Browse content similar to Episode 3. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
Line | From | To | |
---|---|---|---|
There's an obesity epidemic in Britain, | 0:00:04 | 0:00:06 | |
and we think it's all down to us eating too much fast food, | 0:00:06 | 0:00:10 | |
processed ready meals and indulgent desserts. | 0:00:10 | 0:00:13 | |
But what if we are wrong? | 0:00:15 | 0:00:17 | |
What if the food being sold to us as healthier | 0:00:19 | 0:00:22 | |
is the very thing making us fat? | 0:00:22 | 0:00:24 | |
If you live on organic chocolate, organic ice cream and organic oven chips, | 0:00:24 | 0:00:28 | |
you will get fat just as if you lived off non-organic ice cream, | 0:00:28 | 0:00:31 | |
non-organic chocolate, non-organic oven chips, you'd get fat. | 0:00:31 | 0:00:35 | |
My name's Jacques Peretti, and in this series, | 0:00:35 | 0:00:38 | |
I'm going behind the closed doors of big business and government | 0:00:38 | 0:00:42 | |
to reveal how the food industry is making us fat. | 0:00:42 | 0:00:46 | |
Does food marketed as healthier | 0:00:46 | 0:00:49 | |
change the psychology of the very way we eat? | 0:00:49 | 0:00:52 | |
This is something I call the health halo. | 0:00:52 | 0:00:54 | |
It's the idea that when the food is marketed as being healthy, | 0:00:54 | 0:00:57 | |
people think that it has less calories, and as a result, | 0:00:57 | 0:01:00 | |
they think they can eat more of it without getting fat. | 0:01:00 | 0:01:02 | |
I'll reveal how the industry makes money out of our determination to eat more healthily. | 0:01:04 | 0:01:09 | |
There were lots and lots of products which had, "contains fruit!" | 0:01:09 | 0:01:13 | |
But it might only contain 0.1% fruit flavour, | 0:01:13 | 0:01:15 | |
but that's permissible, but, of course, in an age that's concerned about nutrition, | 0:01:15 | 0:01:19 | |
you bring up the fruit to the front of the packet. | 0:01:19 | 0:01:22 | |
And I find out how the food industry put profits first, | 0:01:22 | 0:01:25 | |
despite the explicit warnings of scientists. | 0:01:25 | 0:01:28 | |
Putting the food industry at the policy table | 0:01:30 | 0:01:33 | |
is like putting Dracula in charge of the blood bank. | 0:01:33 | 0:01:37 | |
Welcome to the brave new world of shopping science. | 0:01:53 | 0:01:56 | |
Kantar Worldpanel are the people who track the buying behaviour | 0:01:56 | 0:02:00 | |
of 30,000 households nationwide. | 0:02:00 | 0:02:03 | |
And they sell this intelligence to all the major supermarkets | 0:02:04 | 0:02:08 | |
and food manufacturers in Britain. | 0:02:08 | 0:02:10 | |
If anyone knows about the extraordinary rise of health food, they do. | 0:02:10 | 0:02:14 | |
'Giles Quick, a director at Kantar Worldpanel, | 0:02:19 | 0:02:23 | |
'analyses how the food we buy impacts on our obesity levels.' | 0:02:23 | 0:02:27 | |
Giles, what's the kind of profile for someone who buys healthy food? | 0:02:27 | 0:02:31 | |
Well, they tend to be more middle-class, | 0:02:31 | 0:02:34 | |
more likely to be a woman living in the south of England, | 0:02:34 | 0:02:37 | |
more highly skilled, more knowledgeable about cooking | 0:02:37 | 0:02:41 | |
and about foodstuffs, but the truth is, they're getting fatter, | 0:02:41 | 0:02:46 | |
and that's something that's changed over the past few years. | 0:02:46 | 0:02:49 | |
So, how does that work in regard to health food? | 0:02:49 | 0:02:53 | |
We spend about £54 billion on food and drink from grocery supermarkets, | 0:02:53 | 0:02:58 | |
and of that, about £12 billion is spent on products that we believe are healthy. | 0:02:58 | 0:03:04 | |
We say, "I chose this because I believed it was healthy." | 0:03:04 | 0:03:08 | |
And that's grown by about 20% in the last six or seven years. | 0:03:08 | 0:03:12 | |
That's almost a quarter of your basket of things you bought, | 0:03:12 | 0:03:15 | |
-because you perceive them, perceive them, to be healthy. -Yeah. | 0:03:15 | 0:03:18 | |
Could you tell me a little bit about how you actually market and price a health product? | 0:03:18 | 0:03:24 | |
Are there any kind of rules as to how it works? | 0:03:24 | 0:03:26 | |
In general terms, the more, if you like, brand promises a product can make, | 0:03:26 | 0:03:31 | |
the more ticks in the box, it's good for this, it's good for that, | 0:03:31 | 0:03:36 | |
it tastes great, it's healthy for you, it's low-calorie, | 0:03:36 | 0:03:39 | |
the more ticks a product has, then, in principle, it's likely to have a higher price. | 0:03:39 | 0:03:45 | |
So, the bigger the promise, the bigger the price, in general terms. | 0:03:45 | 0:03:50 | |
More in the way of vitamins, fresh fruit on top, | 0:03:50 | 0:03:53 | |
whatever it is, there seems to be a huge amount | 0:03:53 | 0:03:55 | |
of healthy add-ons to existing products to make them seem healthy. | 0:03:55 | 0:04:00 | |
I've got an example over here of a product that would certainly appeal to the healthy consumer, | 0:04:00 | 0:04:06 | |
and the ingredients listed on the front of the pack | 0:04:06 | 0:04:10 | |
is like a checklist of the sorts of products associated with it. | 0:04:10 | 0:04:14 | |
So, honey granola. | 0:04:14 | 0:04:15 | |
We've got oats, sunflower seeds, flaked almonds, rye flakes, pecans, pumpkin seeds, honey. | 0:04:15 | 0:04:22 | |
How fattening is that cereal? | 0:04:22 | 0:04:25 | |
If we take saturated fats, then, if you compare this product to this one, | 0:04:25 | 0:04:30 | |
then this has a much higher concentration of saturated fats than this. | 0:04:30 | 0:04:34 | |
And yet, in general terms, | 0:04:34 | 0:04:36 | |
this would be purchased because of its health credentials much more than this product. | 0:04:36 | 0:04:40 | |
Do you think consumers get confused about what's healthy and what is less fattening? | 0:04:40 | 0:04:45 | |
There's no question that that is true, | 0:04:45 | 0:04:47 | |
and there are products you can look at, maybe that have got added fruit or fibre, | 0:04:47 | 0:04:51 | |
and your instinct is, "That's healthier." | 0:04:51 | 0:04:55 | |
You may be wrong in some senses, | 0:04:55 | 0:04:57 | |
it may well have more saturated fats, so there is confusion. | 0:04:57 | 0:05:02 | |
There's confusion around lots of processed products. | 0:05:02 | 0:05:04 | |
Sales of food marketed as healthier are rocketing, | 0:05:07 | 0:05:11 | |
but we're deluded about what is and isn't fattening. | 0:05:11 | 0:05:14 | |
This Innocent smoothie has more calories in it | 0:05:14 | 0:05:19 | |
than this can of Coke. | 0:05:19 | 0:05:21 | |
This Pret no bread sandwich with rocket and lentils | 0:05:21 | 0:05:25 | |
has more calories in it than this Big Mac. | 0:05:25 | 0:05:29 | |
And for dessert, this granola yoghurt from Eat | 0:05:31 | 0:05:36 | |
has more calories in it than this Krispy Kreme doughnut. | 0:05:36 | 0:05:41 | |
How did we get here? | 0:05:41 | 0:05:44 | |
In 1992, John Major's government was the first to grapple with obesity in this report. | 0:05:46 | 0:05:53 | |
Back then, it was less than a third of what it is today, | 0:05:53 | 0:05:56 | |
but scientists saw the coming storm, and wanted action. | 0:05:56 | 0:06:00 | |
The food industry, however, | 0:06:03 | 0:06:05 | |
had far bigger problems than a government report. | 0:06:05 | 0:06:08 | |
The very food we ate was becoming toxic. | 0:06:13 | 0:06:17 | |
Mad cow disease and BSE were at their peak. | 0:06:17 | 0:06:19 | |
Images of burning cattle sent sales plummeting as consumers stopped buying beef. | 0:06:22 | 0:06:28 | |
Even Agriculture Minister John Gummer | 0:06:31 | 0:06:34 | |
couldn't persuade his four-year-old daughter to take a bite. | 0:06:34 | 0:06:37 | |
No, it's too hot! Too hot! | 0:06:37 | 0:06:41 | |
And the egg industry was still reeling from the salmonella crisis, | 0:06:43 | 0:06:47 | |
which saw sales drop by 60% overnight, | 0:06:47 | 0:06:51 | |
when, in 1988, Health Minister Edwina Currie, | 0:06:51 | 0:06:54 | |
rather than feeding her children eggs, told reporters... | 0:06:54 | 0:06:58 | |
We do warn people now that most of the egg production | 0:06:58 | 0:07:02 | |
in this country, sadly, is now infected with salmonella. | 0:07:02 | 0:07:05 | |
It was not long before she resigned under industry pressure. | 0:07:05 | 0:07:08 | |
Manufacturers wanted to captivate consumers with nice, | 0:07:13 | 0:07:16 | |
new products that were safe, or appeared to be. | 0:07:16 | 0:07:20 | |
-Mum, can we get a drink? -Go on! | 0:07:20 | 0:07:23 | |
In 1998, Procter & Gamble launched Sunny Delight | 0:07:23 | 0:07:26 | |
with a £10 million ad campaign. | 0:07:26 | 0:07:29 | |
-And that's new Sunny Delight! -Sunny Delight, sounds good to me! -Yeah! | 0:07:29 | 0:07:32 | |
It's got orange, tangerine and lime, with a load of lovely vitamins. | 0:07:32 | 0:07:37 | |
Marketed as a healthy soft drink, | 0:07:37 | 0:07:39 | |
it promised a bright and profitable new dawn. | 0:07:39 | 0:07:42 | |
Its rise was unprecedented, putting it just behind Coke and Pepsi. | 0:07:42 | 0:07:48 | |
The future was orange. | 0:07:48 | 0:07:49 | |
But one woman questioned just how fresh and healthy Sunny Delight really was. | 0:07:53 | 0:07:59 | |
'I went to Brighton to meet Sue Dibb, | 0:07:59 | 0:08:01 | |
'co-director of the Food Commission | 0:08:01 | 0:08:03 | |
'at the time of Sunny Delight's launch.' | 0:08:03 | 0:08:05 | |
How did you come to start looking at Sunny Delight? | 0:08:05 | 0:08:09 | |
What made you think this was a product worth examining in more detail? | 0:08:09 | 0:08:14 | |
It was a really big marketing campaign, | 0:08:14 | 0:08:16 | |
and it tapped in to that growing interest in health. | 0:08:16 | 0:08:20 | |
Sunny Delight was sold in chiller cabinets, | 0:08:20 | 0:08:23 | |
it gave the impression that here was a fresh, ie a healthier, product. | 0:08:23 | 0:08:27 | |
But it wasn't a fresh juice by any means, | 0:08:27 | 0:08:29 | |
it only had 5% juice in it, and it had an awful lot of sugar, | 0:08:29 | 0:08:33 | |
as much sugar, in fact, as you'd get in Coke, | 0:08:33 | 0:08:36 | |
though they had added in some vitamins, a sprinkling of vitamins, | 0:08:36 | 0:08:40 | |
to again give it that aura of a healthy food, | 0:08:40 | 0:08:43 | |
but you can't turn a sugary drink into a truly healthful product just by adding a few vitamins to it. | 0:08:43 | 0:08:50 | |
Were they actually breaking any laws with Sunny Delight? | 0:08:50 | 0:08:53 | |
No, they were breaking no laws with Sunny Delight, | 0:08:53 | 0:08:55 | |
and the marketers knew that, | 0:08:55 | 0:08:56 | |
and they were very clever in the way they presented this product. | 0:08:56 | 0:08:59 | |
They didn't make any direct health claims, | 0:08:59 | 0:09:01 | |
they didn't even call it a juice or a juice drink, | 0:09:01 | 0:09:04 | |
they called it an enriched citrus beverage. | 0:09:04 | 0:09:06 | |
Here's the issue of the magazine | 0:09:06 | 0:09:08 | |
in which we wrote about Sunny Delight, | 0:09:08 | 0:09:10 | |
just after it had come out, so it wasn't our front-page story, | 0:09:10 | 0:09:14 | |
but this was what the media then subsequently picked up on. | 0:09:14 | 0:09:17 | |
We were the first people to raise concerns | 0:09:17 | 0:09:19 | |
and ask questions about Sunny Delight. | 0:09:19 | 0:09:22 | |
Were the press quick to run with your story? | 0:09:22 | 0:09:24 | |
Yes, the press did pick up on our story. | 0:09:24 | 0:09:26 | |
We got the national media and television contacting us and asking us for quotes, | 0:09:26 | 0:09:31 | |
picking up on what we'd written in the food magazine. | 0:09:31 | 0:09:34 | |
But it was alongside the story about how big sales of Sunny Delight were. | 0:09:34 | 0:09:41 | |
So, just as Sunny Delight's sales were rocketing, | 0:09:41 | 0:09:44 | |
so were these questions about what was really in it? | 0:09:44 | 0:09:48 | |
Yeah. | 0:09:48 | 0:09:49 | |
It wasn't really until a four-year-old child turned orange | 0:09:49 | 0:09:52 | |
18 months after we'd reported on this | 0:09:52 | 0:09:55 | |
that really that was the nail in the coffin for sales. | 0:09:55 | 0:09:59 | |
What had happened was | 0:09:59 | 0:10:00 | |
this four-year-old had been drinking 1.5 litres of Sunny Delight | 0:10:00 | 0:10:03 | |
and had turned orange because of the amount of beta-carotene she'd been consuming. | 0:10:03 | 0:10:07 | |
And I think it was really ironic, also, | 0:10:07 | 0:10:09 | |
that they were actually carrying advertisements on the television | 0:10:09 | 0:10:12 | |
for snowmen turning orange as a result of Sunny Delight! | 0:10:12 | 0:10:16 | |
Didn't really work out that well for Sunny Delight after that in the UK. | 0:10:16 | 0:10:19 | |
-ADVERT VOICEOVER: -For whoever might pop in this winter. | 0:10:19 | 0:10:23 | |
Sunny Delight, | 0:10:24 | 0:10:25 | |
the great stuff kids go for. | 0:10:25 | 0:10:28 | |
So, not all publicity is good publicity? | 0:10:28 | 0:10:31 | |
LAUGHING: Not in the end, no. | 0:10:31 | 0:10:33 | |
But it was really interesting to see what it took | 0:10:33 | 0:10:36 | |
to really bring that awareness to people's attention. | 0:10:36 | 0:10:40 | |
If you hadn't written the story and put it on page six, | 0:10:40 | 0:10:43 | |
no-one would have heard about this. | 0:10:43 | 0:10:44 | |
Where were the Government in all of this? | 0:10:44 | 0:10:46 | |
We put this out, the media picked it up | 0:10:47 | 0:10:49 | |
and of course it got a very big news story once the girl turned orange, | 0:10:49 | 0:10:53 | |
but the fact is, it shouldn't have been like that. | 0:10:53 | 0:10:56 | |
The Government's main focus at that time was promoting | 0:10:56 | 0:10:59 | |
and protecting the food and farming industry. | 0:10:59 | 0:11:01 | |
It wasn't about putting consumers first. | 0:11:01 | 0:11:03 | |
Consumers came a poor second at that time. | 0:11:03 | 0:11:06 | |
The massive success of Sunny Delight showed that the public | 0:11:13 | 0:11:16 | |
would lap up a product marketed as healthy, given half the chance. | 0:11:16 | 0:11:21 | |
And it took someone like Sue to kick up a fuss | 0:11:21 | 0:11:23 | |
to actually stop them, because there was no government legislation | 0:11:23 | 0:11:27 | |
that prevented a company like Procter & Gamble | 0:11:27 | 0:11:30 | |
selling a product full of sugar and additives, | 0:11:30 | 0:11:34 | |
and marketing it as healthy. | 0:11:34 | 0:11:36 | |
In 2004, Procter & Gamble sold off Sunny Delight. | 0:11:39 | 0:11:43 | |
Despite being rebranded as Sunny D - with more fruit, less sugar | 0:11:43 | 0:11:48 | |
and no artificial additives - its early success hasn't been repeated. | 0:11:48 | 0:11:52 | |
-ADVERT VOICEOVER: -New Sunny D - with absolutely nothing artificial. | 0:11:53 | 0:11:56 | |
Improved by mums, approved by kids. | 0:11:57 | 0:12:00 | |
But the health food gold rush was on. | 0:12:04 | 0:12:07 | |
The public were desperate for food they could trust. | 0:12:08 | 0:12:11 | |
And supermarkets saw an opportunity, | 0:12:12 | 0:12:15 | |
turning to an unlikely source for help. | 0:12:15 | 0:12:17 | |
Consumers would pay more for ingredients that were natural and chemical-free. | 0:12:22 | 0:12:26 | |
Within a few months, | 0:12:26 | 0:12:28 | |
all the major supermarkets expanded their organic ranges. | 0:12:28 | 0:12:32 | |
By 1999, the organic business was worth over £600 million - | 0:12:32 | 0:12:37 | |
more than doubling in two years. | 0:12:37 | 0:12:40 | |
-ADVERT VOICEOVER: -At Sainsbury's, our organic range includes... | 0:12:42 | 0:12:46 | |
organic bread... | 0:12:46 | 0:12:47 | |
Sainsbury's was the first, | 0:12:49 | 0:12:50 | |
launching over 300 new organic products in 1998. | 0:12:50 | 0:12:54 | |
..organic ready meals... | 0:12:56 | 0:12:58 | |
..organic lager. | 0:12:59 | 0:13:01 | |
In fact, with our widest ever range, | 0:13:03 | 0:13:05 | |
It's easy to eat organic food every day... | 0:13:05 | 0:13:08 | |
'Organic specialist, Simon Wright, | 0:13:08 | 0:13:11 | |
'was recruited by Sainsbury's to advise on the launch.' | 0:13:11 | 0:13:13 | |
You really went for it in a big way, didn't you? | 0:13:13 | 0:13:16 | |
-Sainsbury's didn't do it in a half-hearted way, did they? -Absolutely not. | 0:13:16 | 0:13:19 | |
So, what happened? | 0:13:19 | 0:13:21 | |
Well, it was a time when there was a lot of media stuff around problems with food. | 0:13:21 | 0:13:26 | |
We had salmonella, | 0:13:26 | 0:13:28 | |
We had Edwina Currie saying her stuff about eggs, | 0:13:28 | 0:13:31 | |
we had BSE, so, you know, pictures of burning cows. | 0:13:31 | 0:13:34 | |
We had concerns about GM... | 0:13:34 | 0:13:36 | |
It was a time when conventional food supply was under a lot of strain. | 0:13:36 | 0:13:41 | |
So, what happened? Tell me about that summer. | 0:13:41 | 0:13:43 | |
Organics had been trickling along, | 0:13:43 | 0:13:45 | |
being sold through natural food stores, health food stores, | 0:13:45 | 0:13:48 | |
So, very unusually, they actually approached all these small suppliers | 0:13:48 | 0:13:52 | |
and said, "would you like to sell your products in our stores?" | 0:13:52 | 0:13:56 | |
Usually, if you want to start supplying a supermarket, you know, | 0:13:56 | 0:14:00 | |
you're bringing up the buyer everyday, "Can I come and see you?" | 0:14:00 | 0:14:03 | |
"Can I supply you with my product?" | 0:14:03 | 0:14:04 | |
For it to invert, and for the supermarket to go | 0:14:04 | 0:14:07 | |
to these small companies and say, "We'd like you to supply us," | 0:14:07 | 0:14:10 | |
well, that was unprecedented. | 0:14:10 | 0:14:12 | |
I've never experienced it happening before or since. | 0:14:12 | 0:14:15 | |
So, they turned, really, what was a crisis - | 0:14:15 | 0:14:17 | |
with BSE and salmonella - into an extraordinary business opportunity. | 0:14:17 | 0:14:22 | |
Yes, which is what supermarkets do. They're very clever at it. | 0:14:22 | 0:14:25 | |
Crucially, they discovered that | 0:14:25 | 0:14:27 | |
the people who were buying a lot of organic products | 0:14:27 | 0:14:29 | |
were also shopping extensively in the other bits of the store, | 0:14:29 | 0:14:32 | |
where they wanted to encourage shoppers. | 0:14:32 | 0:14:34 | |
So, for example, they buy a lot of beer, wines and spirits. | 0:14:34 | 0:14:37 | |
They buy a lot from the deli counter. | 0:14:37 | 0:14:39 | |
These are high-margin, high-value items, | 0:14:39 | 0:14:42 | |
so the supermarkets were very keen to retain those organic shoppers, | 0:14:42 | 0:14:45 | |
not just for the organic products they bought, | 0:14:45 | 0:14:47 | |
but for the other products they bought in the store. | 0:14:47 | 0:14:50 | |
Wow, so in a way, organics was almost the sort of, | 0:14:50 | 0:14:54 | |
the tip of the iceberg for the supermarkets. It was really about | 0:14:54 | 0:14:57 | |
everything else that you could shift... | 0:14:57 | 0:14:59 | |
I think there was some of that, yes. | 0:14:59 | 0:15:02 | |
But as someone who buys organic food, | 0:15:02 | 0:15:05 | |
I myself would feel more virtuous about buying organic food, | 0:15:05 | 0:15:08 | |
and almost feel, I think, at some level, | 0:15:08 | 0:15:11 | |
that I wouldn't become obese because I'm eating organic food. | 0:15:11 | 0:15:15 | |
In my mind, that's how it's working. | 0:15:15 | 0:15:18 | |
Yeah, and I think a lot of consumers would share that perception. | 0:15:18 | 0:15:21 | |
But I would emphasise that is a perception, | 0:15:21 | 0:15:23 | |
rather than anything people in the organic sector have said. | 0:15:23 | 0:15:25 | |
If you live on organic chocolate, | 0:15:25 | 0:15:27 | |
organic ice-cream and organic oven chips, you will get fat, | 0:15:27 | 0:15:31 | |
just as if you lived off non-organic ice-cream, non-organic chocolate | 0:15:31 | 0:15:34 | |
and non-organic oven chips, you get fat. | 0:15:34 | 0:15:35 | |
Simon, with supermarkets, of course they're in it to make money, | 0:15:35 | 0:15:39 | |
they're a business, but do you think they have a moral responsibility | 0:15:39 | 0:15:42 | |
when it comes to something like obesity? | 0:15:42 | 0:15:44 | |
What supermarkets are incredibly good at is responding to consumer demand. | 0:15:44 | 0:15:49 | |
But to ask supermarkets to lead the charge against obesity, | 0:15:49 | 0:15:53 | |
I think is a misunderstanding of what supermarkets do. | 0:15:53 | 0:15:56 | |
Talking to Simon, I realised that supermarkets are about profit. | 0:15:58 | 0:16:01 | |
The bottom line. What happened in the '90s was extraordinary. | 0:16:01 | 0:16:05 | |
They were facing a crisis with BSE and salmonella, | 0:16:05 | 0:16:08 | |
and what did they do? They turned it into an opportunity. | 0:16:08 | 0:16:11 | |
They took organic food, which was this cranky, hippie, | 0:16:11 | 0:16:15 | |
weird lifestyle thing and rolled it out. | 0:16:15 | 0:16:18 | |
They turned it into a money-spinner. And that is their genius. | 0:16:18 | 0:16:22 | |
'But behind this, a global disease was spreading to Britain. | 0:16:26 | 0:16:30 | |
'By 2001, obesity had doubled in women and trebled in men. | 0:16:30 | 0:16:36 | |
'And it was rising. | 0:16:36 | 0:16:38 | |
'Two years later, the World Health Organisation | 0:16:39 | 0:16:42 | |
'published this groundbreaking report. | 0:16:42 | 0:16:45 | |
'It found that heavy marketing of high calorie foods to children | 0:16:47 | 0:16:51 | |
'and the excessive consumption of sugary drinks | 0:16:51 | 0:16:53 | |
'was having a major impact on obesity. | 0:16:53 | 0:16:56 | |
'The food industry was being held to account.' | 0:16:57 | 0:17:00 | |
Within a month of that World Health Organisation report, | 0:17:11 | 0:17:14 | |
JP Morgan, who are a major financial institution, | 0:17:14 | 0:17:17 | |
published a report of their own. | 0:17:17 | 0:17:18 | |
But this report was different | 0:17:18 | 0:17:21 | |
because it was of the food industry investors. | 0:17:21 | 0:17:23 | |
What they said was that because obesity | 0:17:25 | 0:17:27 | |
was now being called an epidemic, | 0:17:27 | 0:17:28 | |
governments might actually be forced to regulate, | 0:17:28 | 0:17:31 | |
and if they regulate, this will affect profits. | 0:17:31 | 0:17:34 | |
'The report warned, | 0:17:40 | 0:17:41 | |
'And it actually went as far as ranking companies | 0:18:02 | 0:18:05 | |
'most exposed to financial risk.' | 0:18:05 | 0:18:07 | |
'Professor Philip James was head | 0:18:13 | 0:18:15 | |
'of the International Obesity Task Force, | 0:18:15 | 0:18:17 | |
'and contributed to the WHO report. | 0:18:17 | 0:18:19 | |
'In September 2003, he was invited to speak | 0:18:21 | 0:18:25 | |
'at JP Morgan's headquarters.' | 0:18:25 | 0:18:27 | |
Philip, the JP Morgan report, 2003. | 0:18:27 | 0:18:31 | |
What was it like when it came out? | 0:18:32 | 0:18:34 | |
This was a bombshell, because it was in the business world, | 0:18:34 | 0:18:39 | |
out of the health world, and it was talking about the bottom line, | 0:18:39 | 0:18:44 | |
and whether their returns were going to move up or down, | 0:18:44 | 0:18:48 | |
and that is what gets chief executives | 0:18:48 | 0:18:51 | |
out of bed in the morning, worrying about what's coming next. | 0:18:51 | 0:18:55 | |
What was it in the report that said would threaten the bottom line? | 0:18:55 | 0:18:58 | |
Well, it's regulation, and if you want to think about | 0:18:58 | 0:19:01 | |
what the food industry in general is paranoid about, it's regulation. | 0:19:01 | 0:19:07 | |
This is a whole different world, this is business, serious business. | 0:19:07 | 0:19:12 | |
Well, I mean, JP Morgan was essentially assessing | 0:19:12 | 0:19:17 | |
the biggest global industry in the world. | 0:19:17 | 0:19:21 | |
They start categorising the range of products of a company, | 0:19:21 | 0:19:26 | |
and then work out, "Where is this company making all its money?" | 0:19:26 | 0:19:31 | |
"If it's making its money on unhealthy products, | 0:19:31 | 0:19:34 | |
"they're vulnerable." | 0:19:34 | 0:19:36 | |
And they said, "There's profit to be made, | 0:19:36 | 0:19:40 | |
"if you change your portfolio | 0:19:40 | 0:19:43 | |
"and you are developing all these healthier," | 0:19:43 | 0:19:47 | |
whatever that meant, "products." | 0:19:47 | 0:19:49 | |
And what is amazing from what you've just said is that | 0:19:49 | 0:19:53 | |
here in obesity is a business opportunity. | 0:19:53 | 0:19:56 | |
To make money, you diversify into products that are seemingly healthy, | 0:19:58 | 0:20:04 | |
the important thing being not whether they're healthy or not, | 0:20:04 | 0:20:07 | |
but whether they're perceived to be healthy. | 0:20:07 | 0:20:09 | |
Here is a chance to make money from obesity. | 0:20:09 | 0:20:13 | |
And this was, therefore, in a way, not remotely interested in health. | 0:20:13 | 0:20:18 | |
It was interested in business opportunities, | 0:20:19 | 0:20:23 | |
and threats to a particular business. | 0:20:23 | 0:20:25 | |
So Philip, what happened next? How did things unfold? | 0:20:25 | 0:20:28 | |
JP Morgan rang me up and said, "Would you come and talk, | 0:20:28 | 0:20:32 | |
"and have a chat with us?" | 0:20:32 | 0:20:35 | |
I sent my slides and turned up at this magnificent headquarters | 0:20:35 | 0:20:40 | |
of JP Morgan in London, and they asked me, | 0:20:40 | 0:20:42 | |
"Would you mind standing over there, so that Frankfurt, New York," | 0:20:42 | 0:20:47 | |
and I think it was Philadelphia, "can hear at the same time?" | 0:20:47 | 0:20:50 | |
And I said, "What?" Well, they said, "Well, they have your report, | 0:20:50 | 0:20:53 | |
"all your slides already there." | 0:20:53 | 0:20:55 | |
And I said, "OK." | 0:20:55 | 0:20:58 | |
And they were there for two and a half hours, and not a soul left. | 0:20:58 | 0:21:02 | |
And how did that make you feel, Philip? | 0:21:02 | 0:21:05 | |
Well, it was quite extraordinary because suddenly we realised | 0:21:05 | 0:21:10 | |
that companies were having meetings of their major executive boards | 0:21:10 | 0:21:16 | |
and deciding that they had to change | 0:21:16 | 0:21:20 | |
in response to this investor analysis. | 0:21:20 | 0:21:23 | |
What's amazing, talking to Philip is that, | 0:21:23 | 0:21:26 | |
all of a sudden this report comes out | 0:21:26 | 0:21:28 | |
and obesity is this massive issue that they have got to confront. | 0:21:28 | 0:21:31 | |
But it's also an opportunity to make money. | 0:21:31 | 0:21:35 | |
'Kath Dalmeny was policy director at the Food Commission | 0:21:39 | 0:21:42 | |
'when industry was reacting to the JP Morgan report. | 0:21:42 | 0:21:45 | |
'At the time, this grassroots organisation exposed record numbers | 0:21:47 | 0:21:51 | |
'of processed foods dubiously marketing themselves as healthier.' | 0:21:51 | 0:21:55 | |
Kath, what kind of effect did the JP Morgan report | 0:21:57 | 0:22:00 | |
have on the food that we see in our supermarkets? | 0:22:00 | 0:22:02 | |
I think the JP Morgan report and some of the other things | 0:22:02 | 0:22:06 | |
that were going on at the time marked a real crossroads | 0:22:06 | 0:22:08 | |
in how a company chose to go forward with their healthiness. | 0:22:08 | 0:22:11 | |
So there are two ways you can approach it | 0:22:11 | 0:22:13 | |
if you're a food industry body who is making food products. | 0:22:13 | 0:22:16 | |
You can either make your products actually healthier, | 0:22:16 | 0:22:19 | |
and that's called reformulation. | 0:22:19 | 0:22:21 | |
You change the things that are in the product. | 0:22:21 | 0:22:23 | |
Or you can go down the line of saying, | 0:22:23 | 0:22:25 | |
"I'm not going to change the actual product. | 0:22:25 | 0:22:27 | |
"I'll have to make it look healthier. | 0:22:27 | 0:22:29 | |
"I'll have to change the perception of the product." | 0:22:29 | 0:22:31 | |
Can you give me any examples of these? | 0:22:31 | 0:22:33 | |
Any examples of making something look healthier? | 0:22:33 | 0:22:36 | |
There were lots of products which had, "Contains fruit!" | 0:22:36 | 0:22:40 | |
But it might only contain 0.1% fruit flavour, but that's permissible. | 0:22:40 | 0:22:43 | |
But, of course, in an age that's concerned about nutrition, | 0:22:43 | 0:22:46 | |
you bring up the fruit to the front of the packet and say, | 0:22:46 | 0:22:48 | |
"Absolutely fantastic, this must be good for health," | 0:22:48 | 0:22:51 | |
is the implication, even if the claim isn't actually made. | 0:22:51 | 0:22:53 | |
There were all kinds of things about calcium. | 0:22:53 | 0:22:56 | |
Big ticks on the front of children's food packets saying, | 0:22:56 | 0:22:58 | |
"This contains calcium. | 0:22:58 | 0:22:59 | |
"Must be good for teeth, then, mustn't it?" thinks the parent. | 0:22:59 | 0:23:01 | |
But of course, what it actually means is, | 0:23:01 | 0:23:03 | |
"This product is full of sugar, but we're not saying that on the packet. | 0:23:03 | 0:23:06 | |
-They weren't lying in what they were saying? -No, not at all. | 0:23:06 | 0:23:09 | |
That's not the point. They're not lying, they're just sprinkling | 0:23:09 | 0:23:12 | |
a little bit of magic dust on the top to make it look healthier. | 0:23:12 | 0:23:15 | |
What does a company do when they've got nowhere to go? | 0:23:15 | 0:23:17 | |
When they can't reformulate their food | 0:23:17 | 0:23:19 | |
because they are essentially known as fattening? | 0:23:19 | 0:23:22 | |
The prime example is Cadbury. | 0:23:22 | 0:23:25 | |
There they are, stuck with a product that is a high-fat product, | 0:23:25 | 0:23:29 | |
a high-sugar product. It's got calories in it, | 0:23:29 | 0:23:31 | |
it's something that people can consume a lot of, so the finger | 0:23:31 | 0:23:34 | |
is pointing at it, saying, "That's part of the problem." | 0:23:34 | 0:23:38 | |
So what do they do? They get into a partnership with government and say, | 0:23:38 | 0:23:41 | |
"What we'll do is sponsor a sports equipment scheme, | 0:23:41 | 0:23:43 | |
"and the government will endorse that | 0:23:43 | 0:23:45 | |
"and we'll be seen as part of the solution | 0:23:45 | 0:23:47 | |
"in providing sports activities in schools, | 0:23:47 | 0:23:49 | |
"through children having to collect tokens from the chocolate wrappers, | 0:23:49 | 0:23:53 | |
"having eaten the chocolate." | 0:23:53 | 0:23:54 | |
How did this Cadbury's campaign work? | 0:23:54 | 0:23:56 | |
We found, for example, that for a netball | 0:23:56 | 0:23:59 | |
that would normally cost five pounds in the shop, | 0:23:59 | 0:24:01 | |
you'd have to spend 38 quid to get it by buying chocolate. | 0:24:01 | 0:24:04 | |
There was a cricket set, for example, that, | 0:24:04 | 0:24:07 | |
if you bought it in the shop, it'd cost you £150, | 0:24:07 | 0:24:09 | |
if you got it through the Cadbury Get Active tokens scheme, | 0:24:09 | 0:24:12 | |
then it would cost you £1,100. And in the process, | 0:24:12 | 0:24:15 | |
you'd also have been exposed to half a million calories. | 0:24:15 | 0:24:18 | |
And the whole scheme, when we totted it all up, | 0:24:18 | 0:24:20 | |
my calculator nearly exploded | 0:24:20 | 0:24:22 | |
cos it was 36 billion calories' worth of chocolate. | 0:24:22 | 0:24:24 | |
So what happened when you found all this out | 0:24:24 | 0:24:27 | |
about this sports equipment fiasco? | 0:24:27 | 0:24:29 | |
I came in late on the morning that the story broke in the media, | 0:24:29 | 0:24:32 | |
and I cycled in and saw the headlines | 0:24:32 | 0:24:34 | |
on the news stand outside our office, and nearly fell off my bike. | 0:24:34 | 0:24:37 | |
I realised, "Oh, my word! This is going to be big." | 0:24:37 | 0:24:40 | |
It had all the magic ingredients for a media story. | 0:24:40 | 0:24:43 | |
It was about a national brand everybody would recognise. | 0:24:43 | 0:24:45 | |
It was about an issue parents care passionately about, | 0:24:45 | 0:24:48 | |
the health of their children. | 0:24:48 | 0:24:49 | |
It was about ministers getting involved with endorsing a scheme | 0:24:49 | 0:24:52 | |
that was about promoting fat and sugar | 0:24:52 | 0:24:53 | |
in the middle of a health crisis. | 0:24:53 | 0:24:55 | |
The phones didn't stop going all day. | 0:24:55 | 0:24:57 | |
What do you have to eat 40 quid's worth of to get a free basketball? | 0:24:57 | 0:25:00 | |
-BELL RINGS -Chocolate bars. | 0:25:01 | 0:25:04 | |
Cadbury has decided that the best way to get children fit | 0:25:04 | 0:25:07 | |
is to fill them up full of chocolate. | 0:25:07 | 0:25:09 | |
And so, did you hear from Cadbury after you did this? | 0:25:09 | 0:25:13 | |
My boss and I were called up to go and see the Cadbury bosses | 0:25:13 | 0:25:17 | |
in Berkeley Square in this very posh office | 0:25:17 | 0:25:19 | |
full of mahogany and very thick carpet. | 0:25:19 | 0:25:22 | |
I think they wanted to get the size of us, | 0:25:22 | 0:25:24 | |
and the size of us was quite small. | 0:25:24 | 0:25:26 | |
There was only two or three of us in the office | 0:25:26 | 0:25:28 | |
who had done all these calculations with a glass of wine at night. | 0:25:28 | 0:25:31 | |
So we were called up to meet the head of Cadbury | 0:25:31 | 0:25:34 | |
and also his marketing person who had been involved | 0:25:34 | 0:25:37 | |
in some of the design of the scheme, and we had this bizarre conversation | 0:25:37 | 0:25:41 | |
with silverware and beautiful plates, sort of chinking, | 0:25:41 | 0:25:44 | |
very politely having a meal together, | 0:25:44 | 0:25:46 | |
while we were grilled, my boss and I were grilled | 0:25:46 | 0:25:49 | |
about why on earth we had criticised this wonderful scheme. | 0:25:49 | 0:25:53 | |
And I remember that the marketing person said to me, | 0:25:53 | 0:25:57 | |
"Were you not aware that this would damage children | 0:25:57 | 0:25:59 | |
"by taking away this sports equipment from them? | 0:25:59 | 0:26:01 | |
"This is all we wanted to do was to give children sports equipment." | 0:26:01 | 0:26:04 | |
What happened to their scheme? | 0:26:04 | 0:26:07 | |
In the end, the scheme quietly died. | 0:26:07 | 0:26:09 | |
There was no fanfare about that, but it disappeared off the radar, | 0:26:09 | 0:26:13 | |
and no such scheme has happened since, | 0:26:13 | 0:26:15 | |
and certainly not with government endorsement. | 0:26:15 | 0:26:17 | |
Are the companies still promoting healthy lifestyle | 0:26:17 | 0:26:21 | |
and fitness whilst giving us a product...is this still going on? | 0:26:21 | 0:26:25 | |
Well, it's interesting that you're asking that question in 2012, | 0:26:25 | 0:26:28 | |
because, of course, we've got the London 2012 Olympic | 0:26:28 | 0:26:30 | |
and Paralympic Games coming to London, a few miles down the road | 0:26:30 | 0:26:33 | |
from where we're sitting, and of course, that is sponsored by | 0:26:33 | 0:26:36 | |
a burger company, a soft drinks company and Cadbury once again. | 0:26:36 | 0:26:41 | |
'Cadbury say the scheme gave schools thousands of pounds' worth | 0:26:43 | 0:26:46 | |
'of sports equipment, and sales were not affected. | 0:26:46 | 0:26:50 | |
'But they admit the negative publicity made them offer promotions | 0:26:50 | 0:26:54 | |
'with free entry to theme parks and attractions instead.' | 0:26:54 | 0:26:57 | |
Obesity kept on rising, | 0:27:00 | 0:27:02 | |
and the pressure was mounting on the food industry, | 0:27:02 | 0:27:05 | |
and in 2006, they were to face a real challenge. | 0:27:05 | 0:27:08 | |
A challenge that could potentially wipe billions off their profits, | 0:27:08 | 0:27:11 | |
and it all came down to a tiny label, | 0:27:11 | 0:27:14 | |
about the size of a postage stamp, | 0:27:14 | 0:27:16 | |
being looked at by the Food Standards Agency. | 0:27:16 | 0:27:19 | |
'The Food Standards Agency wanted to help consumers | 0:27:19 | 0:27:22 | |
'see past the seductive packaging | 0:27:22 | 0:27:24 | |
'and understand how fattening food really was. | 0:27:24 | 0:27:27 | |
'They looked at Guideline Daily Amounts or GDAs, | 0:27:29 | 0:27:33 | |
'which lists percentages of nutrients, | 0:27:33 | 0:27:35 | |
'but decided to recommend traffic lights, which uses a colour code. | 0:27:35 | 0:27:40 | |
'Red means high, amber means medium and green means low. | 0:27:40 | 0:27:45 | |
'The industry was divided. | 0:27:47 | 0:27:49 | |
'Some, like Sainsbury's, Co-op and Waitrose, went for it. | 0:27:49 | 0:27:54 | |
'And others, like Tesco, Morrison's and Kellogg's, | 0:27:55 | 0:28:00 | |
'stuck with Guideline Daily Amounts. | 0:28:00 | 0:28:02 | |
'Richard Ayre was on the board of the Food Standards Agency | 0:28:08 | 0:28:11 | |
'when they scrutinised food labelling.' | 0:28:11 | 0:28:14 | |
So, Richard, when you set out, you didn't have any clear preference | 0:28:14 | 0:28:18 | |
as to whether you should go with GDA or the traffic light system. | 0:28:18 | 0:28:22 | |
You didn't have any clear preconception | 0:28:22 | 0:28:24 | |
as to how this would turn out. | 0:28:24 | 0:28:26 | |
The Agency never had an axe to grind. | 0:28:26 | 0:28:29 | |
We had a legislative statutory responsibility | 0:28:29 | 0:28:32 | |
to put the interests of consumers first. | 0:28:32 | 0:28:35 | |
That's what we did, so we asked consumers. We tested with consumers. | 0:28:35 | 0:28:39 | |
What system would enable them to make the healthiest choices? | 0:28:39 | 0:28:43 | |
And it was clear what the answer was. They preferred traffic light. | 0:28:43 | 0:28:47 | |
The companies who opposed traffic lights, what were their reasons? | 0:28:47 | 0:28:51 | |
It was put about that the Food Standards Agency | 0:28:51 | 0:28:54 | |
wanted to slap a red traffic light on every bar of chocolate | 0:28:54 | 0:28:58 | |
or on every block of sugar or on every tub of butter or spread, | 0:28:58 | 0:29:06 | |
of course, we never suggested that. We were absolutely clear - | 0:29:06 | 0:29:09 | |
the traffic lights were only to label what are called complex foods | 0:29:09 | 0:29:12 | |
like processed meals, ready meals - | 0:29:12 | 0:29:16 | |
things that have several different ingredients, | 0:29:16 | 0:29:18 | |
and, unless you have some guidance, you really don't know how much | 0:29:18 | 0:29:21 | |
fat, salt, sugar there is in the total food. | 0:29:21 | 0:29:24 | |
Were you surprised by the response of supermarkets who didn't want to introduce traffic lights? | 0:29:24 | 0:29:28 | |
I think disappointed, | 0:29:28 | 0:29:30 | |
and disappointed because they wouldn't show us the evidence | 0:29:30 | 0:29:34 | |
upon which they rejected what was clear to us | 0:29:34 | 0:29:37 | |
was the right, preferred system for consumers. | 0:29:37 | 0:29:41 | |
Were we disappointed that some of the most important supermarkets, | 0:29:41 | 0:29:45 | |
like Tesco, wouldn't even try traffic lights for real? | 0:29:45 | 0:29:49 | |
Yes, of course we were disappointed. | 0:29:49 | 0:29:51 | |
How would you describe Tesco's response? | 0:29:51 | 0:29:55 | |
Almost 300,000 people in Britain work for Tesco. | 0:29:55 | 0:29:59 | |
If Tesco are unhappy with policy, governments listen, | 0:29:59 | 0:30:04 | |
so Tesco was fantastically powerful in this debate. | 0:30:04 | 0:30:08 | |
What did the industry fear so much about traffic lights? | 0:30:08 | 0:30:11 | |
It would unquestionably have changed consumer choices. | 0:30:11 | 0:30:14 | |
People would, broadly, have bought more of healthier food. | 0:30:14 | 0:30:19 | |
That was the objective, after all. | 0:30:19 | 0:30:21 | |
I wondered what the government actually did once you gave them your results. | 0:30:21 | 0:30:27 | |
Politicians hate the idea of regulation. | 0:30:27 | 0:30:30 | |
For the last 20 years, politicians of all parties | 0:30:30 | 0:30:34 | |
say they are not in favour of regulation. | 0:30:34 | 0:30:36 | |
They want to deregulate it, | 0:30:36 | 0:30:38 | |
but once the Food Standards Agency was set up | 0:30:38 | 0:30:41 | |
and it started to try to regulate in the consumer's interest, | 0:30:41 | 0:30:45 | |
it got up the noses of a lot of politicians and a lot of industry. | 0:30:45 | 0:30:49 | |
It's somewhat paradoxical that we're in a time | 0:30:49 | 0:30:51 | |
where obesity's an epidemic and yet health food | 0:30:51 | 0:30:54 | |
is the fastest-growing sector of the food industry, | 0:30:54 | 0:30:57 | |
and I wonder how those two things square. | 0:30:57 | 0:30:59 | |
So-called health food is. Um, the problem is | 0:30:59 | 0:31:03 | |
in the absence of a single, clear, simple labelling system, | 0:31:03 | 0:31:07 | |
consumers really are at the mercy of the marketing department, | 0:31:07 | 0:31:11 | |
so we know that people can be conned into believing | 0:31:11 | 0:31:16 | |
that a pizza will be good for them | 0:31:16 | 0:31:18 | |
because it has a bit of pineapple on top of it. | 0:31:18 | 0:31:22 | |
We know they can be convinced by being told that a product | 0:31:22 | 0:31:27 | |
is one of their five a day, | 0:31:27 | 0:31:29 | |
one of their five portions of fruit or vegetable a day, | 0:31:29 | 0:31:32 | |
but they're also having their entire daily allowance of sugar, | 0:31:32 | 0:31:36 | |
or of salt, or sometimes of saturated fat. | 0:31:36 | 0:31:39 | |
Richard, put yourself in the shoes of the food manufacturers. | 0:31:39 | 0:31:43 | |
Would you have introduced traffic lights? | 0:31:43 | 0:31:45 | |
Probably not. | 0:31:46 | 0:31:48 | |
Because as a food manufacturer, | 0:31:48 | 0:31:51 | |
I have an obligation to my shareholders first of all, | 0:31:51 | 0:31:54 | |
I have an obligation to my employees, I want to maximise my profit, | 0:31:54 | 0:32:00 | |
and the fact is that if you produce a clear labelling system | 0:32:00 | 0:32:04 | |
of the sort that traffic lights was, then you put at risk | 0:32:04 | 0:32:08 | |
that part of the industry that makes a healthy living | 0:32:08 | 0:32:11 | |
by producing not-very-healthy food. | 0:32:11 | 0:32:14 | |
We asked Tesco about what Richard said, and they say their GDA labels | 0:32:14 | 0:32:20 | |
are clear and simple, but they are open to discussion | 0:32:20 | 0:32:23 | |
for the best way to help customers make an informed choice. | 0:32:23 | 0:32:26 | |
Some very powerful people didn't want traffic lights to happen. | 0:32:33 | 0:32:38 | |
What's more, within six months of the coalition government coming to power, | 0:32:38 | 0:32:43 | |
the Food Standards Agency was stripped of responsibility for food labelling. | 0:32:43 | 0:32:46 | |
But the battle now shifted to Brussels, | 0:32:48 | 0:32:51 | |
where the stakes were raised and the fight was going to get dirty. | 0:32:51 | 0:32:54 | |
In the European Parliament, the votes of the MEPs, | 0:33:06 | 0:33:09 | |
who had the power to introduce traffic lights across Europe, | 0:33:09 | 0:33:13 | |
were fought over in a David and Goliath struggle. | 0:33:13 | 0:33:16 | |
The David being the small health charities lobbying for traffic lights | 0:33:19 | 0:33:22 | |
and the Goliath being the food giants with their enormous wealth and influence. | 0:33:22 | 0:33:27 | |
MEP Glenis Willmott fought hard for traffic lights | 0:33:31 | 0:33:35 | |
and saw first-hand the tactics the food lobby deployed. | 0:33:35 | 0:33:39 | |
How much effort did the food industry make | 0:33:39 | 0:33:41 | |
to influence the decision on traffic lights? | 0:33:41 | 0:33:44 | |
A huge amount. They spent, it's estimated, | 0:33:44 | 0:33:47 | |
over a billion euros to stop traffic lights. That's an awful lot of money. | 0:33:47 | 0:33:51 | |
We were inundated with e-mails, with requests for meetings. | 0:33:51 | 0:33:54 | |
There were lunches, breakfasts, dinners | 0:33:54 | 0:33:57 | |
that people were being invited to in order to try and change their minds | 0:33:57 | 0:34:01 | |
to make sure that traffic light labelling didn't get agreed. | 0:34:01 | 0:34:04 | |
Did they give you any good reasons why traffic lights wouldn't work? | 0:34:04 | 0:34:07 | |
Did they give you any research? | 0:34:07 | 0:34:09 | |
They basically said there was no evidence | 0:34:09 | 0:34:11 | |
that people preferred traffic lights. That's basically what they said, | 0:34:11 | 0:34:15 | |
but they said that meant that people preferred GDAs. It isn't what the research said, | 0:34:15 | 0:34:19 | |
and it's just one of the many, many things that they did | 0:34:19 | 0:34:23 | |
in order to stop this system getting through. | 0:34:23 | 0:34:26 | |
Could you tell me how much effort was made | 0:34:26 | 0:34:28 | |
on the side of the campaign to bring in traffic lights here? | 0:34:28 | 0:34:31 | |
Was there any lobbying by that side here? | 0:34:31 | 0:34:34 | |
Yes. However, it was a completely different scale. | 0:34:34 | 0:34:36 | |
You know, the organisations, the health and consumer organisations, | 0:34:36 | 0:34:40 | |
haven't got the resources anywhere near. | 0:34:40 | 0:34:43 | |
It was miniscule compared to the food industry. | 0:34:43 | 0:34:46 | |
What would they actually say, then, to the MEPs? | 0:34:46 | 0:34:48 | |
I mean, give me an example of the kind of thing they would say to an MEP. | 0:34:48 | 0:34:52 | |
An example would be, to Italian MEPs, for example, | 0:34:52 | 0:34:55 | |
"If you agree these traffic lights, | 0:34:55 | 0:34:57 | |
"then we will lose all of these jobs in Italy | 0:34:57 | 0:35:00 | |
"because we won't be able to produce this particular product any more | 0:35:00 | 0:35:03 | |
"because it will be labelled bad, it will be labelled red." | 0:35:03 | 0:35:06 | |
So the food industry was targeting the MEPs who had food jobs in their area? | 0:35:06 | 0:35:10 | |
Yes, absolutely. So if you had a particular factory in your area, | 0:35:10 | 0:35:14 | |
you were more likely to be targeted and told, | 0:35:14 | 0:35:17 | |
"You will lose jobs in your constituency." | 0:35:17 | 0:35:20 | |
Wow, that shows an extraordinary degree of, kind of, | 0:35:20 | 0:35:24 | |
laser-like precision to hone in on specific MEPs. | 0:35:24 | 0:35:27 | |
That was the problem. You know, people were frightened. | 0:35:27 | 0:35:30 | |
They don't want to lose jobs, obviously. | 0:35:30 | 0:35:32 | |
They've got to go back home to their constituencies | 0:35:32 | 0:35:34 | |
and explain why they voted in this way. | 0:35:34 | 0:35:37 | |
How do you go back and face your constituents? Do you want to get re-elected? | 0:35:37 | 0:35:41 | |
The food industry won, | 0:35:42 | 0:35:44 | |
and traffic light labelling would not be enforced. | 0:35:44 | 0:35:47 | |
The shocking thing is not that the food industry lobbied MEPs, | 0:35:50 | 0:35:53 | |
it's the way that they did it. | 0:35:53 | 0:35:56 | |
They specifically targeted MEPs with food industry jobs, | 0:35:56 | 0:35:58 | |
because this bill really mattered. | 0:35:58 | 0:36:01 | |
If it was passed, it would affect their bottom line, | 0:36:01 | 0:36:04 | |
their profits, and they couldn't afford to let it pass. | 0:36:04 | 0:36:07 | |
'Reading labels to work out what's good for you | 0:36:07 | 0:36:10 | |
'can sometimes be really complicated.' | 0:36:10 | 0:36:13 | |
Yet there were companies that took up traffic lights voluntarily. | 0:36:13 | 0:36:18 | |
'Mostly green means go for it. | 0:36:18 | 0:36:20 | |
'Mostly red means enjoy it once in a while. Simple.' | 0:36:20 | 0:36:24 | |
What made them work for Sainsbury's | 0:36:24 | 0:36:26 | |
when others in the industry resisted? | 0:36:26 | 0:36:28 | |
'Judith Batchelar is director of Sainsbury's Brand.' | 0:36:30 | 0:36:34 | |
Judith, when you introduced traffic lights, | 0:36:34 | 0:36:36 | |
why did you do it at Sainsbury's? | 0:36:36 | 0:36:38 | |
Well, it was back in 2004, and I think it would be fair to say | 0:36:38 | 0:36:43 | |
Sainsbury's had lost a little bit of its sparkle, | 0:36:43 | 0:36:45 | |
and I think we really were up for driving change within the organisation | 0:36:45 | 0:36:51 | |
and putting, as I say, a little bit of that sparkle back into Sainsbury's. | 0:36:51 | 0:36:55 | |
There are a lot of products that are marketed as healthy | 0:36:55 | 0:36:59 | |
which are anything but, | 0:36:59 | 0:37:00 | |
and I wondered if the worry would be around those kinds of products | 0:37:00 | 0:37:04 | |
that seem healthy because of the marketing of them, | 0:37:04 | 0:37:07 | |
but in reality, if you did put a traffic light on it, it would be red. | 0:37:07 | 0:37:11 | |
Yeah, I think what we found with traffic lights was exactly that. | 0:37:11 | 0:37:15 | |
Not that people stopped buying things, | 0:37:15 | 0:37:17 | |
but that they were surprised by things, | 0:37:17 | 0:37:19 | |
particularly things where intuitively | 0:37:19 | 0:37:21 | |
they thought that perhaps the category was healthy. | 0:37:21 | 0:37:25 | |
So, dairy products and things like yogurts, for example, | 0:37:25 | 0:37:28 | |
they thought were healthy, but actually, some yogurts have lots of sugar in them | 0:37:28 | 0:37:31 | |
because they've got different flavours and all sorts of things. | 0:37:31 | 0:37:34 | |
They're not really as healthy as they thought they were. | 0:37:34 | 0:37:37 | |
Sandwiches is another great category, actually, where... | 0:37:37 | 0:37:39 | |
-What did they do with sandwiches? -Well, they just swapped, | 0:37:39 | 0:37:42 | |
and actually I've got another example here, actually, | 0:37:42 | 0:37:46 | |
and it's just on two chicken products. | 0:37:46 | 0:37:49 | |
Basically, you've got a product here that's got a red traffic light. | 0:37:49 | 0:37:53 | |
It's a southern fried chicken wrap. | 0:37:53 | 0:37:55 | |
The number of calories in that is, well, 525. | 0:37:55 | 0:37:59 | |
You can actually buy a 281-calorie chicken sandwich | 0:37:59 | 0:38:04 | |
in the same range, and those are the kind of trade-offs that people were making. | 0:38:04 | 0:38:09 | |
And in fact, sandwiches was where we saw the biggest shift in behaviours, | 0:38:09 | 0:38:13 | |
of people switching out of ambers and reds into greens and ambers. | 0:38:13 | 0:38:17 | |
How has traffic lights changed the culture within Sainsbury's? | 0:38:17 | 0:38:21 | |
The whole process is completely reversed, | 0:38:21 | 0:38:24 | |
because today we start with that multiple traffic light, | 0:38:24 | 0:38:28 | |
so part of the process is saying, "What kind of traffic light | 0:38:28 | 0:38:30 | |
"do I want to put on the front of this product | 0:38:30 | 0:38:33 | |
"and how hard am I going to have to work to make sure | 0:38:33 | 0:38:36 | |
"I turn a red to amber, or turn an amber to green?" | 0:38:36 | 0:38:39 | |
Clearly you will get to a point where reformulation | 0:38:39 | 0:38:42 | |
does start to have a detrimental effect on the taste of the product. | 0:38:42 | 0:38:47 | |
-Have you found that at all? -Yes, we have found that. | 0:38:47 | 0:38:49 | |
The argument that has always been used against traffic lights | 0:38:49 | 0:38:52 | |
would be the effect on sales, so is this what you've found? | 0:38:52 | 0:38:55 | |
Have you found that you can square the circle? | 0:38:55 | 0:38:58 | |
Has it affected sales badly or not? | 0:38:58 | 0:39:00 | |
No. No, it has just transferred sales. | 0:39:00 | 0:39:03 | |
People still eat, they still come and buy the same things. | 0:39:03 | 0:39:06 | |
They still buy ready meals, they just change what they buy. | 0:39:06 | 0:39:09 | |
Sainsbury's had, by their own admission, lost their sparkle, | 0:39:09 | 0:39:13 | |
so they went for traffic lights, but if you're a thriving company | 0:39:13 | 0:39:17 | |
doing really well, why would you do it unless regulation forced you? | 0:39:17 | 0:39:21 | |
America. | 0:39:29 | 0:39:32 | |
Home of the most profitable food industry in the world. | 0:39:32 | 0:39:35 | |
If there is a way to get us to buy more food, | 0:39:35 | 0:39:39 | |
it's probably been tried here first. | 0:39:39 | 0:39:41 | |
Pierre Chandon, visiting professor at Harvard Business School, | 0:39:45 | 0:39:49 | |
has done ground-breaking research into how fattening foods are marketed as healthy. | 0:39:49 | 0:39:53 | |
'Pierre explained to me exactly how this worked.' | 0:39:57 | 0:40:01 | |
I call this the paradox of low-fat food and high-fat people, | 0:40:01 | 0:40:04 | |
and I thought, "How come when people are trying to lose weight, | 0:40:04 | 0:40:07 | |
"trying really hard and trying to eat right, they're not losing weight?" | 0:40:07 | 0:40:11 | |
And I thought maybe there's a boomerang effect here. | 0:40:11 | 0:40:14 | |
Maybe all of this healthy food is actually the reason why we're not losing weight as fast as we can. | 0:40:14 | 0:40:18 | |
And what did you discover when you started studying this? | 0:40:18 | 0:40:22 | |
So, in our study we compared two fast food chains, | 0:40:22 | 0:40:25 | |
one of which is called Subway, which in the US is marketed as being | 0:40:25 | 0:40:28 | |
a healthy place where you can get fresh food | 0:40:28 | 0:40:31 | |
and lower-calorie sandwiches, | 0:40:31 | 0:40:33 | |
and McDonald's, which is a fast food chain, a regular burger chain. | 0:40:33 | 0:40:38 | |
And what did you find? | 0:40:38 | 0:40:39 | |
So, for example, in one study we took two products. | 0:40:39 | 0:40:41 | |
We took this really big foot-long sandwich from Subway, | 0:40:41 | 0:40:45 | |
-which actually has 900 calories. -A foot-long sandwich?! -That's right. | 0:40:45 | 0:40:49 | |
And we took the Big Mac from McDonald's, and we asked people to estimate the number of calories. | 0:40:49 | 0:40:55 | |
What's fascinating is that even though the Subway sandwich has 50% more calories than a Big Mac, | 0:40:55 | 0:40:59 | |
people thought that it was healthier, hence it had fewer calories. | 0:40:59 | 0:41:03 | |
Now, the other thing that's really interesting is beyond that. | 0:41:03 | 0:41:07 | |
It's when people underestimated the calories of a healthy sandwich, | 0:41:07 | 0:41:11 | |
then they treated themselves to a more indulgent dessert | 0:41:11 | 0:41:14 | |
or to a full-calorie drink. | 0:41:14 | 0:41:16 | |
So the important thing is the actual store that it's coming from. | 0:41:16 | 0:41:21 | |
If the store has a healthy overall perception, | 0:41:21 | 0:41:24 | |
then everything that comes from that store will be seen as being healthy, | 0:41:24 | 0:41:27 | |
regardless of what's actually in it. | 0:41:27 | 0:41:29 | |
Exactly, so people have this idea that if you're healthy | 0:41:29 | 0:41:32 | |
because you're fresh then you're also good in terms of calories | 0:41:32 | 0:41:35 | |
and you have fewer calories. | 0:41:35 | 0:41:37 | |
This is something I call the health halo. | 0:41:37 | 0:41:39 | |
It's the idea that when food is marketed as being healthy, | 0:41:39 | 0:41:41 | |
people think that it has less calories, and as a result, | 0:41:41 | 0:41:44 | |
they think they can eat more of it without getting fat, | 0:41:44 | 0:41:46 | |
and that's a very powerful effect that we find over and over in the US, | 0:41:46 | 0:41:50 | |
in Europe, with different brands, with different types of food. | 0:41:50 | 0:41:54 | |
-It doesn't matter. -This health halo is really fascinating. | 0:41:54 | 0:41:56 | |
I wonder how else it works, if it works on any other products. | 0:41:56 | 0:41:59 | |
We actually invented some food which does not exist. | 0:41:59 | 0:42:02 | |
You invented some food? | 0:42:02 | 0:42:03 | |
Yeah, we went and we printed on all of these M&Ms "low-fat" or "light," | 0:42:03 | 0:42:07 | |
and we told people, "Here's some M&Ms. | 0:42:07 | 0:42:10 | |
"There's a new product. Low-fat M&Ms. Have as many as you want." | 0:42:10 | 0:42:14 | |
And we gave other people some regular M&Ms, | 0:42:14 | 0:42:17 | |
and what we found is just because the M&Ms were called low-fat, | 0:42:17 | 0:42:20 | |
-that people consumed up to 50% more of them. -Wow. | 0:42:20 | 0:42:23 | |
Just simply because they had been labelled as low-fat. | 0:42:23 | 0:42:26 | |
Exactly, because, again, the health halo. | 0:42:26 | 0:42:28 | |
If I'm saying I'm good, I have lower fat, people think | 0:42:28 | 0:42:31 | |
I also have lower calories, therefore they think they can eat more. | 0:42:31 | 0:42:35 | |
It's so illogical, the way we actually behave. Why do we do this? | 0:42:35 | 0:42:38 | |
It's actually, from a psychological point of view, | 0:42:38 | 0:42:41 | |
it makes a lot of sense. We tend to look at food in binary terms. | 0:42:41 | 0:42:45 | |
There's good food and bad food. | 0:42:45 | 0:42:46 | |
The basic idea is very simple. | 0:42:46 | 0:42:49 | |
It's that when you're good at something or in some aspect, | 0:42:49 | 0:42:51 | |
people think you must be good in every aspect, | 0:42:51 | 0:42:54 | |
so if you are also organic, if you think that there's gluten-free everything, | 0:42:54 | 0:42:57 | |
people tend to categorise the food as being a good food overall. | 0:42:57 | 0:43:00 | |
As a result, they think it's going to be less fattening, | 0:43:00 | 0:43:03 | |
and it's not. Not always. | 0:43:03 | 0:43:05 | |
But, Pierre, all this work you've done, | 0:43:05 | 0:43:06 | |
what are the actual implications for the food industry, | 0:43:06 | 0:43:09 | |
in terms of what you've discovered? | 0:43:09 | 0:43:11 | |
I think the food industry has understood | 0:43:11 | 0:43:13 | |
and, first of all, they know this. They know this really well. | 0:43:13 | 0:43:15 | |
They've understood that there's actually an opportunity to market food as healthy. | 0:43:15 | 0:43:19 | |
And today it's almost impossible to buy food that's not saying it's healthy, | 0:43:19 | 0:43:24 | |
because more and more people are interested in being good | 0:43:24 | 0:43:27 | |
and eating healthily, and these are exactly the people | 0:43:27 | 0:43:30 | |
who are most likely to be misled by the health halos. | 0:43:30 | 0:43:33 | |
So the paradox of low-fat food and high-fat people | 0:43:33 | 0:43:36 | |
is not going to go away. I think it's just going to get worse. | 0:43:36 | 0:43:39 | |
Pierre's work on health halos | 0:43:41 | 0:43:42 | |
found that we underestimate the calories in healthy foods | 0:43:42 | 0:43:46 | |
because we subconsciously categorise food into simply good or bad. | 0:43:46 | 0:43:51 | |
If he's right about the food industry knowing this | 0:43:51 | 0:43:54 | |
and cashing in on it, can it ever help us fight obesity | 0:43:54 | 0:43:57 | |
when profits are at stake? | 0:43:57 | 0:43:59 | |
Before the Conservative Party entered office, | 0:44:09 | 0:44:13 | |
Andrew Lansley, then shadow health minister, declared | 0:44:13 | 0:44:16 | |
he was also a paid non-executive director of Profero - | 0:44:16 | 0:44:20 | |
a marketing agency whose clients included Pizza Hut, Pepsi and Mars. | 0:44:20 | 0:44:24 | |
He maintains he did not work on anything that could be a conflict of interest. | 0:44:26 | 0:44:31 | |
But at the same time as he was preparing the Tory policy on obesity, | 0:44:31 | 0:44:36 | |
he invited contributions from food industry giants. | 0:44:36 | 0:44:40 | |
Meetings would take place at the headquarters of global corporation, Unilever. | 0:44:41 | 0:44:47 | |
Andrew Lansley's Public Health Commission would meet with the major players in the food industry, | 0:44:50 | 0:44:55 | |
people like Tesco and Unilever. | 0:44:55 | 0:44:57 | |
The plan was to formulate the incoming government's policy on obesity. | 0:44:57 | 0:45:02 | |
Lansley believed working with the food industry | 0:45:02 | 0:45:06 | |
was a faster way of tackling obesity than regulation. | 0:45:06 | 0:45:10 | |
But Professor Simon Capewell, | 0:45:14 | 0:45:16 | |
a leading expert in public health from the University of Liverpool | 0:45:16 | 0:45:19 | |
who was invited to join, didn't see it that way. | 0:45:19 | 0:45:22 | |
Simon, when you were first contacted by Andrew Lansley's office, | 0:45:23 | 0:45:27 | |
why did they tell you? | 0:45:27 | 0:45:28 | |
I was actually contacted by Unilever, the public relations head, | 0:45:28 | 0:45:35 | |
who followed up on the letter from Lansley inviting me | 0:45:35 | 0:45:40 | |
to be a member of the Public Health Commission. | 0:45:40 | 0:45:42 | |
He sought to explain the purpose of the Public Health Commission. | 0:45:42 | 0:45:48 | |
Give me some idea of what it was like walking into that room for the first time. | 0:45:48 | 0:45:52 | |
-Who was there? -It was all very grand. | 0:45:52 | 0:45:56 | |
This was a large, glitzy organisation. | 0:45:56 | 0:45:59 | |
It was clearly very successful. | 0:45:59 | 0:46:01 | |
I think some of us felt a little bit flattered. | 0:46:01 | 0:46:04 | |
We felt we were at the top table, that people were taking notice of us. | 0:46:04 | 0:46:08 | |
At no point was that sensation undermined. | 0:46:08 | 0:46:13 | |
Simon, which companies were actually represented at the meeting? | 0:46:13 | 0:46:17 | |
The chair of the Public Health Commission | 0:46:17 | 0:46:20 | |
was the chair of Unilever UK. | 0:46:20 | 0:46:22 | |
Nudging it along, Tesco were there and ASDA as well. | 0:46:23 | 0:46:29 | |
Also the people from the advertising communities. | 0:46:29 | 0:46:33 | |
So, Simon, in terms of obesity, what were you coming to the table to say? | 0:46:33 | 0:46:37 | |
I wanted to lay out the evidence | 0:46:37 | 0:46:40 | |
for interventions in public health that worked. | 0:46:40 | 0:46:43 | |
When you looked around the world, there were a number of countries | 0:46:43 | 0:46:48 | |
that have done amazing things and done it very effectively. | 0:46:48 | 0:46:52 | |
Scandinavia, Finland in particular. | 0:46:52 | 0:46:55 | |
The success of those countries was based on legislation and regulation. | 0:46:55 | 0:47:00 | |
Regulation of the food industry? | 0:47:00 | 0:47:03 | |
Yes, and serious regulation of advertising. | 0:47:03 | 0:47:07 | |
So, yes, there was a recognition that the individual had a role to play | 0:47:07 | 0:47:14 | |
but, at the end of the day, | 0:47:14 | 0:47:16 | |
the big, powerful levers were in the hands of government. | 0:47:16 | 0:47:20 | |
And what did the food industry say when you said this at this meeting? | 0:47:20 | 0:47:24 | |
In retrospect, they were very clever, | 0:47:24 | 0:47:26 | |
because we all had opportunities where we were invited to prepare papers | 0:47:26 | 0:47:32 | |
and, indeed, to do presentations. | 0:47:32 | 0:47:35 | |
On each of those occasions they listened with considerable interest and politeness. | 0:47:35 | 0:47:41 | |
-And then? -And then nothing. | 0:47:41 | 0:47:45 | |
So the minutes of the meeting were written up and it would say, | 0:47:45 | 0:47:49 | |
"Professor Capewell gave a presentation on national interventions, | 0:47:49 | 0:47:54 | |
"and material will be used in the final report," | 0:47:54 | 0:47:58 | |
and then we would move on to something else. | 0:47:58 | 0:48:01 | |
So none of the tricky stuff was ever challenged or contradicted. | 0:48:01 | 0:48:06 | |
What did they say were their objectives? What was their position? | 0:48:06 | 0:48:11 | |
Instead of looking at effective things like regulation, | 0:48:11 | 0:48:14 | |
taxation, we were discussing what sort of pretty package | 0:48:14 | 0:48:19 | |
should we have here to say it is the responsibility of individuals | 0:48:19 | 0:48:23 | |
if they get fat and, in particular, the government has no duty of care. | 0:48:23 | 0:48:29 | |
In terms of Andrew Lansley, where did he lie? | 0:48:29 | 0:48:33 | |
Did he lie on the side of the food companies or the scientists? | 0:48:33 | 0:48:38 | |
It was very clear from his behaviour before, | 0:48:39 | 0:48:43 | |
during and particularly afterwards, that his interests | 0:48:43 | 0:48:46 | |
and the interests of the industry were in complete agreement. | 0:48:46 | 0:48:50 | |
Simon, what is wrong, in principal, | 0:48:50 | 0:48:53 | |
with the idea of consulting with the food industry? | 0:48:53 | 0:48:56 | |
The risk here is conflict of interest. | 0:48:56 | 0:48:59 | |
Apparently, when it comes to the food industry, | 0:48:59 | 0:49:03 | |
who are producing masses of calories that make children obese or diabetic | 0:49:03 | 0:49:08 | |
or they conceal vast amounts of salt or trans fats in the food which make people sick or kill them, | 0:49:08 | 0:49:15 | |
for some reason that principle is completely ignored. | 0:49:15 | 0:49:20 | |
The conflict of interest is outrageous. | 0:49:20 | 0:49:25 | |
Putting the food industry at the policy table | 0:49:25 | 0:49:28 | |
is like putting Dracula in charge of the blood bank. | 0:49:28 | 0:49:32 | |
Instead of saying the food industry is part of the problem, | 0:49:32 | 0:49:37 | |
they actually come in and say, "From your shareholder perspective, | 0:49:37 | 0:49:42 | |
"would you like to suggest how we take forward food policy in this country?" | 0:49:42 | 0:49:47 | |
It's insane. | 0:49:47 | 0:49:49 | |
What Simon saw first-hand was the government-in-waiting's relationship with the food industry. | 0:49:49 | 0:49:54 | |
He was there, he was in the room. | 0:49:54 | 0:49:56 | |
What he said was that that relationship was too close | 0:49:56 | 0:50:00 | |
and that the science had been left out of the picture. | 0:50:00 | 0:50:03 | |
This is something we have seen again and again with the food industry - | 0:50:03 | 0:50:07 | |
that they have one priority, and that is making money. | 0:50:07 | 0:50:10 | |
In May 2010, the coalition government entered office, | 0:50:12 | 0:50:16 | |
and Andrew Lansley was now the Secretary of State for Health. | 0:50:16 | 0:50:19 | |
Within a year, the new government set out its strategy to fight obesity. | 0:50:20 | 0:50:24 | |
It was called the Public Health Responsibility Deal, | 0:50:28 | 0:50:32 | |
and invited the industry to make voluntary pledges. | 0:50:32 | 0:50:34 | |
There was to be no regulation, and many companies signed up. | 0:50:34 | 0:50:39 | |
But crucially, food companies could choose | 0:50:41 | 0:50:43 | |
what they wanted to do in terms of calorie reduction. | 0:50:43 | 0:50:46 | |
The only actual target was to help the nation as a whole | 0:50:49 | 0:50:53 | |
to reduce its calorie intake by five billion a day by the year 2020. | 0:50:53 | 0:50:59 | |
MP Valerie Vaz sits on the Commons Health Select Committee, | 0:51:02 | 0:51:06 | |
which has declared itself unconvinced | 0:51:06 | 0:51:08 | |
that the Responsibility Deal could tackle obesity. | 0:51:08 | 0:51:11 | |
In March, there was a pledge made to reduce the nation's calorie intake by five billion calories. | 0:51:11 | 0:51:18 | |
Would do you think about that pledge? | 0:51:18 | 0:51:20 | |
We need something much more specific, much more measurable. | 0:51:20 | 0:51:24 | |
Something that you can look at in a few years' time | 0:51:24 | 0:51:27 | |
and say this is working or this isn't. | 0:51:27 | 0:51:30 | |
Five billion is a very large, vague figure amongst the whole population. | 0:51:30 | 0:51:35 | |
It's meaningless. | 0:51:35 | 0:51:36 | |
No-one wants something specific. | 0:51:36 | 0:51:38 | |
The government don't want it, the food industry don't want it. | 0:51:38 | 0:51:41 | |
The whole point is that it needs to be vague for it to be something | 0:51:41 | 0:51:44 | |
that everyone can sign up to. | 0:51:44 | 0:51:47 | |
It needs to be vague, but it won't be effective. | 0:51:47 | 0:51:50 | |
There will be absolutely no result at the end of this. | 0:51:50 | 0:51:52 | |
We will be sitting here in five years' time | 0:51:52 | 0:51:54 | |
saying there is a problem with obesity, and nothing will have changed. | 0:51:54 | 0:51:58 | |
How are they actually going to review this pledge? | 0:51:58 | 0:52:01 | |
I was asking him how this was going to work. | 0:52:01 | 0:52:04 | |
How was he going to measure the success or otherwise of it? | 0:52:04 | 0:52:09 | |
Only recently he said would there be an evaluation. | 0:52:09 | 0:52:11 | |
He set aside £1 million. | 0:52:11 | 0:52:13 | |
But it is not clear exactly what the terms of reference of that review is. | 0:52:13 | 0:52:17 | |
Is it going to be a review of what the industry pledged in the first place? | 0:52:17 | 0:52:22 | |
Is it going to be a review of the outcomes? It is absolutely not clear. | 0:52:22 | 0:52:25 | |
So I am looking forward to hearing exactly what this review is about. | 0:52:25 | 0:52:29 | |
Do you not think that they have to be made to do something? | 0:52:29 | 0:52:32 | |
If you don't regulate what is going into food, | 0:52:32 | 0:52:34 | |
if you don't regulate the way the industry deals with something, | 0:52:34 | 0:52:38 | |
then you will get these diseases, you will get people cutting corners | 0:52:38 | 0:52:42 | |
and you will get a much more unhealthy society. | 0:52:42 | 0:52:46 | |
Everyone I have met has told me that regulation is the way forward | 0:52:53 | 0:52:57 | |
to stop the obesity epidemic. | 0:52:57 | 0:52:59 | |
So why doesn't the government agree? | 0:52:59 | 0:53:01 | |
Public health minister Anne Milton | 0:53:03 | 0:53:06 | |
is in charge of the government's policy on obesity. | 0:53:06 | 0:53:08 | |
Would you agree that we are in an obesity crisis? | 0:53:10 | 0:53:13 | |
I am not very fond of words like obesity crisis | 0:53:13 | 0:53:16 | |
and obesity epidemic, because somehow it takes on a life of its own. | 0:53:16 | 0:53:21 | |
It's something to do with someone else, it is not to do with me, | 0:53:21 | 0:53:24 | |
me, the government, me, an individual, me, the food industry. | 0:53:24 | 0:53:28 | |
Actually, we've all got a part to play. | 0:53:28 | 0:53:30 | |
You see, I'd love to believe that the world was like that, | 0:53:30 | 0:53:33 | |
but unfortunately, what history has taught us | 0:53:33 | 0:53:37 | |
is that time and time again the food industry has put the onus on the individual, | 0:53:37 | 0:53:42 | |
because it takes the spotlight off them. | 0:53:42 | 0:53:44 | |
When you think of obesity, | 0:53:44 | 0:53:46 | |
everyone would like to think that it is someone else's problem. | 0:53:46 | 0:53:49 | |
So you're right in a way. | 0:53:49 | 0:53:51 | |
The food industry say, "We just sell the food, it is up to an individual what they buy to eat." | 0:53:51 | 0:53:55 | |
The government find this quite difficult | 0:53:55 | 0:53:57 | |
because you've got to navigate your way through all the different factors. | 0:53:57 | 0:54:02 | |
Actually, what you have to do is be very mature and grown-up. | 0:54:02 | 0:54:04 | |
The problem with these voluntary things is that there are so tremendously vague. | 0:54:04 | 0:54:08 | |
Five billion calories by 2020, | 0:54:08 | 0:54:11 | |
and each year you just kind of find out maybe along the way how they are doing. | 0:54:11 | 0:54:15 | |
The key issue here, according to all the scientists, is calories. | 0:54:15 | 0:54:20 | |
The sheer amount of calories we're taking in. | 0:54:20 | 0:54:23 | |
On that issue, you are leaving it vague. | 0:54:23 | 0:54:25 | |
We're certainly not leaving it vague, but are being realistic. | 0:54:25 | 0:54:30 | |
The end point in this is what people put in their mouths. | 0:54:30 | 0:54:35 | |
But we've got to take a very broad approach to this. | 0:54:35 | 0:54:39 | |
It is naive to think that actually, there is one tool that will solve this problem. | 0:54:39 | 0:54:45 | |
It has always been the food industry being in partnership with the government | 0:54:45 | 0:54:49 | |
and deciding pretty much for themselves what the goal will be. | 0:54:49 | 0:54:53 | |
What's quite interesting about the food and retail industry | 0:54:53 | 0:54:57 | |
is they know quite a lot about people's behaviour. | 0:54:57 | 0:55:00 | |
They use it to their advantage to sell their products. | 0:55:00 | 0:55:03 | |
We have to work with them to try and encourage them. | 0:55:03 | 0:55:06 | |
They want to make a profit. | 0:55:06 | 0:55:07 | |
If they can make a profit selling apples | 0:55:07 | 0:55:09 | |
instead of chocolate bars, then that is great by me. | 0:55:09 | 0:55:11 | |
So when would you legislate? | 0:55:11 | 0:55:14 | |
What would make it possible for you to legislate against the food industry? | 0:55:14 | 0:55:19 | |
You can't legislate your way out of this. Everybody's got a part to play. | 0:55:19 | 0:55:24 | |
Sorry, why can't you legislate your way out of this? | 0:55:24 | 0:55:27 | |
It would be lovely to think that that just works. It doesn't just work. | 0:55:27 | 0:55:31 | |
What we have to do is change people's behaviour. | 0:55:31 | 0:55:34 | |
Fundamental to this is changing people's behaviour. | 0:55:34 | 0:55:39 | |
Talking about people changing their behaviour | 0:55:39 | 0:55:43 | |
is putting the onus on us, the public. | 0:55:43 | 0:55:46 | |
Why are you so scared of the food industry? | 0:55:46 | 0:55:49 | |
Why are governments, not just your government, | 0:55:49 | 0:55:53 | |
so scared of bringing in legislation to deal with the food industry? | 0:55:53 | 0:55:58 | |
Can we do a minute of myth-busting here? | 0:55:58 | 0:56:02 | |
First of all, the food industry does not dictate government policy. | 0:56:02 | 0:56:06 | |
Secondly, the government is not scared of the food industry. | 0:56:06 | 0:56:09 | |
Thirdly, we will do what works. | 0:56:09 | 0:56:13 | |
And what I do know, and anybody out there watching this programme knows, | 0:56:13 | 0:56:17 | |
is that there is not one tool that will fix this. | 0:56:17 | 0:56:20 | |
We will legislate, if necessary. | 0:56:20 | 0:56:22 | |
We have got voluntary agreements at the moment. | 0:56:22 | 0:56:24 | |
Those will be independently evaluated. | 0:56:24 | 0:56:26 | |
If it is not working, it is not working, and we will have to do something else, | 0:56:26 | 0:56:29 | |
and the food industry is very clear on that. | 0:56:29 | 0:56:32 | |
But scared of the industry I am not. | 0:56:32 | 0:56:33 | |
The minister couldn't be pinned down | 0:56:34 | 0:56:37 | |
to when they would actually bring in legislation. | 0:56:37 | 0:56:39 | |
So the question is, when will the critical moment come? | 0:56:39 | 0:56:43 | |
In my opinion, there will be a tipping point, and that will be | 0:56:43 | 0:56:46 | |
when the cost to the NHS of the obesity crisis | 0:56:46 | 0:56:49 | |
is greater than the revenue they receive from the food industry. | 0:56:49 | 0:56:54 | |
I have come to Leicester to see a painting of Britain's fattest man. | 0:56:56 | 0:57:00 | |
Not in 2012, but 200 years ago. | 0:57:00 | 0:57:03 | |
This is Daniel Lambert in 1806. | 0:57:05 | 0:57:08 | |
He weighed over 50 stone and was considered a freak of nature, | 0:57:08 | 0:57:12 | |
charging people a shilling to see him | 0:57:12 | 0:57:14 | |
and becoming rich on the proceeds. | 0:57:14 | 0:57:16 | |
Now the money made from obesity is made by the food industry | 0:57:16 | 0:57:21 | |
selling us food that they claim is healthy | 0:57:21 | 0:57:24 | |
but is actually making us fat, | 0:57:24 | 0:57:25 | |
with successive governments letting them do it. | 0:57:25 | 0:57:29 | |
In this series I have gone behind the obesity crisis | 0:57:29 | 0:57:33 | |
to reveal the men who made us fat, | 0:57:33 | 0:57:35 | |
who changed the very nature of what we eat, super-sized everything | 0:57:35 | 0:57:39 | |
and, in so doing, super-sized us. | 0:57:39 | 0:57:42 | |
But the greatest mistake was to believe it was solely our fault. | 0:57:42 | 0:57:47 | |
It wasn't. | 0:57:47 | 0:57:48 | |
It was also the men making decisions behind closed doors | 0:57:48 | 0:57:52 | |
who changed the shape of a nation without us even realising it. | 0:57:52 | 0:57:56 | |
Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd | 0:58:18 | 0:58:21 |