Browse content similar to Lord Turner - Chairman, Financial Services Authority, UK (2008- 2013). Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
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Now on BBC News it's time for Welcome to HARDtalk. Five years ago | :00:15. | :00:18. | |
the western world's banking system was spiralling into crisis. How | :00:18. | :00:21. | |
confident can we be that the fundamental flaws exposed then have | :00:21. | :00:29. | |
really been fixed? Lord Turner has just ended a heavily scrutinised | :00:29. | :00:32. | |
term at the head of Britain's Financial Services Authority. Have | :00:32. | :00:35. | |
the bankers and the regulators learned the right lessons from the | :00:35. | :00:45. | |
:00:45. | :01:18. | ||
Welcome to HARDtalk. You have just ended for Pipe five-year term as | :01:18. | :01:28. | |
:01:28. | :01:30. | ||
Britain's financial services regulator. -- 2.5. The UK banking | :01:30. | :01:36. | |
system is in a much better shape than it was in 2008. We have much | :01:36. | :01:42. | |
higher levels of capital. The reserve of Cup proper letter to the | :01:42. | :01:49. | |
size of the balance sheet. We have more liquid balance sheet. I think | :01:49. | :01:54. | |
we are in a very different position them that which led to the crisis. | :01:54. | :02:03. | |
There are two problems that we still have. I do not think we are | :02:03. | :02:08. | |
being radical enough. The faults in the system before the crisis were | :02:08. | :02:12. | |
very profound. There were the product of 50 years of policy | :02:12. | :02:16. | |
mistakes. We are still struggling with the aftermath of the crisis. | :02:16. | :02:21. | |
The fact that once we have a large financial crisis, you create an | :02:21. | :02:25. | |
economic depression. Even if you get your banking system into shape, | :02:25. | :02:30. | |
people are very worried and wary of borrowing money. That is one of our | :02:30. | :02:35. | |
fundamental problems. That is exactly where I wanted to pick up | :02:35. | :02:39. | |
with you. Polls suggest that trust in the banks are still no. Much | :02:39. | :02:44. | |
lower than other business and industrial sectors. It is fair to | :02:44. | :02:49. | |
say that people look at the fat profits made by banks today, the | :02:49. | :02:53. | |
pale Sudhir been given to the senior bankers themselves, and then | :02:53. | :02:57. | |
they look at the fact that it is still very difficult for small and | :02:57. | :03:00. | |
medium enterprises to borrow money. They think this system is as | :03:00. | :03:05. | |
dysfunctional as it ever was. have to break those points apart. | :03:05. | :03:10. | |
There are very good reasons why people became very distressed for. | :03:10. | :03:14. | |
Not just that the banking system, but other bits of the financial | :03:14. | :03:22. | |
system. There are two reasons for that. They were told a story that | :03:22. | :03:27. | |
this development of complicated, global finance was in some | :03:27. | :03:30. | |
mysterious way making the whole world economy much more efficient | :03:31. | :03:36. | |
and growing. That turned out to be untrue. We now find us to get too | :03:36. | :03:46. | |
:03:46. | :03:50. | ||
big and banks to leverage. And it's the thing blew up. They are also | :03:50. | :03:56. | |
right to be distrustful to the fact that in very particular products, | :03:56. | :03:59. | |
products like payment protection insurance, banks were guilty of | :03:59. | :04:05. | |
selling things that were not in the customer's interest. That mistrust | :04:05. | :04:11. | |
will take many years to come back. The air was a very powerful phrase | :04:11. | :04:15. | |
you coroner to describe much of what the banks have been up to in | :04:15. | :04:20. | |
the run-up of 2008 maybe even beyond. And that was socially | :04:20. | :04:28. | |
useless. Do you think the banks are still making a lot of money by the | :04:28. | :04:32. | |
sorts of business operations that are socially useless? Far less. And | :04:32. | :04:36. | |
lot of what I was talking about, quite a lot of that, has been | :04:36. | :04:42. | |
shaken out of the banking system. Quite a lot of it has shocked out. | :04:42. | :04:47. | |
A lot of it has to do with the way some mortgages in the US were | :04:47. | :04:55. | |
packaged up in these incredibly complicated Securities. We still | :04:55. | :04:58. | |
have those. We still have very complex financial vehicles that I | :04:58. | :05:04. | |
barely understand. We had much fewer of them. We had derivatives. | :05:04. | :05:11. | |
Corrected designed. They can be a useful part in hedging risk. The | :05:11. | :05:20. | |
basic idea was not a bad idea. It was taken to absurd excess. People | :05:20. | :05:24. | |
were creating a new creditors for the sole purpose of being able to | :05:24. | :05:30. | |
bet against them. We allow that to occur. The central bankers, the | :05:30. | :05:35. | |
regulators, the people are right the laws. We allow the banks to do | :05:35. | :05:39. | |
these activities with far too little capital resources. We are | :05:39. | :05:47. | |
halfway to fixing back. It is about the period before you took over. | :05:47. | :05:51. | |
That is about the period to the run-up. Let's have a look at your | :05:51. | :05:57. | |
record, post 2008, in charge of the financial services a priority. If | :05:57. | :06:05. | |
we look at a few issues, the get things wrong? Why didn't you go | :06:05. | :06:09. | |
after the individuals who had failed to run their banks | :06:09. | :06:19. | |
:06:19. | :06:21. | ||
responsibly? We looked very carefully. We looked at the issue | :06:21. | :06:25. | |
as to where there were cases that we could bring which had a chance | :06:25. | :06:31. | |
of success, under the existing set of rules and laws, against | :06:31. | :06:35. | |
individuals for malpractice or recklessness. There were a number | :06:35. | :06:39. | |
of cases that we brought, in relation to an end did -- and | :06:39. | :06:48. | |
individual... You can name many more who have made the most | :06:48. | :06:52. | |
terrible, irresponsible, encumber the decisions and they are still, | :06:52. | :06:57. | |
some of them, still working in the financial sector. You have to judge | :06:57. | :07:01. | |
this according to the law but existed at the time. The law does | :07:02. | :07:06. | |
not draw a distinction between being an added -- a director of a | :07:06. | :07:12. | |
bank and the director of a hotel company. In those other sectors of | :07:12. | :07:17. | |
the economy, we quite rightly say that if you make bad business | :07:17. | :07:21. | |
decisions, that is for your shareholders to sack you. It is not | :07:21. | :07:26. | |
for the state or the law to prosecute you. I believe banking is | :07:26. | :07:29. | |
different. We should draw a distinction between the law but | :07:29. | :07:33. | |
relates to the directors of banks and back which relates to the | :07:33. | :07:37. | |
directors in other sectors of the economy. When you brought up in | :07:37. | :07:42. | |
banks, you do not just have a problem for the individual company. | :07:42. | :07:48. | |
Ukraine a' problem for the economy. But an enforcement agency has to | :07:48. | :07:55. | |
enforce the law but parliament has written. We have to change it. | :07:56. | :07:59. | |
antimony easy were hamstrung by having to work within the laws that | :07:59. | :08:03. | |
were inadequate for the problems he faced. Important point to establish. | :08:03. | :08:12. | |
In the future, which are echoed the words: In future, we would love to | :08:12. | :08:22. | |
:08:22. | :08:24. | ||
see bankers to make the sort of decisions to be put in prison since | :08:24. | :08:32. | |
and locked away. I am not convinced that the way forward is to create a | :08:32. | :08:37. | |
criminal offence. I did not think it will be used. I do not think | :08:37. | :08:42. | |
will be enforced. If you create a criminal offence, the processes of | :08:42. | :08:48. | |
natural law, the ability to appeal, will say if this is a criminal case, | :08:48. | :08:53. | |
it has to be subject to the degree of proof that says you individually | :08:53. | :09:02. | |
were directly responsible. That will be a burden of proof which is | :09:02. | :09:07. | |
very difficult to make. I do not think that is the way to go. I | :09:07. | :09:13. | |
propose a different way of going. A proposes 2.5 years ago. I think we | :09:13. | :09:18. | |
should define that when you are the director of a bank, we wanted to | :09:18. | :09:22. | |
take a different trade off between risk and return. That is perfectly | :09:22. | :09:27. | |
legitimate in other sectors of the economy. You should know if that | :09:27. | :09:33. | |
bike fails, you will both be banned from operating from a bank and the | :09:33. | :09:36. | |
rest of the financial services sector there after, and you should | :09:36. | :09:40. | |
be forced to put a large amount of your director's fees into an | :09:40. | :09:45. | |
account which you should totally lose. You should use it | :09:45. | :09:49. | |
automatically, unless, reversing the burden of proof, you can prove | :09:49. | :09:59. | |
:09:59. | :10:01. | ||
you were one of the good guys. That, I think, is the way to go. If you | :10:01. | :10:05. | |
criminalise it, and given the burden of proof, which is always | :10:05. | :10:11. | |
legitimately acquired in criminal cases, you'll end of not having | :10:11. | :10:15. | |
prosecutions. The essence of the issue is these people make | :10:15. | :10:19. | |
decisions, had they been hi-tech companies, people would have said | :10:19. | :10:25. | |
this is part of capitalism. You are meant to take risks. What we wonder, | :10:25. | :10:29. | |
is an approach to banking which is different from the approached which | :10:29. | :10:34. | |
is applicable to other sectors of the economy. A lot of this is about | :10:34. | :10:41. | |
accountability and public trust. In that spirit, believing that | :10:41. | :10:51. | |
:10:51. | :10:54. | ||
accountability and public trust is so important, why did June try and | :10:54. | :10:58. | |
sit on the report and not released the findings to the public? We did | :10:58. | :11:04. | |
not sit on it at all. You please -- he released a one-page statement. | :11:04. | :11:09. | |
That is completely untrue. You went through -- we went through a legal | :11:09. | :11:17. | |
process which generates hundreds and hundreds of files. Those are | :11:17. | :11:21. | |
subject to the normal processes of, the French -- confidentiality. If | :11:21. | :11:28. | |
deposited in a boaties goes through, investigates an individual and | :11:28. | :11:32. | |
decides that in the end there is not a good enough case to bring a | :11:33. | :11:37. | |
prosecution case against them, we do not say we will release all of | :11:37. | :11:44. | |
the evidence into the public domain. If we suggested it, you would be St | :11:45. | :11:49. | |
what an extraordinary breach of the normal confidentiality of somebody | :11:49. | :11:54. | |
who deposited in a pretty decided not to prosecute. If he did not put | :11:54. | :12:02. | |
up -- presented as a legal document, and simply as a trail of evidence... | :12:02. | :12:09. | |
What we should have done and what Parliament should have suggested | :12:09. | :12:17. | |
was that parallel to our legal process, which is bound to be | :12:17. | :12:21. | |
subject to confidentiality, we should have launched an inquiry | :12:21. | :12:29. | |
which was going to produce a public report. We suggested that that is | :12:29. | :12:35. | |
what we should do. The idea but we should do a really deep report and | :12:35. | :12:45. | |
:12:45. | :12:46. | ||
that it should cover the actions of the FS a came specifically from me. | :12:46. | :12:52. | |
I know people rewrite history, it did not come from other people. | :12:52. | :12:57. | |
want to test whether you, over a deal for years at the top job, | :12:57. | :13:02. | |
really can put hand on heart and say bet you did your utmost to | :13:02. | :13:08. | |
write some of the runs inside of the system. There's talk about the | :13:08. | :13:15. | |
LIBOR manipulation. Big banks were manipulating the interest rate at | :13:15. | :13:19. | |
which they lend to each other. There was a huge knock-on effect. | :13:19. | :13:26. | |
It affected interest rates, cracker cars. Because of an internal order, | :13:26. | :13:32. | |
there were at least 26 letters informing you of what was going on. | :13:32. | :13:36. | |
Your own report acknowledged that you were too narrowly focused to | :13:36. | :13:46. | |
:13:46. | :14:20. | ||
respond effectively. Why did he There was enough information by May | :14:20. | :14:25. | |
of 2009 to set alarm bells ringing. When the alarm bells were not | :14:25. | :14:32. | |
ringing. By that time we were doing the investigation. I was first told | :14:32. | :14:38. | |
about this in autumn 2009. I knew there was an investigation into | :14:38. | :14:43. | |
libel. As the chairman, you are like the Home Secretary being told | :14:44. | :14:48. | |
the Director of Public Prosecutions and now doing a detailed | :14:48. | :14:54. | |
investigation. That is when I was told. I said to get on with it. | :14:54. | :15:00. | |
Those things take years to come to fruition. Taking one random example | :15:00. | :15:10. | |
:15:10. | :15:12. | ||
of a bank - but police have was fined �59 million as a result -- | :15:12. | :15:17. | |
Barclays. That represents a tiny few days of corporate profits. In | :15:17. | :15:27. | |
:15:27. | :15:27. | ||
the US were find it more. This is much weaker than what we see in the | :15:27. | :15:37. | |
:15:37. | :15:39. | ||
US. He has been transformed in the last five for six years. If you | :15:39. | :15:49. | |
:15:49. | :15:52. | ||
look over that five you period, are the size of the fines imposed, at... | :15:52. | :15:58. | |
In the last few days, we have had at Lloyds bailed out by the public, | :15:58. | :16:07. | |
announcing a quarterly profit, Barclays also. They have restored | :16:07. | :16:10. | |
their balance sheet in a significant way by winning comes to | :16:10. | :16:15. | |
punishment, it is a pinprick. could argue they could be bigger | :16:15. | :16:23. | |
fines. As I say, the FSA has been steadily increasing these overtime. | :16:24. | :16:29. | |
They were -- they are much finer than before. You can always debate | :16:29. | :16:34. | |
how far down that path you should go. The scale of fine and public | :16:34. | :16:40. | |
notice does make the bankers concentrate on this which was not | :16:41. | :16:46. | |
true five or ten years ago. Renumeration - it is interesting to | :16:46. | :16:51. | |
me that it is the European Union moving fast this in try to control | :16:51. | :16:56. | |
and damp down the renumeration packages that banks seem to come up | :16:56. | :17:01. | |
with. There were European Parliament proposals that required | :17:02. | :17:09. | |
banks and other companies to limit bonuses up to 100% of salaries. The | :17:09. | :17:13. | |
British government proposes that measure. Do you support it? I am | :17:13. | :17:20. | |
not convinced it is the best way to go. We in the FSA, along with the | :17:21. | :17:26. | |
Swiss and the Americans and the French, were forced or in I doing | :17:26. | :17:36. | |
:17:36. | :17:36. | ||
in 2009 for a new set of rules on a renumeration. They will most then | :17:36. | :17:42. | |
forced by us and the French but not the Americans. It is not for us to | :17:42. | :17:49. | |
regulate how much people are paid but regulate how they are paid. We | :17:49. | :17:54. | |
said that in equity. I do not think we got it quite right. If we were | :17:54. | :17:59. | |
to return to this issue, rather than the one for one cat which the | :18:00. | :18:04. | |
European Parliament has gone before, we should have insisted on a longer | :18:04. | :18:09. | |
period and when we have the feral, and what people should be paid is | :18:09. | :18:14. | |
subordinated debt which loses all its value if the bank fails. It is | :18:14. | :18:21. | |
coming - it looks like the European Council will pass it. The question | :18:21. | :18:27. | |
for you as an experience analyst of the City of London, is it going to | :18:27. | :18:33. | |
have a materially damaging effect on London's position as a global | :18:33. | :18:37. | |
financial centre? 90% of this measure will be in London according | :18:37. | :18:43. | |
to some. It would be a major complicating effect for some of the | :18:43. | :18:52. | |
big global banks operating in London, Singapore, Hong Kong. Their | :18:52. | :18:57. | |
competitors will not enforce these. Like those things, it would be a | :18:58. | :19:04. | |
less beach effect meant people initially think. It is not an | :19:04. | :19:09. | |
entirely beneficial effect. We will see an increase in people's base | :19:09. | :19:15. | |
salaries. What is being limited is the ratio of the bonus. That is an | :19:15. | :19:23. | |
interesting comment. The culture, if I can put it there this way, the | :19:23. | :19:28. | |
Greek culture, is still there. The Archbishop of Canterbury has said | :19:28. | :19:31. | |
recently there is still an entrenched culture of entitlement | :19:31. | :19:36. | |
amongst the bankers in London? Where does the money come from. | :19:37. | :19:41. | |
That is what you need to return to. Some of this activity we do not | :19:41. | :19:46. | |
need. If we have a regulatory system, a set of capital regimes | :19:46. | :19:52. | |
and rules which allow people to make money out of things that do | :19:52. | :19:56. | |
not need to insist, quite a lot of that is going to stick to the | :19:56. | :20:02. | |
employees. The most important thing to be doing is get the renumeration | :20:02. | :20:07. | |
of capital right. We are only halfway there, in particular in | :20:07. | :20:12. | |
regards to the trading activity. It is too easy to do trading activity | :20:12. | :20:16. | |
of might capital bases. If that is the case, there is activity going | :20:16. | :20:20. | |
on which is not needed and some of the money sticking to people who do | :20:20. | :20:30. | |
:20:30. | :20:31. | ||
not needed. Quick fire. Fencing of banks - consumer base activities, | :20:31. | :20:35. | |
looking after depositors money as opposed to the casino banking. Some | :20:35. | :20:39. | |
wanted a complete separation of those separation and for banks to | :20:39. | :20:45. | |
be broken up. It is not going to happen. Are you happy? A ring- | :20:45. | :20:50. | |
fencing along with extra capital will make a difference. It gives | :20:50. | :20:54. | |
the resolution authority the ability to distinguish in a crisis | :20:54. | :20:59. | |
between the bit of you really need to keep going for - the basic real | :20:59. | :21:04. | |
economy - what people call the casino activity. Banks will still | :21:04. | :21:11. | |
be too big to fail - Yass? And that is a fundamental problem? Winter | :21:11. | :21:16. | |
much higher capital departments. Everything else, including these | :21:16. | :21:19. | |
offences, these are inadequate second best compared to what we | :21:19. | :21:24. | |
need to do which is to have the extra capital but more. Interesting. | :21:24. | :21:31. | |
OK. Before we finish, on the wider environment - we can talk about | :21:31. | :21:35. | |
different rules and regulations about how the City of London can be | :21:35. | :21:41. | |
run by we cannot ignore Europe. If there is sustained financial crisis | :21:41. | :21:44. | |
in the eurozone, it will have a destabilising effect in London | :21:44. | :21:49. | |
whether we like it or not. What is urinalysis? Do you believe this | :21:49. | :21:55. | |
ability of banks in Europe is still fundamentally compromised? I think | :21:55. | :22:00. | |
Europe is fundamentally compromised by the fact that the eurozone | :22:00. | :22:05. | |
structure as being a single currency without an adequate degree | :22:05. | :22:10. | |
of fiscal union is a dangerous structure. This is what I do admit | :22:10. | :22:15. | |
my own fault. Because you're a supporter going into the euro... | :22:15. | :22:20. | |
was a supporter. Now you are suggesting it is dysfunctional. | :22:20. | :22:26. | |
underestimated the degree of fiscal union which was required to deal | :22:26. | :22:29. | |
with... In interesting point which even those who are you against the | :22:29. | :22:34. | |
euro did not really understand - this crucial issue of how the | :22:34. | :22:38. | |
banking works in a single currency without a fiscal union. That has to | :22:38. | :22:44. | |
be fixed. As long as you don't fix it will be a potentially unstable | :22:44. | :22:49. | |
system. They need to go all the way down the line to a banking union | :22:49. | :22:53. | |
and underpin that with fiscal resources so that if a bank in | :22:53. | :22:57. | |
Spain is in trouble, it can be bailed out with the resources from | :22:57. | :23:01. | |
the centre not from the Spanish government. It is a fundamental | :23:01. | :23:11. | |
:23:11. | :23:12. | ||
problem. A manner you are associated with says Dairies their | :23:12. | :23:16. | |
European Treasury with a power to tact to biros well - are you going | :23:16. | :23:24. | |
down the same track? -- to borrow as well? Mario Draghi was pretty | :23:24. | :23:28. | |
close to saying that as well. that is not going to happen. That | :23:28. | :23:33. | |
is the implication. You are saying we have to live with fundamental | :23:33. | :23:36. | |
instability and dysfunction for an awful long time to calm? I fear | :23:36. | :23:40. | |
from a combination of the extraordinary excesses of pre- | :23:40. | :23:46. | |
crisis finance in the US, UK in particular, plus the problems of | :23:46. | :23:52. | |
the eurozone, I think we are long way from being out of the crisis. I | :23:52. | :23:57. | |
fear we are, for many years, we are subject to economic performance. | :23:57. | :24:05. | |
The have soared excesses of Anglo- Saxon finance and the misty sign of | :24:05. | :24:11. | |
the eurozone. Incredibly important, alongside the justifiable anger of | :24:11. | :24:16. | |
individual bankers - that is important, we need to put that | :24:16. | :24:21. | |
system right - but it is the overall system that we have a wrong. | :24:21. | :24:25. | |
We have allowed fine as to get out of control. Us and worse with the | :24:25. | :24:29. |