Cyber Debate Scottish Parliament


Cyber Debate

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The next item of business is the motion 5733 in the name of John

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Swinney. Achieving a cyber resilient Scotland. I call on John Swinney. 12

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minutes, please. Thank you, presiding officer. As we debate

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cyber security today our thoughts are with those affected by the

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despicable attack in Manchester. What has been emphasised over the

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last few weeks with cyber attacks against the National Health Service

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and Monday's attack is that we as an open society cannot prevent all

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harmful instances occurring. It is simply not possible. Opportunities

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have been and will unfortunately continue to be exploited by those

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who have the determination, the will and the capability to do so. What we

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must do is ensure we do not let such issues drive us away from living our

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lives to the fullest and also taking the action that can involve

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reasonable steps for any Government or as individuals to undertake to

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understand the nature of these attacks. And to take reasonable

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steps to prevent them from carrying. For those who are responsible, it is

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our duty to ensure our arrangements are such that we can respond

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effectively to prevent further harm and rigorously precede those who

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cause -- seek to cause societal harm and bring them to justice in all

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circumstances. Our focus on the saddening's to beat recognises the

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urgency for everyone to secure this technology, data and networks from

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the many threats that we face and proposes that citizens and

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organisations must become more resilient, aware of the risks and be

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able to respond and recover quickly from any kind of a cyber attack. On

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the 12th of May, there was a global cyber attack, the impact of wit

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effectively National Health Service across UK. The scale and speed of

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this attack was unprecedented and it demonstrates the absolute urgency

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for everyone to take steps to secure this technology, data and networks

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from the many threats that we face online. If we are to realise

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Scotland's full potential in the digital world and the opportunities

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it offers two our citizens, businesses and organisations, there

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we must also equally be aware of the new risks this environment presents

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and be able to respond effectively. Of course. I thank you forgiving

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way, he is quite correct response is vital, but so is prevention. One of

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the key issues in the recent attack was the volume of Windows XP

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installations in the health service. Does the Scottish Government have a

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target date for removing Windows XP from the IT a state across Scottish

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Government? I think the key question we have two addresses how do we

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establish and maintain the most rigorous level of security possible

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around all systems that are utilised? That is the key question

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that has to be answered, because there may well be in certain

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circumstances and appropriate use for some of the systems that Mr

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Johnston refers to, but the crucial thing is that the security

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arrangements have to be in place to ensure that the necessary

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precautions are taken. I will talk in more detail about all of these

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proportions. Fundamentally comic the key point I would say to Mr Johnston

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is that there is an important of ensuring that at all stages we take

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the necessary measures to address this point. If I look at some of

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these steps that we do take already, clearly our policy approach and the

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requirements we place on organisations are designed to

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achieve exactly that objective. There can be little doubt that the

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evolution of the Internet has been the most significant development of

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our age. For business, digital transformation is ever present. It

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has been a game changer, enabling increased efficiency and

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international reach, expanding markets, capabilities and

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opportunities. It has been and will continue to be a truly innovative

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force driving economic element and prosperity. Never before has data

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had such a value and in its digital form its availability, integrity and

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security is critical to all businesses. Criminal exploitation of

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the Internet is also growing rapidly, data is the target and

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businesses and citizens have lots of that detail. Unlike physical risks,

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cyber risks are much harder to grasp as criminals exploit both systems

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and human vulnerabilities. Business leaders must be prepared for the

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cyber threat and more importantly must ensure their organisations take

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all steps possible to mitigate that threat. We are used to managing risk

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in the digital age but we must also consider the cyber threat as another

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business risk. Any business that successfully can demonstrate that it

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has taken steps to respect. It is a strong position to grow in the

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digital age. Organisations that can demonstrate their to cybercrime can

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again a both a competitive advantage and increased consumer confidence.

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Developing a cyber resilience as a core part of an organisation's

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business strategy will ensure it continues to take full advantage of

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the Internet age and flourish into the bargain. I am pleased to say the

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Scottish Government and its partners are working together to build a

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strong and cyber resilient Scotland. We are taking action to ensure we

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are adequately prepared, but I want to be clear with Parliament this is

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not something that Government can do alone. This is also the

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responsibility of individuals and organisations, who need to take the

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necessary steps to ensure that they keep safe and secure online. It has

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been widely commented that 80% of cybercrime is indiscriminate and can

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be prevented by getting the basics right. This includes keeping

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software up-to-date, using proper antivirus software and making

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regular system back-ups. These are simple measures that all users can

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and should take. Often our technical defences are robust but are overcome

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by the inadvertent actions of an individual. Clicking on a link to a

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seemingly genuinely looking website or an infection potentially caused

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by opening attachments. Social engineering is one of the simplest

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ways of overcoming our technical defences. We should not blame users,

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they are not the weakest link, as is often said, the RSN to assets, links

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and attachments are common in the workplace and that's why they are

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exploited. Part of our response must be to get the basics of online

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security correct and this includes raising the knowledge and awareness

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level of all of our citizens to the risks and the steps they can take to

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reduce this. As we have learned from recent events, swift action in

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coordination and sharing information limited the impact of the NHS

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ransomware attack. However, we must also reflect upon this incident,

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identified the license and shared these lessons with our partners so

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we can help each other to put in place the appropriate and effective

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measures to combat cyber crime. Since I published safe, secure and

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prosperous, a cyber resilient strategy for Scotland back in

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November 2015, the Scottish Government has committed to

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providing strong leadership and direction to help our individuals,

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businesses and organisations make the most of the online world. We

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have laid the foundations to make Scotland a cyber resilient country,

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we have achieved much already by focusing delivery on key strategic

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priorities of leadership and partnership, awareness raising,

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education, skills and professional development and research and

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innovation. Let me outline to Parliament the focus of our work to

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date. Thank you. Would the Cabinet Secretary agree that additional

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availability of teaching computing skills at all levels of school would

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help address some of these issues? Obviously, competing signs is an

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integral part of the curriculum and it is part of education in some of

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the early stages of primary education. I have seen various

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coding and initiatives in primary schools involving primary three and

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primary for pupils. I am firmly supportive of the importance of

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ensuring young people at the earliest possible ages are exposed

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to education on a computing. And it able to acquire the skills and

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attributes that are necessary for them to prosper. Let me set out to

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Parliament some of the focus of the work that's been undertaken as part

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of the Government strategy that was launched in November 20 15. Firstly,

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as part of the leadership effort we establish the National cyber

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resilient leaders board in September 20 16th to try and forward and

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implement the strategy across Scotland. That board is led by the

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director of CBI Scotland and the board is made of key leaders from

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across the public, private and third sectors who are providing strategic

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direction across all of our sectors. Secondly, the digital Scotland

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business excellence partnership has provided ?400,000 to help businesses

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in Scotland improve their cyber resilient and work towards achieving

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the cyber essential standard. We focused efforts on raising awareness

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to cyber risk, since the beginning of this year we have developed a

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joint cyber German occasions calendar which has been used by our

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partners to provide a consistent message across the board and we are

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linking closely in this work and this relates to Mr Green's and

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maiming today with the UK National cyber aware campaign. In terms of

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learning and skills, we have built cyber resilience into the curriculum

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for excellence and are working to build it with an digital skills. We

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are also looking at how we can fill the gaps that we currently have in

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terms of the cyber security skills pipeline, particularly around

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apprenticeships and the qualifications that are on offer. We

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are working to build the capacity of cyber security research across

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higher education in Scotland. The University of Edinburgh has recently

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become an academic centre of excellence in cyber security

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research. Acknowledged and endorsed by the National safe Bilic cyber

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security centre. This work has been about ensuring we took early

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preparations to ensure we well equipped as a country to meet the

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challenges we now face. I want to acknowledge the tremendous efforts

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of our national health service staff and the wider public sector in

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responding to the recent attack that took place and providing assurances

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around the security of their networks. It was considerable cross

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sector engagement during this event and collaboration at this level is

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an essential element and helps to demonstrate confidence in the public

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sector's ability to respond to such acts. The investment the Government

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is making in this area is specifically to support the

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arrangement of hardware and software measures to prevent the Government's

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ICT systems, infrastructure and data, to improve the Government's

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network monitoring capabilities. To establish and expand a cyber

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security operations centre and corporate education awareness and

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training right across the board. We recognise that ultimately the focus

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of our public sector work is about ensuring we can gain our citizens

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trust and we move towards digital public services. With that outcome

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in mind, we have established a cross sector Public grip on cyber

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resilience. This is made up of technical and business expert from

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central and local Government, from health, procurement, academia and

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the third sector, all of them focused on putting in place the

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necessary measures to protect the public sector ICT school Dodt

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skills. It is essential across a range of different areas, whether

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learning or skills or the role of the private sector, compliance with

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the EU General data protection regulations by the security of our

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critical infrastructure that we take effort any cohesive and coherent way

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to ensure that we are equipped to make these challenges. That is the

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focus of the Government strategy. That lies at the heart of the

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approach we are taking and we are doing that in an engaged and

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collaborative way with the private, third and public sectors to ensure

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that Scotland is a country that's able to demonstrate cyber resilience

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but is also able to use our cyber kick ability as a foundation for

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economic opportunity in the years to move amendment... Thank you. Less

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than two weeks ago, we witnessed one of the most severe coordinated cyber

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attacks the world has ever seen. This attack was not isolated to

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Scotland, nor the UK are our neighbours across the world reported

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attacks on IT infrastructure, in some cases crippling their ability

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to deliver public services. On our shores are at NHS network was head,

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doctors could no longer access patient's files. The effects were

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felt as hospitals were asking only urgent cases to come to a and E to

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ease the pressure on them, appointments were cancelled,

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operations were cancelled, GP surgeries unable to access records.

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The so-called ransomware attack also targeted Germany's primary rail

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link, Deutsche Bank and Spain's Telefonica. It is estimated that the

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ransomware attack affected 230,000 computers and over 150 countries.

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Europe described this attack is unprecedented in its scale. Make no

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mistake, the events of the 12th of May 20 17th highlighted the

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fragility of public IT infrastructure at the world over.

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For all the benefits that economic digitalisation has brought us, the

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shift online has opened up an emerging threat from the cybercrime

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and cyber terrorism. Estimates from the Scottish business resilience

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centre put the cost to the Scottish economy from cybercrime at ?393

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million in the year 2015, 2016. Globally that figure could be well

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over half a trillion US dollars. In fact, it has become such a threat

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that the whole industry in a cyber insurance has sprung up in recent

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years. The Scottish Conservatives will support any measures the

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Scottish Government is taking to increase a resilience against

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further attacks, for that reason we welcome the tone of the Government

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motion today and will be supporting it this afternoon.

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The Scottish Government made references to cybersecurity

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and in its previous cyber-resilience strategy,

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Nevertheless, in the light of the recent attacks,

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we would like more detail on what specific action is being

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taken to protect public services, utilities and large public networks.

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In particular, we would like to know the monetary value

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The UK Government has invested heavily in cybersecurity

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and last year announced ?2 billion of investment.

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A new national cybersecurity centre was set up to operate

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out of London under the control of Government

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It is there to assist businesses, Government bodies and academia

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across the UK, including in Scotland, in times of need.

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"The UK Government is leading the way with the cyber initiatives

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However, the Government cannot protect the UK alone.

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Businesses must understand the cyber threat their organisation faces

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and take strong protective action themselves."

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There is a shared responsibility on all of us to ensure

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that we are prepared to deal with online threats.

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Our amendment asks the Scottish Government to ensure

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that it is having a proactive discussion with UK-wide enforcement

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and intelligence agencies and Government bodies to ensure that

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I will personally liaise with my UK Government counterpart to highlight

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any areas in the Digital Economy Act 2017 pertaining to cybercrime

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and online protection that are relevant to Scotland.

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It is clear, in the aftermath of the ransomware attack,

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that the evidence suggests that several hospitals did not install

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the updates that they had received prior to the attack,

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Daniel Johnson was right to probe into that further today by asking

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if the Windows XP replacements or updates will take place

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in our NHS, because a co-ordinated upgrade and end-of-life plan

:17:29.:17:31.

is a necessary part of any large-scale IT project.

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The public sector should be no different to mainstream

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The European Commission's 2016 Digital Progress Report

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highlighted that half the EU's population

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access public services via online platforms.

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That number will surely only continue to grow.

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A crucial pillar in our preparedness against attacks is the understanding

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In a digital world, we are not shielded by being an island.

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A hacker in North Korea can attack a database in North Queensferry.

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DigitalEurope, the digital industry's respected trade

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body, recently said cybersecurity is important.

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However the approach must be centered on better security

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practices to defeat evolving threats in a global landscape.

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The digital market is borderless and virtual and it is a workplace

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like no other, in which there are invisible but tangible threats.

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The Scottish Conservatives will support the Scottish Government's

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current cybersecurity plans, but our support is conditional

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on realistic and measurable plans being put in place.

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We want the Scottish Parliament to be regularly informed of progress

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and we want close collaboration between all Governments and agencies

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to ensure that a truly UK-wide cybersecurity framework is in place.

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We think Scotland could lead the charge against global cyberthreats

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I say that because just last week another major Californian

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cybersecurity firm announced that it will be opening a new office

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in Belfast, which will create 120 new jobs in an already buoyant

:19:26.:19:29.

cybersecurity and tech sector in that city.

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They firm were attracted to Belfast by Invest Northern Ireland,

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which gave it a ?780,000 grant towards the new venture.

:19:43.:19:51.

Invest NI also recently awarded ?5.5 million to Queens University

:19:52.:19:54.

to help to fund a new centre for secure IT, which

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brings total investment in the centre to ?38 million.

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Belfast is becoming the world's number one hub for cybersecurity,

:20:00.:20:08.

data analytics, fintech and blockchain technology.

:20:09.:20:10.

The skills that are required to fill those newly created posts

:20:11.:20:17.

Although I appreciate the good work that is happening in Edinburgh,

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why cannot it also happen in Glasgow or Dundee?

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There must be more than words of goodwill and lip service paid

:20:28.:20:30.

Targeted investment, a bank of suitably skilled workers

:20:31.:20:34.

and a can-do Government attitude can and will have a material

:20:35.:20:37.

and positive effect on the industry, and will open up real opportunities

:20:38.:20:40.

Cybersecurity is so big in Northern Ireland right

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now that the sector has a zero per cent unemployment rate.

:20:49.:20:50.

While I let that potential sink in, I look forward to hearing

:20:51.:20:53.

the Government's response to my comments and to listening

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I now call Claire Baker to speak. Miss Baker, seven minutes, please.

:20:57.:21:27.

The past few days have been very challenging

:21:28.:21:29.

It is a critical, on-going situation and it is right that we prioritise

:21:30.:21:33.

My thoughts are with all those families affected by the terrible

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Turning to today's debate, we must ensure that we are as safe

:21:38.:21:41.

To many politicians, cybersecurity is an area

:21:42.:21:44.

in which it can often seem as if a different language

:21:45.:21:46.

is being spoken, the same is true for much of the public.

:21:47.:21:49.

As we heard in the recent debate on keeping children safe online,

:21:50.:21:52.

the internet is central to modern life, and while it brings

:21:53.:21:55.

many benefits, it also contains many risks.

:21:56.:21:56.

Cyber-resilience is an important strategy in protecting

:21:57.:21:58.

against vulnerability for individuals

:21:59.:21:59.

The significant change to how we communicate,

:22:00.:22:08.

how we do business and how we create systems has brought

:22:09.:22:11.

considerable risks and we must always be vigilant.

:22:12.:22:13.

As quick and easy as it is for an MSP to send

:22:14.:22:16.

an email to a constituent, it can be just as quick and easy

:22:17.:22:19.

to send malware or to find the one weak spot among millions

:22:20.:22:22.

I appreciate that, following the recent

:22:23.:22:24.

ransomware attack on our NHS, the Government has been active

:22:25.:22:27.

in helping businesses and organisations, but today's

:22:28.:22:29.

debate appears to be reactive rather than proactive.

:22:30.:22:32.

Although a specific attack on a specific target

:22:33.:22:35.

is difficult to predict, the threat of such an attack is not.

:22:36.:22:39.

I appreciate the recent update from the Government

:22:40.:22:42.

on the extraordinary meeting of the national cyber-resilience

:22:43.:22:45.

leaders board, but should such meetings always have

:22:46.:22:49.

The Scottish Government published their Safe,

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Secure and Prosperous: Cyber Resilience Strategy

:23:10.:23:10.

We are now two years into the five-year strategy,

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and it is clear that the recent attack on the NHS represents

:23:14.:23:16.

a setback to confidence in the security of information

:23:17.:23:18.

Although I will support the Government's motion

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and am inclined to support the Conservatives' amendment,

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which welcomes the strategies of the UK and Scottish Governments,

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I want to mention the recent report of the UK Parliament's

:23:26.:23:28.

Public Accounts Committee, which said that the UK Government

:23:29.:23:30.

needs to raise its game in this area and described significant

:23:31.:23:33.

skills shortages and the chaotic handling of personal data.

:23:34.:23:35.

In Scotland, we have the well-documented problems with i6

:23:36.:23:41.

at Police Scotland and at NHS 24, which raise questions

:23:42.:23:43.

I appreciate that the Government has committed to providing a public

:23:44.:23:48.

sector action plan that will develop a set of guidelines and standards

:23:49.:23:51.

However, as our amendment makes clear, investment is necessary

:23:52.:23:59.

to ensure that we can withstand future attacks.

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Improvements in infrastructure, investment in expertise and advice

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and the capability to build resilience all take resources,

:24:06.:24:10.

and it is difficult for our public services to prioritise

:24:11.:24:13.

when there is so much pressure on service delivery.

:24:14.:24:19.

The national cyber-resilience leaders board's action plan is due

:24:20.:24:21.

to be approved by ministers in June, and I hope that Parliament

:24:22.:24:24.

will have the opportunity to scrutinise and monitor

:24:25.:24:28.

When it comes to cyberattacks, we in Scotland must not stand alone.

:24:29.:24:35.

We need to work across the UK and beyond to understand potential

:24:36.:24:38.

threats, to learn from best practice and to halt attacks

:24:39.:24:43.

That process must begin with the recent attack on our NHS.

:24:44.:24:48.

We must ask why our hospitals and health centres were affected

:24:49.:24:51.

Did Wales take better pre-emptive action?

:24:52.:24:57.

Did the Scottish Government provide adequate instructions

:24:58.:24:59.

on cybersecurity prior to the attack?

:25:00.:25:05.

Was the issue given sufficient priority around the Cabinet table?

:25:06.:25:07.

I hope that those questions will be addressed by the Government

:25:08.:25:10.

According to the Government's strategy,

:25:11.:25:18.

cyber resilience is being able to prepare for, withstand,

:25:19.:25:20.

rapidly recover and learn from deliberate attacks

:25:21.:25:22.

or accidental events in the online world.

:25:23.:25:24.

With the attack on the NHS, we know that Scotland is not yet

:25:25.:25:28.

fully prepared to withstand such attacks and, although

:25:29.:25:31.

it has appeared to recover and deserves credit for that,

:25:32.:25:34.

we must now ensure that we are able to learn.

:25:35.:25:36.

The world is increasingly moving online.

:25:37.:25:39.

From socialising to shopping and learning to leisure,

:25:40.:25:47.

the public, old as well as young, are conducting large parts

:25:48.:25:50.

As local politicians, we know that many high street banks

:25:51.:25:57.

are closing, with the argument made that most transactions

:25:58.:25:59.

That is true for our businesses and organisations, millions

:26:00.:26:07.

of pounds worth of transactions take place online every day.

:26:08.:26:10.

Cybercrime is a threat that we are all aware of,

:26:11.:26:12.

but it is also one that we believe to be underreported.

:26:13.:26:15.

It can be prevented if the right security,

:26:16.:26:17.

firewalls and precautions are in place, but computers,

:26:18.:26:19.

data and personal details are often left inadvertently exposed.

:26:20.:26:24.

We would not leave the front door or the car unlocked,

:26:25.:26:27.

but computer systems are left wide open in exactly that way.

:26:28.:26:30.

As part of my research for the debate, I found out that

:26:31.:26:33.

Britain ranks below Brazil, South Africa and China

:26:34.:26:35.

when it comes to keeping phones and laptops secure,

:26:36.:26:38.

Around 80% of cybercrime can be prevented if we just

:26:39.:26:46.

That involves having strong passwords, downloading,

:26:47.:26:56.

installing and crucially updating security, protecting our

:26:57.:26:58.

mobile devices and wireless networks and being aware

:26:59.:27:00.

of suspicious emails, which often claim to be

:27:01.:27:02.

As much as we must look to individuals and businesses

:27:03.:27:06.

to take responsibility, we must ensure that here in Scotland

:27:07.:27:08.

we have the resources to tackle such crimes once they take place.

:27:09.:27:11.

We are currently in the middle of the policing 2026 strategy,

:27:12.:27:14.

and cybersecurity is one of the major challenges

:27:15.:27:16.

We need to ensure that the right people are being recruited

:27:17.:27:20.

There is a clear need for a balanced workforce in our policing,

:27:21.:27:24.

and efforts to tackle cybercrime would benefit from that.

:27:25.:27:36.

We also need the best minds - for example,

:27:37.:27:38.

the recent NHS situation was resolved by a self-taught

:27:39.:27:40.

such people can work with Police Scotland

:27:41.:27:44.

to support our agencies in being cyber-resilient and able

:27:45.:27:46.

Last year, I visited the Scottish crime campus at Gartcosh,

:27:47.:27:50.

which is a world-leading facility hosting specialist crime fighters.

:27:51.:27:52.

It is proof of what can be achieved by setting high-quality,

:27:53.:27:55.

highly skilled jobs alongside the right resources,

:27:56.:27:58.

but, as we know, Police Scotland is facing a significant

:27:59.:28:00.

We need to ensure that all our public services from the NHS,

:28:01.:28:08.

which was attacked earlier this month, to Police Scotland

:28:09.:28:11.

all have the proper resources and investment to withstand,

:28:12.:28:13.

Finally, partnership is so important, and the Scottish

:28:14.:28:16.

Government must work with the UK Government and other devolved

:28:17.:28:21.

assemblies and agencies throughout the UK to ensure

:28:22.:28:23.

that we have the capabilities, the knowledge and the resources

:28:24.:28:25.

to keep us all safe and secure online.

:28:26.:28:30.

Thank you very much. I've moved to the open debate. Mr Stevenson,

:28:31.:28:40.

please. On 9th February 1984, we saw

:28:41.:28:45.

the launch of the first real-time, high-value money

:28:46.:28:54.

transfer system, CHAPS. I was the project manager

:28:55.:28:55.

for the Bank of Scotland, which was the first bank

:28:56.:28:58.

ready to implement. I well remember our excitement later

:28:59.:29:00.

that year when we made our first real-time, irrevocable

:29:01.:29:03.

payment of over ?1 billion. By 2011, the system had

:29:04.:29:04.

processed ?1 quadrillion In other words, a thousand

:29:05.:29:08.

million million pounds, To secure the transactions,

:29:09.:29:17.

I had to gain permission from the US Department of Defense

:29:18.:29:22.

and sign my life away to use what was categorised

:29:23.:29:25.

as weapons-grade encryption It operated from within a black box

:29:26.:29:27.

that self-destructed if someone attempted to open it

:29:28.:29:33.

to examine its contents. The technology was,

:29:34.:29:39.

and is, as secure as one and the objective today should be

:29:40.:29:41.

to ensure that every business and individual is in possession

:29:42.:29:45.

of similarly impenetrable security. We are, but we do not

:29:46.:29:53.

all choose to implement it. My point, however, is that

:29:54.:29:57.

even if we do so, we do not necessarily use it in a way that

:29:58.:30:02.

allows it to be as secure For the most part, it is not

:30:03.:30:05.

the technology that fails, "Citizens, we must be

:30:06.:30:11.

aware of the risks." Indeed, in his opening remarks,

:30:12.:30:18.

John Swinney said that this should not be the responsibility

:30:19.:30:21.

of the Government alone. The history of human failure

:30:22.:30:23.

to properly use secure data systems 2,000 years ago, slaves

:30:24.:30:27.

had their heads shaved. A message was written

:30:28.:30:35.

on their scalp; the hair grew back; and the slave and the message

:30:36.:30:37.

were sent elsewhere. That was all well and good,

:30:38.:30:40.

until people realised what Having a secret method

:30:41.:30:43.

provides no real security, Indeed, effective data security

:30:44.:30:49.

systems rely on their having been published and scrutinised to confirm

:30:50.:30:56.

that their methods are sound. However, we need to keep the keys

:30:57.:31:01.

secret and change them frequently. In the 16th century,

:31:02.:31:06.

Mary Queen of Scots used a two-cover system to protect

:31:07.:31:09.

her confidential messages. The first was a secure box

:31:10.:31:13.

with two locks and a key for each - she had one key,

:31:14.:31:17.

while the other was held by the recipient, and no-one else

:31:18.:31:19.

had access to either key. Mary put her message in the box,

:31:20.:31:24.

she locked it and then it went to the recipient,

:31:25.:31:28.

who used his key to lock his lock. The box came back to Mary,

:31:29.:31:33.

who unlocked her lock, and went back to the recipient,

:31:34.:31:35.

who unlocked his. It was a secure system

:31:36.:31:39.

for transmitting a message from A to B in the 16th century,

:31:40.:31:42.

because nobody shared the key The second aspect of the system

:31:43.:31:45.

was encryption of the message inside the box through

:31:46.:31:50.

a letter-substitution system. However, that is

:31:51.:31:54.

where Mary fell down. She thought that the system

:31:55.:31:56.

was totally secure, because transmission was secure,

:31:57.:31:58.

but when the message came out of the box,

:31:59.:32:01.

she forgot that it was now a bit of paper that was available

:32:02.:32:04.

to anyone who might be passing. Queen Elizabeth I picked

:32:05.:32:08.

up one of her messages and was able to unscramble it,

:32:09.:32:11.

and it formed part of the evidence at Mary Queen of Scots' trial,

:32:12.:32:16.

which caused her to be executed. Napoleon had le grande

:32:17.:32:20.

chiffre - the great code. Common letters of the alphabet

:32:21.:32:28.

were not always coded in the same way, so that people could not break

:32:29.:32:31.

it by analysing frequency. However, encoders started to use

:32:32.:32:35.

some of the spare codes over and over again,

:32:36.:32:38.

as place names for where the fighting was, in order

:32:39.:32:43.

to save time and effort. Wellington's code-breaker was a guy

:32:44.:32:45.

called George Scovell and, because of the weak way

:32:46.:32:49.

in which that good system was used, When Wellington got to the battle

:32:50.:32:54.

of Waterloo, he knew what Napoleon's plans were and that led to the end

:32:55.:33:03.

of an empire. The Enigma machine,

:33:04.:33:06.

which the Germans thought was unbreakable until 1945,

:33:07.:33:13.

was actually broken Bletchley Park broke a later,

:33:14.:33:15.

improved version because, every day at 6am, the Germans sent

:33:16.:33:18.

out an encrypted weather forecast. The fact that it was in the same

:33:19.:33:23.

format and at the same time every day enabled people at Bletchley Park

:33:24.:33:27.

to break what should have been a very secure system, of course,

:33:28.:33:30.

they had to do lots of other good Most of us know how to drive a car,

:33:31.:33:34.

but rather fewer of us know how the mechanical bits work or how

:33:35.:33:40.

to fix them when they fail. Most of us also know how to use

:33:41.:33:45.

a computer and perhaps even use the security functions that

:33:46.:33:49.

are provided with it. However, as with a car,

:33:50.:33:50.

if we do not get an expert to service it regularly or to fix it

:33:51.:33:56.

when it fails, disaster will loom. All businesses should have

:33:57.:34:00.

regular security check-ups. They will not be free,

:34:01.:34:02.

but the cost of not doing them It is like insurance -

:34:03.:34:05.

it is a product that a business cannot just buy when it wants it,

:34:06.:34:11.

when its reputation is trashed and its customers have flown,

:34:12.:34:14.

paying a little bit once a year My final example of a security

:34:15.:34:17.

problem is from the modern world. I bought a good-quality second-hand

:34:18.:34:23.

car, as I usually do, and it had all the gadgets,

:34:24.:34:27.

including a Bluetooth That is good technology,

:34:28.:34:29.

but an unaware previous owner of my car had left his phone's

:34:30.:34:34.

entire contact list Do members realise that

:34:35.:34:40.

they could do that, too? I am a good guy and I deleted it,

:34:41.:34:47.

but suppose the chief executive... You are such a good guy that

:34:48.:34:50.

you have to wind up now, intriguing though this is,

:34:51.:34:53.

Mr Stevenson. In that case, Presiding Officer,

:34:54.:34:55.

let me caution chief executives and chairmen of companies not to use

:34:56.:34:58.

Bluetooth in their cars unless they know how to delete

:34:59.:35:02.

data from the memory. I am a good guy and I deleted it,

:35:03.:35:04.

but not everybody is as honest Oh my goodness, Mr Stevenson,

:35:05.:35:08.

I cannot wait for your book to come out: Facts You Didn't Know But I'm

:35:09.:35:15.

Going to Tell You Anyway. I refer to my entry in the register

:35:16.:35:26.

of members' interests and the fact that I am on the board of two

:35:27.:35:29.

companies that invest It is significant that, on a day

:35:30.:35:32.

when we are all still digesting the horrific news of a violent

:35:33.:35:36.

physical attack on our country, we are debating the need to protect

:35:37.:35:39.

ourselves from cyberattacks. The Deputy First Minister mentioned

:35:40.:35:43.

that, and I entirely Although nothing can surpass

:35:44.:35:46.

the tragic loss of so many innocent lives that Manchester witnessed,

:35:47.:35:54.

it seems to me that one of the greatest challenges

:35:55.:36:00.

that we face as a society is the sheer number

:36:01.:36:02.

and variety of threats Our enemies come in many forms,

:36:03.:36:04.

from the deadly and murderous suicide bomber of Monday night

:36:05.:36:08.

to the sophisticated The ransomware attack on IT systems,

:36:09.:36:12.

which affected some 200,000 computers across 150 countries,

:36:13.:36:19.

was certainly one of the most unprecedented attacks

:36:20.:36:23.

that we have ever seen. My comments will concentrate

:36:24.:36:27.

on our NHS, the attack on which was nothing short

:36:28.:36:32.

of spiteful, especially given the delays to patients'

:36:33.:36:34.

treatment across the UK, In Scotland, we were relatively

:36:35.:36:37.

lucky in that only 1% of electronic devices were affected

:36:38.:36:43.

and the number of people whose operations required to be

:36:44.:36:46.

rescheduled was minimal. However, any delay to an operation,

:36:47.:36:50.

appointment or treatment as a result of the attack was frustrating,

:36:51.:36:53.

to say the least. 13 health boards were affected,

:36:54.:36:58.

and some GP surgeries. The Cabinet Secretary for Health

:36:59.:37:02.

and Sport swiftly made a statement last week,

:37:03.:37:05.

and I am grateful for the clear manner in which she

:37:06.:37:07.

presented the known facts. Like her, I welcome the fact

:37:08.:37:09.

that there have been no reports I would also like to pay tribute

:37:10.:37:12.

to the IT staff in the NHS who worked extraordinarily hard

:37:13.:37:17.

to get all the affected systems As was reported last week,

:37:18.:37:20.

very few people knew how to fix the problem,

:37:21.:37:24.

but it is a testament to those who were able

:37:25.:37:27.

to overcome it that they did I also want to thank our front-line

:37:28.:37:29.

NHS staff, who carried on serving the public as normal even if it

:37:30.:37:35.

meant a lesser reliance on IT The Health and Sport Committee

:37:36.:37:38.

heard yesterday from the Scottish Ambulance Service

:37:39.:37:44.

that there had been no operational impact and no loss of patient data

:37:45.:37:47.

during or after the attack. It is plain that there are several

:37:48.:37:50.

aspects of the attack that need to be tackled,

:37:51.:37:55.

in order to ensure that future attacks can be thwarted

:37:56.:37:58.

as early as possible. Naturally, we cannot expect

:37:59.:38:02.

to prevent every attack, but as our reliance on various forms

:38:03.:38:05.

of IT continues to grow, so too The cyberattack could have been far,

:38:06.:38:09.

far worse, and it is clear that we need to do more to ensure

:38:10.:38:15.

that our IT systems in the NHS are up to date and that we can

:38:16.:38:19.

respond to future attacks According to the Scottish

:38:20.:38:22.

Business Resilience Centre, cybercrime cost Scotland around

:38:23.:38:27.

?394 million in 2015-16. It is an exceptionally lucrative

:38:28.:38:33.

market for those who know how to code and wish

:38:34.:38:36.

to use their talents That is why we need to be on guard,

:38:37.:38:38.

but we also need people within our NHS and the wider public

:38:39.:38:43.

and private sector who possess the relevant skills to combat

:38:44.:38:46.

attacks, as and when they happen. That in turn requires people

:38:47.:38:51.

who are able to stress-test IT systems continually,

:38:52.:38:54.

so that they are protected from I am sure that others, like me,

:38:55.:38:57.

received an interesting briefing from the University of Abertay

:38:58.:39:07.

on that point. It said that defensive cybersecurity

:39:08.:39:09.

is already fairly well established in both undergraduate

:39:10.:39:12.

and postgraduate programmes at university, with skills

:39:13.:39:15.

such as cryptography and intrusion-prevention

:39:16.:39:17.

being taught. However, it points out that

:39:18.:39:20.

offensive cybersecurity courses are not as common,

:39:21.:39:23.

and that there is a real need to consider investing in that

:39:24.:39:25.

particular avenue of learning. It says, quite simply, that,

:39:26.:39:29.

"the best way to catch a thief While it is clear that major ethical

:39:30.:39:32.

questions will arise, particularly in giving

:39:33.:39:38.

a new generation the skills and abilities to hack maliciously,

:39:39.:39:39.

degree programmes such as that might help to fill a skills

:39:40.:39:43.

vacancy that is all too evident across Scotland,

:39:44.:39:46.

Britain and the wider world. Turning back to the NHS,

:39:47.:39:48.

I will focus on why the issues that I have mentioned

:39:49.:39:53.

are particularly pertinent. We know that many of our NHS health

:39:54.:39:56.

boards continue to use out-of-date software,

:39:57.:39:59.

which in many cases cannot be updated for fear of having

:40:00.:40:02.

a negative impact on the technology that is used to serve and heal

:40:03.:40:06.

patients, such as magnetic That software, and that updating,

:40:07.:40:08.

needs to be reviewed. The Cabinet Secretary for Health

:40:09.:40:16.

and Sport stated last week that she would seek to ascertain

:40:17.:40:19.

whether health boards have regular It would be interesting

:40:20.:40:22.

to understand whether that is indeed the case, and I hope

:40:23.:40:26.

that the cabinet secretary will report back to Parliament

:40:27.:40:29.

with an update on that It is abundantly clear that

:40:30.:40:31.

lessons need to be learned. Now is not the time for political

:40:32.:40:37.

posturing on the issue, but for all of us to debate,

:40:38.:40:40.

as we have, the actions that are required to ensure that such

:40:41.:40:43.

incidents are dealt with swiftly without causing public

:40:44.:40:46.

fear and panic. We must take every precaution

:40:47.:40:49.

possible to protect one of the most Fundamentally, I believe that

:40:50.:40:52.

long-term solutions are required for an issue such as this,

:40:53.:40:58.

short-term fixes simply We need to be constantly aware -

:40:59.:41:01.

let us learn from that Thank you very much. I call Liam

:41:02.:41:08.

McArthur, Mr McCarthy, please. Dr Christopher Frei,

:41:09.:41:23.

Secretary General of the World Energy Council said 12

:41:24.:41:25.

months ago: "We're in the Stone Age

:41:26.:41:26.

of cyber security." He went on to add that: "Real

:41:27.:41:28.

learning will only come Whether the recent global

:41:29.:41:31.

cyberattack will act as a catalyst for the real learning that Dr Frei

:41:32.:41:35.

talked about remains to be seen, but it is abundantly obvious,

:41:36.:41:38.

as all speakers have acknowledged, that this is an area that

:41:39.:41:41.

will demand far greater attention in future than it has perhaps

:41:42.:41:43.

commanded to date. In that context, I welcome

:41:44.:41:47.

the opportunity to take part in this debate on creating a cyber-resilient

:41:48.:41:50.

Scotland and I confirm that the Scottish Liberal Democrats

:41:51.:41:55.

will support the Government's motion Unfortunately, due to a funeral

:41:56.:41:59.

back in my constituency, I will be unable to stay

:42:00.:42:03.

until the end of the debate and for that I apologise to you,

:42:04.:42:06.

Presiding Officer, to the cabinet John Swinney's motion makes

:42:07.:42:09.

a number of important points about the serious threats that

:42:10.:42:16.

are posed and the need for far greater vigilance on the part

:42:17.:42:19.

of individuals and organisations, and he reinforced those

:42:20.:42:21.

points in his remarks. I also welcome the amendments that

:42:22.:42:24.

were lodged by Jamie Greene and Claire Baker, which helpfully

:42:25.:42:27.

reinforce the need to improve the way in which we report

:42:28.:42:29.

on and capture the scale of cybercrimes, as well as

:42:30.:42:32.

the importance of building resilience across our public

:42:33.:42:35.

services and ensuring the closest possible working

:42:36.:42:38.

and co-operation between the UK and Scottish Governments

:42:39.:42:42.

and their partners. Without those elements at the core,

:42:43.:42:45.

our collective ambition to create a safe, secure,

:42:46.:42:47.

prosperous and cyber-resilient Scotland will inevitably

:42:48.:42:51.

be frustrated. In the brief time available to me,

:42:52.:42:54.

I will concentrate my remarks It is worth acknowledging

:42:55.:42:57.

at the start that there are two There is that that uses computer

:42:58.:43:05.

software as the tool and the end target for attacks,

:43:06.:43:09.

such as the recent ransomware attack that caused so much disruption,

:43:10.:43:11.

notably across our health service-I pay tribute to those

:43:12.:43:15.

in the health service There is also cyber-enabled crime,

:43:16.:43:17.

which uses computers simply as a conduit for criminal activities

:43:18.:43:23.

that also take place offline, such as identity theft

:43:24.:43:26.

and money laundering. It is safe to say that cyberattacks

:43:27.:43:29.

across the board have been Unfortunately, we appear some way

:43:30.:43:32.

short of being able to assess the true extent and scale

:43:33.:43:36.

of those attacks. As Her Majesty's inspectorate

:43:37.:43:41.

of constabulary in Scotland highlighted in its crime audit last

:43:42.:43:43.

year, "There is currently no comprehensive data on the extent

:43:44.:43:45.

of cyber-enabled crime in Scotland." It went on to recommend that

:43:46.:43:49.

Police Scotland develop the ability to tag all incidents and crimes that

:43:50.:43:52.

have a cyber element and that it assess the demands

:43:53.:43:56.

on policing in Scotland. Since HMICS carried out its audit,

:43:57.:44:00.

it has acknowledged that police officers have now been instructed

:44:01.:44:02.

to tag crime reports with cybercrime markers,

:44:03.:44:06.

but that still does not appear to extend to

:44:07.:44:09.

cyber-related incidents. Indeed, as recently as November last

:44:10.:44:12.

year, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice acknowledged in response

:44:13.:44:15.

to a parliamentary question from me that,

:44:16.:44:17.

"work is required to improve He also acknowledged that work

:44:18.:44:19.

is needed on the way in which such crime is defined,

:44:20.:44:27.

recorded and reported. We are not clear on the extent

:44:28.:44:29.

to which Police Scotland's failed i6 programme is inhibiting the force's

:44:30.:44:32.

ability to track and It has certainly deprived

:44:33.:44:34.

Police Scotland of the cost savings promised by ministers at the time

:44:35.:44:39.

of the merger of the previous forces, and that in itself will make

:44:40.:44:42.

more difficult the task of matching police resources to the scale

:44:43.:44:45.

of the cyber challenge. The Scottish crime recording board

:44:46.:44:49.

has been asked to consider the extent to which current crime

:44:50.:44:51.

recording practice adequately captures the scale of cyber-enabled

:44:52.:44:54.

sexual crime and victimisation, particularly for children

:44:55.:44:59.

and young people. It would be helpful

:45:00.:45:02.

if the Justice Secretary, in concluding the debate,

:45:03.:45:04.

updated Parliament in that regard. In the meantime, we perhaps need

:45:05.:45:07.

to take care in talking about lower levels of crime overall

:45:08.:45:11.

if we are still unsure about the extent to which there has

:45:12.:45:14.

been a shift online Even now, there seems to be enough

:45:15.:45:17.

evidence to suggest something of a displacement effect,

:45:18.:45:21.

with all the challenges that that presents through issues

:45:22.:45:27.

such as identification, As I said, John Swinney

:45:28.:45:28.

is absolutely right to emphasise the need for increased vigilance

:45:29.:45:33.

and care on the part of individuals. We all have a responsibility to do

:45:34.:45:36.

what we can to protect ourselves, albeit that some will inevitably

:45:37.:45:40.

need more help in achieving At the same time, however,

:45:41.:45:43.

the way in which Government and public bodies treat personal

:45:44.:45:48.

data and information requires Mr Swinney will be aware

:45:49.:45:50.

of the concerns that Scottish Liberal Democrats had

:45:51.:45:54.

about the Scottish Government's recent plans to create

:45:55.:45:57.

a superidentification database. Those concerns were shared

:45:58.:45:59.

by independent experts It is not acceptable to sacrifice

:46:00.:46:01.

personal data in the interests of administrative efficiency,

:46:02.:46:06.

so I very much welcome the recent There seems to be growing

:46:07.:46:08.

recognition of the importance of the issue among organisations

:46:09.:46:14.

and businesses. However, as the Association

:46:15.:46:18.

of British Insurers points out in its briefing,

:46:19.:46:20.

although awareness levels among businesses about cybersecurity

:46:21.:46:21.

is high, only around half of them have the basic technical

:46:22.:46:24.

controls necessary. Moreover, although preventing such

:46:25.:46:27.

attacks has to be the priority, when they occur, it is imperative

:46:28.:46:30.

that organisations and businesses have the advice, support

:46:31.:46:33.

and wherewithal to recover Not surprisingly, the ABI makes

:46:34.:46:35.

the case for the benefits of cyberinsurance, but it is worth

:46:36.:46:40.

acknowledging, as the Government did in its 2015 strategy,

:46:41.:46:44.

that we are fortunate in the UK to have an innovative cybersecurity,

:46:45.:46:47.

goods and services industry that can help us to meet demand not just

:46:48.:46:51.

here, but globally. For that reason, I hope

:46:52.:46:55.

that the Government will agree that it is in all our interests

:46:56.:46:57.

to ensure that that sector, alongside the work being done

:46:58.:47:00.

in our world-class research In an increasingly digital age,

:47:01.:47:02.

our future prosperity depends on our ability,

:47:03.:47:09.

individually and collectively, to embrace and make the most

:47:10.:47:11.

of digital technologies. Although those technologies

:47:12.:47:14.

open up a bewildering array of opportunities,

:47:15.:47:18.

so too do they Preventing risk completely

:47:19.:47:20.

is as impossible in the digital arena as it is anywhere else,

:47:21.:47:24.

but we can and must minimise the risks by raising

:47:25.:47:28.

awareness, being vigilant I welcome the opportunity

:47:29.:47:31.

for Parliament to reinforce Thank you, Mr McCarter. I call

:47:32.:47:36.

Claire Adamson. I declare an interest as a member

:47:37.:47:48.

of the British Computer Society, and I associate myself

:47:49.:47:51.

with my colleagues' remarks on the appalling incident

:47:52.:47:53.

in Manchester this week. Richard Phillips Feynman

:47:54.:47:56.

was an American theoretical physicist who was known as a pioneer

:47:57.:47:59.

of quantum mechanics and quantum computing, and for introducing

:48:00.:48:03.

the concept of nanotechnology. He was also awarded

:48:04.:48:07.

the Nobel medal for physics. During his lifetime,

:48:08.:48:12.

Mr Feynman became one of the best-known scientists

:48:13.:48:15.

in the world, and the British journal Physics World ranked him

:48:16.:48:18.

as one of the ten greatest He assisted in the development of

:48:19.:48:21.

the atomic bomb during World War II and in the 1980s he became

:48:22.:48:33.

widely known to the public as a member of the Rogers

:48:34.:48:35.

commission, which investigated the Challenger space

:48:36.:48:38.

shuttle disaster. I would like to highlight Mr

:48:39.:48:39.

Feynman's experience at Los Alamos To pass the time while working

:48:40.:48:42.

on the Manhattan project, he grew As he was working on perhaps

:48:43.:48:48.

the most sensitive project in human history, he took it upon himself

:48:49.:48:53.

to probe the security around him. That was a cause of much

:48:54.:48:59.

frustration and annoyance to the great and the good,

:49:00.:49:02.

but he believed that he was providing a necessary

:49:03.:49:05.

check to their balances. Today, we might describe Mr Feynman

:49:06.:49:09.

as a friendly ethical hacker, but I am sure that his bosses

:49:10.:49:12.

described him as something else. Richard Feynman did not

:49:13.:49:17.

understand how to crack safes, but he knew how to break a security

:49:18.:49:22.

system at its weakest point, If the Presiding Officer

:49:23.:49:28.

will allow me, I will highlight just a few of the human vulnerabilities

:49:29.:49:36.

that he exposed and detailed in his essay "Safecracker

:49:37.:49:42.

Meets Safecracker". He said: "All the secrets

:49:43.:49:46.

of the project, everything about the atomic bomb,

:49:47.:49:50.

were kept in filing cabinets" that were locked with

:49:51.:49:52.

three-pin padlocks, which of the first set of filing cabinets,

:49:53.:49:55.

they were replaced. Mr Feynman discovered that

:49:56.:50:04.

when the new cabinets were left open, it was easy to identify

:50:05.:50:09.

the first two digits of the combination lock, indeed,

:50:10.:50:13.

it was as easy as pie. After about two years

:50:14.:50:16.

of practice in Los Alamos, he was able to do that

:50:17.:50:19.

within seconds, and to do it on the Manhattan project safes,

:50:20.:50:22.

which had the same locking mechanisms as some of

:50:23.:50:27.

the filing cabinets. He discovered that when a safe

:50:28.:50:31.

was left open, he could find out at least the first two digits

:50:32.:50:36.

of its combination. He understood humans

:50:37.:50:41.

as well, and he knew that, more often than not,

:50:42.:50:44.

the combination would be significant Having got the first two digits,

:50:45.:50:46.

he was able to look at significant dates for the people involved

:50:47.:50:50.

and their family, and then guess He also knew that people

:50:51.:50:53.

wrote down lock codes. Even if they used a cipher,

:50:54.:51:00.

they would almost always use a common mathematical cipher,

:51:01.:51:05.

which he could decipher because he He also discovered that people

:51:06.:51:09.

frequently used the same combination Explaining this to a senior military

:51:10.:51:15.

officer while visiting a uranium storage facility at

:51:16.:51:30.

Oakridge, he explained the dangers of leaving

:51:31.:51:31.

the cabinets and safes open. When he returned a few months later,

:51:32.:51:33.

hoping to see new security measures in place, he discovered that he had

:51:34.:51:37.

been identified as the problem. He was no longer allowed to be

:51:38.:51:40.

left alone in a room and he was accompanied at all times,

:51:41.:51:43.

but there was no instruction to keep But his most significant discovery,

:51:44.:51:47.

which perturbed him because he thought that he had

:51:48.:51:57.

discovered a safe-cracker, happened when he was asked to open

:51:58.:51:59.

a safe that had been locked by a military commander who was no

:52:00.:52:02.

longer on site and which needed It was his greatest challenge,

:52:03.:52:05.

so he was very excited, but when he entered the room

:52:06.:52:17.

he discovered that the safe had been After months and months of worry,

:52:18.:52:21.

with attempts to work out what had happened and discussions

:52:22.:52:25.

with the chap to get to the bottom of it,

:52:26.:52:27.

eventually all was revealed. The default setting of the safe

:52:28.:52:29.

when it was delivered by the manufacturer had never been

:52:30.:52:31.

changed, and the technician knew That highlights issues around

:52:32.:52:34.

passwords being reused, systems being left unsecured

:52:35.:52:41.

and default settings being left. Anyone who was affected by the phone

:52:42.:52:44.

hacking scandal knows how easily False sense of security

:52:45.:52:54.

from having a physical safe in the corner or hearing that

:52:55.:53:02.

little tick on antivirus software. Failure to implement the solutions

:53:03.:53:10.

when the threat is revealed. All that tells us that,

:53:11.:53:12.

if we do not understand the threat, The British Computer Society has

:53:13.:53:15.

produced a number of leaders' Part two of the society's most

:53:16.:53:21.

recent set is on security. There are five tips,

:53:22.:53:28.

none of which is about computing. They are all about humans,

:53:29.:53:32.

and they concern leadership from management, cybersecurity

:53:33.:53:35.

policies, face-to-face delivery of training and a culture

:53:36.:53:39.

of openness that allows people to admit when they

:53:40.:53:42.

have made mistakes. It is a human problem that

:53:43.:53:45.

requires a human solution. I call Three, to be followed by John

:53:46.:53:57.

Finney. As events this week so tragically

:53:58.:54:03.

demonstrate, there are people who will wilfully seek to attack,

:54:04.:54:05.

in various ways, individuals, communities, our services and

:54:06.:54:08.

the nation's vital infrastructure. In the area of cybercrime,

:54:09.:54:10.

it is increasingly apparent that threats and potential threats

:54:11.:54:12.

are becoming ever-more organised What we saw happen ten days ago

:54:13.:54:16.

was not a random or one-off attack on the nation's infrastructure;

:54:17.:54:23.

rather, it was the result of a predetermined and, indeed,

:54:24.:54:27.

determined act by organised forces. That is why our response

:54:28.:54:30.

and preparedness to deal with such 11 health boards were affected, as

:54:31.:54:33.

was the Scottish Ambulance Service. People were asked not to visit A

:54:34.:54:42.

unless they needed urgent The response from the Scottish

:54:43.:54:49.

Government was swift, although I fear that it

:54:50.:54:52.

was too late. We had been warning

:54:53.:55:03.

the Scottish Government for some time of the need for proper

:55:04.:55:05.

preparedness on the part of Scottish public bodies to the growing

:55:06.:55:08.

threat of cybercrime. In December 2016, freedom

:55:09.:55:10.

of information requests found that more than half of our NHS boards had

:55:11.:55:12.

been subject to ransomware attacks. At that time, we called for

:55:13.:55:16.

an urgent review of cybersecurity. As recently as January,

:55:17.:55:22.

there was a similar attack on Scotland's NHS staff,

:55:23.:55:25.

with their details being hacked. On 25 January, ministers

:55:26.:55:31.

were informed of that Again, we called for

:55:32.:55:33.

a review of cybersecurity. My colleague Richard Simpson,

:55:34.:55:43.

who is no longer in the Parliament, had regularly been asking questions

:55:44.:55:47.

on cybersecurity, specifically Despite those questions,

:55:48.:55:51.

it appears that little or no action has been taken

:55:52.:55:59.

by the Cabinet Secretary It is also disappointing

:56:00.:56:02.

that the Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport is not

:56:03.:56:10.

in the chamber, given that a direct attack was made

:56:11.:56:13.

on our NHS infrastructure. I have a few specific

:56:14.:56:17.

questions that I hope the Deputy First Minister can

:56:18.:56:19.

address, and I would be happy to take interventions from him

:56:20.:56:22.

if he wants to respond It is in all our interests

:56:23.:56:26.

to get this right. First, why was the NHS

:56:27.:56:30.

in Scotland adversely affected by the recent cyberattacks,

:56:31.:56:34.

whereas the NHS in Wales was not? Why do we still have antiquated

:56:35.:56:39.

computer systems in our public sector infrastructure

:56:40.:56:43.

when we would not expect to have them in our homes,

:56:44.:56:46.

in our parliamentary offices Why was pre-emptive action not

:56:47.:56:51.

taken, as was done for example in Wales and which helped to prevent

:56:52.:57:00.

the cyberattacks there? What specific warnings or advice has

:57:01.:57:04.

the Cabinet Secretary issued to NHS Scotland to ensure that adequate

:57:05.:57:09.

resilience against When was any such advice given

:57:10.:57:11.

and, if it was given, will the Cabinet Secretary publish

:57:12.:57:18.

it as it would be welcomed by other institutions that might also

:57:19.:57:23.

face similar attacks? What additional resources has

:57:24.:57:27.

the Scottish Government allocated in 2016-17 to specifically improve

:57:28.:57:30.

security against cyberattacks on NHS Scotland, on Scottish Government

:57:31.:57:36.

departments, and on all other agencies and organisations

:57:37.:57:40.

for which the Scottish Government It would be interesting to know

:57:41.:57:43.

whether any agency or department for which the Scottish Government

:57:44.:57:50.

has responsibility has ever paid any ransom to those responsible

:57:51.:57:54.

for ransomware attacks. What advice has the Scottish

:57:55.:57:59.

Government issued on the required response to ransom demands

:58:00.:58:02.

from those responsible for cyberattacks and will that

:58:03.:58:05.

advice be published? It is clear for all to see

:58:06.:58:11.

that the attack could have been prevented or less destructive

:58:12.:58:15.

if we had been better prepared The past ten days have acted

:58:16.:58:19.

as a wake-up call to us all. The Government has said that it

:58:20.:58:31.

will develop a set of standards and guidelines, and I welcome that,

:58:32.:58:36.

but I say with regret that doing it Surely we can all do

:58:37.:58:39.

better than that. These are immediate attacks that

:58:40.:58:44.

are affecting our institutions right now, so 18 months is too long

:58:45.:58:48.

to wait before setting out I hope that the Cabinet Secretary

:58:49.:58:52.

will address that point In its first three months,

:58:53.:58:59.

the national cybersecurity centre's chief executive officer reported

:59:00.:59:04.

that the centre had handled It has also been reported

:59:05.:59:07.

that the centre has blocked 34,550 potential attacks on Government

:59:08.:59:12.

departments and members of the public in the past six

:59:13.:59:15.

months, that is 200 cases a day. I do not think we should be

:59:16.:59:26.

waiting 18 months We should also be quicker in moving

:59:27.:59:30.

towards accreditation of all public sector organisations to make sure

:59:31.:59:34.

that they have the essential minimum standards in place so that they can

:59:35.:59:37.

respond in a much clearer I hope that the Deputy First

:59:38.:59:40.

Minister and the Cabinet Secretary for Justice will address those

:59:41.:59:47.

issues head on. I hope that they have listened

:59:48.:59:51.

to my genuine concerns about what is happening

:59:52.:59:55.

around our infrastructure, that we can end the catalogue of IT

:59:56.:59:58.

failures that we have seen across the public sector,

:59:59.:00:01.

and that we can focus and make sure that such attacks

:00:02.:00:04.

do not happen again.

:00:05.:00:08.

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