The Hospital That Didn't Care


The Hospital That Didn't Care

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Stafford Hospital. Abuse and neglect led to the unnecessary

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It is Christmas, 2007. In a town with a dark secret. Patients were

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left in horrific situations and conditions. It was just patience

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screaming out, banging on the doors. It was absolute bedlam. I thought

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the only way I would get out of that place was in a wooden box.

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years, appalling care at an NHS hospital has gone unnoticed. But in

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a cafe less than a mile away, a group of strangers are about to

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discover the truth. There are hundreds of patients that have been

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suffering and dying from neglect. It was dreadful and awful. It

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should never have happened. This is the story of what went wrong. And

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The story starts in July 2001. With another NHS scandal. And an

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opportunity missed. Up to 35 babies died unnecessarily at Bristol Royal

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Infirmary. Appalling care at Bristol Royal Infirmary has led to

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the deaths of dozens of babies. Investigators claim the system of

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monitoring care in hospitals is completely inadequate. They demand

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urgent reform. An -- be issued this chilling warning. For good Bristol

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happen again? Could it be happening right now? The honest answer is

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that it could. If it were happening, we would only have a slight chance

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of knowing. Sir Ian Kennedy was right. It did happen again. And no-

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one saw it coming. July, 2004. It is more than three years since the

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Bristol inquiry. A new hospital watchdog, the Healthcare Commission,

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has helped restore faith in the health service. But has it really

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made a difference? One woman is about to find out. Mickelham Monty

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has just given birth to her second child. But she returns to Stafford

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Hospital with a bowel condition. It is a decision she will always

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regret. 11 it was a very busy ward. Chaotic. Not very clean. Pilots

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were often felt be. -- toilets. -- filthy. I had to provide a stool

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samples that were left in cardboard pots. Those would accumulate in the

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toilets. The staff were not taking them away. Not only my own, but

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other people's. That would lead to cross-infection. That is exactly

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what happened. In the conditions, Nicola pick up not one hospital

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superbugs, but three. She spends the next nine months in hospital.

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Much of it in crippling pain. Saura swarmed all over her body. Some

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more than a foot wide. But the hospital hardly seemed to care.

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They found out that I had the infection and walked into my

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isolation room. She walked inside the door and threw a piece of paper

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in my direction and told me to read that. It was horrendous. I had been

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in hospital a long time. I could not see my children. I was isolated,

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stuck in a room on my own. Only my husband came to see me. Hours every

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day with me. I was still incredibly lonely and frightened. What she did

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not know was that the hospital's problems spread far beyond her ward.

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Towards the end of her stay, a member of the local patients group

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does a local inspection. The area itself was dirty. There were

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hypodermic needles out of dressings on the floor. Patients were coming

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in and going out and doctors and medical staff touching those

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patients and going to another patient and touching them. No

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gloves, with their hands. It does not leave much to the imagination

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that the probability of some form of cross infection is much higher.

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He was so alarmed he wrote a report. He expected the patients group to

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call on the hospital to take urgent action. But to his dismay, they did

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not. There was a culture of working hand-in-hand with the hospital and

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not upsetting the hospital. And there was the fear of that because

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of the nature of the report, that it would cause friction between the

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hospital and the PPI. They felt that the report should be, for want

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of a better word, watered down. protest, he left the group. He went

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directly to the hospital's new chief executive. Martin Yates had

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just inherited a poor management structure, a shortage of nurses and

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a multi-million pound debt. He told Terry that his report had prompted

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improvements. But he was not satisfied. He complained again.

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views are exaggerated. Has spent about seven or eight minutes with

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him at the outside. It was not very long. Someone else was also trying

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to raise the alarm. Someone on the inside. A nurse. I had seen people

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die in in a very undignified situations that could have been

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avoided. They were relatively frequent. On a daily basis, the

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poorer care and standards should never have been allowed. She blamed

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chronic under staffing and poor equipment. She asked managers to

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take urgent action. Instead, they told her simply to fill out an

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incident report. During her six years she would submit nearly 100

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forms. Not once was she given any indication they were even read.

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Things did not get listened to war -- or acted upon. It went right to

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the top. People were just not listening. That is why things got

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so extreme. The Department of Health then hands all hospitals two

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daunting new challenges. In Stafford, chief executive Martin

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Yates is just two months into the job. But he was told to balance the

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hospital's books and win Foundation Trust status. As a Foundation Trust,

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Stafford would have more control over its affairs. But again, the

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condition is a healthy bank balance. And Stafford now owes �10 million.

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The instruction was quite clear. Of money needed to be saved. The trust

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had to do that in any way it could. Ultimately, that led to them making

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some dangerous decisions in the years that followed. The meeting

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sets in motion 18 months of savage cuts. Chief executive Martin Yates

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makes 150 staff redundant. Next year we have got an issue to deal

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with. We are taking those tough decisions now so we can continue

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that long-term financial sustainability. But it was far from

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excellent. This tough decisions had an unintended impact on patient

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care. Staff became obsessed with noticed

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noticed when she was given a new bestrode up, the nurses said, you

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do realise this little bag costs? About �700. As if you are not

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were were also feeling the pinch. A lack

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of staff, lack of equipment. The reason always given is that we are

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going for a foundation status. Once we get that status, that would get

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better. That is a lot of why people did not speak out. And we thought

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that given time things would improve. The pressure was coming

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right from the top. The government was telling all hospitals to not

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only break even, but also to go for a foundation trust status. But

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Labour politicians denied they are partly to blame for what happened

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at Stafford. In a sense, that suggests that the chief executive

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was right to cut staff and put receptionists on trio's nursing

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pressure. I do not accept that at all. That was a disgracefully bad

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management. A year on, and Stafford's dark secret remains

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hidden. George Dalziel goes into hospital for an operation. His wife

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goes with him. What they do not know is that the hospital now has

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one of the highest death rates in England. Nobody was warned. It was

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at hing at that time. If it had been my way,

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he would not have gone in there. -- if I had been aware. He is

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operation is a success. But the couple's joy is short-lived. His

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epidural becomes dislodged, leaving him without pain relief for days.

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He is given the wrong food. That makes him throw up faeces. He is

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left unsold bedclothes for hours. He is too scared to ask his nose

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for water. He was frightened to drink. He was frightened he would

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wet the bed again. She was so nasty with him. He had to call her. They

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were left on their own all the time. If they ring the bells, it was rare

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if the nurses or any body came to see them. George was a brave man.

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He was always to reclaim. To be put in a position that he was put in,

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he felt ashamed and disgusted. He was so upset. When Christine visits

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her husband, she is so horrified by his condition that she demands to

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see a doctor. I helped to get his jacket of so she could examine him.

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Sorry. When I did it, his bones were just sticking out. I said,

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what on earth are you doing to him? He should not be like this. During

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his two weeks in hospital, George Dalziel had lost 3.5 stone. His

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strength had gone. When we were leaving, I said, I love you. And he

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says, I love you too. And that was the last words we said. That night,

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George Dalziel was added to the growing list of people who went

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into Stafford Hospital, but never came out. But what Christine did

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not know was that the list was being monitored by a group of

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statisticians. 140 miles away in London. The reason we started doing

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this is because after the Bristol inquiry, I realised that there were

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problems that could be detected by analysing the data. I wanted to

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make sure that Bristol did not happen again. We would send a

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letter to hospitals around the country and say this was an early

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warning. And in 2007, one hospital Each month, I am my colleague sent

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a letter to the chief executive Martin Yates and said we noticed

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you have a high death-rate for this particular diagnosis. It is

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possible it could be codeine or quality of care. Would you like to

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look and see if there are any problems. But managers and their

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NHS bosses will weary. They already suspected there were serious flaws

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in the way the hospital clerk to the data and so they commissioned a

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team of academics to investigate whether there could be another

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investigation. Their reaction was to employ somebody else effectively

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to try to discredit us and that was very frustrating and frustrating

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that they would not allow us to explain what the problem us. There

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were many people dying over that period. And they are the dying in

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their hundreds. Then in September came a day when

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the people of Stafford began to fight back. 86 he ruled Bella

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Bailey is admitted to hospital with a hernia. With her is an expert,

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someone who would ultimately bring staff have's problems to the nation.

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Her daughter is a senior social worker. -- Stafford's. It was

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appalling. No proper food, care, she was lying in a wet bed. If it

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was not for us being there, we would have lost her in the first

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week. Julie Bailey was so concerned, she insisted on staying at her

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mother's bedside during the night and it was then she saw how

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desperate some patients had become. I was told they could not leave

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drinks out at night because of health and safety. So what the

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confused patients would do is get out of bed and the first thing they

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found would be a flower vase and they would just drink out of that.

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It was absolutely ridiculous. November the eighth, 2007, Bella

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Bailey died and her daughter's campaign began. She made an

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official complaint but have found the response alarming. She said she

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had never seen anything like what I had seen and she walked towards day

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and night. That really shocked me and I knew. I was so desperate and

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I knew that if I had seen those things, other people must have. If

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I had lost someone that way, other people must have. I knew alone I

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would achieve little with that sort of response from hospital. So Julie

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Bailey appealed for help. In a letter to a local newspaper, she

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asked anyone with concerns about the hospital to get in touch and

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set up a meeting. The response was overwhelming. My priority was to

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try to stop what was going on in the hospital. When people started

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to write, it was a shock because I only had 16 seats. -- started to

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arrive. Around 25 people turned up. As they concave story, the sheer

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scale of the scandal becomes clear. Stafford's secret comes out. A

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campaign group is formed. They call themselves Cure the NHS. Inside the

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hospital, staff are also starting to speak out, exposing more scandal.

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One nurse writes a report, telling senior managers that in A&E,

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patient records have been routinely adopted in order to meet government

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targets. Weeting Heath times change so they appear to fall below the

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four and would limit. -- waiting times. The main culprits would

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routinely do this and they would encourage other staff to do it.

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Doctors and nurses. And if they did not want to, such as myself, they

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would become very aggressive and bullying basically into making

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people do it. The hospital investigates and Hans two nurses in

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prison up notices but concludes there is not enough evidence to

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take it further. She resigns. February 2008. The campaign to

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expose poor care at Stafford is gathering pace. In London, health

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service regulators are about to launch a full investigation,

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triggered by the alarmingly high death-rate. In Stafford, Julie

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Bailey is protesting outside the hospital. But inside, staff are

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putting up balloons. The reason? Stafford has just been awarded

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Foundation Trust status. In the eyes of the NHS, it is now a

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flagship hospital. You can imagine, standing outside with banners, and

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one of the staff, the managers from the hospital, came out and told us,

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we have just been awarded Foundation Trust status. I asked

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what it meant. They said, it's a flagship hospital. There is nothing

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wrong here, he said. It was like a slap in the face. Stafford Hospital

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faced an imminent investigation. It had one of the highest death rates

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in England and a public campaign against it and yet it was allowed

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to join the Premier League of hospitals. Giving it greater

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freedom to do as it pleased. One evening, just one month later, a

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group of experts from the Healthcare Commission conduct a

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surprise inspection that will alter that we expose one of the biggest

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scandals in the history of the health service. -- ultimately

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exposed. There were clearly problems but whether it was in the

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emergency, the medical wards or on the surgical wards, problems were

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there. Simple compassion and kindness, those were missing. But

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also, the more technical side of things. Weather observations were

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done properly and recorded properly. Whether equipment was used properly.

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Can you imagine a situation which because nurses do not understand

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cardiac monitors and are annoyed by their bleeding, they turn the

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monitors off? -- BB&T. Investigators find hundreds of

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patients have died from incompetence and neglect. But when

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they confront chief executive Martin Yates they are stunned by

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his response. He was actually shocked at what we were telling him

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and that in itself is difficult because really you should know what

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is going on in your own hospital. The man in charge may not have

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known the scale of the problem but, by March 2009, everyone did.

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Routinely neglected. A damning inquiry concludes Stafford Hospital

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lost sight of its responsibility. If for years, 25 NHS watchdogs

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missed what was going on. But finally, after hundreds of decks,

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thousands of complaints and a catalogue of reports, the man at

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the top was told. -- of deaths. were appalled by Stafford ANI

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publicly apologised on behalf of the Department of Health. It was

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awful and should never have happened. Should I have done

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something to pick up on bid earlier? Maybe. I don't know.

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in Stafford, the hospital's chief executive Martin Yates was

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suspended. He acknowledged the hospital's failings of apologised.

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Five years after the first complaints, something had finally

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changed. I struggle to find any satisfaction in knowing we were

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right all along. I was made to feel that I was the exception, that this

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sort of thing was... I was the unfortunate one person that this

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had happened to and it was how I responded to the situation but it

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wasn't. Lots of people were suffering and still continue to

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suffer today. This is the story of appalling and unnecessary suffering

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of hundreds of people. The findings of an inquiry into why

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the scandal was allowed to happen have now been made public. Robert

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Francis described a catalogue of failings at every level of the NHS.

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I have today made 290 recommendations, designed to change

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this culture and make sure that patients come first. Everything we

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have heard today it tells us this was systemic failings from the ward,

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write to the top. Just as they did after the Bristol inquiry,

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politicians have promised to learn from the mistakes of the past.

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will create a single regime where the suspension of the board can be

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triggered by failings in care, as well as failings in finance. We

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will put the boys of patients and staff at the heart of the way

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hospitals go about their business. -- the voice. For those who fought

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for change for so long, it's a defining moment. Very emotional. We

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will all be glad when it is over and just hope that now people of

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Stafford will understand what we have tried to do. Not for ourselves

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now, just for them. In Stafford, the hospital's future is uncertain.

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Riddled with debt, it survives only on government handouts. But there

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is a new chief executive with a new strategy. Now, when they are short

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of staff, it simply closes its doors. There comes a point when you

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have to make difficult decisions around safety. In the case of the

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emergency department, that is what we do. There is no point trying to

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run a walk safely if you have not got the right number of nurses and

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doctors. I think the care is very much better than it was two or

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three years ago. We are not perfect, we do not get it right every time,

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but I think the standards have dramatically improved.

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Perhaps, finally, Stafford has a hospital we can trust. But those

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who suffered their have heard it all before. They have wasted so

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