Exiting the EU Committee Select Committees

Good morning. Can I, we have of the

committee, express a very warm

welcome to our three witnesses

today. Professor Michael Dougan,

University of Liverpool. The

director of UK in a changing Europe.

And Stephen Booth, director of

policy and research, open Europe.

Thank you for agreeing to come along

today. Can I begin with this

interesting question of full

alignment of the UK and the EU. In a

way that was the most significant

part of phase one because it enabled

the 27 to say, right, that

sufficient progress, off we go. Can

I start by asking you what is your

understanding, briefly, we have got

a lot of questions to ask in the

time, succinct answers would be

really helpful, what is your

understanding of what it is the

government has committed to in what

they described as the fallback? In

other words, if there is no deal, no

other method, there is a clear

commitment in the deal to this full

alignment that ensures there is no

border? Can I start with you,

Professor Dougan?

Sure. Thank you

very much for the invitation. Would

you like me to comment specifically

on the context of Northern Ireland,

the passage of the joint report that

deals with Northern Ireland?

Indeed.

Absolutely.

I think there are four.

There are four questions, I think,

which arise out of that part of the

text and the joint report of the

fourth option, unilateral

commitment, full alignment, with

certain rules of the single market

and the Customs Union. It is only

certain rules. The text gives a few

indicative fields. They talk about

the all Ireland economy, North South

cooperation and the Good Friday

Agreement. But each of those is open

to interpretation. So we are not

quite sure yet what scopes of

cooperation we are talking about. It

is clearly not the full single

market the Customs Union. The phrase

full alignment may not have a

certain political resonance, it may

have political symbolism, but it is

very difficult for me as a

constitutional EU trade lawyer to

translate it into something more

concrete and precise. The single

market and the Customs Union are

built on different combinations of

legal techniques, mutual

recognition, harmonisation,

surveillance and supervision. They

differ from sector to sector, they

change over time. It is difficult

for me to get a sense of what full

alignment means maps onto the actual

complexities of the single market

and the Customs Union. I think the

third issue is that full alignment

is not clear territorially, whether

it is intended to apply only to

Northern Ireland are to all of the

UK, whether that might change in

different situations. For me, it is

interesting in that the choice seems

to be left to the Northern Ireland

institutions rather than the UK

government. The stereo --

territorial scope of full alignment

is not necessarily that clear. The

fourth issue is this is a unilateral

offer. This is the UK saying

unilaterally we will fully align

ourselves with certain rules of the

single market and the Customs Union.

That can limit the roles of another

territory and don't me very much in

international trade, because without

the institutions, the processes, the

structures and networks that

underpin the interaction of rules

while remaining a unilateral

decision to mimic rules, they don't

give you any greater market access

or deal with customs barriers. It is

interesting that the UK government

in both of its -- in its partnership

paper in this position paper on

Northern Ireland, explicitly say

that unilateral solutions will not

work. We need agreed solutions

because unilateral solutions will

not work. So to that extent the

joint report is a departure from

what we knew from the future

partnership paper and the position

paper.

That is extremely helpful.

Just one more point. If it only

applies to certain sectors of the

economy, the all Ireland economy,

then how can that be consistent with

what is also written, clearly, in

the phase one agreement, that there

will be no checks, no infrastructure

at all? The only way you can honour

that commitment is if it applies to

all part of the economy. Basically,

all movements between Northern

Ireland and the Republic, and the

Republic and Northern Ireland.

Isn't

that the case? It may be helpful if

I give you my summary review of the

position on Northern Ireland. At

least the customs part. For me it is

just a forge. -- for it's. The

position hasn't changed. We are

promising irreconcilable things to

different groups of people. We don't

know how to solve it. We have come

up with a form of words that people

feel they can buy into to enable

progress. But it is actually very

difficult for me to see how these

solutions are carrying the situation

forward. For me this is just a

postponement of the argument until

the New Year. And in certain

respects it could make the

resolution of the situation worse,

or at least more difficult, because

by putting it down in writing, by

giving concrete commitments, by

generating expectations among

different groups of people that

these commitments are somehow

binding are guaranteed or

unenforceable, we are entrenching an

intractable problem and making the

position is potentially more

difficult to come to a compromise,

rather than offering clear

solutions. For me, the Northern

Ireland selection is kicking it into

the New Year without any clear

resolution.

Thank you.

I will just

add three things to what Michael

said. This is a clear commitment. It

is. The legal status of this

document is open to debate. It is a

clear commitment in a document that

may not be binding. What status that

gives it, heaven alone knows. To

pick up on the points you made about

scope, the other thing the report

stresses is the need to maintain

integrity through the single market.

It is difficult to see how that

happens if you're picking off bits

with regard to the all Ireland

macroeconomy. There is a further

attention to those outlined by

Michael. The third point is a

unilateral offer. It seems to me the

missing element is the question of

adjudication. That lurking in the

text of this document is we will be

alignment trusts. The big question

is who gets to -- the sake? Wrote

what is the form of legal

adjudication? We have a very good

institution in Luxembourg that does

it already, if you are interested. I

think that has been postnatally to

one side as well. Nobody in

International Trade takes the other

parties -- party pots word for it.

-- party's.

Thank you.

I agree with

much of what has been said. There is

a risk of trying to analyse this to

rationally when basically this is a

political forge and it's hard to

find much meaning. If there is no

deal, there is no deal. How a

unilateral declaration from the UK

can somehow keep the UK in the

Customs Union for practical

purposes, to move goods across the

border, I don't see how it achieves

that. You can look at that from

either way. From the EU side. What

does this commitment mean if the EU

tries to bank this deal? How does

that work? I do think that this is,

yes, it's a very political section

of the document which effectively

means very little, I think.

Thank

you.

Pat McFadden. I want to keep

going with this line of questioning,

if I can. Professor Dougan, you

described it as a postponement a

couple of minutes ago. If things are

not clear, I just want to ask a few

questions about what we need to

become clear in the second phase of

this to understand it better. First

of all, on full alignment, it seems

that the UK government is defining

this as the six areas for North

South cooperation stemming from the

Good Friday Agreement. Tourism,

transport etc. Significantly, those

in six areas do not cover import and

export of goods and services. So the

first question I would like to ask

is, is it your understanding that

that is also the EU and Irish

government view of what full

alignment means? And if their view

is different, what is it that needs

to be clarified about this in the

second phase?

For me, the north South cooperation

part of the phrasing in the joint

report is a relatively clear

criterion in the sense that the two

sides have been drawing up a list of

areas that are the subject of

North-South co-operation,

underpinned by EU law and policy. It

covers health and energy etc. For EV

much more ambiguous criterion which

is listed in the joint report is

supporting the all Ireland

macroeconomy. This could mean

anything. This could mean

everything, every part of the single

market and the Customs Union in its

entirety, or it could mean just

single parts and selected parts, and

we have no real idea what is meant.

When I mentioned earlier in response

to the question, these criteria are

very malleable, open to

interpretation. They don't tell us

very much at all. Especially that

criterion, the all Ireland economy,

protecting the all Ireland economy.

That can be as broad or narrow as

you wanted to be.

In the end we will

need a legal text, the end of phase

two. What in your view needs to be

clarified? If this is all

constructive ambiguity, what needs

to be clarified so that we know at

least what it leads to?

I can give a

direct answer. Somebody needs to be

told that there are going to be very

disappointed with this agreement. I

think that is the actual answer that

needs to be conveyed. It is worth

bearing in mind the government sets

out a 3-judge approach. First of

all, these issues could be solved by

the special partnership. That is

problematic as things stand. First

of all because we don't know what

the special partnership may look

like. The government's idea has not

gone down terribly well, are

terribly credibly either at home or

abroad. And the timescales don't

necessarily match up with the

imminent problem of the Irish

border. The deep and special

partnership could only be sorted in

six or seven years. The next

position is the special solutions

agreed, not unilateral, unique to

the situation of Ireland and

Northern Ireland. Given again what

we know from the government position

paper on Northern Ireland, these are

only building on the deep and

special partnership. These are

additional things on top. If we

don't have the deep and special

partnership in place, it's difficult

to see how the government has yet

put on the table credible solutions

specific to Northern Ireland. This

is a default position. As a default

position it doesn't tell us very

much at all, especially because of

its unilateral nature. The problem

is that we have irreconcilable

promises to different groups of

people, and somebody is going to be

disappointed. I think it is a matter

of identifying who is going to be

the most disappointed by the time of

12 months from here.

I will ask your colleagues if they

want to come in.

The Irish

government want an invisible border.

You have to decide which part of the

United Kingdom stays in the single

market and the Customs Union. That

is something it fails to do. That is

a question of deciding which

constituency you want is -- to

disappoint with the outcome.

I'm not

sure that is entirely true. I think

the only way this can be solved is

through continued postponement. I

think the way that this process

might unfold, May allow this to

continue for quite some time. If we

do enter a transitional

instrumentation phase in which the

UK effectively replicates the single

market and the Customs Union, we

will face this exact same question

at the end of 2018, early 2019, and

the question is, is either side

going to blink? We have got to the

point now virtually the EU was

prepared to move forward with a

postponement and Ireland as well,

the UK too, given the expectation is

we're not going to have this final

trade agreement on the future

partnership, signed, sealed and

delivered by March 2019, I can see

every likelihood that the continue

this into the transition period. And

I think at that point it may start

to become easier to focus on a

narrow scope of the particular

issues which both the Republic of

Ireland, the rest of the EU and the

United Kingdom feel they need to

keep open, and focus on the

alignment where you can keep an open

border between North and South. What

I think we will be living with this

question for a great deal of months

and years ahead.

The other side of this is the

following paragraph in that joint

document published the other week,

also said that there should be no

new regulatory barriers between

Northern Ireland and the rest of the

UK as a result of this. There's been

a lot of attention this means

north-south. I want to ask you about

the implications then for that

second part of this. Do you think,

could you spell out what you think

they are, in terms of what full

alignment will mean for the whole of

the UK? With the rest of the UK on

this - broadening out from Northern

Ireland? And do you think that's

been fully understood in political

debate here?

It is a really, really

interesting question. We're starting

to talk a lot about the UK internal

market, this sort of new concept

which has emerged since 2016. But we

don't actually know very much about

what that UK internal market

consists of, how it will be

organised and so on. In a way, this

joint report - bleakly gives us

first glimpses into what the market

might look like. One could say this

is the tail wagging the dog. In many

respects it is. I can tell you what

I learned about the UK internal

market from the joint report. In so

far as full alignment applies to the

UK as a whole, then, that's

obviously the easiest way to ensure

there are no regulatory barriers

between Northern Ireland and GB. It

guarantees full market access for

Northern Irish businesses into GB.

In so far as the full alignment only

applies to Northern Ireland because

the Northern Irish institutes have

agreed that should be the case and

doesn't apply to GB, then obviously

there can be no new regulatory

barriers for Northern Irish

businesses going into GB, but there

will potential I will be regulatory

barriers for GB businesses going

into Northern Ireland. What that

tells us I think in a way is that

the model of the internal market

which is emerging - bleakly from

this joint report, A, makes some

very striking assumptions about the

confidence of the UK Government to

deal with devolved matters, because

the UK Government, in so far as,

full alignment covers the hole of

the UK, it's presupposing confidence

to regular sectors which would

belong in the devolved fields of

competence. The UK Government is

assuming it has the competence to

determine the trade between the

nations of the UK. And from what we

can see so far it is a fairly

lop-sided relationship, in that

Northern Ireland will have a special

place. Will that special place

extend to Scotland and Wales? To

other parts of England? We are

learning lots of interesting things

from this document, probably not

intended in that way. But we are

learning that the internal market of

the UK is going to be based on a

relatively extensive conception of

the UK Government, vis a vis the

devolved regions and it may be a lop

sided market which gives certain

regions greater privileges than

others.

Thank you. What I am asking

really is the Irish question reverse

engineering the type of Brexit we

are going to end up with?

To an

extent. What is interesting is it

gives the Irish political

authorities to do something if they

so wish and it promises unfeted

access in one direction but not the

other, which is a curious form of

wording. I have not understood the

implications of that. It is A

symmetrical, in a sense, if you were

a cynical political scientist, you

would say you were laying the ground

for some blame-shifting here. It is

up to these authorities to take a

decision as to whether or not they

will allow certain barriers to

arise. Maybe that's the plan. I

don't know, to be honest.

Which the Irish Government are

equally concerned about is the

border east-west, not just

north-south, because of course their

main market lies in GB and the goods

which go to the EU go through GB.

So, given what you have said so far

about this being a fudge, do you,

what barriers do you see, or what

prospects do you see within this

document that the east-west border

can be, there's a guarantee of

frictionless trade in that

direction? And what implications

does that have for regulations vis a

vis the United Kingdom as a whole?

And the EU?

Well, I think the first

thing to say is if the UK leaves the

Customs Union and the single market

it will not be frictionless. The

question is how to minimise the

friction. And I think, so again the

notion of an invisible border, I

think that when the UK Government

talks about that, it is clear it

wants to avoid physical

infrastructure, but everything

recognises if you are outside the

Customs Union there'll have to be

new paperwork to be done. The

question is whether that can be done

in a virtual sense rather than

through checking everything at the

border. But as you say, I think

there are going to be areas where

the UK wants to be closely ashrine r

lined to the Customs Union, the

transit of goods through the United

Kingdom which would help Irish

supporters -- exporters to export to

the main line Europe. It would help

UK exporters to help them with their

access to the single market and the

Customs Union as well. There'll be a

mutual interest in keeping a degree

of alignment on certain rules which

facilitate trade.

The Government has

already said that the term full

alignment is a flexible term. It

does not mean being part of the

single market or part of the Customs

Union. There are lots of ways, lots

of recognition, etc. So, does the

commitment and in document give

enough leeway for the Government to

be able to say, look we can still be

outside the single market, we can

still be outside Customs Union and

yet there are other ways in which we

can meet the commitment?

Yes, it

does. It is what the agreement says.

It says in the absence of solutions.

So the aim now for the UK and for

the rest of EU are to find those

solutions.

I am less convinced, I

have to say. How you minimise

friction because you will get

friction. If we are outside the

single market the Customs Union,

there'll be friction. The other

question is where that arises?

Whether it arises Ireland or

east-west. That is the political

choice that has to be made.

Can the

fudge not be, and you talked about

this being a fudge, could the fudge

not be from the EU side, where for

example they fudge some of their

requirements for border treatment in

relation to the Irish Republic?

Can

I say something quickly on that, for

me, one of the problems with Brexit

is you don't have historical

comparisons. One is when Poland

joined the EU and the Poles had a

very open border with Ukraine. As a

result western Ukraine floushished

economically because there was more

going on with the Polish economy and

the Poles begged the European Union

to be flexible when it came to a

border, they said, absolutely

rightly, this will have a very

detrimental effect on the west

Ukrainian economy. It was ignored.

Showed very little in the way of

flexibility about that. If that is

the precedent, then the answer to

your question is, no.

A couple of

small points and a potentially

larger point which you might want me

to talk about or you may think

you've heard enough of me. On the

issue of transit, which is very,

very crucial, of course. They have

explicitly reserved that for the

second phase of the negotiation.

They will come back to reach an

agreement on transit itself. Second

point, one of the most important of

the borders that runs east-west, is

not the border for goods or the

border and regulation, it is the

border for the common travel area

and in a way that's the one triumph

of the secretary on Ireland and

Northern Ireland in the joint

report. It is a really welcome

thing. It is not a guarantee that

the common travel area persist in

all areas -- in all circumstances.

There's work still to be done by the

UK, by Ireland and by the UK and

Ireland together to make sure that

the conditions under which the

common travel area can be preserved,

way into the future will exist into

the future. But it is a significant

achievement.

The third point is I described the

section on the customs and

regulatory border as a political

fudge, the problem is that this is a

political fudge which cannot last

forever. Because we are going to

leave the EU. There is going to be a

border and it has to be a border of

a particular type and character and

that does need to be sorted out. So

this is a fudge in the sense that it

postpones the difficult decisions,

but doesn't take away the need to

make the difficult decisions

eventually. We cannot live with a

fudge when we actually need to have

solutions. Will there be border

checks at that border or will there

not be? Your question raises wider

issues which may come back to what

Hillary talked about at the start

about what regulatory alignment or

convergence mean, not just in the

context of Northern Ireland but in

the context of the EU-UK

relationship as a whole? There is

probably a lot to be said about that

and I don't want to go off on a

monologue if you don't think it is

the right moment. The issues of

Ireland and the UK are much more

wrapped up in the question of the

future relationship between the UK

and the EU as a whole, rather than

necessarily to do with the situation

of Northern Ireland.

That ening you

very much. Just a factual question,

in the agreement it says, the UK

recalls its commitment to the

avoidance of a hard border,

including any physical

infrastructure or related checks and

controls - that is very specific. Is

there any border between the EU 28

and none EU member-states where that

condition obtains? In other words -

there are no checks, no controls, no

infrastructure? Just as a matter of

fact. If one takes the example of

say Sweden and Norway, which is

cited statements, does that apply

there?

No it doesn't.

And doesn't

apply in relation to Poland and

Ukraine, despite the Ukraine's

association? That is very helpful.

Now, Stephen Crabb is next to be

followed by Stephen Graham. We have

hit a rich seam and a number of

colleagues want to come in.

I want

to ask Mr Booth to answer that

question which was put out there,

whether the circumstances of Ireland

and Northern Ireland mean, are

unique enough to mean that the EU

will feel motivated to compromise on

how stringent it wants to implement

its regulatory checks, whether there

is a fudge option there?

Ultimately

that is a political question. I

think that the only way this does

get solved is both sides move a bit.

I agree that would require the EU to

show some flexibility. And that

would beviable long-term?

The

long-term deal. We then revisit this

issue two more times before we are

done. We will revisit it at the end

of this Article 50 process. If the

final partnership is not agreed by

that point it will have to be put

off again. I think what is crucial

throughout this process between now

and then is that we start to hon in

on the issues where this really

matters, defining what we actually

mean by full alignment in, what is

the scope that might apply to.

Clearly at the moment there is no

agreement between both parties, what

we are talking about. Is this just

about agricultural products? Is it

about wider manufacturing products?

What are we talking about? At this

moment this is a vague concept. We

need to hon in on what thingual

issues are that the EU are concerned

about. What is specifically

concerned the EU will happen? How

can the UK seek to address those

concerns? That's what we need to get

to know, I think.

So you wounltd

necessarily agree with the professor

on that there's no precedent at all

for the EU not firmly implementing

its regulatory requirement at

borders?

On the border there are not

many precedents. There are in the UK

history where it is fudged through a

series of legal and things which you

might have said were unthinkable

politically six months before. The

EU has managed to find a way if

there is a will. That is what it

comes down to in the end.

And to the

wider panel, did you think that

there is clarity and agreement

between the EU, the UK and Irish

Government about what no physical

checks actually means?

I am not in a

position to say, to be honest. From

reading the document and lissening

to what the various sides say,

probably not. That is a guess rather

than based on knowledge.

I would say the expansion of the

words used in the joint report, hard

border, that could have been a

phrase that is open to

interpretation. You can have a bit

of a border that is not that hard

and get away with it. Referring to

any physical infrastructure,

referring to formalities, is a

hostage to fortune. Customs about

checks and formalities. That is

inescapable. It is not just a matter

of EU law or UK law. It is WTO law

as well. You can have fudges, room

for a wriggle. But border customs

mean checks and formalities. It was

a bit on helpful to add that

expanded formulation of the words.

Potential hostage to fortune in the

future.

If you were drafting the

agreement between the EU and UK,

what would you deliver to make sure

you can deliver on no checks?

I

don't think you can. That is one of

the main problems we have come

across particularly with the

proposals customs. Hillary mention

the Norway and Sweden border before.

In a way the Norway Sweden border is

about as closely integrated a border

as you can get without being in the

Customs Union. Bear in mind there

are no customs tariffs are duties of

any kind on most categories of goods

between EU member states, there are

no internal tariffs between those

countries. Only external tariffs,

which involve third countries with

pretty much full regulatory

alignment and convergence and

cooperation within the EU agreement.

There is still a customs border. It

still has to function as a customs

border. You can manage it, control

it. You can say commercial vehicles

must go through these checkpoints.

But a common border zone, between

Norway and Sweden, whether customs

officials can travel across the

border freely, but it is still a

customs border. That is as close and

cooperative as you can get. But you

still have checks, formalities,

physical infrastructure etc.

Can I

just add one thing? The mention of

tariffs is interesting. We are back

to the start of the question. This

is in the event of no deal. In the

event of no deal there will be

customs tariffs. If the EU is

correct in saying it wants to

enforce its border, presumably the

EU will set of customs posts to

collect the tariffs gear -- due? If

the EU sticks to its word it will

have to impose a border.

That would require the UK sing

unilaterally we're not going to have

tariffs.

For the world. When you say

you have no tariffs, you are saying

you have no tariffs for anybody.

The

EU presumably wants to correct --

collect its tariffs? In the event of

no deal, whether the UK unilaterally

does anything, it's beside the

point. It will require the EU as

well to provide a border.

Leading on

from that, can I gently chides the

language that all three of you have

been using? You have consistently

used the word fudge. Negotiations

are about people with different

starting points. What is always

required to make them seed --

succeed our compromise. Fudge is a

negative word. Compromise is a

positive one. You will talk about

fudges as if reaching an agreement

through that is a negative

achievement. Michael, why don't you

use the word compromise and

recognise that actually compromise

has already been made to achieve the

first phase and get us through to

the next phase? And what makes you

believe it will be possible to

achieve similar compromises, to

achieve a similar agreement, in the

second phase?

I used the word fudge

because you started off asking us

about Northern Ireland, and that is

definitely a fudge. There are other

parts of the joint report which are

definitely compromises and

definitely deliver positive results.

The citizens rights part of the

joint report is based on a series of

compromises, both by the UK and the

EU, and it has produced a close to,

not complete, but close to a full

political agreement which can be

translated into legal text. That is

a positive compromise. I mentioned

common travel area. That is not a

fudge. That is a clear achievement.

It is a positive thing and it's

clear in itself. The difference with

the customs border...

On common

travelling, the reason that was so

easy is because both sides want the

same solution.

There were different

reasons why it was straightforward.

Both sides wanted the same solution.

It had relatively little to do with

EU law.

If both sides want the same

solution in terms of an access --

absence of physical infrastructure,

what makes you believe it will be

impossible to arrive at that? Just

saying there is no precedent for it

isn't necessarily an obstacle to

arriving at some new method. You

said that the Customs Union requires

a particularly type of character or

border. They have been changing

throughout history all the time. I

do believe it would be so impossible

to arrive at an agreement on what

the border could look like?

It will

be possible to arrive rather than

agreement. It depends on which

compromises are eventually made. The

point about the Northern Ireland

section on the customs and

regulatory border being a fudge for

the time being is that they haven't

reached any solutions. They haven't

reached any agreement. They have

simply said, we are going to come

back to this at a later date.

When

both sides said they didn't want

physical infrastructure...

When they

come back to us they will have this

great the circle. There are many

more people than just us sitting on

this panel who have observed that if

you're going to leave the Customs

Union and the single market, but you

don't want to have any physical

infrastructure between the Republic

of Ireland and Northern Ireland, and

you are not willing to have any

border between Northern Ireland and

Great Britain, you have got a

serious problem.

Stephen, if that is

the case, why does that not act as a

further incentive for the Republic

of Ireland to give positive impetus

for making sure that we don't arrive

at a no deal end to the

negotiations?

I would say that for

the record I do think that a

compromise could be found. Certainly

in the long-term. At the moment it

is quite difficult to see what that

is because we are still discussing

as if, we're talking about

everything rather than narrowing

down to the areas where the

compromise may be found.

Agricultural standards, for example.

But on this particular point, since

the UK has said, we will not put up

physical infrastructure, the obvious

implication is that the only side

that could do it would be the

Republic of Ireland. What degree of

political enthusiasm you deduce in

the Republic of Ireland for doing

that?

I am not going to speak for

Ireland. I don't think they would

want to do that. It is not just

their decision. It is the EU 27's

decision. I think what the question

really is, is how much that does the

EU 27 want to force Ireland to put

the border up? I think what has been

quite interesting in this process of

the joint report has been that

effectively it looks like the EU 27

has been quite happy for Ireland to

take the lead in negotiating this in

terms of the position with the UK.

So I think if the UK and Irish

governments can come to a

compromise, it will be difficult for

the EU to turn around and say, we

don't accept this.

Thank you.

Christopher Chope.

When David Davis said this joint

report was a statement of intent and

not legally binding, he was

absolutely right. Yes? You agree? He

was absolutely right in saying it

was not legally binding.

I think it

requires a more nuanced analysis. It

is clearly not legally binding. I

think we can all agree on that. It

is not a legally binding agreement.

It is more than merely a statement

of intent. We can give what the

expectations are and we probably

have to qualify those expectations

in several really quite important

ways. The expectation, and this is

in the text of the joint report, is

that the joint report will be

respected in full. It will be

treated as a package, translated

into a final legal text as quickly

as possible, and it will be on

picked. The joint report says quite

clearly that attempting to do that

for what has already been agreed

will have adverse consequences for

the rest of the agreement. It is not

just a statement of intent. Breach

will have future consequences. I

think we have to nuanced this idea

of those clear expectations in a

couple of different ways. First of

all, these are not complete

agreements. I mentioned citizens

drives. That is the most advanced

part of the agreement which has been

reached under the joint report. It

comes closest to being ready and

finalised and can be translated into

a final text. Even the citizens

rights parts have gaps, in some

parts of significant gaps. Secondly,

I suggested earlier run that when it

comes specifically to the question

of Northern Ireland, the border, the

customs and regulatory border,

rather than the common travel area,

there are irreconcilable commitments

in there which you may not

necessarily make concrete in a way

that will pin down future

negotiations. The European

Parliament, in its resolution after

the joint report was published,

welcomed the joint report and said,

we are happy with what has been

achieved. We want to revisit some of

these issues, particularly on

citizens rights, future partners,

the binding nature of the courts of

justice. There is a political

expectation already on the European

Parliament side that part of the

joint report agreement could still

be up for a re-discussion. And in

the final qualification, the

transitional deal, if there is one.

That could have a significant impact

on the way that some parts of the

report have to be considered and

construed. For example, the

effective date on which certain

parts of the agreement make come

into force. Clear expectation that

this is binding, not legally, but a

clear expectation that it will

become one, but it has to be nuanced

by those qualifications.

The Dutch

Prime Minister said the text should

be converted into a form that is

legally binding. Thereby suggesting

that the European Parliament doesn't

want to amend any of the substance

in it, which seems slightly

inconsistent with what you have just

said.

I think the European

Parliament has not used the words

amending what has been agreed, but

extending what has already been

agreed to new things. I will give

some examples from the list. This is

the text of the European Parliament

resolution. There are still

outstanding issues to be resolved

before the withdrawal agreement can

be finalised. They give some

examples. Extending the coverage of

citizens rights provisions to future

partners. We thought that had been

settled. Apparently not quite. The

binding character of court of

justice decisions on citizens rights

provisions. And the future role of

the UK national independence

authority to act on citizens'

complaints. And a very important

one, guaranteeing freedom of

movement across the EU 27 for

current EU migrants in the UK. Some

of those issues are on the table,

were going to be on the table for

future negotiation. Some we thought

were pretty much settled in the

joint report. But the European

Parliament resolution suggests they

can be revisited. Not using the

phrase revisited. But an extended

scope of application.

Can we now

look at what the Taoiseach said? He

described this fudge as politically

bullet-proof and Castan fudge. Was

he correct in that?

Referring to

paragraph 49 in particular?

I'm

referring to what the Taoiseach said

immediately following this

agreement, this joint report. And he

said that this joint report was

politically bullet-proof and cast

iron, when some people were

suggesting it may be rather vague, a

fudge. The Taoiseach was saying to

his people in the Republic of

Ireland, don't worry people, this is

politically bullet-proof and cast

are in.

Was he correct? It goes back

to what Michael was saying about the

agreement being all things to all

men at the moment. This takes us

back to the discussion about fudge

versus compromise. For me the

difference between fudge and

compromise is a compromise can be

implemented. There are bits of this

agreement that maybe now, just

about. There are other bits,

particularly the paragraph around

alignment, which frankly is not

because the choices necessarily have

not been made. That is the

distinction between fudge, were you

clearly need to make a choice

Estelle, and compromise, or you have

arrived at something you could

probably implement very quickly. It

takes us back all the way back to

the fact that those choices have yet

to be made and will have to be made.

These questions are leading to this

point. Which is that I, and I know a

number of other people, are

concerned that this issue may be

referred to the European Court of

Justice by either of the parties. If

it is such a fudge, if it is so

vague, open to interpretation, are

we not increasing the possibility

that the European Parliament are

some outlier may referred to the

European Court of Justice within a

constant current delay of six months

to two years?

Are you talking about the status of

the current report or the final

withdrawal?

Not the report itself

but where we are heading?

No, there

are a range of issues. They could

potentially be referred to the court

of justice for a resolution. I would

not say that the legal status of the

joint report is one of them because

I do not think anybody, really,

different people will tell their

domestic audiences different

interpretations of this document

because that's what people do after

a major summit but I don't think

that anybody really would seriously

believe that this is a question

worth asking the Court of justice.

It's a phase, another step in a

lengthy and complex negotiation.

There are few chill -- future issues

that mitigate the Court of Justice

or a request for advice. One of them

has been discussed many times

before. I will raise it as an

example, he noticed to withdraw and

Article 50 but in the context of

these negotiations, whether it

provides a side legal business for

an extensive transitional regime, is

sophisticated regime can be based on

Article 50, that's an open question.

The transitional regime, whether it

can be do by the EU institutions

acting under Article 50 or whether

it may also require ratifications by

every member state and their

parliaments, that would be

undesirable from everyone's point of

view. On the one hand, I think

there's a real incentive for people

not to ask the Court of Justice as

it adds more time into the process.

It does not need to be 12-18 months,

the court can do things quickly when

it knows that things need a quick

answer. There have been judgments

from the court, they deliver

judgments in the space of four weeks

when it is required to do so. The

timing is unfortunate but not as bad

as your question may have suggested.

Having said that, I do think that

there are a range of difficult

issues the court may be called upon

to adjudicate. But really, even a

small delay in time could

potentially be very difficult. I

think somebody described the

transitional arrangements as a

wasted asset. The longer it takes to

get this finalised, sorted, the less

valuable it is. Even a relatively

minor delay before the court can be

difficult. I suppose the other

factor is that this is not good in

the hands of the government alone.

National parliament or a national

parliamentarian may decide that they

are not happy with what their

government is agreeing to

politically. There may be a

reference from a national court to

the Court of Justice, simply by

passing member states and

institutions. It isn't entirely

within the control of the actors of

the negotiations themselves, where

the Court of justice becomes

involved.

I think going back to your

original question, there is the

possibility that this could end up

before the ECJ, the withdrawal

agreement itself, which is going to

be in the minds of negotiators when

they draft legal text, they want it

to be legally solid and legally

sound and in accordance with EU law.

Fear a hothouse?

-- I remember you from there. Could

we move on, to what extent has the

joint report made a no deal scenario

more less likely? Perhaps if I could

ask the Professor?

I do not like

these odds games but I would think

that a no deal scenario would be

less likely, but it makes the

extremes less likely, I would say.

Yes, it's a strong political signal

that the EU would like a deal, an

important political signal. But

ultimately, if issues like the Irish

border cannot be resolved, then no

deal is still a possibility. I agree

that it is less likely than it was

three months ago, as a result of

this agreement.

I agree, I think

everybody wants a deal aside from

some at the fringes. One of the

difficulties, I suppose, is again,

the more that time goes on and the

closer we get to an actual

withdrawal date, having banked all

of us on sorting these problems out

amicably by agreement through

multilateral processes, are less

likely it is that people can just

walk away because they will not be

in a position to deal with the

consequences for themselves. Not in

a way that wouldn't cause serious

disruption to their own citizens and

businesses, let alone anyone else

here.

The elephant in the room is

the customs union and single market.

So, with the ideal scenario involves

the single market and access to the

single market? We were talking about

Fudge, but how can it be fudged?

There are two separate deals at play

here, I was referring to the Article

50 deal, which would have to be

negotiated and resolved by October

next year and the second is the

trade deal. I do not expect it to be

more than a statement of intent

about a trade deal in place, we will

not get anywhere near ratifying a

trade deal at the time we are

ratifying Article 50. I was talking

about no Article 50 rather than

anything to do with the trade deal.

When we went as a group, the Liberal

Democrats to Brussels, we were told

by the EU then, in September, that a

transition period is not an

extension after the status quo but a

transition by which, you know before

we enter a transition, we know where

we are going to, say how can that be

done, if by March 2019, with a

withdrawal agreement, we also know

where we are going in order to have

a transition, how is that going to

work out?

We have an idea about the

direction of travel, if not a

destination.

I would agree, in the

statement of intent, it has to be

clear to both parties what the

ultimate objective is, and from a UK

site that is very clear, that is to

be outside the single market,

outside the customs union and

negotiate the best possible

free-trade agreement. I think again,

by virtue of agreement, this text

has tacitly agreed that that is what

the UK has said so I think we are

all along the same understanding

that if that's the direction the UK

is going in, there's a lot of detail

left to be answered.

Did I hear you

saying that you think the tacit

agreement is that the UK will be

outside of the single market and the

customs union?

Yes, I think the EU

has understood that is the UK's

position.

I think there's an

interesting change in the EU's

approach. I've worked on the

question of transition for a little

while now. Obviously I was looking

carefully for what happened at the

European Council meeting to see how

they phrased transition, there were

a number of issues concerned about

transition but one of the issues

concerning me was precisely your

point, that the EU guidelines from

April 2017, they said that it cannot

be abstract but it has to be a

reasonably foreseeable future

be abstract but it has to be a

reasonably foreseeable future. It

has to be bridged with a new

relationship, even if not fully

crystallised is at least reasonably

clear. For me, that meant a

difficult and potential problem in

the face to negotiations, because we

know so little about what the UK's

positive vision of a steep and

special partnership is, we know the

negative bits, we don't want being

the customs union or single market,

but we don't know much about the

more positive aspects of that future

relationship. One of my concerns

was, how can you then square this

with April guidelines? What I do

think is interesting is that the EU

has read-only sequencing of the

transition and future agreement

negotiations, they are perfectly

happy to begin talking about

transition in January and hopefully

get transition sorted out fairly

quickly, possibly by March. It may

take longer, there are a lot of

issues but they would not even have

adopted their guidelines on the

future relationship until March

anyway. The EU itself seems to have

changed its position and willing to

sort out a petering out transition

without necessarily having agreed a

clear destination into the future,

which was what we thought they may

insist upon. From that point of view

I think there has been a change of

policy rather than just a change in

emphasis.

He would agree for

businesses telling us they need

clarity that this hasn't added any

clarity?

Not yet.

I think it hasn't

given concrete legal clarity but I

think there is a strong sense of

political assurance that both sides

won the transition to happen. From a

business point of view, that is

important and a lot of businesses

have been saying that an agreement

in principle and transition in March

would go a long way towards

reassuring.

Thank you. Stephen

Kinnock?

Thank you. Banks just to be

clear on the terms of the

transition, the EU has been

consistent, if you look at previous

negotiation guidelines and the

European Parliament resolution, that

the transition will, in essence, be

a carbon copy of the status quo, so

all existing union judiciary,

supervisory, budget and structures

apply, including the competence of

the Court of Justice of the European

Union. Could you briefly, would you

all say that you absolutely agree

with that? That in effect we will

continue membership in all but name

following the 29th of March 2019?

Yes, I think that is right, that is

the UK's government understanding.

Accepting the role of the ECJ during

transition is her understanding of

how that would work as well. I think

the potential quibble point is about

what happens to new EU laws made

during the transition period and how

they affect the UK. Politically, the

EU would insist on that and it may

be difficult for the UK to negotiate

their way out of that. In practical

circumstances, if we are talking

about it transition lasting until

December 2020, the data Michel

Barnier is talking about, most

directives have an 18 month grace

period before you implement them. In

practical purposes there are a lot

of things you may say or do you wear

the UK would never have to implement

it anywhere but to answer your

question yes, I think the UK and EU

have both agreed it will extend the

current terms and a different legal

form.

I don't like the formulation

membership in all but name,

membership implies that you get a

say. That is fundamental in a

transitional stage and membership,

that there are all of the

obligations but none of the rights

when it comes to political

participation but yes, it seems to

me that for reasons apart from

anything else of time, that the EU

is saying, we cannot negotiate

anything this book, it would be too

complicated, too time-consuming, we

only have until October so

basically, the status quo minus

participation is what we can offer

you at this point when it comes to

transition. The phraseology of

paragraph four, it strongly implies

that the EU has a position on what

happens to new EU laws, that we all

had to adopt them. It's a clear

distinction between the two sides.

I

would go slightly further. In the

work I've been doing on transition

over the last several weeks, I have

identified eight different points.

Some of them are not that serious,

like when the UK says that it wants

to have the ability to negotiate new

trade deals, but they will not enter

under false until the transition is

ever, even the EU Parliament in its

resolution from December earlier

this month have said they can live

with that. Potential quibble points

are being resolved as the situation

develops although they are a bit

more serious. For example, the UK

suggested it wants full

participation in all of the EU

regulatory agencies during

transition, the EU has clearly said

that you can have operational

participation but you cannot have

decision-making participation.

That's a potential sticking point.

Others, concerning Gibraltar for

example, we've no idea whether

Gibraltar would be covered by a

transitional period. There were

noises from Spain that it should not

be. Politically, there is still a

range of issues which needs to be

discussed and debated on transition.

From my perspective legally, there

are two the questions outstanding on

transition. The first is one I've

mentioned before, could a

sophisticated transitional agreement

be agreed in terms of Article 50 or

would it require national

ratifications as well? At the

moment, the EU's political stances

that Article 50 is an exceptional

competence and procedure, and the

member states politically have said

that the EU could do this alone,

even if it touches upon matters of

national competence and will not

require national ratification. That

is very useful because it takes away

potentially months or years of

waiting time, as national

parliaments debate this agreement

and decide to vote but it is only a

political understanding, it's

vulnerable to legal challenge of a

disgruntled parliamentarian decides

otherwise. The other big issue,

relating to what we call the

autonomy of EU law, how far can a

third country which the UK will be

by then participate or influence the

internal functioning of the EU

itself? This is where I think, for

example, the issue of the EU

regulatory agencies is clear. The EU

does not want UK decision-making

participation in the EU regulatory

agencies because it could render a

transitional agreement vulnerable to

legal challenge before the Court of

Justice for infringing the autonomy

of the UK legal system. So there are

political issues and legal issues.

One of the big issues remains the

appropriate vehicle by which to do

this. We could have just extended

membership and Article 50 by

unanimous agreement, we could have

agreed a third date of entry for the

with withdrawal agreement, we could

have used it for different purposes,

we could say the institutional

provisions of the withdrawal

agreement would enter into force in

March 2019 but with substantive

provisions to do with the internal

market or policy making would enter

into force within two years. They

are legally neat ways of achieving

the transition. As you suggested, to

negotiate a parallel system of

transition from scratch is

potentially incredibly

time-consuming and could almost

involve as many difficult questions

as simply trying to negotiate the

future partnership.

Probably worth adding a third

category to that, which is the EU's

international agreements. No one is

quite certain yet what to do with

those thousand plus agreements,

political and economic agreement,

signed with third countries, with

members of the European Union as

member states. And that third

country, it's far from clear what

our status would be with regards to

that transition if we're no longer a

member state.

Thank you very much,

we're having a relatively technical

and legalistic conversation today,

but I do think it's worth thinking

also about the broader political

implications of this. I'd be

interested in your perspective on

this. Do you feel that there has

been enough discussion in terms of

public discourse about the fact that

the country voted to leave on the

23rd of June 2016 but, in effect,

both the British government and the

EU have now signed up to a

transition deal which will, in

essence, be a carbon copy of the

status quo minus our voice at the

table for a period of at least until

December 2020? But that of course is

subject to how long it'll take to

negotiate the future relationship.

I'd like to come onto that

afterwards. I'd be interested in

your perspective more in terms of

what, you know, what do I say to the

retired steel worker in Port Talbot

in my constituency who voted Leave

that when he voted Leave he probably

had a certain set of expectations

about what it would mean and how

long it would take. That clearly now

isn't going to happen. I'd be

interested in your sort of

assessment of the risks around that

particular issue.

Well, I think that

part of the reason why December 2020

has been talked about on the UK side

is it's before the next general

election. I think it's quite

important we are obviously having

left and in the process of

substantively leaving by that point,

from EU side they don't want to push

this transition into a new budget

around which will start post-2000

20. I think in the first instance,

yes, needs to be explained to people

this is perhaps more complicated

than was expressed in a row --

expressed in the referendum

campaign. I think the government and

EU will want to start taking steps

that take effect from 2020 that

substantively mean a difference from

the status quo. I think in terms of

a transition period, we're looking

at two, one of which is standstill

transition, which I think we'll

probably end in 2020. Then you're

still going to go through a process

of implementing whatever has been

agreed in that process. Moving to a

new custom system, new trade regime,

new regulatory regime on services

and so on. I think that would

obviously take longer than many

people may have bought but in order

to have a smooth and orderly Brexit,

that is what will be required. I

think it's not necessarily a bad

thing as long as we get to the point

where we are entering a new election

on which the terms of our engagement

with the EU are clearly changing.

I'm not sure this is the time or

place to talk about what you should

take your constituent. It does occur

to me, following what Michael said

earlier, one easy way to do

transition which would circumvent

all the problems we've mentioned in

passing would be to do it via an

extension of the Article 50 target

an extended by a couple of years,

call it transition. It is very much

with a view to the kinds of issues

you phrased, that it is being seen

as politically acceptable. The

moment of leaving is important in

all of this, the minute the

government can turn around and say,

we've left the European Union, is

something they are keen to put back.

Transition will be quite a fraught

period. It'll be a period where the

country is chafing at the bit of

being out but still bound.

Politically I think it's going to be

very difficult. The adjudication

mechanisms in place to ensure that

system holds, I think it'll be a

fragile state of affairs those years

in many ways, because of the

political pressures you've

mentioned, to say, we've left,

country star doing the things we

said we'd do? The answer is no. Real

tensions will come after we've left,

and nothing has changed.

I'll focus

on a slightly different motivation

for a transitional period. And for

me this is probably the most

important motivation of the lot. The

Prime Minister has said said quite

rightly, everyone will benefit from

having more time to prepare for is

coming. I think in many respects it

has been interpreted as to get our

ports ready for new custom

restrictions, airport ready answer

one. I think the problems run far

deeper than that and I suspect

nearly everyone in this room will

know this very acutely, when you

look at the volume of work that has

to be done under the European Union

withdrawal bill, when eventually

enacted, we're talking about

potentially thousands of changes to

our legal system, many of them

utterly fundamental and going right

to the heart of the various sectors

in which they are operable. We still

have to construct new regulatory

regimes on fisheries, agriculture,

trade, customs, nuclear safety. We

have to effectively rewrite large

parts of our own legal system. We

mentioned an incredibly serious

problem, well over 1000 EU external

agreements with third countries and

international organisations which we

either participate in or benefit

from. We'd have no idea what the

status of those is. We see what the

initial reaction is to our attempt

to sort out together with the EU,

with the joint proposal and

regularise our membership of the

WTO. It was virtually slapped back

in our face by a whole range of

countries. We're not in a position

we can say we can fall back on WTO

rules because we are not sure what

our WTO membership is going to look

like and how far it'll be accepted

and regularised by the others. When

you put together this enormous range

of challenges I would say we simply

need more time to be ready to leave

the EU internally without causing

enormous disruption to ourselves. It

comes back to the point made

earlier, it isn't about relations

with the EU, this is about whether

we leave the EU without enormously

damaging our own citizens, own

economy, businesses, because there

is simply so much work to do and we

have so little time left to do it.

That is a major motivation behind a

transitional regime. If you can't

wait to get out, maybe you might be

persuaded that not ruining your own

economy and society in the process

would be worth waiting a little bit

extra for.

Maybe. Sorry, one more

question. I just wanted to connect

this to financial settlement. So...

Ministers have indicated that the

financial settlement and the Prime

Minister indicated this from the

dispatch box as well, the financial

settlement is contingent on striking

a deal on the future relationship.

But article 96 of the joint progress

report indicates that the financial

settlement is in fact contingent on

agreeing the divorce items and the

transitional deal. Because as Mr

Barnier and others have said, there

clearly won't be in agreement on the

future relationship before we leave

the European Union, just the scoping

of the principles. Is that also your

understanding, that the financial,

in fact, the financial settlement is

a done deal, assuming that the

divorce items and transitional deal

are in place? And it's not actually

connected to the future

relationship?

I think this speaks to

that infamous phrase, nothing is

agreed until everything is agreed.

For the European Union that is a

reference to phase one. Everything

has to be tied up together in phase

one. It's not a reference to a link

between phase one issues and the

trade talks. From the EU perspective

there is no link between the

financial settlement and any future

trade talks. For practical reason,

which is the one you stated, we're

not going to be in a position to

sign of a trade deal till several

years after we've been paying the

money we've already agreed to pay

anyway, because this agreement has

to be signed and sealed in October

next year. The timing is simply

wrong, we can't play-off, except

when it comes to the heads of terms,

which won't be binding in any

serious way. There is no way to play

of the financial settlement against

the terms of the future trading

agreement.

The Prime Minister has always talked

about and implementation period, not

transition. If you implement in you

have to know what you are

implementing. The timetable has been

phase one, and you're quite right to

say there was a fudge on Northern

Ireland. You might reason there was

a fudge on Northern Ireland, it was

in the wrong sequencing, it's easier

to deal with Northern Ireland when

you know what a future relationship

would look like. The second mark was

the end of March, we should have an

increment Asian agreement. The next

one is October. When everything is

supposed to be in place so it can be

ratified. I think the Prime Minister

understands that to include the

special relationship. The trade

deal. It seems to me so far

everything has been following that

schedule. All of you have talked

about transition, not

implementation. Is the Prime

Minister right or are you right?

I

think it's worth noting the

government rhetoric has changed

because the initial schedule, as

laid out by David Davis before the

talks started, was that the trade

negotiations would carry on

concurrently with the article 15

negotiations from the start, so the

timetable is that according to the

original timetable the government

laid down. You're absolutely right,

the Prime Minister keeps referring

to an intimidation period and I

don't have a crystal ball, I don't

know if we'll be proven to be right,

I myself find it very hard indeed to

believe a set of trade talks that

can only start in March are going to

be anywhere near even the end of the

preliminary stage by the time this

agreement has to be signed in

October.

I completely agree.

I will

maybe push the buy little further.

The government White Paper from

debris this year set out that

timescale, that we will have a

withdrawal agreement with a future

framework agreements by the time we

leave. Then there will merely be an

implementation period for the

gradual bringing into force of the

new framework relationship. That was

immediately contradicted. It had

already been contradicted by most of

the people who work in the field,

like me, who said the timescale was

not very credible. And legally

speaking the EU cannot negotiate a

trade agreement with a member state,

only with a third country, so you

have to wait until after you've

left. Those positions were affirmed

by the European Council, by the

council, commission, European

Parliament. The Florence speech in

September was the government's

admission that it had miscalculated

the timing the Prime Minister

recalibrated the government strategy

in Florence, and said, we're looking

at a withdrawal agreement, and

discussions about the framework for

the future. But explicitly recognise

that could not be progressed and

concluded until after withdrawal.

The language of intimidation period

was retained but the reality is the

intimidation period as it was

originally meant in the White Paper

is no longer the case, we're now

talking about a transition period.

The answer I gave earlier, you could

almost say it is the EU's

recognition that has happened within

the UK. OK, we'll no longer wait

until we have a clear idea of the

future relationship before we start

talking transition, we'll just start

talking transition now because we

all know the context has changed. I

think there has been a very

significant change in events. I

think we still use the term, not I,

but some people use the term

intimidation period to give the

impression of continuity, not much

has changed, it's been a very

significant shift in government

policy, even if it is difficult to

admit it more publicly than we'd

feel comfortable.

Do you think...

Sorry.

I would agree with most of

that, the other thing I would add,

as far as the EU is concerned, the

special relationship is not just a

trade. We're going to have to talk

about migration, security, research

and develop and come all the other

programmes the UK is currently part

of. So I think using language of

implementation, there may well be

issues we can resolve sooner rather

than later in that transitional

phase as a result of negotiating the

wider future partnership. We may

well implement a new policy on by,

Y, Z, which isn't necessarily the

trade deal. I agree with the general

sentiment, we're not going to the

detail of a trade agreement by 2019.

I do think the UK, the fact that the

withdrawal agreement is tied to the

future framework agreement, the UK,

I think, rightly can insist to have

a fairly detailed discussion about

what that future framework is

looking like Amanda the sense of

direction. I think if the UK doesn't

feel there is a sense of direction

being agreed with EU, the EU will

say we're not go to sign a

withdrawal agreement, you're not

going to have the money. That is

always going to be an option open to

you at that point if the government

feels it is necessary.

And that would be October on the

timetable, October 2018?

In that

situation I think it would be one

minute to midnight of March 2019 but

ideally it needs to be wrapped up by

October 20 18.

European Parliament

has to ratify, that is where the

timeline comes from.

Michel Barnier

has been working, it seems sensible

to me, since the 29th of March, it

seemed to be nonsense to me. I

should really be concentrating

around 2018.

They feel that there

has been no progress whatsoever on

discussing the future framework,

then we could time out. It is still

a possibility.

Despite our fears, I

think the main losers are simply

walking away from negotiations.

Remember, the bulk of negotiations

are about what do we do with people

who currently have licenses or

permits to do their job, what will

happen to those people's lives. What

do we do with intellectual property

rights that have currently been

granted and recognised under EU law?

Were they disappear? The range of

issues being dealt with under the

separation part of the withdrawal

agreement should not be so

politically controversial, some of

them are but they should not all be.

They will directly affect the lives

and livelihoods of millions of

people. I do think to simply say

relatively at the last minute

because we are not getting our way

on the future trade relationship, it

is not moving as fast as we would

like, when told repeatedly that it

will not move that fast, we will be

cutting our nose off to spite our

face. It would be damaging for

ourselves, our businesses, our

citizens and our economy that would

suffer the consequences. This does

not come across as very credible. We

all want to get an agreement and we

all want to stop damage being done

to people in their lives and

businesses. I do think to link up in

this highly contingent way, the

separation issues with the future

relationship issues, it's not coming

across terribly credibly.

But isn't

that probably the government's

strategy? To stop me from

complaining at this time about what

is going on, and by the time we get

to October 2018, the government

would say, you were probably right

but we are too far down the road. We

cannot possibly have a no deal.

Wouldn't that be quite reasonable?

Not a fudge gratitude that

diplomatic strategy.

But the

compelling argument about no deal is