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criminal organisation. And now, The Bottom Line with Evan | :00:00. | :00:12. | |
Davis. When the world economy is booming, | :00:13. | :00:14. | |
corporate bosses love nothing more than take each other's companies | :00:15. | :00:16. | |
over. Mergers and acquisitions stall. Many of these are a waste of | :00:17. | :00:22. | |
effort and money. When the badges come, the dealmaking culture fades. | :00:23. | :00:28. | |
We are in a low period at the moment. With signs of things picking | :00:29. | :00:32. | |
up, what better time to take stock of takeovers? Each week, influential | :00:33. | :00:40. | |
business leaders gather in London for the BBC Radio 4 programme the | :00:41. | :00:41. | |
bottomline. Takeovers, mergers and acquisitions. | :00:42. | :01:02. | |
I have three people from the world of finance industry to take as the | :01:03. | :01:05. | |
result and confessed their own mistakes. First of all, Sir George | :01:06. | :01:11. | |
Buckley, former chief executive of the 3M group in the US. Soon to be | :01:12. | :01:17. | |
head of a British engineering group. Also with us is the chairman of BT, | :01:18. | :01:24. | |
the deputy chairman of Barclays bank. And Juergen Maier, who runs | :01:25. | :01:30. | |
Siemens in the UK and Ireland. They thought would get you to talk me | :01:31. | :01:36. | |
through a specific takeover you have been involved in, tell me some of | :01:37. | :01:41. | |
the lessons you true from it. The essence of the deal is to try to | :01:42. | :01:45. | |
make money. We always like to hear that message. There is a return | :01:46. | :01:50. | |
calculation always make. You are investing money to return money. The | :01:51. | :01:54. | |
second thing you are trying to do is gain some relative competitive | :01:55. | :01:59. | |
advantage. It might be entry into market, getting a brand, getting new | :02:00. | :02:03. | |
methods of distribution and technology. One example is the | :02:04. | :02:10. | |
merger of Stanley and Black Decker. It was a wonderful merging | :02:11. | :02:16. | |
together of a handful company and a powerful company. Craftsmen in the | :02:17. | :02:20. | |
industry use both. It was a wonderful way to leveraged the | :02:21. | :02:25. | |
market knowledge and have a bigger company that was more defensible. | :02:26. | :02:34. | |
Did it work? Has worked superbly. So you are looking for the two plus two | :02:35. | :02:39. | |
equals five formula. The extra one was the fact that you are | :02:40. | :02:44. | |
distributing to the same places, so you had two distribution networks | :02:45. | :02:47. | |
that it could now make one. You get a bigger seat at the table, Tory | :02:48. | :02:52. | |
seat of the table were you did not have formally. `` or a seat. So you | :02:53. | :02:59. | |
can have more influence with the customer. That is a good one. Mike. | :03:00. | :03:06. | |
One that is quite recent and interesting involved the complete | :03:07. | :03:11. | |
transformation of the company. So far it is doing well. It was a | :03:12. | :03:18. | |
family publishing business in the US. It was in that area of media. It | :03:19. | :03:28. | |
was something called SNP. `` S and P. In the past three years it has | :03:29. | :03:34. | |
with a complete transformation of the company. It has sold its | :03:35. | :03:39. | |
publishing businesses. The acquisition of other indices | :03:40. | :03:46. | |
businesses. It will one day be a case study for Harvard Business | :03:47. | :03:50. | |
School. Very few companies transform themselves from one activity to | :03:51. | :03:54. | |
another. It takes courage to do it. You've got adjust culturally. You | :03:55. | :04:01. | |
also realise in doing that that you get more focused on what is becoming | :04:02. | :04:06. | |
your core business. That is quite a transformation story. He will not | :04:07. | :04:11. | |
responsible for the takeovers, you are on the British and of it. You do | :04:12. | :04:20. | |
make some decisions. Absolutely. Very often a large takeovers in | :04:21. | :04:26. | |
which there are British entities they have to integrate. The example | :04:27. | :04:33. | |
I will use is a British organisation. It is very small. | :04:34. | :04:40. | |
Sometimes it is interesting why a large corporation should take over a | :04:41. | :04:43. | |
small one. This company was in the 70 people. It is a beautiful company | :04:44. | :04:47. | |
because they make manufacturing software, improving the way in which | :04:48. | :04:53. | |
manufacturing companies scheduled that production. We have a massive | :04:54. | :04:59. | |
ambition to be much Jong in this area. `` much stronger in this area. | :05:00. | :05:07. | |
We cannot write this software fastener. We are looking out for | :05:08. | :05:12. | |
these companies. He was a beautiful company. They already have 4500 | :05:13. | :05:19. | |
applications in companies over the world. For us it was a fantastic | :05:20. | :05:23. | |
acquisition. We have to ask how you get the two plus two equals five out | :05:24. | :05:27. | |
of this. You have a good company, Siemens is a good company, you join | :05:28. | :05:33. | |
them together. What are you getting it adds to the value of the good | :05:34. | :05:38. | |
company? We already have a whole host of other software suites. What | :05:39. | :05:44. | |
we can do is now take this better software, integrated with other bits | :05:45. | :05:47. | |
of software we have got and create even more value for manufacturing | :05:48. | :05:56. | |
customers. This small company was getting to a point where it was | :05:57. | :05:58. | |
struggling to get further and bigger market access will stop with our | :05:59. | :06:04. | |
massive sales organisations, our contacts into manufacturing, we can | :06:05. | :06:12. | |
help leveraged a lot more sales. What you also get it if its speed. | :06:13. | :06:15. | |
You can bring the benefits you would get forward. We have had three | :06:16. | :06:23. | |
interesting example. They have all raised different reasons. Look | :06:24. | :06:28. | |
through a list of all the motivations for mergers. Finance, | :06:29. | :06:34. | |
access to distribution, access to a foreign entity, maybe moving into | :06:35. | :06:44. | |
China, media technology. A lot can be refined to what has just been | :06:45. | :06:49. | |
said. Innovation, big companies are less good at innovation and small | :06:50. | :06:52. | |
companies. You can bring in innovation. There is no good reason | :06:53. | :07:00. | |
Lisicki news innovation that unless you can now use the innovation. Also | :07:01. | :07:06. | |
you can have access to people with a particular methodology of research | :07:07. | :07:13. | |
that is important. In other companies, particularly in the US | :07:14. | :07:19. | |
had unique technological advances. It was cheaper to buy them then | :07:20. | :07:24. | |
develop yourself. The event was to take it on, institutionalise it and | :07:25. | :07:33. | |
use it. The risk is that if you're not careful, you institutionalise | :07:34. | :07:42. | |
the people, rather than the product. A whitespace, a technological | :07:43. | :07:49. | |
whitespace. For Siemens the red? Clear strategic ones. One is | :07:50. | :07:56. | |
innovation. We have 30,000 people doing RNs di everyday. `` R and D. | :07:57. | :08:11. | |
We often look for small start`up companies in innovative areas that | :08:12. | :08:16. | |
we can join up with. Maybe a new technology, or something where we | :08:17. | :08:19. | |
can combine technologies. The other key area is market access. We may | :08:20. | :08:24. | |
have the technology, we think you will have a long time to market | :08:25. | :08:28. | |
access. So you want to get into a foreign country. It is a judgement | :08:29. | :08:34. | |
to make. Sometimes you say, we take this 10`year journey or a we have a | :08:35. | :08:38. | |
great company with the market access. There is opportunity to buy, | :08:39. | :08:43. | |
which is not always the case. There are often failing companies. They | :08:44. | :08:50. | |
need to find a direction. Perhaps they can be stripped down, perhaps | :08:51. | :08:56. | |
closed. There is a role for takeovers in those situations. It | :08:57. | :09:02. | |
would be something very unusual for us to do. In those cases, the rainy | :09:03. | :09:07. | |
weather given transformative value company is that you have some | :09:08. | :09:10. | |
synergies where you can join them up and make them profitable. For | :09:11. | :09:14. | |
organisations that Siemens that is expensive. Usually that is more | :09:15. | :09:18. | |
where private equity companies coming. They might then sell on to | :09:19. | :09:24. | |
companies like our companies. Even in the largest companies, you always | :09:25. | :09:31. | |
have limited resources. Whether you are 3M, Siemens, you have limited | :09:32. | :09:37. | |
resources. Your general philosophy is that you are better at a plane is | :09:38. | :09:45. | |
limited philosophy is `` resources to fixing good companies and bad | :09:46. | :09:53. | |
ones. Unless it is a special deal, we would shy away. They are often | :09:54. | :09:58. | |
cheeky get. They may have one gem that you want. You have got to be | :09:59. | :10:06. | |
careful you do with it. There is rubbish, and then there is rubbish. | :10:07. | :10:11. | |
There is no such thing as a cheap acquisition. If it is cheap to buy, | :10:12. | :10:15. | |
he had to invest hugely to make it work. We have listened to your | :10:16. | :10:22. | |
explanations. We have a comprehends it less. Good reasons for mergers. | :10:23. | :10:27. | |
We know a lot of them do not come out as planned. Give me some of the | :10:28. | :10:33. | |
bad reasons for takeovers. Ego. Personally I think the commendation | :10:34. | :10:39. | |
of big egos and too much cash leads to huge pressure from shareholders, | :10:40. | :10:43. | |
particularly now, to give the cashback. Use it or give it back | :10:44. | :10:53. | |
through special dividends. If you have it, give it to the | :10:54. | :10:56. | |
shareholders. It is what is happening. The boss wants to do the | :10:57. | :11:01. | |
deal, investment bankers come in and what to do a deal. If you are not | :11:02. | :11:06. | |
careful, you are on a rollercoaster. History shows there are a few of | :11:07. | :11:10. | |
those. They are in the minority, but it does happen. It is eager where | :11:11. | :11:15. | |
emotion is a bigger driver than looking at the value being | :11:16. | :11:19. | |
generated. Sometimes size gets people. We need to be bigger, how | :11:20. | :11:30. | |
large are we? It must be good. The companies are good, so we must make | :11:31. | :11:35. | |
ourselves big. The ones where the risk grows is when you start and | :11:36. | :11:39. | |
acquisitions away from your core. Transformation as resistance `` | :11:40. | :11:48. | |
acquisitions, we say, I do not like this space and they want to move | :11:49. | :11:51. | |
into another one. The matter how much you try to convince herself, | :11:52. | :11:56. | |
you do not know the customers, the market, the technology. It is a | :11:57. | :12:03. | |
risky pathway. It is an example of a bad one. AOL Time Warner. It was | :12:04. | :12:14. | |
announced in 2000. It was a three and $60 billion `` three page and | :12:15. | :12:24. | |
$60 billion. It was gently dismantled ten years later at less | :12:25. | :12:31. | |
than a quarter of the value. What was the problem with that one? They | :12:32. | :12:36. | |
did not understand the business is that they were in. When the future | :12:37. | :12:42. | |
is less certain, I do not mean uncertain, you have a big dream, at | :12:43. | :12:47. | |
the idea, you have to remember there is a big difference between dream | :12:48. | :12:52. | |
and fantasy. Sometimes it is a fantasy, rather than a dream. As a | :12:53. | :12:56. | |
consequence, these things sometimes go wrong. Especially in these cases | :12:57. | :13:03. | |
when you are mixing the old traditional companies with a seven | :13:04. | :13:09. | |
metre distribution with a new thing where neither party knows much about | :13:10. | :13:13. | |
the other. I can give you a bad example from Siemens. During the | :13:14. | :13:18. | |
worst we lost most of our assets, something would not talk about much | :13:19. | :13:25. | |
and Siemens. Most of our assets were taken by the government and given | :13:26. | :13:31. | |
away. When we came back into Britain with innovation of products, we were | :13:32. | :13:35. | |
desperate to get back what we originally had. One of those was, we | :13:36. | :13:40. | |
wanted to buy back a brand. Everywhere else in the world it | :13:41. | :13:45. | |
belongs to Siemens. In the UK it belongs to GEC. We were desperate to | :13:46. | :13:51. | |
get that brand. It was our main focus. Alongside of it, we picked up | :13:52. | :14:00. | |
all this other stuff that was an absolute nightmare to integrate. I | :14:01. | :14:06. | |
spent about three years closing down a couple of the factories because it | :14:07. | :14:10. | |
did not work. The other thing was, I have her chief executives say that | :14:11. | :14:15. | |
the only thing we can use is to take our overvalued stock and buy theirs. | :14:16. | :14:24. | |
That is a disaster. Then you are losing something really valuable. A | :14:25. | :14:31. | |
bad one is the acquisition of BMW buying another company. This is BMW, | :14:32. | :14:39. | |
that was a small volume luxury German Carmody Thatcher are trying | :14:40. | :14:45. | |
to buy into a Walkman to market. That did not work. Again, what it | :14:46. | :14:51. | |
did do, there were still a silver lining to the cloud and that it got | :14:52. | :15:00. | |
many. BMW had planned on a small entry`level car, and got the brand | :15:01. | :15:03. | |
along with it. Even though they wasted some money on the rover Peter | :15:04. | :15:10. | |
the acquisition, it turned out that the many brought their plans for | :15:11. | :15:17. | |
Wigan by about seven years. Sometimes in a real terrible | :15:18. | :15:25. | |
situation, there is a silver lining. Let's go into some of the mechanics | :15:26. | :15:28. | |
of this. Most people have not been in the `` involved in a merger at | :15:29. | :15:33. | |
the top level. Take us through the process, from inception to | :15:34. | :15:37. | |
completion. It is a bit more than buying a house. How much due | :15:38. | :15:46. | |
diligence do you do? The classic way that these things happen, investment | :15:47. | :15:50. | |
bankers come along, they tried to market it to you. Usually when I | :15:51. | :15:56. | |
received those visits, I go hide in the cupboard. They are the last kind | :15:57. | :15:59. | |
of things that I want to be involved in. My approach is to build | :16:00. | :16:04. | |
relationships with those companies in segments. It may take several | :16:05. | :16:09. | |
years. You may have a partnership of some kind early on, sharing | :16:10. | :16:13. | |
technology, maybe they are eight supplier, or a competitor, but you | :16:14. | :16:17. | |
supply a bit to them. The best targets for me, founder companies, | :16:18. | :16:27. | |
where there is no successor, we can beat the solution to their problem. | :16:28. | :16:32. | |
Every owner worth its salt, a bit like living down, you want to make | :16:33. | :16:35. | |
sure that your dog goes to a good family. We find in those cases, we | :16:36. | :16:41. | |
have a good chance of making a successful acquisition, because we | :16:42. | :16:44. | |
are not in an auction and the price is more modest. Is it going to be | :16:45. | :16:50. | |
contested, is going to be by agreement? Is it public company? You | :16:51. | :16:58. | |
have to have equal access, or is it a private company? The process can | :16:59. | :17:03. | |
vary enormously. You could have significant amount of commercial and | :17:04. | :17:07. | |
financial due diligence, some you can with a public company, some you | :17:08. | :17:15. | |
cannot, also on timeframes. An opportunistic bid that had to be | :17:16. | :17:18. | |
done at very fast notice, which did fulfil a strategic objective. The | :17:19. | :17:27. | |
Barclays acquisition of Bateman. `` laymen. It fulfilled a strategic | :17:28. | :17:32. | |
goal. It came after the collapse of linens. By Monday, the guys were in. | :17:33. | :17:45. | |
The bank... Whether the whole thing could be saved, but it could not be. | :17:46. | :17:50. | |
But it was opportunistic. You had to go fast with the key things. Do the | :17:51. | :17:53. | |
deal very quickly to keep the resources. The compaction of time. | :17:54. | :18:02. | |
Did it work? I do not think it would be right but the payback period | :18:03. | :18:05. | |
could be measured in much less than years. Let's suppose you have the | :18:06. | :18:11. | |
best of intentions, good strategic intentions, long`term ones, you have | :18:12. | :18:17. | |
done your due diligence, you have butted up the company that you are | :18:18. | :18:21. | |
buying, you have persuaded them it is a good team, they are or opt for | :18:22. | :18:27. | |
it, now you have sealed the deal. It is where the trouble begins. The | :18:28. | :18:36. | |
real key to success is execution. Recently, BT did a post acquisition | :18:37. | :18:40. | |
review of what had been sent to the board and what actually happened. | :18:41. | :18:47. | |
There were some brilliant products in their, technologies that we never | :18:48. | :18:52. | |
properly expanded. We do not understand the people, the elements | :18:53. | :18:55. | |
of smaller companies with good products. We found that some things | :18:56. | :18:59. | |
were better than we thought, but not for the reasons that we thought. It | :19:00. | :19:05. | |
epitomised the things that I have seen for many years. If you do not | :19:06. | :19:08. | |
understand how you are going to integrate the company and its | :19:09. | :19:12. | |
products, its people, particularly when you are big and they are small, | :19:13. | :19:17. | |
in a way that motivates them, so they do not walk out the door, so | :19:18. | :19:21. | |
you can take the technology and use it around the whole organisation, | :19:22. | :19:26. | |
these are challenges which you have. The one thing you do not know until | :19:27. | :19:31. | |
you have started, the cultural aspects. A company like Siemens, you | :19:32. | :19:36. | |
cannot take a small company and throw what can be quite complicated | :19:37. | :19:40. | |
systems onto them. You will stifle them. Listening to you talking about | :19:41. | :19:50. | |
the motives for takeovers, the execution of takeovers, it does | :19:51. | :19:57. | |
sound like... And this is a business point which is not original, the | :19:58. | :20:02. | |
human factors are absolutely key. Everything is about human factors. | :20:03. | :20:09. | |
It is 5% manufacturing plants and synergies, it is all about the | :20:10. | :20:13. | |
motives, they are driven by human beings who have egos and fighting | :20:14. | :20:16. | |
battles which may be relevant or irrelevant. There is a lot of gut | :20:17. | :20:23. | |
feeling on the end of it. It is not an individual one. At the end, a | :20:24. | :20:28. | |
team of you will get together with different experiences. The Finance | :20:29. | :20:33. | |
people were put their advice in, but in the end, it does come down to a | :20:34. | :20:40. | |
gut feeling. Many people think there is an intuition that people have | :20:41. | :20:44. | |
about certain issues. It tells you about something about people at the | :20:45. | :20:48. | |
company. Their run things that you can never programme for. It is not | :20:49. | :20:53. | |
good to be stupid, but it is not enough to be clever. You need to | :20:54. | :20:59. | |
have a bit of luck. Technologies suddenly get taken over that you did | :21:00. | :21:03. | |
not expect. Markets collapse for reasons that you could not have | :21:04. | :21:09. | |
foreseen. That is business. That is boosting king. `` risk taking. There | :21:10. | :21:18. | |
is an interesting piece in Robinson Crusoe, he is asking himself, why do | :21:19. | :21:29. | |
C think something is logically, it goes wrong, but when he relies on | :21:30. | :21:35. | |
his gut instinct, it goes right. There is no such thing as gut. It is | :21:36. | :21:40. | |
a collection of experiences, observations, packaged in a single | :21:41. | :21:46. | |
kind of conglomerate block. That is what you are relying on. It is not | :21:47. | :21:50. | |
guesswork. It is the sum of experience. There is the emotional | :21:51. | :21:55. | |
factor that you cannot get away from. Would you all agree that | :21:56. | :22:02. | |
executives, corporate executives, should not view business as a | :22:03. | :22:06. | |
process in dealmaking, buying and selling, it is about creation. Isn't | :22:07. | :22:15. | |
it exhilarating? It is. We could leave people with the impression | :22:16. | :22:20. | |
that it is all about deals. At a company like Siemens, and innovation | :22:21. | :22:25. | |
company, if you are not innovating, that is 90% plus. We have 30,000 R | :22:26. | :22:31. | |
people. What we have been talking about is the 10% on top, which is | :22:32. | :22:35. | |
just something that we could not quite do ourselves. We are adding to | :22:36. | :22:40. | |
a portfolio. It cannot be the majority. Innovation is not only | :22:41. | :22:45. | |
about doing innovation, it is about Ding and adopting stop `` adopting. | :22:46. | :22:58. | |
There is no doubt that at some period, 80s and 90s, if things are | :22:59. | :23:02. | |
going bad, confuse everyone by buying a company. I think in the | :23:03. | :23:13. | |
end, in many respects, their run more companies to destroy value | :23:14. | :23:18. | |
through acquisitions. There should always be a buy Apple where sticker | :23:19. | :23:21. | |
on acquisitions. Thank you all, gentlemen. `` buyer beware. | :23:22. | :23:34. | |
I will be back with more guests next week. Don't forget that you can | :23:35. | :23:42. | |
download the show. Details on our website. You can always listen to it | :23:43. | :23:50. | |
on BBC Radio 4. We also like to get your emails. Drop us a line: | :23:51. | :23:55. |