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Welcome to HARDtalk, I'm Stephen Sackur. | 0:00:09 | 0:00:11 | |
After five years of bloodletting and suffering, the Syrian war has | 0:00:11 | 0:00:14 | |
a new, potentially game-changing dynamic. | 0:00:14 | 0:00:19 | |
The combined forces of the Assad regime and its Iranian and Russian | 0:00:19 | 0:00:24 | |
backers are pushing back the rebels in the north and west | 0:00:24 | 0:00:27 | |
of the country. | 0:00:27 | 0:00:29 | |
A mooted truce appears to have been brokered on Russia's terms, | 0:00:29 | 0:00:33 | |
and seems unlikely to halt the military push. | 0:00:33 | 0:00:36 | |
My guest today is Bassma Kodmani, a representative of the so-called | 0:00:36 | 0:00:39 | |
moderate rebels. | 0:00:39 | 0:00:42 | |
Is the only realistic choice in Syria today Assad, | 0:00:42 | 0:00:47 | |
or Islamic State? | 0:00:47 | 0:00:57 | |
Bassma Kodmani, welcome to HARDtalk. | 0:01:14 | 0:01:17 | |
Thank you. | 0:01:17 | 0:01:18 | |
This is the strangest of weeks in the Syria conflict, | 0:01:18 | 0:01:22 | |
because by the end of the week we are supposed to be seeing | 0:01:22 | 0:01:25 | |
a quote-unquote cessation of hostilities, and yet day by day | 0:01:25 | 0:01:29 | |
right now we hear of the most terrible new acts of violence. | 0:01:29 | 0:01:34 | |
In the last few hours, strikes against hospitals, | 0:01:34 | 0:01:37 | |
a medical facility in the north of the country. | 0:01:37 | 0:01:41 | |
What, in your view, is going on right now? | 0:01:41 | 0:01:45 | |
Probably because of the announcement of cessation of hostilities, | 0:01:45 | 0:01:49 | |
the parties are positioning themselves as best as they can. | 0:01:49 | 0:01:54 | |
I suppose Russia, if it believes in any way in what it has signed, | 0:01:54 | 0:01:58 | |
which is an agreement on cessation of hostilities by the end | 0:01:58 | 0:02:01 | |
of the week, then it is trying to make the biggest gains it can | 0:02:01 | 0:02:05 | |
make this week, in these coming days. | 0:02:05 | 0:02:06 | |
And that is not something that will happen, I think, | 0:02:06 | 0:02:10 | |
without any response from neighbouring countries. | 0:02:10 | 0:02:16 | |
You mean Turkey, in particular, because many of the strikes right | 0:02:16 | 0:02:19 | |
now are happening close to the Turkish border | 0:02:19 | 0:02:23 | |
in the north of Syria. | 0:02:23 | 0:02:26 | |
Clearly for Turkey, Turkey's anger and frustration with the situation | 0:02:26 | 0:02:28 | |
has been growing. | 0:02:28 | 0:02:30 | |
It is now at a point where it sees that no-one is going to come | 0:02:30 | 0:02:34 | |
in support of its own vital national interests. | 0:02:34 | 0:02:38 | |
And I think it has made a decision that, whatever happens, | 0:02:38 | 0:02:41 | |
it is going to defend its vital interests, and those vital interests | 0:02:41 | 0:02:44 | |
can be defined. | 0:02:44 | 0:02:48 | |
They are, first and foremost, the Kurdish issue, which impacts | 0:02:48 | 0:02:51 | |
Turkey's internal stability and internal national cohesion, | 0:02:51 | 0:02:58 | |
as well as it has taken a position against the Assad regime. | 0:02:58 | 0:03:02 | |
It cannot see the Assad regime prevail again, | 0:03:02 | 0:03:10 | |
because it sees this as future years of attempts to destabilise it | 0:03:10 | 0:03:13 | |
by the regime. | 0:03:13 | 0:03:14 | |
Well, we will come back to analysis of the Turkish condition | 0:03:14 | 0:03:17 | |
and all the key international players in this conflict | 0:03:17 | 0:03:19 | |
in a short while. | 0:03:19 | 0:03:20 | |
But I want to begin by getting to grips with the position | 0:03:20 | 0:03:24 | |
of your grouping of, let's say, moderate forces, | 0:03:24 | 0:03:27 | |
both political and military, inside Syria. | 0:03:27 | 0:03:31 | |
You have represented them for the best part of the last four | 0:03:31 | 0:03:34 | |
or five years. | 0:03:34 | 0:03:35 | |
I just want to get a very simple question out of the way. | 0:03:35 | 0:03:38 | |
Do the groups that you are associated with, | 0:03:38 | 0:03:40 | |
the so-called moderates, recognise this cessation | 0:03:40 | 0:03:42 | |
of hostilities deal? | 0:03:42 | 0:03:45 | |
Will the fighters that you, in a sense, speak for, | 0:03:45 | 0:03:50 | |
be silencing their guns by the end of this week? | 0:03:50 | 0:03:52 | |
If there is a stop of air bombings by Russia. | 0:03:52 | 0:03:55 | |
The air campaign has jeopardised the whole attempt to get, | 0:03:55 | 0:03:58 | |
really, to a point where there is a cessation of hostilities. | 0:03:58 | 0:04:03 | |
The groups who went along with the political opposition, | 0:04:03 | 0:04:08 | |
these were military groups represented in Geneva two weeks ago, | 0:04:08 | 0:04:11 | |
when talks were supposed to start, peace talks were supposed to start | 0:04:11 | 0:04:16 | |
in Geneva, with the regime. | 0:04:16 | 0:04:23 | |
Those groups were represented, they were there. | 0:04:23 | 0:04:25 | |
And they came because they were sincerely planning to abide | 0:04:25 | 0:04:27 | |
by any political arrangement. | 0:04:27 | 0:04:29 | |
Now, the humanitarian situation was no... | 0:04:29 | 0:04:33 | |
Not any better, and this was an important requirement | 0:04:33 | 0:04:36 | |
for the talks to start. | 0:04:36 | 0:04:38 | |
But more importantly, the air campaign by Russia started. | 0:04:38 | 0:04:44 | |
So the opposition, both political and military, | 0:04:44 | 0:04:46 | |
was left with no choice but to ask for a suspension of the peace talks, | 0:04:46 | 0:04:50 | |
which in fact never really started. | 0:04:50 | 0:04:53 | |
No, but as far as you are concerned now, you are not going to take part | 0:04:53 | 0:04:57 | |
in any mooted further peace talks, are you? | 0:04:57 | 0:05:00 | |
Because the idea of the Americans is to get back to Geneva and get | 0:05:00 | 0:05:03 | |
back to talking before the end of February. | 0:05:03 | 0:05:05 | |
But your groupings are not interested anymore? | 0:05:05 | 0:05:07 | |
Of course they are. | 0:05:07 | 0:05:08 | |
I think it is very important to continue to say that the opposition | 0:05:08 | 0:05:16 | |
is genuinely committed to a political process. | 0:05:16 | 0:05:17 | |
But the political process will never happen if the minimal conditions | 0:05:17 | 0:05:22 | |
that the opposition has set, what it has been fighting | 0:05:22 | 0:05:24 | |
for for five years, are not met. | 0:05:24 | 0:05:26 | |
When I say minimal, we know what that means today. | 0:05:26 | 0:05:29 | |
And Russia understands, and every country that has been | 0:05:29 | 0:05:31 | |
involved in this process understands, what that means. | 0:05:31 | 0:05:36 | |
That means that Assad is not part of transition negotiations. | 0:05:36 | 0:05:41 | |
He is still there, until we reach an agreement | 0:05:41 | 0:05:46 | |
on what the transition looks like. | 0:05:46 | 0:05:49 | |
And it should look like what we have defined in the Geneva document, | 0:05:49 | 0:05:52 | |
four years ago now, what we have redefined and reconfirmed in several | 0:05:52 | 0:05:55 | |
documents signed by Russia, signed by the United States, | 0:05:55 | 0:06:00 | |
that a transition... | 0:06:00 | 0:06:01 | |
Yes, but if I may interrupt you, things have changed. | 0:06:01 | 0:06:03 | |
You are still banging on about Assad having absolutely no role | 0:06:03 | 0:06:07 | |
in the transition, when it has become painfully obvious in recent | 0:06:07 | 0:06:10 | |
weeks that the Russians are driving this process forward. | 0:06:10 | 0:06:14 | |
And as far as they are concerned, Assad is essential to | 0:06:14 | 0:06:17 | |
Syria's future. | 0:06:17 | 0:06:18 | |
They are not letting him go, they are now buttressing his power. | 0:06:18 | 0:06:21 | |
And as we now know from Mr Assad himself, an interview a few days | 0:06:21 | 0:06:25 | |
ago, he now firmly believes he can achieve full military victory, | 0:06:25 | 0:06:30 | |
thanks to Russia's and Iran's support. | 0:06:30 | 0:06:34 | |
Look, even Russian observers themselves say that what Assad says | 0:06:34 | 0:06:37 | |
himself doesn't matter that much. | 0:06:37 | 0:06:39 | |
He is not a player any more in this equation. | 0:06:39 | 0:06:42 | |
The player is Russia. | 0:06:42 | 0:06:44 | |
Russia is clearly calling the shots. | 0:06:44 | 0:06:47 | |
Do you believe that the Russians right now are, in a sense, | 0:06:47 | 0:06:50 | |
running rings, diplomatically speaking, around the Americans | 0:06:50 | 0:06:52 | |
and the Western powers? | 0:06:52 | 0:06:55 | |
I think Russia has defined its strategy, has decided that it | 0:06:55 | 0:07:00 | |
would keep the regime in place, not necessarily Assad, | 0:07:00 | 0:07:02 | |
maybe in the future. | 0:07:02 | 0:07:05 | |
But for now it needs Assad, because Assad provides legality | 0:07:05 | 0:07:07 | |
for its own intervention, international legality. | 0:07:07 | 0:07:11 | |
Russia says it intervened on the request of the Syrian regime. | 0:07:11 | 0:07:14 | |
It therefore needs Assad. | 0:07:14 | 0:07:16 | |
Assad - whatever you say, Assad is very much a player. | 0:07:16 | 0:07:21 | |
Well, Assad is still sitting in power in Damascus, | 0:07:21 | 0:07:23 | |
but he doesn't call the shots. | 0:07:23 | 0:07:27 | |
He is not the one who makes the decisions. | 0:07:27 | 0:07:29 | |
On the ground, his troops are not even visible. | 0:07:29 | 0:07:32 | |
But we see armed militias from Iran, from Iraq, from Hezbollah, | 0:07:32 | 0:07:37 | |
Lebanon, and these are the militias, these are the Shia-led militias | 0:07:37 | 0:07:41 | |
who are fighting against the revolutionary groups, | 0:07:41 | 0:07:45 | |
the rebel groups everywhere. | 0:07:46 | 0:07:48 | |
And your fighters, if I can put it that way, they are such a loose | 0:07:48 | 0:07:51 | |
association of so-called moderate fighters, it is very hard to call | 0:07:51 | 0:07:54 | |
them fighters, for example the fighters who were defending | 0:07:54 | 0:07:57 | |
Aleppo, and areas around Aleppo in the north, | 0:07:57 | 0:08:03 | |
they are losing, losing big-time. | 0:08:03 | 0:08:05 | |
Yes, they are. | 0:08:05 | 0:08:06 | |
But being confronted by what they are, do you know how | 0:08:06 | 0:08:10 | |
many enemies these groups are fighting today? | 0:08:10 | 0:08:15 | |
They are fighting Russia from the air, they are fighting Iran | 0:08:15 | 0:08:17 | |
and the regime on the ground, they are fighting Daesh, | 0:08:17 | 0:08:22 | |
of course, because Daesh is attacking at the same time, | 0:08:22 | 0:08:24 | |
and taking advantage of the situation to attack, | 0:08:24 | 0:08:29 | |
and the fourth one, unfortunately, are the Kurdish groups, | 0:08:29 | 0:08:32 | |
what we call the PYD groups, which is the radical Kurdish groups | 0:08:32 | 0:08:37 | |
with the secessionist agenda in Syria. | 0:08:37 | 0:08:40 | |
Sure, there are all these groups who frankly right now are militarily | 0:08:40 | 0:08:45 | |
much more effective than the groups you are associated with. | 0:08:45 | 0:08:48 | |
All it means is that you, the so-called Syrian moderates, | 0:08:48 | 0:08:50 | |
have no leverage left at all. | 0:08:50 | 0:08:54 | |
You are barely players in the game anymore. | 0:08:54 | 0:08:58 | |
They are players. | 0:08:58 | 0:08:59 | |
They are delaying the attacks, they are making it more difficult. | 0:08:59 | 0:09:01 | |
That is all they can do at this stage. | 0:09:01 | 0:09:03 | |
But the point is that what are we looking at politically? | 0:09:03 | 0:09:08 | |
Because if we are only going to say these have anti-tank missiles, | 0:09:08 | 0:09:12 | |
and the others have aircrafts, then is this what will... | 0:09:12 | 0:09:15 | |
Are these the terms on which we will develop a political process, | 0:09:15 | 0:09:18 | |
and a political agreement? | 0:09:18 | 0:09:23 | |
I don't think any of these powers, whether it is Russia | 0:09:23 | 0:09:25 | |
or the United States or any of the actors on the ground, | 0:09:25 | 0:09:30 | |
or even Iran, are saying that this will determine an acceptable | 0:09:30 | 0:09:33 | |
political settlement that will stabilise Syria. | 0:09:33 | 0:09:39 | |
Well, stabilise is the word, and if we just leave the military | 0:09:39 | 0:09:42 | |
and the political aspects for a moment, and talk humanitarian, | 0:09:42 | 0:09:45 | |
stability there is so very important for all the players. | 0:09:45 | 0:09:48 | |
But particularly for Turkey, the neighbouring states, | 0:09:48 | 0:09:54 | |
and then for Europe, because of the huge numbers | 0:09:54 | 0:09:56 | |
of refugees who are escaping the bloodshed and the suffering | 0:09:56 | 0:10:00 | |
in Syria, and going ultimately, many of them, toward Europe. | 0:10:00 | 0:10:03 | |
Do you, from what you see and hear on the ground, | 0:10:03 | 0:10:08 | |
fear that the exodus of Syrians from Syria, | 0:10:08 | 0:10:11 | |
particularly in the areas around Aleppo and in the north | 0:10:11 | 0:10:13 | |
of the country right now, is going to accelerate once again? | 0:10:13 | 0:10:17 | |
Of course. | 0:10:17 | 0:10:18 | |
There is every risk that the refugee issue will become... | 0:10:18 | 0:10:23 | |
Will accelerate, and will become much more serious in the weeks | 0:10:23 | 0:10:26 | |
to come, if the situation is what it is. | 0:10:26 | 0:10:31 | |
And if it is not, there is nothing, there is no political horizon. | 0:10:31 | 0:10:34 | |
We have a very dangerous situation on the ground, | 0:10:34 | 0:10:38 | |
but we have the opportunity right now to say what would create | 0:10:38 | 0:10:40 | |
in Syria conditions for stabilisation. | 0:10:40 | 0:10:43 | |
Stabilisation will take a long time, and lots of effort, and the groups | 0:10:43 | 0:10:47 | |
on the ground will have to commit, and some who will not commit will be | 0:10:47 | 0:10:53 | |
considered spoilers, and will have to be fought. | 0:10:53 | 0:10:56 | |
I think the moderate opposition will go along with that. | 0:10:56 | 0:10:59 | |
If we were to reach cessation of hostilities, these groups will be | 0:10:59 | 0:11:02 | |
excluded if they don't abide by an agreement. | 0:11:02 | 0:11:05 | |
Therefore, if there is no process that takes those terms | 0:11:05 | 0:11:11 | |
into consideration, we are in for something very dangerous. | 0:11:11 | 0:11:15 | |
Remember Iraq 12 years ago, 13 years ago maybe now, | 0:11:15 | 0:11:18 | |
when George Bush decided to invade Iraq, and we are still | 0:11:18 | 0:11:23 | |
paying the price. | 0:11:23 | 0:11:25 | |
What is the price? | 0:11:25 | 0:11:26 | |
The price is the loss of Iraq altogether, and the emergence | 0:11:26 | 0:11:29 | |
of a monster, Daesh. | 0:11:29 | 0:11:32 | |
Daesh is out there because of the policy | 0:11:32 | 0:11:35 | |
which was brought in Iraq. | 0:11:35 | 0:11:36 | |
And I fear that they are doing the same today in Syria. | 0:11:36 | 0:11:40 | |
One thing that strikes me very powerfully right now | 0:11:40 | 0:11:43 | |
is that the more I read about what is happening | 0:11:43 | 0:11:45 | |
on the ground, in places like Aleppo, the more I realise that | 0:11:45 | 0:11:49 | |
many of the fighters who used to perhaps self-describe themselves | 0:11:49 | 0:11:52 | |
as moderates have given up on this idea that the Western powers | 0:11:52 | 0:11:57 | |
are somehow going to help them with funding and arms, | 0:11:57 | 0:12:00 | |
and back them in their struggle against the Assad regime, | 0:12:00 | 0:12:04 | |
and against Daesh, the Islamic State. | 0:12:04 | 0:12:07 | |
And many of them, it seems, are now actively joining | 0:12:07 | 0:12:12 | |
the jihadists, whether it be Nusra Front or Islamic State itself. | 0:12:12 | 0:12:17 | |
Fighters who used to be loyal to your position are now giving up | 0:12:17 | 0:12:20 | |
on any idea that there is room for moderation, | 0:12:20 | 0:12:23 | |
and they are actively now joining the jihadists. | 0:12:23 | 0:12:29 | |
Well, they are definitely very disappointed with Western powers, | 0:12:29 | 0:12:32 | |
particularly the United States. | 0:12:32 | 0:12:35 | |
The support has not come, and the picture could have been very | 0:12:35 | 0:12:39 | |
different had they received the kind of support they needed. | 0:12:39 | 0:12:41 | |
Not only in arms, and maybe not specially in arms, | 0:12:41 | 0:12:46 | |
but more in organisational capacity, the ability to raise an army, | 0:12:46 | 0:12:49 | |
to organise it, to provide central command, et cetera. | 0:12:49 | 0:12:53 | |
With respect, you can't blame the Americans. | 0:12:53 | 0:12:55 | |
The Americans committed $500 million to a training programme | 0:12:55 | 0:12:58 | |
for quote-unquote moderate fighters. | 0:12:58 | 0:13:01 | |
Most of that money was siphoned off, was lost. | 0:13:01 | 0:13:04 | |
And those fighters who were trained were put into theatre in Syria, | 0:13:04 | 0:13:08 | |
most of them either ran away or gave up both themselves | 0:13:08 | 0:13:13 | |
and their weaponry to the Nusra Front, and the Americans | 0:13:13 | 0:13:16 | |
have washed their hands on it, and said, these moderates, | 0:13:16 | 0:13:19 | |
they are totally incompetent and unreliable. | 0:13:19 | 0:13:21 | |
The programme from the start was ill-conceived, and there was no | 0:13:21 | 0:13:24 | |
political will to implement it. | 0:13:24 | 0:13:25 | |
The money was not spent on the rebels. | 0:13:25 | 0:13:28 | |
Had it been spent, I assure you, it would have been a very, | 0:13:28 | 0:13:31 | |
very different result. | 0:13:31 | 0:13:32 | |
Is that not your fault? | 0:13:32 | 0:13:33 | |
The Division 30 men who were put on the ground, we now know, | 0:13:33 | 0:13:37 | |
on the record, gave most of their weaponry to the local | 0:13:37 | 0:13:41 | |
commanders of the Nusra Front, a group that is associated with Al | 0:13:41 | 0:13:44 | |
Qaeda. | 0:13:44 | 0:13:47 | |
That is why it is that it was most important to organise the people, | 0:13:47 | 0:13:51 | |
provide salaries to the fighters. | 0:13:51 | 0:13:54 | |
And then you would have an army. | 0:13:54 | 0:13:55 | |
You would have soldiers. | 0:13:55 | 0:13:56 | |
You have people committed to their units. | 0:13:56 | 0:13:58 | |
That never happened. | 0:13:58 | 0:13:59 | |
This... | 0:13:59 | 0:14:02 | |
The selection process was ill-conceived, the definition | 0:14:02 | 0:14:03 | |
of the criteria for vetting were not there. | 0:14:03 | 0:14:07 | |
Nothing was properly done in this process. | 0:14:07 | 0:14:10 | |
It was so disappointing. | 0:14:10 | 0:14:11 | |
Do you not take any responsibility on the part of the Free Syrian Army, | 0:14:11 | 0:14:15 | |
the moderate various different groupings of locally-based forces | 0:14:15 | 0:14:18 | |
whom you claim to be associated with? | 0:14:18 | 0:14:21 | |
They failed. | 0:14:21 | 0:14:23 | |
There is an incoherence to the so-called moderation | 0:14:23 | 0:14:27 | |
opposition which has hamstrung your movement | 0:14:27 | 0:14:29 | |
from the very beginning. | 0:14:29 | 0:14:30 | |
The groups were really determined to fight, | 0:14:30 | 0:14:33 | |
and they continue to be determined to fight, | 0:14:33 | 0:14:35 | |
but they were left for a very long time with no alternative. | 0:14:35 | 0:14:38 | |
The money was going to groups which were radical. | 0:14:38 | 0:14:41 | |
When they still wanted to fight, they found money and arms in groups | 0:14:41 | 0:14:45 | |
that were radical. | 0:14:45 | 0:14:50 | |
This was the alternative. | 0:14:50 | 0:14:52 | |
Now, today what we are desperately seeking to create is | 0:14:52 | 0:14:54 | |
an alternative to that. | 0:14:54 | 0:14:55 | |
The military alternative, the funding that should have come | 0:14:55 | 0:14:58 | |
from outside from the democratic countries, did not happen. | 0:14:58 | 0:15:00 | |
Can we create it politically? | 0:15:00 | 0:15:02 | |
Can we get these groups to commit to a political process and therefore | 0:15:02 | 0:15:05 | |
in a cessation of hostilities context, we will see | 0:15:05 | 0:15:08 | |
them re-emerge immediately? | 0:15:08 | 0:15:13 | |
It is too late. | 0:15:13 | 0:15:15 | |
It's too late. | 0:15:15 | 0:15:17 | |
That is the tragedy of your situation. | 0:15:17 | 0:15:18 | |
It is simply too late. | 0:15:18 | 0:15:20 | |
Look at the words very recently of the former US Defence Secretary, | 0:15:20 | 0:15:23 | |
Chuck Hagel, who says looking back, "Our big mistake was to say, | 0:15:23 | 0:15:29 | |
'Assad must go.' That was plain wrong." | 0:15:29 | 0:15:32 | |
We now, from Libya to Syria to even Egypt and obviously Iraq, | 0:15:32 | 0:15:38 | |
can say that when we remove the authoritarian, remove | 0:15:38 | 0:15:40 | |
the dictator, the chaos that follows is actually often worse | 0:15:40 | 0:15:43 | |
for our national interest. | 0:15:43 | 0:15:46 | |
So the Americans frankly now look at the situation in Syria and it | 0:15:46 | 0:15:49 | |
seems they are prepared to walk away and leave the Russians to support | 0:15:49 | 0:15:55 | |
Assad, and allow Assad to expand his area of operation. | 0:15:55 | 0:16:02 | |
Mr Chuck Hagel resigned because he disagreed with Obama's | 0:16:02 | 0:16:06 | |
policy, and because he was not given the means to implement a serious | 0:16:06 | 0:16:10 | |
policy that would have had some effect. | 0:16:10 | 0:16:12 | |
Now, I think there is a temptation in Washington to leave the situation | 0:16:12 | 0:16:17 | |
to Russia, but what is happening, in fact, and what we are seeing | 0:16:17 | 0:16:21 | |
between yesterday and today, is that the countries in the region | 0:16:21 | 0:16:26 | |
consider that the vital interests are under threat, | 0:16:26 | 0:16:31 | |
and they are seeing that the United States is not | 0:16:31 | 0:16:37 | |
willing to mobilise to defend their interests. | 0:16:37 | 0:16:38 | |
It's Turkey, but also all of the Gulf countries who see | 0:16:38 | 0:16:41 | |
that if this is left to Russia, Russia will leave Iran, | 0:16:41 | 0:16:44 | |
take positions there, and saying what happened in Iraq | 0:16:44 | 0:16:49 | |
happened once - it will not happen a second time in Syria. | 0:16:49 | 0:16:52 | |
So you are pinning your hopes now on the Turks, the Saudis | 0:16:52 | 0:16:55 | |
and the Gulf states? | 0:16:55 | 0:16:56 | |
The Turks and Saudis are mobilising now. | 0:16:56 | 0:16:59 | |
Are they really? | 0:16:59 | 0:17:02 | |
The Saudis and UAE say they are prepared to commit men | 0:17:02 | 0:17:05 | |
on the ground inside Syria. | 0:17:05 | 0:17:06 | |
They said that a few days ago. | 0:17:06 | 0:17:08 | |
Absolutely no sign they really mean it. | 0:17:08 | 0:17:10 | |
They may or may not. | 0:17:10 | 0:17:12 | |
The point here is are we only going to believe it when guns go up | 0:17:12 | 0:17:16 | |
and start blowing? | 0:17:16 | 0:17:19 | |
When bombs start blowing? | 0:17:19 | 0:17:21 | |
Is this what diplomacy is about? | 0:17:21 | 0:17:27 | |
These countries are saying to the United States and the world, | 0:17:27 | 0:17:29 | |
our vital interests are in danger. | 0:17:29 | 0:17:31 | |
The risks for this region are huge, considerable. | 0:17:31 | 0:17:33 | |
So they are sounding the alarm bell. | 0:17:33 | 0:17:36 | |
If no-one is going to hear that alarm bell and only say, | 0:17:36 | 0:17:40 | |
"Well, they're bluffing, they're not going to send their troops in," | 0:17:40 | 0:17:44 | |
fine, they may not send their troops, because they may | 0:17:44 | 0:17:47 | |
decide it is not worth it. | 0:17:47 | 0:17:48 | |
Definitely not 'worth it', but that it is too risky to do so. | 0:17:48 | 0:17:54 | |
The fact remains that they are unhappy with the situation. | 0:17:54 | 0:17:58 | |
Just to be clear about what you want, because it's | 0:17:58 | 0:18:01 | |
important to nail this down. | 0:18:01 | 0:18:02 | |
We've heard Prime Minister Davutoglu of Turkey make some very grave | 0:18:02 | 0:18:04 | |
warnings, or even threats, to the Russians, suggesting | 0:18:04 | 0:18:09 | |
that the Turks may well take serious action in northern Syria. | 0:18:09 | 0:18:15 | |
Are you saying you want to see Turkish troops | 0:18:15 | 0:18:22 | |
I don't hope that we go that far. to see Turkish troops | 0:18:22 | 0:18:25 | |
What I hope happens is that we do get a cessation | 0:18:25 | 0:18:28 | |
of bombings by Russia. | 0:18:28 | 0:18:32 | |
We had an agreement signed in Munich three days ago, | 0:18:32 | 0:18:35 | |
and all of the parties were saying, "It is not going to be implemented," | 0:18:35 | 0:18:38 | |
because in fact it is Russia who sets the pace of implementation. | 0:18:38 | 0:18:41 | |
It is Russia who decides it is not today, it is too early. | 0:18:41 | 0:18:45 | |
Russia has a clause which allows it to keep striking at quote/unquote | 0:18:45 | 0:18:48 | |
"terrorist targets" even if there is a cessation of hostilities. | 0:18:48 | 0:18:51 | |
Yes, and Mr Kerry goes out and says, "But you are targeting | 0:18:51 | 0:18:54 | |
the legitimate opposition". | 0:18:54 | 0:18:57 | |
And Russia continues to ignore it. | 0:18:57 | 0:19:01 | |
So who is going to stop Russia and Iran from controlling | 0:19:01 | 0:19:04 | |
a situation which will push Syria, which first of all is | 0:19:04 | 0:19:07 | |
going to break... | 0:19:08 | 0:19:11 | |
The simple answer to your rhetorical question is no-one, | 0:19:11 | 0:19:13 | |
because the Russians have made a massive military commitment | 0:19:13 | 0:19:15 | |
alongside the Iranians, which the Europeans and Americans | 0:19:15 | 0:19:21 | |
are not prepared to counter or to match. | 0:19:21 | 0:19:24 | |
So the reality of today, the real politic of today, | 0:19:24 | 0:19:26 | |
is that your side has lost. | 0:19:26 | 0:19:30 | |
I believe that if this is the conclusion that the Western | 0:19:30 | 0:19:40 | |
countries have reached, then it is decades of refugees, | 0:19:40 | 0:19:42 | |
and I'm afraid some terror attacks, inside Europe. | 0:19:42 | 0:19:45 | |
These are the vital interests of the West and of Europe, | 0:19:45 | 0:19:48 | |
even more than the United States, that are at stake. | 0:19:48 | 0:19:53 | |
If there is no wake-up here to the situation | 0:19:53 | 0:19:58 | |
and the gravity of the situation and implications of leaving | 0:19:58 | 0:20:01 | |
the place to Assad and Daesh, because this is what is happening | 0:20:01 | 0:20:04 | |
now with Russian policy, it is bombing everybody | 0:20:04 | 0:20:06 | |
on the ground. | 0:20:06 | 0:20:08 | |
Civilians, children, throughout everybody | 0:20:08 | 0:20:11 | |
out there indiscriminately. | 0:20:11 | 0:20:14 | |
What does that produce? | 0:20:14 | 0:20:15 | |
It produces Daesh and the regime. | 0:20:15 | 0:20:19 | |
It is a terrible thing to say, but maybe in the end, | 0:20:19 | 0:20:22 | |
the suffering we see today is a precursor to the end | 0:20:22 | 0:20:29 | |
of the war, an end of the war which brings some sort of victory | 0:20:29 | 0:20:33 | |
to Assad in the areas he really cares about, | 0:20:33 | 0:20:35 | |
and leaves Islamic State to be dealt with later, | 0:20:35 | 0:20:37 | |
maybe, by the international coalition of forces. | 0:20:37 | 0:20:40 | |
But the point surely is about the end of the day-to-day warfare. | 0:20:40 | 0:20:46 | |
With all respect you in the moderate Syrian opposition, you don't | 0:20:46 | 0:20:48 | |
live inside Syria. | 0:20:49 | 0:20:50 | |
Those Syrians left inside the country surely want an end | 0:20:50 | 0:20:53 | |
to the war and the bombing more than anything else? | 0:20:53 | 0:20:59 | |
We all agree. | 0:20:59 | 0:21:00 | |
That is what we would like to see, believe me. | 0:21:00 | 0:21:02 | |
The moderate opposition, inside or outside, | 0:21:02 | 0:21:04 | |
is on the same page. | 0:21:04 | 0:21:06 | |
We want an end to this conflict. | 0:21:06 | 0:21:10 | |
Maybe the only person who can end the conflict at least | 0:21:10 | 0:21:13 | |
in the medium-term is President Assad backed | 0:21:13 | 0:21:16 | |
by the Russians and Iranians. | 0:21:16 | 0:21:18 | |
It may not be pretty, it may be in your view horrible, | 0:21:18 | 0:21:22 | |
but it might lead to the quickest end of this terrible war. | 0:21:22 | 0:21:26 | |
OK, let's take this rationale and apply it over | 0:21:26 | 0:21:29 | |
the last five years. | 0:21:29 | 0:21:33 | |
We've had a wake-up of the social fabric of Syria. | 0:21:33 | 0:21:37 | |
We have had a collapsing of institutions of the state. | 0:21:37 | 0:21:42 | |
We have had an army that is now entirely controlled by one | 0:21:42 | 0:21:47 | |
community, which is going after another large community in Syria. | 0:21:47 | 0:21:52 | |
We are now seeing the break-up of the country because Assad | 0:21:52 | 0:21:55 | |
is willing to let go of a piece of the territory that goes | 0:21:55 | 0:21:58 | |
to the a Kurdish secessionist programme. | 0:21:58 | 0:22:04 | |
What does that tell us about Assad? | 0:22:04 | 0:22:06 | |
It tells us he is simply bringing this country, | 0:22:06 | 0:22:09 | |
burying this country, and the best way to salvage | 0:22:09 | 0:22:13 | |
the institutions, the society, and the army of a country that can | 0:22:13 | 0:22:19 | |
restart its army and its national army, is to get rid of him | 0:22:19 | 0:22:22 | |
as quickly as possible. | 0:22:22 | 0:22:24 | |
Is that really the lesson of Libya and Iraq? | 0:22:24 | 0:22:29 | |
Oh, definitely. | 0:22:29 | 0:22:30 | |
Really? | 0:22:30 | 0:22:31 | |
Now, the best thing for Syria would be for Assad and his regime | 0:22:31 | 0:22:36 | |
to be toppled? | 0:22:36 | 0:22:37 | |
What kind of chaos would follow? | 0:22:37 | 0:22:40 | |
We don't want chaos. | 0:22:40 | 0:22:41 | |
We care for the stability more than any country outside Syria. | 0:22:41 | 0:22:46 | |
We Syrians want stability before anything else. | 0:22:46 | 0:22:49 | |
But he is creating instability every single day. | 0:22:49 | 0:22:52 | |
What we need to see, is the moment we are promised | 0:22:52 | 0:22:54 | |
that there is a serious transition of this country, | 0:22:54 | 0:22:57 | |
Assad cannot be part of that. | 0:22:57 | 0:22:59 | |
He is a criminal. | 0:22:59 | 0:23:01 | |
We know that. | 0:23:01 | 0:23:05 | |
Even if nobody is allowing us to take him to court, | 0:23:05 | 0:23:07 | |
we know and everybody knows he is a criminal. | 0:23:07 | 0:23:09 | |
So we need that transition. | 0:23:09 | 0:23:11 | |
Once we have that political horizon, that political promise, | 0:23:11 | 0:23:14 | |
then you will see immediately guns turn against Daesh from both sides. | 0:23:14 | 0:23:17 | |
From the Free Syrian Army as well as the national army. | 0:23:17 | 0:23:19 | |
Those who defected from the army continue to believe this | 0:23:19 | 0:23:23 | |
is their army, and it has been confiscated by the regime. | 0:23:23 | 0:23:26 | |
They want a national army and would want to merge | 0:23:26 | 0:23:32 | |
with the national army in order to fight Daesh. | 0:23:32 | 0:23:35 | |
That is the only way to create an indigenous force on the ground | 0:23:35 | 0:23:38 | |
to fight Daesh. | 0:23:38 | 0:23:39 | |
In the end, Daesh, Islamic State, is what the West is most preoccupied | 0:23:39 | 0:23:42 | |
about. | 0:23:42 | 0:23:44 | |
You are visiting London and talking to politicians in the West. | 0:23:44 | 0:23:46 | |
Surely you know now their priority is no longer getting rid of Assad, | 0:23:46 | 0:23:51 | |
it is taking on Daesh, and they may believe keeping Assad | 0:23:51 | 0:23:54 | |
there in the long run is better for their campaign against IS-Daesh. | 0:23:54 | 0:23:59 | |
We believe it is one objective - Assad and Daesh need to be ended. | 0:23:59 | 0:24:06 | |
That is how one needs to proceed, otherwise we are going to keep both. | 0:24:06 | 0:24:09 | |
Bassma Kodmani, we have to end there. | 0:24:09 | 0:24:12 | |
Thank you for being on HARDtalk. | 0:24:12 | 0:24:14 | |
Thank you. | 0:24:14 | 0:24:24 |