Live Foreign Affairs Committee Select Committees

I think it was important because otherwise he would have had a

situation where Libya was continuing to develop chemical and nuclear

weapons and would have remahned isolated in the internation`l

community and I think it is important that we brought them in

from the cold as it were, and important also in today's context

because I think particularlx if we still had the residue of th`t

chemical weapons programme hn Libya today, given the state of Lhbya

today in the presence of icd is there, it would have constituted a

real risk. -- the presence of ISIS there. It was always one of these

are decisions that was diffhcult because of the nature of thd regime

at the individual we were khlling with but on the other hand H think

it was worthwhile because of the protection of our security `nd the

broader interests of trying to engage a country like that hn the

process of change. We took dvidence from Professor Joffe to help our

rather limited understanding of Libya, I want to invite you to

comment on that. Given your role in 2004-2006 and the reset of the

relationship with Libya, we were then able to establish UK dhplomatic

religion should -- UK relathons there at the diplomatic rel`tion

there, sadly and she is not here today, he has written a book on

Colonel Gaddafi, and you ard reported to have made six vhsits to

Libya after you are premised before 2010. Actually our understanding is

pretty reasonable of Libya, Britain probably understood as much as

anyone about Libya. Yes, we had obviously very close links to them

and I continued those links after I left because I think it was

important to see if it was possible to get them to do the polithcal and

economic reform that followdd the switch on the position of sdcurity.

I am not sure it was very e`sy to do that but it was worth trying in my

opinion. Just explore those meetings in your post premiership period

before 2010, I have presuming there may have been a mixture of work

being done, I imagine you could tell us about any work as Middle East

convoy about the political re-engagement with Libya, pdrhaps

you could just explain... Stre. I never had any business interests in

Libya. And secondly, the interaction I had was as a result of thd

interaction I had in governlent and I obviously, I exclude what I was

doing. He had an interest in the is really Palestinian issue. I would

talk to him a lot about Afrhca, which was the main topic, and the

whole relationship with Libxa to the outside world which I was kden to

encourage, a process of devdlopment. As I see a lot of the conversation

afterwards was about whether it was possible for them to open up their

economy, to make political change. The tragedy of Libya is that the

potential of the country is enormous. It has got some incredible

assets. It has got obviouslx the potential for energy is hugd but so

it is in tourism, I remember growing up in the 60s, Tripoli was regarded

a bit like to buy is today, it was regarded as one of the great open

cities. They have got extraordinary antiquities in the country. So

Libya, it is tragic for the Libyan people, really, tragic that the

country was taken over by the Gaddafi regime and tragic as to what

has happened subsequent to the fall. But those assets remain in the

country's progress remains something that if they can get stabilhty

there, it would be a fantastic country. I have had the report to me

by a diplomat who was in Libya in the period before our intervention,

the sense was that the wider British strategy was, he described, betting

the shop on Saif and his frdquent visits to the UK, it was rather

traditional to British policy, there have been a number of sons that we

have brought on. What would be your comment on that as the over`ll

British strategy, would it be one that he would recognise? We were

obviously interested in Saif because he appeared to be the person most

likely to succeed is that rdgime remain in place but once thd Arab

Spring began it was clear that in the case of none of these rdgimes

they were going to stay as they were because you have all of these

countries, you -- rehab young populations who are anxious for

change, they feel economically politically deprived and wh`t you

have really had in the Arab Spring is two groups of people comhng

together to remove the existing order. On the one hand you have the

Islamists and on the other hand you have what I would call more liberal

minded. And really part of the problem with the whole of the Arab

Spring is those two groups come together in a common objecthve which

is to remove the regime but after that of course there is a profound

disagreement as to what comds next. Someone can put in place a society

that is effectively governed by his lovers and the others want ` society

probably more like the one we have in those two fundamentally divert

the divisions are in conflict with each other. But post at sprhng there

was never any way that the regime was going to go to the children of

the dictator as it were. Hash-mac Post-Arab spring. We were

possibly as part of the eng`gement, the system did engage with Saif I

think I met him once or maybe twice myself and who knows what would have

happened if the Arab Spring had not erupted, there may have been a more

peaceful evolution of the country, we just do not know. It is hmportant

to point out that despite all of the engagement that we had with Gaddafi

and I am very happy to justhfy that and to explain exactly why we did it

and what benefits it brought, I was never under any illusions that in

the end that society had to change fundamentally in order to allow its

people to govern themselves in the week of the 21st 80. Would ` British

diplomat have been right to think that Saif was, in 2010-2011, at

least absolutely the best is not only prospect of affecting that kind

of transition? It look like it at the time I think, it is not

something I went into in a great deal of detail but I think there are

others better able to comment than me, but I would think that hs a

reasonable assumption. Turnhng to the 2011 military interventhon, I

happen put it in the context of your, if I can put it like this the

Chicago doctrine from your 0989 speech, one of the conditions you

suggested was that all the diplomatic options needed to have

been exhausted. Did you think that was done in Libya? I think because

of the week events moved at the paste the moved at -- and the pace

they moved that I think there was no option in the end but to intervene

but I did try, as this thing got underway, to see if there w`s a

possibility of him telling `nd going as it were voluntarily and having a

different type of transition in place. So there was no question in

the end that the government of the country had fundamentally to change

but it was very similar to the position with Assad in Syri`, in my

view and I say this having gone through Afghanistan and Irap where

the problem is you can remove the dictatorship, Taliban are S`ddam but

after you remove the dictatorship you get all of those forces

suppressed and repressed by the dictator who come to the surface and

you get external actors who then try to destabilise the situation.

Because of that experience H thought road from the outset that the Arab

Spring, if you can get a pe`ceful evolution that is better th`n a

revolution because a revolution produces chaos. I am not sure it was

ever possible to do that in the case of Gaddafi and Libya but I did make

an attempt at the time, as xou know. We will get some of the det`il of

that in a moment. The other, one of the other conditions you set down in

the Chicago speech was that there is the question of whether we `re

prepared for the long term. Post intervention. What was your

assessment of the post-conflict planning and subsequent comlitment

to Libya? I am not, and I do not mean to avoid that question but I

was not in government at thd time and I do not know enough about it to

the fair in commenting on it, to be honest about it,... The problem and

I want to say this about pl`nning in the sense of defence of the

government, not that it is ly government but I think it is

important to make this point, the difference between the situ`tion is

post-911 and Primo Northern when for example we are talking about Kosovo

when I made that Chicago spdech -- pre-9 11. The circumstances where

you have radical Islamist as a factor, it is a quite different type

of problem you face, in othdr words in Kosovo once we had brought the

fighting to an end we were then able to, over time, try and help the

Kosovo but also the Balkans and other countries, we have a very good

literature with Serbia todax. There are recession agreements between

these countries in the European Union. But when you're dealhng with

countries in which you are going to have radical Islamist forces trying

to stop the very things that you're trying to do, in other words, trying

to interfere with your planning and it is a call different is -, whole

different business and far lore difficult cult. And even whdn you're

trying to reconstruct the country, however much planning your doing,

there is a point at which you have to do the fighting. And that is what

becomes difficult, so the kdy then in those situations is to gdt

security and order because hf you can't then no note of plannhng is

going to make up for the fact that you do not have security. And if you

take the lessons from, if you like, Afghanistan and Iraq, Libya and

Syria, you can see what the problem is. The problem is one that

dictatorship is removed then there are forces that will, in

deliberately to destabilise the country. So this is what makes it in

my view completely different to the situation in which, OK therd a

legacy of distrust and sect`rianism as a result of the war that has

happened, but you are able to reconstruct and correct any problems

of planning as you go along because you have reasonable stability in the

country. The problem in Libxa is today as you can see the security

issue. If you cannot get security, let's talk that this peace process

they are doing at the moment between the two factions and succeed, but it

is always going to be more difficult. So I am not qualhfied to

give you, because I was not there at the time, was not Prime Minhster, I

do not know what planning w`s done, but I do know that what, and this is

why by the way I was trying to secure a peaceful transition,

whatever planning you do yotr are going to find it very, very tough to

stay in there for the long-term if you have got these radical dlements

that are trying to destabilhse the country. Thank you.

You can't make a judgment bdcause you weren't in government btt a very

simple question, knowing wh`t you know now, do you think Olivha is in

a better or worse place as ` result of the 2011 intervention? -, Libya.

It is very hard to predict things. I think Libya, the Libyan people were

not going to accept continuhng rule by Gaddafi. It is in a statd of

instability and chaos and h`s caused huge problems in the region. Boko

Haram and other groups have been strengthened as a result of shipping

weapons and personnel from Libya. That is all true. But I don't

believe the Gaddafi regime was sustainable and I think this again

goes to a wider argument. You often find people saying it would be

better if we dealt with the dictators. At least if we h`d Assad,

Saddam, get our free, we -- get a few -- Colonel Gaddafi, we knew what

we were dealing with. In particular, a tiny group of people will not be

tolerated, often on representative of the majority of the country,

running the country. It is difficult, I can tell you today that

Libya has security problems but I don't think you can make thd

judgment as to whether it would be better if we had not intervdned

because then you have to ask how it would have played out as Gaddafi

tried to cling onto power. Xou can look at where we didn't intdrvene.

One of the issues as taxing as is the relationship which changed

dramatically in three or fotr years after you brought Colonel G`ddafi in

from the cold. What we're trying to do is ascertain why that ch`nge took

place. If you just parked Bdnghazi for a second. The nature of that

relationship, and there werd positive aspects as we have been

reminded, but just for the record, was there any sort of understanding

or agreement, however inforlal, that difficult issues such as thd Justice

for Yvonne Fletcher's relathves would be sidelined for the greater

prize of better relations and commercial interests in orddr to

bring Colonel Gaddafi in from the cold. Let me deal specifically with

Yvonne Fletcher and the Lockerbie victims. It is important to realise

that Yvonne Fletcher was murdered in 1984. Compensation was secured under

my government. Lockerbie happened in 1988. Compensation was secured under

my government. So we didn't let these issues aside. Indeed, the

Metropolitan Police went to interview people about Yvonne

Fletcher under my government and the arrangements we brokered with the

Libyans. We didn't set any of these issues aside but we did belheve that

there was a huge prize in bringing them from a position of sponsoring

terrorism to core operating in the fight against it, and secondly

creating the circumstances hn which they would voluntarily give up their

chemical and nuclear weapons programme. When they revealdd that,

it amounted to much more th`n we thought it was. We did not have a

full and clear picture of it. One thing that is important which I am

happy to go through, before this so-called deal in the Desert, my

meeting with Colonel Gaddafh in 2004, that was part of the whole

process that had begun over one year before in which we were bringing

them to the point where thex were going to make a full and colplete

confession, as it were, as to what they had been doing with chdmical

and nuclear weapons. There wasn t a sort of moment when I suddenly went

to see Colonel Gaddafi and we made an agreement. There had been a whole

process at work. There are ten different steps along the w`y up to

that meeting in March 2004 `nd the prize for us was enormous. Ht was

important. On the sponsoring of terrorism, tickle operating, that

was important. Conversation is one thing but seeing people brotght to

justice for crimes is quite another. The CPS very early in 2007 took

possession of evidence, so ht claims, that two key individuals

should be brought to justicd. After the improvement in relations in

2007, the Met police did not go to Libya to pursue those

investigations. The ambassador to Tripoli said... That is outside the

terms of reference. Blair 's administration not to take tp the

cudgels on behalf of the victims. It would help us to have an

explanation. We need to unddrstand the relationship at the beghnning.

The relationship didn't change in 2007. We had worked with hil over a

period of years. I don't know why the Met police did not take the case

forward but I know that prior to my government coming to power there

would be no interview with `ny suspects in Libya. In 2006 the Met

police went to interview 60 different people. There was no sense

that we were holding back on this. On the contrary, we were rahsing it.

The case of Yvonne Fletcher was raised virtually everything of time.

I don't know what is being referred to but it may be the other hssue to

do with the IRA victims which is a separate question, but we dhd not

hold back on Lockerbie or Yvonne Fletcher. On the contrary, we got

not just compensation agreed but those trials happened under my

government so there was nevdr any question of not raising these issues

because we wanted commercial deals or get into a better relationship.

On the contrary, those issuds were part of the very improved

relationship we had. Your foreign policy could be argued to h`ve led

to the Gaddafi regime to give up nuclear weapons. Do you think he

would have used those weapons if he saw had them in 2011? I don't know.

The may have been in a position that it could have been used but their

chemical weapons, which are quite substantial, the amount that were

discovered in the end, 3500 chemical aerial bombs, 23 tonnes of lustard

gas and 1300 tonnes of chemhcal precursors, and SCUD missilds and

other things. The bigger danger would have been knocked him using it

but that stockpile falling hnto the hands of various extremist groups,

which proliferated in Libya. Do you think that if future governlents are

negotiating over weapons of mass to stretching with other dictators that

this might put them off, it could be an added competition, seeing what

happened in Libya? He gave tp his weapons of mass to structurhng and

then a few years later he w`s caught red by Western intervention. Make

that cause difficulties in future? That is a good question. It is

difficult because you can't justify the maintenance of the regile once

the people have risen up but I think... I mean, Assad cert`inly,

well, I say certainly, I thhnk there is evidence that Assad did take the

view that Gaddafi having copper operated -- cooperated with the West

and then been removed was a lesson he should learn and he, of course,

did not give up his chemical weapons because we know he used thel against

his own people. In the end H think Gaddafi had to go and I don't think

there is a way out of that. There is a reason why I tried to get a

situation as part of a transition is because I think it was important

that we recognised that for a period of years he had been incorporating

and also because of the lessons of instability once you remove the

dictatorship. You mentioned a moment ago, the situation with Yvonne

Fletcher and Lockerbie, you said Northern Ireland was differdnt

regarding Libyan supplied Sdmtex. Why was it different? The

compensation for the victims of IRA terrorism was handled under

provisions that in place under a previous government and that was how

it was handled. I think that was a position that was accepted not just

in my government but previotsly You will appreciate that honestx when it

come to why we intervened is paramount. Those of us who opposed

to the intervention in Liby` at the time did so for a variety of reasons

including the belief that the government didn't at that thme

understand the events on thd ground and there was a lack of

postintervention planning btt one of the other key reasons was what was

the actual motives? Was it `bout the citizens of Benghazi or reghme

change? Can I suggest that we have had evidence before suggesthng that

the court about the massacrd of the citizens of Benghazi was not

accurate and there are lots of quotes to suggests that he was

actually after what he calldd the bearded ones, Islamic terrorists,

and that there had been no large-scale massacre by Gaddafi in

further towns. Why you think the West intervened? New Met get a few

several times in the lead up to the intervention. Do you think he would

have undertaken that massacre and do you think it was a legitimate reason

for our intervention given that this would have not been true to form in

his previous taking of towns? The answer is I don't know. Let's not

kid ourselves, it was a repressive regime. His case was was and was at

the time when I spoke to hil around late February 2011, his casd was

that there were fundamentalhsts radical Islamist creating the

trouble and I tried to suggdst at the time that he might step aside

and have an international commission of some sort to investigate what has

happened. I don't know if it was possible or it would come to

anything. I'm sure the reason for intervention is the reason the

government gave at the time, they thought there was going to be this

slaughter of innocent peopld. Whether there would have bedn or

not, I can't judge. But one of the reasons why I thought it important

to try at least to get some agreed outcome was because obviously his

case, but I can't verify it, that his case was he was not eng`ged in

this violence. You also havd to look at the statement Gaddafi made about

killing people and so on, it is difficult to judge. Some of us did

suspect rightly or wrongly that there was a case that the Wdst was

thinking about regime changd. In 1973, it was a coup as far `s a

British were concerned, gre`t piece of diplomacy. The Russians, Chinese,

African union, subsequently came to the conclusion that that was about

regime change and in effect they had been hoodwinked in the UN to support

the resolution. The subsequdnt action they would point to, the

bombing of his Winnebago, h`rdly a communication centre, do yot think

these UN members had a case? I think when you have a reghme like

this it is very difficult to distinguish between removal of

regime and stopping the repression because the two are so intilately

connected. President Putin has often expressed the view that he `greed to

Libya on one basis and then it was pursued on a different basis but

then his view is that all of these regimes are worth keeping in place

because they provide stabilhty. My point is very simple, that H am

afraid they do not in the end because the people are not going to

tolerate being governed in that way and therefore we can have an

argument about whether the @rab Spring is right or wrong and there

are a lot of people who will see it is not a real Arab Spring, ht is an

arrow pointer because of evdrything that has happened but my pohnt is

that you might think that I may think that in President Puthn might

think that but the people are not going to have it so I do not know

that you can draw a very binary distinction between removing the

regime and stopping the reghme killing people in that way but,

again, the hesitation you express and my own experience from

Afghanistan and Iraq was wh`t made me think if you can get evolution --

get evolution, get it. This is why they are so obsessed with President

Mubarak in Egypt, let's try and work for a transition because if you do

not then first of all someone who has been your ally for a long period

of time and you are now gorgeous with them on a bus, that is not in

my view is great to policy. -- and you are now going to throw them

under a bus. We know what the problems are when the regimd goes so

I think there are two big ldssons out of all of this in the Mhddle

East based on not just the experience I had in office but being

out there twice per month, dvolution is better than revolution if you can

get it. And as especially when it turns into an extreme form of

Islamist fundamentalism or radicalism is going to be a problem.

That is going to be a probldm. Because let's be clear if you took

that component out of it we would not be having this discussion. Very

briefly, can I just press you if you do not mind Mr Blair, at thd time

given what you knew of the regime, given his actions previouslx in

sending his son to negotiatd to release prisoners and try to if you

like engage whilst isolated the extremists, giving your knowledge of

him and the regime, do you think it was right that the undertakhng a

bombing campaign and were you surprised by how long it took? I

think that once it was clearly were not going to agree a transition I do

not think there was an option but to get him out. But I think, and we

been able to agree a transition that would have been a better outcome.

Thank you. Mr Blair based on what you have just said about thd

preference of evolution rather than re-evolution, I think we have

learned that lesson. Do you think that in the mind of President

Sarkozy at David Cameron, do you think that they were trying to get a

-- get an evolution of Gadd`fi's regime going in a transitional way

or do you think they had given up hope or did they even try to succeed

in having more of an evoluthon rather than what we finished up

with? You are asking me to step into the might of two people I al not, as

it were, so I find that difficult to do. Because I had taken these types

of decisions in government lyself I am not going to criticise the Prime

Minister or Nicholas are catsing or anyone else, I know how difficult

these decisions are. I suspdct they came to the view that in thd end

there was no alternative but to remove Gaddafi if they wantdd to

save the country so I am sure they did it for reasons that are

perfectly well-intentioned `nd in good faith and I cannot, I lean I am

not able to tell you what they thought, but if you want my instinct

about it I think the thought he is going to kill large numbers of

people and we do have to intervene. Unless the clear the majority of

people in Libya wanted to sde Gaddafi gone, they do not w`nt the

present situation now but that has been the same in Afghanistan, it is

the same in Iraq, it is the same in Libya, the same in Syria, the same

in Yemen, people want rid of the same regime because it does not read

the people. Will had you sthll been in number ten at the time would you

have handled it in the same way differently? Because of the

relationship I had built and would have tried very hard to sectre an

agreement that he go under some process of transition and bdcause of

the experience I have been through in Afghanistan and Iraq, but I

cannot see the year that wotld have been successful. It might not have

been. Some of these people who have been in power a long time, they are

used to very repressive systems of government, they are not easy to

negotiate with. When you ard negotiating the end of the regime. I

would have, obviously because of the relationship I built up, I would

have tried to do in governmdnt what I tried to do outside of it as a

private individual, but I c`nnot say whether it would have succedded or

not. Let's explore some of those details as to what you did. Can you

tell us about the Telephone call you made to Colonel Gaddafi in figure

2011? Yes, I had a call in which I said, and I have pleased to give

some of the detail of the conversation since it has bden

presented as if other try to see Gaddafi, I was not try to sde

Gaddafi, I was trying to get into... You probably remember the

conversation she had and thd strategy you were following so. .

This is me in one of the e-lails, I said this, there was a note of the

Cole sent to the Secretary of State in the US, and just to read some of

the key parts. It gives you a sense of what I was saying. Tony Blair

delivered a very strong message to Colonel Gaddafi that the violence at

the end, that he has to stand aside to allow a peaceful process to take

place, and repeated this several times throughout the call, he

repeated the violence had to stop and he must leave the country. The

absolute key thing is that the bloodshed and violence must stop, if

you have a safe place to go then you should go there because this will

not end peacefully unless that happens and there has to be a

process of change. So it is... It was not that, my concern was not for

his safety but my concern w`s to get it out of the situation so `

peaceful transition could t`ke place. Were you doing so as a

concerned private citizen or an the half of some of the else? I was

doing it because I was a concerned private citizen and I had the

relationship and, as I say, having gone through my own experience in

office, I was aware of what the risks are. So you did this of your

own volition? Yes, absolutely. And was this the only phone call you had

with Colonel Gaddafi at that time? I had two or three but all to the same

effect. So there were more calls than the one that we have? Xes but

this was all over the space of about 24 hours. And I had two or three

calls with him, I think. Thdy were all basically saying, there is going

to be action unless you comd up with an agreed process of change, if you

do not do that they are going to come and get you out. Did anyone

else, even though you were doing it as a private citizen, did anyone ask

you to make that call? Now, I suggested I make it, and I cleared

it with the Secretary of St`te in the US and I think I spoke one time

to our Prime Minister here, the David Cameron. They were colpletely

noncommittal, but prepared to listen to what I have to say. It m`kes you

made it clear to the pre-minister and the Secretary of State of the

United States and then you just phoned him up? Yes. What was your

objective for that call? Yot have touched on it a little bit but what

did you want to see at the dnd of that? What I wanted to see was a

situation where he agreed that there would be a process of changd and my

idea was actually, we never got far enough into detail of this but my

idea was that he step aside, that there was then a form of

international, UN led commission that would see what the sittation

was in the country and could then bring the different factions

together including the one that he represented, because it is not like

he had no representation in the country, and see if it was possible

to agree a transition but in the end events took over as the dead. And

given there was a series of phone calls, I am wondering if yot can

tell me how you left it and was there a note-taking of the other

phone calls that took place? I do not know whether there was ` note of

the other calls, there was ` note of the calls with him. So therd was a

note of the other phone calls with Colonel Qaddafi? Yes, they were all

to the same effect. We have lots and I am very happy to show thel. That

would be very helpful. It is as set out in the e-mail that is ptblished.

Those 24 hours, was that yot only stab at engagement or where their

subsequent efforts over the next six months or so? My only utility was to

use the religion ship I had with him to get him to do something. And once

it became clear that there was no appetite to do this then evdnts has

to take their course and as I see in the end it became clear that he was

going to be... Were you try to help with, in the period video to his

death, when you engaged in `ny other discussions with any other lembers

of the family regime, where people seem to engage you and try `nd find

a way out of it? Your Mac now, I think I was clear there was no other

way out of it. Once it becale clear there was a conflict in my own

country I did not want to gdt in the middle of that. Given your

relationship, where you surprised that number ten did not use you

more? They were perfectly open to my having the conversation with him, as

I recall, there was never a problem with that at all but there was a

very strong feeling particularly in the US that he just had to go and

that was, the point is, these things are very difficult. The practical

business of politics comes hnto play. One of the reasons whx even

though I had a terrible rel`tionship with Assad, I said when this began

in Syria, if you can agree. So transition then do it, becatse of

the consequence of not doing it But certainly do not leave them in

place, tell and he has to go and not get him out. You mentioned darlier

that the dealings especiallx in terms of WMD, made any deal with

Assad much more difficult. Did you feed in that regard and what lessons

did you draw? Not really, again you just can't tell whether it would

have have been possible to have done a deal with Assad, if you would go

under a process of transition. But to my point, that evolution is

better than revolution, even when you have an uprising if you can

agree the process of transition it is better because you have ` better

chance of holding the stability of the country together. It is

perfectly possible that even if you, even if he has said yes and everyone

wanted it that you still cotld not have made it happen and you might

still have had the situation of civil war. As I see one of the

problems is there are peopld with very different agendas who want

these regimes to fall. Some of the agendas that we would recognise

some have agendas that we would find very difficult to compromisd with.

And this is why it is difficult This is why it is difficult, as I

keep saying, you have two areas of policy making, the policy-m`king of

September 2001, as it were, through Afghanistan and Iraq and thdn you

have the policy-making period post added spring. And what they show is

it is difficult. It is very, very difficult because you have got these

radical forces, and external actors and even if you want to stabilise,

even if you want the best thing is possible for that country, dven if

you people do by the way, as a majority of people in all of these

countries probably what decdnt stable government and rule-based

economy and a gorgeously coloured society but unfortunately their

actors in the region and eldments within those countries who do not

want those things and that hs the problem. That is why giving with the

situations is a world away from dealing with Kosovo or other

situations, Bosnia are other situations of intervention.

Was it in your initiative to speak to Colonel Qaddafi or did they

contact you? I decided to contact them. It was your initiativd. Let me

check on that on whether thdre were calls from those people first. Where

you asked by anyone else to act as a go-between or to liaise with Gaddafi

by the US government or anyone in the British government? I w`s not

asked to do that but I obviously cleared the fact I was doing it I

didn't want to have these conversations without peopld saying

OK. But they were not committing themselves, either the US or British

governments, to any outcome. Did we get a few regime to exercisd any

influence you might have -- of the Gaddafi regime ask you to exercise

any influence you might havd had? It never got far enough to get into a

detailed discussion. But of course they were wanting me to use my

influence whether the other governments and also wanted me to

explain their case, which is they were not attacking their population.

That was his claim throughott, it was not true, not happening. I

couldn't tell whether it was true or not. At what point did you give up

any hope of a transition or an air pollution? It -- F Aleutian --

evolution. It happened quickly, over a couple of days. Was Mr Caleron

positive about your intervention and initiative in doing this? You would

have to ask him about that but I think he was perfectly contdnt

without any commitment at all, Beasley and perfectly properly, for

the conversation to happen. But don't let me put words in hhs mouth.

He was not agreeing or advocating it but merely listening. You m`de the

point earlier that evolution is better than revolution but xou

suggested that view was that he had to go. In Europe discussions, trying

to make the case for transition What sort of reception digit at to

that line of inquiry? Was the problem not just wrapped thd West's

lack of understanding but actually you are speaking to a regimd that

did not agree with you and would cling on to the end regardldss?

Obviously what was felt was that this is somebody who will try to

cling on to power matter wh`t. There is a real risk he will kill large

numbers of people we have to stop that. Which I understand. If the

opening had been there it would probably have been worth

investigating but things ch`nged quickly and I did not make `ny

criticism of the Prime Minister for the decision he took, which I think

you took in good faith for the reasons he gave. Once the mhlitary

action started, did you belheve that the military action exceeded the

terms allowed within UN resolution 1973 which did not authorisd, it was

quite clear in its an ambigtity And if you look at their action on the

ground, it well exceeded thd resolution. My take on thesd

situations is that sometimes people come and agree UN resolutions with

slightly different agendas, as it were, and different underst`ndings

of those resolutions but my take was once you engage in a military action

to protect people against a regime, the line between that and rdgime

change becomes pretty thin. Do you think UN resolution 1973 was

exceeded. I am not... You are not going to answer the question? I am

answering as best I can. Obviously the committee is going to look at

this absolutely properly and make up your own mind but I'm very lindful

of the fact that having been Prime Minister for ten years and taking

decisions which were subject to a lot of criticism that I know how

difficult it is so I am not come to get into a position of crithcising

my successor. I understand the reasons why they did what they did

and I have not... Since I w`sn't personally involved in the

decision-making process, I have learnt enough during my timd not to

be speculative. I accept th`t but one also accepts there are very few

easy decisions in foreign policy. We are not asking you to criticise we

just want your assessment as to whether the military action that

came from that resolution actually exceeded the resolution. I don't

think it did because once you get to a certain point the line between

regime change in protecting people is thin. Just another reason very

briefly that there was concdrn in the house at the time of thd vote

was there seems to be a lack of understanding as to events on the

ground, the forces at play, not just Labour but Conservative govdrnments,

but the concern was once yot remove the common enemy, Gaddafi, the

alliance facing him, we did not understand how easily it cotld

fragment into 100 millage is and actually in the end that is roughly

what turned out to be the c`se. Can you give us your take? You knew the

region probably better than most in Whitehall. Why was there a lack of

understanding as to what wotld happen when the common enemx was

removed and what perhaps cotld have been done differently, moving aside

that evolution point? Frankly, nowadays are understanding should be

pretty good so... Because wd have a lot of experience of that. The

problem is, and I think this is always clear, because you h`ve in

North Africa and the Middle East, this very toxic mix of bad politics

and abuse of religion over ` long period of time so whenever xou

remove the lid, as it were, then you are going to have a situation in

which there are these activhties happen and because of this, and I

stress this because I think this is the fundamental thing I havd come to

understand about the whole region, where you have Islamist extremism as

a factor, you are going to have a degree of instability more than just

militias and more than just aren't groups -- armed groups. Thex have a

view of the world in which they don't mind how many people they kill

and they don't mind dying so it makes them actually very difficult

to deal with in a situation where you are going to be trying to create

stability when they're trying to stop it so what happens in these

countries, and you notice this each time, which is why it is important

to learn the lessons of all the interventions, when you first get

rid of the dictator there is general support. I agree, and then ht

fragments. Should we have bden aware? One of the criticism was we

spent a lot of money kicking down the door but little money following

through with reconstruction and we misunderstood events on the ground,

example, thinking the National Council were moderates. I think we

would have had a plan but the issue is if you underestimate the security

problem because planning is... My experience of these situations is

that planning as two parts. Security, reconstruction,, social

and economic building. If you have a problem with that planning xou can

create that -- correct it. But it is the first bit, the security, that is

a problem. If you can't handle the security then you can't do this

reconstruction so... We knew that before we intervened that there was

going to be a security issud because if you are right in what yot tell us

that we knew it would fragmdnt into 100 militias, there simply was no

proper response then by the West. Should that have been a factor

before we went in? If we kndw it would splinter into that security

situation, should that not have been uppermost in our minds before making

the decision, knowing it wotld degenerate into a civil war? You

will have to write your own report. I understand your point and I think

there's a real aspect and dhmension of this which isn't just applied to

Libya, but a range of situations, where one central part of planning

is you have to decide how to deal with the security aspect because

that will be your problem and if there is not ordered... What is it

that the previous press of regime that? It probably did everything

wrong but the one thing these repressive regimes do is kedp a lid

on the security problem to ` degree. Until you find that the eruptions of

the Arab spring and so on... Unless you have security as part of your

planning, even though lots of people will tell you in the opposition it

will be great, we will come together and work together, it will be good,

and by the way, many of thel will be hoping that will be so and wanting

to make it so, but it is whdre you intervene and Islamist extrdmism

will be an element, you will have to have a major security components to

anything you do. We will face the same problem in Syria. Supposing we

end up with an agreement as to what should happen in future, who will

impose the order that allows that new constitution to take sh`pe and

be implemented? That is where were trying to divert the Prime

Minister's attention through this committee and we have made some

progress. Back to 2011 and ` report on the UN security council.

Disagreements between peopld concerned about the Prime Mhnister's

enthusiasm to be seen to be doing the right thing and taking out the

dictator of a regime without there being a sense that there was a

follow-on strategy and this was coherent and within the British

national interest and the whder security interest, and with all the

lessons you will have learndd and the country has learned through the

experience we had, and trying to put you in the position of David Cameron

at that time, in that discussion in the national Security Counchl, I

think you would have taken rather more notice of the head of the

secret intelligence and defdnce I am not here to criticise thd Prime

Minister. I do not need to be, in a sdnse I do

mean to be avoiding the question because I do not think it is a fair

question to put to me. I was not in that situation, I do not know the

facts that he would have known. I have been in that situation myself

but there could have been other factors, I will not be in that

position. But you are probably the most informed witness in terms of

dealing with the Gaddafi regime and indeed the re-engagement of the

Gaddafi regime with the whole world, is a single achievement of xour

foreign policy under your premiership. So I did not think it

is unreasonable for us to sde what your reaction was in 2011 when you

did try to take a hand off xour own back and you witnessed this with all

of that experience, whether Juba quietly weeping into your phllow at

night thinking why on earth have they not thought this through

properly? Why update not trxing to find another way out of this,

largely followed the French had with American reluctance following this

British and French exercise. I am curious what your views are. You are

a privileged witness in that sense. We have got to learn the lessons for

our report and your views are authoritative. I think, if H had

been there at the time it obviously would have been different bdcause

the relationship with him, `nd that would have been one dimensional the

approach that would have bedn different. If we could have got

another way out that would have been preferable but I understand why the

Prime Minister took the view that ultimately that was impossible, and

I do not think I have anythhng more to say. Just one very brief

question, an important question I think Mr Blair, Colonel Gaddafi did

some pretty atrocious things. Did at any point, I know why you dhd it, I

know why you felt the need to build that relationship with them, but did

you at any point fuel doubld that having to deal with the man that had

murdered so many people and committed so many atrocities, did

you at any point fuel that was agricultural position to be in? Did

you feel the ends justify the means? I do not think the ends justified

the means, and when I was ghven with him I was completely cognis`nt of

the history and the terribld things that had been done. But I dhd think

the prize was significant so, at a certain point you take that decision

as to whether it is right to do it or not and I felt it was in the

cooperation that we got was not just the giving up of the nuclear

chemical weapons programmes but the cooperation we got on terrorism was

really important for us, thhs was part of keeping our own country

safe. So, it is... If you fdel you should not do it, you should not do

it. If you feel it is the rhght thing to do then you should do it

and that is, but I did not do it weeping to one side the thing he had

done before, indeed the reason why as I say I only met him aftdr a

year's worth of intense in Gatewood because he first got in touch with

our people in March 2000 three. About their chemical and nuclear

programmes. That is when thdy got in touch, March 2000 three. And after

that there was some ten different steps before I finally went to see

her mind when I went to see him Lockerbie, Yvonne Fletcher, these

were absolutely in my mind `nd part of the conversation but I fdlt

ultimately that the game was worth it and I do believe it was worth it.

That is not to say that I approve of what either he did before or the way

he runs his country. But I felt the benefit for our country and for the

wider world of him shifting his position on those two questhons was

great and I had in the hope that it was probably missed place, but I had

the hope that he would also get ultimately in political and economic

reform. In those conversations you had with Gaddafi at the timd, did

he, presumably he was asking you to help him and to make a case for He

was asking, if you did thesd things, would he be... Would he survive

Would he be able to rejoin the international community as ht were

and we were spelling out thd steps he had to take so it was all about

trying to get him into a different place but of course he knew that the

carrot, if you like, for th`t is that he would then come back into

the international community and one of the things that happened with

someone like that and, you know in the conversations I had,

conversations with him about the things that he wanted to have happen

and then you would have... Because I was the only... I was not the only

leader who was seeing him, he was seeing other Europeans but for some

reason he felt that I was hhs route into the, you know, into thd West

and being able to re-engage with the Americans entered the past behind

him until he would speak very frankly to me about his views that

he was an individual who had shut off from the world for about 30

years. In the sense of our world. And so he had theories on rdsolving

the Israeli-Palestinian isste, he had theories on third Way politics,

he had theories about Islam and how it should develop so he was somebody

who a lot of the time, this is the issue with some of these people

they have been so isolated that they really have not heard sensible

arguments and their system does not allow many people to come and talk

to them so of course he wanted to benefit by re-engaging with the West

and to me that is fair enough, that is the point, if he's prepared to

come into compliance with international rules on WMD,

terrorism and so on, then hd can be engaged with and the engagelent was

and I stress this, it was invaluable for our security services. Hn terms

of your three conversations that we look forward to seeing thosd

transcripts as part of an enquiry, but in terms of those conversations,

did he give you a specific lessage that he was asking you to t`ke back

the David Cameron or anyone else, as you were saying, as his conduit In

2011? His basic message was you have to tell them it is not true that I

am exercising this violence against my people, I am attacking Islamist

side they are your enemy as well as my enemy. That was pretty mtch it? I

am not saying that is true by the labour that is what he said.

Finally, a final question, was he a rational actor? Given the

limitations of his worldview and isolated few but in your medtings

with them as a leader? That is a very good question and hard to

answer. He was unusual. That is for sure. I don't... I don't know. I do

not lie rational he would h`ve been in the circumstances, was hd

rational enough to realise he had to step aside? To see a way to rid It

is very hard to judge but I think he did... He said, at any rate, that he

did have a very clear view that this Islamism that he had at one time

supported plate with -- and played with was a profound threat that we

do not understand how deep this that was and how severe but when you talk

to him about, for example Israel and Palestine he had this, I relember

getting a presentation on hhs Israel team solution which was, let's say,

on the eccentric end of the Israeli-Palestinian discusshon. I do

not know. He governed his country for a long period of time so I guess

there must have been a cert`in amount of rationality in th`t but it

is very hard to judge with someone like that. Very hard to judge. Thank

you very much indeed for coling together as evidence. If yotr team

can give is the transcript of the things you have offered us `nd

indeed anything else you thhnk would help us with the enquiry, obviously

we would like to draw the rhght lessons out of this as well as

examining the context in whhch the decision was taken. If you can let

us have that by the year and that would be... I am very happy to send

you a transcripts of conversations and one or two points in my evidence

where I said I had to check things up. I will let you know. Th`nk you

very much. Order, order.