National Security Strategy Committee Select Committees

Thank you very much for coming.

Thank you.

Particularly, as you

probably know, we were dismayed it

took to set up the committee but we

are grateful for you for coming so

early in the period since we had

been set up. We have all taken note

of the fact that the Prime Minister

has tasked you with reforms to the

national security council process.

What exactly are you considering?

Thank you Madame chair, thank you

very much for your welcome to this

session. Essentially there is a

continuous process of trying to

improve the National Security

Council. You will be aware that we

have been seeking to embed the

Chilcott reforms into the process.

With my coming in, with there being

a new parliament, she asked me to

look at the process and ensure that

it was functioning effectively. That

is aside from the policy work and

capability review. I suppose the

headlines of fact is that we are

trying to prepare meetings more

thoroughly. The NSC owner, the

officials group that meets

beforehand now considers the main

issues a few weeks ahead -- NSCO. So

that we have a proper steering

discussion to make sure that we

bring issues to the council itself

in a more strategic format. We have

also made some adjustments to the

agenda. Again, so that there is a

work plan several months ahead.

Ministers have the chance to

consider issues more strategically.

Thirdly, I can talk more about this,

issues particularly concerning...

This is the most important,

actually, that we had a rigorous

implementation process in place so

that the council's decisions were

then driven through government.

That is helpful and interesting. As

you may know, in the past, this

committee has expressed some anxiety

as to what degree the NSC was

strategic. We were worried it was

being too operational and driven by

day-to-day events. The notion

that... You are wanting to look at

it more thoroughly and to a

consistent plan, which has a

strategic approach, is... Welcome

news.

He said you're looking carefully at

how you can make the discussions

more strategic and have more notice

and prepare in greater depth. He

also said rigorous implementation.

-- you also said. Which of those do

you think requires most attention?

Probably the latter, to be candid.

That's what I thought.

There are

many colleagues who have worked in

government and as you will know,

particularly when one is dealing

with crosscutting issues, weather

isn't a natural single home in a

department, it is very

straightforward if a department

brings a proposal that is agreed or

not and then they move ahead. In

this area, of course, we are dealing

with proposals that involve several

departments, half a dozen or more.

It's in those areas that

implementation has constantly proved

challenging. When you are in

government -- when you were in

government, we talked about joined

up government. We need to bring that

concept alive in the national

security area and ensure that each

department, each individual area, is

clear about what is expected of them

and what is the must direction and

guidance.

We are well understood

that was part of the point of having

the National Security Council. Am I

right in thinking that you used to

attend, previously, in your previous

capacity...?

When I was ambassador

in Afghanistan, I attended and when

I returned as the Foreign Office

political director I would attend

from time to time on those issues. I

had hidden very rarely when I was

permanent secretary at the Home

Office. If the Home Office couldn't

go and there wasn't a junior

minister available.

Is that a

strength? Does that help to inform?

I guess I'm the wrong person to ask,

perhaps you should ask some of my

colleagues, Madame chair. I think

having that blend of experience,

having worked overseas and of

course, my predecessors were very

experienced ambassadors. They had

not won a domestic department.

Having that blend the two has helped

me. It means I probably understand

some of the pressures in particular

this intimidation question. I have a

good appreciation of the particular

domestic security agenda.

Although I

don't invite you to comment on this

in case you don't want to come I do

recall it being said, although not

in public by her, that the Prime

Minister as Home Secretary had some

concerns about the degree to which

the NSC did not consider the

domestic agenda.

Without commenting

on the specific point, the general

point you make is well made. We try

to ensure there is a good blend of

issues brought. We try to look at...

Some overseas issues in geographic

clusters, rather than country by

country. That helps with a strategic

discussion. In response to your

letter to the Prime Minister, by the

way, Madame chair, I will write to

you this week with the agenda

details of the NSC over the past

couple of years so you can have a

look at the issues we've been

discussing. We tend to look now at

overseas issues in clusters. We will

look at, for example, East Asia, not

just China. We look at the Matic

issues that cut across the domestic

and overseas, such as

counterterrorism or serious

organised crime.

Extraordinary, that

was about to be my next question.

One brief business type question, in

the past, your predecessors have

given the committee information

about the size and function of the

Secretariat, which is germane,

implementation. Can we write to you

after the session with questions? I

don't invite you to dwell on that

Indy car now.

Of course. The

secretariat is still pretty much the

same size as under my predecessor.

-- dwell on that at the moment.

I am

happy to take any detailed questions

on that after the session.

OK. Mr

Grey.

We will move straight to the

capability review. First of all,

who's idea was it and when was it

commissioned?

We conducted a piece

of work during the election

campaign. My arrival coincided with

the declaration coincidently. I've

already talked to the Prime Minister

about just doing a quick refresher

of the 2015 strategy. And STS are.

-- SDSR. Parley to deal with the

evolving threat picture and the

question of whether it was still

right in all respects, given that it

was written before the decision to

leave the European Union.

Essentially, that morphed into a

preparatory work, during the

election campaign for incoming

governments. We need to be able to

present the incoming government with

a range of options on how they might

proceed. We presented that the

council after the election. It was

as a result of that discussion that

the council commissioned the

capability review, which is in

effect a refresh of the 2015 SDSR.

The outgoing Prime Minister... Not

unusual for an outgoing promised to

construct a review of this campaign

during election campaign, is that

normal?

My initial discussion with

the Prime Minister was before the

election campaign was close. I

wasn't aware of it you would expect,

just as departments have to prepare

for an incoming government of

whatever... Party or mixture of

parties, in any event, would have

had to have done some work during

the election campaign to prepare for

an incoming government. We brought

the two pieces of work together. We

would have done that whether the

Prime Minister have sorted it or not

as part of the proper work of the

civil service during the election

campaign to prepare for an incoming

government.

A proper review of the

national security strategy as well,

was that part of the work?

The

initial piece of work looked at the

2015 strategy. Essentially we looked

across it to ask whether it still

looked as though it was broadly

correct in did other than 17 --

broadly speaking correct. The main

structure and approach. -- in 2017.

And the broad approach. It was

right. It was as a result of that is

that the council commissioned the

capability review.

Given the 20th 15

national security review and the

SDSR well one document, unusually

for the first time, is in this

review, you cast and I over it, as

you say, the NSS part of the

document, what led you to the

conclusion that something was to be

changed in other parts. If the NSS

was sufficient, despite the fact

that it didn't know about Brexit,

didn't know about all sorts of

things that hadn't happened in 2015,

if you concluded that the NSS was

sufficient, white was another review

needed?

-- why was another review.

You are right, the two remained

together and there will be some

changes to the first part, if you

like, the strategy part of the

document when the process is

concluded. The operational

consequences of that, the council

concluded was forced to look at a

range of capabilities. Some because

it was an evolving threat picture,

the terrorist threat picture has

evolved for example. Some of them,

global Britain, because of the

decision to leave the European

Union. We are looking at air

mixture. It isn't just purely

capability. We are looking at a

mixture. -- we are looking at a

mixture.

Forgive me, I am puzzled.

You have confused me. The national

security strategy 2015 was merged

with the NSS. The conclusions were

based on that strategy. That

strategy in 2015 did not know much

about the emerging threat, Brexit,

lots of things. Nonetheless, you

concluded that it was not necessary

to carry out another review?

Sorry,

I haven't been clear. We concluded

that we did not need a full, new

national security strategy and SDSR,

that was one of the options that the

council could have commissioned but

they concluded that we did not need

that, because broadly speaking, the

structure and conclusions of the

2015 reviews were correct. A broader

view of national security that

incorporated security, economic and

influence objectives, commitment

already made in that strategy to

deliver certain capabilities, most

of which were only just starting.

There were clearly areas where we

might need a course correction.

Essentially, that's why they

commissioned a capability review,

rather than a full SDSR. Also, the

government didn't commissioned a

spending review immediately after

the election and that is the third

component of the 2015 document. It

was run alongside a full spending

review. It was that range of factors

that cause the council to conclude

it did not need a full SDSR.

What is

the point of having the NSS review.

If the budgets were precisely as

they were before? How can any

outcome of the review have been

effective, because there is no more

money?

A constant challenge in

government and it goes back to the

point the chair was making at the

beginning, are we spending all of

the money we already have two best

effect and in the right places.

That

is a different point.

Depending on

how you define it, we spent

something like £56 billion a year on

national security. It is reasonable

or the government to want to know

that is being spent, the balance is

correct, before they consider

whether that £56 billion per year is

the right number.

Hang on. You

haven't answered the question.

What's the point in having a

national security review and the

defence review linked to it if the

premise is there is no more money?

No matter what you conclude... Let's

imagine the NSS, they concluded

there were vast new threats are

perfectly possible, nonetheless,

there is no more money attached to

it. Therefore, what's the purpose in

doing it?

To see whether the money

already allocated is allocated in

the right way.

You don't have to

have a NSS review, nor SDSR to do

that, presumably all departments do

that all the time. Presumably it is

one of the primary function is to do

that. Don't you think you're

emasculating the SDSR or the NSA

review by saying that no matter what

you conclude, the budget will remain

the same?

I wouldn't put it quite

that starkly but this exercise was

commissioned by the council as a

fiscally neutral exercise.

Commissioned against the background

that we spend around £56 billion per

year depending on how you define it,

national security broadly defined.

To ensure the balance of that

expenditure across departments is

allocated correctly. There are some

constraints within that, the 2%

commitment on defence. And the 0.7%

commitment on ODA were fixed.

There is a great deal one can do in

terms of allocating resources within

a pool that size to make sure they

are being allocated correctly and

the prioritisation is correct.

Essentially that is what we are

considering.

When is it going to be announced.

We

will bring it to the national

Security Council in the new year and

it will be made public in due

course.

Rumours were it would be

delayed and would in fact happen the

same time as the funding review?

Next year's Budget.

There isn't a

spending review for next autumn's

Budget. No decisions have been taken

about a full spending review. It is

not being delayed. There was a tweet

about a meeting moving, I'm not

going to get into a running

commentary on what is on their

agenda, but this will be brought to

the council in the new year and

ministers will take decisions then.

In the new year. It is scheduled to

be taken in the new year. The

schedule is for the Prime Minister.

I'm going to move on to Miss Reeves.

You mentioned that Russia and Brexit

were reasons for the updates since

2015. I wonder whether those are the

principal reasons, the former

Defence Secretary said one reason

for the capability review is the

intensification of the four

principal threats identified in the

2015 national security strategy. Is

it the intensification of the risks,

or is it Brexit and Russia or a

combip nation that meant --

combination meant the update was

needed.

The former defence Secretary

included Russia in the threats he

was talking about. The review did

identify four threats, Russia among

them, terrorism among them.

How

about Brexit.

I didn't identify,

that was separate. But it did

identify those threats and it was

largely based around tackling those

threats. The threats of terrorism,

as the former Defence Secretary said

and the Russian threat have

intensified. That is influencing the

shape of the review. The original

review took place before Brexit and

of course we have to make sure that

the current review is correct in the

new circumstances.

The work you have

been doing, in what way is Brexit

important for our national security?

Well it affects our relationship

with the European Union and it

therefore affects our and our

co-operation with them or will do,

as you know we seek to have a deep

and special partnership, but we have

that yet to negotiate. And it

affects our relations with the rest

of the world. The Government is

seeking to exploit the freedoms to

deepen relationships with other

countries in South Asia, in the Gulf

etc. Across the economic and

security agenda. Brexit sets a

different context within which we

are operating. The threats are

independent of that.

In 2015

obviously we knew, you knew there

was going to be a referendum in

2016. So had the risk of Brexit or

the opportunity of Brexit however

you might see it, had that been

included in the NSS and the SDSRo

did you have to look at this from

scratch?

Of course the 2015 exercise

was conducted before I took the job.

But the Government... Of course the

Government position at the time was

there would be a referendum. At the

time of the review, I don't think

the timing of that was set and the

intention, the Government's

intention was to campaign for

remain. It was mentioned I think in

the 2015 review, but it wasn't taken

as a strategic driver of the review.

We have a different context now and

we need to make sure we are in the

right shape for 2017 and beyond.

It

sounds like, it is obviously a

hugely different context, I'm

surprised when the work was done it

wasn't looked at more systemically.

Have you undertaken a new risk

assessment as part of national

security capability process?

That

process is under way. We have

published within Government, there

are three documents, there is a

national risk assess. Both are

confidential and there is a

published national risk register.

That is an unclassified document. We

have... These are constantly under

review. But we conducted a refresher

of the national risk assessment this

year and will conduct a refresh in

2018.

Thank you.

My question would

be there from the work you have done

so far, are you already seeing a

significant variation between the

four principal threats identified in

their impact on the UK and the need

to deal with them?

I think perhaps

the two I would focus on Lord Pole

are Russia and the terrorist threat.

We expected both, if you look back

at the 2015 review, we expected both

of those positions to become more

troublesome and they have and they

will probably become more

troublesome faster and more broadly

than was an is the painted at the

time. They were -- anticipated at

the time. But they were shaping the

review. But clearly the Russian

attitude has worsened more generally

towards the west and that is, that

seems set to continue. The terrorist

threat has changed because of the

way terrorist threat has developed

and innovated.

Would you see a

significant variation in spending

emerging from the present base?

No,

not necessarily. It is more about

the balance. If you look at... There

is of course some more money coming

in. I should have made this point in

answer to the earlier question, the

Home Secretary and the Chancellor

announced an extra £50 million to

support the police and help deal

with the terrorist threat and the

Home Secretary will set out more

detail later this week in the House

of Commons. We had already agreed in

the 2015SRR to expand the resources

into counter terrorism and security

and intelligence. And you will note

from the Anderson review that has

been published of the operational

lessons learned from the terrorist

attacks earlier this year that the

main recommendations are not about

additional resources or resources

additional to those planned to come

in, but about changes to the way

information is shared, changes to

the way different organisations

operate with each other. It isn't

always just about resources. A lot,

perhaps to go back to the earlier

question, is about the way we

operate across the national security

community.

One last question, not

directly related to the previous

two, when you're looking at possible

variations in the allocations of

funds, are you also looking at the

question of how our nuclear

capability is funded and whether it

should be moved back to central

funded as we did in the 80s, rather

than lumping it into the MoD budget?

There is a separate discussion about

that. I don't want to get drawn on

the detail of the deterrent, but

that particular issue has not been

central to the capability review,

although there is a separate

discussion about that.

Mr Jarvis.

Can I ask about defence specific

resource and capability. You will

know perhaps better than anybody the

huge range of varied threats that we

face. Given that, is 2% of GDP

sufficient to invest in our defence?

Well, it's a political question

above my pay grade. We do invest

over 2% now. We're the biggest, we

have the biggest defence budget in

Europe, the biggest defence

contributor in Europe. I tend to

think of this in the round. We're

the only western country that hints,

exeseeds the 2% target for defence

and hits the 7% target for

development. World class security

agencies and so on. When I think

about our national security

capabilities, I'm thinking of the

whole portfolio and no country has

quite that mix. Back to the chair's

first line of questioning, part of

my job is to ensure we fuse all that

and deliver it effectively. Of

course, anyone in my job would be

delighted to have more capability,

but we do have one of biggest

defence budgets in the world. The

programme will give us world class

and modern capabilities across the

piece and I think as a country we, I

think if I look at my counter part

over seas, I think they envy the

sort of capabilities that I'm able

to recommend ministers deploy.

In

terms of capabilities we can bring

to bear, when with we are looking to

develop those, it is important to

think about what our allies are

doing, can I ask you therefore, what

conversations are you having or what

work is taking place alongside our

US and European partners about the

contribution they're proposing to

make in the future?

This is a

powerful point if I may. Of course,

one of our capabilities and a

capability in particular the

Russians don't have is allies. If

you look at the, if you added up the

British, French and German defence

budgets, although they don't hit the

2% target, that is double the

Russian budget. A lot is not about

expenditure, but the effectiveness

we get. Part of NATO modernisation

programme is to ensure that forces

are genuinely more able to deploy

alongside each other. As we deploy

the carriers, we are, we will have

some allied capability in the

carrier groups and on the carriers

themselves. And when I was in the

United States last week and saw the

Secretary of defence there, he was

talking about examples of British

capability that are almost defence

capability, military capability that

are almost unique that make a real

contribution to the American view of

the allied effort both within Europe

and outside it. You're right, if one

of our strengths is our alliances,

we need to ensure we integrate and

interoperate our capabilities.

Do

you want to come in on this point?

The question Lord Powell raised on

spending is surely key to your

responsibility as in the flexibility

of finances from one area of

spending to another and the reality

of the 2% which isn't after all a

target, what is a targ is the

strategic capability of the UK. That

is a floor of 2%. Can you say how

you see is threats being balanced

against this floor?

I think as I

have said, perhaps I can just take

the European theatre as an example,

otherwise I could probably deliver a

20 minute answer which I suspect

would try your patience. We know

that the Russian threat is

intensifying and diversifying, they

are, they're improving the

sophistication of their of

conventional capability and in

Norway they were show manager me the

capabilities they're developing in

the north. At the same time we saw

that huge operation which was as

much a propaganda operation as a

military exercise, designed to

unsettle our allies in eastern

Europe and we are aware of the

cyberthreat they mount. So we are

seeing a diversification of the

Russian threat. As we need to be

able to deter and disrupt and defend

ourselves against all of those

threats. But we have to do it as an

alliance. It is not just the 2%, the

floor, it is I think 2.14 at the

moment in defence fence with a

growing budget. It is about that

full mix of national security

capabilities we can bring to bear

and my job is to ensure that

ministers have to opportunity to

consider all the options available

to them. They then need to decide

what the blend of the capabilities

is and there is a bigger discussion

about the over all funding which is

one for main spending reviews.

It

that is that spectrum that one sees

holes appearing, such as winter

training in Norway to defend the

northern flank, it appears to be one

of areas of strategic vacuum.

I'm

not an expert on the particular, I

mean on the particular deployment

you set out there. But when I was in

Norway we had a very rich

conversation about how on that

northern flank her to Norway and

other allies can deal with the

Russian threat. I would need to come

back to you on detail, having taken

a bit more expert advice.

... Intensified, as Michael Fallon

stated and as you have been

outlining, why are cuts in defence

credibility so widely being

anticipated as a consequence of this

review?

There's been a great deal,

as you have been aware, of public

speculation. The former Defence

Secretary, of course, and now the

new Defence Secretary have both been

quite clear about both the floor and

growth in the defence budget.

Obviously, they are considering it

very carefully. The capabilities

that can be developed. You have just

issued a report. I haven't had a

chance to look at all of the detail

of it but I've seen a summary of the

report you issued about the

efficiency programme and so on. But

the programme is designed to deliver

joint force 2025, that is a very

impressive set of military

capabilities that would be available

to this country in the mid 2020s.

That remains the capability baseline

that we are... That is our target.

Are you saying that there are no

chances of significant cuts in

existing defence capabilities

resulting from this review?

It's not for me to pre-empt

decisions ministers will take.

I'm

not asking you to be specific, I am

asking you to be general. I'm

saying, are you telling us that, as

a result of this review, we need not

be concerned that there will be cuts

in existing capabilities, given that

the review is supposed to be being

held because the threats are getting

worse?

Doctor Lewis, ministers will need to

have options about making

adjustments to capabilities and to

the programme. That may mean

reducing some and increasing others.

That's for ministers to decide.

While this review is in flight I

can't say much more than that.

Didn't James Gray get to the heart

of it when he asked you a question

about this trade off between an

increasing threat on one hand

leading to a cut in the capability

to meet another threat on the other

unless you increase the overall

defence budget? And wasn't the game

given away by your answer when you

said that this is meant to be "A

fiscally neutral exercise". Are you

telling us that even if the threats

that led to the capabilities being

drawn up in 2015, they may not have

changed, but other threats may have

got a lot worse. And because you're

not willing to recommend an increase

in the defence budget, indeed, you

seem to be rather complacent about

the size of the defence budget in

what you have just been saying, but

this means that we have to make cuts

in capabilities that we really need

in order to meet other threats that

have got worse, isn't that the

logical consequence of everything

you've been telling us?

I don't

agree, Doctor Lewis. The 2015

review, when I said was fiscally

neutral, within a growing envelope.

The 2015 review already has

significant increases coming into a

range of budgets. The defence

budget, as you know better than I,

has a fixed floor of 2% of national

income and will grow by half a

percent a year in real terms. There

are other commitments within that.

The defence budget is increasing.

The budget available to this purity

and intelligence agencies are

increasing. Even if you take the

hard power ended this, we have an

increasing envelope. The question I

was trying to respond to Mr grow, it

is about how we balance off the

decisions in that increasing

envelope -- Mr James Gray. There is

a question about whether that is

sufficient overall. But this

exercise looks at how to best make

use of the rule sources available to

us against the threat picture and we

reached conclusions at the end.

Do

you or do you not have the ability

to make a recommendation, if you

believe that you cannot meet the new

and intensifying threats without

making cuts in capabilities which,

only two years ago, we decided were

necessary and important. Do you have

the ability to say to the

government, "We need to enlarge the

financial envelope?" To use the

jargon.

Of course. If we concluded

that the total set of capabilities

optimised across that 56 billion

were insufficient to meet the

threats then, of course, we would

say that to ministers. That is not a

conclusion I expect to reach. But I

have the freedom, always, to give

ministers candid advice. As I

already said, the government has

already just announced, even in the

short-term, a significant increase

in funding for the policing. Because

of the intensification of that

threat. There are areas in which

this is being considered.

With

respect, you keep lumping together,

and I know that's your job, because

you are the national security

adviser and not just the Defence

Secretary, you keep lumping together

the budgets for all of these things.

There is no doubt, because of

terrorist threats in particular,

there have been very substantial

increases in budgets for things like

the intelligence services. But the

budget the defence is 36 billion.

That is the budget that gives us our

Nato comparator of 2% as a minimum.

You said one of the main reasons

that the threat has intensified has

been a newly assertive Russia. The

last time we had an assertive Russia

was in the 1980s. We weren't

spending 2% on the defence budget

then, we were spending between

4.6%-5.1%. I beg your pardon?

And

allies were comparatively spending

more as well.

Thank you, Tom. And

even after the Cold War came to an

end, between 1989 and 1991, and even

after we took the peace dividend

cuts, as late as the financial year

1995-1996, we weren't spending just

2% of GDP on defence, we were

spending 3% of GDP on defence. Given

that we are -- we used to spend a

much greater percentage of GDP on

defence and have defence much higher

in our scale of national priorities

in comparison with other high

spending departments that we do now,

are you still saying to me that we

should not be concerned about the

fact that we are talking about

deleting entire capabilities like

the Royal Marines amphibious

capability, when only in January

this year, I was being assured that

HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark were due

to the service in 2033 and 2044? How

can you tell me that we do not need

an enlarged defence budget if we

cannot deal with intensifying

threats without cutting other

capabilities that only two years ago

we decided we needed?

With respect

Doctor Lewis, the direct example you

gave is speculative, no decisions

have been taken of mankind. There is

a lot of speculation in the press,

some very well sourced speculation

in the press, but no decisions had

been taken. In terms of the general

point you are making, the historical

comparison, is, of course, correct

in the sense of our own expenditure.

But let's not forget the nature of

the threat we faced in the 1980s. As

I said earlier on, I don't think the

way to measure this is just through

budgets, it is about the effect you

are seeking to achieve but just

taking that as a proxy, as I

mentioned, if you put together the

British, French and German defence

budgets, even now, that's even

before Germany and France hit the

2%, but even now, it's about twice

the Russian defence budget. What

they get for that and the way they

deploy themselves is clearly

different. You will be the first to

tell me that is not a direct

comparison. But that's my point

about budgets, we can't just...

Compare to our own historic

experience.

Areas in which we may decide to deal

with the Russian threat because of

the nature of that threat, the

diversifying nature, they exist

outside the defence budget. I don't

dispute the basic analysis that

you're setting out, but I think it

is right in my job to think about

the whole set of capabilities, not

just the biggest one.

I have to stop

now, but can I just say that anyone

who underestimates Russia's military

potential and the size of their GDP

does so at their peril. I have many

more questions I'd like to put but I

fear they'll have to wait for a

different forum from this one.

Lord

King wanted to come in very briefly.

One quick question, are you the

right person that Doctor Lewis

should be asking these questions to?

Just, quite simply, do you come in a

sense, few of the dual

responsibility is to work within the

terms of reference this may have

been employed to you and perhaps

feel that you're not in a position

to actually challenge the Treasury

had on? Is that right or wrong?

Perhaps there are two passed to the

question and answer. Of course,

Doctor Lewis and I have exchanged

some correspondence and the Prime

Minister has as well. I genuinely

think that it is the government

position that questions of this

detail should be addressed to the

Defence Secretary and permit

secretary of defence, they are

responsible for this area of work.

On the broader question... --

permanent secretary of defence. Can

I have the frank conversations with

the Prime Minister and Chancellor of

the Treasury about the overall

allocation of resources? Absolutely.

I expect to do so. But, as always,

in private.

I will move on to

Baroness Fox will stop you said the

large and growing diverse threat.

Baroness Fox will stop you said the

large and growing diverse threat.

I'm interested in your view on how

much has

I'm interested in your view on how

much has shifted since 2015. A lot

has shifted since last week. How you

would characterise the threats and

plan for them?

You know this area

much better than I. I hope you would

agree that the rate of change in

this area, you know, both

essentially, how individual threats

have become sharper but also the

diversification of threats. They

have progressed faster than anyone

expected two or three years ago. As

you say. It's almost as if there is

something different all of the time.

The thing that has really struck me

about the cyber threat and I dealt

with this a lot at the Home Office,

the way it cuts right across any

definition of national security and

public safety. If you are an

individual small business and there

is one near to where my flat is in

Battersea, they has two crimes in

the space of a week. One of which

was to smash up their stuff outside.

It was a florist. The other was a

cyber attack on their bank account.

The second was the much more

difficult one for the police to

address. The cyber threat is not

just in national strategic threat of

the kind we have been discussing

already, where hostile state could

achieve, through cyber activity, the

same kind of effect they could

achieve through significant military

action. It's also a threat that goes

right the way down to individual

businesses, or as you know,

individual citizens. Particularly

the most vulnerable. Therefore, it's

not one we can parcel up and put in

one place. It is now essentially a

place or battle space, one likes

that language, a domain that runs

right the way across the national

security and public safety agenda.

Again, one could talk about this at

great length. Therefore, the

approach has to be, as it is in

other areas, in very generic terms,

to tackle the threats as best we

can. Reduce those, go after the

people responsible for them. You get

a blend of state and non-state,

criminal, political, etc. It also

improve resilience. This is not

something, as you know, the

government can do alone. We have to

improve the resident resilience of

citizens and government as a whole.

I am happy to talk at length about

it. Perhaps I should stop.

How can

it possibly be that 1.9 billion is

even beginning to scratch the

surface of this threat? How do you

see that number in relation to the

overall budget?

1.9 billion is for

the government cyber security

programme. It is as much about

societal and economic resilience,

not just about government. That is

designed to try and improve

government activity. It is what

has... Funded the National Cyber

Security Centre, which of course,

was launched since this committee

last discussed this issue. A big

part of that unit's job is to

improve best practice in businesses,

best practices amongst citizens,

making people cyber streetwise. To

improve resilience across the

economy and across society. I don't

think this is an area which is

simply bad government spending money

to change things. It's about

changing the way that people and

businesses conduct themselves.

Online. That is something they need

to build in.

Can I just talk about

the specific NHS WannaCry attack?

I'm not sure if there was a

central... Sorry, decision about the

central security operations before

that attack, whether that decision

came afterwards? That the NHS have

established a centre for security? I

wondered if you could tell us about

that. My understanding of the

challenge is that it was people

failing over a very long period of

time to have consistently upgraded

the software that they needed to.

How are you approaching this as a

challenge across all of our critical

infrastructure?

On your first question, I believe

the operation existed before, but

has been energised since. I would

like to the committee. I am not

sure. If I have a romcom I will

write to the committee to correct

that, if I may -- if I have that

wrong. You are right on the second

point. Without going into detail

which exposes vulnerabilities, as

you will be aware, some areas, but

not all, where old software that is

no longer fully supported and that

hadn't been patched. The reason that

this attack hit individual

fragments, if you like, of the NHS

was that most of the NHS systems and

most other government systems hit

Russian businesses and others, were

updated and resilient to it but

someone. That basic message, it goes

back to the first question, it

wouldn't matter what the government

budget for cider is, actually, this

is as much about IT departments is

-- cyber security. And hospitals and

elsewhere indulging in basic hygiene

of updating their systems, making

sure their software is patched.

That won't guarantee them against

all threats, but it will increase

their resilience against this kind

of threat. Some of this is about

properly backing up data, so if

there is an attack, you have only

lost a day's work, because

everything up to yesterday was

backed up in a different system.

There is a whole load of practices

that... Good IT hygiene will make

any organisation or individual less

vulnerable.

How can you influence

making sure that we have the skills

and attention paid to these issues?

Well, this is and this is something,

so in the economy as a whole, it is

led by DCMC, they have the

responsibility for trying to ensure

as businesses exploit the digital

economy, that they do that in a way

that is safe. That properly protects

them. But I think the main

contribution we make out of national

security community is the national

cyber-security centre which has had

good first few months in operation.

Is supporting businesses and

Government in dealing with

cyber-attacks or dealing with them

if they happen. That is probably the

main contribution we can make more

widely. Within the national security

departments and agencies, we have to

make sure our own systems are

resilient and there are parts of our

supply chains that we are addressing

carefully.

I know different

ministers think they have different

bits of this and it is a complex

web, do you think there should be a

single minister with responsibility

for cyber-security.

I don't to be

honest, it is now too distributed to

say there is a single minister for

cyber. I set out in my letter where

that responsibility now lies, we

have consolidated some of it,

compared to where we were, the

responsibilities where we have DCMC

responsible for the digital economy

and ensuring h it is safe, that sits

with their core responsibilities.

The Home Secretary response Dibble

responsible for dealing with the

civil contingencies. That is within

her core responsibilities. That is

part of GCHQ and we have the first

Secretary of State and that is a

change, a senior cabinet minister in

charge of the national

cyber-security programme. That feels

like a good mix of responsibilities

to me.

One short question to follow

that. Do you feel like you can

recruit the talent you need to think

about this issue?

I think, I would

take people on, it is not an issue

for me. I think if you look at QCHQ

and they are able to offer something

that to computer scientists and

graduates coming out of universities

y that the private sector can't and

that is the sense of pup purpose and

the fascination of work and they

feel they have a good record of

attracting highly skilled people. It

is not like people like me, they're

not going to spend 25 or 30 years in

one organisation. They do have

innovative programmes with

scholarships and bursaries in

university, so they're doing some

creative things to attract the right

people and I think they feel they

have a good handle on that question.

Do you really think people have yet

woken up o' to is seriousness of the

cyber situation. It seems to go

right across government I'm

surprised DCMS that isn't seen as

the most heavy weight department has

that responsibility. But looking at

this and knowing that starting with

critical national infrastructure, in

the old days if you wanted to attack

a country you bombed their airports,

you damaged their railway lines and

did those thing, now you just shut

those systems down. I Aviation is

under a major threat. Any transport

system, power generation. It seems

we haven't woken up to the enormous

scale of what is going on both in

terms hostile nations, indulged in

numbers I find incredible and the

amount of attacks that are coming

from, either from hostile nations or

enterprising young men or women who

actually and I talk about putting

people in university, I hope we are

going to recruit people before they

get to university, who are some of

brightest people in this field to

defend us. But also because a lot of

people and we know this as

businesses cover up the fact that

they have been attacked, how good a

picture do we actually have of what

is really going on and are we right

across government and suppliers to

government and to the nation and the

whole of national fabric, how good

are we really doing at covering the

whole of that waterfront.

You make

the point very eloquently. For the

economy and society as a whole, I

think you're right, people have not

appreciated the seriousness of this

threat. And this is something that

one needs to think about as a parent

as much as anything else, the social

harms, cyber-bullying and revenge

porn are new factors that young

people are dealing with, right up to

strategic factors. This is something

that there is a role in schools,

there is a role for business and

you're rights we do need to recruit

people out of school and put them

through bursaries and the

cyber-security centre and GCHQ are

doing that. That is a challenging

prospect for government, because

they haven't traditionally done

that. On the the broader strategic

question about critical national

infrastructure, the supply chains

into the security capabilities, and

so on, we are on top, well we are on

this question, I wouldn't claim we

are completely on top of it, there

are vulnerabilities and there are

sophisticated attacks being mounted.

But we are conscious of threat,

whether with the private sector or

parts of public sector, building

that into our programmes is a big

part of their work. In terms of

point you made about disclosure and

companies disclosing this kind of

attack, this is an area where NCR

SEAC is working in a sophisticated

way and agreeing with companies how

they will handle an attack,

beginning with the confidential

conversations so that companies feel

they can share that vulnerability

with the MCSC and that when that

need to do after that to reassure

their customer or shareholders that

they have handled it properly. We

have seen examples where that didn't

work with NCSS they have sought to

learn the lessons of that and help

companies deal with this and not

increase their vulnerability by

going public at the wrong time,

whilst going public at the

appropriate time.

You mentioned cyber as an electronic

crime and it is a physical crime.

Could you comment on that.

The chief

of defence staff spoke about this at

some length last week. It goes to

the point Lord King was making in

the modern era, you can achieve the

same effect as you used to be during

World War two say bombing the London

docks or taking out a power station,

by going after the physical

infrastructure of cyberspace and

cables or going after the hard ware

or going after the software,

cyber-attacks that freeze or tip

over systems and we have to take

both seriously.

It ever sizes the

over lap on defence capability.

Of

course, I take an active interest in

all of the capabilities, but in the

end they're delivered by individual

departments and what those

departments, what those departments

deliver, how effective they deliver

it and whether they're on budget is

a matter for them. My job is to try

and help the NSC see the whole

picture and play that co-ordinating

role. I run a small secretariat and

some of caricatures that I have seen

in the press of my influence on

these matters are perhaps slightly

exaggerated.

Lord Hamilton.

There

was a report that companies were

accumulating bit coins so that they

could pay off black mailers on the

cybersite. Are you confident that if

that happens, although it wouldn't

be in the public domain these

companies would inform you that

happened, or is this going on

without you knowing anything about

it.

That goes to the point I was

making to Lord King, I can't be

absolutely confident, but companies

that indulge in that are going to

lay themselves open to more of the

same problem and part of test of

whether our cyber-strategy as a

whole across the economy, and the

cyber-resilience is whether

companies feel they need to ensure

themselves through that kind of

mechanism. I can assure you that

companies that face this kind of

vulnerability or have an incident

can go to NCSC in confidence and

NSCS will help them manage the

public disclosure of it in an

appropriate way.

Thank you.

I would

like to move on to counter terrorism

and March the previous committee

heard from the Home Secretary and

asked about what was happening on

contest and the publication of

document that's referred to as

contest 2.0and she said it was

running late and stressed the

importance of getting it done. That

was overtaken by events clearly, but

I think it would be useful to hear

from you how the sort of shift from

contest 2.0to 3.0has affected your

thinking, why was there not a case

for pressing ahead with the

publication of contest document, the

review that was expected even with,

even in t expectation of work being

done on the new review that was

announced after the general

election?

The question of

publication is a very one for the

Home Secretary and for ministers. I

think they felt that given the

nature of nose attacks and the fact

that we needed to take another look

at this, there was this operational

review conducted with David

Anderson's assurance that it didn't

make sense to put out one document

that at the time we wouldn't have

known there was significant changes

and it would have... It could have

been, could have caused confusion is

guess. But I was n't involved in the

decision. In terms of work since the

election it is broad-ranging, so

there has been as you know the

operational reviews and those have

reached significant lessons learned

about how the operational mechanism,

the case work mechanisms need to

change, more data sharing and

engagement with mainstream policings

and more broadly as the threat has

diversify and defused and we have

seen people being radicalised online

at much greater speed than was the

case even a few years ago. I was

struck about that at the Home

Office. We need to put in place a

broader structure that deals with

that more defuse threat and which

people can use every day implements

to launch attacks. So that review is

in progress, contest 3.0as you refer

to it. It is part of capability

review portfolio and will be again

as the capability review as a whole

will be published in due course.

I

appreciate it is an awkward question

when a publication has yet to take

place, but would envisage there

being a significant difference of

emphasis following on from the sort

of low tech, lone actor attacks that

occurred earlier this year. Is that

going to have a big impact on the

thrust of the next part of

programme.

We were already seeking

to deal with that. That is a threat

that had already emerge. As the

Anderson review sets out, the case

work model that was in place, which

is focussed on a intense focus on a

relatively small number of high

threat cases needs to be

complemented with a broader picture

of as they are called in the trade,

closed SOIs, people who have been on

the list of threats and have been

taken off it and of trying to

identify new and emerging threats.

That is a complex business and does

involve some of the more intrusive

powers of online surveillance that

Parliament granted in the

legislation in the legislation last

year. But fundamentally it is a

question about data-sharing, making

sure that we understand, we have the

whole picture of all the government

data on individuals and can assess

risk and applying algorithms to

enable the experts to make risk

judgments in a more sophisticated

and time sensitive way and about

engaging that wider set of stake

holders. That is a challenging

prospect and taking security into

areas that are they are no

traditionally comfortable with

security and so there are cultural

questions there. We will want to

pilot some of things and those will

the the main changes and that came

out of the Anderson review.

As part 06 of that could it

strengthen neighbourhood policing

so, those officers who are sort of

embedded in communities can sort of

help provide the early warning of

individuals at risk to

radicalisation? Is there going to be

something in the new contest review,

which might give us a fresh

perspective on how we utilise those

tremendously important aspects more

effectively in encounting terrorism?

Without prejudging the final review,

because it has not yet been to

ministers for decision. I think the

basic point you made is correct and

came out of the Anderson review,

engaging those local neighbourhood

policing but also others to ensure

they can do their job effectively

about this set of threats, as they

do about gangs, other social

problems and so on is one of the

conclusions of the Anderson review

and doubtless will then be followed

through in the broader review that I

presume the Home Secretary will want

to announce in the New Year.

Shall I

go on to 13?

Yes.

It will be use tofl get -- to get

your thoughts on the statement by

MI5 on the uplift in threat of the

terrorist threat in the United

Kingdom. He's clearly spoken out in

the strongest terms and it would be

useful to hear your thoughts on what

the main drivers for this very

significant change in the level of

activity and threat that we face?

Of

course, I entirely agree, this is a

subject the Director-General and I

have discussed a lot over the last

few years, when I was doing my

previous job as well. We're still, I

think all of us, seem to understand

better and better what has really

driven this. There are a number of

factors that we can see evidence of,

as I said - online radicalism of

people based in ra qua until

recently of people in the UK. Often

impressionable youngsters. There

have been trends, if you look at the

average of the people who are under

scrutiny, the average age has come

down, there are more women than

would have been the case a few years

ago. Quite why that is, what has

driven those individuals into that

situation, obviously there'll be

individual cases and as the Prime

Minister has pointed out on

occasions, there is a high

propensity of people who have had

mental health problems in this

co-hort, whom these people are

exploiting and exploiting that

particular vulnerability. I don't

want to characterure that - it is

not the case across the bored, but

there are factors of that kind. The

nature of the radicalising threat is

more sophisticated and goes to the

point that was made earlier about a

cyber threat. Adversaries who are

targeting these individuals have

become more sophisticated - the

tools and techniques they are using

are more sophisticated. And of

course we need to be alert to the

effect as people who have been in

Syria return to the UK, although we

will try and manage that as

effectively as we can. We need to be

alert to that possibility as well. I

think we understand some of the

trends and therefore can probably

give a pretty good answer to the

what. It is harder to give an answer

to the why, I think. And that's

probably a matter for as much

academic research as our own

analysis.

You have slightly

anticipated my next question -

something which has come across from

a number of your answers today is

one of the things has changed is

people are becoming radicalised more

quickly than has previously been the

case, so it would be really useful

to understand what you and your team

in the Government are doing to try

and understand that, to obviously,

as means to try and counter it in

the future.

We are trying to

understand that. If I can give you

an example, you will review the very

high profile case of the schoolgirls

from Bethnal Green who went out to

Syria. These were young women who

had shown no evidence to close

friends or family of being

radicalised and suddenly off they

went. It turned out, in essentially

a private space they had been

radicalised and were able to conceal

it from people who knew them, school

friends and so on. And that was a

new phenomenon. And we have been

working to understand that. It was

partly that that led to the prevent

duty and you will review that was a

piece of controversial legislation

which extended to several million

public servants t duty to report, as

they would report another kind of

vulnerability if they believed a

child was being subject to physical

or sexual abuse in the home, it

extended that duty to this area. And

requires teachers, for example, to

report, if they observe the kind of

behaviour that would lead them to

believe that a vulnerable young

person is at risk of being

radicalised F I think quite a lot of

the prevent case work, I have been

out on the channel programme, for

example, some people will be

familiar with, I have been out and

seen that in operation. If it often

focussed on young people and from

third sector, charities, etc, in

order to try and deal with that

threat. What we are trying to do is

ensure those programmes are

triggered as early as possible and

indeed learn from the experience of

others. It is an area I wouldn't

wish to characterise it as me and my

team, except in the national

security community as a whole is

there. This is an area that Home

Office, DCLG, devolved

administrations and the police are

looking very, very carefully at.

Thank you. Moving on to my last

question. Now Daesh has lost most of

its territory, which do you believe

is the greater threat? Is it

returning fighters or people who

have stayed at home but find

themselves inspired by Daesh

propaganda online?

To be honest, I

am not sure I would want to say

which one is greater. Both are a

threat. We have more, we probably

have more control points over

returning fighters. Many would come

through Turkey. We have got a very

strong relationship with the Turkish

authorities and have been able to

bring people f they have to come

home, bring people under control. If

they have a dual nationality we

might remove that. We probably have

more control points, including our

own borders, on people returning

home, as long as we have

intelligence about them. I think the

nature of the sort of, the domestic

radicalisation on people who are

radicalised online for the reasons

we see. I recommend the Anderson

report, it is not a very long

report, to those who have not read

it. That report sets out just how it

is possible for people to hide in

plain sight, having been radicalised

online. And therefore, it is even

more challenging for the police and

other authorities to understand, to

be aware of that threat and then

take the right, put the right sort

of interventions in place and the

kind of changesvy talked about are

de-- changes I have talked about,

like the prevent duty, but those

which are coming in as we approach

the Anderson review, are redinned to

deal with them.

And -- designed to

deal with them. And the Defence

Secretary's statements about what

our approach should be in response

to returning fighters - does that

signal a formal change of approach

in the Government's policy, or is

that more general commentary?

It

doesn't signal a formal change of

approach. There have been occasions,

which you are aware, on which we

have had to takeleten strikes in

theatre, that has been the

appropriate thing to do. If people

have dual nationality we will seek

to remove that so they cannot return

and pose a threat. Other people we

will bring back under control and if

they either then face a criminal

justice prol success or potentially

other kinds of executive measures of

that kind, depending on which is

appropriate to the individual case.

It is that fuel intervention. Among

those interventions is and remains

lethal strikes when this is

necessary.

It is not envisaged that

the Defence Secretary statement's

envisaged a greater use of drone

strikes than previously...

They are

used when appropriate.

From the 2017 attacks and how is the

capability review taking into

account the recommendations recently

identified by MI5 and CT policing

for improving counter-terrorism

operations is that also prevent part

of that strategy?

Thank you, so this

is one of the dozen or so projects

within the capability review and

essentially, as we were just

discussing, it is the, this will be,

these lessons will be accounted for

in the counter-terrorism project or

the contest 3.0 project, as we were

just discussing.

And will the

capability review be delayed as a

result of having to do so?

I don't

anticipate that, no. The work is in

hand. The work is on-going. But

there's no delay.

And the money that

you mentioned which has just been

announced, this additional £50

million, this is to assist this

process?

So the Home Secretary will

set out more detail about that on

the floor of the House, in the House

of Commons when she announces the

police funding settlement, which I

believe she's doing tomorrow or

Wednesday. I am not sure. Anyway,

this week. The actual £50 million

she and the Chancellor set out at

the weekend is to deal with the

capacity issue that the police have

faced this year and next year in

dealing the increase in operation,

removing the immediate threat. That

is related to, but somewhat separate

from, the changes in process, the

broadening out of the involvement of

other parts of Government that will

come through as a result of the

Anderson review and as part of the

overall contest, 3.0.

Do you see one

of your main responsibilities as

ensuring better co-ordination

between these different groups?

That's one of the lessons?

It is

essentially, that is a function I

would say is my responsibility when

I was at the Home Office and it was

to pull together all the homeland

security factors. But I think again

if I compare us to other countries,

the co-operation we see between our

intelligence agencies, between the

intelligence agencies and the police

and indeed increasingly between

those security actors and the wider

social policy community stands in

comparison with anyone. I think most

countries would look to us,

particularly if you think of prevent

programme, the involvement of

schools, of social security, of

other social policy in our

counter-terrorism work. Most others

have nothing comparable to the type

of liaison we have. We can work on

improving that. Make sure the data

flows t expertise are at the opt mum

level. That is part of what the

Anderson review talks about. Thank

you.

You said that the threat that we

face has intensified and diversified

and I would like to refer you to the

threat from Russia, which the

Foreign Secretary recently said was

now at a higher level than had been

the case for decades. I wonder if

you could talk about that and this

phrase modern deterrence and to what

extent is it involved an

intensification and diversification

of our own efforts and draw your

attention to what Lord Hanagan said,

that the United Kingdom has

underestimated Russia's ability and

intent to use unconventional

methods.

Thank you, Lord Trimble,

this is something that I think all

western democracies have faced. We

saw a mixture of propaganda and

cyber-attacks in the French

election. There are other high

profile cases of that case. If we

take that as an example, it was

clear it was not aimed to change the

result, there is no way outside

intervention could have shifted the

result of a two to one election

victory, but it was designed to

undermine the citizens' trust in the

systems. So we have fake news to use

the fashionable term, but propaganda

to use an old fashioned one, seeking

to undermine public support in the

Baltics for the enhanced forward

presence, including the British

presence. Stories about the conduct

of soldiers that are untrue and they

are clearly on this agenda. As I was

saying earlier, while we recognise

in 2015 the nature of that threat it

has intensified at pace and at a

greater pace than was anticipated

there. In terms of modern deterrence

we are working on this, this is one

of areas of capability review that

we are looking at and the general

approach we take to being able to

employ our capabilities to exploit

threats and opportunities. If we any

about the Russian example f we are,

let's say we're hit with a cyber-or

propaganda attack, probably a

deniable one, who they will disavow

knowledge of. The correct response

might not be in the same area of

operation. The correct response

might be to... To push back or

disrupt in a different area, where

we are exploiting our strengths and

their weaknesses. You will

understand I don't want to go into

detail in that a public session. But

you choose to fight on your ground

of strength. It is employing

different capabilities that exploit

oured opponents vulnerabilities.

One

of the things we want to do is

minimise our own vulnerabilities and

to use an old fashioned term, sub

version, are we looking to see what

extent foreign state actor,

particular ly Russian or others are

trying to subvert our way of doing

thing?

Yes we have a strategy that

sits under the rub rick of the

national state security for hostile

state activity and cyber and it is

designed to do just that.

On this

question of sub version, I don't

know if you read the works of people

like Luke Harding from the Guardian

on elements of state corruption of

British institutions or state

sponsored corruption of British

institutions, including finances and

economic output, we are seeing a

notable increase in such levels of

corruption of British organisations,

not exclusive to economic output,

including things like political

parties. Are you, have you diverted

resources away from other elements

of MI5s responsibilities to what

might be seen as more fundamental

part of British state security.

You

understand I'm not going to comment

on the allocation of MI5 resources.

You know the reasons for that. But I

probably can say that they are well

aware of that risk and act

accordingly.

Can I ask about, it is

a bit old fashioned, but about

expertise, during the Cold War in

Britain we had a lot of expertise in

relation to Russia and that was the

case I think until quite recently,

there is a sense, I have a sense

that that expertise has been lost

and now we seem to have a much

dimmer view of what is happening in

Russia. Would you agree with that.

If we have lost expertise and I have

a sense not just with Russia, but

with other country, what are we

doing to try and build it back up.

I

don't know that's right. We often

hear it. But we have for example if

I look at the run of ambassadors in

Russia, we have real deep Russia

experts who have done that job one

after the other and I use that as a

proxy for it. I suppose there is

clearly an over all capacity issue

that when we faced essentially a

single threat during the Cold War we

had a great deal of expertise in

that and the internal threat was

from Northern Ireland, Republican

terrorism. And those, so therefore

we had a lot of resources devoted to

both of those. We now have a lot of

resources dealing with terrorism,

international terrorism, of the time

we have difference cussed. I think

that has -- discussed. I think that

has sometimes been exaggerated we

have a balance across the agency and

they have sought to maintain that

diverse expertise. There is always

an adjustment between different

areas.

Given your position as

principal adviceor, where do you see

the greatest threat, is it from

terrorism or sub version of... Led

by state actors.

I don't think it is

an either or.

But what is greater.

It is a threat, it is a threat to

what I guess would be... Of course

Russia and a strategic threat from a

nuclear state presents a significant

strategic effect to us. But given

the capabilities we are and our

allies have it is unlike will I ly

that threat will manifest itself

except in the ways we see. But we

face an acute threat that is killing

British citizens from terrorists. I

just don't think... One can say one

is more than the other. They're

different. We need to address both.

Can I press you? The reason I ask

you on the threat to the nation

state is because we are seeing

through sub version and through what

you referred to as propaganda, we

are seeing institutions that we have

grown to trust for our security like

NATO become undermined by

organisations that we see being

attacked by state actors. I

therefore question are we seeing the

nation state, the British nation

state, the United Kingdom and Great

Britain and Northern Ireland being

undermined by sub version by foreign

state powers and is that a greater

threat to us as a nation than

damaging though it and painful

though it and awful though it is,

terrorism.

I wouldn't characterise

it that way. To put it simply if you

think of risk, it is threat minus

resilience. So if I think about the

risk to this country and the risk to

the citizen and the country, we have

to take into account not only the

nature of the threat, but the nature

of the country's resilience against

that threat. So yes you're right,

there are efforts to undermine NATO

and to sew dissent and undermain

mine the confidence of the citizen,

but we should have competence in our

resilience against those threats.

They haven't really worked and we

are seeking to strongen that

resilience. Whether through making

ourselves stronger against