The Spies Who Fooled the World Panorama

For the north-east of Scotland and England be prepared for snow

overnight overnight and tomorrow. Overnight, the worst of the snow in

the hills of Scotland. Blowing around. By the end of the night

getting down to a lower level. In the south a quieter story. The

showers fading away. Mist and fog forming for England and Wales. A

touch of frost possible almost anywhere in parts of the UK. In the

morning, it is all about the snow in the east of Scotland. It is down

at low levels. It is settles, the accumulations building up. Be

prepared for tricky travelling conditions in the morning. Quieter

over England and Wales in the morning. Cloud around but not much

rain. Some rain towards Essex and Kent. Maybe a few light showers

lingering on from the overnight period. Some brighter spells to be

found. Mainly in the west, but here a chance of one or two showers.

Maybe some snow up over the moors. Snow showers in Northern Ireland in

some places. Through the day, the main focus is the north-east of the

UK. The snow continuing to pile up. Then at sea level, about five to so

centimetres, more in the hills and blowing around in places. In the

south it is more straightforward. Sunny spells and heavy showers in

the afternoon. A little bit of sunshine, reaching eight Celsius.

By Wednesday, north of the line through Wales and the southern

counties of England, that is where the colder air isened -- and the

wintry showers. Thursday, a feed of cold air coming from the Continent.

To the west, weather fronts bofrpling into that. Wind and rain

piling into the cold air. Later on, uncertainty but the general theme

is there. The rain is to turn to snow in the north of the UK. So,

staying cold for the rest of the week. Bitter winds bringing snow

with them. To keep up-to-date, do so online.

Apology for the loss of subtitles for 93 seconds

Good night. Ten years ago, the Iraq war began.

We were told it was necessary to get rid of Saddam's weapons of mass

destruction, WMD. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not

shut down. It is up and running now. Tony Blair assured us the

intelligence was beyond doubt. In fact, it was anything but. What

appeared to be gold in terms of intelligence turned out to be

fool's gold. He has existing and active military plans for the use

of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45

minutes. Did he say he'd seen the weapons? No. The Iraqi regime has

tried to -- plotted to develop anthrax and nuclear weapons for

over a decade. There was an atmosphere of "we've got to find

something". Very bad intelligence got to the leadership quickly.

Other intelligence just didn't make it. We can now show how much of the

key intelligence was based on wishful thinking and lies. Why did

he fabricate such a story? I think he wanted to find a new home.

Fauplty -- faulty intelligence fabricated by spies like this man

pressed the button for war. called me on a secure phone and

said, he's fabricating. The Iraq war is based on lies. The source

was an eyewitness. He actually was present during biological agent

production runs. Were you present then? We have first-hand

descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels. There were no

mobile trucks? No. You were simply making it up? Yes. Tonight, we

reveal how British and American intelligence got it so wrong. The

fact is that we went to war in Iraq on a lie. That lie was your lie.

The spies who fooled the world were telling Downing Street and the

White House what they wanted to hear, that Saddam had WMD hidden

away somewhere deep in the desert. But just six months before the

invasion, there was one piece of intelligence that could have

stopped the war. The story begins in Paris, the source was unique,

the closest Western intelligence had ever got to Saddam, a minister

in his cabinet. French intelligence held the key. The key was a trusted

intermediary who had worked with the French before and who knew the

minister well. The French decided to give the key to the head of the

CIA station in Paris, Bill Murray. I was told that the source was

considering leaving Saddam Hussein's regime and try to get out

and that he had a great deal of intelligence that he might wish to

share. How highly placed was the source? He was one of the chief

members of Saddam Hussein's cabinet. So he looked like a person of real

interest, somebody we should be talking to. French intelligence put

Bill Murray in touch with the intermediary, an Arab journalist in

Paris. What did the intermediary ask you for? $1 million up front.

The sum demanded was huge, but so too was the potential value of the

source. He was Iraq's Foreign Minister Naji Sabri.... To defend

our lands, our people... I gave the intermediary up front a sum of

money, I won't say exactly how much. Bill Murray gave the intermediary

$200,000. In cash? In cash. To be used to pay his expenses, to show

that we were serious and also to provide some personal items for the

source. Due personally hand over -- did you personally Hanover the

cash? Yes. In a suitcase, brown paper envelope? I don't remember,

to tell you the truth, probably, probably a paper bag. We finally

tracked down the intermediary in Paris. We understand he denies

receiving any money. His name is Nabil Mo grabi. He wanted money for

an interview. We said no. Bill Murray gave the intermediary

questions for the Iraqi Foreign Minister. Top of the lift was WMD.

-- list was WMD. The intermediary met the minister in New York six

months before the invasion and only a week before the British

Government published its dossier which made the case for war. Bill

Murray received the answers to his questions and a secret sign was

devised to show the source, Naji Sabri, was on board.

intermediary had had a couple of suits tailor made for the source.

One of which he wore when he gave a speech at the UN. That was part of

the agreement to confirm the relationship between the

intermediary and the source. when you saw the source, the Saddam

cabinet minister wearing his new suit what did that tell you? It was

my new seat. I here by declare before you... It told me that yes,

they're telling me the truth, they really have had the meeting and you

know, they've passed the materialsment The American

officials have been fabricating... Murray couldn't meet the minister,

so the intermediary briefed him on what Saddam really had. The CIA

insists the intelligence showed Saddam had WMD programmes. Murray

says his report was used selectively. He had some chemical

weapons left over from the early 90s, so he had taken the stocks and

given them to various tribes that were loyal to him. He had

intentions to have weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological

and nuclear, but the report was very clear about what he actually

had at that point in time. He had virtually nothing. Were the British

informed? All the intelligence we had was being passed to them. I

have to assume that they knew about it. We asked Naji Sabri for an

interview, but he declined. In a statement he said, "The entire

story was totally fabricated." He confirmed he had met an Arab

journalist in New York but disputes the account of the meeting. The

Bush Administration simply dismissed this secret intelligence

from Iraq's Foreign Minister on the grounds that "he would say this,

wouldn't he"? They were not happy. I was told they were not happy.

not? They just didn't believe it. I was told that the biological

weapons information didn't square with the information from "our best

source". It wasn't until later I heard about the history of

Curveball. Curveball, the code name of

American intelligence's best source. This shadowy figure was to

transform the intelligence on WMD, an Iraqi refugee with first-hand

evidence that Iraq was producing deadly biological weapons. The

story he would spin began at the Zirndorf refugee camp outside

Nuremberg, Germany. He arrived here at the end of December 1999

desperately seek asylum as a refugee from Saddam's tiranical

rule. We finally managed to track him down in a small German town.

Hills real name was Rafed Al Janabi. In fear of his life, he disappeared

from view, seeking anonymity and security. Intransigent my dream was

not only my dream but the dream of many Iraqis to see Saddam Hussein

out of power in Iraq. Janabi's details were placed on file at

Zirndorf. As his background aroused particular interest he was

interviewed by German intelligence. Intransigent the man told me --

they've heard your statement. This is the first television interview

that the head of German intelligence has ever given about

Curveball. It was very difficult to get inside information at that time

from Iraq. It was very important for us to have a human source who

has been engaged in this programme and therefore, it was very valuable

-- a very valuable source. They didn't know if this guy was a liar

or telling the truth. If he's telling the truth then there was a

serious problem. Years of UN inspections prove that Saddam had

lied and concealed his lethal chemical and biological agents.

They'd been manufactured in giant vats or fermenters like these. This

agricultural seed factory is where Curveball said he worked.

Translation: I worked at site for seven to eight months. This, at

least, was true. Political asylum and money were on the horizon. He

told his German interrogators with sketches that he'd been involved in

developing mobile biological laboratories with fermenters

mounted on trucks. TRANSLATION: They gave me an opportunity to say

what I wanted. A lot of the information, which was given to

German intelligence was extremely detailed and they verified this

information. German intelligence gave the Americans over 100 top-

secret reports on Curveball's case. The Americans wanted to meet

Curveball face to face and make their own assessment of his

credibility. But the Germans steadfastly refused. He told us, I

don't want to see the Americans. If he is not willing, really, to meet

the American side or others, then we have to respect that.

Germans were telling us he doesn't like Americans. He doesn't speak

English. He only speaks Arabic and German. He only wants to talk to

Germans. But there was another reason. The Germans concerned that

the Americans might overplay Curveball's intelligence. We were

in a delicate situation. We don't know what the Americans will do

with the information. We can't control that any longer, so the

decision was quite clear - give them our level of information and,

The story began to unravel when the Germans realised that Curveball had

lied about parts of his story. Satellite imagery confirmed these

doubts. Photographs contradicted the description of the site where

Curveball had worked near Baghdad. He said large trucks with trailers

had been driven in and out of the end warehouse but satellite images

showed it would have been impossible for a truck to make that

manoeuvre. What is more there was a six foot wall in the way.

Curveball's duplicity was well known to his former boss and close

friend. Each of thing to the other's wedding. We worked together

for a long time. I knew this guy was a liar. A congenital liar.

do you say that? He was always making up stories. He was a spy, a

conman. A disaster worldwide and for Iraqis. After a year of

interviews with Curveball, German intelligence decided to stop the

regular meetings with him. At the beginning of two dozen of one he

was out in the cold, flipping burgers at this fast food outlet

near Nuremberg. But one seismic event was to change everything and

place Curveball centre stage once again.

9/11 gave President Bush the opportunity to achieve his long-

term goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Erroneously associated him

with Al-Qaeda. This is a regime that has something to hide from the

civilised world. States like these and their terraced allies

constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world.

What Curveball was saying now seemed too good to dismiss. To the

White House Curveball underpinned their case. But doubts were growing.

In the spring of two dozen and to MI6 sent the CIA cable summing up

its position on Curveball. Elements of his behaviour strike us as

typical of individuals we normally assessed as fabricators.

Nevertheless it was... Inclined to believe that a significant

departure of his reporting is true. I believe there were doubts in MI6

in this case. And there was a debate and they did not have any

additional information. Curveball was saying I was first-hand witness

to the production. I saw accidents were people died. I sort real road

cars moving stuff. Some of it was quite detailed. That type of Mike

Rolfe. He was telling us information that people wanted to

hear. Despite all the reservations, both MI6 and the CIA decided to

stick with Curveball. And they soon had what they thought was

corroboration. An Iraqi major who defected confirmed that Iraq has

mobile biological research laboratories.

This was the second spy who fooled the world. An Iraqi defector from

Saddam Hussein's intelligence services who made his way to Jordan.

His name was major Mohammed Harith. He offered himself to an exile

group known as the are rushing -- the Iraqi National Congress. He was

an Iraqi defector in Jordan. He was quite desperate to get out of

Jordan. Nabil Mussawi was filmed by American television talking to

major Mohammed Harith. Major Mohammed Harith said it was his

idea to develop mobile biological laboratories. He said he had

brought tracks and he revealed how many. But the Americans had doubts

because his story was so elaborate and unbelievable. He even claimed

he had met Osama bin Laden. Major Mohammed Harith was given a

lie-detector test. But perhaps surprisingly he passed. When he

talked about the robot unit, I did believe it. Was his story true?

it was fabricated. There was no proof. Why did he fabricate the

story? I think he wanted to find a new home.

In the end, neither the Pentagon nor the CIA was convinced. And in

spring 2002 a berm notice was issued saying that Major Mohammed

Harith was a fabricator. Americans realised that he was

making it all up. Yet his intelligence was still quoted.

with Curveball. Inexplicably as with Curveball, the intelligence

would remain on file waiting to come back and fight.

Now there was to be a third attempt to fool the world. Based on the

nightmare scenario that Saddam Hussein could be developing a

nuclear weapon. Saddam Hussein is determined to get

his hands on a nuclear bomb. Once again the story starts with

the tantalising kernel of truth. This time in Rome. In 1999 a

genuine secret letter came to light indicating that an Iraqi ambassador

was planning to visit Niger, a country rich in uranium. But soon

the fact turned to fantasy. Fantasy would also around this man,

Rocco Martino, flew over the years have had dealings with the Italian

and other intelligence agencies. In this so Ben's picture he's meeting

an intelligence officer. He liked to be a charming man. He was very

mysterious. And there was something shadowy around him.

Rocco Martino gave Elisabetta Burba a a set of documents which she

later gave to the American embassy. Potentially they were at the

smoking gun that everybody at the time was looking for.

It is a murky story. What is clear is that Rocco Martino got the

documents from the Embassy of Niger in Rome and an Italian intelligence

officer was involved as some stage. The sensational documents detailed

how Iraq was planning to buy 8500 tons of pure uranium from Niger and

was signed and sealed by the President of Niger.

The documents looked authentic and they even included the original

genuine laughter. But on closer examination they soon turned out to

be a crude forgery. There were filled with all kinds of

mistakes. They newest the name of the previous minister of foreign

affairs. -- they used. It was a pretty bad forgery for stock de -.

Earlier on Rocco Martino had tried to sell the documents to French

intelligence but they refuse to take the bait. We were highly

sceptical. We did not even mention them to any friendly services. And

we did not trace any acquisition of uranium by Iraq during that whole

period. French intelligence officers were

twice dispatched to the uranium mines in Niger and to check it out.

There reported there was nothing to it. Pierre Brochand talks about the

spread of the documents. It was disseminated to some intelligence

services including France, Germany, the UK. Then across the Atlantic

and in the end only the US and the UK may that public. Because

probably their immune system was weak.

The White House eagerly seized on the intelligence. Once again it was

exactly what they wanted to here. The CIA had his reservations but

the larger story just kept on turning up.

My agency tried repeatedly to bang down that whole issue over and over

again. One of my colleagues referred to it as whack a mole.

contacted Rocco Martino through this family but they said he was

too ill to look - judged to do interview. The exact role of

intelligent services is unclear. The journalist who fuelled the

story feels guilty. Personally I feel very bad because I have been

used. To justify a war or which ended up with hundreds of thousands

of deaths. MI6 stood by in the merger story.

Not based on the forged documents but on British intelligence

including eavesdropping from here at GCHQ.

The current British inquiry into the Intelligence failings chaired

by Sir John Chilcott is now into its 4th year. Behind its closed

doors one senior MI6 officer was distinctly underwhelmed by the

intelligence on the Niger. That uranium story was pretty

unfortunate. It should never have seen the light of day.

The late Brian Jones who was head of the WMD section at Defence

Intelligence was equally dismissive. There was no suggestion in

intelligence that Saddam Hussein was close to having a nuclear

weapon. We knew that he had sought nuclear weapons but there was never

any suggestion that he had acquired them or indeed was close to

acquiring them. Saddam Hussein's alleged attempt to

buy uranium from Elijah remained on intelligence files in Washington

and London just like Curveball's and Major Mohammed Harith's. They

had sowed the seeds for the biggest intelligence fender in living

memory. Politically events were now moving

fast. 11 months before the war, Tony Blair met President Bush at

his ranch in Texas. Tony Blair agreed to support race seemed

changed but only if the United Nations wrote had been exhausted. -

- regime change. Sir Richard Dearlove, the hemp - does the head

of MI6, but the Prime Minister on his visit to Washington in July. He

is reported as saying, military action was now seen as inevitable.

The intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.

In our view we felt that intelligence was used to justify a

war which was a walk of choice, of pure choice. But the intelligence

was used to disguise that as a war of necessity.

Tony Blair's chief-of-staff, Jonathan Powell, have warned the

public opinion was fragile and the government now needed a Rolls-Royce

information campaign. The last call went out for any

further intelligence that could be presented in a dossier designed to

be made public. With the publication deadline approaching,

three pieces of crucial new intelligence game into MI6.

Uncertainty became certainty. Saddam Hussein was now judged to

have active chemical and biological weapons.

The most dramatic new intelligence was the warning that the WMD could

be launched within 45 minutes. has existing and active military

plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons which could be

activated within 45 minutes. So where did this intelligence come

The founder headed a military committee with secret cells of

dissident army officers inside Iraq. This was all based on very tight-

knit connections through relatives to avoid the security of Saddam. We

had cells and various units. Information was to be passed to us.

Dr Allawi's group was first told about the 45-minute warning when it

was planning a coup in the mid90s and feared Saddam would use WMD

against defecting soldiers. The warning came from an Iraqi kernel

called Al-Dabbagh, an artillery commander in Iraq's western desert.

What was the intelligence? That they are ready to, within 45

minutes to hit any unit that will defect. With what? With chemical

weapons. Did Colonel Al-Dabbagh say he had seen the weapons? No.

fact Colonel Al-Dabbagh simply assumed the sealed boxes delivered

to his unit contained chemical or biological agents and they'd just

be short range weapons for use on the battlefield. Was it clear from

the intelligence from Colonel Al- Dabbagh that the 45 minutes was

refer to battlefield weapons? it was clear, yes. The intelligence

was then passed from Colonel Al- Dabbagh to his relative Brigadier

General Muhie, a senior officer in Saddam's military. We contacted him

but he didn't want to talk. Brigadier General Muhie pass today

to the INA. When you got the information about the 45 minutes,

did you pass that information on to MI6? I think it was passed by one

of our officers. To MI6? Yes. the time it got to London, the

intelligence was third-hand. Unusually, MI6 did not say the 45-

minute warning came from on opposition group, albeit a trusted

one, but simply said it came from a reliable source. CIA director

George Tenet was less than flattering about Britain's 45-

minute claim. Reportedly he referred to it as "that 45 minute

shit". The 45 minute intelligence prompted serious concern at the

MoD's defence intelligence staff. Their experts thought it vague and

ambiing Russ -- ambiguous. referred generally to chemical and

biological weapons, which immediately suggested that whoever

was providing the material didn't have a detailed understanding.

first Government inquiry into the use of intelligence was chaired by

Lord Butler. He singled out the 45- minute warning as being one of the

most misleading intelligence failings, since it implied Iraq was

a serious and current threat to the UK. It was interpreted as referring

to missiles that you could fire at Cyprus and that did make it

sensational. That misunderstanding was due to a bit of sloppy

intelligence, unusual because for the most part the intelligence was

handled professionally, but in this case, it was left vague. What's

more, although MI6 knew that the 45-minute claim referred to short-

range battlefield weapons and not long-range missiles, this critical

distinction was never mentioned in their intelligence report or in the

Government's dossier. Indeed, the MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove

admits he knew it only referred to battlefield weapons. But MI6 never

told the Prime Minister or ever mentioned it in the dossier.

think it was a serious owe mission because it misled a lot of people.

So I think one can say that it was a serious error in the dossier.

there were still more errors to come. Just 12 days before the

dossier was published, Sir Richard Dearlove took personal charge of

the other two pieces of new intelligence and drove to Downing

Street to brief the Prime Minister. For the first time, MI6 had a spy

who claimed to have direct access to the production of chemical and

biological agents. He became known as the new source on trial. Sir

Richard called it a significant breakthrough. Although the source

was not quoted in the dossier, the intelligence was seized upon as

confirmation that Saddam had active WMD. It was an exciting event, last

minute, rather like stop press news in a newspaper. So people did act.

I think with undue haste. Giving evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry

some MI6 officers were highly sceptical of the new source on

trial. It was... Being torn Ovcharov the teleprinter and rushed

to Number Ten with a little more haste than was probably appropriate.

Another said it was... Wishful thinking, which promised the crock

of gold at the end of the rainbow. Why wasn't it shown to the defence

intelligence staff who could have made a proper assessment of it?

Because it was thought dangerous that here was a new source on trial

and if it was compromised in any way, the source might be lost.

found it quite difficult to believe that there could zist a single

piece of intelligence -- could exist a single piece of

intelligence in which there could be such great confidence. This made

me suspicious about it and about what was going on. I think it was a

serious mistake that it wasn't shown to the analysts, it always

should be shown to the people who can analyse its validity.

Richard Dearlove also told Tony Blair of more dramatic new

intelligence. It seemed to corroborate Curveball's claims of

mobile biological labs. I was told and specifically briefed about

these mobile production facilities for biological weapons. So this was

an additional and new factor. MI6 chief said one of their trusted

spies code named red river had heard that Iraq had developed

biological fermenter to be carried on lorries or railway trucks. The

problem was it was here say. Red River was basing this on what he

was told by someone else, whom MI6 had never met. What's more that

someone else had never claimed that the fermenters had any connection

with biological weapons. This really didn't substantiate

Curveball's information but it was complementary to it. What this

illustrates is that you must always subject those reports to the

technical experts. We asked Sir Richard Dearlove to comment, but he

said he could not ahead of the forth coming Chilcot report.

General Sir Mike Jackson was Britain's senior soldier when

troops were sent to fight a war, allegedly justified by this

intelligence. What I do know is intelligence sources do not always

tell the truth. What appeared to be gold in terms of intelligence

turned out to be fool's gold, because it looked like gold but it

wasn't. When the eagerly awaited dossier was finally published, the

Prime Minister lost no time in telling Parliament that the

intelligence case had been established beyond doubt.

weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and

growing. The trouble was the intelligence was never that certain,

as defence analysts felt at the time. We had not seen evidence that

established that beyond doubt. That concerned us. The weapons of mass

destruction programme is not shut down. It is up and running now.

was just guessing that there could be reSidual stocks and reassumption

of activities. It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological

weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them. There was a

contistent effort to find insell jepbs that supported pre-conceived

positions and desires. He has existing and active military plans

for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be

activated within 45 minutes. that was a surprising statement to

us in the military. What was your reaction? Extremely surprised.

were quite dismissive of that intelligence and thought it was

transparently weak. What was your reaction to the 45-minute claim?

haven't had such kind of information. The intelligence

picture they paint is one accumulated over the last four

years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritytive. In fact, the

original intelligence that was given to the Prime Minister was

clearly qualified. It said: "Intelligence remains limited, is

sporadic and patchy." The crucial qualifications to the

intelligence were totally absent from the Government's dossier in

order to make a convincing case to the public and to Parliament. It

seems the Government wanted to leave little room for doubt.

qualifications should have been there, because I think that in a

sense, this was the mistake, the dossier led people to believe that

because it was intelligence, it was uniquely worthy of belief. There

was other intelligence from human and technical sources,

eavesdropping and intercepts, but they painted a less alarming

picture. Blair's critics have accused him of deliberately sexing

up the dossier by owe mitting these qualifications and including flakey

intelligence. Was Tony Blair a liar? No, I don't believe he was a

liar. I believe that when he said what he believed about Saddam

Hussein, he was speaking the truth, but I think, because the

qualifications on the evidence weren't made clear, I think he

oversold the case. But that's the reason why there are so many people

today who feel outraged still today that they were misled by the Prime

Minister. Yes, but I think one could say in the Prime Minister's

defence that he misled himself. He, and indeed the intelligence

community, had misled themselves. When the dossier was published, the

invasion was just six months away. America's war machine was waiting

for the signal to go. Now the Bush Administration was determined to

use Curveball to clinch the case for war. The CIA was more anxious

than ever to meet him face to face. At a Washington restaurant Tyler

Drumheller pressed his contact in German intelligence for access to

Curveball. He and I were good friends. We had a lot to talk about.

At the end, I said, "By the way, they asked me to ask you about the

Curveball case. Is there any way they can get access to him. It's

really important." He said don't ask, they're not going to give you

access. He said look, this is a source we don't have any

corroboration for. I'll tell you off the record, he said, that I

think personally, he said I dealt with this case, I believe

personally that he may be a fabricator. The CIA stkrector says

Drumheller failed to pass this and other warnings on. Just before

Christmas 2002, the head of German intelligence August Hanning sent a

personal cabelling to CIA director George Tenet warning about the

intelligence from Curveball. It is not confirmed, please be cautious

to use this kind of not confirmed information. Of course he was a

single source. He was a single source. We told them. Did you do

enough to warn the Americans, to warn the CIA about Curveball?

But they were not in a state or in a mind set to be warned. The CIA

says Hanning's cable never left Drumheller's office. George Tenet

says he never got that cable from the head... But he did. But he says

he did. I tell you he did. You have to put my word against George

Tenet's. I won't say he lied, but I just say I know. How do you know he

got it? Because we sent it to him. Apparently there are other senior

officers who don't have any specific recollection of these 11th

hour warnings that came from Tyler Drumheller. I have complete faith

in the integrity both of George Tenet and of John McLaughlin his

George Tenet says he never got your cable. It was addressed to him

personally himself to him, I have no explanation for it. Do you

believe George Tenet? I always By the return of the year no one in

the White House or donning Street down to that war was imminent.

Debtor at Downing Street. I do not believe the issue of W o d e was

the sole reason to go to war. It was that strategic dimension. And

without doubt the ideological mood in Washington was that way. Would

the war have happened anyway? believe that the United States were

determined to deal with the Saddam Hussein regime.

Finally there was to be one last piece of intelligence that could

have stopped the war. Incredibly the source was the Iraqi head of

intelligence, Habbush Al-Tikitri, the Jack of Diamonds on America's

notorious deck of cards. Three months before the war and LA6

officer met him in Jordan. We understand that Habbush Al-Tikitri

told MI6 that Saddam Hussein had no active weapons of mass destruction.

The same message as that conveyed by the Iraqi Foreign Minister just

days before the British dossier it was published. But it was not what

London or Washington wanted to hear. Apparently they dismissed it out of

hand because they thought it was propaganda. It did the fit exactly

into the story. Did you get information about the

meeting between MI6 Secret Intelligence Service and Habbush in

Jordan? Was that part of the paperwork you had from SIS? Were

discovered it was part of the paperwork we got. We discover that

after the event. Why was it not discovered before? And cannot

explain that. This was something which I think our review did miss.

But when we asked about it we were told it was not a very significant

factor. Because SIS discounted it. It was something they said was

designed by Saddam Hussein to mislead. Claud Butler's inquiry did

not even know about the Iraqi Foreign Minister, the man in the

new suit. Were you aware that that Serie A had retreated to the Iraqi

Foreign Minister as a source? not. One would have thought he

would have been informed of that. If SIS was aware of it then we

should have been informed. It is possible that if MI6 and the Serie

A had been able to convince Tony Blair and President Bush of the

validity of the intelligence there were getting from their two most

highly placed sources, the Iraqi Foreign Minister and head of

intelligence, then Britain and America it might not have gone to

war. But by this time the die had probably been cast.

The month before the invasion, despite the growing doubts,

Curveball was about to be revealed to the world. The US secretary of

state Colin Powell prepared to make a landmark speech to the United

Nations. Tyler Drumheller says he was sent the draft for vetting.

There was a whole bunch of stuff on Curveball. I called my new boss and

he said you had better check this with John McLaughlan. I said

there's a problem with this, we should not use it. They are

paragraphs from crows for all through the speech. John McLaughlin

said he has no recollection of you telling him this. Someone is not

telling the truth. I am telling the truth. The night before the speech

Colin Powell and George Tenet were closeted in a hotel room in New

York with their top aides. I sat with George Tenet until around 2

o'clock or later. The atmosphere was serious. We knew this was

profound and we knew we had to get it perfect. Did Colin Powell

question the intelligence he was being given on weapons of mass

destruction? The secretary of state not only Quested it but quench

under intensely. To judge questioned it intensely.

daughter answered the phone and it was George calling from the United

Nations. He wanted to get a telephone number for somebody in

SIS. I said that German report, make sure they do not use that.

There is a lot of problems with that. He said, it is under control.

George Tenet says he has no word -- no recollection of that. One of us

is not telling the whole truth. I am quite comfortable with what I

had to say. Every statement I made to date is backed up by a solid

sources. These are not anything but solid intelligence. A monetary the

person presiding over the United Nations session was the German

foreign minister. He knew there was a big question hanging over

Curveball. Colin Powell said these are facts. We knew that the veil

fact is that neither Colin Howell nor a week could prove that these

are facts. It might be true, it might not. The source was an eye

witness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these

facilities. He was actually present during biological agent production

runs. Colin Powell said that the source was president -- was present

during the biological runs. We are present? Know. Way you present on

site when the accident occurred? was not. We have first-hand

descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails.

You say you provided diagrams of the mobile biological tracks. You

were making that up? And also, you made a model, you constructed a

model of these trucks. Again, you made that up? I turned on the

television in my office and it is the Curveball stuff he's going

through. Not only that he has got graphics of mobile trailers. Which

gave me the impression that this was drawn from things that could

fall said. All of it was Maurice? Yes. This has been corroborated by

other sources. An Iraqi Major had affected confirmed that Iraq has

mobile biological research laboratories. That was the second

spy who fooled the world. Major Mohammed Harith. But inexplicably,

no one had told Colin Howell that he had been formally dismissed as a

fabricator nine months before. is Curveball, that is it. It was

based on lies. Gradually the lines were revealed.

Three days after Colin Powell's presentation, United Nations

inspectors now back in Iraq visited the site worker Paul said he had

seen them off while biological laboratories. What did you find?

lot of corn, a lot of seed. A lot of nothing. We have first-hand

descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels. The building

was dusty, extremely dusty. There were some old equipment. I did not

recognise it. I don't think any have been used for biological

production. And the 6 ft wall for a block the entrance to the warehouse

was still there. I do not know the last time the human was in that

building but it was a long time. This was clearly not in use for a

long time and clearly not a biological production facility. At

that stage I was very disappointed. As doubts were growing about the

strength of the intelligence case, 1 million demonstrators marched

through London to express their opposition to the imminent invasion.

Tony Blair remained adamant. This is not the time to falter. This is

the time for this house not just this government or this Prime

Minister, but for this House to give the lead. To show we will

stand up for what we know to be right.

The following night, of the war began. In a matter of weeks Saddam

Hussein's regime was toppled. After the war was over and the fall of

Saddam Hussein, MI6 and the CSA traverse the Middle East hoping to

track down their precious agents. They helped to confirm that they

were reliable sources and find out where the elusive weapons of mass

destruction were hidden. There were no weapons of mass

destruction and no substance to the corroborating sources on which MI6

had relied. The two key pieces of the last minute intelligence that

the MI6 chief have personally conveyed to Tony Blair were

withdrawn. The new source on trial was deemed to be unreliable. Red

River was given a lie-detector test and failed. And what is more, the

controversial 45 minute claim was withdrawn.

There was even if one report that MI6 trace the source back to a

small Jordanian town. He was a taxi driver who said he had overheard

Iraqi generals talking about weapons of mass destruction in the

back of his cab. It seemed to epitomise how flaky some of the

intelligence was. It was a year after the invasion

before this series finally got to meet Curveball. An MI6 officer was

also present. Curveball was shown a satellite photograph of the site

where he had worked. It bore no relation to how he had described it.

Curveball said that has been doctored. But it had not. He just

stopped talking. Then he said I told you this was a mistake. What