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Now on BBC News, it's time for Hardtalk. | 0:00:02 | 0:00:09 | |
Welcome to HARDtalk. | 0:00:09 | 0:00:09 | |
I'm Stephen Sackur. | 0:00:09 | 0:00:11 | |
Frustration and anger are the common currency | 0:00:11 | 0:00:13 | |
of today's European politics. | 0:00:13 | 0:00:15 | |
On the right, there's a resurgent nationalism, fuelled | 0:00:15 | 0:00:17 | |
by fears of immigration, and, on the left, well, on the left, the | 0:00:17 | 0:00:20 | |
enemy is austerity and an economic system seen as serving the elite. | 0:00:20 | 0:00:31 | |
My guest today is one of the most powerful voices | 0:00:31 | 0:00:34 | |
in Europe's radical left, Yanis Varoufakis, the motorbike | 0:00:34 | 0:00:36 | |
riding, former Greek Finance Minister who confronted the powers | 0:00:36 | 0:00:38 | |
that be during the darkest days of Greece's debt crisis and lost... | 0:00:38 | 0:00:41 | |
Or did he? | 0:00:41 | 0:00:42 | |
Yanis Varoufakis, welcome to HARDtalk. | 0:00:42 | 0:00:42 | |
Yanis Varoufakis, welcome to HARDtalk. | 0:01:16 | 0:01:17 | |
It's great to be here. | 0:01:17 | 0:01:20 | |
When you reflect on your own life and Greece's turbulent | 0:01:20 | 0:01:23 | |
life over the last, say, 15 months or so, do you reflect with a deep | 0:01:23 | 0:01:26 | |
sense of disappointment, failure? | 0:01:26 | 0:01:31 | |
Oh, no. | 0:01:31 | 0:01:31 | |
Nothing could be further from the truth. | 0:01:31 | 0:01:33 | |
Life is a constant battle and waging it is where | 0:01:33 | 0:01:36 | |
the satisfaction comes out of. | 0:01:36 | 0:01:37 | |
In the end, we are all dead - it does not mean we do not wake up | 0:01:37 | 0:01:41 | |
in the morning full of zest. | 0:01:41 | 0:01:48 | |
Well, that's a very interesting way of putting it. | 0:01:48 | 0:01:50 | |
Life is a constant battle but nobody wants to spend life losing battles | 0:01:50 | 0:01:54 | |
and you fought and you lost? | 0:01:54 | 0:01:55 | |
Not necessarily. | 0:01:55 | 0:01:56 | |
Losing the good battle, waging the fight that has to be | 0:01:56 | 0:02:00 | |
fought, if you feel that it is a good cause, is a source | 0:02:00 | 0:02:03 | |
of great satisfaction and pride. | 0:02:03 | 0:02:10 | |
Even when you look at Greece today, you a country that is still tied to | 0:02:10 | 0:02:14 | |
the so-called Troika bailout package, desperately trying to | 0:02:14 | 0:02:16 | |
negotiate the latest instalment of the third bailout, you see former | 0:02:16 | 0:02:18 | |
comrades like Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister, | 0:02:18 | 0:02:20 | |
now managing a process which you have described in the past | 0:02:20 | 0:02:23 | |
as little more than terrorism inflicted upon your country? | 0:02:23 | 0:02:37 | |
Well, there is no doubt we have an extremely sad affair | 0:02:37 | 0:02:40 | |
in the case of Greece. | 0:02:40 | 0:02:41 | |
Greece went bankrupt in 2010 and since then the powers that be, | 0:02:41 | 0:02:44 | |
including in Athens but everywhere in Europe... | 0:02:44 | 0:02:54 | |
Including your former comrades, the party that you served for - | 0:02:54 | 0:02:56 | |
what was it? | 0:02:56 | 0:02:57 | |
- 6-7 months... | 0:02:57 | 0:02:58 | |
Including every government that has served since 2010, the IMF... | 0:02:58 | 0:03:01 | |
they have all been, in the end serving a gross denial | 0:03:01 | 0:03:03 | |
by extending the crisis into the future, pretending they have solved | 0:03:03 | 0:03:06 | |
it through, you know, just adding unsustainable debt on unpayable debt | 0:03:06 | 0:03:09 | |
and this sounds like a historical incident of some interest but, | 0:03:09 | 0:03:10 | |
in reality - that is why it is extremely disappointing - because we | 0:03:11 | 0:03:15 | |
are talking about real people, here, we are talking about kids that faint | 0:03:15 | 0:03:18 | |
at school from malnutrition, we are talking about a lost generation. | 0:03:18 | 0:03:31 | |
But I suppose what interests me most is that it was supposed to | 0:03:31 | 0:03:34 | |
be different after 2015. | 0:03:34 | 0:03:37 | |
You know, you talk about the crisis going back to 2010, and you're quite | 0:03:37 | 0:03:41 | |
right to do so, the crisis has been deep and long, but something | 0:03:41 | 0:03:44 | |
happened in 2015 - the Greek people voted for a radical left alternative | 0:03:44 | 0:03:47 | |
- the Syriza party. | 0:03:47 | 0:03:58 | |
You, having said that you would "never, never, never" - and that'sa | 0:03:58 | 0:04:02 | |
direct quote - "serve in politics," answered the call from Alexis | 0:04:02 | 0:04:05 | |
Tsipras, and joined the Syriza-led government in an effort to | 0:04:05 | 0:04:07 | |
fundamentally change the deal in Greece and Greece's deal with | 0:04:07 | 0:04:10 | |
the European Union. | 0:04:10 | 0:04:10 | |
Precisely. | 0:04:10 | 0:04:11 | |
We stood on a platform of speaking through to power - | 0:04:11 | 0:04:13 | |
and power of course is the Troika lenders, of creditors of Greece. | 0:04:13 | 0:04:16 | |
Our pact was based - the pact of those who served in the | 0:04:16 | 0:04:20 | |
first government that was elected in January, 2015 - was very simple. | 0:04:20 | 0:04:23 | |
We are going to go to Brussels, and we're going to go to Washington, | 0:04:23 | 0:04:26 | |
and we're going to go to Frankfurt and say to them, the program that | 0:04:26 | 0:04:30 | |
you have been implementing in Greece has been a spectacular failure, the | 0:04:30 | 0:04:35 | |
greatest macro-economic disaster in the history of the IMF, | 0:04:35 | 0:04:39 | |
for instance - a third of our income dissipated, unemployment | 0:04:39 | 0:04:42 | |
jumped up by 20% - imagine that, one in two families do not have | 0:04:42 | 0:04:45 | |
a waged person in their midst. | 0:04:45 | 0:04:50 | |
And we are going to say to them, we need to reboot. | 0:04:50 | 0:04:54 | |
We're no longer going to sign on the dotted line of loan | 0:04:54 | 0:04:57 | |
agreements without having secured that these new loan agreement is | 0:04:57 | 0:04:59 | |
going to be sustainable. | 0:04:59 | 0:05:09 | |
And we were, I thought, absolutely united in that and we were not going | 0:05:09 | 0:05:12 | |
to back away, but in the end, a wedge was pushed between us. | 0:05:12 | 0:05:16 | |
We were divided by the end, and once you get divided, you fall. | 0:05:16 | 0:05:23 | |
Yeah, you fell. | 0:05:23 | 0:05:23 | |
I mean, I look back at some of the things you said | 0:05:23 | 0:05:26 | |
at the time you took the job. | 0:05:26 | 0:05:28 | |
Having said you wouldn't do politics, you said, well, | 0:05:28 | 0:05:30 | |
I can't resist this call, it's too important, my country's at stake. | 0:05:30 | 0:05:33 | |
You said that we are going to do things differently - | 0:05:33 | 0:05:36 | |
"we are going to destroy the country's oligarch who viciously | 0:05:36 | 0:05:39 | |
sucks the energy and the economic power from everybody else." | 0:05:39 | 0:05:41 | |
Your message was we are going to be truly radical to change Greece | 0:05:41 | 0:05:45 | |
for ever. | 0:05:45 | 0:05:45 | |
Why? | 0:05:45 | 0:05:45 | |
(CROSSTALK). | 0:05:45 | 0:05:57 | |
Not necessarily... | 0:05:57 | 0:05:57 | |
I am not accusing left or right, at the moment, | 0:05:57 | 0:06:00 | |
I'm just saying you refused... | 0:06:00 | 0:06:01 | |
The crisis was so deep that left, right, commonsense could prevail. | 0:06:01 | 0:06:04 | |
We needed to do three things - first, we needed to restructure | 0:06:04 | 0:06:07 | |
and negotiate an unsustainable debt because, | 0:06:07 | 0:06:08 | |
if you are bankrupt, that's it. | 0:06:08 | 0:06:10 | |
There is no life beyond that. | 0:06:10 | 0:06:12 | |
It's like being in the shadow of Mephistopheles all the time. | 0:06:12 | 0:06:15 | |
Secondly, we would have to have credible fiscal targets so that we | 0:06:15 | 0:06:18 | |
would never fall back into deficit position but, at the same time not | 0:06:18 | 0:06:21 | |
have huge surplus targets that are unbelievable and therefore deeply | 0:06:21 | 0:06:24 | |
further your credibility stock. | 0:06:24 | 0:06:33 | |
And thirdly, attack the oligarchy, attack corruption, | 0:06:33 | 0:06:34 | |
reform Greece deeply. | 0:06:35 | 0:06:35 | |
These were the three things we needed to do. | 0:06:35 | 0:06:40 | |
But there is arrogance, a hubris there, because the assumption you're | 0:06:40 | 0:06:43 | |
making is it was within your power and remit to decide how | 0:06:43 | 0:06:46 | |
to prioritise and what to do? | 0:06:46 | 0:06:47 | |
But, of course, Greece was essentially bust. | 0:06:47 | 0:06:49 | |
It was totally reliant on the money coming from outsiders and | 0:06:49 | 0:06:53 | |
therefore outsiders had - clearly had - the right to decide how Greece | 0:06:53 | 0:06:56 | |
should get itself out of this mess? | 0:06:56 | 0:07:00 | |
Well, I think you are overstating it. | 0:07:00 | 0:07:01 | |
Since when does debt mean that you have lost formally | 0:07:01 | 0:07:04 | |
and fully your national sovereignty and foreigners will decide | 0:07:04 | 0:07:12 | |
everything about your country...? | 0:07:12 | 0:07:19 | |
Well, I am not saying everything. | 0:07:19 | 0:07:21 | |
Think about any arrangement which involves a loan and a debt - | 0:07:21 | 0:07:23 | |
there is a choice to be made on both sides. | 0:07:23 | 0:07:26 | |
You only loan the money if you are sure and have promises... | 0:07:26 | 0:07:29 | |
Ah-ha. | 0:07:29 | 0:07:31 | |
About how that money is going to be used. | 0:07:31 | 0:07:33 | |
So why did they land this money to a bankrupt state? | 0:07:33 | 0:07:36 | |
2010 where the largest loan in absolute terms | 0:07:36 | 0:07:38 | |
in human history given to the most bankrupt European state, | 0:07:38 | 0:07:40 | |
you know, it takes an irresponsible lender and an irresponsible borrower | 0:07:40 | 0:07:43 | |
to forge this kind of pact. | 0:07:43 | 0:07:46 | |
(CROSSTALK). | 0:07:46 | 0:07:53 | |
Indeed but the power and the cards lie... | 0:07:53 | 0:07:55 | |
But to answer your question... | 0:07:55 | 0:07:56 | |
Going forward the real power lies with the lender | 0:07:56 | 0:07:58 | |
not with the borrower because the borrower is going to go bust... | 0:07:58 | 0:08:02 | |
Not exactly. | 0:08:02 | 0:08:02 | |
If you owe 320 billion euros, you have some power. | 0:08:02 | 0:08:04 | |
Yeah? | 0:08:04 | 0:08:05 | |
If you owe ?3,000 to the bank then you have no power. | 0:08:05 | 0:08:08 | |
But if you owe 300 billion, and you are part of | 0:08:08 | 0:08:10 | |
an interconnected financial system, you are not completely devoid | 0:08:10 | 0:08:13 | |
of power but that is not the issue. | 0:08:13 | 0:08:18 | |
Let's set aside for the moment the question of bargaining power. | 0:08:18 | 0:08:20 | |
When I went to Europe group and to meet Dr Schauble... | 0:08:20 | 0:08:23 | |
I want to talk a lot about that... | 0:08:23 | 0:08:25 | |
I am referring to what you just said. | 0:08:25 | 0:08:27 | |
What I took with me, in my suitcase, was a willingness to sit | 0:08:27 | 0:08:30 | |
down with them, not to dictate to them what should happen in Greece | 0:08:30 | 0:08:34 | |
but sit down with them and work out a manageable fiscal | 0:08:34 | 0:08:38 | |
and reform consolidation programme. | 0:08:38 | 0:08:42 | |
The trouble was, they were not interested. | 0:08:42 | 0:08:46 | |
This is the very first time in history that creditors did not | 0:08:46 | 0:08:49 | |
want their money back. | 0:08:49 | 0:08:50 | |
Hang on a minute. | 0:08:50 | 0:08:51 | |
You talk about going to the euro group, | 0:08:51 | 0:08:54 | |
and sitting there with Schauble and all the others - you took a style | 0:08:54 | 0:08:58 | |
with you, a style that was designed to antagonise, send a message... | 0:08:58 | 0:09:01 | |
What, I do not wear a tie? | 0:09:01 | 0:09:03 | |
Of course, you wore your leather jacket, we all know that... | 0:09:03 | 0:09:06 | |
No, I did not wear my leather jacket (CROSSTALK). | 0:09:06 | 0:09:08 | |
I can assure you. | 0:09:08 | 0:09:10 | |
It was not about what you wore, whether you had atie on, whether you | 0:09:10 | 0:09:14 | |
came on your motorbike - it wasn't about any of that - it was about | 0:09:14 | 0:09:18 | |
the inflammatory language, accusing them of fiscal waterboarding... | 0:09:18 | 0:09:22 | |
There was no inflammatory language. | 0:09:22 | 0:09:23 | |
You called them terrorists! | 0:09:23 | 0:09:24 | |
No, no, no. | 0:09:24 | 0:09:26 | |
Get your chronology right. | 0:09:26 | 0:09:29 | |
I used... | 0:09:29 | 0:09:29 | |
Firstly I never caught anyone a terrorist. | 0:09:29 | 0:09:32 | |
What I said was, in the first week of July, after our banks were closed | 0:09:32 | 0:09:39 | |
down by our central bank, why? | 0:09:39 | 0:09:40 | |
Was there a problem with the banks? | 0:09:40 | 0:09:42 | |
No. | 0:09:42 | 0:09:44 | |
The central bank of Europe - the ECB - had proclaimed our banks to be | 0:09:44 | 0:09:48 | |
solvent and why did they close them? | 0:09:48 | 0:09:51 | |
In order to force us, the elected government, | 0:09:51 | 0:09:53 | |
to accept massive pension cuts, massive austerity cuts. | 0:09:53 | 0:10:02 | |
Yeah? | 0:10:02 | 0:10:03 | |
Now, what is the spread of fear in order | 0:10:03 | 0:10:05 | |
to attain political objectives? | 0:10:05 | 0:10:06 | |
It is terrorism. | 0:10:06 | 0:10:07 | |
And so, by that stage... | 0:10:07 | 0:10:10 | |
Fiscal waterboarding as well, that is torture. | 0:10:10 | 0:10:17 | |
These are people you say, "I approach with an open mind, trying | 0:10:17 | 0:10:20 | |
collectively to find a way out of this crisis that would help the | 0:10:20 | 0:10:23 | |
Greek economy and the Greek people." | 0:10:24 | 0:10:25 | |
You say that and then I refer back to every | 0:10:25 | 0:10:27 | |
attitude you took into the room. | 0:10:27 | 0:10:29 | |
You made a point of being the antipolitics politician but the | 0:10:29 | 0:10:32 | |
way you did it just does not work. | 0:10:32 | 0:10:34 | |
Stephen, Stephen, when a new government is elected to | 0:10:34 | 0:10:37 | |
confront creditors and to say to them that in your | 0:10:37 | 0:10:45 | |
interest, too, and in the interest of our long-suffering nation | 0:10:45 | 0:10:47 | |
in a great depression, we have to sit down and find common ground. | 0:10:47 | 0:10:50 | |
At that moment, you have to set aside all this brimstone | 0:10:50 | 0:10:53 | |
and noise and get down to work. | 0:10:53 | 0:10:58 | |
The fact that for five years, all previous governments were being | 0:10:58 | 0:11:01 | |
fiscally waterboarded is indisputable. | 0:11:01 | 0:11:06 | |
Think of what has been happening since today. | 0:11:06 | 0:11:08 | |
It is happening as we speak. | 0:11:08 | 0:11:11 | |
You can continue to use that language if you like but I then | 0:11:11 | 0:11:15 | |
reflect upon Christine Lagarde, at the height of the crisis, in June, | 0:11:15 | 0:11:18 | |
2015, coming out of a meeting with you and saying, with just total | 0:11:18 | 0:11:21 | |
frustration, "it would be nice if we had some adults in the room." | 0:11:21 | 0:11:25 | |
Stephen, she had not come out of a meeting with me when she said that. | 0:11:25 | 0:11:29 | |
Who do you think she was talking about? | 0:11:29 | 0:11:33 | |
Well, I'm not going to divulge this. | 0:11:33 | 0:11:34 | |
It is not for me, you have to ask her. | 0:11:34 | 0:11:37 | |
But, look, when I first met Christine Lagarde - | 0:11:37 | 0:11:46 | |
since you're refering to Christine - we had conversation | 0:11:46 | 0:11:49 | |
one-hour long conversation and we actually agreed on all the basic | 0:11:49 | 0:11:52 | |
failures of the previous programme. | 0:11:52 | 0:11:54 | |
Indeed, with Paul Thompson, who is the European chief | 0:11:54 | 0:11:57 | |
of the International Monetary Fund, a very close associate of Christine | 0:11:57 | 0:12:00 | |
Lagarde, we had agreed that the previous programmes had failed | 0:12:00 | 0:12:02 | |
because there was no serious debt restruction involved, | 0:12:02 | 0:12:10 | |
that the way of managing previous Greek governments by the Troika was | 0:12:10 | 0:12:13 | |
effectively the strategy of fiscal waterboarding, which is what? | 0:12:13 | 0:12:15 | |
You bring the subject to the point of no return | 0:12:15 | 0:12:19 | |
and then you let the subject have a gulp of air - or liquidity, in the | 0:12:19 | 0:12:22 | |
case of Greece - and then you repeat and you repeat and you repeat. | 0:12:22 | 0:12:30 | |
This has been the pattern since May, 2010, and the result is the loss of | 0:12:30 | 0:12:37 | |
one third of income and an ability to repay our debts to our creditors. | 0:12:37 | 0:12:41 | |
The point is, and we come back to the opening of | 0:12:41 | 0:12:44 | |
this conversation about senses pf failure - the point is that you, in | 0:12:44 | 0:12:47 | |
the end, were thrown overboard by your former colleague, and the guy | 0:12:47 | 0:12:50 | |
who hired you, Alexis Tsipras. | 0:12:50 | 0:12:51 | |
No, this is not what happened... | 0:12:51 | 0:12:52 | |
This is not what happened. | 0:12:52 | 0:12:54 | |
It is what happened. | 0:12:54 | 0:12:58 | |
No, it's not. | 0:12:58 | 0:12:59 | |
Essentially, he said I'm going to let you go because the euro group | 0:12:59 | 0:13:02 | |
cannot work with you anymore. | 0:13:02 | 0:13:03 | |
That's not what happened. | 0:13:03 | 0:13:04 | |
Do you want me to tell you what happened? | 0:13:04 | 0:13:07 | |
You tell me what happened. | 0:13:07 | 0:13:08 | |
From the end of April onwards, Alexis Tsipras and I started | 0:13:08 | 0:13:11 | |
diverging in our views of what the right strategy should be. | 0:13:11 | 0:13:13 | |
He was making compromises which, as far as I was concerned, were lethal, | 0:13:13 | 0:13:18 | |
in the sense that they were... | 0:13:18 | 0:13:23 | |
he was accepting for instant fiscal targets impossible to achieve. | 0:13:23 | 0:13:29 | |
My view was, the moment you start doing that, you lose credibility and | 0:13:29 | 0:13:32 | |
then at some point you're going to have to surrender and capitulate. | 0:13:32 | 0:13:35 | |
That happened. | 0:13:36 | 0:13:39 | |
Let me tell you... | 0:13:39 | 0:13:41 | |
(CROSSTALK) when that happened, when he said to me on | 0:13:41 | 0:13:43 | |
the referendum, when we called upon the Greek people to back us, not to | 0:13:43 | 0:13:47 | |
capitulate, that night we met and he said it is time to surrender and | 0:13:47 | 0:13:50 | |
at that point I said, not for me. | 0:13:50 | 0:13:54 | |
We parted amicably, having disagreed on whether the right course | 0:13:54 | 0:13:58 | |
of action at that moment was to continue the confrontation with the | 0:13:58 | 0:14:02 | |
Troika creditors that were imposing upon us strings and measures that | 0:14:02 | 0:14:07 | |
made it absolutely impossible for Greece, firstly, | 0:14:07 | 0:14:10 | |
to recover and, secondly, to pay its debts, or to capitulate. | 0:14:10 | 0:14:17 | |
When he decided as a Prime Minister's want is, to capitulate, | 0:14:17 | 0:14:20 | |
it was time for me to resign. | 0:14:20 | 0:14:22 | |
I was not thrown overboard. | 0:14:22 | 0:14:25 | |
I was made aware of the absence and it was supposed to be | 0:14:26 | 0:14:29 | |
potentially helpful. | 0:14:29 | 0:14:30 | |
So the Tsipras did not want you and he knew that, and... | 0:14:30 | 0:14:37 | |
It is not one voice. | 0:14:37 | 0:14:39 | |
We can talk about individuals. | 0:14:39 | 0:14:40 | |
You became toxic. | 0:14:40 | 0:14:44 | |
I did not become toxic and I was a major inconvenience. | 0:14:44 | 0:14:47 | |
Because I was the first Finance Minister. | 0:14:47 | 0:14:55 | |
And this gets personal. | 0:14:55 | 0:14:56 | |
Before you get there... | 0:14:56 | 0:15:13 | |
Let me tell you why I was so despised. | 0:15:13 | 0:15:15 | |
Either we capitulate and accept the programme | 0:15:15 | 0:15:17 | |
of the previous governments that had failed so spectacularly or | 0:15:17 | 0:15:19 | |
the banks would be closed. | 0:15:20 | 0:15:21 | |
I made it abundantly clear that I shall never submit to such | 0:15:21 | 0:15:24 | |
blackmail. | 0:15:24 | 0:15:24 | |
Tsipras understood that. | 0:15:24 | 0:15:25 | |
It was very important to him that I should be sidelined. | 0:15:25 | 0:15:27 | |
As the Finance Minister of the Bank of State I would not sign | 0:15:27 | 0:15:31 | |
on another loan knowing that we would not be able to repay it. | 0:15:31 | 0:15:34 | |
This is what a sensible, rational, moderate Finance Minister should do. | 0:15:34 | 0:15:37 | |
If you are running a business, the BBC or a company, you should | 0:15:37 | 0:15:40 | |
never accept a loan if your existing loans and not sustainable. | 0:15:40 | 0:16:14 | |
You were a radical. | 0:16:14 | 0:16:15 | |
When radicalism hits it, reality trumps radicalism. | 0:16:15 | 0:16:17 | |
That was the message that came out in the summer of 2015 and it is | 0:16:17 | 0:16:21 | |
the message that comes out today in many different parts of Europe. | 0:16:21 | 0:16:24 | |
There are powerful voices like yours that propounded a very radical | 0:16:24 | 0:16:27 | |
leftist view of European economics. | 0:16:27 | 0:16:42 | |
That is not the basis of it. | 0:16:42 | 0:16:44 | |
Explain to me why? | 0:16:44 | 0:16:45 | |
I ask you all to go to my website or any Google search engine and look | 0:16:45 | 0:16:49 | |
at my proposals as Minister of Finance on the 11th of May 2015. | 0:16:49 | 0:16:52 | |
What were our proposals to the Troika of lenders? | 0:16:52 | 0:16:54 | |
They were the most moderate proposals we have. | 0:16:54 | 0:17:07 | |
You are not in power any more. | 0:17:07 | 0:17:09 | |
Greece is desperately trying to maintain the third bailout deal. | 0:17:09 | 0:17:12 | |
You, in all respect... | 0:17:12 | 0:17:20 | |
Ran a county that did not fail. | 0:17:20 | 0:17:22 | |
We needed to have a radical minister. | 0:17:22 | 0:17:24 | |
This is the depth of the European crisis. | 0:17:24 | 0:17:26 | |
You need to have a radical left wing minister to propose common sense. | 0:17:26 | 0:17:29 | |
Commonsense is in very short supply in Europe. | 0:17:29 | 0:17:31 | |
Is Greece better off as a result of my defeat and my removal? | 0:17:31 | 0:17:34 | |
No. | 0:17:34 | 0:17:34 | |
We are deeper into the mire than we were a year ago. | 0:17:34 | 0:17:37 | |
If my proposals had been accepted instead of the Troika, | 0:17:37 | 0:17:40 | |
would we be better off? | 0:17:40 | 0:17:41 | |
Definitely. | 0:17:41 | 0:17:41 | |
It is indisputable. | 0:17:41 | 0:17:42 | |
Look at the proposals and ask top-notch economists | 0:17:42 | 0:17:44 | |
around the world, which are better or more sensible? | 0:17:44 | 0:17:46 | |
Which would have given the Greek Nationals a chance to recover? | 0:17:46 | 0:17:49 | |
After my removal, why did it happen? | 0:17:49 | 0:18:18 | |
I don't want to get stuck on the past because there are | 0:18:18 | 0:18:21 | |
important things to talk about. | 0:18:21 | 0:18:30 | |
You are leaving an impression that a radical minister left | 0:18:30 | 0:18:33 | |
and moderation prevailed. | 0:18:33 | 0:18:33 | |
And moderate minister, released a radical minister | 0:18:33 | 0:18:35 | |
proposing moderate policies was removed, and idiocy prevailed. | 0:18:35 | 0:18:37 | |
Let me give you one example because your audience has to hear this. | 0:18:37 | 0:18:40 | |
One of the things I would not sign into | 0:18:40 | 0:18:43 | |
law was increasing the corporate tax in a country that was broken | 0:18:43 | 0:18:46 | |
and the imposition of prepaying next year's tax a year in advance for | 0:18:46 | 0:18:49 | |
small businesses that were broken. | 0:18:49 | 0:19:10 | |
You are not reconciled to your defeat, are you? | 0:19:10 | 0:19:12 | |
Well... | 0:19:12 | 0:19:14 | |
You are not reconciled and you now run a movement that you | 0:19:14 | 0:19:17 | |
say has the capacity to completely reshape Europe in a democratic way. | 0:19:17 | 0:19:20 | |
Your argument is that the European Union | 0:19:20 | 0:19:22 | |
as they are currently constituted is currently undemocratic | 0:19:22 | 0:19:24 | |
and it is killing Europe. | 0:19:24 | 0:19:25 | |
I just wonder how you believe you're going to persuade the European | 0:19:25 | 0:19:28 | |
public as a whole of this argument? | 0:19:28 | 0:19:46 | |
Firstly, the movement is not me. | 0:19:46 | 0:19:48 | |
But since you are focusing on my past, and my record, it is | 0:19:48 | 0:19:51 | |
important that we set it straight. | 0:19:51 | 0:19:52 | |
In my six months in the finance ministry I put | 0:19:52 | 0:19:55 | |
forward certain proposal. | 0:19:55 | 0:19:56 | |
I consider them to be the only chance, even today, | 0:19:56 | 0:19:58 | |
of Greece's recovery and of healing within the eurozone. | 0:19:58 | 0:20:00 | |
I may be wrong or I may be right. | 0:20:00 | 0:20:03 | |
When did that happen exactly? | 0:20:03 | 0:20:10 | |
Well... | 0:20:10 | 0:20:12 | |
You just slipped in a major way. | 0:20:12 | 0:20:14 | |
When I was the most severe supporter of this | 0:20:14 | 0:20:16 | |
process, with 62% of the votes. | 0:20:16 | 0:20:34 | |
And the next day the Prime Minister said we're going to back | 0:20:34 | 0:20:37 | |
the deal anyway. | 0:20:37 | 0:20:37 | |
Do not say it was the Greek people who rejected the proposals. | 0:20:37 | 0:20:40 | |
They are not even in first place any more. | 0:20:40 | 0:20:43 | |
In that case, I need to get your ideas on the future of Europe | 0:20:43 | 0:20:46 | |
because such a big debate, not least in Europe, and there is an argument | 0:20:46 | 0:20:50 | |
about whether Europe can be changed from within or actually Europe is go | 0:20:50 | 0:20:53 | |
to have to collapse before anything else can be rebuilt | 0:20:53 | 0:20:55 | |
and something better. | 0:20:55 | 0:20:56 | |
What is your view? | 0:20:56 | 0:21:15 | |
There is no doubt that what we have created is a monster. | 0:21:15 | 0:21:18 | |
We have created a European Union which is deeply contemptuous | 0:21:18 | 0:21:20 | |
of the democratic process. | 0:21:20 | 0:21:21 | |
This is the reason why I had to resign and not to pursue what I | 0:21:21 | 0:21:25 | |
consider to be modern policy. | 0:21:25 | 0:21:39 | |
But you wanted to stay in the eurozone and you now advise Britain | 0:21:39 | 0:21:42 | |
to stay in the European Union. | 0:21:42 | 0:21:44 | |
But you call it a monster. | 0:21:44 | 0:21:45 | |
It seems entirely contrary. | 0:21:45 | 0:21:46 | |
Well I got in a country with a monstrous regime and we either | 0:21:46 | 0:21:49 | |
had to get out of it or to abandon it or to see it be dismembered. | 0:21:49 | 0:21:53 | |
I wanted to be democratised after our dictatorship in the 1960s. | 0:21:53 | 0:21:56 | |
The same thing applies to the European Union. | 0:21:56 | 0:21:58 | |
If we had not created the European Union and the eurozone, | 0:21:58 | 0:22:01 | |
we should not have had consent to the creation. | 0:22:01 | 0:22:03 | |
Is that OK? | 0:22:03 | 0:22:13 | |
As they currently exist... | 0:22:13 | 0:22:18 | |
But now that they exist, dismembering it, fragmenting it, | 0:22:18 | 0:22:20 | |
is going to take us where we want to be had we not created at. | 0:22:20 | 0:22:24 | |
It is going to throw us into a terrible abyss. | 0:22:24 | 0:22:26 | |
What is going to happen? | 0:22:26 | 0:22:27 | |
My prediction, and tell me if you agree with me or not, is that | 0:22:27 | 0:22:31 | |
there is going to be a huge fault line with Germany, Austria, the | 0:22:31 | 0:22:34 | |
Netherlands, Poland all forming a zone which will immediately go to a | 0:22:34 | 0:22:37 | |
big recession as its currency appreciates through the roof. | 0:22:37 | 0:22:39 | |
The rest of Europe, Latin Europe with Greece, | 0:22:39 | 0:22:41 | |
maybe Ireland, is going to go in a stagflation situation because their | 0:22:41 | 0:22:44 | |
currencies are going to depreciate. | 0:22:44 | 0:22:46 | |
This will create a vortex, and Britain as well | 0:22:46 | 0:22:48 | |
as other nations that are inappropriate for all of this vortex | 0:22:48 | 0:22:51 | |
are going to fall into it. | 0:22:51 | 0:22:52 | |
There is no way that we as Europeans are going to escape if this monster | 0:22:52 | 0:22:56 | |
of the European Union disintegrates under the weight of its hubris | 0:22:56 | 0:22:59 | |
and discontent for democracy. | 0:22:59 | 0:23:00 | |
It is our monster and we better civilise it. | 0:23:00 | 0:23:44 | |
We have to end there. | 0:23:44 | 0:23:45 | |
Thank you for being on HARDtalk. | 0:23:45 | 0:23:59 | |
It was a great pleasure. | 0:23:59 | 0:24:04 |