James Comey Briefings


James Comey

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It is frustrating when the FBI refuses to answer this committee's

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questions. But leaks relevant information to the media. In other

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words, they don't talk to us, but somebody talks to the media.

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Director Comey, have you ever been an anonymous source in news reports

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about matters relating to the Trump investigation or the Clinton

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investigation? Never. Question two on relatively related... Have few

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other authorised somebody else at the FBI to be an anonymous source in

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news reports about the Trump investigation or by investigation?

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No. Has any classified information relating to President Trump or his

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associates being declassified and shared with the media? Not to my

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knowledge. You testified the four by House intelligence committee --

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before the House intelligence committee that a lot of classified

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matters have ended up in the media recently. Without getting into any

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particular article, and I want to emphasise that, without getting into

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any particular article, is there an investigation of any leaks of

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classified information relating to Mr Trump or his associates? I don't

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want to answer that question, Senator, for reasons I think you

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know. There have been a variety of leaks, leaks are always a problem,

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but especially in the last 3-6 months. And where there is a league

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of classified information, the FBI, if that is our information, makes a

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referral to the Department of Justice, or if it is another

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agency's information, they do the same, and the DOJ authorises an open

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of an investigation. I don't want to confirm if there are any

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investigations open. I want to challenge you on that. The

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Government regularly acknowledges when it is investigating classified

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leaks. You did that in the Valerie plane case, what is the difference

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here? The most important difference is that I don't have authorisation

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from the Department to confirm any of the investigations they have

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authorised. It may be that we can get that at some point, but I'm not

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going to do that in the open setting without having talked to them. You

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can expect me to follow up on that offer. Sure. There are several

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senior FBI officials who would have had access to the classified

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information that was leaked, including yourself and the deputy

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director. So how can the Justice Department guarantee the integrity

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of the investigations without designating an agency of than the

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FBI to gather the facts and illuminate senior FBI officials?

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Well, I'm not going to once about any particular investigations, but I

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know of situations in the past where if you think the FBI or its

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leadership are suspect, you have another investigative agencies abort

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the investigation by federal prosecutors. It could be done, and

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it has been done in the past -- support the investigation. Moving on

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to another subject. The New York Times recently reported that the FBI

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had found a crumbling e-mail among the ones -- a troubling e-mail among

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the ones found from Democratic operatives. The e-mail reportedly

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provided assurances that Attorney General Lynch would project academic

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written by making sure that -- would protect Secretary Clinton by making

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sure that the investigation did not go too far. How and when did you

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first learn of this document? Also, who sent it and who received it?

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That is not a question I can answer in this forum, Mr Chairman, it would

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call for a classified response. I have briefly to ship the

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intelligence committees on that particular issue, but I cannot talk

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about it here so I have briefed leadership. You can expect me to

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follow up with you on that point. Sure. What is that that did the FBI

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take to determine -- what steps did the FBI take to determine if

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Attorney General Lynch had... Did the FBI interview the person who

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wrote the e-mail? I cannot talk about that in an unclassified

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setting. OK, then you can expect me to follow up on that. I asked the

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FBI to provide this e-mail to the committee before today's hearing.

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Why haven't you done so? And were you provided by the end of this

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weeks -- will you provide it? To react to that, I have to give a

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classified answer, and I can't give it sitting here. So that means you

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called give me the e-mail? I'm not confirming there was an e-mail,

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surf. The subject is classified. In an appropriate forum, I would be

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happy to brief you on it, but I can't do it in an open hearing. I

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issue that other members of the committee can have access to that

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briefing if they want -- I assume. I want to talk about going dark, a few

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years ago you testified before the committee about going dark problem

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and the inability of law enforcement to access encrypted data despite the

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existence of a lawfully issued court order. You continue to raise this

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issue in your public speeches, most recently at Boston College. My

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question, you mentioned at the beginning in your testimony briefly,

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but can you provide the committee with a more detailed update on the

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status of the going dark problem, and how it has affected the FBI's

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ability to access encrypted data. Has there been any progress

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collaborating with the technology sector to overcome any problems, at

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our hearing in 2015 you said you didn't think legislation was

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necessary. At that time. Is that still your view? Thank you, Mr

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Chairman. The shadow created by the problem we call going dark continues

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to fall across more and more of our work. Take devices, for example. The

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ubiquitous default for this encryption devices is affecting now

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about half of our work. The first it's months of this fiscal year, FBI

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examiners were presented with over 6000 devices, forward we have lawful

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authority, search warrant a court order to open, and 46% of those

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cases we could not open those devices with any technique. That

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means half of the devices that we encounter in terrorism cases, in

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counterintelligence cases, in gang cases, cannot be opened with any

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technique. That is a big problem. And so the shadow continues to fall.

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I'm determined to continue to make sure the American people and

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Congress know about it. I know this is important to the president and

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the new Attorney General. I don't know yet how the new administration

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intends to approach it, but it is something we have to talk about,

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because like you, I care a lot about privacy, I also care a lot about

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public safety. And there continues to be a huge collision between those

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two things we care about. I look forward to continuing that

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conversation, Mr Chairman. You didn't respond to the part about you

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still have the view that legislation is not needed? I don't know the

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answer yet. I hope I said last time I talked about this, it may require

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a legislative solution at some point. The Obama administration was

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not in a position where they were seeking legislation. I don't know

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yet how President Trump intends to approach this. I know he spoke about

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it during the campaign and he cares about it, but it is per for me to

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say. -- it is premature for me to say. Director, I have one question

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regarding my opening comment. And I view it as the most important

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question. And I hope you will answer it. Why was it necessary to announce

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11 days before a presidential election that you were opening an

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investigation on a new computer without any knowledge of what was in

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that computer? Why didn't you just do the investigation, as you would

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normally, with no public announcement? A great question,

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Senator, thank you. October 27, the investigative team that had finished

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the investigation into life focused on Secretary Clinton's e-mail, I met

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with them later that morning in my conference room. They laid out to me

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what they could see from the meta data on Anthony Weiner's laptop,

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that had been seized in an unrelated case. What they could see from the

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meta data was that there were thousands of Secretary Clinton's

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e-mails on that device. Including what they thought might be the

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missing e-mails from her first three months as Secretary of State. We

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never found any e-mails from her first three months. She was using

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Akers and blackberry then, that is very important. If there was

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evidence that she was acting with intent, that is where it would be.

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But they were not there? , I finish my answer, Senator? They said, we

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can see thousands of e-mails from the Clinton e-mail domain, including

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many from the rise and blackberry domain. They said, we think we have

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to get a search warrant. -- from the Verizon. The Department of Justice

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agrees, and by authorised them to seek a search warrant, I faced my

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choice. I have lived my entire career by the solution that you can

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possibly avoid it, you avoid any action in the run-up to an election,

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why you might have an impact, but I sat there that morning and I could

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not see a door labelled no action here. I could see two doors, and

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they were both actions. One was labelled speaks, the other was

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labelled conceal. Here is how I thought about it, I want you to know

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my thinking. Having repeatedly told this Congress, we are done, there is

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nothing there, there is no case there, to restart in a hugely

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significant way, potentially finding the e-mails that would like to her

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intent from the beginning, and not speak about it, that would acquire

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an active concealment, in my view. I stared at speak and conceal. Speak

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would be really bad, there is an election in 11 days, that would be

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bad. Concealing in my view would be catastrophic, not just to the FBI

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but well beyond. And honestly, between really bad and catastrophic,

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I said to my team, we've got to walk into the world of really bad, I've

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got to tell Congress that we are restarting this. Not in some

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burglars way, in a hugely significant way. -- not in a

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frivolous way. The team worked night after night and they filed thousands

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of new e-mails. They found classified information on Anthony

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Weiner, somehow her e-mails had been forwarded to Anthony Weiner,

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including classified information, by her assistant, Huma Abedin. They

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found thousands of new e-mails, they called me the Saturday night before

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the election and said, thanks to the wizardry of our technology, we have

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only had to personally read 6000. We think we can finish tomorrow

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morning, Sunday. I met with them and they said, we found a lot of new

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stuff. We did not find anything that changes our view of her intent. We

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are in the same place we were in July. It hasn't changed our view. I

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asked them lots of questions. I said, OK, if that's where you are I

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have to tell Congress this is done. This is terrible, it makes me

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nauseous to think that we might have had impact on the election, but it

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would not change the decision. Everybody who disagrees with me has

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to come back to October the 28th with me and stare at this and tell

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me what you would do. Would you speak or would you conceal? I could

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be wrong, but we honestly made a decision between those two choices

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that even in hindsight, this has been one of the world's painful

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experiences, I would make the same decision, I would not conceal it on

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October 28 from the Congress. I sent a letter to Congress, I did not make

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a public announcement, I send a private letter to the chairs on the

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rankings of the oversight committees. I know it is a

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distinction without a difference in the world of leaks, but it was very

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important that I tell them instead of consuming. Reasonable people can

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disagree, but that is the reason that I made that choice, and it was

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a hard choice. I still believe in retrospect it was the right choice,

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as painful as this has been. I'm sorry for the long answer. That you

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respond, on the letter it was just a matter of minutes before the world

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knew about it. Secondly, my understanding and the staff has just

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said to me that you didn't get a search warrant before making the

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announcement. That is right. We are going to seek

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a search warrant. I don't see it as a meaningful distinction. It is very

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hard. You took an enormous gamble, the gamble was that there was

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something there that would invalidate her candidacy and there

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wasn't. So one has to look at that action in and say did it affect the

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campaign? I think most people who have looked at this say, yes it did

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affect the campaign, why would he do it? Was there any conflict among

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your staff, people saying do it, people saying don't do it, as has

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been reported? No. There was a great debate. I have a fabulous staff at

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all levels and one of my junior lawyers said should you consider

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that what you are about to do elect Donald Trump president. Hanky for

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raising that, but I can't consider for a second whose political

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fortunes will be affected in which way. I had to ask what is the right

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thing to do. I am proud of the way debated it and everyone on my team

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agreed that we have to tell Congress that we are restarting this in a

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hugely significant way. There is a way to do that. I don't know whether

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it would work, but certainly in a classified way, carrying out your

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tradition of not announcing investigations. I look at this

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exactly the opposite way you do. Everybody knew it would influence

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the investigation before. But there was a very large percentage of

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chance that it would. And that percentage of chance was taken.

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There was no information and the election was lost. It seems to me

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that before your department does something like this, you really

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ought to... Because another senator began to talk about other

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investigations and this theory does not hold up when you look at other

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investigations. Let me go on to 702 because you began your comments

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saying how important it is and coming yes, it is,. We've got a

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problem the issue that we need to address as the FBI's practice of

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searching 702 data using you as person identifiers as query terms

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and some have called this a unconstitutional back door search.

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Others see it as essential in ensuring terrorists don't slip

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through the cracks as they did before. Could you give us your views

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on that and how it could be handled to avoid the charge which may bring

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down 702? Thank you, Senator. An important issue. The way 702 works

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is that under the provision of the statute, the Pfizer Court, federal

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judges, authorised us as US agencies to collect information overseas if

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they are using American infrastructure. The criticism we

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have got since 911 is you have to make sure you are in a position to

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connect the dots. You can't have stove piped information. We have

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responded to that, mostly the great work of my process, we collect

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information under 702, it does not sit in a separate stovepipe. It sits

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on a single cloud type environment, so that if I am opening an

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investigation in the United States on a terrorism, criminal matter and

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I have the name of the suspect, telephone, e-mail addresses, I

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searched the FBI databases. That search necessarily will also touch

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the information that is collected by 702 so that we don't miss a dot, but

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nobody gets access to the information that sits in the 702

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database unless they have been trained correctly. If there is,

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let's imagine that terrorists overseas were talking about a

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suspect in the knighted States, or were Connacht someone's --... We

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open the case in the United States and put in that name that e-mail

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address, it will touch that data and tell us that there is information in

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the 702 database that is relevant. If the agent doing the query is

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properly trained, they can see that information. If they are trained,

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they will be alerted and they will have to get the appropriate training

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to see it. To do it otherwise is to risk asked where it matters most in

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the United States failing to connect dots. My view is that the

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information that is the 702 database has been lawfully collected,

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carefully overseen and checked and our use of it is also appropriate

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and overseen and checked. You are an masking the data. -- unmasking. I

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don't know what that means in this context. We collect data collected

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from a lawful source all on place and we don't miss a dot. What we

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make sure is that no one can see the information unless they have the

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appropriate training and oversight. My time is up. Thank you. Senator

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Hatch. In January I introduced the rapid DNA act. It is bipartisan.

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Chairman, I want to thank you for putting this bill on the agenda for

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tomorrow's business meeting. This is the same build that the Senate

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unanimously passed last year and this technology allows developing a

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DNA profile and performing database comparisons in less than two hours.

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The following standards and procedures will allow law

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enforcement to solve crimes and innocent advocates to exonerate the

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wrongfully accused. You came before this committee in December 2015 and

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I asked you then about this legislation. You said it would help

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us change the world in a very exciting way. Is that still your

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view of the value of this legislation and do you believe that

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Congress should act on this without getting tangled up another criminal

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justice reform issues? I agree very much. Rapid DNA will materially

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advance the safety of the American people. If the police officer in the

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United States has in their custody someone who is a rapist, before

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letting them go on some lesser offence, they will be able to

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quickly check the DNA database and get a hit that will save lives, that

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will protect all kinds of people from pain. It is a great thing.

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Thank you. You're prepared statement touches on what the FBI is doing to

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protect children from predators. Personnel and youth serving

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organisation such as employees, coaches, volunteers, often work with

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unsupervised use. That magnifies the need for a thorough evaluating when

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they join. I introduced a child protection improvement act which

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gives youth serving organisation greater access to the nationwide FBI

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fingerprint background checks system. Do you believe that

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providing organisations like the YMCA and the Girl Scouts of America

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greater access to the FBI fingerprint background checks is an

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important step in keeping child predators and violent criminal away

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from our children. I do. I think the more information you can put in the

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hands of the people who are vetting the better. We have an exciting new

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feature of the FBI's fingerprint system called wrap back, once you

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check someone was Mike identification, check they have no

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record. They later develop one, you can be alerted to it if it happens

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later. That makes a big difference. Thank you for sub is broken at

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length about the so-called going dark programme. Strong encryption

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technology enters the ability of law enforcement to access the personal

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data on smartphones and similar devices. You're prepared testimony

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for today's hearing addresses this issue. I have expressed significant

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concern about proposals that would require devices or software

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manufacturers to build a back door into their programming to allow law

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enforcement to access a cryptic data in the course of investigations. I

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remain convinced that such back doors can be created without

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seriously compromising the security of cryptic devices. I believe this

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is an issue where law enforcement and stakeholders need to work

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together to find solutions rather than coming to Congress with one

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size fits all legislative fixes. What are you doing to engage with

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stakeholders in this issue and what kind of progress are you making if

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you can tell us? Thank you. Good news on that front. We have had very

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open and productive conversations with the private sector over the

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last 18 months. Everybody realises that we care about the same things.

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We all love and care about privacy and public safety. None of us want

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back doors. We don't want access to devices built in in some way. What

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we want to work with the manufacturers on is to figure out

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how can we accommodate both interests in a sensitive way? How

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can we optimise the privacy, security features of their devices

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and allow court owners to be complied with? We are having good

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conversations. I don't know where they will end up. If you're going to

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make devices of the United States is, you figure out how to sort it

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out. We now have almost a decade of experience using a statute so we

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have more to go on. The gamut intelligence value of 702 is

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documented and it has never been intentionally misused or abused.

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Every federal court has addressed the issue has concluded that 702 is

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lawful and that both parties have strongly supported it. Describe the

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targeting and minimisation procedures or section 702 and how

:25:00.:25:07.

each agency's procedures oversee the executive branch. They said my

:25:08.:25:11.

opening, 702 is a critical tool to protect this country. The way it

:25:12.:25:16.

works is we are allowed to conduct surveillance under the supervision

:25:17.:25:22.

of the foreign intelligence court on non-US persons who are outside the

:25:23.:25:25.

net United States if they are using American infrastructure. It does not

:25:26.:25:33.

involve US persons or activity in the United States. Each agency as

:25:34.:25:37.

you said has detailed procedures as to how we will handle this

:25:38.:25:42.

information. It is approved by the Pfizer court. Not only will we

:25:43.:25:47.

overseen the Pfizer court, we are being overseen by the US general.

:25:48.:25:53.

There have been no abuses. Every court that has used this has said

:25:54.:25:59.

this is appropriate under the fourth Amendment, under the statute, it was

:26:00.:26:05.

an act passed by a democratically controlled Congress and then renewed

:26:06.:26:09.

by a Republican-controlled Congress and upheld by every court that has

:26:10.:26:12.

looked at it. I am telling you what the rest of the intelligence

:26:13.:26:15.

community has said, we need this to protect the country. This should be

:26:16.:26:19.

an easy conversation to have, but often people get confused about the

:26:20.:26:22.

details and mix it up with other things. It is our job to make sure

:26:23.:26:28.

we expend it clearly. My time is up. I will turn to you. Welcome back.

:26:29.:26:40.

You mentioned you like the annual meeting. We didn't have one last

:26:41.:26:45.

year. Last year was the first one in 15 years that the FBI did not

:26:46.:26:53.

testify for this committee. A lot has happened in the last year and a

:26:54.:27:02.

half. Senator Feinstein noted that Americans across the country have

:27:03.:27:08.

been confused and disappointed by your judgment in having an

:27:09.:27:13.

investigation into Secretary Clinton's e-mails. On a number of

:27:14.:27:18.

occasions, you chose to comment rectally and extensively on that

:27:19.:27:21.

investigation. You even released internal FBI memos and notes. I have

:27:22.:27:32.

missed this may be, but I have never seen anything like this. You said

:27:33.:27:36.

nothing about the investigation into the Trump campaign into Russia. Was

:27:37.:27:49.

it appropriate for you to comment on one investigation repeatedly and not

:27:50.:27:55.

say anything about the other? I think so. Can I explain? I only have

:27:56.:27:59.

so much time. People forget, we would not confirm

:28:00.:28:11.

the existence of the Hillary Clinton e-mail investigation until three

:28:12.:28:14.

months after it began, even though it began with a public referral and

:28:15.:28:18.

the candidate herself talked about it. In October of 2015, we confirmed

:28:19.:28:23.

it existed and then said not another word, not a peep about it until we

:28:24.:28:28.

were finished. It was a critical time, a couple of weeks before the

:28:29.:28:32.

election. I think there are other things involved in that election.

:28:33.:28:40.

But there is no question that that had a great effect. Historians can

:28:41.:28:43.

debate what kind of an effect it was. But you did do it. In October,

:28:44.:28:57.

the FBI was investigating the Trump campaign's connection to Russia. You

:28:58.:29:01.

sent a letter informing the Senate House that you were reviewing

:29:02.:29:05.

additional e-mails. It could be relevant to this. But both

:29:06.:29:09.

investigations were open but you still only commented on one. I

:29:10.:29:14.

commentated, as I explained earlier, in a letter I sent to the chair and

:29:15.:29:18.

rankings of the oversight committees that we were taking additional steps

:29:19.:29:21.

in the Clinton e-mail investigation because I had passed the fight under

:29:22.:29:25.

oath repeatedly that we were done, that we were finished. -- I had

:29:26.:29:31.

testified under oath. We treated the Trump investigation like the Clinton

:29:32.:29:34.

investigation, we didn't say a word about it until months into it, and

:29:35.:29:38.

we only confirmed that we were investigating. We are not going to

:29:39.:29:42.

say anything about it until we are done, and I don't know when that

:29:43.:29:45.

will be, but that is the way we handled the Clinton investigation as

:29:46.:29:50.

well. That we ask you this, during the investigation into Hillary

:29:51.:29:56.

Clinton's e-mail, a number of people like Rudy Giuliani claimed to have a

:29:57.:30:01.

pipeline to the FBI. Numerous agents talk to them all the time, and I

:30:02.:30:06.

quote. Regarding the investigation. He even said that he had insinuated

:30:07.:30:12.

he had advanced warning about the e-mails described in your October

:30:13.:30:18.

letter. A former FBI agent made similar claims. Either they are

:30:19.:30:26.

lying, or this is a serious problem within the bureau. The FBI during

:30:27.:30:33.

this 2016 campaign have contact with Rudy Giuliani about the Clinton

:30:34.:30:40.

investigation -- did anybody from the FBI? I don't know yet. But if I

:30:41.:30:46.

found out that people were making information about our investigation

:30:47.:30:51.

there will be severe consequence -- that people were leaking. I don't

:30:52.:30:56.

know yet. Do you know anything about other former agents? I don't know

:30:57.:31:00.

yet. But it is a matter that I am very, very interested in. But you

:31:01.:31:05.

are looking into it? Correct. And once you have found that answer,

:31:06.:31:08.

will be provide it to ask was young I will provide it to the committee

:31:09.:31:13.

in some form. I don't know whether I will be able to say it publicly, but

:31:14.:31:19.

I will let you know. There are reports that senior officials in the

:31:20.:31:21.

Trump campaign of penetration are connected to the Russian

:31:22.:31:26.

investigation. Like the Attorney General. Many members of this

:31:27.:31:34.

committee have urged the deputy Attorney General, and he has that

:31:35.:31:39.

authority, to appoint a special console to protect the independence

:31:40.:31:43.

of the investigation. I recall, and I was here in December 2003 shortly

:31:44.:31:50.

after you were confirmed as Deputy Attorney General, then Attorney

:31:51.:31:56.

General Ashcroft accused himself in the investigation of the Valerie

:31:57.:32:00.

plainly. You immediately appointed a special council, I think you

:32:01.:32:06.

appointed... What led you to that decision? In that particular

:32:07.:32:12.

investigation, my judgment was that the appearance of fairness and

:32:13.:32:16.

independence required that it be removed from the political chain of

:32:17.:32:19.

command within the Department of Justice because, as you recall, it

:32:20.:32:23.

seems like a lifetime ago, but that involved the conduct of people,

:32:24.:32:25.

senior level people in the White House. And my judgment was that even

:32:26.:32:34.

I, as an independent minded person, was a political appointee, and I

:32:35.:32:37.

should give it to a career person like Pat Fitzgerald. What about the

:32:38.:32:42.

situation now? We have a Deputy Attorney General, I voted for his

:32:43.:32:45.

confirmation, but should he be not the one to be investigating campaign

:32:46.:32:52.

contacts when his boss, the Attorney General, was a central figure in

:32:53.:32:56.

that campaign? That is a judgment you will have to make. He is, as I

:32:57.:33:01.

hoped I was as deputy Attorney General, is very independent minded

:33:02.:33:06.

career oriented person. It would be premature for me to comment on that.

:33:07.:33:11.

President Trump said that the hacking on the DNC and other efforts

:33:12.:33:15.

to influence the election could have been a lot of different groups. Is

:33:16.:33:19.

that contrary to what the intelligence community has said? The

:33:20.:33:24.

intelligence community with high confidence concluded it was Russian.

:33:25.:33:27.

In many circumstances it is hard to do attribution of a hack. But

:33:28.:33:31.

sometimes the intelligence is there. We have high confidence that the

:33:32.:33:37.

North Koreans hacked Sony, and that the Russians that the hacking of the

:33:38.:33:41.

DNC and other organisations. I have a lot of other questions that I will

:33:42.:33:49.

submit. I want to praise the response of the FBI and South

:33:50.:33:59.

Burlington, for -- Vermont. We had anonymous e-mails coming in,

:34:00.:34:05.

threatening serious action against students at a high school.

:34:06.:34:11.

Escalating cyber threats, including detailed death threats, multiple

:34:12.:34:15.

lockdowns and all. The FBI were close to the college for digital

:34:16.:34:21.

investigation, which you visited a number of years ago. It was a

:34:22.:34:24.

textbook example collaboration between state, local and federal

:34:25.:34:28.

authorities. And I want to thank all of those, it turned out to be very

:34:29.:34:34.

disturbed young man who was doing it. But you only had to turn on the

:34:35.:34:38.

TV and see what happens in different parts of the country, how worried we

:34:39.:34:42.

were in Beaumont. I just want to thank you FBI agents for their help.

:34:43.:34:47.

Thank you, Senator. Senator Graham will be next. Good morning, director

:34:48.:34:56.

Comey. I'm disappointed to see that former Secretary of State Hillary

:34:57.:35:00.

Clinton was in the news yesterday, essentially blaming you and blaming

:35:01.:35:02.

everything other than herself for her loss on November the 8th. I find

:35:03.:35:09.

it ironic, because you're not the one who made the decision to handle

:35:10.:35:14.

classified information on a private e-mail server. You're not the one

:35:15.:35:20.

who decided to have a private meeting with Secretary Clinton's

:35:21.:35:24.

husband in the of the Justice Department's ongoing investigation

:35:25.:35:28.

into Secretary Clinton's server. I use the word investigation here

:35:29.:35:31.

because according to a recent piece in the New York Times you were

:35:32.:35:34.

forbidden from using the word investigation and were instead told

:35:35.:35:38.

to refer to the investigation, which it was, as a matter. Of course, it

:35:39.:35:42.

was the former Attorney General Loretta Lynch who up until that

:35:43.:35:47.

meeting with President Clinton was the person responsible for making

:35:48.:35:52.

the decision of whether to convene a grand jury involved in key

:35:53.:35:55.

allegations against Secretary Clinton. It was former Attorney

:35:56.:35:59.

General Loretta Lynch who apparently forbade you from using the word

:36:00.:36:03.

investigation. Indeed, if the New York Times' story is true, a

:36:04.:36:07.

Democratic operative expressed confidence that the former Attorney

:36:08.:36:10.

General would keep that investigation from going very far. I

:36:11.:36:17.

think you were given an impossible choice to make. And you did the best

:36:18.:36:21.

you could in light of the situation that you were presented with. And it

:36:22.:36:28.

strikes me as somewhat sad for people here and elsewhere to condemn

:36:29.:36:31.

the queue for notifying Congress shortly before the election -- to

:36:32.:36:42.

condemn you. Secretary Clinton had made the decision to use a private

:36:43.:36:46.

e-mail server. And I think it is important to remind folks that you

:36:47.:36:49.

are not the one who decided to do business this way and keep State

:36:50.:36:54.

Department e-mails on a computer of someone suspected of child

:36:55.:36:57.

pornography. Again, I believe you were placed in and incredibly

:36:58.:37:03.

difficult position and did the best you could. I was one of those who

:37:04.:37:07.

felt that given the nature of the investigation and concerns that a

:37:08.:37:10.

special council should have been appointed to conduct the

:37:11.:37:13.

investigation, but of course the Attorney General Lynch and the Obama

:37:14.:37:18.

administration opposed that effort. So I just wanted to express to you

:37:19.:37:25.

my disappointment that this continued seeking of a reason, any

:37:26.:37:29.

reason, other than the flawed campaign of the candidate herself

:37:30.:37:32.

for Secretary Clinton losing the presidential election. If I can turn

:37:33.:37:38.

to a couple of other substantive items here. You have mentioned 702,

:37:39.:37:44.

the reauthorisation. I believe you referred to this is the Crown Jewels

:37:45.:37:50.

of the FBI and counterterrorism investigations. Could you explain

:37:51.:37:56.

why this provides such a unique to all, and why you regard it as

:37:57.:38:00.

literally the Crown jewels of the FBI -- unique to all. Thank you,

:38:01.:38:06.

Senator. Every time I talk about this publicly and went a little bit

:38:07.:38:09.

because I don't want bad people around the world to focus on this

:38:10.:38:12.

team at. It really bad people around the world, because of the genius of

:38:13.:38:17.

American innovation, use our products and infrastructure, for

:38:18.:38:22.

their e-mails and communications. What 702 allows us to do is quickly

:38:23.:38:31.

target terrorists, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, spies,

:38:32.:38:35.

cyber hackers, non-Americans who are using our infrastructure to

:38:36.:38:38.

communicate, target than quickly and collect information on them. It is

:38:39.:38:42.

vital to all parts of the intelligence community because of

:38:43.:38:46.

its agility, its speed and its effectiveness. Again, in an open

:38:47.:38:49.

setting we can't explain what you worried you know from classified

:38:50.:38:51.

briefings about what a difference this makes. -- what you already

:38:52.:38:56.

know. Because America is the mother of this innovation, they use a lot

:38:57.:39:00.

of our agreement and that works to communicate with each other. If we

:39:01.:39:04.

were ever required to establish the normal warrant process for these

:39:05.:39:07.

non-Americans while not in our country, just because the photons

:39:08.:39:10.

they are using to plan attacks across our country's runs, we would

:39:11.:39:17.

be tying ourselves in not -- for reasons that make no sense at all.

:39:18.:39:23.

We talked last year about the meta data database, that is a useful

:39:24.:39:28.

tool. It does not compare in importance to 702. We cannot lose

:39:29.:39:34.

702. I agree. It is a bit difficult to talk about things that are

:39:35.:39:38.

involved classified matters in public. But I think the public needs

:39:39.:39:44.

to know that there are multiple oversight layers, including the

:39:45.:39:48.

Pfizer court. Congressional oversight, internal oversight within

:39:49.:39:52.

the FBI and intelligence community that protect Americans under their

:39:53.:39:59.

privacy rights whilst targeting terrorists and people who are trying

:40:00.:40:04.

to kill us. I want to talk a minute about the electronic communication

:40:05.:40:07.

transactional records, something that you and I have discussed before

:40:08.:40:13.

as well. The FBI can use national Security letters, I believe, to get

:40:14.:40:18.

financial information and telephone numbers now in the conduct of a

:40:19.:40:21.

terrorist investigation. But because of a type of in the law the FBI has

:40:22.:40:28.

not been allowed access to the meta data and national security cases --

:40:29.:40:32.

because of a type of. To the extent that is necessary. Can you talk to

:40:33.:40:38.

us about the importance of that particular fix, the electronic

:40:39.:40:41.

Communications and transactional records six? Thank you so much,

:40:42.:40:46.

Senator. This seems like a boring deal but it makes a big impact on

:40:47.:40:51.

our work. In counterterrorism cases and counterintelligence cases, we

:40:52.:40:53.

can issue with all kinds of layers of approval in the FBI, a national

:40:54.:40:58.

Security letter to find out the subscriber to a particular telephone

:40:59.:41:03.

number and to find out what numbers that telephone number was in contact

:41:04.:41:07.

with. Not the content of those communications, but just the

:41:08.:41:09.

connection. Because of what I believe is a typo in the law, and if

:41:10.:41:19.

I'm wrong Congress will tell me they intended this, they say they do not

:41:20.:41:24.

have the statutory authority to serve an NSL national Security

:41:25.:41:27.

letter defined by subscriber to a particular e-mail handle or what

:41:28.:41:30.

addresses were in contact with what addresses. Although we can do the

:41:31.:41:34.

same with telephone communications. I don't think Congress intended that

:41:35.:41:40.

distinction, but what it does us in our most important investigations is

:41:41.:41:44.

that if we want to find out the subscriber to repeatedly e-mail

:41:45.:41:47.

handle to go and get an order from a federal judge in Washington as part

:41:48.:41:51.

of the Pfizer court, and incredibly long and difficult process. And I'm

:41:52.:41:55.

worried about that slowing us down, and I'm also worried about it

:41:56.:41:58.

becoming a disincentive for our investigators to do it at all.

:41:59.:42:02.

Because of you are working a case in San Antonio or Seattle, you are

:42:03.:42:06.

moving very, very quickly. If I have to go to get subscriber information

:42:07.:42:13.

on in e-mail address to a federal court in Washington, I'm probably

:42:14.:42:16.

going to try and find some other way around it. If that is what Congress

:42:17.:42:18.

wants, we will follow the law. I don't think that was ever intended,

:42:19.:42:21.

so I hope the West will fix what I believe was a typo. Thank you. I

:42:22.:42:25.

have other questions for the record. Thank you.

:42:26.:42:35.

We are going over to vote. I would also like to have both Democrat and

:42:36.:42:41.

Republicans notify me they want a second round. So I can get in

:42:42.:42:48.

inventories of that. Thank you, welcome back, director Comey. As you

:42:49.:42:53.

are well aware, Russia is actively working to undermine our democracy

:42:54.:42:56.

and hurt American businesses at the same time. Now more than ever

:42:57.:43:01.

Americans are looking to Congress for the leadership, and we must be a

:43:02.:43:05.

united front. And I'm appreciative of some of the members of this

:43:06.:43:09.

committee on the Republican side who have spoken out about this. We must

:43:10.:43:14.

be united as we seek information from the administration. Last month

:43:15.:43:18.

during a hearing at the House intelligence committee, you confirm

:43:19.:43:22.

that the FBI is investigating the Russian government's efforts to

:43:23.:43:27.

interfere in the 2016 presidential election. Including any links

:43:28.:43:30.

between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. I know that you

:43:31.:43:40.

cannot discuss that ongoing investigation. But just one question

:43:41.:43:42.

to clarify - you commit to ensuring that the relevant to national

:43:43.:43:44.

committees receive a full and timely briefing on that investigation's

:43:45.:43:45.

findings? In general I can, Senator, I need

:43:46.:43:55.

Department of Justice's approval to brief on particular people. We've

:43:56.:43:59.

briefed in the rankings, including this committee, on who we have cases

:44:00.:44:03.

on and what we are doing and how we are using various sources of

:44:04.:44:09.

information. I doepted be know if the department will approve that for

:44:10.:44:16.

the entire committees. And do you now go to Rod Rosen Steyn, given the

:44:17.:44:22.

other person is recuesed? Yes I briefed him in his first day in

:44:23.:44:25.

office. He would be the person to make that decision. In your

:44:26.:44:29.

testimony, you note that the Justice Department brought charges against

:44:30.:44:32.

Russian spies and criminal hackers in connection with the 2014 Yahoo

:44:33.:44:37.

cyber attack in February. An example of a cyber attack in our economy. In

:44:38.:44:43.

December of 2016, the FBI and theent dove homeland security released --

:44:44.:44:47.

the Department of homeland security released a 13-page report, providing

:44:48.:44:52.

technical details on how federal investigators linked Russia to the

:44:53.:44:55.

hacks against UK political organisations. Does Russia use the

:44:56.:45:00.

same military and civilian tools it used to hack our political

:45:01.:45:03.

organisations, in order to do things like hack into US companies, steal

:45:04.:45:07.

identities and sell the credit card information of Americans on the

:45:08.:45:12.

black market? And how is the FBI working to fight against hackers,

:45:13.:45:15.

supported by foreign governments like Russia? ? The answer is yes,

:45:16.:45:19.

both their government organisations and then they have a relationship

:45:20.:45:25.

that is he a often difficult to define with criminals. The Yahoo

:45:26.:45:32.

hack is an example. You had so. Greatest hackers and intelligence

:45:33.:45:35.

agencies there working together so the answer is yes, what we are doing

:45:36.:45:39.

is trying to see if we can impose costs on that behaviour in different

:45:40.:45:46.

ways in different ways but what I mentioned in ply opening, lock up

:45:47.:45:53.

people. Russia is not too great working with us outside their

:45:54.:45:59.

borders but if we can put handcuffs on them to send a message that's in

:46:00.:46:05.

the a free by. You said that transnational organised crime poses

:46:06.:46:09.

a challenge to our security. Russia has vast criminal networks that the

:46:10.:46:13.

Kremlin uses to sew instability around the world I heard this first

:46:14.:46:18.

hand when I was in the balance particulars, Ukraine and Georgia

:46:19.:46:22.

with other senators there have been concerns that Russians are using the

:46:23.:46:25.

luxury real estate market to launder money. The Treasury department has

:46:26.:46:30.

noted a significant rise in the use of shell companies and real estate

:46:31.:46:32.

transactions because foreign buyers use them as a way to hide their

:46:33.:46:37.

identity and find a safe haven for their money in the such. In fact

:46:38.:46:41.

nearly half of all homes in the US, worth at least $5 million are

:46:42.:46:46.

purchased using shell companies. Does the anonymity associated with

:46:47.:46:50.

the use of shell companies, to buy real estate, hurt the FBI's ability

:46:51.:47:00.

to trace the flow illicit money and fight organised crime and do you

:47:01.:47:05.

need more transparency in these transactions? Yes and yes. Very

:47:06.:47:10.

good. It is a huge problem when you hear that over $5 million homes,

:47:11.:47:14.

half purchased by shell companies, that is a major problem. In March

:47:15.:47:19.

this committee's subcommittee on crime and terrorism held it first

:47:20.:47:25.

hearing, I think Senator Graham and Senator White House for that. I

:47:26.:47:30.

raised the issue of proecting it election infrastructure with former

:47:31.:47:33.

bush official Ken wine Steyn. He agreed it is an important issue. As

:47:34.:47:39.

the rapging member of the rules committee I'm particularly concerned

:47:40.:47:41.

about ensuring our elections are safe from foreign interference. I

:47:42.:47:46.

recently led a group of 26 Senators in calling for a fall account of the

:47:47.:47:49.

election assistance commission's efforts to address Russian cyber

:47:50.:47:53.

security threats in the 2016 election. I'm also working on

:47:54.:47:57.

legislation in thisser why. Can you discuss how the if. BI has

:47:58.:48:04.

co-ordinated with the election assistance commission, Department of

:48:05.:48:06.

Homeland Security and state and local election officials to help

:48:07.:48:09.

protect the integrity of our election process? Thank you N short

:48:10.:48:14.

what we have done with DHS is share the tools, tactics and techniques we

:48:15.:48:20.

see hackers, especially from the 2016 election season using to attack

:48:21.:48:25.

bored voter registration databases and engage in other hacks. We have

:48:26.:48:29.

pushed that out to all the states and election assistance commission

:48:30.:48:31.

for harden their networks. That's one of the most important thing we

:48:32.:48:35.

can to, equip them with the information to make their systems

:48:36.:48:38.

tighter. Very good. You know we have different equipment all over the

:48:39.:48:42.

country, there's some advantage to that, I think, I think it's good

:48:43.:48:46.

when we have paper ballot back-ups, of course but we have to be prepared

:48:47.:48:49.

for this and this certainly isn't about one political party or one

:48:50.:48:54.

candidate. The last time you will came before the committee in

:48:55.:49:01.

December, 2015, just one week after the San Bernadino attacks, since

:49:02.:49:05.

then as was noted by the chir we have seen other attacks in our

:49:06.:49:13.

country. We had a tragedy in a shopping malin St Carmen, minute sow

:49:14.:49:18.

too, ten wounded at a shopping mal. Thankfully brave off-duty cop was

:49:19.:49:21.

there. He was able to stop further damage from being done. And I would

:49:22.:49:27.

also like to thank you, and the FBI for your investigation, having

:49:28.:49:31.

talked to the chief up there, Senator Franklin and I from briefed

:49:32.:49:36.

by him, as well as congressman Emmer, right after this attack the

:49:37.:49:41.

local Police Department, a mid-size department and they had to do a will

:49:42.:49:46.

the with working with the community, they have a figure Somali community

:49:47.:49:49.

there, that is a big part of their community that they are proud to

:49:50.:49:52.

have there. So they are working with them, they are working with the

:49:53.:49:56.

community, they are helping but the FBI really stood in and did the

:49:57.:50:01.

investigation and I guess I want to thank thank you with that and end

:50:02.:50:06.

with one question. It's been reported that Isis has encouraged

:50:07.:50:10.

loan wolf attacks like we saw in Orlando. What chal eggs do these

:50:11.:50:15.

type of ak at thats present for law enforcement and what is the FBI

:50:16.:50:18.

doing to prevent these strategies? Thank you. The central challenges,

:50:19.:50:26.

not just finding needles in a nationwide haystack but trying to

:50:27.:50:29.

find out which pieces of hay might become a needle and that is which of

:50:30.:50:33.

the troubled young people or sometimes older people are consuming

:50:34.:50:38.

poisonous prop began ga, some Isis, some other sources and are moving

:50:39.:50:42.

towards an act of violence, like a stabbing at a shopping malis some

:50:43.:50:45.

way it achieve meaning in their lives. A huge part is building

:50:46.:50:48.

relationships with the communities you mentioned. Because those folks

:50:49.:50:52.

do not want anyone committing vile he is, committing violence in the

:50:53.:50:56.

name of their faith so they have the same inp sentives we do in making

:50:57.:51:01.

sure they see us that way and we see them that way is at the heart of our

:51:02.:51:07.

response. We are not going to see some troubled kid going side ways

:51:08.:51:10.

and thinking he should stab people, anywhere near as easily as the

:51:11.:51:13.

people around that kid are going to see it. So getting into a position

:51:14.:51:15.

where they feel comfortable in telling us or telling local law

:51:16.:51:18.

enforcement is at the heart of our responsibility, to to find the

:51:19.:51:21.

needles, evaliate the pieces of hay and stop this. Thank you, director

:51:22.:51:26.

Comey could you pass on to our agents and support personnel how

:51:27.:51:30.

much we appreciate their efforts to defend the country. We are going to

:51:31.:51:34.

set a record for a questions asked and answers r answered in six

:51:35.:51:39.

minutes and 54 seconds, if I can. Do you agree with me if is he quest

:51:40.:51:44.

racial comes into effect it would be devastating to the FBI? Yes. And it

:51:45.:51:50.

is due to do so, unless congress straining it. I have been told that.

:51:51.:51:55.

Do you agree if Isil loses the caliphate these people will go out

:51:56.:51:59.

throughout the world and welcome terrorist agents and the terrorism

:52:00.:52:02.

threat to the homeland will get greater over time, not smaller? Yes,

:52:03.:52:06.

it'll diminish in their power to put out their media to the troubled

:52:07.:52:10.

people in the country will decrease but the hardened killers thrown out

:52:11.:52:13.

of the caliphate will be a big problem. So from a funding point of

:52:14.:52:17.

view, terrorism is not going to get better, probably worse? I think

:52:18.:52:22.

that's fair to say. Did you ever talk to Sally Yates about her

:52:23.:52:26.

concerns about General Flynn being compromised? I did. I don't know

:52:27.:52:32.

whether I can talk about it in this forum. But, the answer is yes. That

:52:33.:52:38.

she had concerns about General Flynn and she expressed those concerns to

:52:39.:52:43.

you? Correct. OK. We'll talk about that later. Do you stand by your

:52:44.:52:46.

House testimony on March 20th that there was no surveillance of the

:52:47.:52:49.

Trump campaign that you are aware of? Correct. You would know about it

:52:50.:52:54.

if there were is that correct? Think so, yes. Carter Paige was there a

:52:55.:53:02.

warrant issued regarding his activity with the Russians? I cannot

:53:03.:53:08.

answer that here. Did you consider carteder Paige an agent of that

:53:09.:53:11.

campaign? Same answer, can't answer it here. Do you stand by your

:53:12.:53:18.

testimony that there is a counterintelligence investigation,

:53:19.:53:19.

regarding Trump campaign, individuals and the Russian

:53:20.:53:22.

Government as to whether or not they collaborate? To see if there was any

:53:23.:53:25.

coordination between the Russian evident and peoples... Is that still

:53:26.:53:29.

going on? Yes. Nothing has changed, you stand by those two statements?

:53:30.:53:34.

Yes. But you won't tell me about Carter Paige? Not here I won't. The

:53:35.:53:38.

Chairman mentioned that Fusion, are you familiar with Fusion? I know the

:53:39.:53:44.

name. Are they part of the Russian intelligence apparatus? I can't say.

:53:45.:53:50.

OK. Do you agree with me that Fusion was involved in preparing a dossier

:53:51.:53:54.

against Donald Trump, if they z that would be interfering in our election

:53:55.:53:57.

by the Russians? I don't want to say. OK. Do you agree with me that

:53:58.:54:07.

Anthonie Weiner of 2016, should not have access to classified

:54:08.:54:09.

information? Yes, that's a fair statement. Would you agree with me

:54:10.:54:14.

that if that's in the illegal we've got really bad laws? Well, if he

:54:15.:54:20.

hadn't -... Well, he got it somehow? It would be illegal if he didn't

:54:21.:54:24.

have appropriate clearance. Do you agree with me he didn't have

:54:25.:54:27.

appropriate clearance or if he did, that would even be worse I don't

:54:28.:54:32.

believe at the time we found that on his laptop he had any kind of

:54:33.:54:35.

clearance. I agree. So for him to get it should be a crime. Somebody

:54:36.:54:41.

should be prosecuted for letting him have access to classified

:54:42.:54:44.

information. Does that make general sense? It could be a crime it would

:54:45.:54:50.

depend upon... Do you agree with me that it should be, that anybody who

:54:51.:54:54.

let him have the information probably should have been

:54:55.:54:58.

prosecuted. If our law doesn't cover that, it probe should. There is no

:54:59.:55:05.

Anthony Weiner statute. Well perhaps there should be. I wonder how you

:55:06.:55:11.

can get information and it is notal crime. Unmasking, are you familiar

:55:12.:55:20.

with that? Familiar with the term. Has the bureau asked for the

:55:21.:55:24.

unmasking of a citizen... Oh, yes, I did it this week. Before I

:55:25.:55:30.

reauthorise 702, and I'm a hawkish guy, I want to know how it works.

:55:31.:55:34.

Are you aware of any request by the White House, anybody in the Obama

:55:35.:55:38.

administration to unmask American citizens that were caught up in

:55:39.:55:43.

incidental surveillances in 2015-16? I'm in the I'm in the aware of any

:55:44.:55:47.

request to the FBI. Would you know? Who would they make the request to?

:55:48.:55:51.

Well, they could make it to anyone in the FBI who was... What about the

:55:52.:55:56.

NSA? Wouldn't you make it to them? Sure, if it was an NSA report. I

:55:57.:56:01.

have read in the media and heard about NSA reports but I don't

:56:02.:56:06.

know... Who do you sk, do you go to the NSA it ask somebody be unmasked.

:56:07.:56:12.

I give you an example. I got a report that said that US company

:56:13.:56:15.

number 1 had been removed. I said I believe I need to know the name of

:56:16.:56:21.

that cop. Who do you ask? I ask my briefer who works for the PDB staff,

:56:22.:56:25.

I would like to know, she goes and asks the owner of the information.

:56:26.:56:29.

The NSA? In this case I think it was CIA. Does the owner of the

:56:30.:56:33.

information, record, request for unmasking? I believe the NSA does, I

:56:34.:56:39.

don't know about CSA. But there should be a record, somewhere in our

:56:40.:56:43.

Government for a request to unmask regardless of who made the request?

:56:44.:56:47.

I think that's right. Is it fair to say that very few people can make

:56:48.:56:50.

requests for unmasking? I mean I can't go and make that request as a

:56:51.:56:56.

Senator, can I? Sure, it is a fairly small group - the consumers, which I

:56:57.:57:02.

am, of that small set of... The National Security Council, within

:57:03.:57:05.

that group can make this request or do you know? I don't know for sure.

:57:06.:57:08.

The national security advisor certainly can. When it comes to

:57:09.:57:14.

Russia s it fair to say that the Government rf Russia actively

:57:15.:57:16.

provides safe haven to cyber criminals? Yes. Is it fair to say

:57:17.:57:21.

that the Russian government is still involved in American politics? Yes.

:57:22.:57:26.

Is it fair to say we need to stop them from doing it? Yes. Fair to

:57:27.:57:30.

say. Do you agree with me the only way they are going to stop is for

:57:31.:57:35.

them to pay a price for interfering in our political process? I think

:57:36.:57:39.

that's a fair statement. So what we're doing today is not working,

:57:40.:57:42.

they are still doing it. They are doing it all over the world, aren't

:57:43.:57:47.

they? Yes. So what kind of threat do you believe Russia represents to our

:57:48.:57:51.

democratic process, given what you know about Russia's behaviour of

:57:52.:57:56.

late? Well certainly in my view the greatest threat of any nation on

:57:57.:58:00.

earth, given their intention and capability. Do you agree that they

:58:01.:58:05.

did not change the actual vote tally but one day they might? I agree, we

:58:06.:58:11.

found no information of any change in vote tallies. There was efforts

:58:12.:58:16.

aimed at voter registration systems but I spokes in theory, the part of

:58:17.:58:20.

the United States, the beauty of our system is that it is a bit of a

:58:21.:58:24.

hairball and all different kinds of systems... Have they done this in

:58:25.:58:29.

other countries, tampered with the vote? My attempt is they have

:58:30.:58:32.

attempted to. And there is no reason they won't attempt it here if we

:58:33.:58:35.

don't stop them, over time Think think that's fair. Thank you V --

:58:36.:58:39.

thank you V 100 years ago, when women were

:58:40.:59:31.

battling to win the vote in the United Kingdom, this place was on

:59:32.:59:39.

the front line. Campaigners known as suffragettes had been fighting for

:59:40.:59:42.

decades to secure the vote, but to no avail. So, one group decided to

:59:43.:59:48.

take direct action. The women's social and political union was led

:59:49.:59:49.

by Emily

:59:50.:59:51.

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