its speed and its effectiveness. Again, in an open | :38:47. | :38:49. | |
setting we can't explain what you worried you know from classified | :38:50. | :38:51. | |
briefings about what a difference this makes. -- what you already | :38:52. | :38:56. | |
know. Because America is the mother of this innovation, they use a lot | :38:57. | :39:00. | |
of our agreement and that works to communicate with each other. If we | :39:01. | :39:04. | |
were ever required to establish the normal warrant process for these | :39:05. | :39:07. | |
non-Americans while not in our country, just because the photons | :39:08. | :39:10. | |
they are using to plan attacks across our country's runs, we would | :39:11. | :39:17. | |
be tying ourselves in not -- for reasons that make no sense at all. | :39:18. | :39:23. | |
We talked last year about the meta data database, that is a useful | :39:24. | :39:28. | |
tool. It does not compare in importance to 702. We cannot lose | :39:29. | :39:34. | |
702. I agree. It is a bit difficult to talk about things that are | :39:35. | :39:38. | |
involved classified matters in public. But I think the public needs | :39:39. | :39:44. | |
to know that there are multiple oversight layers, including the | :39:45. | :39:48. | |
Pfizer court. Congressional oversight, internal oversight within | :39:49. | :39:52. | |
the FBI and intelligence community that protect Americans under their | :39:53. | :39:59. | |
privacy rights whilst targeting terrorists and people who are trying | :40:00. | :40:04. | |
to kill us. I want to talk a minute about the electronic communication | :40:05. | :40:07. | |
transactional records, something that you and I have discussed before | :40:08. | :40:13. | |
as well. The FBI can use national Security letters, I believe, to get | :40:14. | :40:18. | |
financial information and telephone numbers now in the conduct of a | :40:19. | :40:21. | |
terrorist investigation. But because of a type of in the law the FBI has | :40:22. | :40:28. | |
not been allowed access to the meta data and national security cases -- | :40:29. | :40:32. | |
because of a type of. To the extent that is necessary. Can you talk to | :40:33. | :40:38. | |
us about the importance of that particular fix, the electronic | :40:39. | :40:41. | |
Communications and transactional records six? Thank you so much, | :40:42. | :40:46. | |
Senator. This seems like a boring deal but it makes a big impact on | :40:47. | :40:51. | |
our work. In counterterrorism cases and counterintelligence cases, we | :40:52. | :40:53. | |
can issue with all kinds of layers of approval in the FBI, a national | :40:54. | :40:58. | |
Security letter to find out the subscriber to a particular telephone | :40:59. | :41:03. | |
number and to find out what numbers that telephone number was in contact | :41:04. | :41:07. | |
with. Not the content of those communications, but just the | :41:08. | :41:09. | |
connection. Because of what I believe is a typo in the law, and if | :41:10. | :41:19. | |
I'm wrong Congress will tell me they intended this, they say they do not | :41:20. | :41:24. | |
have the statutory authority to serve an NSL national Security | :41:25. | :41:27. | |
letter defined by subscriber to a particular e-mail handle or what | :41:28. | :41:30. | |
addresses were in contact with what addresses. Although we can do the | :41:31. | :41:34. | |
same with telephone communications. I don't think Congress intended that | :41:35. | :41:40. | |
distinction, but what it does us in our most important investigations is | :41:41. | :41:44. | |
that if we want to find out the subscriber to repeatedly e-mail | :41:45. | :41:47. | |
handle to go and get an order from a federal judge in Washington as part | :41:48. | :41:51. | |
of the Pfizer court, and incredibly long and difficult process. And I'm | :41:52. | :41:55. | |
worried about that slowing us down, and I'm also worried about it | :41:56. | :41:58. | |
becoming a disincentive for our investigators to do it at all. | :41:59. | :42:02. | |
Because of you are working a case in San Antonio or Seattle, you are | :42:03. | :42:06. | |
moving very, very quickly. If I have to go to get subscriber information | :42:07. | :42:13. | |
on in e-mail address to a federal court in Washington, I'm probably | :42:14. | :42:16. | |
going to try and find some other way around it. If that is what Congress | :42:17. | :42:18. | |
wants, we will follow the law. I don't think that was ever intended, | :42:19. | :42:21. | |
so I hope the West will fix what I believe was a typo. Thank you. I | :42:22. | :42:25. | |
have other questions for the record. Thank you. | :42:26. | :42:35. | |
We are going over to vote. I would also like to have both Democrat and | :42:36. | :42:41. | |
Republicans notify me they want a second round. So I can get in | :42:42. | :42:48. | |
inventories of that. Thank you, welcome back, director Comey. As you | :42:49. | :42:53. | |
are well aware, Russia is actively working to undermine our democracy | :42:54. | :42:56. | |
and hurt American businesses at the same time. Now more than ever | :42:57. | :43:01. | |
Americans are looking to Congress for the leadership, and we must be a | :43:02. | :43:05. | |
united front. And I'm appreciative of some of the members of this | :43:06. | :43:09. | |
committee on the Republican side who have spoken out about this. We must | :43:10. | :43:14. | |
be united as we seek information from the administration. Last month | :43:15. | :43:18. | |
during a hearing at the House intelligence committee, you confirm | :43:19. | :43:22. | |
that the FBI is investigating the Russian government's efforts to | :43:23. | :43:27. | |
interfere in the 2016 presidential election. Including any links | :43:28. | :43:30. | |
between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. I know that you | :43:31. | :43:40. | |
cannot discuss that ongoing investigation. But just one question | :43:41. | :43:42. | |
to clarify - you commit to ensuring that the relevant to national | :43:43. | :43:44. | |
committees receive a full and timely briefing on that investigation's | :43:45. | :43:45. | |
findings? In general I can, Senator, I need | :43:46. | :43:55. | |
Department of Justice's approval to brief on particular people. We've | :43:56. | :43:59. | |
briefed in the rankings, including this committee, on who we have cases | :44:00. | :44:03. | |
on and what we are doing and how we are using various sources of | :44:04. | :44:09. | |
information. I doepted be know if the department will approve that for | :44:10. | :44:16. | |
the entire committees. And do you now go to Rod Rosen Steyn, given the | :44:17. | :44:22. | |
other person is recuesed? Yes I briefed him in his first day in | :44:23. | :44:25. | |
office. He would be the person to make that decision. In your | :44:26. | :44:29. | |
testimony, you note that the Justice Department brought charges against | :44:30. | :44:32. | |
Russian spies and criminal hackers in connection with the 2014 Yahoo | :44:33. | :44:37. | |
cyber attack in February. An example of a cyber attack in our economy. In | :44:38. | :44:43. | |
December of 2016, the FBI and theent dove homeland security released -- | :44:44. | :44:47. | |
the Department of homeland security released a 13-page report, providing | :44:48. | :44:52. | |
technical details on how federal investigators linked Russia to the | :44:53. | :44:55. | |
hacks against UK political organisations. Does Russia use the | :44:56. | :45:00. | |
same military and civilian tools it used to hack our political | :45:01. | :45:03. | |
organisations, in order to do things like hack into US companies, steal | :45:04. | :45:07. | |
identities and sell the credit card information of Americans on the | :45:08. | :45:12. | |
black market? And how is the FBI working to fight against hackers, | :45:13. | :45:15. | |
supported by foreign governments like Russia? ? The answer is yes, | :45:16. | :45:19. | |
both their government organisations and then they have a relationship | :45:20. | :45:25. | |
that is he a often difficult to define with criminals. The Yahoo | :45:26. | :45:32. | |
hack is an example. You had so. Greatest hackers and intelligence | :45:33. | :45:35. | |
agencies there working together so the answer is yes, what we are doing | :45:36. | :45:39. | |
is trying to see if we can impose costs on that behaviour in different | :45:40. | :45:46. | |
ways in different ways but what I mentioned in ply opening, lock up | :45:47. | :45:53. | |
people. Russia is not too great working with us outside their | :45:54. | :45:59. | |
borders but if we can put handcuffs on them to send a message that's in | :46:00. | :46:05. | |
the a free by. You said that transnational organised crime poses | :46:06. | :46:09. | |
a challenge to our security. Russia has vast criminal networks that the | :46:10. | :46:13. | |
Kremlin uses to sew instability around the world I heard this first | :46:14. | :46:18. | |
hand when I was in the balance particulars, Ukraine and Georgia | :46:19. | :46:22. | |
with other senators there have been concerns that Russians are using the | :46:23. | :46:25. | |
luxury real estate market to launder money. The Treasury department has | :46:26. | :46:30. | |
noted a significant rise in the use of shell companies and real estate | :46:31. | :46:32. | |
transactions because foreign buyers use them as a way to hide their | :46:33. | :46:37. | |
identity and find a safe haven for their money in the such. In fact | :46:38. | :46:41. | |
nearly half of all homes in the US, worth at least $5 million are | :46:42. | :46:46. | |
purchased using shell companies. Does the anonymity associated with | :46:47. | :46:50. | |
the use of shell companies, to buy real estate, hurt the FBI's ability | :46:51. | :47:00. | |
to trace the flow illicit money and fight organised crime and do you | :47:01. | :47:05. | |
need more transparency in these transactions? Yes and yes. Very | :47:06. | :47:10. | |
good. It is a huge problem when you hear that over $5 million homes, | :47:11. | :47:14. | |
half purchased by shell companies, that is a major problem. In March | :47:15. | :47:19. | |
this committee's subcommittee on crime and terrorism held it first | :47:20. | :47:25. | |
hearing, I think Senator Graham and Senator White House for that. I | :47:26. | :47:30. | |
raised the issue of proecting it election infrastructure with former | :47:31. | :47:33. | |
bush official Ken wine Steyn. He agreed it is an important issue. As | :47:34. | :47:39. | |
the rapging member of the rules committee I'm particularly concerned | :47:40. | :47:41. | |
about ensuring our elections are safe from foreign interference. I | :47:42. | :47:46. | |
recently led a group of 26 Senators in calling for a fall account of the | :47:47. | :47:49. | |
election assistance commission's efforts to address Russian cyber | :47:50. | :47:53. | |
security threats in the 2016 election. I'm also working on | :47:54. | :47:57. | |
legislation in thisser why. Can you discuss how the if. BI has | :47:58. | :48:04. | |
co-ordinated with the election assistance commission, Department of | :48:05. | :48:06. | |
Homeland Security and state and local election officials to help | :48:07. | :48:09. | |
protect the integrity of our election process? Thank you N short | :48:10. | :48:14. | |
what we have done with DHS is share the tools, tactics and techniques we | :48:15. | :48:20. | |
see hackers, especially from the 2016 election season using to attack | :48:21. | :48:25. | |
bored voter registration databases and engage in other hacks. We have | :48:26. | :48:29. | |
pushed that out to all the states and election assistance commission | :48:30. | :48:31. | |
for harden their networks. That's one of the most important thing we | :48:32. | :48:35. | |
can to, equip them with the information to make their systems | :48:36. | :48:38. | |
tighter. Very good. You know we have different equipment all over the | :48:39. | :48:42. | |
country, there's some advantage to that, I think, I think it's good | :48:43. | :48:46. | |
when we have paper ballot back-ups, of course but we have to be prepared | :48:47. | :48:49. | |
for this and this certainly isn't about one political party or one | :48:50. | :48:54. | |
candidate. The last time you will came before the committee in | :48:55. | :49:01. | |
December, 2015, just one week after the San Bernadino attacks, since | :49:02. | :49:05. | |
then as was noted by the chir we have seen other attacks in our | :49:06. | :49:13. | |
country. We had a tragedy in a shopping malin St Carmen, minute sow | :49:14. | :49:18. | |
too, ten wounded at a shopping mal. Thankfully brave off-duty cop was | :49:19. | :49:21. | |
there. He was able to stop further damage from being done. And I would | :49:22. | :49:27. | |
also like to thank you, and the FBI for your investigation, having | :49:28. | :49:31. | |
talked to the chief up there, Senator Franklin and I from briefed | :49:32. | :49:36. | |
by him, as well as congressman Emmer, right after this attack the | :49:37. | :49:41. | |
local Police Department, a mid-size department and they had to do a will | :49:42. | :49:46. | |
the with working with the community, they have a figure Somali community | :49:47. | :49:49. | |
there, that is a big part of their community that they are proud to | :49:50. | :49:52. | |
have there. So they are working with them, they are working with the | :49:53. | :49:56. | |
community, they are helping but the FBI really stood in and did the | :49:57. | :50:01. | |
investigation and I guess I want to thank thank you with that and end | :50:02. | :50:06. | |
with one question. It's been reported that Isis has encouraged | :50:07. | :50:10. | |
loan wolf attacks like we saw in Orlando. What chal eggs do these | :50:11. | :50:15. | |
type of ak at thats present for law enforcement and what is the FBI | :50:16. | :50:18. | |
doing to prevent these strategies? Thank you. The central challenges, | :50:19. | :50:26. | |
not just finding needles in a nationwide haystack but trying to | :50:27. | :50:29. | |
find out which pieces of hay might become a needle and that is which of | :50:30. | :50:33. | |
the troubled young people or sometimes older people are consuming | :50:34. | :50:38. | |
poisonous prop began ga, some Isis, some other sources and are moving | :50:39. | :50:42. | |
towards an act of violence, like a stabbing at a shopping malis some | :50:43. | :50:45. | |
way it achieve meaning in their lives. A huge part is building | :50:46. | :50:48. | |
relationships with the communities you mentioned. Because those folks | :50:49. | :50:52. | |
do not want anyone committing vile he is, committing violence in the | :50:53. | :50:56. | |
name of their faith so they have the same inp sentives we do in making | :50:57. | :51:01. | |
sure they see us that way and we see them that way is at the heart of our | :51:02. | :51:07. | |
response. We are not going to see some troubled kid going side ways | :51:08. | :51:10. | |
and thinking he should stab people, anywhere near as easily as the | :51:11. | :51:13. | |
people around that kid are going to see it. So getting into a position | :51:14. | :51:15. | |
where they feel comfortable in telling us or telling local law | :51:16. | :51:18. | |
enforcement is at the heart of our responsibility, to to find the | :51:19. | :51:21. | |
needles, evaliate the pieces of hay and stop this. Thank you, director | :51:22. | :51:26. | |
Comey could you pass on to our agents and support personnel how | :51:27. | :51:30. | |
much we appreciate their efforts to defend the country. We are going to | :51:31. | :51:34. | |
set a record for a questions asked and answers r answered in six | :51:35. | :51:39. | |
minutes and 54 seconds, if I can. Do you agree with me if is he quest | :51:40. | :51:44. | |
racial comes into effect it would be devastating to the FBI? Yes. And it | :51:45. | :51:50. | |
is due to do so, unless congress straining it. I have been told that. | :51:51. | :51:55. | |
Do you agree if Isil loses the caliphate these people will go out | :51:56. | :51:59. | |
throughout the world and welcome terrorist agents and the terrorism | :52:00. | :52:02. | |
threat to the homeland will get greater over time, not smaller? Yes, | :52:03. | :52:06. | |
it'll diminish in their power to put out their media to the troubled | :52:07. | :52:10. | |
people in the country will decrease but the hardened killers thrown out | :52:11. | :52:13. | |
of the caliphate will be a big problem. So from a funding point of | :52:14. | :52:17. | |
view, terrorism is not going to get better, probably worse? I think | :52:18. | :52:22. | |
that's fair to say. Did you ever talk to Sally Yates about her | :52:23. | :52:26. | |
concerns about General Flynn being compromised? I did. I don't know | :52:27. | :52:32. | |
whether I can talk about it in this forum. But, the answer is yes. That | :52:33. | :52:38. | |
she had concerns about General Flynn and she expressed those concerns to | :52:39. | :52:43. | |
you? Correct. OK. We'll talk about that later. Do you stand by your | :52:44. | :52:46. | |
House testimony on March 20th that there was no surveillance of the | :52:47. | :52:49. | |
Trump campaign that you are aware of? Correct. You would know about it | :52:50. | :52:54. | |
if there were is that correct? Think so, yes. Carter Paige was there a | :52:55. | :53:02. | |
warrant issued regarding his activity with the Russians? I cannot | :53:03. | :53:08. | |
answer that here. Did you consider carteder Paige an agent of that | :53:09. | :53:11. | |
campaign? Same answer, can't answer it here. Do you stand by your | :53:12. | :53:18. | |
testimony that there is a counterintelligence investigation, | :53:19. | :53:19. | |
regarding Trump campaign, individuals and the Russian | :53:20. | :53:22. | |
Government as to whether or not they collaborate? To see if there was any | :53:23. | :53:25. | |
coordination between the Russian evident and peoples... Is that still | :53:26. | :53:29. | |
going on? Yes. Nothing has changed, you stand by those two statements? | :53:30. | :53:34. | |
Yes. But you won't tell me about Carter Paige? Not here I won't. The | :53:35. | :53:38. | |
Chairman mentioned that Fusion, are you familiar with Fusion? I know the | :53:39. | :53:44. | |
name. Are they part of the Russian intelligence apparatus? I can't say. | :53:45. | :53:50. | |
OK. Do you agree with me that Fusion was involved in preparing a dossier | :53:51. | :53:54. | |
against Donald Trump, if they z that would be interfering in our election | :53:55. | :53:57. | |
by the Russians? I don't want to say. OK. Do you agree with me that | :53:58. | :54:07. | |
Anthonie Weiner of 2016, should not have access to classified | :54:08. | :54:09. | |
information? Yes, that's a fair statement. Would you agree with me | :54:10. | :54:14. | |
that if that's in the illegal we've got really bad laws? Well, if he | :54:15. | :54:20. | |
hadn't -... Well, he got it somehow? It would be illegal if he didn't | :54:21. | :54:24. | |
have appropriate clearance. Do you agree with me he didn't have | :54:25. | :54:27. | |
appropriate clearance or if he did, that would even be worse I don't | :54:28. | :54:32. | |
believe at the time we found that on his laptop he had any kind of | :54:33. | :54:35. | |
clearance. I agree. So for him to get it should be a crime. Somebody | :54:36. | :54:41. | |
should be prosecuted for letting him have access to classified | :54:42. | :54:44. | |
information. Does that make general sense? It could be a crime it would | :54:45. | :54:50. | |
depend upon... Do you agree with me that it should be, that anybody who | :54:51. | :54:54. | |
let him have the information probably should have been | :54:55. | :54:58. | |
prosecuted. If our law doesn't cover that, it probe should. There is no | :54:59. | :55:05. | |
Anthony Weiner statute. Well perhaps there should be. I wonder how you | :55:06. | :55:11. | |
can get information and it is notal crime. Unmasking, are you familiar | :55:12. | :55:20. | |
with that? Familiar with the term. Has the bureau asked for the | :55:21. | :55:24. | |
unmasking of a citizen... Oh, yes, I did it this week. Before I | :55:25. | :55:30. | |
reauthorise 702, and I'm a hawkish guy, I want to know how it works. | :55:31. | :55:34. | |
Are you aware of any request by the White House, anybody in the Obama | :55:35. | :55:38. | |
administration to unmask American citizens that were caught up in | :55:39. | :55:43. | |
incidental surveillances in 2015-16? I'm in the I'm in the aware of any | :55:44. | :55:47. | |
request to the FBI. Would you know? Who would they make the request to? | :55:48. | :55:51. | |
Well, they could make it to anyone in the FBI who was... What about the | :55:52. | :55:56. | |
NSA? Wouldn't you make it to them? Sure, if it was an NSA report. I | :55:57. | :56:01. | |
have read in the media and heard about NSA reports but I don't | :56:02. | :56:06. | |
know... Who do you sk, do you go to the NSA it ask somebody be unmasked. | :56:07. | :56:12. | |
I give you an example. I got a report that said that US company | :56:13. | :56:15. | |
number 1 had been removed. I said I believe I need to know the name of | :56:16. | :56:21. | |
that cop. Who do you ask? I ask my briefer who works for the PDB staff, | :56:22. | :56:25. | |
I would like to know, she goes and asks the owner of the information. | :56:26. | :56:29. | |
The NSA? In this case I think it was CIA. Does the owner of the | :56:30. | :56:33. | |
information, record, request for unmasking? I believe the NSA does, I | :56:34. | :56:39. | |
don't know about CSA. But there should be a record, somewhere in our | :56:40. | :56:43. | |
Government for a request to unmask regardless of who made the request? | :56:44. | :56:47. | |
I think that's right. Is it fair to say that very few people can make | :56:48. | :56:50. | |
requests for unmasking? I mean I can't go and make that request as a | :56:51. | :56:56. | |
Senator, can I? Sure, it is a fairly small group - the consumers, which I | :56:57. | :57:02. | |
am, of that small set of... The National Security Council, within | :57:03. | :57:05. | |
that group can make this request or do you know? I don't know for sure. | :57:06. | :57:08. | |
The national security advisor certainly can. When it comes to | :57:09. | :57:14. | |
Russia s it fair to say that the Government rf Russia actively | :57:15. | :57:16. | |
provides safe haven to cyber criminals? Yes. Is it fair to say | :57:17. | :57:21. | |
that the Russian government is still involved in American politics? Yes. | :57:22. | :57:26. | |
Is it fair to say we need to stop them from doing it? Yes. Fair to | :57:27. | :57:30. | |
say. Do you agree with me the only way they are going to stop is for | :57:31. | :57:35. | |
them to pay a price for interfering in our political process? I think | :57:36. | :57:39. | |
that's a fair statement. So what we're doing today is not working, | :57:40. | :57:42. | |
they are still doing it. They are doing it all over the world, aren't | :57:43. | :57:47. | |
they? Yes. So what kind of threat do you believe Russia represents to our | :57:48. | :57:51. | |
democratic process, given what you know about Russia's behaviour of | :57:52. | :57:56. | |
late? Well certainly in my view the greatest threat of any nation on | :57:57. | :58:00. | |
earth, given their intention and capability. Do you agree that they | :58:01. | :58:05. | |
did not change the actual vote tally but one day they might? I agree, we | :58:06. | :58:11. | |
found no information of any change in vote tallies. There was efforts | :58:12. | :58:16. | |
aimed at voter registration systems but I spokes in theory, the part of | :58:17. | :58:20. | |
the United States, the beauty of our system is that it is a bit of a | :58:21. | :58:24. | |
hairball and all different kinds of systems... Have they done this in | :58:25. | :58:29. | |
other countries, tampered with the vote? My attempt is they have | :58:30. | :58:32. | |
attempted to. And there is no reason they won't attempt it here if we | :58:33. | :58:35. | |
don't stop them, over time Think think that's fair. Thank you V -- | :58:36. | :58:39. | |
thank you V 100 years ago, when women were | :58:40. | :59:31. | |
battling to win the vote in the United Kingdom, this place was on | :59:32. | :59:39. | |
the front line. Campaigners known as suffragettes had been fighting for | :59:40. | :59:42. | |
decades to secure the vote, but to no avail. So, one group decided to | :59:43. | :59:48. | |
take direct action. The women's social and political union was led | :59:49. | :59:49. | |
by Emily | :59:50. | :59:51. |