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develop the disease. Those are the headlines. Now it is | :00:03. | :00:13. | |
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Ali Soufan is a man apart. A Muslim and an Arabic-speaker, he became | :00:18. | :00:22. | |
the FBI's lead investigator on Al- Qaeda, before and after the 9/11 | :00:22. | :00:25. | |
attacks, attacks which he said could have been prevented had some | :00:25. | :00:28. | |
key intelligence been shared. In his own work for the FBI, he | :00:28. | :00:32. | |
pursued and interrogated some of Al-Qaeda's top people. Now he has | :00:32. | :00:35. | |
gone public with the story of his fight against Islamist militants | :00:35. | :00:39. | |
and his struggle within the American intelligence community. | :00:40. | :00:44. | |
Indeed, he says he's been a marked man, not from Al Qaeda, so much as | :00:44. | :00:54. | |
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Ali Soufan, will come to HARDtalk. You came to the United States from | :01:09. | :01:15. | |
Lebanon as an immigrant. -- welcome. You ended up applying to the FBI | :01:15. | :01:19. | |
pressure to university almost as a joke, as a bet with friends. Tell | :01:19. | :01:28. | |
me how that happened. When I was in college, an administrator at the | :01:28. | :01:32. | |
University suggested that I applied to the FBI. It became a joke. It | :01:32. | :01:40. | |
was a very long application process. You were not of the usual FBI stock. | :01:40. | :01:48. | |
That is what I thought. Surprisingly, when I finished | :01:48. | :01:53. | |
graduate school, I was accepted as an FBI agent. You were unusual | :01:53. | :02:01. | |
because you were one of fully eight Arabic-speaking people in the FBI. | :02:01. | :02:09. | |
-- one of only. You were one of the first to say a Osama Bin Laden is | :02:09. | :02:15. | |
posing in a greater threat to the United States, back in the 1990s. | :02:15. | :02:24. | |
Yes. I was involved with one of the premier terrorist Task forces. I | :02:24. | :02:30. | |
spoke with some supervisors at the head of the task force about this | :02:30. | :02:36. | |
man I had been reading about, Osama Bin Laden. I had read his | :02:36. | :02:46. | |
:02:46. | :02:46. | ||
declaration of G hand in 1996. -- Jihad. I was surprised that we | :02:46. | :02:52. | |
already knew about him. People were working on it. Soon after, I was | :02:52. | :02:57. | |
assigned to that team. By the time of the East African embassy | :02:57. | :03:04. | |
bombings, I was full time. There was still an astonishing level of | :03:04. | :03:09. | |
ignorance in the FBI about how the structure of Al-Qaeda worked. In | :03:09. | :03:13. | |
your book, you said that when you were translating a manual of | :03:13. | :03:17. | |
terrorism which British officers had recovered that looked at high | :03:17. | :03:22. | |
cell structures work, you were translating, cell numbers are told | :03:22. | :03:29. | |
not to recognise one another in public, that's amazing, declared an | :03:29. | :03:36. | |
FBI colleague. Abbas have thought that was elementary. -- I would | :03:36. | :03:42. | |
have thought. It was amazing that we found that manual. It is amazing | :03:42. | :03:48. | |
that now we have got a document that would encompass the law | :03:48. | :03:52. | |
enforcement channels and that describes the or been warfare rules | :03:52. | :04:02. | |
:04:02. | :04:05. | ||
and regulations for an organisation like Al-Qaeda. -- urban. The FBI | :04:05. | :04:08. | |
and the Department of Justice indicted Osama Bin Laden in June of | :04:08. | :04:16. | |
1998. A lot of people do now know that. That was before the first | :04:16. | :04:20. | |
overt act that Al-Qaeda did against the United States. The embassy | :04:20. | :04:27. | |
bombings. That was August 1998. the wake of that, due ended up in | :04:27. | :04:33. | |
Yemen investigating the attack into a US naval ship. You claim that | :04:33. | :04:38. | |
there was a chief of staff for a member of the Senate intelligence | :04:38. | :04:42. | |
committee who took you and your colleague to one side and said to | :04:42. | :04:48. | |
you that the White House, this is a quad, cannot have Al-Qaeda lent to | :04:48. | :04:53. | |
the attack because President Bush felt he was too politically weak to | :04:53. | :05:01. | |
do anything like that, to go after Al-Qaeda. That is extraordinary. | :05:01. | :05:06. | |
were very shocked when that happened, myself and my colleagues. | :05:06. | :05:16. | |
:05:16. | :05:17. | ||
Later on, if you look at De 9/11 Commission report, many people have | :05:17. | :05:23. | |
made similar claims. The Secretary of Defence called the whole | :05:23. | :05:29. | |
investigation stale. When we started trying to explain to the | :05:29. | :05:35. | |
Attorney-General, the first Attorney-General assigned under | :05:35. | :05:39. | |
Bush, that there was something called terrorism, be sure that his | :05:39. | :05:49. | |
:05:49. | :05:49. | ||
side. -- they pushed it to one side. That came back to haunt us. | :05:49. | :05:56. | |
were in Yemen Brendan 9/11 attacks happened. -- when they are. | :05:56. | :06:03. | |
Suddenly, the CIA, with whom you had been working with, you had been | :06:03. | :06:08. | |
sharing intelligence, stuffy had been after four months, you say it | :06:08. | :06:12. | |
could have had a material impact perhaps in preventing the 9/11 | :06:12. | :06:20. | |
attacks. What did you mean by that. Does? We were able to find a link | :06:20. | :06:25. | |
between people who were involved with the suicide bombers and a | :06:25. | :06:29. | |
meeting that took place in south- east Asia. An Al-Qaeda member crew | :06:29. | :06:37. | |
was spotted at that meeting delivered $36,000 to that meeting. | :06:37. | :06:42. | |
Be sure that information with the intelligence community at the time. | :06:42. | :06:51. | |
-- we shared that. This was November, 2000. We continued to | :06:51. | :07:00. | |
fall some Leeds. In April, 2000 and June, 2000, we were told the | :07:00. | :07:08. | |
intelligence community knew nothing about this. One day after a 9/11, I | :07:08. | :07:15. | |
was passed a file that included photographs of people we had been | :07:15. | :07:21. | |
asking about for many months. It included surveillance photos, | :07:21. | :07:30. | |
photos of two hijackers were were on Flight 77. Why do you think you | :07:30. | :07:35. | |
did not get that intelligence? not have any answer for that. I | :07:35. | :07:42. | |
just put the facts in my book. The facts come to the same conclusion | :07:42. | :07:52. | |
that where made by the inquiries. Could it be that the CIA was trying | :07:52. | :07:57. | |
to protect its own sources? There was this thing called the Wall, | :07:57. | :08:01. | |
where the FBI wants to protect its own potentially criminal | :08:01. | :08:05. | |
investigations by not having evidence that can be used in the | :08:05. | :08:14. | |
court of law. I am not buying that theory. When you have 17 sailors | :08:14. | :08:21. | |
murdered and people who are lent to the modders -- all linked to the | :08:21. | :08:25. | |
modders being in the United States and you do not tell investigations | :08:25. | :08:32. | |
about that, you have a problem. If the information is passed to the | :08:32. | :08:40. | |
FBI in a timely basis, even if the names of the two hijackers are put | :08:40. | :08:45. | |
on the list, it could have been a different thing. This is a | :08:45. | :08:50. | |
conclusion. The danger of all the us is that you could perhaps | :08:50. | :08:55. | |
inadvertently play into the hands, there are great swathe of opinion | :08:55. | :09:00. | |
he believed there is a conspiracy. People think there is US | :09:00. | :09:05. | |
governmental complicity. I do not believe in conspiracy theories, | :09:05. | :09:13. | |
personally. What I tried to do is to put their human face of that | :09:13. | :09:20. | |
disaster. The disaster steps that cause 9/11. I think that the | :09:20. | :09:25. | |
conclusion that the commission reached, if this information was | :09:26. | :09:29. | |
shared with the FBI team investigating, these would be the | :09:29. | :09:36. | |
findings. 9/11 could have been stopped at many stages. I am trying | :09:36. | :09:40. | |
to put a human face on it. Usually conspiracy theories come because | :09:40. | :09:45. | |
you do not have an answer. People are looking for an answer. Do you | :09:45. | :09:53. | |
think that as a result of 9/11, that President Bush started a war | :09:53. | :09:58. | |
on terror. Was that the inevitable consequence? But it would become a | :09:58. | :10:06. | |
war? Absolutely. A war rather than a criminal investigation. Yes. The | :10:06. | :10:12. | |
way 9/11 happened, crashing planes in two buildings, into the Pentagon, | :10:12. | :10:17. | |
that is more than an act of war. I believe that that war should have | :10:17. | :10:23. | |
been focused and limited to Al- Qaeda. It is interesting because | :10:23. | :10:27. | |
British counter-terrorism chiefs have said that the use of the World | :10:27. | :10:32. | |
War has not been helpful. Your counterparts, your colleagues in | :10:32. | :10:38. | |
Britain, they have said that the use of the World War is responsible | :10:38. | :10:47. | |
for taking us in the wrong direction. -- the word. Many people | :10:47. | :10:52. | |
agreed with a war against Al-Qaeda. I believe that the war against Al- | :10:52. | :10:59. | |
Qaeda, the one against their command and control in Afghanistan | :10:59. | :11:04. | |
was a legitimate war. I don't think anyone opposed that at the very | :11:04. | :11:09. | |
beginning. One of the by-products of the self declared war was new | :11:09. | :11:13. | |
rules of engagement, particularly but it comes to interrogation. | :11:13. | :11:19. | |
There was this thing called enhanced interrogation. Stress | :11:19. | :11:24. | |
preciousness, sleep deprivation, waterboarding. You interviewed lots | :11:24. | :11:30. | |
of pop Al-Qaeda people. Reid did not agree with enhanced | :11:30. | :11:36. | |
interrogation. -- Top. You did not agree. I do not agree with that. | :11:36. | :11:40. | |
do not think there is any justification for it. Not | :11:40. | :11:48. | |
operationally. As appalling as these things are to you and me, | :11:48. | :11:53. | |
they are nothing compared to bodies detain these are expected to | :11:53. | :11:56. | |
receive and some deals in the Middle East for example. Why did | :11:57. | :12:00. | |
you want to go down a path were eventually you will have to glass | :12:00. | :12:05. | |
ceiling? You will hit a water more of a Jew cannot cross. Do you think | :12:05. | :12:11. | |
it is torture? It depends on how it is being carried out. We all know | :12:11. | :12:18. | |
but waterboarding is. That is the simulation of drowning. Enhanced | :12:18. | :12:24. | |
interrogation is not only waterboarding. It is techniques | :12:24. | :12:28. | |
that evolved into waterboarding. Waterboarding as a technique itself | :12:28. | :12:38. | |
:12:38. | :12:39. | ||
is by US law considered torture. Who bears the responsibility? For | :12:39. | :12:44. | |
the use of waterboarding? The fact that the sanction that the top? | :12:44. | :12:49. | |
goes to the top. Do you think there should be legal redress against | :12:49. | :12:57. | |
people like President Bush? Won the top? Yes? -- yes. I am asking the | :12:57. | :13:02. | |
opinion, whether it should be. There should be accountability. | :13:02. | :13:09. | |
That accountability shouldn't be only for the CIA officers. The way | :13:09. | :13:13. | |
to follow that logically is to say that there should be a follow-up. | :13:13. | :13:19. | |
It depends how it came down and what happened and to approve it. | :13:19. | :13:24. | |
Which channels did it come down? I think we should have some kind of | :13:24. | :13:31. | |
accountability for what happened. In terms of ethnicity, Peter King | :13:31. | :13:36. | |
denies what you say. He said that for those who say waterboarding | :13:36. | :13:40. | |
does not work and that it should be stopped and not used again, they | :13:40. | :13:44. | |
got vital information through waterboarding that directly led | :13:44. | :13:54. | |
:13:54. | :13:57. | ||
them to Bin Laden. I disagree with that. People denied facts on the | :13:57. | :14:07. | |
:14:07. | :14:08. | ||
waterboarding that we later found out were important. People were | :14:08. | :14:13. | |
lying after 183 sessions of waterboarding. It must have been | :14:13. | :14:18. | |
important. That is not an indication of the technique. | :14:18. | :14:25. | |
Everything else we have been told about de effectiveness of | :14:25. | :14:33. | |
waterboarding is proving to be wrong. The man in question, | :14:33. | :14:43. | |
:14:43. | :14:48. | ||
waterboarding did not stored until I believe so. I believe that is not | :14:48. | :14:52. | |
an accurate assessment. I believe the President was not told the | :14:52. | :14:57. | |
truth about this. How certain are you now that the technique is no | :14:57. | :15:03. | |
longer used? Pretty certain. I think we did something as a | :15:03. | :15:06. | |
government that very few governments in the world will do. | :15:06. | :15:12. | |
We declassified these issues regarding enhance interrogation | :15:12. | :15:22. | |
:15:22. | :15:24. | ||
techniques. We included the CIA, not one immense threat worse start | :15:24. | :15:34. | |
:15:34. | :15:35. | ||
because of was a boarding. -- was stopped because of water boarding. | :15:35. | :15:42. | |
The former Secretary of General Defence told me, there is obviously | :15:42. | :15:47. | |
a legal limit to what you can do, you do not want to go beyond that, | :15:47. | :15:51. | |
but if you want to use tougher measures, it may be justified to | :15:51. | :16:01. | |
:16:01. | :16:05. | ||
save in media -- immediate lives. It is an absolute principle that | :16:05. | :16:10. | |
you have to do whatever you can to save lives. I believe in the | :16:10. | :16:16. | |
efficacy of the interrogation techniques. It is not justified | :16:16. | :16:20. | |
from and efficacy perspective. I gave so many reasons in the book | :16:20. | :16:29. | |
Where did not work. This was something from Hollywood. He does | :16:29. | :16:39. | |
:16:39. | :16:42. | ||
not exist in reality. All my years in the FBI... If we are talking | :16:42. | :16:51. | |
about the ticking clock ferry. Enhance interrogation techniques do | :16:52. | :17:01. | |
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not deal with the ticking bomb. It is one step that evolved into water | :17:08. | :17:14. | |
boarding. Sleep deprivation is a week. Where is the ticking bomb | :17:14. | :17:24. | |
:17:24. | :17:28. | ||
theory in a Which? -- week. These techniques are to be used over time, | :17:28. | :17:35. | |
not immediately. The limits that he is talking about are not designed | :17:35. | :17:43. | |
to deal with that theoretical magic theory of ticking bomb theory. | :17:43. | :17:46. | |
me ask you about another instant decision that has been taking more | :17:46. | :17:52. | |
and more frequently over recent times, drone attacks. You have said | :17:52. | :17:59. | |
that the killing of the Yemeni based cleric was legal, he was | :17:59. | :18:07. | |
killed in Yemen. Why was that legal but enhance interrogation throws up | :18:07. | :18:13. | |
different questions? You have to look at the act itself. | :18:13. | :18:18. | |
Interrogation techniques I have got a problem with. Your strategy and | :18:18. | :18:25. | |
laws have to beat in sink together. Unita get reliable information and | :18:25. | :18:34. | |
what you want to do with it... You need to get. Yes, I believe that | :18:34. | :18:40. | |
drone attacks are illegal. We are at war with Al-Qaeda. You have got | :18:40. | :18:44. | |
Al-Qaeda leaders sitting together, meeting together, conspiring | :18:44. | :18:52. | |
together. He was involved in every plot against the US since 2009. | :18:52. | :19:00. | |
Just because the US has declared war on Al-Qaeda, it does not | :19:00. | :19:07. | |
automatically turn half the world into a battle zone, does it? We are | :19:07. | :19:12. | |
not taking the battle around the world. Al-Qaeda is taking the | :19:12. | :19:17. | |
battle around the world. You have individuals plotting to bomb London. | :19:17. | :19:22. | |
What do you want to do about it? Send special forces to the mill of | :19:22. | :19:32. | |
:19:32. | :19:32. | ||
a trouble zone just to arrest them? Or is it better to deal with that | :19:32. | :19:42. | |
:19:42. | :19:45. | ||
target? This is an American citizen's right to judicial process. | :19:45. | :19:51. | |
I do not discriminate on terrorist based on their nationality. If | :19:51. | :19:55. | |
someone is trying to kill innocent people around the world and to have | :19:55. | :19:58. | |
the opportunity to take them out, I believe it is legitimate to take | :19:58. | :20:05. | |
them out. The drone attacks do not change the overall outcome of the | :20:05. | :20:12. | |
war. We have to think beyond these tactical wins for a strategy to | :20:12. | :20:18. | |
deal with the incubators that generate and caused terrorism. | :20:18. | :20:25. | |
did you decide to leave the FBI? was involved in a lot of things in | :20:25. | :20:35. | |
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the bureau, I reached a time... What do you mean a lot of things. - | :20:35. | :20:45. | |
:20:45. | :20:46. | ||
-? Around the 9/11 Commission, what I described in the book about | :20:46. | :20:56. | |
:20:56. | :20:59. | ||
enhanced interrogation techniques, absolutely among some groups... But | :20:59. | :21:04. | |
I always go the support of the leadership of the FBI. I felt that | :21:05. | :21:11. | |
it was time for me to get out of the way. I decide are the best | :21:11. | :21:15. | |
thing for me and for my team and for the bureau is to get the heck | :21:15. | :21:20. | |
out of the way. There are remarkably few agents like you in | :21:20. | :21:30. | |
:21:30. | :21:33. | ||
the FBI. There are eight native Arabic speakers when you joined, | :21:33. | :21:40. | |
now there are nine. Remarkably few. Why is that? The FBI need to do a | :21:40. | :21:45. | |
better job to reach out to people in communities that can help the | :21:45. | :21:52. | |
national security of the US. The woeful thing about it is that if | :21:52. | :22:00. | |
you try to work in the FBI now, you could not get security clearance. | :22:00. | :22:07. | |
Is that right? I have not been in the government for a while. My | :22:07. | :22:10. | |
relationship with the people I used to know in the government is still | :22:10. | :22:14. | |
phenomenal. I know what he's talking about, it is more difficult | :22:14. | :22:21. | |
for people from some ethnic origins to join the intelligence community. | :22:21. | :22:25. | |
That is not just about the effectiveness of the fight, it is a | :22:25. | :22:30. | |
pretty bad indictment of the state of American intelligence, about the | :22:30. | :22:33. | |
state of the American establishment? Do you agree with | :22:34. | :22:43. | |
:22:44. | :22:46. | ||
it? I said I do not. Tell me about the fight against Islamist terror, | :22:46. | :22:55. | |
given the death of Osama Bin Laden, how strong tea think Al-Qaeda is? - | :22:55. | :23:04. | |
- do you think. A different Al- Qaeda exist today. It shifted from | :23:05. | :23:10. | |
being chief operator to be in chief motivator. You have an organisation | :23:10. | :23:20. | |
:23:20. | :23:21. | ||
that is a franchise. It has remnants of Algerian extremists | :23:21. | :23:27. | |
operating on the border. You have Al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsular. | :23:27. | :23:34. | |
That is Saudi Al-Qaeda and the Yemen side. Fractured, does that | :23:34. | :23:39. | |
mean it is more difficult to fight against? Yes, I think it is. You | :23:39. | :23:43. | |
have to focus your strategy on different regional areas. There are | :23:43. | :23:48. | |
different incubators for each one of these areas. A strategy that can | :23:48. | :23:52. | |
work in Yemen is very difficult -- very different from a strategy that | :23:52. | :23:57. | |
can work in Iraq or Algeria. These are the things that we have to chat | :23:57. | :24:04. | |
-- take into account. The threat is greater or a smaller? The threat is | :24:04. | :24:10. | |
different. Al-Qaeda has been diminished greatly. Bin Laden's | :24:10. | :24:19. | |
death was a mortal blow. His importance in Al-Qaeda, he knows | :24:19. | :24:25. |