Reassessing the Fixed Term Parliaments Act Briefings


Reassessing the Fixed Term Parliaments Act

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Denied's event could hardly be a more topical one. We are delighted

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to be hosting this. -- tonight's event. As I'm sure most now, a fixed

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term Parliament act was passed by the Coalition government in 2011,

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and the idea of the act was we would move from a system of flexible

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length parliaments in the UK to fixed terms of five years. Then

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Theresa May called the general election she required approval but

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MPs seemed happy to vote. But raised some questions about fixed term

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Parliament Acts. Last week, more topicality because the Conservative

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manifesto stated that the party that wins the election intensity repealed

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the fixed term Parliament act. It's a good time to talk about this

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topic. They have two excellent legal minds and stronger speakers to

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debate the rights and wrongs of that act. Carl Gardner, who will go

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first. He was called to the bar in 1993, and spent around 12 years as a

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government lawyer advising in various departments on a wide range

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of legal issues. At the moment, he runs amongst other things, the

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excellent head of legal blog. In 2015, he published a book called

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What A Fixed Up about the act, which he is opponent of. He is probably

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feeling happy at the moment. Gavin Philipson is a long-standing friend

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of the Constitution unit, a professor of law at Durham

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University, a specialist in public and constitutional law. He has

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worked on issues like human rights, anti-terrorism legislation, and

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recently did work on the Miller case which, if you remember, was about

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whether Parliament had to be consulted on the triggering of

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Article 50. Gavin is a supporter of the fixed term Parliament Acts, and

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after the events of last months, he thinks it is doing its job. He will

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defend the act and it may be easier said than done to repeal it.

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Excellent line-up, each Speaker will address us for about 20 minutes and

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then we will open to questions and discussion. This will be off the

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record so cameras will be turned off at that point. But the presentations

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which I greatly look forward to Bobby on the record. I invite Carl

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to get us off. I invite Carl to kick us off. Thank

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you. Thank you to UCL and the Constitution unit for inviting me to

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speak to you. I am delighted, assuming we get a Conservative

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government, not something I otherwise want. If we do get one, we

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will see the back of the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. Where I am coming

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from, I used to be a great believer in constitutional reform, not

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specific reforms, to tackle particular problems, but

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constitutional reform in principle. I thought the Constitution was

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rubbish, archaic, old hat, and all that. And we need to sweep it away

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in place of a written constitution. I don't think any of that any more.

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Today, I come to you as a defender of the traditional British

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constitution but, I think, is sound, underestimated by the British

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people, and by what you might call the political class. And I think

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those who would like constitutional reform in a broad sense and a deep

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sense on principle, I think, are engaged in something very dangerous

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indeed. And the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act is, I think, a

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cautionary tale. Let me say this before I mentioned the act

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specifically. Never let them write a constitution. Not the politicians

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and not, sorry Gavin, the experts and academics either. They will muck

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it up. All in the name of principle. That is what has happened with the

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Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. Let me give you a reading from the second

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reading of the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. -- the Bill in 2010

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or 2011. Nick Clegg said this. He explained the purpose of the Bill.

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He said it had a single clear purpose, to remove the right of a

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Prime Minister to seek the dissolution of parliament for pure

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political gain. For the first time in our history, the timing of

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general elections will not be a plaything of government. There will

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be no more feverish speculation over the date of the next election,

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distracting politicians and getting on with the running of the country.

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Instead, everyone will know how long the Parliament can be expected to

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last. Bringing much greater stability to our political system.

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We can see immediately how utterly hollow those words have proved to

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be. Everyone was surprised by what Theresa May has done, and I think

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the argument we may hear government argued -- Gavin argued it was as

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intended, but the way it was introduced is it really wasn't. To

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cut a long story short, I think the birth of the act is very cynical. If

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you read David Law's book, 22 days in May, you will see the partisan

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observations behind temp1macro. It was

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-- behind Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. A Conservative government

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couldn't cut and run and pull the right out of the Liberal Democrats

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and vice versa. Originally, it was going to be set at 55%, exquisitely

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calculated to allow the Coalition to get an election whenever it wanted.

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But to allow the Conservative Party to block one. There was a lot of

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cynicism about the act, it was always to protect the Coalition,

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shield it from an early election. And it shielded Theresa May from

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call to get a mandate. When she first in power, if anyone said, you

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should call an election and get remembered, she can simply say no,

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the fixed term Parliament act prevented. Bert when she turned on a

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sixpence, it is help to get the election that she wanted. So the

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cynical motives behind this Act, but I also blame idealists, people who

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supported it on principle sincerely, who thought it was an act of

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progressive reform. What went wrong was the fixed term that people

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wanted underestimated and caricatured the old system. They

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said the Prime Minister could just ask for an election and get one when

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he or she wanted. It was never true. The legal position is that the Queen

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can refuse, or refuse a dissolution of parliament. You may laugh. That

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shows what is wrong, actually, with our attitude for the Constitution. I

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think you should learn from Americans and be more interested in

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it and supportive of it. By the way, it's the same system they have in

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Ireland. The President can refuse an election. Not a silly and unique as

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we Brits like to think. The evidence that that system worked is, where

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was the abuse? It was said, it was awful but Prime Minister had to ask

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the Queen for a dissolution, it was awful, there would be all this

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political abuse, it was terrible. I don't remember our poor or outrage

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in my lifetime, whenever a Prime Minister asked for a dissolution and

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gossip. I don't remember in 2000 when we got dissolution, the last

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fixed term of Parliament. A debtor in Britain 2001 or 1987. I don't

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remember it in 1983. This abuse by Prime Minister is just was never a

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problem. In fact, more common than to complain about an election being

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granted was a public demand for an election, like when Gordon Brown

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took over and David Cameron, later one of the authors of this Act,

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demanded that there be an election immediately. In fact, he wanted to

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change the law at this time to require Prime Minister is to ask for

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an election. So, what has happened? What we have seen with Theresa May

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has happened because of partisans in cynicism and idealists who

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underestimated the real content of a traditional constitution and

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tinkered with it. What is the at -- what has the act mucked up then? And

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quite a lot. Because of it, no one knows what would happen following a

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no-confidence motion, a statutory motion in line with section two of

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the Act. It used to be clear, the Fai Minister had to resign or ask

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for an election. Well, third 2011 act sets a clock ticking with an

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election triggered after 14 days, unless there is an antidote motion

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stopping the clock, a notion of confidence in the government or

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anyone. So what can a Prime Minister do? Resign? And hand over government

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to the opposition? Camp they simply sit on their hands and force an

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election? Making that 14 day period pointless.

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Or can they use the 14 day period to shore up the government, trying to

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get an antidote motion themselves. How much of the time timber used to

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do that was either how many times than they fail? To get an antidote

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motion? Nobody knows the answers to these questions. All raised by the

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2011 act. In my e-book, I set out some theories about this, that

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basically fall into two families, the free choice theory and the duty

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to resign theory. But nobody knows. The courts could not decide, of

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course, because of a mixture of the fact that the old rules and

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conventions which the courts don't enforce. And because no-confidence

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votes will be proceedings in Parliament, shielded from litigation

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by article nine of the Bill of Rights. It would be madness for the

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courts to decide these things. You can be sure that under the

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Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, politicians would make up the new

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rules as it suited them. That is what is wrong with this system.

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Again, it would give the sitting Prime Minister the power to decide

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what he or she wanted to do in that situation. For example, the Prime

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Minister might want to force an election. Or a startling PM might

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rather install a new government. And prevented from seeking an election.

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-- and prevent it from seeking an election. Forcing a minority

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government. For example, a PM who narrowly lost a majority in June

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might rather seek to form a Coalition which had views on

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boxer-macro, she might have to prefer to force an unworkable

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rainbow Coalition on the country, frustrated at every turn and if she

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had just short of a majority, deny it any chance to seek an increased

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majority of its own. Even if that became a popular rainbow Coalition.

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In crisis situations... Various theories drawn on, ad hoc.

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Justifying what was expedient. It is not just a question of the act

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having mocked up no confidence motions, then Parliament act also

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has other motions. It used to be clear that if the government did not

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have the confidence of the House of Commons it had to resign. Say if it

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couldn't get the Queen's speech through... The budget. Tony Blair

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was cleared in 2003, if he had not one that notorious vote on Iraq, he

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would have had to resign. I do not think we can be as confident now. A

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theory abroad, no such thing as a matter of confidence, although

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statutory motions, under the fixed-term Parliament act. Ideas are

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already shifting. Behaviour, already shifting. You may think I am being

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mad, but conservative back benchers, threatening to repeal the Queen's

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speech. In the article, then journalist passed on information

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from the office, they told him defeats are no longer regarded as

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motions of confidence because of the fixed-term Parliament act. This has

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been affecting the House of Commons, MP behaviour, that amendment that

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the threatened in 2013. Actually, and agreed amendment to the Queen's

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speech in 2013. Not what they used to be. That is because of the

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fixed-term Parliament act. Another example. The Syria vote, 2013. I

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thought it was shocking. The government could not carry the

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policy on war and peace in 2013. Bot the response of David Cameron, we

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should carry on merrily. Things have been broken, by this act. If you

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think about it, if the government doesn't have to resign if it loses

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its Queen's speech, and why shouldn't it is not a matter of

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confidence, when does it ever have to resign? When you realise, with

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this theory on the fixed-term Parliament act, never a duty to

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resign... That cannot be correct. We have broken something in the

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Constitution. That makes my case against the act. One more thing I

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want to cover. We are often told by supporters of the act, no going

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back. Even if people like me when the argument, that the act is a

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mess, failure, you cannot go back because the prerogative that the

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Queen had to dissolve parliament is gone forever. Because of that idea,

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from the statute that covers a ground, a bridge, certain giving

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prerogative powers on the same subject. It is said that the

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prerogative is dead. And if we got rid of the fixed-term Parliament

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act, we would need to get some new statutory system. I think that is

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wrong. Before I explain why it can be repealed, I want to let you no

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what it remains me of. A story Michael Foot told in 1980. He was

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talking about his youth, he saw a magician in Plymouth. He said he

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wanted a beautiful watch from the audience. And when he got this, he

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would wrap it in a hanky, take out a hammer, smash it to smithereens.

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Then he would say, I am sorry, I have forgotten the rest of the trip.

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That is what the principal people who got us the fixed-term Parliament

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act and we have done to the Constitution. It could be broken,

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but we cannot mend it. That is not correct. A repeal can work. Repeal

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has the effect of providing any law that was changed by the act. In this

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case, fixed-term Parliament act. Prerogative powers are no different

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from other common law. Rules... Spring back to life. Put back by

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statute, spring back to life. If you are not convinced by that, some keys

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authority on this. People are going to remember the GCHQ case, from the

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1980s. That went to the House of Lords. Some of fell away in the

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first instance. That unions had been arguing that the prerogative to

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manage the civil service had been abolished by legislation in 1927,

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subsequently repealed. They said it had not survived, was dead. The High

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Court rejected that argument. They ruled a statute may abridge,

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restrict prerogative power. But it's such a statute is later repealed,

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the prerogative power with apparently really watch as it had

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existed before the statute. That can be done here. People sometimes say

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a-ha! Just look at section 16 of the interpretation act. That does

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prevent exactly this effect. The answer to that, you can easily get

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around section 16, I meeting Parliament intervention clear

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enough. We can go back to the old position. I think that we should,

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because any other statutory position from the government is probably

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going to be even less trustworthy. Gosnell, unilateral statutory power

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in the hands of the Prime Minister, like the recent Article 50. Never

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let them right Constitution. Thank you very much. Thank you. Something

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to say? Thank you very much for organising this. It came out of a

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Twitter fight! But various otherwise. Come and have it out in

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public. It has changed since then because of the Tory pledge to repeal

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the act. You spent two thirds saying it was bad. I am going to reverse

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that. Defend it briefly. Then explain why they cannot go back. It

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would be extremely unwise just to repeal it. So... I accept my

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argument on this point, the prerogative may not be right, I am

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not arguing that I'm definitely correct, you are definitely wrong,

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as much as I would love to do that. But we have been discussing this

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with people and I decided we have got considerable doubt. That is my

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argument. We do not know for sure. We cannot know, simply not a

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definitive answer. That is because it never has actually happened. I do

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not think the GCHQ case... That is at least as far as I know, from

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Twitter when I asked that. Nobody could come his when that actually

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happened. Claiming it would be a messages,

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seeking the declaration that no prerogative of the solution. The

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better course but better still, I suspect that the more government

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lawyers look into this, the more likely they would be to add files to

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reason me that repealing act would not be what the legal uncertainty,

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the prerogative still there. Not what the hassle, getting through the

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grumpy Parliament, occupied with the legal challenges of Brexit. And

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definitely not worth litigation. It would be a doomed attempt, could

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look foolish but a one off. Does she really want to do that? I am going

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to spend a few minutes just briefly defending the act. But I am not

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going to go into all the arguments about those descendant the

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prerogative. First... Does the episode of Theresa May, and the

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selection, getting people to vote so readily, sure that the act is not

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worth the paper it is written on? It is true that some of the arguments,

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whether it puts a stop to or make less frequent early elections. Nick

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Clegg mentioned it would make politics short term. I always saw

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those as ancillary benefits. But if those were the reasons for

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supporting the act, I am only going to pause, because one particular set

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of circumstances Parliament voted to give Theresa the election. May we

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know that the Prime Minister 's are always going to get the assent of

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the House of Commons. If Labour are crushed in the next general

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election, and the Conservatives get no large majority, future leaders

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could look back on Jeremy Corbyn's decision to vote so readily, draw

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conclusions that may not be bitter. Turkeys voting for Christmas? We do

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not know. Political advantage always means that you can never avoid an

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election. Some circumstances could be put for a perfectly good case,

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the two thirds required. Secondly, the main reason for supporting the

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act was not because it made Parliament have fixed terms, matters

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better. The act was perhaps slightly misleading in name, sold. It was not

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to give Parliament fixed-terms but to change who have the power to

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dissolve parliament. Removing that from the Queen, the archaic powers,

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and give that to Parliament, specifically the House of Commons.

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Secondly, by requiring two thirds majority, the government losing a

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vote of confidence, to stop this being used for purely partisan

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advantage as it was routinely and openly used. Never any pretense. It

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have been used for the benefit of the governing party. We could time

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it when they wanted. It remains indefensible. It does remain

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indefensible that the government should have the constitutional

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advantage simply because it is in power. It is not the case in some

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countries and does not have to be in ours. Of course, an unwritten

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constitution, much of this comes about by accident, the particular

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set of political circumstances, none of that Timmy matters. I do not give

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about the motives. I think we were lucky to get real statutory

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prerogative. That was largely untouched. Certainly, through the

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new legal reform programme. To see it removed and replaced with

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a democratic studied. We should certainly not give it back. That is

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because, I think, perhaps, times I have read them all over the weekend,

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some of his worried about the doubt created by the impact of the act on

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the resignation commission is overdone. Even if not, it has been

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nearly 40 years since we last had a successful moat Toure motion

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in by Minister, in 1979. It may be 40 years until it happens again.

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There is uncertainty and what happens in circumstances where that

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happens again, is not a good enough reason to go back to the product. I

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would take issue with some of the particular uncertainties that Carl

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says are created. As Carl himself says, the reason he wants to go back

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where he is so happy about going back to the prerogative of governing

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by convention, is that conventions are flexible and adapt to new

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situations and change. It is why Karl likes. One of the reasons why

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conventions have to adapt is because of new legislation. He says he loves

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legislation for adaptability and then spends 50 pages boning the fact

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it might obtain. -- the pack fact it might change. If there was a period

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of uncertainty while the changes taking place. If there's a problem,

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fix it. If there's a problem in the draft, amended. If there's a problem

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in the convention, look at the Cabinet manual and Carl agrees that

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some problems are attributed to misinterpretations and blues

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drafting. Take a look at that again and also the parliament involved

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again. Try clarifying the goalie it in the act. This uncertainty has not

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become real life or 40 years, it's not a reason to go back to the

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prerogative. And prime ministerial partisan use of it. My final point

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is that Carl did not really mentioned that there are, of course,

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similar problems of uncertainty over whether in the convention whether

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the Queen is legally entitled, which is right to reduce the prerogative

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but constitutional scholars debated and disagreed over when the Queen

:31:41.:31:44.

could justifiably refuser dissolution. That was a letter in

:31:45.:31:51.

the 1950. It's not clear and it is contested. All of that meant that

:31:52.:31:55.

the norms that should guide the decision of an unelected moniker

:31:56.:32:00.

were open to doubt, an clear at least in some circumstances. That, I

:32:01.:32:05.

think, is worse than any uncertainty created by the interaction between

:32:06.:32:08.

the dissolution prerogative and the Convention of resignation, sorry,

:32:09.:32:13.

between the new act and the convention of resignation. It could

:32:14.:32:17.

mean the Queen having to make a real live political and very important

:32:18.:32:21.

decision to grant a dissolution. Now the convention is uncertain, leaving

:32:22.:32:25.

her real choice or advisers choice, that is unjustifiable in principle

:32:26.:32:28.

and if you care about the monarchy, places it in peril. I will not say

:32:29.:32:34.

much more because if the Tories win the next general election, this is a

:32:35.:32:39.

manifesto, the fact that some law professor has criticised the act

:32:40.:32:42.

will not stop Parliament repealing it. It seems as though manifesto, I

:32:43.:32:47.

thought, let's assume they probably will win: can they go back to the

:32:48.:32:54.

prerogative? I argue, this is at least uncertain. So I'm starting

:32:55.:33:00.

with a view basics. Parliament is softened, which means the statute as

:33:01.:33:05.

we know ranks higher than the prerogative and common law. So it

:33:06.:33:13.

can replace prerogative and four. This is known as the abeyance

:33:14.:33:20.

principle. It relates to the Miller negotiation. This poll 's superior

:33:21.:33:23.

force occupies the field, the probative is replaced. It's the

:33:24.:33:27.

question of what happens to that replace prerogative, what is its

:33:28.:33:36.

status in doubt? From the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty that it

:33:37.:33:41.

can repeal any previous statute, Karl explains it at some length in

:33:42.:33:45.

his book" is the work on interpretation, obliterating the

:33:46.:33:52.

statute making it never existing. If Parliament can do it to the statute,

:33:53.:33:57.

must I submit, it must be able to do it to the perogative. If you argue

:33:58.:34:03.

otherwise, you with elevating the status of Acts above statutes. It's

:34:04.:34:12.

wrong and constitutional heresy -- perogatives over statutes.

:34:13.:34:17.

Parliament sovereign over prerogative powers. Parliament staff

:34:18.:34:26.

must be legally capable of doing the same thing to prerogative as

:34:27.:34:30.

statutes. Mainly, abolishing them, not putting into abeyance. Now, gas,

:34:31.:34:41.

there have been several cases -- yes, there have been several cases,

:34:42.:34:49.

including possibly Miller, in which courts talk about statutes putting

:34:50.:34:56.

prerogative and abeyance. They use the metaphor Carl talked about, the

:34:57.:35:00.

statute sits on top of the perogative like a carpet on top of a

:35:01.:35:09.

floor. As long as the statute is on, the Act can't be used. Repeal the

:35:10.:35:17.

statute and it's like lifting up the carpet, hey presto, the perogative

:35:18.:35:23.

is still there and believe it. -- underneath it. But. In a system

:35:24.:35:29.

where parliament is suffering, the question is what is Parliament's

:35:30.:35:33.

intention? What is the legislation done? In many cases it's silently

:35:34.:35:43.

obligated the field. Displacing the perogative. I would argue Parliament

:35:44.:35:49.

Gatley Bolasie perogative not just the place. Otherwise Parliament is

:35:50.:35:56.

not sovereign. So there isn't a case laying down, that is always the case

:35:57.:36:03.

when Parliament goes from AIDS Act goes

:36:04.:36:03.

Abeyance. -- it immediately renders it anyway and then it will be

:36:04.:36:16.

plainly unconstitutional. It would give prerogative a statement that

:36:17.:36:22.

even statute or repeal doesn't have. Parliament only put a new carpet

:36:23.:36:26.

down, it contains the floor itself. It is to replace the dusty

:36:27.:36:30.

prerogative floorboards with a smart new hardwood floor of statute. This

:36:31.:36:41.

Fixed-Term Parliaments Act is hardwood flooring. Carl illustrates

:36:42.:36:46.

this well in his book. Prerogative powers are not abolished once and

:36:47.:36:52.

for all, a statute displaces a prerogative only when in force. But

:36:53.:36:55.

to say they are not abolished is only another way of saying they

:36:56.:37:02.

can't be abolished. In turn, but as another were saying Palmer is

:37:03.:37:10.

legally incapable -- Parliament is incapable... That

:37:11.:37:13.

if Parliament and get rid of the statute, that may have never

:37:14.:37:20.

existed, it must be able to do the same for a prerogative. If you

:37:21.:37:25.

temporarily displace it, you are saying the House less power over the

:37:26.:37:28.

prerogative than it does over the statute. That must be wrong. It

:37:29.:37:32.

turns the doctrine of sovereignty on its head. Finally, as a matter of

:37:33.:37:37.

case law, the claimed that if Parliament had tried to abolish the

:37:38.:37:40.

prerogative it would provide if the act doing the abolition was

:37:41.:37:46.

revealed, it has not been shown to be the case. It may be right but

:37:47.:37:53.

it's never, unequivocally happened. In the GCHQ case that Carl mentioned

:37:54.:37:57.

that I am indebted to him for pointing it out, it was obvious to

:37:58.:38:06.

me that on the fact is the argument put forward by the trade unions in

:38:07.:38:11.

the 1927 act that prerogative was an abeyance was wrong. There was no

:38:12.:38:15.

surprise that point was lost. As he points out, the regulations

:38:16.:38:20.

introduced in 1927 act that supposedly put the prerogative into

:38:21.:38:23.

abeyance referred to the council put under the prerogative. The 1927 act

:38:24.:38:29.

was imposing minor restrictions on how those powers could be exercised.

:38:30.:38:34.

There was never any questions of abolishing it. It was not revived

:38:35.:38:43.

again. So, I think Parliament can abolish prerogative powers and

:38:44.:38:47.

colours want is only to say it can put in abeyance. When you come to

:38:48.:38:51.

the more difficult question, even if it was abolished, can a later part

:38:52.:38:57.

want to revise it? That is a difficult conceptual question. I

:38:58.:39:02.

would put my cell of the argument by saying that is the prerogative that

:39:03.:39:06.

actually gone has ceased to exist, then the later Parliament cannot in

:39:07.:39:11.

truth be reviving it, because there was nothing to revise. Bullets can

:39:12.:39:21.

do as the it with a statutory power. To say at a later Parliament can

:39:22.:39:25.

revive the prerogative is logically the same as saying the early

:39:26.:39:29.

Parliament could not abolish it. It is still there to be revived,

:39:30.:39:37.

somehow. Parliament providing it will only create statutory power,

:39:38.:39:38.

Parliament cannot create powers, prerogative powers, it only

:39:39.:39:48.

creates... So far I have only argued that Parliament can Parliament can

:39:49.:39:52.

get rid of prerogative. The final part is saying why it has. This is

:39:53.:39:58.

the evidence from the act. As I say, it depends on the act. The early

:39:59.:40:05.

triggers for dissolution, Parliament may not be devolved otherwise.

:40:06.:40:10.

Explanatory notes to that says the Queen will not be able to dissolve

:40:11.:40:15.

parliament in exercise of the prerogative. And even

:40:16.:40:27.

more spectacularly, Parliament was not abolished by this act. They are

:40:28.:40:35.

admissible as an aid to construction. Judges has given me a

:40:36.:40:45.

list of cases in which they have referred to construction. That is

:40:46.:40:51.

the -- that was noted in a House of Commons briefing paper where the act

:40:52.:40:58.

was introduced to remove the prerogative power of dissolution.

:40:59.:41:04.

Now, so, suppose it has been, suppose I am right or we don't know,

:41:05.:41:11.

what will happen is there was one -- the fixed Parliament act was

:41:12.:41:17.

repealed. And. My argument is, given this is never actually been tested,

:41:18.:41:22.

there is not a prerogative that has been revived, there must be

:41:23.:41:26.

substantial doubt as to what would happen. The House of Commons library

:41:27.:41:35.

briefing says what happened. The interpretation, you can argue either

:41:36.:41:39.

way, does it apply to prerogative? Not clear, it suggests. That they

:41:40.:41:47.

wouldn't provide. You can perhaps, by providing the contrary intention.

:41:48.:41:50.

I don't think the interpretation of the act is decisive either way on

:41:51.:41:51.

that. The local governor of -- what would happen because I could

:41:52.:42:04.

you would be left with no mechanism of dissolution at all. You might

:42:05.:42:12.

argue, there would be a legal void and law would be a vacuum. I would

:42:13.:42:18.

say no, if there was no mechanism for dissolution than the mechanism

:42:19.:42:22.

is there in an act. I thought Theresa May had lost, if she hadn't

:42:23.:42:27.

been given the two thirds of majority and Labour had turned it

:42:28.:42:32.

down, if she hadn't gone to no confidence her own government, she

:42:33.:42:36.

could have done, that was likely, the Bristol next step would be the

:42:37.:42:42.

act to threaten the House of Lords, a terrible thing happening

:42:43.:42:48.

immediately straightaway, and in light of that, the safe clause is to

:42:49.:42:53.

replace the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act with statutory. There must be

:42:54.:42:57.

considerable doubt as to whether the prerogative still exists or not.

:42:58.:43:01.

There was one final slam dunk which says why you can't have a

:43:02.:43:06.

straightforward repeal, it's because if you repeal the tap-in you would

:43:07.:43:15.

be indefinitely extended -- if you repeal the Fixed-Term Parliaments

:43:16.:43:20.

Act you would extend Parliament. This is because the five-year limit

:43:21.:43:24.

on Parliament was provided by section seven of the bomb attack.

:43:25.:43:29.

Both of those works -- Parliament act. Both of those are repealed by

:43:30.:43:34.

the act. That sets out a five-year limit on file. So repeal the

:43:35.:43:37.

Fixed-Term Parliaments Act and this just carries on.

:43:38.:43:44.

He you read the extending the life of Parliament indefinitely. Under

:43:45.:43:56.

section 21 no limit on the powers does not extend to extending the

:43:57.:44:04.

way. Full veto rights. I would argue that the convention would not apply.

:44:05.:44:08.

Because of the fact that what would be going on, government would be

:44:09.:44:15.

extending the life of Parliament. Not expecting intelligent voters to

:44:16.:44:27.

go digging round. And no mandate, clearly, four extending the life of

:44:28.:44:30.

Parliament. This bill has got to do something. I think we have set out

:44:31.:44:34.

the arguments. Good evening. I am glad to see what

:44:35.:45:34.

you past the selected tests, not everybody could get in! You would

:45:35.:45:39.

imagine that the members of the panel, speaking, some going outside

:45:40.:45:49.

to jeer, calling them failures! We are always accused of doing that. It

:45:50.:45:55.

is done incessantly by the opponents of selection by ability. The

:45:56.:45:59.

principle of that debate, pretending we do not

:46:00.:46:01.

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