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Tonight, the scandal at the top of Britain's banking establishment | 0:00:02 | 0:00:05 | |
caught on tape. | 0:00:05 | 0:00:06 | |
Interest rates were rigged. | 0:00:14 | 0:00:16 | |
There are calls for an inquiry into whether Parliament was misled. | 0:00:16 | 0:00:20 | |
That is shocking. We need an immediate inquiry | 0:00:20 | 0:00:23 | |
to look into exactly who knew what, when. | 0:00:23 | 0:00:25 | |
Last week, two Barclays bankers walked free from court. | 0:00:25 | 0:00:29 | |
-How are you feeling? -Delighted. | 0:00:29 | 0:00:31 | |
But what about the bankers accused of conspiring with them | 0:00:31 | 0:00:35 | |
who've been jailed? | 0:00:35 | 0:00:36 | |
Barclays, they just threw us to the wolves. | 0:00:36 | 0:00:38 | |
They get off with their fine while we rot in jail. | 0:00:38 | 0:00:42 | |
We ask, should they have been prosecuted? | 0:00:42 | 0:00:45 | |
'You've got the Bank of England involved in the whole thing.' | 0:00:45 | 0:00:48 | |
It's my opinion that if this was available last year, | 0:00:48 | 0:00:51 | |
the result might have been very different. | 0:00:51 | 0:00:53 | |
-Stylianos. How are you feeling? -Delighted. | 0:01:01 | 0:01:04 | |
Last week, two former Barclays traders, | 0:01:05 | 0:01:08 | |
Ryan Reich and Stylianos Contogoulas, walked free from court, | 0:01:08 | 0:01:12 | |
cleared of conspiracy to defraud by rigging interest rates. | 0:01:12 | 0:01:17 | |
It was the end of a long battle to clear their names. | 0:01:17 | 0:01:19 | |
I am very happy, obviously, and this has been | 0:01:19 | 0:01:23 | |
five and a half years of my life, | 0:01:23 | 0:01:25 | |
and I just want to go back to my family now. That's it. | 0:01:25 | 0:01:27 | |
-Thank you very much. -Thank you very much. -Thank you, thank you. | 0:01:27 | 0:01:31 | |
Sometimes I look at it and I think I'm in a bad movie. It's like... | 0:01:31 | 0:01:34 | |
It's just something completely... | 0:01:34 | 0:01:36 | |
If you'd told me this ten years ago, I would say, "You're mad." | 0:01:36 | 0:01:39 | |
It's destroyed big parts of my life, like my career, totally gone. | 0:01:39 | 0:01:45 | |
I'm very sad that people are in jail when they shouldn't be, | 0:01:45 | 0:01:48 | |
that's my opinion. | 0:01:48 | 0:01:49 | |
The acquittals raised serious questions about the convictions | 0:01:51 | 0:01:54 | |
of four other Barclays bankers who Stylianos Contogoulas | 0:01:54 | 0:01:58 | |
was accused of conspiring with. | 0:01:58 | 0:02:00 | |
They were convicted and jailed last June. | 0:02:01 | 0:02:03 | |
Four ex-employees of Barclay Bank | 0:02:05 | 0:02:07 | |
have been sentenced to jail for rigging Libor, | 0:02:07 | 0:02:09 | |
the benchmark for how much it costs banks to borrow from each other. | 0:02:09 | 0:02:13 | |
'I've been investigating this story for the last 18 months.' | 0:02:14 | 0:02:18 | |
I just can't believe it, at this age, my son goes to jail? | 0:02:20 | 0:02:22 | |
Jay Merchant, who's 45, | 0:02:24 | 0:02:26 | |
he was sentenced to six and a half years. | 0:02:26 | 0:02:28 | |
Peter Johnson, who's 61, was sentenced to four years. | 0:02:28 | 0:02:33 | |
Jonathan, do you have anything to say? | 0:02:33 | 0:02:35 | |
Jonathan Mathew, 35, was sentenced to four years. | 0:02:35 | 0:02:39 | |
How are you feeling about it? | 0:02:39 | 0:02:41 | |
-Not great. -Not great. | 0:02:41 | 0:02:42 | |
And Alex Pabon, an American who worked for Barclays. | 0:02:42 | 0:02:46 | |
He was sentenced to nearly three years. | 0:02:46 | 0:02:49 | |
I don't know what you want, you want your Cheerios? | 0:02:49 | 0:02:51 | |
-Oh, God! -Oh, yeah. -OK. | 0:02:51 | 0:02:54 | |
Just two hours before he was jailed, | 0:02:54 | 0:02:57 | |
he and his wife Julie agreed to speak to me. | 0:02:57 | 0:03:00 | |
I never thought that what we were doing was wrong. | 0:03:00 | 0:03:02 | |
We've been saying the same story for ten years. | 0:03:02 | 0:03:05 | |
They didn't do anything wrong. | 0:03:05 | 0:03:08 | |
I don't know what will happen from here, you know? | 0:03:08 | 0:03:10 | |
It's just very scary and I feel like it could happen to anyone | 0:03:13 | 0:03:15 | |
to be honest, you know. | 0:03:15 | 0:03:16 | |
Alex Pabon and the other Barclays bankers were all prosecuted | 0:03:22 | 0:03:26 | |
over rigging an interest rate called Libor. | 0:03:26 | 0:03:30 | |
The London Interbank Offered Rate is meant to track | 0:03:30 | 0:03:34 | |
the cost of borrowing money. | 0:03:34 | 0:03:36 | |
It has a big influence on your mortgage and other loans. | 0:03:36 | 0:03:40 | |
Libor is now more tightly policed, | 0:03:41 | 0:03:44 | |
but until recently it used to be set by taking an average each day | 0:03:44 | 0:03:48 | |
of what the big banks thought they'd have to pay to borrow money. | 0:03:48 | 0:03:52 | |
Libors, if you like, are interest rates. | 0:03:54 | 0:03:56 | |
That is THE major benchmark for global interest rates. | 0:03:56 | 0:04:01 | |
350 trillion or so of financial products based on Libor, | 0:04:01 | 0:04:05 | |
it is the major global benchmark for interest rates. | 0:04:05 | 0:04:08 | |
The very same banks involved in setting Libor | 0:04:10 | 0:04:13 | |
had big money staked on whether Libor went up or down. | 0:04:13 | 0:04:17 | |
If a trader could influence the rate, the bank could make money. | 0:04:17 | 0:04:22 | |
It's been called trader manipulation. | 0:04:22 | 0:04:25 | |
The convicted Barclays traders say that what they were doing | 0:04:26 | 0:04:30 | |
was encouraged by their bosses, | 0:04:30 | 0:04:32 | |
a normal commercial practice dating back to the '90s. | 0:04:32 | 0:04:35 | |
In the City, it was common knowledge for years that traders | 0:04:40 | 0:04:44 | |
would try to secure tiny shifts in Libor rates every day. | 0:04:44 | 0:04:47 | |
Pippa Malmgrem is a leading US financial expert, | 0:04:49 | 0:04:53 | |
and was an economic advisor to President Bush. | 0:04:53 | 0:04:55 | |
When you work on a trading floor, | 0:04:59 | 0:05:01 | |
your whole job is to buy | 0:05:01 | 0:05:03 | |
something for one price and you sell it for something a little higher. | 0:05:03 | 0:05:06 | |
This is the way every trader on a trading floor thinks. | 0:05:06 | 0:05:09 | |
So when they're asked to establish a rate, | 0:05:09 | 0:05:11 | |
they're thinking in terms of the two sides, | 0:05:11 | 0:05:13 | |
and so this is their attempt to create a little space | 0:05:13 | 0:05:16 | |
because you always want to make money on the deal. | 0:05:16 | 0:05:19 | |
The way I saw it was, it was perfectly OK to do it. | 0:05:19 | 0:05:22 | |
It was almost like what we call a free option, | 0:05:22 | 0:05:24 | |
you might as well do it. You can do it, it's perfectly normal | 0:05:24 | 0:05:26 | |
and proper, you can do it. | 0:05:26 | 0:05:28 | |
If it works, great, if not, that's it. | 0:05:28 | 0:05:31 | |
In August 2007, the world changed. | 0:05:34 | 0:05:38 | |
Global financial markets went into meltdown. | 0:05:39 | 0:05:42 | |
British banking was on the brink. | 0:05:43 | 0:05:46 | |
Tonight at Ten: | 0:05:46 | 0:05:47 | |
Northern Rock appeals for calm and urges its customers not to panic. | 0:05:47 | 0:05:52 | |
Banks became scared of lending to each other, | 0:05:52 | 0:05:55 | |
worried they wouldn't get their money back. | 0:05:55 | 0:05:58 | |
The market seized up. The economy was heading towards a crisis. | 0:05:58 | 0:06:02 | |
Not since the beginning of the First World War | 0:06:04 | 0:06:07 | |
has our banking system been so close to collapse. | 0:06:07 | 0:06:11 | |
Whenever you have a major financial crisis, you always have what | 0:06:11 | 0:06:15 | |
might be called the recrimination phase of the economic cycle | 0:06:15 | 0:06:19 | |
which is when everybody goes, | 0:06:19 | 0:06:20 | |
"Wait, how the heck did this happen and who is responsible for it?" | 0:06:20 | 0:06:23 | |
The public and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic | 0:06:25 | 0:06:29 | |
wanted to know what had gone on, and who was to blame. | 0:06:29 | 0:06:33 | |
Banks had to be called to account. | 0:06:33 | 0:06:35 | |
Financial regulators targeted | 0:06:35 | 0:06:37 | |
the so-called trader manipulation of Libor. | 0:06:37 | 0:06:39 | |
Whee! | 0:06:41 | 0:06:43 | |
Tom Hayes was the very first trader to be jailed for it, | 0:06:44 | 0:06:47 | |
found guilty of conspiracy to defraud. | 0:06:47 | 0:06:50 | |
He was working for the Swiss bank UBS. | 0:06:51 | 0:06:54 | |
Tom Hayes is now in prison. | 0:06:54 | 0:06:57 | |
-I feel angry about it. -Why? | 0:07:00 | 0:07:02 | |
Because Daddy shouldn't be in his new place, should he? | 0:07:04 | 0:07:07 | |
We call it Daddy's new place. | 0:07:07 | 0:07:09 | |
That new place is Lowdham Grange Prison in Nottinghamshire | 0:07:09 | 0:07:14 | |
where Tom Hayes is serving 11 years. | 0:07:14 | 0:07:16 | |
The sentence is just inexplicable. | 0:07:18 | 0:07:21 | |
What does it compare with? What are you talking about? | 0:07:21 | 0:07:24 | |
I think you can get less time for killing somebody. | 0:07:24 | 0:07:27 | |
Sarah, a lawyer, is fighting to get her husband released. | 0:07:27 | 0:07:32 | |
All I really want is for the truth to come out, | 0:07:32 | 0:07:34 | |
because if the truth came out, I think he would come out of prison, | 0:07:34 | 0:07:37 | |
but the truth has never come out about this. | 0:07:37 | 0:07:39 | |
Tom Hayes had a reputation as a trading superstar. | 0:07:45 | 0:07:49 | |
He earned millions. | 0:07:49 | 0:07:51 | |
From his base in Tokyo, he had a network of London brokers | 0:07:51 | 0:07:54 | |
who he tried to use to make small changes to Libor. | 0:07:54 | 0:07:59 | |
One of them was Noel Cryan. | 0:07:59 | 0:08:01 | |
He was the biggest trader at the time, | 0:08:05 | 0:08:06 | |
he had power over not only the brokers | 0:08:06 | 0:08:08 | |
but other traders were scared of him as well. | 0:08:08 | 0:08:10 | |
He would always take advantage of that. | 0:08:10 | 0:08:12 | |
Tom Hayes started asking Noel to try to influence Libor. | 0:08:14 | 0:08:17 | |
The requests Tom Hayes was making were tiny, | 0:08:34 | 0:08:37 | |
but because his bank had billions staked on Libor, | 0:08:37 | 0:08:40 | |
even a minuscule move could make big money. | 0:08:40 | 0:08:43 | |
Everyone knew there is this very important benchmark out there, | 0:08:45 | 0:08:48 | |
that the banks were in charge of setting and lots of traders, | 0:08:48 | 0:08:51 | |
making their living was based on playing with that | 0:08:51 | 0:08:54 | |
and no-one made any effort to stop that or impose order on it. | 0:08:54 | 0:08:58 | |
Tom Hayes said he HAD tried to influence Libor, | 0:08:59 | 0:09:02 | |
like the Barclays traders who later followed him into the dock. | 0:09:02 | 0:09:06 | |
But they all said it was a day-to-day banking practice, | 0:09:06 | 0:09:09 | |
something their bosses expected them to do. | 0:09:09 | 0:09:13 | |
Tom Hayes says he should never have been prosecuted | 0:09:13 | 0:09:16 | |
by the Serious Fraud Office, or SFO. | 0:09:16 | 0:09:19 | |
There's e-mails, there are phone recordings, | 0:09:19 | 0:09:21 | |
there are chat transcripts, | 0:09:21 | 0:09:23 | |
that show that people up and down the organisational ladders | 0:09:23 | 0:09:26 | |
knew about, condoned, in some cases participated in what was going on. | 0:09:26 | 0:09:30 | |
Don't forget, Tom Hayes never made any secret of it. | 0:09:30 | 0:09:33 | |
He was completely open. He never acted once like a man | 0:09:33 | 0:09:36 | |
who thought he was doing anything wrong or illegal. | 0:09:36 | 0:09:39 | |
Noel Cryan and five other brokers were later charged with | 0:09:40 | 0:09:44 | |
conspiring with Tom Hayes. | 0:09:44 | 0:09:46 | |
They told the court they hadn't done what he'd asked them to do. | 0:09:46 | 0:09:49 | |
They were all acquitted. | 0:09:49 | 0:09:51 | |
We've been scapegoated in the whole thing. | 0:09:51 | 0:09:53 | |
They've gone to the bottom of the food chain, the brokers, six brokers | 0:09:53 | 0:09:56 | |
answering the Libor question. | 0:09:56 | 0:09:58 | |
Really? If there's things to be answered, | 0:09:58 | 0:10:00 | |
WE shouldn't be answering the questions. | 0:10:00 | 0:10:01 | |
The SFO need to ask themselves, should they have wasted | 0:10:01 | 0:10:04 | |
that much time and money bringing this case | 0:10:04 | 0:10:06 | |
against six money brokers? I don't think so. | 0:10:06 | 0:10:08 | |
UBS, Tom Hayes's employer, | 0:10:11 | 0:10:13 | |
was fined 1.5 billion for allowing its traders to attempt to rig Libor. | 0:10:13 | 0:10:19 | |
UBS told us, "Criminal and regulatory investigations..." | 0:10:22 | 0:10:26 | |
But UBS wasn't the only bank punished for manipulating Libor. | 0:10:38 | 0:10:42 | |
Barclays Bank was fined £290 million. | 0:10:44 | 0:10:49 | |
A week later, its boss, Bob Diamond, was forced to resign. | 0:10:49 | 0:10:52 | |
The bank's Chief Executive, Bob Diamond, | 0:10:52 | 0:10:55 | |
has surprised the City by quitting with immediate effect. | 0:10:55 | 0:10:58 | |
When MPs demanded to know what had been going on, | 0:10:59 | 0:11:03 | |
Bob Diamond told them a handful of traders | 0:11:03 | 0:11:06 | |
down the ranks deserved to be punished. | 0:11:06 | 0:11:08 | |
Do you think a criminal prosecution of a banker... | 0:11:08 | 0:11:12 | |
He was asked whether those bankers should be locked up. | 0:11:12 | 0:11:16 | |
It's reprehensible behaviour, | 0:11:16 | 0:11:18 | |
and if you're asking me should those actions be dealt with, absolutely. | 0:11:18 | 0:11:22 | |
Thank you very much indeed. | 0:11:22 | 0:11:23 | |
But throwing the book at a handful of bankers is not where this story ends. | 0:11:25 | 0:11:29 | |
Hundreds of miles from the City in Cumbria, | 0:11:37 | 0:11:40 | |
a family of caravan park owners were about to discover evidence of | 0:11:40 | 0:11:44 | |
what looked like a cover-up at the top of the banking establishment. | 0:11:44 | 0:11:48 | |
In 2005, Paul Holgate and his father Martin | 0:11:49 | 0:11:53 | |
wanted to borrow £3.5 million to expand their business. | 0:11:53 | 0:11:57 | |
We were recommended to move to Barclays. | 0:12:00 | 0:12:02 | |
It was absolutely fine, it was very good long-term prospects. | 0:12:02 | 0:12:05 | |
Barclays lent the money on condition the Holgates bought | 0:12:05 | 0:12:09 | |
a financial product to protect them against rising interest rates. | 0:12:09 | 0:12:13 | |
What Barclays didn't tell them was that if interest rates went down, | 0:12:15 | 0:12:18 | |
they'd end up losing money. Lots of money. | 0:12:18 | 0:12:21 | |
That's where the problems arose. | 0:12:23 | 0:12:27 | |
Because the liabilities they put on us were incredible. | 0:12:27 | 0:12:30 | |
Interest rates plummeted and in 2012, the business went under. | 0:12:32 | 0:12:36 | |
I was thrown off the park that day, | 0:12:38 | 0:12:40 | |
when the administrators were sprung upon us. | 0:12:40 | 0:12:43 | |
I had some clothing in an overnight bag, | 0:12:43 | 0:12:45 | |
and for the next 14 months I had to make do with the clothes in that bag | 0:12:45 | 0:12:49 | |
because the administrators wouldn't even let me | 0:12:49 | 0:12:51 | |
obtain my own clothes. | 0:12:51 | 0:12:52 | |
After Barclays boss Bob Diamond resigned over Libor, | 0:12:53 | 0:12:57 | |
the Holgates began investigating. | 0:12:57 | 0:12:59 | |
If they could prove that senior people inside Barclays | 0:13:01 | 0:13:04 | |
knew about Libor rigging, they might get compensation. | 0:13:04 | 0:13:07 | |
During their legal case against the bank, | 0:13:07 | 0:13:09 | |
they discovered thousands of confidential documents | 0:13:09 | 0:13:12 | |
from inside Barclays. | 0:13:12 | 0:13:14 | |
We've been fighting the bank for seven to eight years. | 0:13:14 | 0:13:17 | |
You have to have...great tenacity | 0:13:17 | 0:13:21 | |
to be able to carry this through. | 0:13:21 | 0:13:23 | |
Most people can't do it. | 0:13:23 | 0:13:25 | |
The documents revealed that senior managers within the bank | 0:13:26 | 0:13:30 | |
had instructed staff to rig Libor. | 0:13:30 | 0:13:32 | |
This wasn't about the tiny shifts of Libor made by the traders. | 0:13:34 | 0:13:38 | |
This was massive rigging, ordered from the top of the bank. | 0:13:38 | 0:13:41 | |
As the banks started running out of cash during the financial crisis, | 0:13:46 | 0:13:50 | |
most of them started doing something called low balling. | 0:13:50 | 0:13:54 | |
Deliberately submitting artificially low Libor rates | 0:13:54 | 0:13:58 | |
so they'd look in better shape than they really were. | 0:13:58 | 0:14:01 | |
If I asked to borrow £1,000 from you, | 0:14:04 | 0:14:06 | |
and you'd heard my finances were in a mess, | 0:14:06 | 0:14:09 | |
you might want to charge me more in interest | 0:14:09 | 0:14:12 | |
to cover the risk that you don't get your money back. | 0:14:12 | 0:14:14 | |
But, if I admitted I was paying higher interest rates, | 0:14:14 | 0:14:18 | |
people might think I was in trouble, | 0:14:18 | 0:14:20 | |
so I might lie and pretend I was paying no more than anyone else. | 0:14:20 | 0:14:26 | |
That's what many banks did during the financial crisis. | 0:14:26 | 0:14:29 | |
The Bank of England had warning signs about this certainly in 2007. | 0:14:35 | 0:14:39 | |
It's not just like little whispers they were hearing. | 0:14:39 | 0:14:42 | |
There were unequivocal signs | 0:14:42 | 0:14:43 | |
that there was something very wrong with this rate. | 0:14:43 | 0:14:46 | |
In October 2008, the Government launched emergency measures | 0:14:49 | 0:14:53 | |
to get stricken banks lending again. | 0:14:53 | 0:14:56 | |
It's been a tumultuous day, | 0:14:56 | 0:14:57 | |
it started with the announcement of a giant rescue package | 0:14:57 | 0:15:00 | |
for the British banking sector. | 0:15:00 | 0:15:02 | |
The Government pumped £37 billion of capital into the troubled banks. | 0:15:04 | 0:15:09 | |
It was part of a huge rescue plan. | 0:15:09 | 0:15:11 | |
If it worked, Libor would fall. | 0:15:11 | 0:15:14 | |
But it stayed frozen. | 0:15:14 | 0:15:16 | |
The problem for the Bank of England was even with a huge bailout, | 0:15:18 | 0:15:22 | |
the banks knew they were all in trouble. | 0:15:22 | 0:15:24 | |
It still wasn't getting any cheaper for them to borrow money from | 0:15:24 | 0:15:27 | |
each other, and Barclays kept their Libor rate high to reflect that. | 0:15:27 | 0:15:33 | |
The Bank of England wasn't happy. | 0:15:33 | 0:15:36 | |
On 29th October, 2008, its then executive director Paul Tucker | 0:15:36 | 0:15:41 | |
phoned up the Barclays boss, Bob Diamond. | 0:15:41 | 0:15:44 | |
A conversation was had. | 0:15:44 | 0:15:46 | |
That conversation was interpreted by Barclays, | 0:15:46 | 0:15:48 | |
by senior people within Barclays, | 0:15:48 | 0:15:50 | |
as an instruction to lower their Libors and they acted on that. | 0:15:50 | 0:15:52 | |
This leads to a flurry of phone calls and e-mails between | 0:15:52 | 0:15:55 | |
senior people, traders, Libor submitters at Barclays. | 0:15:55 | 0:15:58 | |
Bob Diamond has said he was misinterpreted, | 0:16:02 | 0:16:04 | |
but an instruction to lower Libors | 0:16:04 | 0:16:07 | |
was passed down to the bank's submitters. | 0:16:07 | 0:16:10 | |
One of those submitters was Peter Johnson. | 0:16:10 | 0:16:12 | |
He pleaded guilty to manipulating Libor | 0:16:13 | 0:16:16 | |
and is now serving four years in prison. | 0:16:16 | 0:16:19 | |
During the Holgates' investigation, | 0:16:20 | 0:16:22 | |
they found the transcript of a phone call | 0:16:22 | 0:16:25 | |
between Peter Johnson and his boss, Mark Dearlove. | 0:16:25 | 0:16:28 | |
It also happened on 29th October, 2008. | 0:16:28 | 0:16:32 | |
I've got hold of the actual recording, | 0:16:35 | 0:16:38 | |
crucial evidence that Barclays was setting false Libor rates | 0:16:38 | 0:16:42 | |
on instructions from above. | 0:16:42 | 0:16:45 | |
It's never been broadcast before. | 0:16:45 | 0:16:47 | |
Mark Dearlove didn't respond to our questions. | 0:17:18 | 0:17:22 | |
Chris Philp is a member of the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee. | 0:17:22 | 0:17:26 | |
We played him the recording. | 0:17:26 | 0:17:28 | |
-What do you think? -If what Dearlove is saying is true, that is shocking. | 0:17:45 | 0:17:49 | |
This tape suggests that in fact the Bank of England knew about it | 0:17:49 | 0:17:54 | |
and indeed were encouraging or even instructing it. | 0:17:54 | 0:17:57 | |
So we need an immediate inquiry to find out exactly what is going on, | 0:17:57 | 0:18:02 | |
given what we've just heard on this tape. | 0:18:02 | 0:18:04 | |
The banking system was on life support | 0:18:06 | 0:18:08 | |
and the Bank of England wanted Libor down. | 0:18:08 | 0:18:12 | |
If it dropped, it would look like things were on the mend. | 0:18:12 | 0:18:15 | |
Banks were so unwilling to lend to each other... | 0:18:17 | 0:18:20 | |
But when Mervyn King, the then Governor of the Bank of England, | 0:18:20 | 0:18:24 | |
was called to answer questions before Parliament in 2012, | 0:18:24 | 0:18:27 | |
he said there was no instruction to doctor the Libor rate. | 0:18:27 | 0:18:32 | |
This is like the temperature, when a patient is sick, | 0:18:32 | 0:18:35 | |
you want to bring the temperature of the patient down. | 0:18:35 | 0:18:38 | |
But there's a world of difference between trying to think of | 0:18:38 | 0:18:40 | |
what measures you could adopt to bring the temperature | 0:18:40 | 0:18:43 | |
of the patient down and actually tampering with the thermometer. | 0:18:43 | 0:18:47 | |
That was nowhere near anyone's thoughts at the time. | 0:18:47 | 0:18:50 | |
But tampering with that thermometer, Libor, | 0:18:50 | 0:18:53 | |
is exactly what the Bank of England had ordered. | 0:18:53 | 0:18:56 | |
We were not aware... | 0:18:56 | 0:18:58 | |
Mervyn King's second in command at the Bank of England was Paul Tucker. | 0:18:58 | 0:19:02 | |
Despite making that call to Barclays boss, Bob Diamond, back in 2008, | 0:19:02 | 0:19:08 | |
he told MPs he'd only just found out about low balling. | 0:19:08 | 0:19:11 | |
In your recollection, when was the first time that Libor was raised | 0:19:11 | 0:19:15 | |
as an issue in relation to low balling? | 0:19:15 | 0:19:18 | |
-To...? -Low balling. -Erm... | 0:19:18 | 0:19:21 | |
The... | 0:19:21 | 0:19:23 | |
I mean, I wasn't aware of allegations of low balling | 0:19:25 | 0:19:29 | |
until the last few weeks. | 0:19:29 | 0:19:32 | |
Ditto Bob Diamond. | 0:19:32 | 0:19:34 | |
For the third time, what month did you discover | 0:19:36 | 0:19:38 | |
-the low balling was going on? Just give me a date. -This month. | 0:19:38 | 0:19:42 | |
'It sounds to me like those people giving evidence, | 0:19:44 | 0:19:47 | |
'particularly Bob Diamond and Paul Tucker, were misleading Parliament. | 0:19:47 | 0:19:52 | |
'That is contempt of Parliament.' | 0:19:52 | 0:19:53 | |
It's a very serious matter and I think we need to urgently | 0:19:53 | 0:19:56 | |
summon those individuals back before Parliament to explain | 0:19:56 | 0:20:00 | |
why it is they appear to have misled MPs. It's extremely serious. | 0:20:00 | 0:20:03 | |
Bob Diamond told Panorama, "I never misled Parliament. | 0:20:03 | 0:20:08 | |
"And I stand by everything I have said previously." | 0:20:08 | 0:20:10 | |
Mervyn King says that his evidence was clear and he stands by it. | 0:20:12 | 0:20:16 | |
And that there is "a world of difference | 0:20:16 | 0:20:18 | |
"between dysfunctional markets and criminal behaviour". | 0:20:18 | 0:20:22 | |
Paul Tucker didn't respond to our questions. | 0:20:22 | 0:20:25 | |
But Panorama has discovered evidence that the Bank of England | 0:20:30 | 0:20:33 | |
was involved in Libor rigging even earlier. | 0:20:33 | 0:20:36 | |
We found a confidential US Department of Justice document | 0:20:36 | 0:20:40 | |
that shows Paul Tucker began pressuring Barclays | 0:20:40 | 0:20:44 | |
to lower its Libor rates from September 1st, 2007. | 0:20:44 | 0:20:48 | |
You've now got two separate bits of evidence, | 0:20:49 | 0:20:53 | |
one dating from October 2008, | 0:20:53 | 0:20:55 | |
one dating from September 2007, over a year before, | 0:20:55 | 0:20:58 | |
where there's clear evidence, audio evidence and written evidence, | 0:20:58 | 0:21:02 | |
that the Bank of England were pressuring Barclays to lower Libor. | 0:21:02 | 0:21:05 | |
It suggests that it was part of a more systematic | 0:21:05 | 0:21:09 | |
and ongoing attempt by the Bank of England | 0:21:09 | 0:21:12 | |
to put pressure on Barclays. | 0:21:12 | 0:21:14 | |
But the trials of the Barclays bankers didn't get to hear this, | 0:21:15 | 0:21:18 | |
and much of the other evidence of low balling, | 0:21:18 | 0:21:21 | |
because the Serious Fraud Office said their Libor conspiracy | 0:21:21 | 0:21:25 | |
had come to an end on 1st September, 2007. | 0:21:25 | 0:21:29 | |
That's the thing, in these trials that we went through, | 0:21:31 | 0:21:35 | |
they separated everything. | 0:21:35 | 0:21:36 | |
Separated trading requests and low balling. | 0:21:36 | 0:21:39 | |
So anything that has to do with this did not go in. | 0:21:39 | 0:21:42 | |
So you're asking me, do I think if all this was in, | 0:21:42 | 0:21:46 | |
would it make a difference? Erm... | 0:21:46 | 0:21:48 | |
Probably, is the answer. | 0:21:48 | 0:21:50 | |
-SHE SNIFFLES -OK. | 0:21:58 | 0:22:00 | |
Alex Pabon was one of the Barclays bankers jailed last summer. | 0:22:01 | 0:22:04 | |
He was released from prison three weeks ago and immediately | 0:22:11 | 0:22:15 | |
deported to his home in Texas. | 0:22:15 | 0:22:17 | |
He still thinks he didn't get a fair trial. | 0:22:17 | 0:22:20 | |
What effect do you think it had on your case that they didn't bring in | 0:22:21 | 0:22:25 | |
what we know about your bosses and the Bank of England doing that? | 0:22:25 | 0:22:28 | |
The failure to | 0:22:28 | 0:22:30 | |
not put in front of the jury specific evidence | 0:22:30 | 0:22:33 | |
really hamstrung the defence on how we could respond to | 0:22:33 | 0:22:37 | |
what the prosecution was saying. | 0:22:37 | 0:22:39 | |
What's the scale of the difference between what you might have achieved | 0:22:39 | 0:22:42 | |
by making a Libor request | 0:22:42 | 0:22:43 | |
and what your bosses and the Bank of England might have achieved? | 0:22:43 | 0:22:46 | |
We were asking for an eighth of a basis point | 0:22:46 | 0:22:49 | |
and they were asking for 50 basis points, so about 400 times more. | 0:22:49 | 0:22:54 | |
The Bank of England says Libor was not regulated in the UK | 0:22:56 | 0:23:00 | |
or elsewhere during the period in question. | 0:23:00 | 0:23:03 | |
But it's been assisting the criminal investigations | 0:23:03 | 0:23:06 | |
into Libor manipulation by employees at commercial banks. | 0:23:06 | 0:23:10 | |
The Serious Fraud Office says it's still investigating low balling. | 0:23:14 | 0:23:18 | |
It says it follows the evidence | 0:23:18 | 0:23:19 | |
and aims to charge the most senior people, | 0:23:19 | 0:23:21 | |
where there is a realistic prospect of conviction. | 0:23:21 | 0:23:25 | |
The prosecution period, which ended on 1st September, 2007, | 0:23:25 | 0:23:29 | |
was led by the evidence and material dated after this point | 0:23:29 | 0:23:33 | |
was provided to the defence. | 0:23:33 | 0:23:34 | |
The 2008 recording was disclosed to the defence | 0:23:38 | 0:23:41 | |
but it wasn't admitted into court. | 0:23:41 | 0:23:43 | |
Barclays, they just threw us to the wolves. They were happy, I think. | 0:23:46 | 0:23:50 | |
Because they get off with their fine | 0:23:50 | 0:23:52 | |
and then they get some low level guys that go to jail | 0:23:52 | 0:23:56 | |
and they just continue to work and make millions of dollars a year, | 0:23:56 | 0:23:59 | |
while we sit there and rot in jail. | 0:23:59 | 0:24:03 | |
But there is one more twist in the Libor tale. | 0:24:06 | 0:24:09 | |
Back in Cumbria, the campsite sleuths | 0:24:09 | 0:24:12 | |
came across another extraordinary piece of evidence. | 0:24:12 | 0:24:15 | |
At the height of the financial crisis, | 0:24:15 | 0:24:18 | |
Barclays sensed an opportunity. | 0:24:18 | 0:24:20 | |
Having been instructed by the Bank of England to lower its Libor rates, | 0:24:20 | 0:24:24 | |
it hatched a top-secret plan, | 0:24:24 | 0:24:26 | |
involving something called the Ricardo Master Fund. | 0:24:26 | 0:24:29 | |
The goal of Ricardo Master Fund, like all such funds, | 0:24:33 | 0:24:35 | |
was to make money for the bank. | 0:24:35 | 0:24:37 | |
They were investing in financial instruments whose performance | 0:24:37 | 0:24:41 | |
was based on the movement of interest rates. | 0:24:41 | 0:24:43 | |
Barclays put 100 million of its own money into the secret fund. | 0:24:46 | 0:24:51 | |
If you look at this, Andy, this is what we've been shown. | 0:24:52 | 0:24:55 | |
It is a transcript of a telephone conversation at Barclays. | 0:24:55 | 0:25:00 | |
More evidence that the Bank of England's Paul Tucker | 0:25:00 | 0:25:03 | |
had told Barclays to get its Libors down. | 0:25:03 | 0:25:05 | |
"I've been told to get Libor rates down. | 0:25:08 | 0:25:11 | |
"It's political from very, very high, | 0:25:11 | 0:25:12 | |
"so it's Tucker calling the tune." | 0:25:12 | 0:25:14 | |
Because Barclays knew that interest rates would fall, | 0:25:16 | 0:25:19 | |
the Ricardo Master Fund made 100 million for the bank | 0:25:19 | 0:25:23 | |
in a matter of months. | 0:25:23 | 0:25:25 | |
And who was in charge of the Barclays company that ran the fund? | 0:25:25 | 0:25:29 | |
Bob Diamond. | 0:25:29 | 0:25:31 | |
The man who told MPs he knew nothing about low balling until 2012. | 0:25:31 | 0:25:35 | |
For the third time, | 0:25:36 | 0:25:37 | |
what month did you discover that low balling was going on? | 0:25:37 | 0:25:40 | |
-Just give me a date. -This month. | 0:25:40 | 0:25:42 | |
As the Holgates' caravan business was being destroyed | 0:25:43 | 0:25:46 | |
by falling interest rates, Barclays was making a killing. | 0:25:46 | 0:25:50 | |
Barclays didn't answer our questions about the Ricardo Master Fund | 0:25:55 | 0:25:58 | |
but told us it remains committed to fundamental change | 0:25:58 | 0:26:01 | |
in its culture and operations. | 0:26:01 | 0:26:04 | |
The bank reached a financial settlement with the Holgates | 0:26:06 | 0:26:09 | |
but insisted that the amount of compensation they received | 0:26:09 | 0:26:12 | |
be kept confidential. | 0:26:12 | 0:26:15 | |
You just would not think in a country that has the reputation, | 0:26:16 | 0:26:21 | |
prides itself on being a very, very upstanding, | 0:26:21 | 0:26:24 | |
honest nation, allows these things not only to happen, | 0:26:24 | 0:26:29 | |
but they aren't sorted out, just ignored and swept away. | 0:26:29 | 0:26:32 | |
I think that's the biggest shock, not just what's gone on, | 0:26:32 | 0:26:36 | |
but the way it's been dealt with afterwards. | 0:26:36 | 0:26:38 | |
Tom Hayes, the first banker to be jailed, has lost an appeal | 0:26:44 | 0:26:47 | |
against conviction and is now in his second year behind bars. | 0:26:47 | 0:26:51 | |
His son Joshua will be eight by the time his father's due to be released. | 0:26:56 | 0:27:00 | |
It is hard because, you know, when we go to the field, | 0:27:03 | 0:27:06 | |
I have to kick the football with him | 0:27:06 | 0:27:08 | |
because his dad's not around to do it. | 0:27:08 | 0:27:10 | |
Tom Hayes sends his wife and son video messages recorded from prison. | 0:27:12 | 0:27:16 | |
Hello again, Josh. Hi, Mummy. I hope you're both OK. | 0:27:17 | 0:27:21 | |
Love you loads, both. See you soon, bye. | 0:27:21 | 0:27:24 | |
No senior banker in the UK has ever been prosecuted for fixing Libor. | 0:27:32 | 0:27:36 | |
I think that they don't want to go after the guys at the top, | 0:27:39 | 0:27:43 | |
so they come for the low guys | 0:27:43 | 0:27:45 | |
and then just leave the top guys to float away. | 0:27:45 | 0:27:48 | |
To the bankers who've been prosecuted, | 0:27:51 | 0:27:53 | |
there's a huge double standard in the Libor blame game. | 0:27:53 | 0:27:57 | |
It's now clear the scandal of the big bank fix goes far higher than | 0:27:59 | 0:28:04 | |
the banking establishment ever wanted us to know. | 0:28:04 | 0:28:06 |