14/07/2016 House of Commons

private members bills, they talk about the issues but they simply

don't pursue them. Point of order, Paula Sheriff. As a matter of

record, in recent weeks, there has been an escalation of misogynistic

abuse and threats of violence disproportionally towards female MPs

from all sides of this house. It is apparent that this abuse has become

completely out of hand now with many members fearful. To the point where

the number of members have discussed with me that they are worried about

their own personal health as a result of this abuse. This comes

just four weeks today that a dear colleague was murdered. This cannot

be allowed to continue Mr Speaker. I wonder if you could advise this

house what action the house can take to make it clear that this behaviour

will not be tolerated from any party and all perpetrators will be

punished appropriately. I thank her, to whose point of order I will

respond in a moment in truncated terms. The leader of the house is

signalling a desire to contribute and it is important we should hear

from him. Can I say first of all, I absolutely agree with the honourable

lady. Cannot I informed the house that there are measures to improve

the security of members. There is a detailed project group looking at

the lessons that can be learned after the tragic events of a few

weeks ago and the commission will continue proposals for an

improvement to the approach we take. I hope that included in that will be

a great opportunity for individual members to raise concerns about

their safety and have them acted upon. Please Mr Speaker, will

everyone in the Housby reassured that you, myself, the chairman of

ways and Means and the house officials are very mindful indeed

for us to step up the security of members of Parliament and the

service we provide to watch over their safety. I appreciate what he

has said. Traditionally, we don't discuss security on the floor of the

house for very good reasons. That said, the leader of the house has

pointed out the extensive work that is taking place behind-the-scenes.

What the right Honourable gentleman has said about cooperation between

colleagues is of course pertinent and on the money. The leader of the

house and I am the chairman of ways and Means are in regular discussions

about these matters and indeed cooperated only a few days ago in

putting together a letter to register our concerns and

constructive proposals. That letter into another senior colleague. It is

also true, that these matters will be broached in a meeting of the

House of Commons commission on Monday. By definition, I cannot

elaborate because the discussion is to be had but it is important that

members should know that we are not in anyway a medically sealed from

the rest of our colleagues. We share and take very seriously those

concerns. Moreover, those of us who are quite fortunate in our living

accommodation are very conscious of those who are not. To whom, we have

a very particular sense of responsibility. So far as the

honourable lady is concern today, I might make the point that if any

individual member has particular and personal concerns, as of now, the

best course of action is to approach the Parliamentary security director

for his best advice. He is immensely experienced and better placed at a

practical level to give guidance than any of us lay persons could be.

I hope that is helpful but doubtless there will be further updates in due

course. Point of order Mr Christian Matheson. I would like to save thank

you and my right honourable friend for those contributions which are

very reassuring. Could I seek your guidance about the rules of this

place as they refer to the language we use in this house in referring to

each other. We call each other honourable members and the

underlying thought is we act honourably and honestly. But in

business questions, it was raised that claims were being made during

the referendum campaign which we now believe to be palpably untrue. If I

was to accuse other honourable members to making those statements

knowingly, you would instruct me to withdraw those comments if I

referred to a specific member. Nevertheless, I do believe

honourable members no claims women made and I would wish to call out

those members. Is there a mechanism within the rules of the house

whereby I can make suggestions without falling foul of the rules

which we all hold very dear. Procedures with which some

experienced movers of the house are well familiar, I think that for now,

my best advice to the honourable gentleman is that he should go to

the table office. The table office staff will be well able to acquaint

him to that approach or mechanism which might enable him to pursue his

objective. It would be a profitable visit for the honourable gentleman

and it would consume, and he will know the whereabouts of the of this

in question, very little energy. If there are no further points of

order, we shall move on. The cloak will now read the orders of the day.

Report of the Iraqi boy -- Iraqi enquiry. The question is have this

has considered the report of the Iraqi enquiry. Before I call the

first speaker from the backbenches, this is a continuation of the debate

that began yesterday. I should say to the house that at this stage, I

have not imposed a time limit on speeches, the house will be aware

that there will have to be wind-up speeches from the opposition front

bench and the government front bench tonight for which I have to allow.

But beyond that, I will wait to see how things go. My best advice to

colleagues is that if each feels able to contribute for ten minutes

but not much more than that, it may not be necessary to have any formal

limit. There is a burden upon the shoulders of distinguished

colleagues as they commence their contributions. That burden I am sure

will be keenly felt by the chair of the Defence Select Committee, the

right honourable gentleman, remember for New Forest East, Doctor Julian

Lewis. Thank you Mr Speaker. I shall endeavour to follow that instruction

to be brief. There is very good reason to be brief at this stage of

consideration of the Chilcott Report. That is that we have had

very little time to consider a very large mass of detailed information.

I generally find when trying to unravel what has happened

historically that it is sensible to look back at some of the original

sources. What I have done in the very short time available is to pick

out a few original documents that have been included in the mass of

published material. One of them is the joint intelligence committee

assessment dated 29th January 2003 and entitled" Iraq, the emerging

view from Baghdad." I just refer to two quotations from it. " The JI sea

say in paragraph ten, "We are unlikely to receive any advanced

warning of a pre-emptive attack on the Kurds. We judge that a

pre-emptive limited artillery strike on Kuwait using CBW could be

launched in as little as two hours." At another point in the report, a

list of things which might be the results of an attack on Saddam

Hussein is given. One of these possibilities is described in the

following terms. " To inflict enough casualties on any coalition ground

forces are perhaps in Kuwait, including through the use of CBW to

halt a coalition attack and to swing public opinion in the West against

hostilities. Moving forward to another note entitled "Saddam, the

beginning of the end. " Following a discussion on the JI C on 19th March

2003, we find the following quotation: "We judge Iraqi has a

usable CBW capability, deliverable using artillery, missiles and

possibly unmanned aerial vehicles. We judge Iraqi has esses up to 20

missiles with a range of up to 650 kilometres and hundreds of shorter

range missiles mostly with a range of 150 kilometres or less. These

missiles may be able to deliver CBW although intelligence suggests

Barack may lack warheads capable of effective dispersal of such agents."

The reason I wrote those documents is that they were top secret

documents that were never intended for publication until the archives

eventually came to be released many years later. What that shows beyond

any reasonable doubt is that the advice being received by the Labour

government at that time was that Saddam Hussein did possess, in the

assessment of our intelligence agencies, chemical and biological

weapons. Ful As a result of the release of

those documents, we know that the Labour Government of the day did not

lie to Parliament over the question of its belief that chemical and

biological weapons were kept. More contentious is the question of

whether or not Tony Blair exaggerated. And there it is a

matter of harder judgment I sometimes say to mayself - I wonder

what the reaction of Parliament would have been, if we had come to

myself and said - we really don't know for certain whether Saddam

Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons. We know he has

had them in the past, we know he has used them in the past, and because

we can't be certain that he hasn't got them now, and because of the

events that happened, only a matter of months earlier, which put

Al-Qaeda and its suicide-brand of terrorism on the world stage, we

cannot be sure that, for reasons of his own, he might not seek to supply

such weapons to suicidal terrorist groups. We judge we can't take the

chance. I will give way. I thank the honourable gentleman. I welcome the

approach he is taking in going back to the resources. It is a us autoful

one on this occasion, does not the information to which he refers,

though, highlight just how dangerous it is to go to war on the basis of

intelligence alone, which is essentially what marked the Iraq war

out from every other and does he not agree with me, that in fact the be

availability and assessment of intelligence by this House has got

to be approved for the future or we could risk going there again? ! It

is very tricky because, you see there are two types of scenario when

you can go to war, and one type is quite straightforward - somebody

attacks you, you get on with it, you are given no choi.s the other type

is a situation like this, where you have -- reason to believe that

horrible could happen and the question arises - should you

intervene. I have to say I find one of the most problematic aspects of

the Chilcot report, is where they say that military action was not a

last resort and the peace process could have been given longer. The

reality is, unless an attack is launched on you, you can always go

on talking longer and longer and longer. I can't think of any point

at which it would be possible to say - we have to launch an attack now

because there is no prospect of continuing to try to find out,

without taking military action. When the right honourable gentleman talks

about this House then having to assess the intelligence, I'm not

sure that that helps us too much, because we can never - I will in a

moment - we can never be certain that what we are assessing is the

whole picture because sometimes, as those of us who have served on

bodies like the Intelligence and Security Committee will know,

sometimes there are sources of intelligence that cannot be revealed

and therefore, to present raw intelligence to the House, without

being able to say but there is other intelligence we are not presenting

to the House, leaves the House in an an op louse position. The right how

long agree with me that the House voted in 2003 knotted just or mainly

on the intelligence, if you look at the debate Mr Speaker, but on Saddam

Hussein's repeated and unpress departmented non-compliance with

mandatory United Nations' resolutions and on his record. Does

he think from his reading of the report, that Saddam Hussein executed

a massive bluff on the international community and his own people by

pretending he still had the weapons, we know he had, or does he agree

with the current Iraqi government that he sent them across the border

to Syria? I agree with a great deal of what the honourable gentleman has

just said, the right honourable gentleman has just said. The fact is

that Saddam Hussein, although it is not a matter of primary concern to

us now, was the author of his own misfortune. Saddam Hussein, we must

remember, apart from just being a broughtal dictator, had invaded and

occupied Kuwait in 1990. And Saddam Hussein chose to try to convince his

own people that he had not given up these weapons when either he had

given them up, or, as the right honourable gentleman says - and

rumours persist to this day - he had spirited them away, possibly to

Syria. However, although I see sort of a degree of agreement with me on

the Labour benches on this issue, they may find it harder to September

next point I wish to make. I have the greatest respect for my right

honourable friend. Can I suggest on this issue, it was not just about

intelligence sources from here, the United Nations inspectors at the

time were pleading for more time because they couldn't find the WMD,

possible which that premise we were going to war. We should have

listened to them. The reason they don't find them all was ultimately

because they didn't exist Yes, but the problem that they would always

face and we would face was summed up by something that was said from the

inquiry into the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly. I was

going to vote this at a later stage. I will do so now. I attended the

Hutton inquiry on 21st August 2003. In the course course of giving

evidence, a journalist made a statement about a conversation he

had had on the telephone with Dr David Kelly in June 2003. Now, Dr

Kelly was, of course, a weapons' expert and knew all about the

difficulties of defecting weapons, stockpiles, if they were hidden. And

in the course of that telephone conversation, Dr Kelly said it Mr

Rufford the following. "It was very easy to hide weapons of mass

destruction because you simply had to dig a hole in the desert, put

them inside, cover them with tarpaulin, put them in sand and then

they would be' almost impossible to discover'." The question we come

back to once again is - if Tony Blair had come to this House and if

he had more honestly highlighted the question marks against the

reliability of the intelligence, would he be as ex-coraited today as

he has been? And, in particular, just be counterfactual for a moment.

Some stocks of anthrax had been discovered. Supposing there had been

a secret cache, would we still be saying that is it was absolutely

wrong for the people who took the decision in 2003, on the basis of

what clearly was an honest belief that Saddam Hussein might have

deadly stocks of anthrax, would it still be the case that we would now

be saying they were wrong. So, in my opinion, and I have no hesitation in

saying this, I believe that although the Government may have exaggerated

and probably did exaggerate the strength of the evidence they had, I

do believe that they genuinely believed and expected to find stocks

of these weapons. I am I am I am taking interventions but am keen

knotted to abuse the time limit. This is a focal point on the

discussion. Would he not accept that there are some on these benches who

think the whole issue - and this is justified in the Chilcot findings -

that the whole issue of weapons of mass destruction, was an artificial

causi, sms beli, in order to affect regime change. And if they were an

issue, why wait 13 years, why not go in at the time of the first war? The

answer to the second question is easy. And this is - what had

happened in those 30 years was something that happened in September

2001, namely, the appearance, on the international stage of a group that

had been around for a long time, but had not succeeded in killing 3,000

people in the heart of New York and Washington DC. And, therefore, and,

therefore, the issue at question was now the traditional policy and we

often hear this said, quite rightly said in the context of debates about

international terrorism, that the technique of containment, which is

usually the best technique to deal with rogue regimes with weapons

stocks, stocks could not apply under circumstances when it was feared

that rational deterrents would be ineffective in trying to prevent an

international terrorist organisation, if, for any reason, it

was supplied with a substance-like anthrax from using it, no matter how

suicidely. Mr Speaker, I'm grateful to my right honourable friend for

giving way. Giving the role he plays as Chairman of the Defence Select

Committee, I wondered if he could qualify the statement he has just

made, which did cause a reaction, I think in the House. He suggested

that somehow the events of 9/11 then created a divan scenario in Iraq.

Would he not agree with me that -- created a different scenario in

Iraq. Would he agree with me in 2000 #3, Al-Qaeda was not present in Iraq

and the relationship there cannot be made? That was not the point I was

making. The point I was making was that the West was in a major

stwand-off with -- stand-off with Saddam Hussein. And people use other

groups and organisations for their own ends. And the danger was, and

the Prime Minister said at the time - and this is what conadvised me to

support him, at the time the danger was that for reasons of his own,

Saddam Hussein might decide to make some of these weapons available to

groups for - not because he was Allied to such groups, but because

he and Al-Qaeda scared a common enemy in the West. But I want to

move on. Some members will agree with what I have said, some won't.

But let me continue and make the second branch of my remarks and then

it will be for other members to put their own perspective on T I Hayesen

to add, although my Chairmanship of the Defence Committee has been

referred to a number of times, I am, of course, speaking entirely on my

own behalf in making my remarks as someone who was here at the time and

took part in the debate and indeed in the vote. So, when I look back at

those circumstances, I say to myself that the reason I supported and

spoke in favour of military action, the primary reason, was that I

believed what I was told by the then Labour Government, about the

possession, or the believed possession of anthrax and other

weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. But here is where I

have to make a major admission. At the back of may mind - and at the

back, I believe of many other honourable members' minds was a

second belief. It was the belief that if Saddam Hussein was removed,

we might see the emergence of some form of democracy in Iraq. And in

that belief, I was profoundly mistaken. And in looking at the

scenario, as it developed, it is quite clear that what emerged was

not any form of democracy, what reemerged was the mutual hatred

between different branches of fundamentalist Islam that had led

hem into bitter conflict for more than 1,000 years. And that was the

lesson that I drew from the Iraq war and that was why subsequently, when

it became clear that the same scenario was going to be played out

in other theatres, for the same sort of reasons, particularly in relation

to Syria, in August 2013, I was determined not to make the same

mistake again. And I and 29 other honourable and Right Honourable

members of the Conservative Party and nine members of the Liberal

Democrat party, voted not to take the same sort of action against

President Assad that we had taken against Saddam Hussein.

Are a member hearing the same arguments in favour of removing

President Assad that everyone now accept it had been inadequate for

removing Saddam Hussein. I think honourable and right honourable

members who feel so strongly that it was the wrong thing to do in 2003

ought to check what the consequences were not doing, taking the same step

in 2013. We have seen since 2013 huge blood-letting continuing in

Syria but many of us still argue that if it is an alternative between

an authoritarian dictatorship and eight total to civil conflict, where

people are in gauge in it who believe that suicide terrorism is

the answer to the world's problems and the fastest route to paradise.

We can come to an appreciation that very often there are no simple or

easy answers in these dilemmas. I am respectful, I believe I voted for

him actually, is what he is saying, if he had voted, had his time again,

he would have voted against it in 2003 and in favour of conflict in

2010? What I am saying is I was absolutely right not to vote to

remove resident Assad in 2013. And I was absolutely wrong to vote the way

I did in 2003, but I did it because I believed what I was told about

weapons of mass destruction. I also believed wrongly that there was a

chance for Iraqi society to advance along more democratic lines. That

was the terrible error I made. I will make a little more progress and

then I will give way. That leads me to the second question. I have

effectively, I hope, shown that when the Labour government of the day

said to the House of Commons that it believed there were weapons of mass

destruction, it was not lying. And that there was a reasonable case to

be made on those grounds for taking the action that was taken. What the

papers also show was that the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was not

unaware of the possible consequences of removing Saddam Hussein. It in

the results of the enquiry, Sir John Chilcot says the following? "We Do

not agree that hindsight is required, the risks of internal

strife in Iraqi, active Iranians pursuits of interest and Al-Qaeda

activity in Barack were each explicitly identified before the

invasion. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion

were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraqi after

Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate. " There is a January

2003 briefing note from Mr Blair to President Bush in which the then

Prime Minister wrote "The biggest risk we face is into Nice I'm

fighting between all the rival groups, tribes, etc in Iraq when the

military strike destabilises the regime. They are perfectly capable

on previous form of killing each other in large numbers." Let us

remind ourselves Mr Speaker, that this vast total of deaths that have

taken place in Iraqi are not people who have been killed by Westerners,

they are Muslims who have been killed by other Muslims once the lid

of authoritarian repression was removed. I am coming to an end, I

promised I would give way. I am nervous to open up a new thread for

him, but some of the deaths in Barack were our soldiers. Chilcot

said there were some equipment to shortfalls when things began, two of

my constituents died in Iraq, Sergeant Roberts -- Sergeant Robert

died because of the wrong body armour, does my right honourable

friend agree that we should never again send Armed Forces into combat

without Rob Elliot gripping them for the task in hand? Never, ever again

is a very strong statement. The truth of the matter is that it is

seldom the case that when a conflict arises, especially a conflict which

arises as a result of events unforeseen, that the Armed Forces

are fully equipped in every respect. The history of our engagement in

many conflicts is of a disastrous start, usually gradually rectified

as events go on. What the report does bring out is that for far too

long while the conflict was going on, equipment deficiencies were not

identified and remedied. I think I will leave it at that at the moment.

I just have two points on which to conclude. One is that I feel that we

have now to accept that societies -- are not ready for Western-style

democracy while politics remain linked with totalitarian religious

supremacy is. I am not saying anything racialist in making these

remarks because only a few hundred years ago, religious wars devastated

Europe and here in England, heretics were treated just as barbarously as

they are in the middle east today. But the reality is that the

democratic model, if it is to work, usually has to evolve. If it doesn't

evolve, a country has to be totally occupied for many years in order for

it to be implanted and take root. Yesterday, the then Foreign

Secretary said that he believed that some of these decisions that were

mistaken at the time would be less likely to be taken in the future

because of the creation and existence of the National Security

Council. And that the national Security Council was a forum where

these matters could be thrashed out more realistically. I am not sure

that forum is white strong enough. I know that in bygone years, the heads

of each of the three services had direct input to the policy debate. I

know that the chiefs of staff committee was a body that had to be

reckoned with, even by prime ministers as forceful as Winston

Churchill. And I know the present arrangements we have in which the

Chiefs of staff are supposed to funnel their views to the

politicians, through the medium of just one person, the chief of the

defence staff, is entirely inadequate. I am pleased that the

Defence Secretary, my right honourable friend is continuing in

his post and that he is here. I hope he his summing survey that I hope he

will hear from the Defence Select Committee more about in the future.

That is that there is too much of a disconnect between our top military

advisers and the politicians. It is easier for a Prime Minister with a

bee in his bonnet about overthrowing one regime or another to brush aside

the words of one man, no matter how authoritative any Chief of defence

staff may be, manages to brush aside the contribution of the heads of the

Armed Forces as a whole. The Defence Select Committee suggested in one of

its final reports under my predecessor as chairman, the

honourable member for Penrith and the Borders, that the chief of staff

committee needs to be constituted as the military subcommittee of the

National Security Council. That recommendation was ignored but it is

a recommendation I reiterate today. Because only when you have got

people who are authoritative and expert and in a position to stand up

to a Prime Minister on a mission, whether it is a mission to remove

Saddam Hussein or a mission to remove Gadhafi while telling this

house we were just going to do a no-fly zone to protect citizens. But

it was very important that the strategic calculus should be

properly presented to politicians so we don't get the situation ever

again, as we are told happened in Libya where the chief of defence

staff was told to do the fighting while the politicians did the

planning. I am extremely grateful to the right honourable gentleman, Gray

who interpreted my guidance loosely. He had to take lots of

interventions, that is true, can I just ask, it is not the limit, I am

leaving the house to regulate itself but members will want to take into

account that people will want to intervene on them but we do want to

hear from everybody, I say that with sincerity. The next contributor will

be Ben Bradshaw, he now doesn't wish to contribute. I rather hope that Mr

Pat McFadden does. I am happy to be a substitute for my honourable

friend. The decision to go to war in Iraqi was in policy terms the most

controversial decision of the Blair premiership and of that entire

Labour period in government. 179 troops died, over 4000 American

troops and many thousands of Iraqi civilians in the chaos and

destruction afterwards. Sir John's enquiry was asked to look at how the

decision was taken and what lessons can be learned. First there is the

crucial question as to whether the war was based on a lie. On this the

report concludes "There is no evidence that intelligence was

improperly included in the dossier that was published or that number

ten improperly influenced the text. " Prior to the publication of Sir

John's report, there had been years of accusations about fabricating

intelligence. In the wake of its publication, a different question

has been raised, as to why the intelligence was not challenged? The

Honourable member for new Forest is quoted from some of the report, I

don't need to repeat his quotations but for a example, from 2002, the

reports say that the intelligence was "Sporadic and patchy." They also

say "It is clear Barack continues to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD and

deliver -- and their delivery means. They have a chemical weapons

programme and they have chemical and biological weapons capability and

Saddam is repaired to use them." These views turned out to be wrong

but it was genuinely felt, reported to government time after time and

shared by many intelligence services around the world, including

countries that fiercely opposed the war. Sir John makes important

recommendations about how intelligence is to be assessed and

challenged in future. These are not the same as accusations of

fabrication or lying or the use of intelligence deliberately to

mislead. Moving on, Sir John concludes that the war was not a

last resort. That the inspection process should have been given more

time and the decision to use military action undermined the

authority of the UN Security Council. This founding -- this

finding these are huge constitutional question, in view of

the fact that Saddam Hussein had been in breach of a series of UN

Security Council resolutions over a period of 12 years and in view of

the fact he had used chemical weapons in the past against his own

people. One has to ask who was really

undermining the UN in this situation, the country in breech or

the countries trying to enforce the UN's will? And what does this

finding in the report mean about this responsibility to protevenlingt

an issue that was raised in the debate yesterday by my right

honourable friend, the member for Leeds central S one of the lessons

we are going to draw -- is one of the lessons, that we should never

engage in military action, no matter how multiple the breaches of

previous UN Security Council resolutions, unless there is full

support from the UN Security Council itself? And if that is our

conclusion, what does that mean for the authority of the UN? This is not

the view that we took in Kosovo, where, although that action was

opposed by some, it is generally felt to have had a positive

outcomfort people there and prevented a disaster in the Balkans.

Thirdly, let me turn to the issue of the aftermath and the chaos and

destruction which ensued. Surely the question that this House has to ask

is whether there is a weight of evidence to justify action or not.

And to say that we should never go without express authority from the

United Nations' Security Council is not the question, because that would

be merely one section of evidence which the House should take into

consideration. The example of Kosovo is a good one, there were other

reasons for acting in the way we did there which I supported then and

continue to support now. I appreciate the honourable

gentleman's intervention, the point I'm raise something I think this

finding about undermining the authority of the UN raises huge

questions here and is one of the controversial findings in the

report. Colin Powell famously remarked - you break it, you own it.

And it is undoubtedly the responsibility of countries who

remove a broughtal dictator, to put in place security measures

afterwards. On this measure, Sir John's report is understandably

critical of the UK and the United States. With intervention comes

responsibility and security is a key part of that responsibility. But we

should be clear about two other points. Firstly, that the killing of

innocent civilians in Iraq was not being carried out by the UK or the

US Armed Forces, but by terrorists and militias who blew up the United

Nations' headquarters attack mosques and destroy already fragile

infrastructure and bombed marketplaces. Secondly, sectarian

violence and willing in Iraq, did not begin in 20003. Prior to 2003,

it was carried out by the Saddam regime itself. The The use of

chemical weapons against the Kurds in the North, the brutal supression

of the Shia uprising after the first Gulf War in 1991. It was a rein of

terror were mass graves are still being discovered decades on. I want

it pay tribute to the courage and determination of my right honourable

friend, the member for kol win valley, who was campaigning for the

victims at Saddam's brutal regime long before the Iraq war in 20003.

Fourthly, what is the lesson in terms of our own security? Now, I

believe people supported the Iraq war for different reasons. I believe

many people opposed it for different reasons, too and they should not all

be put in the one bracket. Not everyone has drawn a direct line

between this intervention and you will all the security problems we

faced but some have. Now foreign interventions will anger jihadists.

They may also be used as a recruiting sergeant for jihadists

but it would be a fundamental mistake to believe that the mass

murder of innocent people is only a response to what we do and if we

start doing it, they would leave us alone. We should remember that

Islamist terrorism existed long before the Iraq war. The U s. SS

Cole was bombed and the US trade centre was bombed first in 2003 and

then again and Bali in 2002, which saw the murder of many tourists. And

in Paris last year, which took place in the country country which was

most opposed to the Iraq war. I have said this before in the House, Mr

speaker, understanding Islamist terrorism simply in what we do,

infantilis it, confers responsibility on them for what we

do and fails to stand up for the pluralism, diversity and religious

freedom which we hold dear Whatever lesson we learn from past

interventions, it should not be to franchise out our foreign policy

decisions for the approval or veto of the terrorists who oppose our way

of life. Now, finally, Mr Speaker, there is the lesson on

interintervention itself. Sir John makes a number of interventions

about how intelligence should be treated, mine steerial oversight,

the challenge of arguments and so on. They look eminently sensible and

I'm sure any future Government will take them on board. But the truth

is, this is not just a matter of process. I'm grateful to my right

honourable friend. He made a strong critique of one of Sir John's

findings. One of the other findings, I find problematicical is the last

resort suggestion which was also criticised by the Chairman of the

Defence Select Committee. Does he agree with me that at that time, it

was clear that time was running out, Saddam had been given 90 days when

the resolution was specified, 30 days and to say that there was

somehow other avenues that could be explored but not realistic at the

time. I agree with my right honourable friend. I know at some

point there is always the issue of deciding. Every debate about

intervention since 2003 has taken place until the shadow of this

decision. Iraq has already increased the threshold for military action

and the Chilcot report will raise it further. But there is an inescapable

question. Put bluntly -- you can have all the committees and

processes that you want, but you still have to decide and your is he

significance could go wrong and you cannot predict everything that will

happen in the aftermath. A lot has been said about the size of the

report, 2.5 million words, from here, it looks like, if you stack

those volumes on top of one another, you would have a Bo two feet high of

paper. The very sight of the report would be a warning to future Prime

Ministers. Prime Minister and presidents since

2003 have been cautious and this should make them cautious in the

future but between what wrong after the invasion, now the timings of the

report and add into the reduced size of our Armed Forces in reapers yoo,

what if the conclusion was never to intervene again. What message would

that send out to the oppressed of the world or to dictators or to

terrorists groups? I was not an MP in 2003. And therefore never had to

face the responsibility of the vote for the war in Iraq. The most

significant vote on what happened on foreign policy, since I was elected,

was over Syria in 2014. A vote heavily coloured by our experience

in Iraq. I have a slightly different interpretation of that to the member

for New Forest East. I voted against military action in 2013. Even after

Assad had used chemical weapons against his own people, yet Syria,

where we did not intervene, beyond limited air strikes we voted for

last year, has been a humanitarian disaster, even worse than Iraq.

Hundreds of thousands dead. Millions displaced. The greatest movement of

refugees across Europe since the end of the Second World War. It isn't a

vote it intervene which has troubled me most in my 11 years here, it is

that vote not to intervee. As the international community, with the

exception of Russia and where have the demonstrations been outside

their embassies? Indeed, hear, hear. They decided it was all too

difficult There is no Chilcot report into Syria. We can tell ourselves

that because we didn't break it, we didn't buy it. But that makes

absolutely no difference to the human cost. Exactly But let us

learn, let us not sign a blank check for despots and terrorist groups

around the world or delude ourselves that the security issues we face

stem only from our decisions rather than the ideology that encourages

the killing of innocent people in countries around the world. Yes,

intervening has consequences. There are 2.5 million words detailing them

before us. But, so does standing back. We have to decide the

difference. Mr Speaker, thank you for calling

me, I would suggest that Iraq 20003 ranks with Suez in a catalogue of

British foreign policy disasters. It cost the lives of over 200 British

nationals, many tens of thousands of lives of Iraqi nationals and

citizens and set in train a terrible sequence of events, including a

vicious civil war and fundmentally altering the balance of power within

the region and 13 years later, Mr Speaker, I suggest we are still

living with many of these consequences. Having resigned from

the shadow frerge in 20003, to investigate against the war, I

suppose it could be said it was a pivotal point in defining my

political career, Mr Speaker, such as it has been. So it's been a

little bit more than a passing interest to see the gross of the

Chilcot report. -- see the progress. I defended the time he took and I

would like to thank the opportunity of thanking Sir John and his team

for the thoroughness of that report. As a former soldier, I would just

like to start by making this point - and that is that whatever has been

said previously, war should always be the measure of last resort when

all other possibilities have been exhausted. And we should never lose

sight of that simple fact. Of course there is such a thing as a just war

but at the same time you owe it to your citizens, your Parliament and

of about all the soldiers you are committing to battle that it has to

be the measure of last resort. For me, the overwhelming conclusion from

Sir John's report was actually that Iraq was not that last resort. Other

possibilities had about not been exhausted. I think that was the most

damming conclusion of the report itself. -- most damning. It made

other points, the premise of war, we wept on to war on the premise of

WMD, it was overtold and there was caveats attached to the intelligence

and there was a lack of preparedness with regard to our Armed Forces and

there was an absence of post-war planning. This litany of errors was

compounded by an overestimation of our influence over the US. We could

not at the time believe that it could be an in our interests not to

be there, not to be on the frontline, when, when I think one of

the proudest and best moments when it came to Prime Minister Wilson,

was saying no to the Americans when it came to Veet nap t did not

fracture the special relationship, in fact between 15 to 20 years, the

special relationship, as it is so-called was on a very firm footing

indeed. A litany of errors. I don't intend looking back on those, I do

suggest that there are two key lessons from this episode that I

think we would do well to reflect upon. The first is that Parliament

should have done more to question the evidence that came before it.

It's a failure, almost at every level. The legislative is not

examining the evidence. It is not questioning the executive, at times

like this, then when is it going to do so. There was a failure of those

in the know. I would suggest at all level, and particularly the Cabinet

at the time, to challenge what is being presented to the public. I

think the one figure that stands proud with all of this, when it

comes to the select group of people, within the Cabinet is Robin Cook who

clearly, what he forecast on that eventful debate in 2003, everything

he said has been proved right. I contributed to that debate as well

but it was one of the best speeches I have heard for a very, very long

time. But, we should - I will in a second - we should have questioned

more. We should have examined the detail. I was told to stop asking

awkward questions. We were asking so few awkward questions, as an

Opposition, as an official Opposition, it was being suggested

to me from the other side that we were trying to take, play political

games with this issue, that they were hoping to perhaps, if it did

blow up in the Government's face, then we, as an official Opposition

could perhaps take advantage of that. That is how bad it got in that

debate in 20003. We simply were not asking enough questions and we

should have done so. I was here in 2003 and I went

against the leader of my party and voted against action in the Iraqi

war. It is being disingenuous to the house because it was one of the

biggest rebellions there had been on the government side. And I remember

that debate and how difficult it was to make that judgment. When you are

being led by the leader of your party whose judgment you respect, it

is a tough call to disagree and vote against an action of that kind. Can

the Honourable gentleman accept as I do, that in a difference of opinion,

I have not had any cause to change my mind over the decision I make but

I believe those who made the decisions relieved they were doing

the right thing. I believe we are saying different things. I am not

saying there was intentional deceit. What I am saying is that this place,

many of us did not question enough the evidence before us. The JI see

report was full of caveats and holes but we relied on the Prime

Minister's interpretation given in his foreword. I fully respect

members views on that evening itself. If you cannot trust the

Prime Minister standing at the dispatch box making the case for war

and perhaps privy to intelligence that we haven't seen, then it is a

sad turn of events. But I still come back to the fundamental point that

we should have questioned more because there was a firm lack of

evidence of WMD and that was the premise for war. We cannot forget

that point. The reason the inspectors were pleading for more

time is because they couldn't find WMD because they didn't exist. There

is that component in this debate that the UN was asking us to give

them more time. The problem was we were marching to a military

timetable at that point. I am grateful to the Honourable gentleman

to indulge me for a second, I was reduced to four minutes yesterday so

I did not get the opportunity to page of you to my predecessor Robin

Cook, who if not for his untimely death, I would not be in this place,

he was my MP going up, we disagreed on many things but on Iraq we agreed

and he is missed by many, and his family. I am conscious time is

pressing on. I will try and wrap this up in a few minutes. That was

the first lesson from my point of view that we would do well to

reflect on. The second important lesson we should learn from Iraqi is

that we need a proper functioning and funded well sited foreign policy

apparatus. There is no doubt about it, Barack revealed clear

deficiencies in that apparatus. Subsequent interventions would

suggest that we still haven't put that right to a large part. In

Helmand province, most of us supported the initial invasion in

Afghanistan or the intervention to get rid of Al-Qaeda, we made a

massive mistake in allowing that mission to morph into one of

nation-building. That was a mission that was completely under resourced.

In Libya, we did not understand events on the ground and that once

you knocked the doors down, the easy part, you laid open all of the

tribal rivalries. Again we had a lack of understanding of events on

the ground. In Syria in 2013, there was a suggestion we would be arming

the rebels, not realising that lurking in the shadows were the ISI

tell situation and how that would play out. -- I

a loss of expertise and foreign policy and it is a problem felt

within the SCO. In this country we have a narrow pyramid when it comes

to foreign policy making. In the States it is more open and diverse

with lobbyists and political analysts. The experts can buy into

the system and influence the system. In this country it is more narrowly

defined. It is the reserve of the select few, which is why the SCO is

part of that few, it must be firing on all cylinders. It has not been

so. That is why we need proper funding of the SCO, we have had a

continual erosion of the budget and hollowing out of expertise and

staff. Traditional skills like languages and knowledge of events on

the ground and peoples, places, have all been downgraded. As illustrated

by the closure of the in-house language school and the gutting of

the venerable library. How is it that we have got to the point that

when Russia intervened in Ukraine, we did not how one Crimean expert

within the FCO. How is it when the Arab uprising took place, we had so

few Arabists that we were calling them out of retirement. And how we

have a different budget, ten times that of the Foreign and Commonwealth

Office. It does not serve us well. We need to increase the budget for

long-term investment and make sure we are as well sited as we can be.

That is not the case at the moment. There is continual pressure on the

FCO budget and we need to put that right. It is no surprise that

Parliament has raised the bar when it comes to interventions. It

expects to be consulted. That is one of the positive developments of the

Iraqi intervention. If you believe there is a loss of expertise at the

heart of your foreign policy apparatus and if there is a lack of

trust, not just because of Barack but because of Helmand province,

Libya, Syria, again, the bar needs to be raised. This is not a healthy

position in the long term. In the increasingly challenging

international environment, we need a knowledgeable executive to be firing

on all cylinders. Well informed and resourced FCO has to be central to

that, acting as a counterweight to number ten and it may help us avoid

costly errors and conflicts going forward. There has to be within the

system readiness to speak truth to power and I am not sure we are quite

there yet. That is one of the key lessons with regard to Iraq. In

conclusion Mr Speaker, we face enormous geopolitical challenges,

both the UK and the West, going forward. The world population will

rise to 9 billion by 2050, changing distribution in terms of Africa,

urbanisation, the consequent strain on natural resources. 1 billion

people lack access to sufficient water, by 2050, three quarters of

the world could face water scarcity. There are environmental challenges

caused by political and economic uncertainty. In the global

information world, success will depend on not to prevail by force

but who wins the story. One of the failures of Iraq is that it is

symptomatic of a wider malaise. The deficiency in strategic analysis at

the corner of our foreign policy apparatus. The greatest challenge

for policymakers is to ensure that we embrace flexibility and foresight

and perhaps diplomacy's greatest challenge must be to restore foreign

policy and defence capabilities. Otherwise the country risks being

left behind. This is happening at a time when international community is

failing to produce coordinated responses to challenges facing

mankind including poverty, organised crime, conflict, disease, hunger and

inequality. In conclusion, I properly resourced and respected

foreign policy apparatus, investment in soft power and old friendships

and strong in defence because diplomacy and soft power cannot

succeed by it self. We must have this proper funding in place for our

FCO. If we are not well sited, the next intervention challenge, there

will be more, it might not be as local in its ramifications as it has

been in the past errors. We need to be better sited because the cost of

getting it wrong might be so much greater next time. Jim Shannon. It

is a pleasure to speak and to follow the members who have given a wealth

and depth of information to this debate. My comments, the mistakes

made and lessons learned, that is what I wish to refer to. British

forces, 146,000 in the invasion phase but because of how things

work, more than actually served, I would like to pay tribute to the 179

brave and courageous servicemen and women who died during the campaign

and commend those who served in this place and in the other place as

well. The Chilcot Report has raised many issues. There is a lack of

answers on such key issues as the cause of much of the public rage. It

is now very clear that we followed the American lead without properly

analysing intelligence. It was the public commitment from Tony Blair to

the US president on support. We need to be more discerning about how we

get material in regards intelligence. The plan for success

was absent and in 2003, there was an expected success for which no one

had planned. No one could see Saddam Hussein capitulating so early. So

there were no successful programmes is sit such as oil aid. We did not

have a vision of understanding what would happen if we were successful

at time. It is felt strongly to this day, in the region and across the

world. We did not understand the complex society of Barack. The

cultural sensitivity and local division, the sectarianism and the

politics that meant our presence was resented as time went on and things

did not get better. There was the incident in Basra where war was

pronounced. All of these were unforeseen. We cannot seem -- keep

sending forces into places where they are not equipped Ford the

surroundings and understanding. We need to fully prepare our Armed

Forces and regain much of the damaged public trust. I was not a

member at the time of the rock wall but I had constituents who were

sending socks and boots and food and I have to say, on one occasion, body

armour, there is something wrong when our people serve across the

seas and we as families have to send them stuff that the army should send

them. There needs to be a conversation. A lot of the things

went wrong can be explained by the lack of resources. We have not got

the capacity to fight on so many fronts any more. It is now clear

that we greatly underestimated -- overestimated the capability of the

enemy. That was another important point to learn and one that must be

taken forward. I want to speak of the veterans in the family support

package when soldiers were away. At that time, there were two soldiers

left at headquarters to take care of family affairs, it became

overpowering for them. I know that things have changed and I welcome

those changes but we have to build on this and make sure these things

are not forgotten. We need foresight and to continue learning. I want to

quote an example of a gentleman who served in uniform. His story will be

well-known to those who read the Sunday Times, Chris Braithwaite, 41,

a former major in the Duke of Lancaster Regiment. His quote was

"In Basra, we were attacked daily for seven months. We believe the

financial support that was provided by the Army in recognition of long

service would reflect the family sacrifice until the rug was pulled

from under us." "I have saved the Queen 's Diamond Jubilee Medal, I

was given the news I was made risk -- made redundant, 87 days short of

my 16 years service for that medal." These people fought for Queen and

country, they did their bit and when they were needed, they had support

back home but it fell short with a vengeance. We must take care of our

veterans and make sure they get first-class services. Offer the best

and get the best as well for those things are vitally important. I

asked this question and I will ask again, are we going to have a

statistic someday where more Iraqi -- Iraqi war veterans kill

themselves than were killed in the conflict? There are statistical

facts over Afghanistan, these are things we need to take recognition

of and be aware of. If I can quickly referred to the reserves. We use the

highest number of reservists on record and we have no method of

tracking them to see if they have suffered after the conflict, and the

number dropped from 45,000 to 30,000, there needs to be a rethink.

It may well be that the Tony Blair was strong, is own self-importance

having had successes in Kosovo and Sierra Leone and having brokered the

Good Friday Agreement the genuinely thought he could do no long. This

could be the will be with you whatever memo, it is increasingly

clear, that our soldiers were being sent to war by Tony Blair no matter

what. Tim Collins said that at the time they believe that there was it

plan in place but we know now that this was not the case and we know

that the lack of planning was disastrous for many. It is easy to

point the finger at Tony Blair but there are others, Alistair Campbell,

Jeff Kuhn and those in a circle of friends, decision-makers and there

is something for them to think about. Mr Speaker, in the time that

is available to me, right honourable and honourable members will be aware

of that famous poem by Roger Kipling, from the poem Tommy. I will

read the second burst your fifth one. The theme is applicable to

today, "I went into a theatre as sober as could be, they sent him to

the musicals but when it came to fighting they will show me in the

stalls. It is Tommy this and Tommy that, the troop ships on the Tyne,

it is special train for Atkins when the ships are on the Tyne. We talk

of schools and fires for all. For it is Tommy this and Tommy that, and

talk about the bridge, the saviour of his country when the guns begun

to shoot. And it is anything you please but Tommy isn't a blooming

fool. " I believe we need to do better by our veterans to make sure

that those who have served this country well, should be looked

after. I want to conclude with one comment. There was a vulnerable

person scheme, set up after the war, when the current reflection in Iraq

is important, it doesn't make an impact, the honourable member for

Leeds Central referred to it. I want to refer to it again. There are

Catholics, Protestants, and many others who continue to be targeted

on the basis of their identity. Around 3.3 million have been

displaced due to the instability of Iraq, many minority groups are on

the verge of disappearance and during the UN Independent

commission, it was determined that there should committed genocide

against the UCD is, around 90% of them are Iraqi. The resettlement

schemes are not national specific, they have only taken up to 315

Iraqis, while some might fit the scheme, they're not eligible for

asylum because they're not Syrian asylum seekers. I would call, for

the modest increase in the resettlement scheme, for Iraqis who

fit the criteria to qualify for asylum in the UK. A modest expansion

is particularly pertinent, because the Iraqis have suffered as much as

their Syrian counterparts at the hands of the Irish. The UK cannot

absolve itself promises to Iraqis, making them illegible for

resettlement. It is the least we can do. Mr Speaker, we have heard about

mistakes, we can learn from those mistakes, we can move forward, we

can make it a better place for our soldiers to serve. With the veteran

support when they get home for our families as well. Let us learn from

the report and move forward, learning from those mistakes. Thank

you. Johnny Mercer. Thank you very much Mr Speaker, and for allowing me

to rise. The Chilcot report allowed for sobering reading, many things

had been said on the issue and I will not repeat them, the chief

protagonists at the time have received in my view their

criticisms. I have the fortunate position of having been in the Army

at the time of the Iraq war and now a member of this place. I did not

serve in combat in theatre, my theatre was another unpopular war in

Afghanistan. The time of the Iraq the Army was a strange place to be.

It is difficult to be positive about a million people marched against

appointment just before you go. But it is a testament to the character

and the professionalism of UK Armed Forces that the initial operation

was a success despite cruel losses including from my enrichment on the

23rd of March 2003 when Ian Seymour, and others from 29 commando were

killed in southern Iraq by insurgents. But what happened

following the initial operation, for the following seven years bad is

indeed right up to date, has been a tragedy for Iraq. I visited the

country last autumn and I met with the current president, it remains a

place of extreme violence, heavy corruption and deep division. It was

a challenge to return from a visit to Baghdad with much of a sense of

optimism although recent changes in the Iraqi security forces and the

international coalition's mammoth efforts in the fight against Daesh

give real cause for hope and I want to pay tribute to all UK forces

engaged in a fight to date as we speak in this house. But how did we

really get here? I to the youngster and the public rage, the actions of

some of those both at the top of government at the time and yes at

the top of the military were negligent. I am concerned however

that the public's fixation upon Tony Blair could make us miss some of the

learning points, this is the whole point of this process that must be

taken from the very conference of work. It was encouraging to hear the

Prime Minister who left office yesterday say that it would be

impossible for these events to happen again today because of the

structures that he and his team have put in place and I commend him and

the sexual state for defence for that. -- the Secretary of State for

Defence. But there is a decency issue, the morality issue. It is a

rarer and treasured commodity, in an organisation configured to but

physical courage, the ability to stand up for your men in the face of

a seemingly unstoppable sequence of events, to speak truth to power is

an integral part of the duty of the nation. We drive it into the

subordinate and we preach to anyone who will listen, so where was this

courage in the build-up to this disastrous war? It is inconceivable

to me to allow political administration in this country to

have the preparations for war because it did not physically to be

seen to be doing so. It is inconceivable to me to allow

soldiers out patrol bases into contact with the enemy without body

armour, not as a tactical decision, or a of enemy action, but simply

because of bad planning. It is inconceivable to me to continually

allow patrolling in snatch Land Rover is when they were known to

provide no protection whatsoever to our men and women against a

well-known and obvious IED threat. But yet these things happened and

they directly cost UK military lives. And in this almost this rule

fixation of hatred upon Tony Blair these lessons must not be missed

less we do a further disservice to our men and women who serve. The

Prime Minister does not make tactical decisions, she does not

plan logistics, she is advised by those who do. I cannot as a very

junior and insignificant commander in another unpopular war in

Afghanistan would ever sanction an operation knowingly lacking in

equipment required to protect my men from a threat that I clearly knew

about because I wasn't prepared to say no. And I find it hard as do

many of my cohort to understand why it was the case in this instance.

And yet we did, we as a military betrayed the individuals who lost

their lives in this conflict, as a direct result of equipment shortages

and that is the point for me that really sticks in the group from all

this. The political arguments, the strategic comings and goings will be

debated at in-flight and so they must to ensure that we do not make

the same stakes again. But the military and the tactical lessons

must be learned also. What happened in Iraq had a profound effect on a

whole generation of us junior commanders and military, who grew up

in a deep sense of mistrust in our superiors as a result of the lack of

actions or actions in the Iraq war. I know for many is formed us at a

very formative stage in our careers. Finally in my contribution today, I

want to speak strongly against this idea that the lives of British

servicemen and women where somehow wasted in this war died for nothing.

I'm afraid I simply cannot reconcile in my not insignificant personal

experience of commanding men in combat that lives lost in the

pursuit of protections of freedoms and privileges that we enjoyed in

his country have been lost in vain. For the families, many of whom I

know intimately, nothing common omission, no cause can be worth

losing a loved one. But as a soldier I thought that I must represent the

intimate conversations that we share, the deep motivations that we

fell back on to get through yet another date in a sweat, he, blood

and dust of these recent wars. For we soldiers are drawn from all

backgrounds, race, original, colour and creed, we'll have different

views, usually much more informed than anybody gives us credit for. No

doubt crafted from each of R.N. Personal experience. But we wear one

you reform, with one union Jack on our sleep, we sign up to the same

core values to protect our nation, in the same traditions of the

immense sacrifices of our forefathers who wore the same cap

badges under the same flag. The truth is when a soldier leaves his

patrol base in the morning comedies not thinking about how his

particular contribution that they will help advance the cause of

Iraq's future prosperity will gather some's place in the world. He's not

thinking about whether we should have believed a dossier about the

weapons of mass structure whether he will stumble upon a summer's house.

He's thinking about calling his wife later comedies thinking of covering

his arts and trying not to blink unless he misses something. He's

making sure that he has got spare batteries, the is making sure he

doesn't let his mates down. He is more focused on doing his section,

his platoon and his battalion proud than whether or not he should be

there in the first base. And in these endeavours he showing that

courage, that fortitude and that resilience, that humanity that we

all aspire to on the most revealing stage of all, welfare, where norms

do not exist and brutality and brought human emotion is everywhere.

We aspire to these things because they are good, because they are

noble, because they are to be desired. These young men and women

who made the sacrifices demonstrating these qualities, it

makes those are those who witnessed it and lucky to return refuse to

think it is futile. For they did make differences, they said, it's

lives through their bravery, they shielded civilians from brutal

enemy, with the intent showing the worst of the humanity. Improved

amenities and made them safer and better. OK on a strategic level

overall perhaps no, but it wasn't all a waste. So that courage, that

resilience, that discipline, that commitment, that is why we must

number from these conflicts to comic cannot and must never be forgotten,

for that would be an even greater betrayal than the ones we see laid

out in this report. They are not wasted lives, they were engaged in

noble pursuits in the generational struggle of our lifetime, as in the

First World War, the Second World War and conflicts since, these

privileges that we enjoy. These freedoms that we exercise do not

come cheap. So Mr Speaker in conclusion, let us learn these

painful lessons, let us not fixate on Tony Blair, he is yesterday's

man. Let us not commit to things that we cannot fulfil and pass the

buck to the lower end of the command chain to simply work it out. Of

course. I thank the honourable member for giving way and I thank

him also for his very powerful speech. It is one of the things that

has always worried me about the debate on the Iraq war has been the

military as victims. As victims who were forced to go and fight when in

fact they absolutely trained and wanted to do so. But what they

didn't want was bad equipment. And what they don't want today, is bad

equipment. And does it not behove this house and its members to be

much more interested on a daily basis with what we are providing a

service personnel with. Rather than just focusing on past decisions?

Absolutely and I thank my honourable friend for her intervention, I think

that we have, shortly long way in this process. -- an extraordinarily

long way in this process. And absolutely right in that we do

not want sympathy. We want more MP3 and understanding in what we do,

there is sometimes too much sympathy. -- empathy. We do not

expect to be ill-equipped to do so or be part of a mission which is

badly planned and badly resourced. So let us never lose the courage to

speak truth, no matter our rank or position in life. Let us remember it

very humility and courage and sacrifice of our service men and

women in Iraq and make sure we have learned the lessons that the

hundreds of thousands who have lost lives on either side, civilian and

military, the human race can only move forward and I sincerely hope we

do. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to follow the honourable

and gallant member, he makes such a powerful contribution. This whole

House will congratulate him on that speech and remember that people went

to that war on our behalf. Mr Speaker, it is a great pleasure to

take part in this particular debate. I was one of the members of this

House who was in the House when this House voted to go to war. For some

of us, it offers closure now we have the Chilcot report. There is a real

sense of vindication for people like me who resolutely oppose that

conflict and opposed it all the way through. I remember that D, it was a

horrible and ugly DE. It should be imprinted on the collective

consciousness of this House. I refresh my memory about the

atmosphere and culture, I know it sounds masochistic to look at

YouTube recordings of Tony Blair making his speech but I felt it was

important to get a sense of what that day was like. We had to listen

to Tony Blair when he laid out back exaggerated and fabricated case. To

listen again to those flights of fancy. We now know because of the

Chilcot report that it was mainly nonsense and most of it was fiction.

I was the chief whip of what was then a small group of MPs in 2003. I

remember observing the government whips rounding up the recalcitrant

and the doubters and those who were trying to make up their mind about

this. Let us not forget, but Labour Government imposed a harsh three

line whip on their members that day. Women and men dragooned into that

lobbied to support that fabricated case and to giving support to their

very flawed prime minister. The House passed that vote, 412 to 149.

I was among the 149. It is the proudest fort of my 15 years in this

House. It was a vote that characterised the last Labour

government, just like the vote to leave Europe will characterise this

Conservative Government. Both were done in a reckless gamble. There was

no planning for what would happen when it comes to Brexit, there was

no planning as we have learned from Chilcot about what they would do

once they had advanced into Iraq. There are lots of parallels. It is

curious that they seem big events that characterise particular

governments and forever the last Labour government will be

characterised by Iraq. More than that, it is all around one man and

my apologies to the Member for Plymouth. It is Tony Blair. There is

no escape from the personal association with the former Prime

Minister and what transpired in Iraq. It will follow him to the

grave. It will be on his headstone, such is his association with this

conflict in Iraq. It would be as well being tattooed on his forehead.

It is about this man and how he approached this war. When I look

around, and I have listened carefully to many of the speeches

from my colleagues, back on that day in 2003, I think we can grow them

into three categories. I will explain what these categories are.

First, my category, those who voted against the war, who did not except

for a minute the case which was presented to us. We feel in a good

place today. I look at some of my colleagues who were at the House

that the. I want to pay tribute to the Liberal Party. They led that

case against the war in 2003. And also to the Labour members. Take it

easy, gentlemen. Labour members opposed it. It was as he said, the

biggest rebellion we had during that period. They saw through it. They

were prepared to reject the fabricated and nonsensical case the

Prime Minister gave. They did the right thing. The second case... Yes,

of course. Just briefly. It was historically the biggest government

rebellion within the governing party in British political history. 122

backbench colleagues in the Labour party voted on the motion that the

case was not proven. Only 190 backbench colleagues voted with the

government, under immense pressure as the honourable gentleman pointed

out from the whips. He is correct. This is why it is important that I

was setting the context of that day, it was horrible and ugly and

dreadful. I want to come to the Conservatives because these are the

second category. I have listened to several Conservative members, I

cannot remember which one made the case earlier. There is a real sense

among Conservative members that they were misled. They range in

categories from angry and upset about the way they were misled and

duped by the former Prime Minister to the former Prime Minister who

resigned yesterday who was a bit more followers also about it. --

philosophical about it. You have to go along with it because he was

prime minister. But what the Conservative Party failed to do,

this was the utter failure they had that day, they never held that

Labour Government to account. They were not inquisitive. They did not

look at the case presented to them and said, hold on a minute, this is

a lot of nonsense. They should have known. The rest of the country knew

this was wrong. 100,000 people marched in Glasgow. I was on the

front of them. 1 million people in London marched against that war.

There was an atmosphere in the nation, amongst the public who just

knew profoundly that there was something wrong with this case. They

just knew instinctively that what they were hearing night after night

from Tony Blair and his cronies was an comfortable. There was something

wrong. The Conservatives should have picked that up and had they done

their job, we would not have been presented with this absolute utter

failure and disaster. Thirdly, I won't come to the last category.

Those of us to the who still seem to be almost making the case for war.

As of this was somehow justified, that this was right. They point to

things like the world is a better place without Saddam. Of course it

is, but what price we have paid for the world. Half a million people

dead. A region destabilised, a generation radicalise, foreign

policy discredited like never before. It is unlikely we will ever

restore that feeds in foreign policy ever again. This trust in politics.

That was a key point where the public fell of trust with what we

did in this House. Of course we welcome Saddam being removed, no one

least of all the Iraqis who have to live with the consequences. Who

would start to suggest that Iraq is a better place than it was in 2002.

This decision about the public losing faith in this House, many of

those accusations made against this government are not founded in the

Chilcot report do not come to this conclusion about this House... Dirty

not except that on that day it was very difficult for all others, even

those who voted against it were not we had made the right decision. You

cannot be so exact about your judgment call on that day. Surely he

can except that those who voted in favour on that day thought they were

doing the right thing? He is right. Let us have a look at this. He was

in the House in 2003, and I correct? Yes. He would've been recalled to

Parliament in September 2000 and two. When he was recalled like me,

we would take out what has now become cold the dodgy dossier. Did

he for a minute believe the fabricated nonsense that was that

dossier? It was absolutely appalling for this case for war. Most of it

came from the post doctoral thesis of a student. I have just finished

reading a report from this student who has said his evidence and his

work was doctored by this government. That was the case for

war. That was the case that he and I have to make a judgment about. It

was fabricated, a flight of fancy and that was what we were asked to

go to war on, it was a disgrace, like a comedy sketch or a case to go

to war. More sex dog than some teenage starlet embarking on their

first video. -- sexed up. It was an appalling document. It should never

have been taken for a minute, it was rubbish and nonsense. I listen to

Tony Blair last week. I was appalled. I was appalled at his

response to all of this. The lack of contrition. The half-hearted apology

which would probably do nothing other than incense the victims. The

flights of fancy still there. Almost an attempt to rewrite several

sections of the Chilcot Report. His failure to acknowledge the enormity

of what was unleashed. It is appalling what happened. Several

things have to happen. My view is that we not at the end this process.

I still think there is a journey to go in this particular story. This

sorry saga. I do not think we're at the conclusion what happened in

Iraq, mainly because of a couple of points that members have made. They

were not able to judge about the legality of this conflict and we

still have that extra mile to go just to get to say if this was an

illegal war. Until we get back conclusion, there will still be big

outstanding issues when it comes to this conflict and how it will be

assessed. I think there is further journeys to go. Honourable members

have waited Years and Years for the Chilcot report will have the sense

this is another journey we have to take. What must happen -- those who

are responsible for the biggest foreign policy disaster I have seen

as, this is bigger than the Suez crisis. They must be held to account

for the decisions they made and the things they did in the course of

this conflict and how it was per suit. I support overwhelming the

case that the chief architect, designer of the Iraq war, Mr Tony

Blair should be brought in front of this House to face the charges that

have been suggested. I really hope this House gets the opportunity to

discuss this because the public expect us to do it. The public do

not want after all this time to let this go. The only people who lost

their jobs in the course of this conflict are two BBC journalist. Is

that not an appalling way to leave things? I believe there is real

public desire to move to the next stage now which is holding people to

account so I hope we do that. Mr Speaker, I heated every single

minute of the debate about the Iraq war and the build up to it and the

post-conflict resolution. It was this House at its very worst. We

must ever get the ever again. The one thing we can take from this is

hopefully a case for lessons learned and we never do this again. Hold the

people responsible to account and let us apologise for that conflict.

Start to try to move on from all of this and let us know we will never

do something like the Iraq war ever again in this Parliament. Doctor

Philip Lee. Thank you Mr Speaker. Many important lessons will emerge

over the coming months and years. Deep sympathy for the people of Iraq

must persist and indeed to the families of the members of our

outstanding Armed Forces who fell in the line of duty. I wish to focus on

the Iraq inquiry's immediate lessons for the leadership of country. In

which this House has such a vital role. Firstly, can I offer some

historical perspective. It is worth noting some similarities between the

times we're living in now and the last period in recent history which

similarly defined by what I would define as a political sclerosis.

Trigger first half of the 20th-century we witnessed the

collapse of empires, Ottoman Empire, we saw a failure of an

intergovernmental institution, the league of Nations. We enjoyed

economic turbulence and oppression. Such dramatic chip physical change

was fuelled by a remarkable technological change. With the mass

transit of people. Advanced weapons of war, along with large armies

which resulted in appalling human cost in two world wars. Today, we

are experiencing similar geopolitical change. An expansionist

China, a research and Russia. A socially unstable and perhaps more

parochial United States of America, it is said people that we have mass

transit. And globalisation which brings with it opportunities, and

costs. Trojans have replaced tanks. And the potential for spaced based

weaponry looms -- drones have replaced tanks. Within this context

dramatic change, the new government must set its path, the crucial

lesson from the Iraq Inquirer is that we had to be better prepared to

provide great leadership, at historic tipping points. For our

nation and for our world. It was not wrong to wish to depose Saddam

Hussein but the way in which the US led coalition went about it has had

effects that were predicted by many experts. Perfectly foreseeable and

catastrophic for the Iraqi people but also for our own regional

interests. R.N. Country's leadership at every level, from the Prime

Minister down was far too weak to deliver the good outcome. I would

note that we are again at a critical moment, this time in history of our

own nation and continent, delivering a good and long-term outcome once

again depends on this house supplying the best possible

leadership now. The ties that have bound our nation, communities and

people at home and abroad, are severely strained. Some are

breaking. Our people mistrust those whom they have elected to represent

their interests and lead our nation. As in 2003, decisions taken quickly

today will have enormous ramifications over the coming

decades. Like the proverbial flap of the butterfly wings in one part of

the world, that creates a hurricane in another. It is that such critical

moments that we require greater leadership. Leadership with the

experience and perspective to see our nation 's role clearly.

Leadership with the wisdom and understanding to realise what must

be done, the vision to set clear direction, the tenacity to deliver a

plan and the good sense to adapt when the context changes as it

always does. We must not be sclerotic. Leadership and

self-awareness to put the public interest at its heart. We needed a

ship that will forge our future, not allow us to be carried off in the

currents of history to an unknown hand unwonted destination. The Prime

Minister, our new Prime Minister has taken an important step in setting

out her vision for a country that works for everyone. And this and the

previous government have made, welcome changes. Notably the

National Security Council structures, enable more strategic

decision-making in our national interests. Of course. I thank him

for giving way: one of the lessons that I took from the Chilcot report

was a habit that we have beaten out of those of us who have been to

sound Hirst, which is not to start with your aim and retrofit

justifications from that. At this time of change of national

leadership, would he welcome any calls that might be made to the new

Prime Minister to have a robust team of people to provide counter

narratives that time key decision-making to really test

hypotheses and to make sure that went difficult decisions have to be

made the made in the best possible way. I thank my noble friend for his

intervention, yes I think the absence of people speaking truth to

power, in the room that matters, I think we have seen too much evidence

of that over the last ten or 15 years. I am hopeful, that the

elevation of our new Prime Minister will be ushering in the new period

in which we do listen to experts and that we are prepared to listen to

people who might have a different view and a different approach to the

world in which we live. But the changes of the National Security

Council are nowhere near enough to guarantee good leadership, this

means that we are running an unacceptable level of risk for the

security, our nation and our world. The referendum on UK membership of

the European Union is the latest example, I'm no fan of our country's

previous relationship with the European Union, it had to change.

But to hold a referendum on membership, I fear was a strategic

blunder which will add verse the impact our country and our world

over the coming years and decades. We must avoid further such blunders

in the future, because we face existential threats. These threats,

across borders, they are by their very nature, transnational.

International terrorism, radicalisation, a resurgent Russia

and expansionist China, who are not respecting current borders. Cyber

security, organised crime, pandemics, environmental

degradation. All these are asked to work with other nations. We must now

set out our geopolitical priorities. We must properly fund the objective

to increase our influence around the world, we must revisit the

government and how it works. Wisdom and experience must be at the heart

of our decision-making. We must put people who know what they are doing

in charge of delivering, and they must stay in jobs long enough to see

them through. We must urgently overhaul how we identify and nurture

future leaders, our people must once again be able to trust the aims,

intentions and abilities of those who lead our country. We have two

provide leaders worthy of that trust because it will be painstaking work

turning back. This house must insist that we now go much further, and

only then will members of this house in all conscience be able to

reassure the people that we represent, that our nation will have

the leadership that it needs when we need it.

Thank you Mr Speaker, I have had very long involvement with Iraq, for

the members not here, in the 80s and 90s and in the year 2000 aspect many

times in this chamber, about the regime in Iraq. I chaired an

organisation called the campaign against repression for democratic

rights in Iraq, which had many members in this country. And

overseas. We published several books, from academics, and people

who lived in Iraq about the situation in the country. And I used

to have somebody who is now the representative of Iraq, in South

Korea, he would come here almost every other week with a list of

people who had been executed at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad.

Sometimes, they can solve their executions and their torture, were

so dreadful that I would say to him, are you sure this is right? And he

would come back, perhaps a week later and say, yes, it was right.

And here is another long list. So we have no doubt what the situation was

in Iraq. And it existed for a number of years the association and then I

came back from the European Parliament in 1984 and I was asked

to chair an organisation called indict. It was set up, with American

backing and backing from the Kuwaitis. The Kuwaitis had a

particular interest of course in finding the lost Kuwaitis who were

captured during the invasion by Saddam Hussein, of Kuwait. And for

many years, we tried to search for those missing people and to look

maybe for their graves. So the Kuwaitis gave us backing, so did the

Americans. We set up an organisation, with a team of

researchers and the aim was to collect evidence against Iraqi war

criminals. We had a list of 12 in particular, the most wanted, and we

collected very detailed evidence about a great number of them.

Because the idea was to bring them to court, by the mid-19 90s, a body

of law existed that could bring human rights abusers to court.

Development of international law was slow, even though the law existed,

its application was dependent, on institutions, and governments that

have their own political agendas. A new ruling of the International

Court of Justice, blocked indictments for example of heads of

state so whatever evidence we had against Saddam Hussein, we could not

use it. In a court of law. And like the loss of which, who was brought

before an international court. But that still left key members of the

regime, open to indictments. We had a great deal of evidence for example

against Tareq Aziz, who was then the Foreign Minister in Iraq. And then

of course, Ali has an arm achieved, chemical Ali, we had plenty against

him. I had meetings with the UN special rapporteur on torture, the

then UN High Commissioner on human rights, Mary Robinson. And the

Secretary General, Kofi Anand. I also addressed several international

conferences, and tried to spell out what it was that we were doing. We

had to have evidence that could stand up in court so we dismissed a

loss of the evidence that we did not feel could stand

up". We had, the advice of a top human rights barrister, a QC, and we

worked hard interviewing over a period of five or six years

thousands of people to collect testimonies. Once the evidence had

been gathered and analysed by our legal team, my role along the other

board members, was to persuade the lawmakers, in the relevant country,

that there was enough evidence to indict the people concerned. We came

very close to prosecution in Belgium for example. But at the last minute

they change their laws. When I have finished my sentence. In the last

minute they change the laws because someone had also tried to indict an

Israeli leader Ariel Charente. Durable lady is making a speech

where she persuades us that Saddam Hussein was a vile dictator. We all

accept that. But, the argument was made on the basis of weapons of mass

destruction, she will strongly in favour, when I come to that part of

my speech durable gentleman will get his answer. We went to Switzerland,

we went to Norway and we went to Belgium -- my speech, the honourable

gentleman and will get his answer. Just like Britain, there were lots

of warm words but no action. So we were trying very hard to avoid a

war. We thought there was an alternative, and we tried to make

the case, I made it in this chamber, and if the honourable gentleman was

here, he would have heard it. But there were alternatives, but

unfortunately all of the authorities prevaricated, and the issue dragged

on. Without getting anywhere. Meanwhile our main funders, the

Americans were having a change of heart. The Clinton administration

had originally been enthusiastic, wanting us to campaign in the US as

well as Europe. Suddenly they changed their minds, they had moved

to a policy of containment. Not indictment. So our activities really

no longer fitted in with their plans. But as the organisation was

set up in this country, we continued, collecting the evidence.

We turned our attention in particular to Tarik Aziz, because of

his involvement in the taking of British hostages. I think people

forget this, British hostages were taken in Kuwait, and

we never had proper answers to the question why were they in two H, why

the plane landed in Kuwait, and although Saddam Hussein had already

invaded Kuwait, those people were obviously taken as human shields.

Will I presented our evidence to the Attorney General. I had continual

meetings with him to pressurise his teams because we felt they were not

moving fast enough. They kicked their heels for a number of years

and then our top barrister could not understand, given the evidence we

had presented, they were still dragging their feet. We had as much

evidence as we could possibly need, apart from getting a signed

confession from Saddam Hussein, there was nothing further is legally

we could possibly have done. I would occasionally spot Lord Williams in

the corridors of Westminster and take off after him, chasing him down

corridors. He would frequently jokey had to duck into the gents to avoid

me. One day he said, I have good news regarding in sight. He was

going to refer the case against Tarik Aziz to Scotland Yard. I said

he was kicking it into the long grass but he denied that was the

case. We visited the indict team which was made up mainly of Iraqis.

We visited a chief superintendent in new Scotland Yard and talked about

the evidence we had offered. We offered to help him and provide more

evidence but we never got a single word back. It is understandable in

some ways, it was not there are met, they had neither the resources nor

expert sees nor the interest. -- expertise. We came in for somebody

call from the tabloid press with cartoons of British bobbies

apprehending Saddam Hussein. I think it was a very good opportunity

missed. I make this point because there were alternatives and those

alternatives for whatever reasons were not per suit in the way I would

have wished and I am sure many others in this House would have

wished as well. -- were not followed. I would like to be a

tribute to my honourable friend from Northampton who was of great