John Limbert - US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran (2009- 2010) HARDtalk


John Limbert - US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran (2009- 2010)

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Welcome to HARDtalk. For the second time in his presidency Barack Obama

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is eyeing the 'reset button' in his diplomatic toolkit. With Russia it

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misfired, so when it comes to Iran, what are the chances of overcoming

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three decades of hostility? HARDtalk speaks to John Limbert, the state

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department's point man on Iran in Obama's first term, and one of the

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US diplomats held hostage in Tehran 34 years ago. Are the US and Iran

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ready for the difficult decisions that would truly reset relations?

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Ambassador John Limbert in Washington, DC, welcome to HARDtalk.

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I think it is fair to say that few officials have the intimate

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knowledge of Iran that you have. It is potentially very, very exciting.

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This is the first time we see a crack in the deep freeze. A

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relationship based described lack of Narnia. Always winter, never

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Christmas. You say it hasn't happened in 34 years, there have

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been moments of excitement before. Lots of people thought that would

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introduce a thaw in relations and it didn't. So why should we be so much

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more excited this time? Perhaps we shouldn't be. For exactly the reason

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you said. There have been opportunities, there have been

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Neither of us want to see Sunni openings, you mentioned

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Neither of us want to see Sunni fundamentalists, jihadists, Al-Qaeda

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group come to power. Neither of us want to see nuclear weapons used.

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Let's not go there right now. Let's stick with the real substance of

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this relationship. More than anything it is about Iran's nuclear

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ambitions. If the nuclear issue is too difficult, let's put it to one

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side. The problem is, when the Iranians talk about the nuclear

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issue, we are talking about legal issues, technical issues, additional

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protocols. The Iranians are talking about something different. They are

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talking about national pride, their national rights, their status in the

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world. This kind of asymmetric negotiation can only lead to

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frustration. When you are talking to the Iranians over oil, 60 years ago,

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it was the same thing. Its rights to control its own destiny. Their

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acquisition of nuclear weapons. I just want to know whether you as a

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diplomat with extraordinary power and knowledge of this country, a

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long-time diplomat and servant of the State Department, I am yet to

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encounter... That Hassan Rouhani... He doesn't believe it, do you? I

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don't know and I don't know if anyone knows. What I do know is

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this. What is the Iranians core interest in all of these exchanges?

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It seems to me it is the survival of the regime. The main threat to their

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survival are not foreign armies or ships or planes but the internal

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rebellion, internal disturbance, what they call the sedition inside

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Iran. What does a nuclear weapon do to ensure the continuation of the

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regime? I don't want to tell you things you already know because you

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know this better than anyone. The nuclear programme has been woven in

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to their regime strategy for so long that it seems to me that it has

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become an integral part of who they are and what they are. Has served

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the regime in many different senior capacities ever since. H e is a man

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far from being a liberal or a moderate in that cliched language,

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again, woven into the senior decision-making that has let us to

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this place. I think on this case, we are in violent agreement. I am and

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what others have said, if you want to get to the nuclear issue, which

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is a central issue, what you have to do is at least build some confidence

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between the two sides. To go directly to the issue is not going

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to build that confidence. You need to broaden the discussion to areas

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like Afghanistan, perhaps Syria, and where these two sides discover that

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if they say yes to something, but the sky doesn't fall and that in

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fact the other side might not always be out to cheat them, having

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established that, you can go back to the nuclear issue. Pause and

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consider, if you would, how what you just said might be received in

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Israel? I do not speak for the Israeli government. What I do know

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is during my visits to Israel and in conversation with Israeli friends,

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the opinion - this is not just on the left - but much of the opinion

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is strongly divided on this issue. There is a vigorous debate within

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Israel as there are on many subjects on the question of Iran. And the

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kind of rhetoric we hear here on Israel represents just a segment of

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opinion. Unfortunately, here in the US, we do not hear all sides of the

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story. To quote an Israeli newspaper, they said AIPAC - the

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lobbying group in the US - is not Israel. I did not know whether you

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can call the government one voice. Netanyahu is the most important

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voice. The government have dismissed everything that Hassan Rouhani has

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said. The minister of intelligence said the nuclear project is

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galloping forward, if they continue to advance they could have nuclear

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weapon capabilities within six months. Right now, Benjamin

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Netanyahu is pleading with Barack Obama pleading that they do not take

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at face value what the Iranians are saying. The problem is the extremist

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party within Israel had the gift that kept on giving. Khomeini. Now

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he is gone. His absence, after 34 years, has created a serious

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problem. I am sorry to interrupt but this is not about language, it is

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not even about personality, it is about the fact that according to the

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IAEA, there are at least 17 different nuclear facilities inside

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Iran. There is a sophisticated enrichment programme. The IAEA says

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it cannot confirm it is for peaceful purposes. These are realities which

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Israelis see and which leads them to conclude that unless things change

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very quickly, something will have to be done, albeit perhaps by them if

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nobody else will do it. Again, it is interesting you mention the word

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quickly, because that was exactly what we heard some of the Iranian

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representatives in New York, I believe including Hassan Rouhani and

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his delegation, say about the nuclear negotiations, saying we need

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to reach some agreement quickly. What the Iranians have been saying

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and, whether you believe that or not is another issue, if you do not

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believe them, then there is no answer. It is difficult to make any

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kind of progress. Someone said at some point in the negotiations -

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someone has to trust someone. But what the Iranians say is that they

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do not... They are not seeking a nuclear weapon for various reasons -

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ideological and political and so forth - but they do not want to be

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told what to do, bullied, intimidated, as they call it, by

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some outside power. Or politically could they be seen to knuckle under

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threat. As another former State department colleague of yours,

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Nicholas Burns, wrote not so long ago, oftentimes diplomacy requires

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the threat of force. You seem to be advocating a move towards relaxation

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of sanctions, sending warmer signals to Tehran before they have done

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anything. Surely the sanctions are the reason why Hassan Rouhani is

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talking openly about making concessions. You keep the sanctions

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until they pack their words with specific actions? I have great

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respect for ambassador Burns. Smart diplomacy without some backing of

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force is a little bit like a smile without any teeth - it does not

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carry much weight. But to say that sanctions, for example, had this

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effect, made the Iranians become more reasonable, made the Iranians

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change their policy, may be true but I have not seen the evidence for it.

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People have made the statements. I have seen statements that Hassan

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Rouhani owes his election to the sanctions. Again, that may be true

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but where is the evidence? The same people who are making these claims,

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excuse me, are the same people who were the strongest advocates of

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sanctions in the first place. Isn't that self-evident that an economy

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which has seen, they say, around $1 billion squeeze out of it because of

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the strict sanctions, including the loss of output in oil of roughly a

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million barrels per day, is it not self-evident that that is the sort

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of terrible damage being done to the Iranian economy that is going to

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force the regime to start to think very carefully about whether it

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wants to push ahead with its nuclear programme? Iran's economy is in

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terrible shape - there is no doubt about that. With its oil resources,

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with its well educated population, it should be a paradise. It is not.

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That question, the open question that remains - and I have never had

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a satisfactory answer to this - is, how much do these problems come from

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the sanctions, how much from chronic mismanagement? A problem that has

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gone back a long way and a problem and issue that was raised during

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Hassan Rouhani's presidential campaign. You are a diplomat and you

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can learn lessons from recent diplomatic negotiation - I'm

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thinking of North Korea. The West and the US decided to reach out to

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North Korea. An agreement was done in which Pyongyang promised to

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abandon its nuclear programme. What happened less than two years later?

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North Korea launched its first nuclear device. The Israelis point

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to North Korea and state if you back off the pressure on Tehran now, that

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is precisely what you will see in Iran. Within a year or two they will

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be releasing their first bomb. I wish I had the power of prediction

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that the source you quote has. I will say this about my predictions

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about Iran - my predictions have almost always been wrong in the

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past. I will say that but also, if you look at other people's

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predictions, I say they are equally wrong. You ask yourself, statements

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like "a bomb in six months" - how long has that timeline been out

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there? I heard someone mention it going back to 1997. I think we have

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to be very sceptical and very suspicious about predictions like

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that that say that because North Korea did X therefore in Iran we

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must do Y. I appreciate your frankness and your personal history

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with Iran. It is fascinating to think of you 34 years ago tripped up

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in the American embassy, taken hostage by the regime, the fledgling

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regime of the republic. I wonder if it is fair to say that from then

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until now, despite your personal experience, you have consistently

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underestimated the durability of the hostility felt in Iran toward the

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West and the US in particular. Perhaps I have. As I said to you,

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Stephen, I have been wrong a lot but I cannot help seeing the irony of

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all this. I mean, 34 years ago, almost to the day, the foreign

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ministers of the two countries met in New York on the margins of the

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General Assembly and in those days it was the Secretary of State Cyrus

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Vance and the Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi meeting in October

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1979 and the meeting was a disaster. All the Iranians could do was to

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recite their list of grievances. They had nothing constructive to

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bring. Unfortunately, that has been the case for the past 34 years - 95%

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of Iranian diplomacy has been exactly that - reciting their list

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of grievances. No, I would not have thought that we would have been

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estranged for so long. We have been estranged longer than the US from

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China or from Bolshevik Russia after the revolution. It is unprecedented

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in our diplomatic history. If you think about it. And I will make one

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prediction, Stephen, and that is if we do start talking, if this

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particular opening does go somewhere and contacts are established and

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officials are able to talk to each other, not necessarily as friends

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but as States with things to talk about. Both sides are going to ask

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themselves this question - what was all the fuss about? Why did we waste

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so much time bashing each other? With that question hanging in the

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air, I thank you very much Ambassador Limbert for being on

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HARDtalk. Thank you, Stephen.

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