
Browse content similar to Tony Blair. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
| Line | From | To | |
|---|---|---|---|
Specially chosen programmes from the BBC Archive. | 0:00:03 | 0:00:06 | |
For this collection, Sir Michael Parkinson has selected | 0:00:06 | 0:00:10 | |
BBC interviews with influential figures of the 20th century. | 0:00:10 | 0:00:13 | |
More programmes on this theme, and other BBC Four Collections, | 0:00:13 | 0:00:16 | |
are available on BBC iPlayer. | 0:00:16 | 0:00:19 | |
And now the news is that the Prime Minister is here. | 0:00:20 | 0:00:23 | |
- Good morning, Prime Minister. - Morning, David. | 0:00:23 | 0:00:26 | |
From the reports in all the papers today - this headline says, | 0:00:26 | 0:00:30 | |
"US gives Blix more time but edges closer to conflict" - | 0:00:30 | 0:00:33 | |
do I gather from this that we in Britain would agree with that, | 0:00:33 | 0:00:37 | |
and that we are prepared if the inspectors tomorrow say | 0:00:37 | 0:00:40 | |
they haven't had time to complete the job satisfactorily, | 0:00:40 | 0:00:43 | |
we would give them further time, whether weeks or months? | 0:00:43 | 0:00:46 | |
They've got to be given the time to do the job, | 0:00:46 | 0:00:49 | |
but it's important to define what the job is, | 0:00:49 | 0:00:51 | |
because this is where I think a lot of confusion comes in. | 0:00:51 | 0:00:53 | |
The job of the inspectors is to certify | 0:00:54 | 0:00:59 | |
whether Saddam is co-operating or not with the UN inspections regime. | 0:00:59 | 0:01:04 | |
And that duty to co-operate doesn't just mean that he has to give them | 0:01:04 | 0:01:08 | |
access to a particular site, | 0:01:08 | 0:01:10 | |
it means he's got to co-operate fully | 0:01:10 | 0:01:13 | |
in saying exactly what weapons material he has, | 0:01:13 | 0:01:16 | |
allowing the inspectors to inspect it, | 0:01:16 | 0:01:18 | |
monitor it then shut it down. | 0:01:18 | 0:01:20 | |
So we would give him extra time? | 0:01:20 | 0:01:22 | |
Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei? | 0:01:22 | 0:01:24 | |
We've gone down the UN route precisely because the inspectors have | 0:01:24 | 0:01:27 | |
got to be the means of trying to resolve this peacefully. | 0:01:27 | 0:01:31 | |
If the inspectors are able to their job, fine, | 0:01:31 | 0:01:34 | |
but if they're not able to do their job then we have to disarm | 0:01:34 | 0:01:37 | |
Saddam by force, and that's always been the choice. | 0:01:37 | 0:01:40 | |
But we would give them extra time, the inspectors, if they need it? | 0:01:40 | 0:01:43 | |
Space and time, time and space, you said? | 0:01:43 | 0:01:46 | |
Of course. I've always said the inspectors should have the time | 0:01:46 | 0:01:48 | |
to do their job, but what's important is that their job is not | 0:01:48 | 0:01:51 | |
to repeat what happened in the 1990s. | 0:01:51 | 0:01:53 | |
What happened in the 1990s is, in April '91, | 0:01:53 | 0:01:56 | |
when the first Resolution was passed, saying Saddam must disarm, | 0:01:56 | 0:02:00 | |
he was then supposed to give 15 days' notice of a declaration of | 0:02:00 | 0:02:05 | |
everything he had, and the inspectors were then to go in and shut it down. | 0:02:05 | 0:02:08 | |
Now, we've been almost 12 years waiting for him to do that. | 0:02:08 | 0:02:11 | |
So the time the inspectors need is not time to play | 0:02:11 | 0:02:14 | |
a game of hide-and-seek with Saddam, where they go in and try | 0:02:14 | 0:02:16 | |
and find the stuff, and he tries to conceal it. | 0:02:16 | 0:02:19 | |
The objective of the inspectors is on the basis of a full | 0:02:20 | 0:02:24 | |
and honest declaration by Saddam of what he has, | 0:02:24 | 0:02:26 | |
then to shut it down, and so the time they need is in order to certify | 0:02:26 | 0:02:30 | |
whether he's fully co-operating or not. | 0:02:30 | 0:02:33 | |
And they should have that time, | 0:02:33 | 0:02:34 | |
whether it's weeks or even if it's months? | 0:02:34 | 0:02:37 | |
I don't believe it'll take them weeks...months, rather, to find | 0:02:37 | 0:02:40 | |
out whether he's co-operating or not, but they should have whatever | 0:02:40 | 0:02:43 | |
time they need, and we've said that right from the very beginning. | 0:02:43 | 0:02:47 | |
One of the interesting things about this - | 0:02:47 | 0:02:49 | |
I heard your report earlier when your correspondent | 0:02:49 | 0:02:52 | |
was saying war is inevitable - war is not inevitable. | 0:02:52 | 0:02:56 | |
It depends on Saddam. | 0:02:56 | 0:02:57 | |
If he co-operates with the inspectors, | 0:02:57 | 0:03:00 | |
if he says how much material he's got, | 0:03:00 | 0:03:03 | |
if he co-operates fully with them in allowing them not just access | 0:03:03 | 0:03:07 | |
but telling them what material he has and allowing them | 0:03:07 | 0:03:10 | |
then to shut it down and make Iraq safe | 0:03:10 | 0:03:13 | |
and free of weapons of mass destruction - chemical, | 0:03:13 | 0:03:16 | |
biological, potentially nuclear - then the issue's over, | 0:03:16 | 0:03:18 | |
but he's not doing that at the moment. | 0:03:18 | 0:03:20 | |
That's very clear. | 0:03:20 | 0:03:22 | |
But I mean, the thing is that we were told, | 0:03:22 | 0:03:24 | |
we were given to understand that what these inspectors were | 0:03:24 | 0:03:27 | |
going to come up with was evidence of weapons of mass destruction | 0:03:27 | 0:03:31 | |
chemical, biological and nuclear. | 0:03:31 | 0:03:34 | |
Compared to that, | 0:03:34 | 0:03:36 | |
which obviously is a reason for war or military action, | 0:03:36 | 0:03:40 | |
these rather pale things, the non-compliance, the shells, | 0:03:40 | 0:03:46 | |
Blix's men sent on hide-and-seek missions, Iraqi scientists | 0:03:46 | 0:03:50 | |
not agreeing to an interview unless an Iraqi person was there, | 0:03:50 | 0:03:55 | |
that all sounds the reason for a stiff rebuke, not a war. | 0:03:55 | 0:04:02 | |
No. I mean, I profoundly disagree with this idea that somehow Saddam | 0:04:02 | 0:04:08 | |
refuses to co-operate, then that's OK. That's of a lesser order. | 0:04:08 | 0:04:12 | |
Look, what we know is that he has this material. | 0:04:12 | 0:04:16 | |
From what was left over in 1998, for example, | 0:04:16 | 0:04:19 | |
we know there's something like 350 tonnes of chemical warfare agent. | 0:04:19 | 0:04:25 | |
We know that there is something like 30,000 special munitions | 0:04:25 | 0:04:29 | |
for the delivery of chemical and biological weapons. | 0:04:29 | 0:04:32 | |
He hasn't even told us where those old leftovers from 1998 are. | 0:04:32 | 0:04:36 | |
Now, what we know Saddam is doing is that there's an elaborate | 0:04:36 | 0:04:41 | |
process, an infrastructure if you like, of concealment, | 0:04:41 | 0:04:44 | |
where he's putting the stuff out into different parts of the country, | 0:04:44 | 0:04:47 | |
concealing it, where he's saying, for example, | 0:04:47 | 0:04:50 | |
that the people that the inspectors want to interview, | 0:04:50 | 0:04:52 | |
because that's one of this duties, to allow people to be interviewed, | 0:04:52 | 0:04:56 | |
these people are being told by the Iraqi authorities | 0:04:56 | 0:04:58 | |
they can only come for interview with an Iraqi so-called minder | 0:04:58 | 0:05:02 | |
and only be interviewed in certain places, | 0:05:02 | 0:05:04 | |
and we know also, from intelligence, that these | 0:05:04 | 0:05:07 | |
people's families are being told that if they co-operate | 0:05:07 | 0:05:09 | |
and give any information at all, they'll be executed. | 0:05:09 | 0:05:12 | |
Now, if he fails to co-operate in being honest, and he is pursuing | 0:05:12 | 0:05:16 | |
a programme of concealment, that is every bit as much | 0:05:16 | 0:05:20 | |
a breach as finding, for example, a missile or the chemical agent. | 0:05:20 | 0:05:24 | |
One of the papers here says that you may prepare another dossier | 0:05:24 | 0:05:28 | |
because the first one didn't have a lot of impact, and so on, | 0:05:28 | 0:05:32 | |
but what are the sort of things you can tell us now that | 0:05:32 | 0:05:35 | |
our intelligence has discovered that you'll be passing on to the world? | 0:05:35 | 0:05:38 | |
What... Do you have a killer fact? | 0:05:38 | 0:05:41 | |
What we have is the intelligence that says that Saddam has continued | 0:05:41 | 0:05:47 | |
to develop these weapons of mass destruction, | 0:05:47 | 0:05:51 | |
that what he's doing is using a whole lot of dual-use facilities | 0:05:51 | 0:05:54 | |
in order to manufacture chemical and biological weapons, | 0:05:54 | 0:05:57 | |
and what we know is that there is an elaborate | 0:05:57 | 0:05:59 | |
programme of concealment, as I say, | 0:05:59 | 0:06:01 | |
that is pushing this stuff into different parts of the country | 0:06:01 | 0:06:03 | |
and therefore forcing the inspectors to play a game of hide-and-seek. | 0:06:03 | 0:06:07 | |
And what I say to people emphatically is that the UN mandate, set out in | 0:06:07 | 0:06:11 | |
the UN Resolution in November, | 0:06:11 | 0:06:13 | |
is a UN mandate that says that Saddam must not just give access to | 0:06:13 | 0:06:17 | |
different sites but co-operate fully with the inspectors, | 0:06:17 | 0:06:21 | |
otherwise the thing is a charade with the inspectors, | 0:06:21 | 0:06:24 | |
who aren't after all a detective agency. They're experts in munitions. | 0:06:24 | 0:06:28 | |
Do you think at the moment we have, you have, | 0:06:28 | 0:06:30 | |
in the light of the things you said, | 0:06:30 | 0:06:33 | |
actually sufficient evidence, if you wish to, | 0:06:33 | 0:06:35 | |
to go to war tomorrow, if you weren't waiting for the UN? | 0:06:35 | 0:06:38 | |
Do you think you have the goods on him now? | 0:06:38 | 0:06:41 | |
Sufficient to back action? | 0:06:41 | 0:06:44 | |
Well, I've got no doubt at all that he's developing these weapons | 0:06:44 | 0:06:47 | |
and that he poses a threat, | 0:06:47 | 0:06:49 | |
but we made a choice to go down the UN route, | 0:06:49 | 0:06:51 | |
and we're pursuing that UN route, and we'll stick with the UN route. | 0:06:51 | 0:06:54 | |
I mean... Again, when people say to me... | 0:06:54 | 0:06:57 | |
I had someone, as I was going into a building the other day, | 0:06:57 | 0:06:59 | |
someone shouted out to me, "Stop the war!" | 0:06:59 | 0:07:02 | |
And I said, "I haven't started it." | 0:07:02 | 0:07:04 | |
We're not at war, | 0:07:04 | 0:07:06 | |
and what we've laid down is a process that has to be gone through | 0:07:06 | 0:07:09 | |
where there is a UN mandate given to the inspectors, | 0:07:09 | 0:07:13 | |
the inspectors have got to fulfil that mandate, | 0:07:13 | 0:07:15 | |
and our judgment, the American judgment, | 0:07:15 | 0:07:17 | |
of course is that Saddam has these weapons, | 0:07:17 | 0:07:20 | |
but the purpose of the inspectors going in is for the inspectors | 0:07:20 | 0:07:24 | |
then, as, if you like, the objective party, to report back the UN | 0:07:24 | 0:07:27 | |
and say either he is fully co-operating or he's not. | 0:07:27 | 0:07:31 | |
So do we need, require...or would prefer a second resolution? | 0:07:31 | 0:07:37 | |
Of course we want a second resolution, | 0:07:37 | 0:07:40 | |
and there is only one set of circumstances | 0:07:40 | 0:07:42 | |
in which I've said that we would move without one, | 0:07:42 | 0:07:46 | |
and so all this stuff that we're indifferent | 0:07:46 | 0:07:48 | |
as to whether there's a UN resolution or not is nonsense. | 0:07:48 | 0:07:52 | |
We're very focused on getting a UN resolution. | 0:07:52 | 0:07:55 | |
There is one set of circumstances... | 0:07:55 | 0:07:57 | |
- Just the one? - Just the one. | 0:07:57 | 0:07:58 | |
And that is the circumstances where the UN inspectors say, | 0:07:58 | 0:08:02 | |
"He's not co-operating | 0:08:02 | 0:08:04 | |
"and he's in breach of the resolution that was passed in November," | 0:08:04 | 0:08:08 | |
but the UN, because someone, say, unreasonably exercises their veto, | 0:08:08 | 0:08:12 | |
blocks a new resolution. | 0:08:12 | 0:08:14 | |
Now, in those circumstances, you damage the UN. | 0:08:14 | 0:08:16 | |
If the UN inspectors say, "He's not co-operating, he's in breach," | 0:08:16 | 0:08:20 | |
and the world does nothing about it. | 0:08:20 | 0:08:22 | |
But I don't believe that will happen. | 0:08:22 | 0:08:24 | |
I think that if there is a finding by the inspectors, | 0:08:24 | 0:08:26 | |
and Monday's report is just the first full report, | 0:08:26 | 0:08:29 | |
there will be other reports, | 0:08:29 | 0:08:31 | |
but if they find that he's not co-operating, | 0:08:31 | 0:08:34 | |
then I believe that a second resolution will issue. | 0:08:34 | 0:08:37 | |
And again, just to stress the importance of this... | 0:08:37 | 0:08:41 | |
..if we end up with this issue of weapons of mass destruction, | 0:08:42 | 0:08:46 | |
which I think is a huge question facing the world today, | 0:08:46 | 0:08:49 | |
I think this and international terrorism | 0:08:49 | 0:08:51 | |
are the two big security threats, | 0:08:51 | 0:08:53 | |
if we face an issue where around Iraq - | 0:08:53 | 0:08:56 | |
that is a country that has used weapons of mass destruction - | 0:08:56 | 0:08:59 | |
the UN comes to a position | 0:08:59 | 0:09:01 | |
and says, "You've got to disarm yourself of those weapons," | 0:09:01 | 0:09:04 | |
and then the UN does nothing about the failure to disarm, well, | 0:09:04 | 0:09:08 | |
how, when we deal with North Korea, | 0:09:08 | 0:09:10 | |
are we going to get them to treat us seriously? | 0:09:10 | 0:09:12 | |
How, when we take these issues out to other countries | 0:09:12 | 0:09:14 | |
that are developing, potentially, nuclear capability, | 0:09:14 | 0:09:17 | |
are they going to take the international community seriously | 0:09:17 | 0:09:19 | |
when, faced with the challenge of Iraq, we've done nothing? | 0:09:19 | 0:09:22 | |
And what about the situation of persuading the people? | 0:09:22 | 0:09:25 | |
As you will have seen today, the NewGov poll - this is | 0:09:25 | 0:09:29 | |
in the situation where we go ahead, of course, without UN blessing... | 0:09:29 | 0:09:31 | |
Of course. | 0:09:31 | 0:09:33 | |
..and in that situation, 23% minus, | 0:09:33 | 0:09:37 | |
was the situation in September, minus 23 in favour of no, | 0:09:37 | 0:09:41 | |
and now it's gone up to 20/73, | 0:09:41 | 0:09:44 | |
ie 53, more than doubled the opposition to that situation. | 0:09:44 | 0:09:48 | |
How are you... How can you get through the message to those people? | 0:09:48 | 0:09:52 | |
You hope, of course, you won't go ahead without UN blessing, | 0:09:52 | 0:09:56 | |
but if you did, how would you try and convert... | 0:09:56 | 0:09:59 | |
Because it's very, to put it mildly, | 0:09:59 | 0:10:01 | |
uncomfortable to go to war with 73% against. | 0:10:01 | 0:10:04 | |
Yes, but again, I think this is because if people are being | 0:10:04 | 0:10:07 | |
asked today, "Do you support a war?", | 0:10:07 | 0:10:09 | |
my answer to that is, "We're not at war today." | 0:10:09 | 0:10:12 | |
And the circumstances in which we would engage in conflict | 0:10:12 | 0:10:16 | |
are circumstances which haven't yet arisen. | 0:10:16 | 0:10:18 | |
They are circumstances in which the UN inspectors say, | 0:10:18 | 0:10:21 | |
"He's supposed to co-operate with us and he's not co-operating. | 0:10:21 | 0:10:24 | |
"For example, he's refusing to allow us to interview the right people. | 0:10:24 | 0:10:27 | |
"He's refusing to tell us exactly what's happened to | 0:10:27 | 0:10:29 | |
"the weaponry that he has," and in those circumstances, | 0:10:29 | 0:10:32 | |
I think especially if the UN pass the second resolution, | 0:10:32 | 0:10:35 | |
as I believe they will | 0:10:35 | 0:10:36 | |
if the inspectors carry on saying he's not co-operating, | 0:10:36 | 0:10:38 | |
I think public opinion's in a different place. | 0:10:38 | 0:10:40 | |
I do make this point quite strongly to people - | 0:10:40 | 0:10:44 | |
were it not for the stand we have taken, | 0:10:44 | 0:10:47 | |
does anyone seriously think we'd either | 0:10:47 | 0:10:50 | |
have the UN inspectors in there | 0:10:50 | 0:10:52 | |
or any chance of resolving this peacefully? | 0:10:52 | 0:10:54 | |
But at the moment, you do have 75% of the public, | 0:10:54 | 0:10:57 | |
you've united all our quarrelling clerics in this country, | 0:10:57 | 0:11:00 | |
they're all against you, and no Muslim leader has come out in favour. | 0:11:00 | 0:11:04 | |
It's a tough, tough road to hoe. | 0:11:04 | 0:11:06 | |
Well, it is tough, and it's tough for a very simple reason, | 0:11:06 | 0:11:09 | |
that people don't see an immediate threat arising from Saddam | 0:11:09 | 0:11:13 | |
and it's my job as Prime Minister to say to people, | 0:11:13 | 0:11:17 | |
there may not be an immediate threat in the sense that Saddam's | 0:11:17 | 0:11:21 | |
about to launch a strike against Britain, | 0:11:21 | 0:11:23 | |
but this issue of weapons of mass destruction is a huge question | 0:11:23 | 0:11:26 | |
for the world because we know that countries are trying to develop | 0:11:26 | 0:11:30 | |
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, | 0:11:30 | 0:11:32 | |
these are highly unstable states, | 0:11:32 | 0:11:33 | |
we know this stuff is being traded across | 0:11:33 | 0:11:35 | |
international frontiers at the moment, | 0:11:35 | 0:11:37 | |
we know that international terrorist groups - | 0:11:37 | 0:11:38 | |
and this is the link with terrorism - | 0:11:38 | 0:11:40 | |
are trying to acquire these weapons. Unless we take a stand, | 0:11:40 | 0:11:43 | |
then we will find in years to come, it is very much more difficult | 0:11:43 | 0:11:47 | |
to deal with this issue, and I think it is only a matter of time | 0:11:47 | 0:11:50 | |
before international terrorism and these types of weapons come together. | 0:11:50 | 0:11:54 | |
I mean, you know, you can already see from the arrests | 0:11:54 | 0:11:56 | |
that are happening right round Europe - | 0:11:56 | 0:11:58 | |
these terrorist groups will use chemical weapons if they can. | 0:11:58 | 0:12:01 | |
They don't have the capability at the moment | 0:12:01 | 0:12:03 | |
to cause enormous damage with those but if could do so, they would. | 0:12:03 | 0:12:07 | |
Colin Powell said in an interview with me some time ago, | 0:12:07 | 0:12:11 | |
back in September or whatever, | 0:12:11 | 0:12:14 | |
and he's said it since, | 0:12:14 | 0:12:17 | |
that the important thing is not knowing when to start a war, | 0:12:17 | 0:12:22 | |
it's knowing how to end it. | 0:12:22 | 0:12:25 | |
Now, what are we going to do if we get to Baghdad, | 0:12:25 | 0:12:28 | |
if we're victorious, um, what happens then? | 0:12:28 | 0:12:31 | |
How are we going to end it? | 0:12:31 | 0:12:32 | |
Are we going to set up a UN protectorate or what? | 0:12:32 | 0:12:35 | |
We must know that, obviously. | 0:12:35 | 0:12:37 | |
Well, we don't know the precise details of all that. | 0:12:37 | 0:12:40 | |
That's something to discuss with the UN, with allies, obviously, | 0:12:40 | 0:12:43 | |
but what we do know is that it should be a stable government | 0:12:43 | 0:12:47 | |
that tries to release Iraq from what is, frankly, | 0:12:47 | 0:12:51 | |
the appalling situation Saddam's put it in. | 0:12:51 | 0:12:53 | |
Cos remember, partly as a result of the fact | 0:12:53 | 0:12:55 | |
we've been unable to contain Saddam any other way, | 0:12:55 | 0:12:58 | |
the world has had to impose through the UN sanctions on Iraq which, | 0:12:58 | 0:13:02 | |
because of the way Saddam operates those sanctions, | 0:13:02 | 0:13:05 | |
have meant terrible misery and exploitation | 0:13:05 | 0:13:09 | |
for millions of Iraqi people. So, you know, that's why I... | 0:13:09 | 0:13:12 | |
You know, you mentioned the clerics a short time ago. | 0:13:12 | 0:13:15 | |
I've always found it odd that anybody, | 0:13:15 | 0:13:17 | |
particularly people who are, if you like, are more on the centre-left, | 0:13:17 | 0:13:21 | |
could ever dispute the fact that getting rid of Saddam | 0:13:21 | 0:13:23 | |
would be a huge bonus for the world. | 0:13:23 | 0:13:24 | |
The Archbishop of Canterbury said | 0:13:24 | 0:13:26 | |
that it's in violation of Christian moral teaching. | 0:13:26 | 0:13:30 | |
That was the man you made Archbishop of Canterbury. | 0:13:30 | 0:13:33 | |
Well, then it's his... As I always say to people, | 0:13:33 | 0:13:35 | |
it's his right to speak out as he wants. | 0:13:35 | 0:13:37 | |
But I think it would be... | 0:13:37 | 0:13:39 | |
certainly a violation of our duty to protect the world | 0:13:39 | 0:13:43 | |
if we, having laid down the law, through the UN, to Saddam, | 0:13:43 | 0:13:47 | |
then walked away from it. | 0:13:47 | 0:13:48 | |
You must be annoyed, obviously, with Chirac and Schroeder | 0:13:48 | 0:13:51 | |
on this particular issue. | 0:13:51 | 0:13:52 | |
I mean, you must sometimes think, "God, why didn't we join NAFTA?" | 0:13:52 | 0:13:56 | |
No, I don't think that, no. | 0:13:56 | 0:13:59 | |
I mean, they're entitled to different views | 0:13:59 | 0:14:01 | |
but, you know, French foreign policy | 0:14:01 | 0:14:03 | |
no more represents European foreign policy, exclusively, | 0:14:03 | 0:14:06 | |
than does British foreign policy. Countries have different positions. | 0:14:06 | 0:14:08 | |
But not all European countries are in that position. | 0:14:08 | 0:14:11 | |
Spain, Italy, other European countries | 0:14:11 | 0:14:13 | |
have strongly supported the stand we've taken. | 0:14:13 | 0:14:15 | |
Fear of Israel. They've made it clear | 0:14:15 | 0:14:18 | |
that if they're attacked by Saddam, they'll nuke him back. | 0:14:18 | 0:14:21 | |
Are you worried about what that would do? | 0:14:21 | 0:14:23 | |
Well, one of the reasons why we're taking this action | 0:14:24 | 0:14:27 | |
is that if Saddam is allowed to build up these weapons, | 0:14:27 | 0:14:30 | |
then of course he will threaten his neighbours. He's done it before. | 0:14:30 | 0:14:33 | |
But it is extremely important that we make sure | 0:14:33 | 0:14:38 | |
that we reduce whatever possibility there is of any conflict | 0:14:38 | 0:14:41 | |
we're engaged in spreading. | 0:14:41 | 0:14:43 | |
Incidentally, one... | 0:14:43 | 0:14:45 | |
I mean, if there is any advantage in what Saddam has done, | 0:14:45 | 0:14:48 | |
which is to try and dismantle the programme | 0:14:48 | 0:14:50 | |
and push it out and conceal it in different parts of the country | 0:14:50 | 0:14:52 | |
is that it's more difficult for him to bring it together. | 0:14:52 | 0:14:55 | |
But, I mean, would you give him a warning, | 0:14:55 | 0:14:58 | |
rather like the warning that then President Bush did in the Gulf War, | 0:14:58 | 0:15:03 | |
that if he was to use any of these weapons which we say he's got, | 0:15:03 | 0:15:07 | |
that we would use nuclear weapons? | 0:15:07 | 0:15:10 | |
I don't think any warnings we give are best done in a public way, | 0:15:10 | 0:15:15 | |
and in any event, | 0:15:15 | 0:15:17 | |
we'll consider that situation when we get nearer the point of action, | 0:15:17 | 0:15:20 | |
if action there needs to be, | 0:15:20 | 0:15:22 | |
but, as I say, just to come back to the basic point I'm making, | 0:15:22 | 0:15:24 | |
Saddam could avoid a war today | 0:15:24 | 0:15:27 | |
if he made an honest, full declaration of the material he has. | 0:15:27 | 0:15:31 | |
"Know thine enemy" - that was another phrase that Colin Powell once said. | 0:15:31 | 0:15:36 | |
Obviously, we have psychological profiles and everything, | 0:15:36 | 0:15:39 | |
you're trying to assess and second-guess | 0:15:39 | 0:15:42 | |
what Saddam will do next and so on. | 0:15:42 | 0:15:44 | |
Do you think you are dealing with a man who is mad... | 0:15:44 | 0:15:48 | |
..or bad? | 0:15:49 | 0:15:51 | |
Well, bad, certainly. | 0:15:51 | 0:15:52 | |
- I mean, anybody... - Mad? | 0:15:52 | 0:15:54 | |
I'm not in a position to judge that. | 0:15:54 | 0:15:57 | |
I mean, he's exercised considerable skill, actually, | 0:15:57 | 0:16:00 | |
in avoiding the UN mandate for 12 years. | 0:16:00 | 0:16:03 | |
People do forget, as I say, in April 1991 | 0:16:03 | 0:16:07 | |
when the inspectors...the first UN resolution was passed, | 0:16:07 | 0:16:10 | |
15 days was the deadline. Well, we're 12 years later. | 0:16:10 | 0:16:13 | |
You require a certain amount of skill | 0:16:13 | 0:16:15 | |
in playing the international community off against each other. | 0:16:15 | 0:16:18 | |
- So... - Some skill in that. | 0:16:18 | 0:16:19 | |
And in terms of the trip to see the President this week, | 0:16:19 | 0:16:23 | |
what's the most important thing... you've got to do... | 0:16:23 | 0:16:28 | |
or you both have got to do, | 0:16:28 | 0:16:30 | |
when you meet following the reports, tomorrow's reports, | 0:16:30 | 0:16:33 | |
what's the most important item on the agenda? | 0:16:33 | 0:16:36 | |
To agree the right strategy, um, for the future and to go out | 0:16:38 | 0:16:43 | |
and explain to people, yet again, | 0:16:43 | 0:16:45 | |
why it is important to deal with this issue | 0:16:45 | 0:16:47 | |
and I think that the missing part which, you know, we've got | 0:16:47 | 0:16:51 | |
a responsibility to get across to people is to explain how... | 0:16:51 | 0:16:56 | |
why we are concerned about this | 0:16:56 | 0:16:57 | |
whole issue of weapons of mass destruction, | 0:16:57 | 0:16:59 | |
because I think there's a sense in which people feel... | 0:16:59 | 0:17:02 | |
Look, if something like 11th September happens, | 0:17:02 | 0:17:04 | |
they can see an immediate... event has happened, | 0:17:04 | 0:17:08 | |
there's an immediate threat, there's something you need to go after. | 0:17:08 | 0:17:12 | |
I think it's a lot more difficult with this issue | 0:17:12 | 0:17:14 | |
because people don't perceive an immediate threat | 0:17:14 | 0:17:16 | |
and yet it's our job, I think, to say to people, "Look, | 0:17:16 | 0:17:20 | |
"this is why we're worried about this issue, | 0:17:20 | 0:17:22 | |
"not just in respect of Iraq, | 0:17:22 | 0:17:24 | |
"but more broadly than that and this is the potential link | 0:17:24 | 0:17:27 | |
"this has with these terrible, extremist, fanatical groups | 0:17:27 | 0:17:30 | |
"who have given a quite different dimension to terrorism." | 0:17:30 | 0:17:35 | |
And people do say... What about the people who say that there's | 0:17:35 | 0:17:38 | |
a real downside to this? | 0:17:38 | 0:17:40 | |
There's the...Britain becoming a more attractive target for terrorism, | 0:17:40 | 0:17:45 | |
er, the Middle East going up in flames. All of those things. | 0:17:45 | 0:17:50 | |
Iraqis being killed, civilians being killed in their hundreds, um... | 0:17:51 | 0:17:56 | |
What do you feel about that? There is a downside, obviously. | 0:17:56 | 0:17:59 | |
You're not painting this as 100% perfect. | 0:17:59 | 0:18:01 | |
No, of course not, and the very reason | 0:18:01 | 0:18:03 | |
we went down the UN route, when some people thought | 0:18:03 | 0:18:06 | |
that we were just going to lash out, | 0:18:06 | 0:18:07 | |
is precisely to give peace a chance to work but, in the end, | 0:18:07 | 0:18:10 | |
what have we learned from our own history | 0:18:10 | 0:18:12 | |
and the history of the world? That if there is, um, wrong in the world, | 0:18:12 | 0:18:17 | |
if there is a threat and you don't deal with it, | 0:18:17 | 0:18:20 | |
you have to deal with it with even worse consequences in the future | 0:18:20 | 0:18:23 | |
and, you know, the person who's killed hundreds, thousands | 0:18:23 | 0:18:25 | |
of Iraqis is Saddam. | 0:18:25 | 0:18:27 | |
I mean, he's the person who used chemical weapons | 0:18:27 | 0:18:30 | |
against his own Iraqi people. | 0:18:30 | 0:18:32 | |
Incidentally, about Britain being a target... | 0:18:32 | 0:18:35 | |
who would have thought Indonesia was going to be a target, | 0:18:35 | 0:18:38 | |
when those people died in Bali, or Kenya? | 0:18:38 | 0:18:41 | |
Um, round the whole of Europe, there are arrests happening, | 0:18:41 | 0:18:46 | |
not just in Britain, but in France, for example, | 0:18:46 | 0:18:48 | |
which you might have thought has taken | 0:18:48 | 0:18:49 | |
a slightly softer position on the question of Iraq. | 0:18:49 | 0:18:52 | |
We're not going to avoid this by hiding away | 0:18:52 | 0:18:56 | |
and it's not what the British do anyway. | 0:18:56 | 0:18:58 | |
I mean, there's a struggle on and we've got to be there | 0:18:58 | 0:19:00 | |
and we will have, I think... | 0:19:00 | 0:19:02 | |
You know, we would have no influence in shaping it unless we were there | 0:19:02 | 0:19:06 | |
and prepared to be there and I really passionately believe this. | 0:19:06 | 0:19:09 | |
The world is very ambivalent towards America on these issues. | 0:19:09 | 0:19:13 | |
We want America to deal with these issues | 0:19:13 | 0:19:14 | |
and yet we want to attack them at the same time. | 0:19:14 | 0:19:17 | |
And I think that when America is taking on these tough | 0:19:17 | 0:19:20 | |
and difficult questions, our job is to be there, | 0:19:20 | 0:19:22 | |
not be there at any price, not be there without saying | 0:19:22 | 0:19:24 | |
how we think the thing should be dealt with, | 0:19:24 | 0:19:26 | |
but being there in the difficult and tricky times, | 0:19:26 | 0:19:30 | |
not simply there, you know, as fair-weather friends. | 0:19:30 | 0:19:34 |