Episode 5 The Bottom Line


Episode 5

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criminal organisation. And now, The Bottom Line with Evan

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Davis. When the world economy is booming,

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corporate bosses love nothing more than take each other's companies

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over. Mergers and acquisitions stall. Many of these are a waste of

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effort and money. When the badges come, the dealmaking culture fades.

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We are in a low period at the moment. With signs of things picking

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up, what better time to take stock of takeovers? Each week, influential

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business leaders gather in London for the BBC Radio 4 programme the

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bottomline. Takeovers, mergers and acquisitions.

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I have three people from the world of finance industry to take as the

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result and confessed their own mistakes. First of all, Sir George

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Buckley, former chief executive of the 3M group in the US. Soon to be

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head of a British engineering group. Also with us is the chairman of BT,

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the deputy chairman of Barclays bank. And Juergen Maier, who runs

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Siemens in the UK and Ireland. They thought would get you to talk me

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through a specific takeover you have been involved in, tell me some of

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the lessons you true from it. The essence of the deal is to try to

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make money. We always like to hear that message. There is a return

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calculation always make. You are investing money to return money. The

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second thing you are trying to do is gain some relative competitive

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advantage. It might be entry into market, getting a brand, getting new

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methods of distribution and technology. One example is the

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merger of Stanley and Black Decker. It was a wonderful merging

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together of a handful company and a powerful company. Craftsmen in the

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industry use both. It was a wonderful way to leveraged the

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market knowledge and have a bigger company that was more defensible.

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Did it work? Has worked superbly. So you are looking for the two plus two

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equals five formula. The extra one was the fact that you are

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distributing to the same places, so you had two distribution networks

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that it could now make one. You get a bigger seat at the table, Tory

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seat of the table were you did not have formally. `` or a seat. So you

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can have more influence with the customer. That is a good one. Mike.

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One that is quite recent and interesting involved the complete

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transformation of the company. So far it is doing well. It was a

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family publishing business in the US. It was in that area of media. It

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was something called SNP. `` S and P. In the past three years it has

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with a complete transformation of the company. It has sold its

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publishing businesses. The acquisition of other indices

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businesses. It will one day be a case study for Harvard Business

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School. Very few companies transform themselves from one activity to

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another. It takes courage to do it. You've got adjust culturally. You

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also realise in doing that that you get more focused on what is becoming

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your core business. That is quite a transformation story. He will not

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responsible for the takeovers, you are on the British and of it. You do

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make some decisions. Absolutely. Very often a large takeovers in

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which there are British entities they have to integrate. The example

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I will use is a British organisation. It is very small.

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Sometimes it is interesting why a large corporation should take over a

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small one. This company was in the 70 people. It is a beautiful company

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because they make manufacturing software, improving the way in which

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manufacturing companies scheduled that production. We have a massive

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ambition to be much Jong in this area. `` much stronger in this area.

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We cannot write this software fastener. We are looking out for

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these companies. He was a beautiful company. They already have 4500

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applications in companies over the world. For us it was a fantastic

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acquisition. We have to ask how you get the two plus two equals five out

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of this. You have a good company, Siemens is a good company, you join

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them together. What are you getting it adds to the value of the good

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company? We already have a whole host of other software suites. What

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we can do is now take this better software, integrated with other bits

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of software we have got and create even more value for manufacturing

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customers. This small company was getting to a point where it was

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struggling to get further and bigger market access will stop with our

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massive sales organisations, our contacts into manufacturing, we can

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help leveraged a lot more sales. What you also get it if its speed.

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You can bring the benefits you would get forward. We have had three

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interesting example. They have all raised different reasons. Look

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through a list of all the motivations for mergers. Finance,

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access to distribution, access to a foreign entity, maybe moving into

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China, media technology. A lot can be refined to what has just been

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said. Innovation, big companies are less good at innovation and small

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companies. You can bring in innovation. There is no good reason

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Lisicki news innovation that unless you can now use the innovation. Also

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you can have access to people with a particular methodology of research

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that is important. In other companies, particularly in the US

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had unique technological advances. It was cheaper to buy them then

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develop yourself. The event was to take it on, institutionalise it and

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use it. The risk is that if you're not careful, you institutionalise

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the people, rather than the product. A whitespace, a technological

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whitespace. For Siemens the red? Clear strategic ones. One is

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innovation. We have 30,000 people doing RNs di everyday. `` R and D.

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We often look for small start`up companies in innovative areas that

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we can join up with. Maybe a new technology, or something where we

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can combine technologies. The other key area is market access. We may

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have the technology, we think you will have a long time to market

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access. So you want to get into a foreign country. It is a judgement

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to make. Sometimes you say, we take this 10`year journey or a we have a

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great company with the market access. There is opportunity to buy,

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which is not always the case. There are often failing companies. They

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need to find a direction. Perhaps they can be stripped down, perhaps

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closed. There is a role for takeovers in those situations. It

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would be something very unusual for us to do. In those cases, the rainy

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weather given transformative value company is that you have some

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synergies where you can join them up and make them profitable. For

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organisations that Siemens that is expensive. Usually that is more

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where private equity companies coming. They might then sell on to

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companies like our companies. Even in the largest companies, you always

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have limited resources. Whether you are 3M, Siemens, you have limited

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resources. Your general philosophy is that you are better at a plane is

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limited philosophy is `` resources to fixing good companies and bad

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ones. Unless it is a special deal, we would shy away. They are often

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cheeky get. They may have one gem that you want. You have got to be

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careful you do with it. There is rubbish, and then there is rubbish.

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There is no such thing as a cheap acquisition. If it is cheap to buy,

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he had to invest hugely to make it work. We have listened to your

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explanations. We have a comprehends it less. Good reasons for mergers.

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We know a lot of them do not come out as planned. Give me some of the

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bad reasons for takeovers. Ego. Personally I think the commendation

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of big egos and too much cash leads to huge pressure from shareholders,

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particularly now, to give the cashback. Use it or give it back

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through special dividends. If you have it, give it to the

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shareholders. It is what is happening. The boss wants to do the

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deal, investment bankers come in and what to do a deal. If you are not

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careful, you are on a rollercoaster. History shows there are a few of

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those. They are in the minority, but it does happen. It is eager where

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emotion is a bigger driver than looking at the value being

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generated. Sometimes size gets people. We need to be bigger, how

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large are we? It must be good. The companies are good, so we must make

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ourselves big. The ones where the risk grows is when you start and

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acquisitions away from your core. Transformation as resistance ``

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acquisitions, we say, I do not like this space and they want to move

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into another one. The matter how much you try to convince herself,

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you do not know the customers, the market, the technology. It is a

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risky pathway. It is an example of a bad one. AOL Time Warner. It was

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announced in 2000. It was a three and $60 billion `` three page and

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$60 billion. It was gently dismantled ten years later at less

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than a quarter of the value. What was the problem with that one? They

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did not understand the business is that they were in. When the future

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is less certain, I do not mean uncertain, you have a big dream, at

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the idea, you have to remember there is a big difference between dream

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and fantasy. Sometimes it is a fantasy, rather than a dream. As a

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consequence, these things sometimes go wrong. Especially in these cases

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when you are mixing the old traditional companies with a seven

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metre distribution with a new thing where neither party knows much about

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the other. I can give you a bad example from Siemens. During the

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worst we lost most of our assets, something would not talk about much

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and Siemens. Most of our assets were taken by the government and given

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away. When we came back into Britain with innovation of products, we were

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desperate to get back what we originally had. One of those was, we

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wanted to buy back a brand. Everywhere else in the world it

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belongs to Siemens. In the UK it belongs to GEC. We were desperate to

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get that brand. It was our main focus. Alongside of it, we picked up

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all this other stuff that was an absolute nightmare to integrate. I

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spent about three years closing down a couple of the factories because it

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did not work. The other thing was, I have her chief executives say that

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the only thing we can use is to take our overvalued stock and buy theirs.

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That is a disaster. Then you are losing something really valuable. A

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bad one is the acquisition of BMW buying another company. This is BMW,

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that was a small volume luxury German Carmody Thatcher are trying

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to buy into a Walkman to market. That did not work. Again, what it

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did do, there were still a silver lining to the cloud and that it got

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many. BMW had planned on a small entry`level car, and got the brand

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along with it. Even though they wasted some money on the rover Peter

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the acquisition, it turned out that the many brought their plans for

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Wigan by about seven years. Sometimes in a real terrible

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situation, there is a silver lining. Let's go into some of the mechanics

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of this. Most people have not been in the `` involved in a merger at

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the top level. Take us through the process, from inception to

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completion. It is a bit more than buying a house. How much due

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diligence do you do? The classic way that these things happen, investment

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bankers come along, they tried to market it to you. Usually when I

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received those visits, I go hide in the cupboard. They are the last kind

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of things that I want to be involved in. My approach is to build

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relationships with those companies in segments. It may take several

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years. You may have a partnership of some kind early on, sharing

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technology, maybe they are eight supplier, or a competitor, but you

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supply a bit to them. The best targets for me, founder companies,

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where there is no successor, we can beat the solution to their problem.

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Every owner worth its salt, a bit like living down, you want to make

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sure that your dog goes to a good family. We find in those cases, we

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have a good chance of making a successful acquisition, because we

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are not in an auction and the price is more modest. Is it going to be

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contested, is going to be by agreement? Is it public company? You

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have to have equal access, or is it a private company? The process can

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vary enormously. You could have significant amount of commercial and

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financial due diligence, some you can with a public company, some you

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cannot, also on timeframes. An opportunistic bid that had to be

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done at very fast notice, which did fulfil a strategic objective. The

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Barclays acquisition of Bateman. `` laymen. It fulfilled a strategic

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goal. It came after the collapse of linens. By Monday, the guys were in.

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The bank... Whether the whole thing could be saved, but it could not be.

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But it was opportunistic. You had to go fast with the key things. Do the

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deal very quickly to keep the resources. The compaction of time.

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Did it work? I do not think it would be right but the payback period

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could be measured in much less than years. Let's suppose you have the

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best of intentions, good strategic intentions, long`term ones, you have

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done your due diligence, you have butted up the company that you are

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buying, you have persuaded them it is a good team, they are or opt for

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it, now you have sealed the deal. It is where the trouble begins. The

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real key to success is execution. Recently, BT did a post acquisition

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review of what had been sent to the board and what actually happened.

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There were some brilliant products in their, technologies that we never

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properly expanded. We do not understand the people, the elements

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of smaller companies with good products. We found that some things

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were better than we thought, but not for the reasons that we thought. It

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epitomised the things that I have seen for many years. If you do not

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understand how you are going to integrate the company and its

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products, its people, particularly when you are big and they are small,

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in a way that motivates them, so they do not walk out the door, so

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you can take the technology and use it around the whole organisation,

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these are challenges which you have. The one thing you do not know until

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you have started, the cultural aspects. A company like Siemens, you

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cannot take a small company and throw what can be quite complicated

:19:37.:19:40.

systems onto them. You will stifle them. Listening to you talking about

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the motives for takeovers, the execution of takeovers, it does

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sound like... And this is a business point which is not original, the

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human factors are absolutely key. Everything is about human factors.

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It is 5% manufacturing plants and synergies, it is all about the

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motives, they are driven by human beings who have egos and fighting

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battles which may be relevant or irrelevant. There is a lot of gut

:20:17.:20:23.

feeling on the end of it. It is not an individual one. At the end, a

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team of you will get together with different experiences. The Finance

:20:29.:20:33.

people were put their advice in, but in the end, it does come down to a

:20:34.:20:40.

gut feeling. Many people think there is an intuition that people have

:20:41.:20:44.

about certain issues. It tells you about something about people at the

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company. Their run things that you can never programme for. It is not

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good to be stupid, but it is not enough to be clever. You need to

:20:54.:20:59.

have a bit of luck. Technologies suddenly get taken over that you did

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not expect. Markets collapse for reasons that you could not have

:21:04.:21:09.

foreseen. That is business. That is boosting king. `` risk taking. There

:21:10.:21:18.

is an interesting piece in Robinson Crusoe, he is asking himself, why do

:21:19.:21:29.

C think something is logically, it goes wrong, but when he relies on

:21:30.:21:35.

his gut instinct, it goes right. There is no such thing as gut. It is

:21:36.:21:40.

a collection of experiences, observations, packaged in a single

:21:41.:21:46.

kind of conglomerate block. That is what you are relying on. It is not

:21:47.:21:50.

guesswork. It is the sum of experience. There is the emotional

:21:51.:21:55.

factor that you cannot get away from. Would you all agree that

:21:56.:22:02.

executives, corporate executives, should not view business as a

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process in dealmaking, buying and selling, it is about creation. Isn't

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it exhilarating? It is. We could leave people with the impression

:22:16.:22:20.

that it is all about deals. At a company like Siemens, and innovation

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company, if you are not innovating, that is 90% plus. We have 30,000 R

:22:26.:22:31.

people. What we have been talking about is the 10% on top, which is

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just something that we could not quite do ourselves. We are adding to

:22:36.:22:40.

a portfolio. It cannot be the majority. Innovation is not only

:22:41.:22:45.

about doing innovation, it is about Ding and adopting stop `` adopting.

:22:46.:22:58.

There is no doubt that at some period, 80s and 90s, if things are

:22:59.:23:02.

going bad, confuse everyone by buying a company. I think in the

:23:03.:23:13.

end, in many respects, their run more companies to destroy value

:23:14.:23:18.

through acquisitions. There should always be a buy Apple where sticker

:23:19.:23:21.

on acquisitions. Thank you all, gentlemen. `` buyer beware.

:23:22.:23:34.

I will be back with more guests next week. Don't forget that you can

:23:35.:23:42.

download the show. Details on our website. You can always listen to it

:23:43.:23:50.

on BBC Radio 4. We also like to get your emails. Drop us a line:

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