Lord Turner - Chairman, Financial Services Authority, UK (2008- 2013) HARDtalk


Lord Turner - Chairman, Financial Services Authority, UK (2008- 2013)

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Now on BBC News it's time for Welcome to HARDtalk. Five years ago

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the western world's banking system was spiralling into crisis. How

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confident can we be that the fundamental flaws exposed then have

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really been fixed? Lord Turner has just ended a heavily scrutinised

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term at the head of Britain's Financial Services Authority. Have

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the bankers and the regulators learned the right lessons from the

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Welcome to HARDtalk. You have just ended for Pipe five-year term as

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Britain's financial services regulator. -- 2.5. The UK banking

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system is in a much better shape than it was in 2008. We have much

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higher levels of capital. The reserve of Cup proper letter to the

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size of the balance sheet. We have more liquid balance sheet. I think

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we are in a very different position them that which led to the crisis.

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There are two problems that we still have. I do not think we are

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being radical enough. The faults in the system before the crisis were

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very profound. There were the product of 50 years of policy

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mistakes. We are still struggling with the aftermath of the crisis.

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The fact that once we have a large financial crisis, you create an

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economic depression. Even if you get your banking system into shape,

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people are very worried and wary of borrowing money. That is one of our

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fundamental problems. That is exactly where I wanted to pick up

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with you. Polls suggest that trust in the banks are still no. Much

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lower than other business and industrial sectors. It is fair to

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say that people look at the fat profits made by banks today, the

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pale Sudhir been given to the senior bankers themselves, and then

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they look at the fact that it is still very difficult for small and

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medium enterprises to borrow money. They think this system is as

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dysfunctional as it ever was. have to break those points apart.

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There are very good reasons why people became very distressed for.

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Not just that the banking system, but other bits of the financial

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system. There are two reasons for that. They were told a story that

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this development of complicated, global finance was in some

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mysterious way making the whole world economy much more efficient

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and growing. That turned out to be untrue. We now find us to get too

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big and banks to leverage. And it's the thing blew up. They are also

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right to be distrustful to the fact that in very particular products,

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products like payment protection insurance, banks were guilty of

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selling things that were not in the customer's interest. That mistrust

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will take many years to come back. The air was a very powerful phrase

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you coroner to describe much of what the banks have been up to in

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the run-up of 2008 maybe even beyond. And that was socially

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useless. Do you think the banks are still making a lot of money by the

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sorts of business operations that are socially useless? Far less. And

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lot of what I was talking about, quite a lot of that, has been

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shaken out of the banking system. Quite a lot of it has shocked out.

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A lot of it has to do with the way some mortgages in the US were

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packaged up in these incredibly complicated Securities. We still

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have those. We still have very complex financial vehicles that I

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barely understand. We had much fewer of them. We had derivatives.

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Corrected designed. They can be a useful part in hedging risk. The

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basic idea was not a bad idea. It was taken to absurd excess. People

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were creating a new creditors for the sole purpose of being able to

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bet against them. We allow that to occur. The central bankers, the

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regulators, the people are right the laws. We allow the banks to do

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these activities with far too little capital resources. We are

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halfway to fixing back. It is about the period before you took over.

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That is about the period to the run-up. Let's have a look at your

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record, post 2008, in charge of the financial services a priority. If

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we look at a few issues, the get things wrong? Why didn't you go

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after the individuals who had failed to run their banks

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responsibly? We looked very carefully. We looked at the issue

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as to where there were cases that we could bring which had a chance

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of success, under the existing set of rules and laws, against

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individuals for malpractice or recklessness. There were a number

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of cases that we brought, in relation to an end did -- and

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individual... You can name many more who have made the most

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terrible, irresponsible, encumber the decisions and they are still,

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some of them, still working in the financial sector. You have to judge

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this according to the law but existed at the time. The law does

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not draw a distinction between being an added -- a director of a

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bank and the director of a hotel company. In those other sectors of

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the economy, we quite rightly say that if you make bad business

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decisions, that is for your shareholders to sack you. It is not

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for the state or the law to prosecute you. I believe banking is

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different. We should draw a distinction between the law but

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relates to the directors of banks and back which relates to the

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directors in other sectors of the economy. When you brought up in

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banks, you do not just have a problem for the individual company.

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Ukraine a' problem for the economy. But an enforcement agency has to

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enforce the law but parliament has written. We have to change it.

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antimony easy were hamstrung by having to work within the laws that

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were inadequate for the problems he faced. Important point to establish.

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In the future, which are echoed the words: In future, we would love to

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see bankers to make the sort of decisions to be put in prison since

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and locked away. I am not convinced that the way forward is to create a

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criminal offence. I did not think it will be used. I do not think

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will be enforced. If you create a criminal offence, the processes of

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natural law, the ability to appeal, will say if this is a criminal case,

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it has to be subject to the degree of proof that says you individually

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were directly responsible. That will be a burden of proof which is

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very difficult to make. I do not think that is the way to go. I

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propose a different way of going. A proposes 2.5 years ago. I think we

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should define that when you are the director of a bank, we wanted to

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take a different trade off between risk and return. That is perfectly

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legitimate in other sectors of the economy. You should know if that

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bike fails, you will both be banned from operating from a bank and the

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rest of the financial services sector there after, and you should

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be forced to put a large amount of your director's fees into an

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account which you should totally lose. You should use it

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automatically, unless, reversing the burden of proof, you can prove

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you were one of the good guys. That, I think, is the way to go. If you

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criminalise it, and given the burden of proof, which is always

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legitimately acquired in criminal cases, you'll end of not having

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prosecutions. The essence of the issue is these people make

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decisions, had they been hi-tech companies, people would have said

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this is part of capitalism. You are meant to take risks. What we wonder,

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is an approach to banking which is different from the approached which

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is applicable to other sectors of the economy. A lot of this is about

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accountability and public trust. In that spirit, believing that

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accountability and public trust is so important, why did June try and

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sit on the report and not released the findings to the public? We did

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not sit on it at all. You please -- he released a one-page statement.

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That is completely untrue. You went through -- we went through a legal

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process which generates hundreds and hundreds of files. Those are

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subject to the normal processes of, the French -- confidentiality. If

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deposited in a boaties goes through, investigates an individual and

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decides that in the end there is not a good enough case to bring a

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prosecution case against them, we do not say we will release all of

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the evidence into the public domain. If we suggested it, you would be St

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what an extraordinary breach of the normal confidentiality of somebody

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who deposited in a pretty decided not to prosecute. If he did not put

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up -- presented as a legal document, and simply as a trail of evidence...

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What we should have done and what Parliament should have suggested

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was that parallel to our legal process, which is bound to be

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subject to confidentiality, we should have launched an inquiry

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which was going to produce a public report. We suggested that that is

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what we should do. The idea but we should do a really deep report and

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that it should cover the actions of the FS a came specifically from me.

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I know people rewrite history, it did not come from other people.

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want to test whether you, over a deal for years at the top job,

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really can put hand on heart and say bet you did your utmost to

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write some of the runs inside of the system. There's talk about the

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LIBOR manipulation. Big banks were manipulating the interest rate at

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which they lend to each other. There was a huge knock-on effect.

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It affected interest rates, cracker cars. Because of an internal order,

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there were at least 26 letters informing you of what was going on.

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Your own report acknowledged that you were too narrowly focused to

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respond effectively. Why did he There was enough information by May

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of 2009 to set alarm bells ringing. When the alarm bells were not

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ringing. By that time we were doing the investigation. I was first told

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about this in autumn 2009. I knew there was an investigation into

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libel. As the chairman, you are like the Home Secretary being told

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the Director of Public Prosecutions and now doing a detailed

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investigation. That is when I was told. I said to get on with it.

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Those things take years to come to fruition. Taking one random example

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of a bank - but police have was fined �59 million as a result --

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Barclays. That represents a tiny few days of corporate profits. In

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the US were find it more. This is much weaker than what we see in the

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US. He has been transformed in the last five for six years. If you

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look over that five you period, are the size of the fines imposed, at...

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In the last few days, we have had at Lloyds bailed out by the public,

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announcing a quarterly profit, Barclays also. They have restored

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their balance sheet in a significant way by winning comes to

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punishment, it is a pinprick. could argue they could be bigger

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fines. As I say, the FSA has been steadily increasing these overtime.

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They were -- they are much finer than before. You can always debate

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how far down that path you should go. The scale of fine and public

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notice does make the bankers concentrate on this which was not

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true five or ten years ago. Renumeration - it is interesting to

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me that it is the European Union moving fast this in try to control

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and damp down the renumeration packages that banks seem to come up

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with. There were European Parliament proposals that required

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banks and other companies to limit bonuses up to 100% of salaries. The

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British government proposes that measure. Do you support it? I am

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not convinced it is the best way to go. We in the FSA, along with the

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Swiss and the Americans and the French, were forced or in I doing

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in 2009 for a new set of rules on a renumeration. They will most then

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forced by us and the French but not the Americans. It is not for us to

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regulate how much people are paid but regulate how they are paid. We

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said that in equity. I do not think we got it quite right. If we were

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to return to this issue, rather than the one for one cat which the

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European Parliament has gone before, we should have insisted on a longer

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period and when we have the feral, and what people should be paid is

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subordinated debt which loses all its value if the bank fails. It is

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coming - it looks like the European Council will pass it. The question

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for you as an experience analyst of the City of London, is it going to

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have a materially damaging effect on London's position as a global

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financial centre? 90% of this measure will be in London according

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to some. It would be a major complicating effect for some of the

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big global banks operating in London, Singapore, Hong Kong. Their

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competitors will not enforce these. Like those things, it would be a

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less beach effect meant people initially think. It is not an

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entirely beneficial effect. We will see an increase in people's base

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salaries. What is being limited is the ratio of the bonus. That is an

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interesting comment. The culture, if I can put it there this way, the

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Greek culture, is still there. The Archbishop of Canterbury has said

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recently there is still an entrenched culture of entitlement

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amongst the bankers in London? Where does the money come from.

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That is what you need to return to. Some of this activity we do not

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need. If we have a regulatory system, a set of capital regimes

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and rules which allow people to make money out of things that do

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not need to insist, quite a lot of that is going to stick to the

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employees. The most important thing to be doing is get the renumeration

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of capital right. We are only halfway there, in particular in

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regards to the trading activity. It is too easy to do trading activity

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of might capital bases. If that is the case, there is activity going

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on which is not needed and some of the money sticking to people who do

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not needed. Quick fire. Fencing of banks - consumer base activities,

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looking after depositors money as opposed to the casino banking. Some

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wanted a complete separation of those separation and for banks to

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be broken up. It is not going to happen. Are you happy? A ring-

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fencing along with extra capital will make a difference. It gives

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the resolution authority the ability to distinguish in a crisis

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between the bit of you really need to keep going for - the basic real

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economy - what people call the casino activity. Banks will still

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be too big to fail - Yass? And that is a fundamental problem? Winter

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much higher capital departments. Everything else, including these

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offences, these are inadequate second best compared to what we

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need to do which is to have the extra capital but more. Interesting.

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OK. Before we finish, on the wider environment - we can talk about

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different rules and regulations about how the City of London can be

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run by we cannot ignore Europe. If there is sustained financial crisis

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in the eurozone, it will have a destabilising effect in London

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whether we like it or not. What is urinalysis? Do you believe this

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ability of banks in Europe is still fundamentally compromised? I think

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Europe is fundamentally compromised by the fact that the eurozone

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structure as being a single currency without an adequate degree

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of fiscal union is a dangerous structure. This is what I do admit

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my own fault. Because you're a supporter going into the euro...

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was a supporter. Now you are suggesting it is dysfunctional.

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underestimated the degree of fiscal union which was required to deal

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with... In interesting point which even those who are you against the

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euro did not really understand - this crucial issue of how the

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banking works in a single currency without a fiscal union. That has to

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be fixed. As long as you don't fix it will be a potentially unstable

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system. They need to go all the way down the line to a banking union

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and underpin that with fiscal resources so that if a bank in

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Spain is in trouble, it can be bailed out with the resources from

:22:57.:23:01.

the centre not from the Spanish government. It is a fundamental

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problem. A manner you are associated with says Dairies their

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European Treasury with a power to tact to biros well - are you going

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down the same track? -- to borrow as well? Mario Draghi was pretty

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close to saying that as well. that is not going to happen. That

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is the implication. You are saying we have to live with fundamental

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instability and dysfunction for an awful long time to calm? I fear

:23:36.:23:40.

from a combination of the extraordinary excesses of pre-

:23:40.:23:46.

crisis finance in the US, UK in particular, plus the problems of

:23:46.:23:52.

the eurozone, I think we are long way from being out of the crisis. I

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fear we are, for many years, we are subject to economic performance.

:23:57.:24:05.

The have soared excesses of Anglo- Saxon finance and the misty sign of

:24:05.:24:11.

the eurozone. Incredibly important, alongside the justifiable anger of

:24:11.:24:16.

individual bankers - that is important, we need to put that

:24:16.:24:21.

system right - but it is the overall system that we have a wrong.

:24:21.:24:25.

We have allowed fine as to get out of control. Us and worse with the

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