Browse content similar to John Limbert - US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran (2009- 2010). Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
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Welcome to HARDtalk. For the second time in his presidency Barack Obama | :00:10. | :00:16. | |
is eyeing the 'reset button' in his diplomatic toolkit. With Russia it | :00:16. | :00:23. | |
misfired, so when it comes to Iran, what are the chances of overcoming | :00:23. | :00:30. | |
three decades of hostility? HARDtalk speaks to John Limbert, the state | :00:30. | :00:33. | |
department's point man on Iran in Obama's first term, and one of the | :00:33. | :00:37. | |
US diplomats held hostage in Tehran 34 years ago. Are the US and Iran | :00:37. | :00:43. | |
ready for the difficult decisions that would truly reset relations? | :00:43. | :01:14. | |
Ambassador John Limbert in Washington, DC, welcome to HARDtalk. | :01:14. | :01:25. | |
I think it is fair to say that few officials have the intimate | :01:25. | :01:35. | |
knowledge of Iran that you have. It is potentially very, very exciting. | :01:35. | :01:45. | |
This is the first time we see a crack in the deep freeze. A | :01:45. | :01:53. | |
relationship based described lack of Narnia. Always winter, never | :01:54. | :02:01. | |
Christmas. You say it hasn't happened in 34 years, there have | :02:01. | :02:09. | |
been moments of excitement before. Lots of people thought that would | :02:09. | :02:12. | |
introduce a thaw in relations and it didn't. So why should we be so much | :02:12. | :02:21. | |
more excited this time? Perhaps we shouldn't be. For exactly the reason | :02:21. | :02:29. | |
you said. There have been opportunities, there have been | :02:29. | :02:30. | |
Neither of us want to see Sunni openings, you mentioned | :02:30. | :07:16. | |
Neither of us want to see Sunni fundamentalists, jihadists, Al-Qaeda | :07:16. | :07:19. | |
group come to power. Neither of us want to see nuclear weapons used. | :07:19. | :07:46. | |
Let's not go there right now. Let's stick with the real substance of | :07:46. | :07:49. | |
this relationship. More than anything it is about Iran's nuclear | :07:49. | :08:05. | |
ambitions. If the nuclear issue is too difficult, let's put it to one | :08:05. | :08:09. | |
side. The problem is, when the Iranians talk about the nuclear | :08:09. | :08:12. | |
issue, we are talking about legal issues, technical issues, additional | :08:12. | :08:26. | |
protocols. The Iranians are talking about something different. They are | :08:26. | :08:30. | |
talking about national pride, their national rights, their status in the | :08:30. | :08:41. | |
world. This kind of asymmetric negotiation can only lead to | :08:41. | :08:53. | |
frustration. When you are talking to the Iranians over oil, 60 years ago, | :08:53. | :09:03. | |
it was the same thing. Its rights to control its own destiny. Their | :09:03. | :09:21. | |
acquisition of nuclear weapons. I just want to know whether you as a | :09:21. | :09:25. | |
diplomat with extraordinary power and knowledge of this country, a | :09:25. | :09:28. | |
long-time diplomat and servant of the State Department, I am yet to | :09:28. | :09:43. | |
encounter... That Hassan Rouhani... He doesn't believe it, do you? I | :09:44. | :09:53. | |
don't know and I don't know if anyone knows. What I do know is | :09:53. | :10:04. | |
this. What is the Iranians core interest in all of these exchanges? | :10:04. | :10:11. | |
It seems to me it is the survival of the regime. The main threat to their | :10:12. | :10:19. | |
survival are not foreign armies or ships or planes but the internal | :10:19. | :10:21. | |
rebellion, internal disturbance, what they call the sedition inside | :10:21. | :10:36. | |
Iran. What does a nuclear weapon do to ensure the continuation of the | :10:36. | :10:47. | |
regime? I don't want to tell you things you already know because you | :10:47. | :10:59. | |
know this better than anyone. The nuclear programme has been woven in | :10:59. | :11:02. | |
to their regime strategy for so long that it seems to me that it has | :11:02. | :11:06. | |
become an integral part of who they are and what they are. Has served | :11:06. | :11:14. | |
the regime in many different senior capacities ever since. H e is a man | :11:14. | :11:37. | |
far from being a liberal or a moderate in that cliched language, | :11:37. | :11:40. | |
again, woven into the senior decision-making that has let us to | :11:40. | :11:44. | |
this place. I think on this case, we are in violent agreement. I am and | :11:44. | :11:49. | |
what others have said, if you want to get to the nuclear issue, which | :11:49. | :11:53. | |
is a central issue, what you have to do is at least build some confidence | :11:54. | :12:01. | |
between the two sides. To go directly to the issue is not going | :12:01. | :12:11. | |
to build that confidence. You need to broaden the discussion to areas | :12:11. | :12:14. | |
like Afghanistan, perhaps Syria, and where these two sides discover that | :12:15. | :12:17. | |
if they say yes to something, but the sky doesn't fall and that in | :12:18. | :12:21. | |
fact the other side might not always be out to cheat them, having | :12:21. | :12:25. | |
established that, you can go back to the nuclear issue. Pause and | :12:25. | :12:48. | |
consider, if you would, how what you just said might be received in | :12:48. | :13:01. | |
Israel? I do not speak for the Israeli government. What I do know | :13:01. | :13:10. | |
is during my visits to Israel and in conversation with Israeli friends, | :13:10. | :13:13. | |
the opinion - this is not just on the left - but much of the opinion | :13:14. | :13:29. | |
is strongly divided on this issue. There is a vigorous debate within | :13:29. | :13:32. | |
Israel as there are on many subjects on the question of Iran. And the | :13:33. | :13:41. | |
kind of rhetoric we hear here on Israel represents just a segment of | :13:41. | :13:50. | |
opinion. Unfortunately, here in the US, we do not hear all sides of the | :13:50. | :13:56. | |
story. To quote an Israeli newspaper, they said AIPAC - the | :13:56. | :14:00. | |
lobbying group in the US - is not Israel. I did not know whether you | :14:00. | :14:11. | |
can call the government one voice. Netanyahu is the most important | :14:11. | :14:19. | |
voice. The government have dismissed everything that Hassan Rouhani has | :14:19. | :14:25. | |
said. The minister of intelligence said the nuclear project is | :14:25. | :14:27. | |
galloping forward, if they continue to advance they could have nuclear | :14:27. | :14:30. | |
weapon capabilities within six months. Right now, Benjamin | :14:30. | :14:38. | |
Netanyahu is pleading with Barack Obama pleading that they do not take | :14:38. | :14:42. | |
at face value what the Iranians are saying. The problem is the extremist | :14:42. | :14:52. | |
party within Israel had the gift that kept on giving. Khomeini. Now | :14:52. | :15:13. | |
he is gone. His absence, after 34 years, has created a serious | :15:13. | :15:23. | |
problem. I am sorry to interrupt but this is not about language, it is | :15:23. | :15:26. | |
not even about personality, it is about the fact that according to the | :15:26. | :15:30. | |
IAEA, there are at least 17 different nuclear facilities inside | :15:30. | :15:38. | |
Iran. There is a sophisticated enrichment programme. The IAEA says | :15:38. | :15:44. | |
it cannot confirm it is for peaceful purposes. These are realities which | :15:44. | :15:50. | |
Israelis see and which leads them to conclude that unless things change | :15:50. | :15:53. | |
very quickly, something will have to be done, albeit perhaps by them if | :15:53. | :16:08. | |
nobody else will do it. Again, it is interesting you mention the word | :16:08. | :16:10. | |
quickly, because that was exactly what we heard some of the Iranian | :16:10. | :16:14. | |
representatives in New York, I believe including Hassan Rouhani and | :16:14. | :16:16. | |
his delegation, say about the nuclear negotiations, saying we need | :16:16. | :16:38. | |
to reach some agreement quickly. What the Iranians have been saying | :16:38. | :16:41. | |
and, whether you believe that or not is another issue, if you do not | :16:41. | :16:45. | |
believe them, then there is no answer. It is difficult to make any | :16:45. | :16:57. | |
kind of progress. Someone said at some point in the negotiations - | :16:57. | :17:01. | |
someone has to trust someone. But what the Iranians say is that they | :17:01. | :17:05. | |
do not... They are not seeking a nuclear weapon for various reasons - | :17:05. | :17:07. | |
ideological and political and so forth - but they do not want to be | :17:08. | :17:11. | |
told what to do, bullied, intimidated, as they call it, by | :17:11. | :17:21. | |
some outside power. Or politically could they be seen to knuckle under | :17:21. | :17:29. | |
threat. As another former State department colleague of yours, | :17:29. | :17:32. | |
Nicholas Burns, wrote not so long ago, oftentimes diplomacy requires | :17:32. | :17:41. | |
the threat of force. You seem to be advocating a move towards relaxation | :17:41. | :17:43. | |
of sanctions, sending warmer signals to Tehran before they have done | :17:43. | :17:52. | |
anything. Surely the sanctions are the reason why Hassan Rouhani is | :17:52. | :17:55. | |
talking openly about making concessions. You keep the sanctions | :17:55. | :18:05. | |
until they pack their words with specific actions? I have great | :18:05. | :18:21. | |
respect for ambassador Burns. Smart diplomacy without some backing of | :18:21. | :18:25. | |
force is a little bit like a smile without any teeth - it does not | :18:25. | :18:34. | |
carry much weight. But to say that sanctions, for example, had this | :18:34. | :18:37. | |
effect, made the Iranians become more reasonable, made the Iranians | :18:37. | :18:40. | |
change their policy, may be true but I have not seen the evidence for it. | :18:40. | :18:54. | |
People have made the statements. I have seen statements that Hassan | :18:54. | :18:57. | |
Rouhani owes his election to the sanctions. Again, that may be true | :18:57. | :19:09. | |
but where is the evidence? The same people who are making these claims, | :19:09. | :19:12. | |
excuse me, are the same people who were the strongest advocates of | :19:12. | :19:20. | |
sanctions in the first place. Isn't that self-evident that an economy | :19:20. | :19:23. | |
which has seen, they say, around $1 billion squeeze out of it because of | :19:23. | :19:27. | |
the strict sanctions, including the loss of output in oil of roughly a | :19:27. | :19:31. | |
million barrels per day, is it not self-evident that that is the sort | :19:31. | :19:34. | |
of terrible damage being done to the Iranian economy that is going to | :19:34. | :19:38. | |
force the regime to start to think very carefully about whether it | :19:38. | :19:41. | |
wants to push ahead with its nuclear programme? Iran's economy is in | :19:41. | :19:50. | |
terrible shape - there is no doubt about that. With its oil resources, | :19:50. | :19:58. | |
with its well educated population, it should be a paradise. It is not. | :19:58. | :20:05. | |
That question, the open question that remains - and I have never had | :20:06. | :20:09. | |
a satisfactory answer to this - is, how much do these problems come from | :20:09. | :20:13. | |
the sanctions, how much from chronic mismanagement? A problem that has | :20:13. | :20:19. | |
gone back a long way and a problem and issue that was raised during | :20:20. | :20:22. | |
Hassan Rouhani's presidential campaign. You are a diplomat and you | :20:22. | :20:29. | |
can learn lessons from recent diplomatic negotiation - I'm | :20:29. | :20:35. | |
thinking of North Korea. The West and the US decided to reach out to | :20:35. | :20:40. | |
North Korea. An agreement was done in which Pyongyang promised to | :20:40. | :20:45. | |
abandon its nuclear programme. What happened less than two years later? | :20:45. | :20:48. | |
North Korea launched its first nuclear device. The Israelis point | :20:48. | :20:57. | |
to North Korea and state if you back off the pressure on Tehran now, that | :20:57. | :21:01. | |
is precisely what you will see in Iran. Within a year or two they will | :21:01. | :21:07. | |
be releasing their first bomb. I wish I had the power of prediction | :21:07. | :21:17. | |
that the source you quote has. I will say this about my predictions | :21:17. | :21:20. | |
about Iran - my predictions have almost always been wrong in the | :21:20. | :21:30. | |
past. I will say that but also, if you look at other people's | :21:30. | :21:33. | |
predictions, I say they are equally wrong. You ask yourself, statements | :21:33. | :21:39. | |
like "a bomb in six months" - how long has that timeline been out | :21:39. | :21:46. | |
there? I heard someone mention it going back to 1997. I think we have | :21:46. | :21:51. | |
to be very sceptical and very suspicious about predictions like | :21:51. | :21:54. | |
that that say that because North Korea did X therefore in Iran we | :21:54. | :22:03. | |
must do Y. I appreciate your frankness and your personal history | :22:03. | :22:09. | |
with Iran. It is fascinating to think of you 34 years ago tripped up | :22:09. | :22:12. | |
in the American embassy, taken hostage by the regime, the fledgling | :22:12. | :22:18. | |
regime of the republic. I wonder if it is fair to say that from then | :22:18. | :22:21. | |
until now, despite your personal experience, you have consistently | :22:21. | :22:24. | |
underestimated the durability of the hostility felt in Iran toward the | :22:24. | :22:30. | |
West and the US in particular. Perhaps I have. As I said to you, | :22:30. | :22:43. | |
Stephen, I have been wrong a lot but I cannot help seeing the irony of | :22:43. | :22:52. | |
all this. I mean, 34 years ago, almost to the day, the foreign | :22:52. | :22:55. | |
ministers of the two countries met in New York on the margins of the | :22:55. | :22:59. | |
General Assembly and in those days it was the Secretary of State Cyrus | :22:59. | :23:02. | |
Vance and the Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi meeting in October | :23:02. | :23:11. | |
1979 and the meeting was a disaster. All the Iranians could do was to | :23:11. | :23:14. | |
recite their list of grievances. They had nothing constructive to | :23:14. | :23:19. | |
bring. Unfortunately, that has been the case for the past 34 years - 95% | :23:19. | :23:23. | |
of Iranian diplomacy has been exactly that - reciting their list | :23:23. | :23:33. | |
of grievances. No, I would not have thought that we would have been | :23:34. | :23:38. | |
estranged for so long. We have been estranged longer than the US from | :23:38. | :23:41. | |
China or from Bolshevik Russia after the revolution. It is unprecedented | :23:41. | :23:51. | |
in our diplomatic history. If you think about it. And I will make one | :23:51. | :23:57. | |
prediction, Stephen, and that is if we do start talking, if this | :23:57. | :24:01. | |
particular opening does go somewhere and contacts are established and | :24:01. | :24:04. | |
officials are able to talk to each other, not necessarily as friends | :24:04. | :24:07. | |
but as States with things to talk about. Both sides are going to ask | :24:07. | :24:16. | |
themselves this question - what was all the fuss about? Why did we waste | :24:16. | :24:24. | |
so much time bashing each other? With that question hanging in the | :24:24. | :24:27. | |
air, I thank you very much Ambassador Limbert for being on | :24:27. | :24:29. | |
HARDtalk. Thank you, Stephen. | :24:30. | :24:35. |