Guy Verhofstadt European Parliament

I would like to start the meeting. We are already late, so could we

please stop the meeting. As thank you very much indeed. There

we start our usual meeting dedicated to the discussion of the Brexit

process and we today have to parts for this discussion. First of all we

will listen to Guy Verhofstadt, the coordinator of the Brexit process.

And we will have a regular hearing from Guy Verhofstadt on the process.

A lot has happened, and we have those moments of discussion on

Brexit because this committee, as you all know, this committee has a

very important horizontal role in the process. At the end of the

process, this is the committee that will do the evaluation of the

results of the Brexit negotiations and the proposal to endorse the

results of the procedure, so first we will listen to Guy Verhofstadt

and then we will have the chance to also ask questions and then we will

listen to a presentation on the consequences and legal issues

regarding citizens rights in the process. Guy Verhofstadt, I hope you

can have five minutes later on to response to questions that we might

have. I am at the disposal of the committee. First of all, if you

allow me, I want to thank you, chair, for the invitation to give a

new overview of where we are in the preparation of them negotiations on

Brexit. That is the follow up on an earlier report that I did, two

months ago, where we prepared the resolution of the Parliament on

Brexit. Maybe I can start by recalling this resolution that has

been prepared by the Conference of Presidents and has been backed by

five political groups in the Parliament and has been adopted with

an overwhelming majority, as you know, with 560 votes with 50

abstentions. I think that I do not exaggerate when I say that this

resolution has also been the basis for because alterations, and later

on for the mandate and the guidelines that have been decided by

the European Council last Saturday. The fact that apparently the meeting

of the European Council on the mandate only lasted four minutes, I

think, was a sign of the good preparation on these guidelines,

based on the resolution of the Parliament and I can tell you that

when you compare the resolution of the Parliament with the guidelines

of the European Council, there is an enormous similarity in not only

content but also in wording. And the representatives of the European

Parliament, myself also Mistiroc, and with the help of the services of

the Parliament, had been involved in the preparatory meetings to finalise

the text that has been approved in the European Council meeting. --

myself and also Mr Barack. I do not recall all of the elements of that

resolution and I do not recall the content of the guidelines, but what

is now important is to decide on what will be presented today by the

negotiator after the meeting of the European Commission, on the

negotiation directives. These directives contain a proposal on

paper which has already been put at the disposal last week. And when I

received the text of this project, the negotiation directives, I

immediately transferred them to the different committees that were

involved because in fact the negotiation directives concerning a

few specific points that will be discussed. First of all the citizens

rights issue, with everything that implies. That will BA first block in

the negotiation directives. The second block is everything

concerning the financial settlement. And more details about what the

different elements are of the financial settlement. And then a

number of more general issues about borders and the Good Friday

Agreement, which is also a third essential element of the agreement.

And then a chapter on administrative procedures, and a final chapter on

the oversight of the whole process by the European board of justice.

Those are the main five elements of this so-called negotiation

directives. And so I have to inform members that we follow up this

process, since the approval of the resolution, with what we call a

Brexit steering group. In which the representatives of the five groups

will be there, present, that have backed the resolution of the

European Parliament. Plus, naturally, your presence as the

chair of AFCO, because it is clear that AFCO needs to keep the overview

in this process, I should say, and your presence in the Brexit steering

group is extremely important for that goal and for that objective. So

today, the commission will present a proposal for these negotiation

directives, with these five elements, or sediments -- on

citizens rights and the Good Friday Agreement, on administrative

procedures and also on the oversight of the European court of justice.

And that proposal will be adopted in a general council meeting on the

22nd of May. And it is the intention of the Conference of Presidents to

formally react to that proposal of the College on the 11th of May. In

advance of the meeting of the General Council on the 22nd of May.

In general, I can say that the Brexit steering group, we are nearly

100% in line with the known paper was all that will be presented today

in the college. And for that, we have asked our committees to give us

the necessary information so we will send that immediately to a number of

committees, and the committees involved are connected to citizens

rights, and the employment committee. We have sent the

financial settlement chapter to the budgetary committees, the budget

committee itself and the budgetary control committee. And actually, all

of these texts have been sent to the chair of our committee, to ensure

that we are on the right track. The reactions that we have received from

the committees were all positive. There were no fundamental remarks or

criticisms on the text proposed. Nevertheless, yesterday,

in the Brexit steering group, we have made a number of concrete, more

detailed proposals that have been sent to the commission, and that

will be repeated if necessary in the official position of the Conference

of Presidents on the 11th of May. An important addition that would repeat

every time in our contacts discussing this directive, this

negotiation directive, is that on the issue of borders, and the Good

Friday Agreement, it is absolutely key that every time we specify that

it concerns all parts of the Good Friday Agreement. Because it is an

important addition that has been done by the Parliament from day one,

and it needs to be taken on board in the negotiation directives. It is

already in the guidelines, as we know, but also in the negotiations

and the directives. Secondly, on citizens rights, we have also

suggested that the mandates of the UK representatives on European Works

councils in European companies should be maintained, so the whole

problem around the European Works Council established in the UK, we

think that is a useful addition to the chapter on citizens rights, in

the negotiation directives. We also think that it is necessary, and it

was another proposal by the Parliament that in the issue of

citizens rights, there needs to be reciprocity from the beginning until

the end. And naturally, as a Parliament, we agree and we have

even insisted that the chapter on citizens rights needs to be the

first chapter to be negotiated between the UK and the European

union, because we cannot continue to have a situation in which millions

and millions of UK citizens and millions of EU citizens continue to

live in uncertainty, as is the case today. So we have agreed at this

point that it is the first point of the negotiation. But we have done a

few proposals to complete the negotiation directives on this

issue. On the financial settlement, naturally we have repeated the

position that we underlined in the resolution of the European

Parliament, taking on board our commitments, taking on board all

liabilities, including contingent liabilities to the budget committees

which are in anyway positive about the way the financial settlement and

different elements of the financial settlement is approached. On the

issue of the oversight of the whole process, Parliament has proposed,

based on your proposal, chair, to make it clear that in the whole

process, it will be the European board of justice that has the over

site of the whole process, and to make it clearer in the negotiation

directives than it was already the case in the guidelines. -- oversight

of the whole process. And finally, we have also proposed to the

commission and if necessary we will repeat that at the General Council

of the 22nd of May, that in the introduction of the negotiation

directives, it should be useful to put a principle in place which is

that these negotiations must be done in good faith and certainly not in

any way hindered by the day-to-day activities of the European Union.

That is that is a clear problem, we have seen last week that files

linked to the financial framework and the budget are put on hold

because there are negotiations about Brexit. That cannot be repeated in

the future, so it's important and we have suggested to the commission and

hopefully they will take that on board in their proposal they adopt

today in the college that a clear indication in the introduction of

these negotiations directives that we cannot accept that the normal

decision-making process in the union is jeopardised, I should say, by

these first phase of the negotiations. On the sequencing of

the negotiations, the proposal we have made in the resolution has been

taken on board and the guidelines will be repeated also in the

negotiation directives. It means that the first phase is to agree on

a withdrawal agreement and only when sufficient progress is made in this

first phase, we can start to talk about the second phase, the future

relationship with the UK. In that respect, it's important to know and

we have to play a key role in this, it's the intention of the European

Parliament and the proposal of conference of Presidents to the

European Parliament to make its own assessment in the second half of the

year if sufficient progress has been made. If sufficient progress is made

and we can go to the second phase, it's a decision that will be taken

by the European Council. Because they decide on the guidelines. I

think it's the role of the Parliament and the responsibility of

the Parliament to give its opinion, if sufficient progress is made in

due course. That can be in October, November. The idea is that besides

the resolution we have adopted a few weeks ago, we should have a second

horizontal resolution about the question if sufficient progress is

made in the negotiation table from phase one phase two and to do that

with a resolution adopted in the finery of the Parliament before the

European Council is making its assessment. I think that's central

to the role that we have to play, to see that if within the guidelines

and the negotiation directives, we can call from phase one, sufficient

progress in the withdrawal of treatment, two phase two,

negotiations and talks about the future relationship of the European

Union. On the future relationship, I want to recall to my colleagues that

Parliament in its resolution has from day one made a very clear

choice. We have indicated article 217 from the association agreement

is the framework to do so. It's a flexible framework for is that you

can do a lot of things inside the association agreement. It can be

small, it can be brought and it can not only be about trade and economy

but also about security, internal and external. Is the Lisbon Treaty,

it gives a framework that didn't exist before and that clarifies a

lot. I think we need... My advice is that to the Brexit steering group

and all of our contacts and in our briefings with the commission

negotiator and the council should continue on that line and to see the

association agreement is the right framework for the future

relationship with the UK. The next step for us is preparation

of this general counsel with the Brexit steering group and with your

presence, chair, that will normally be done next week. Thank you. Thank

you very much and I like to open the floor for the discussion on the

first to speak, I would like to ask it to be as concise as possible in

your questions and comments. It is very much and my thanks to all the

white that you have done for coming along today and giving us his very

clear outline of the state of play. I want to begin by eating two

general suggestions, one is that no negotiation ends up for the

negotiators would like it to end up. There always are expected events,

feeling in this particular case, a snap election called by Theresa May

was exactly one of these unexpected events. The second general point is

that this is a reciprocal process. In the perception, what impact does

he think the five points that he made and I think the five points are

well taken, what impact are these likely to have on the attitude of

the United Kingdom. The second point, in your perception, however

where is the UK said at the levels that matter of the role this

Parliament, I don't get the feeling that has really sunk in that I hope

I'm wrong on this. Thirdly, if you link the point on citizens rights,

the financial elements on the fifth point, the role of the EU CJ, it

seems to me that what were looking at is the of the EU CJ will actually

be there for the forthcoming period as far as one can see, we know from

the British side that this is totally unacceptable, I expect there

will be a very serious conflict on this but I don't know how he sees

it. I question you don't have to answer but a hypothetical, if you

had a time machine, how would you have drafted Article 50? Much the

same as it is? Not at all, radical changes, I'm curious because of all

your experience working on this, whether you think Article 50 in its

present form is the best option? Very much. Please be as short as

possible. Thank you very much for your presentation and your earlier

work. I have not political but just detailed questions and comments,

it's related to the cross committee work on some issues, for example

citizens rights. On one hand we are looking at some much more

complicated solutions. Privacy protection, writes. Very important

for trade and business development for the economy and on the other

hand it's important with the rule of reciprocity and for citizens on both

sides in the European Union and the UK. We are on the way to implement

general data protection regulations and we have started the work and how

to solve those problems and create some kind of agreements and work on

complicated issues. Thank you very much for coming along

this morning, I'm sure you will understand that when I listen to

what you have to say and you take hardline and I compare that with the

head of the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom who seem to have

undergone some form of change and have now announced them as a

Eurosceptic. Did you contact him to get some input to the comments

you've made? Even so, I will take on board everything that you've

mentioned foot of the troubling matter for a number of people who

have taken the trouble to contact me since the weekend as an MEP in the

United Kingdom is in the context that they recognise that both

parties involved in negotiating situation established their

positions, that parameters and red lines. That is to be expected, there

is no problem in terms of that context. However, what I think has

inflamed public opinion in the United Kingdom was the position

taken following the meeting between Jean-Claude Juncker and the Prime

Minister, seemingly meeting of comments to the press and

effectively a continuation of the bullying coming out of the European

Union in terms of the position announced and the comment made was

why the immature and puerile comments by Jamaat can I ask you to

comment on that and give some idea of whether you support the position

taken last weekend of whether you would be prepared to take back, in

your position as one of the lead negotiators, to ask for an element

of toning down and to return to what was previously a very conservatory

position taken by the United Kingdom and one that was, I believe, in the

past, up until the weekend conducive towards the so-called amicable

divorce. Thank you very much. Following from that, may I underline

there are a variety of views within the United Kingdom about the events

that have taken place over the last few days. Perhaps I could ask the

gentleman whether she gets the impression that the British site of

honour about whether the understand the role of the European Parliament,

do they understand the procedure in general? Because at times one gets

the impression that they have a completely different negotiating

procedure in mind and what the European Union has put on the table.

Secondly, British public opinion is still blissfully unaware of what the

UK Government is intending to demand in these negotiations on a number of

fronts. We still don't know whether the UK ultimately, the UK Government

will ultimately asked to remain with them at least aspects of the customs

union, we don't know whether the UK Government intends to ask to have

some sort of continuing participation in the various EU

agencies, the aviation agency, chemicals agency, medicines agency,

we don't know what ultimate goal, normal transitional arrangements

they wish to put in place regarding fisheries are regarding agriculture.

There are a lot of things that the British Government has still not

spelled-out even to its own public for its own parliament. Have you had

any indications from the British side of what their intentions are in

this respect and can you enlighten us?

Thank you for the presentation, I think you are a competent

representative of this house despite various attacks that come from Ukip,

but that should not preoccupy us more than it does. It is nothing.

Jean-Claude Juncker came out of this dinner seeing I have the impression

the British Government is on another galaxy that that's not only on

another planet of this galaxy but another galaxy. Endlessly far-away

from what we discuss here and Richard asked the same question. On

what galaxy is the British negotiators compared with ours? That

come to my second question, you mentioned that we have in the treaty

Article 217 that any country in the associated to the EU, so it's only

possible if a country wants to re-associate with the EU, if they

want to be a WTO country, then this article will not help us.

And with this article I would be worried that we get cherry picking,

that the British side has let say ten points they like and 20 points

they do not like, and then you negotiate an agreement of lots of

likes, and I think one element of our guidelines were that a country

leaving the EU cannot have a better situation than a member country. So

one has to be careful about the outcome, if the cherry picking

continues what we have seen over the years. To be short, my third

question would be transparency. I learned from the dinner in Downing

Street that the British side would like to hide the position papers,

whereas the new side -- the EU side would like to publish it. It depends

on TTIP and all the negotiations that we do. We have been working for

transparency and it would be ridiculous if these negotiations

were in secret. I would like to speak Polish.

TRANSLATION: I would have one very simple recommendation the

recommendation to adopt a more rational and calm tone that should

definitely improve the climate during negotiations. The European

Parliament definitely has all the rights to play its own role in the

whole process, however it will be best if the European Parliament also

felt its responsibility for the process as a whole, for its final

results. I think it's in the best interests of you to make sure that

it all ends up with a good agreement based on mutual understanding from

both parties. No, it's not a win-win situation, obviously, but it's all

about minimising the collateral damage, if I can put it this way,

and sustaining certain relations. Negative comments that destroy the

climate, unfortunately, have been altered by both sides and the first

resolution of the European Parliament after the referendum also

presented some comments full of irritation that definitely did not

contribute to making the climate or atmosphere better. Yes, we have to

influence the negotiations but we have to be aware that we are

responsible, we have a responsibility for the process as a

whole. And I think that you're assessed and, -- your assessment Mr

Verhofstadt, that should be conducted in autumn by the European

Parliament, I am sure it will be a practical assessment and not at all

to exert pressure on other actors in the negotiations. I would like to

repeat what I think we need is a rational and calm tone to make sure

we have a positive outcome. Positive for Europe. And I think that bearing

a grudge or telling the British that they live in a different galaxy does

not contribute to improving the climate of the talks.

TRANSLATION: Thank you, Mr Verhofstadt for that excellent

presentation. I am happy, as he is, about the fact that the Parliament

has taken on this accelerating role regarding the council positions. But

I am happy in particular with regard to the role of the court of justice

that you spoke about. And also for the future transition agreement. My

questionnaires, on the position of the Council, because that is less

clear than that of the Parliament at this point. -- my question is. And I

would propose a mechanism to resolve controversy. I am happy about these

things but I am extremely concerned about the climate of the negotiation

and all of the indiscretions that have come out over the past few

days. I am not worried about the Ukip attacks but I am worried about

what I think is a hard Brexit positioning on everybody's part. The

UK Government, and also on the part of the Europe of the 27. There are

differences, clear differences, not only on the financial issue but also

on the issue of the rights of European citizens, and on the phased

negotiation idea. Now that gives me cause for concern and I would like

to know what Guy thinks about that. Apparently rights will not be

guaranteed in a detailed manner, as we would like. They will become

currency for exchange regarding other agreements and given that

everybody is thinking about a hard Brexit, there is no will to move

towards an agreement. Why am I saying that? Well, because it is

clear that the principal of an agreement should come first and then

we need to think about other agreements. But Article 50 itself,

and I agree that one day we need to use Time Machine and rewrite that

article, but Article 50 also says that we need to in mind future

relations. And negotiate the first phase. And the withdrawal. Now, Link

to this, I would like to know from Geevor Hof is that what he thinks

about the sentence that really worries me, appearing in the case

decisions, or in the guidelines. -- I would like to know from Guy

Verhofstadt. Nothing can be subject to agreement until everything is the

subject of agreement, or nothing must be agreed on until everything

is agreed on. I don't know if that is a good basis for negotiation but

I would like to know what you think. I think that this was already

rejected as a negotiating line. In South Africa, because it was really

risky. Could be a total impasse. If we use that as a basis for

negotiation. Thank you. We have five minutes more for responses and for

people on the list to speak. Please be short. Let me thank Guy

Verhofstadt for his very useful presentation. I have a brief but I

believe important issue on citizens rights. For the sake of

clarification, the guidelines adopted by the Council working again

on this resolution say that on the date of withdrawal, the treaties

will cease to apply to the United Kingdom. But I also say that,

regarding the traditional arrangement, should the union be

considered, it will require additional judiciary and enforcement

instruments and structures to apply. My questionnaires does this include

the principle of free movement of people? It means that if such a

situation should be prolonged for a traditional period, then we should

understand that the principle of free movement of people should be

capped for the entire transitional period. Thank you. TRANSLATION:

Thank you. I would like to thank Guy Verhofstadt for this clear and size

presentation. Since there isn't much time, I have a couple of questions

that I will ask quickly. The first has to do with the financial

settlement. And would it be possible to distribute a clear document on

the negotiation proposals made since this is one of the hot topics, and

if I have understood correctly, it is causing problems in the first

phase of the negotiations. And on the second point, I am concerned

about the climate, particularly about the impression that the

citizens' rights would be the hardest points to negotiate. From

this point of view... A couple of points on the negotiating position

for the second phase and for the framework would be necessary. Also

on the part of the European Union. We need to think about citizens,

Britons in Europe and Europeans in Great Britain. It is hard for people

to relate this to the future. There is a barrier regarding rights and I

think that would be hard to accept by the public. Some sort of idea

about what the European Union wants for the future to agree on a

framework that isn't simply closing everything off and thinking on WTO

agreements. It would be useful to have that, particularly in order to

respond to what all Europeans and British people are starting to think

about with regard to the future of relations. On citizens and citizens'

rights. Then we can move on the second phase after the is reached.

And we can think about what the European Union might bring to the

table. Max Anderson and then we still have Fabiola. Please keep

comments to one minute. Briefly, I am worried by these negotiations.

Theresa May has been saying that no deal is better than a bad deal.

Theresa May is wrong. A no deal situation would be terrible for the

United Kingdom. It would be car crashed Brexit. And it would be

quite a big problem for the EU as well. In your considered opinion,

what is the risk of a hard Brexit? TRANSLATION: I will try to be brief.

I would like to thank my colleagues for the report. I am delighted that

the first point is about citizens' rights. In that we cannot think

about the fact that, well, there are more than 200,000 living in Greater

London. And I think that the number is greater than the number that is

actually registered, so I am glad you have focused on that point. And

I do hope that this will be confirmed during the course of

negotiations and that it is not just a matter for exchange as mentioned

earlier when referring to risks. The steering group, what about the

difference in views compared to the negotiation proposal made the second

question, picking up on what Barbara said about the risks, I'd like to

echo what she said about the hard Brexit and I want to know, in light

of these rumours and what we read in the papers today, is there a greater

risk that will conclude these two years with a hard Brexit and then

there will be very difficult negotiations, that's clear, but I'd

like to know if any thought has been given to the practical nature of

resolving future elections, for example and how to avoid that

paradoxical situation of the exit of the UK and then an electoral

campaign, I think this is key with regard to reflections on the future

of the European Union. The second thing, there has been mention of the

principle of good faith and that the UK cannot move ahead with

negotiations and trade agreements without this initial agreement but

have we thought about the fact that they might have some kind of legal

condition, might consider some kind of legal condition with regard to

the application of this agreement? Will it be possible for them to

negotiate regardless of their current situation. Agreement be

valid only if and when we leave the European Union? Do you think the

solution might be possible? Thank you for your remarks, it's

clear with the guidelines where we are. One question to all of us and

probably to you in particular, how are we guaranteeing that according

to the principle nothing is agreed before this and everything is agreed

that free movement for citizens interests are not traded in other

chapters with other issues, so how can we guarantee that as a red line

for the parliament and our decision is really kept for us. The second

question, coming from the International trade committee, we

have also discussed the problems with East African communities and

West African communities, we have countries which are not interested

in concluding the ongoing negotiations because they don't know

what the Brexit means for the future relationship, so if we are starting

the trade negotiations of the new relationship between the United

Kingdom and the European Union 27 means that for the ongoing

negotiations today the other countries, how we are bridging this

challenge in our commercial and foreign policy relationships. The

floor is yours. To start with, the element on the risk of all the hard

Brexit. I agree with the comments that were made that it would be a

bad thing for Europe and an even worse thing for the UK. I don't

think that is from the European site have to start the negotiations with

that goal. The goal has to be to find a new partnership and

relationship with the UK based naturally on the principle that you

can never have a better status outside the union than inside the

union. Also a point that was made. A hard Brexit would be bad for

everybody but certainly a hard hit for the UK. Let's not... That brings

me to the second point, the climate is not good, I can tell you, I had

in my life a few negotiations. When you are already a number of decades

in politics, you have done some negotiations and in my own country

and I'm not so surprised by what is happening, it always happens before

the start of a negotiation. It's the building up of pressure from both

sides. So I'm not so worried about that,

the building up of the pressure from the duties owed the European side,

it's also difficult for me to tell you to give comments of what

happened in the meeting between Juncker and... I was not there and

it's difficult to tell something about it and what really happened.

That doesn't, in my eyes, it's not a problem that we are talking about

series negotiations, it's a serious matter, it's a search for a new

relationship and the building up of this pressure, I've seen that plenty

of times in other situations. My preoccupation is a bit different, it

is... What is now the proposals from the UK side? It's difficult to

assess that for the moment. That gives an uncertainty for the moment,

and uncertainty that is not good, certainly not for citizens because

we are here for citizens, the citizens are now ready for one year,

and uncertainty about their rights. Their status. They don't know.

Everything can happen and we receive, Parliament receives

thousands and thousands of e-mails from people living in Britain and

British nationals living on the continent and they ask what will

happen, can you help me a little bit? I think that we had to take

away as fast as possible this uncertainty as part of a global

withdrawal agreement that means we can start with that topic but

formally it will naturally only be formalised at the moment at the

moment of the withdrawal agreement as a whole. That means that you have

only an agreement on the point, you have an agreement on everything I

think it's a sound principle in politics, I've never seen politics

working differently than based on that principle. I'm preoccupied by

that, we cannot afford ourselves... We have two

-- we cannot continued uncertainty with the citizens, another six

months or a year, it is destroying lives, families, businesses and

Parliament has two deal with this at the forefront to avoid this. I can

tell you that is done in the negotiation directors. The European

Union makes clear in transparency, so that document will be published

today, maybe at the moment that we are speaking, it is published, how

to take away this uncertainty for the citizens. All workers, all

self-employed, all families and so on. What we are talking about, what

citizens rights, social rights, labour mobility, writes Link to

that, self-employment and the recognition of diplomas

certificates, formal qualifications and so on. We indicate how from the

European side, we indicate how to deal with the citizens rights in a

broad sense, not the narrow sense, a broad sense. And immediately to

respond to Mr Pereira's remarks, we for some reason, there is a

transition period, for example a phasing out that means that its

continuing for a limited period, we have that in a resolution, maximum

three years. 'S clear that, for example, if we continue, this is an

example, if we continue with a single market like that, it's the

whole single market, also it's the free movement of people, we won't

start in a transition period to say, it's only for good, but not for

people. That's the reason of the wording that you have read, it has

to be consistent, it will then be all the key elements about

continuing. And also the oversight by the UK court of justice because

still union law that's applicable. I think that with what happened today,

an important thing from the European side, we publish in full

transparency because that's the way. We have published the guidelines,

the guidelines, you will know them today. A final version of the

negotiation directors will be on the table. Everybody can see, feel,

read. What the position of the European Parliament and institutions

backed by the European Parliament will be. There is no secret mandate.

That is given in the four corners of the European institutions. I say

that you because this transparency is key and I think it's very

important for the European side to keep that. The next point on the

financial settlement. People have said it's a question of punishment,

that's nothing to do with it. It simply that if we have a divorce,

you go out of your management and your partner will take all the

bills. And by buying. That's not how it works, I've never divorce so I

cannot tell you is not by experience. People can confirm what

I'm saying. There has to be a financial settlement. That is

obvious. The way we see it with Parliament, we have never entered in

that discussion today are about the figure. That's fantastic, maybe for

the media. Our approach is different. We say let's agree. They

are now also in the negotiation directive. Accounting principles,

that has to be the basis for such financial settlement. If you agree

on that, then the figure is the outcome, even when I'm realistic,

and the end we now hope political negotiations work. The reason why we

have to be keen on that is not a question of revenge or punishment,

it's just fairness and we cannot ask to the 27 remaining members of the

European Union to pay the bill for a departure of a country. That will

not be done. I was in several meetings and none of the 27th is

ready to do that. The way to settle this, I think, is let's agree on

sound accounting principles and then let's apply them and we see what the

figure is. At the end there can be a negotiation about it but it's not a

question of punishment or revenge, it's not fair to say that.

In the same way, no cherry picking, not a better position out than in,

citizens first, I have given you that that will be key. On the

questions of trade, in the position of the parliament, it is clear that

there can be no sanctions, that doesn't exist. If the British sites

are threatening the we must continue trading with the same companies, we

have indicated what should be done in our resolution. I stick to that.

There are no formal measures, but in any way, it is a little bit

difficult. I cannot imagine that, for example, you are negotiating

with the country and we are negotiating with the same country.

You can add to the three things at the same time. That is not how you

deal with this. We have given a proposal for that in our resolution

and I think it makes sense to stick to that. The final question, the

Article 50, I hope that this is the only time we need to use Article 50

and never again in the future, because the problem doesn't exist

any more about Article 50. If we don't need to use it any more. It is

not such a bad article, maybe it is not so precise, but the lack of

precision gives us some opportunities to work through

negotiations. Thank you. There is no time for repetition of questions, so

I would like to thank you very much for being with us and I hope to see

you soon. We hope to see you in every meeting because you are a full

member. While we the next briefing, by the start of negotiations, maybe.

Thank you in any case. I would like to move to the second half of this

discussion. We are using... We are not paying for his overnight, we

really appreciate the effort you have done to stay in Brussels and to

come here and your time, first we will speak and then ask questions.

It is about citizens, which is of big interest to many of us here.

Thank you Madame chair and thank you to the committee for the invitation

to speak to you about the consequences of Brexit with regard

to citizenship. Also, thank you for the opportunity for listening to the

previous and very engaging discussion. Actually, I felt tempted

about commenting on some of the things that said. I will not do that

for obvious reasons. That is not what I was asked to come here. I

will talk about the time Article 50 four subject to recall that when

Article 50 was adopted, every EU lawyer, including myself and every

constitutional scholar of the European Union presented Article 50

not as an opportunity to leave the European Union, but so as to make

member states more comfortable in staying. I think it is important to

recall that. Historically, the way it was presented was by formally

forcing the possibility for a member state to exit will reinforce the

voluntary character of the membership of the European Union and

that will make it more comfortable for everyone to stay. This is just

to remind us of the law of and predictable consequences and the

extent to which one would think Brexit itself and what will be the

final outcome of this process, I will be very careful in predicting

whatever outcome will be. I mean whatever outcome would be of Brexit.

You will remember that we have a famous singer in Portugal of a

football player that I always used to say predictions only at the end

of the match. I will say the same thing regarding Brexit. Now, moving

to the question of citizenship, I will address, very briefly, several

possible alternatives and issues that arise in the context of the

protection of the rights of citizens. Both the rights of

citizens of other European states residing in the United Kingdom

currently, or up to the moment of exit. That is one of the questions

that will have to be discussed. What is the cut-off date in terms of

safeguarding those rights. Also, the rights of UK citizens in the

European Union, in particular after Brexit. So, I will also try at the

end to relate this discussion with a broader discussion on the concept of

European citizenship. What should we learn for the concept of European

citizenship more broadly in this context? The first strategy is what

I would call protect the rights, even if you cannot protect the

citizenship. It seems the more natural approach is to decouple the

rights that residents both UK citizens in other European member

states at the moment and other European member states in the UK at

the moment have, to decouple these rights they have and protect those

rights, even if they no longer will have the prospective citizenship.

This is a possibility. It involves finding a package of rights that we

want to protect. We just heard some of them. Recognition of diplomas,

free movement, right of establishment, a variety of social

protections in that context. It has to be clear that it is not the same

thing as protecting those rights and the citizenship. I do not mean that

in a symbolic or political recognition sense, even if that is

important in itself. That will also have a broader consequences because

one of the things that citizenship does is it provides a dynamic

character to the existing set of rights that are linked to it. Even

to rights that exist and were given even before the existence of

citizenship. Citizenship itself, when it was created, didn't bring

many new rights. It brought some political rights. It brought right

to not economically active citizens, but also then, mostly through the

interpretation of the European Court of Justice, was to expand the scope

of existing rights. They quite clearly used the concept of

citizenship to expand its scope of obligation of non-discrimination. If

we decouple the rights from citizenship will be losing that

dimension. There is also the matter of political rights, the extent to

which they can be maintained in the absence of citizenship. He said that

there is a dynamic nature of that is lost. That's one of the reasons why

some people have raised the possibility, particularly for UK

citizens and in particular for UK citizens that are currently residing

in other European member states, even if the possibility in the

abstract can be conceived for all UK citizens, I think that this is

citizens initiative even, raising the possibility. That is the

possibility being raised of them maintaining European Union

citizenship. There are two possibilities in which that could

take place. One partial possibility. The first possibility is what could

be called of associate citizenship. That is to say that the European

Union will give citizenship to UK citizens, even if the UK will no

longer be a member of the European Union. This will be a fundamental

transformation on the concept of European citizenship as it is today.

The concept of European citizenship is a derivative right. It results

from your national citizenship. If, on the one hand, this will be

politically symbolic and important and it is a continuation of the

debate that has taken place in the past, with some arguing that the

European Union should be able to give European citizenship

independently from the existence of national citizenship. On the other

hand, it is important that we understand fundamental impact that

has. The fact that European citizenship is derivative from state

citizenship, is derivative from national citizenship, is something

that has a value because at the same time European citizenship transport

is beyond our states, it also reinforces and strengthens our

relationship with our state. We are only European citizenship because we

have state citizenship. This dimension will be lost. There are

advantages, but also costs in opening the door to that fundamental

transformation. A second possibility that I think much more unlikely

we'll be the European Union to agree to impose on member states to give

their national citizenship to those UK residence and as a consequence

then they will have you citizenship. I think that is very unlikely

because that would be European Union determining the conditions for the

acquisition of national citizenship. I think that proposal is unfeasible

politically. Both proposals would require treaty amendments. There is

no other legal bases to do that. There is one possibility that will

still be within the decouple of rights. There is one possibility is

to guarantee the UK citizens that are residing in other member states

a set of rights that are back in to the similar rights they have under

European citizenship. One of the differences on the statues of

citizens from other member states that will continue to reside in the

kingdom and will have the right to reside and associate rights. The

position of UK citizens that are residing in another member state is

that if the only automatic transformation will give these UK

citizens residing in other member states the right to reside and

similar rights to those they have in those member states, they will lose

one fundamental dimension, the possibility to be mobile and

circulate in other member states. But there is one possibility to

address that the dispute Article 79, the European Union is it legal bases

regulating the rights of third country nationals residing in member

states. That may be one possibility, but still, again, going back to the

possibility of decoupling citizenship from the package of

rights. There is one other possibility with respect to

maintaining citizenship. Again, I think it is very unlikely and very

doubtful in legal terms to be successful, but interesting. There

might be some challenges being brought to the court in this

respect. That is to use the European court of justice case. There is a

case before the court where I was the advocate general in that case.

In that decision, the court conceded, for the first time, that

even if the European Union could not impose an member states the

conditions for the acquisition or loss of national citizenship, the

European Union could control the conditions under which member states

themselves will withdraw the citizenship of other nationals. The

court said that member states could not determine the loss of national

citizenship in a way that would be disproportionate. One possibility,

and I have heard there are groups of UK citizens who are intent on trying

to challenge the loss of citizenship that would result from Brexit using

this case law. They are arguing it would be disproportionate. I think

it is unlikely that that would be successful. If the court will say

so, we will basically devoid Article 50 of any useful purpose because the

consequence of Article 50, of leaving, it has to be losing

citizenship. So, it would be very difficult to square those two

objectives and those two purposes. There is one angle in which this

possible legal challenge, in my view, will have a stronger

likelihood of success, even if it is still highly sensitive. That is the

following. To my knowledge, that question was raised before the

referendum took place and I have to say that at that moment, I thought

that at least they understood why, politically, it was not pursued and

the British court did not refer to the brink of justice when those

issues were raised before the British courts. I think that,

legally, there was a strong argument in that respect and it is the

following. If the UK citizens residing in other member states,

many of them did not have the right to vote in the referendum. They will

have a stronger argument in invoking the way they lost, the way they will

lose their European citizenship, because they will be forced to

abdicate that citizenship in I think there would have been a

basis to challenge the decision. Not to say the member state has no right

to withdraw but to say even the decision of the member state to

withdraw has to take place in accordance with certain fundamental

principles. One of them will be, for example, the right of participation

of all the citizens of those member states. Particularly that they are

not deprived of the right to participate in that decision by the

simple fact that they want to live in another member state. If you

think about that, that was the crucial aspect. In my view, that in

itself legally would be a very strong argument. I understand

politically at this point it will be highly unlikely that even the Court

of Justice will accept to take this decision, but in legal terms I think

there is a strong foundation in that argueful. -- argument. There is one

other possibility that is to have some UK citizens may maintain

citizenship of the European Union and others won't. This is a

provocation and it is nothing prevents a part of the UK to stay

and another part to leave. We have a precedent with that. It's called

Greenland. We have the case of one member state where a part of its

territory left the European Union and another part stayed. So in

principle, nothing will prevent for the territories, for example, of

Northern Ireland and Scotland to stay in the European Union and for

the rest of the territory of the UK no longer to be part of the European

Union. Of course, this will be complex to organise in practice and

will require a border inside the member state because it will

basically mean Scotland and Ireland will remain part of the European

Union and part of the United Kingdom. But it will not be

impossible. Still it will be again very problematic in political terms

and the consequences of it will make it difficult. If you think about it,

I think on the one hand one risk will be economic for the UK because

naturally you will have, I would say for Scotland and Northern Ireland,

it would be extremely positive. They'd attract lots of investments

and companies that will locate in those territories because they'll

benefit from those markets. Of course for the rest of the United

Kingdom, it will be even more dramatic because there'll be

economic mobility to that part of its territory. For the European

Union, the difficulty will be that if this will take place without the

UK formally leaving as a state because part of its territory will

stay, the same way that happened with Denmark and Greenland. It will

mean that the representation of that part of the territory will be made

by the UK Government, not by the Scottish and the Northern Ireland

Government. Another because in terms of for this to be done, without

living and then coming in as Scotland and Northern Ireland to be

then in terms of state cessation, the representation of this part of

the territory will have to continue to be done by the United Kingdom

central Government. Of course, there'll be the possibility to live

as UK and convene as part of the UK. That will be another alternative. On

the question of the European Union citizens' rights in the Unit Kingdom

- just a couple of issues that I believe are important and less

discussed. One is the cut-off date. If we say that we are going to

protect the rights of those of European citizens that are currently

in the UK, what is the cut-off date. Some people have said the date of

the referendum, others have said the date when the exit agreement or the

new agreement or both will be concluded and signed, or the actual

exit date because the two will not in all likelihood coincide. In my

view, to limit to a date previous to the exit date itself, it's already

to limit the rights of the EU citizens at the moment while the UK

is a member of the European Union. So if we'll say that we'll only

protect the rights of those, for example, that were living in the UK

until the date of the referendum or until the date the UK deposits the

notification under the Article 50, what we are saying is that in this

period that starts the United Kingdom is no longer complying with

a series of obligations it has under EU law. In my view, there is no

alternative but to say it has to be the exit at the date that the

agreement will be concluded. Of course, one of the things that is

said is that there is a risk of fraud of people that will move

massively in order not to benefit from those rights, but moreover, I

think that likelihood is low. Second, there is a mechanism in EU

law to protect that. The court has said with respect to free movement,

when it's artificial, it's not recognisable. It's akin to a fraud

of law. So I think that is instrumental. The general principle

can be used in that context and that will be the more correct way to

work. Now, another crucial question that has to be addressed and, as

mentioned already, is the legal protection and interpretation of

those rights after exit. I'm very much in line with what the draft

guidelines have, with the possibility of seeing the commission

and that proposes a system close to the one that exists in the European

economic area, that is basically that in that case, the UK will

continue to be bound by past case law and it will be required to take

into account future case law of the European Court of Justice and the

interpretation of those rites, the rights that will be maintained for

those that will continue to reside in the UK and vice versa for UK

citizens in the European Union. By the way, in the practice of the

court in applying this approach, in the practice there's been not much

different in being bound by past case law and being required to take

into account future case law of the court of the European Court of

Justice. The other question is, who will be the courts enforcing this?

Contrary to what some have raised, I will not be having much reservations

in allowing UK courts to actually apply this. The British judicial

system has in the history of European integration shown a great

degree of loyalty that other judicial systems not always have

shown to the same extent. So I'll trust British courts to enforce and

apply the rights in the same way that that's what we have the EA. It

applies in the after area, the case of the European case law of the

European Court of Justice past. It's the European Court of Justice that

applies in the European Union area for EA citizens, the same thing. I

don't see the need to create a new judicial body in that respect to

resolve those kinds of disputes. Now, one question before I conclude.

Two brief questions before I conclude. One has to do with a link

to the European citizenship. I think that if there is something that

Brexit teaches us, and actually the loss of popularity that we have seen

in the European Union in many respects, is that there is actually

emerged the vision between two categories of citizens. Probably

many of the divisions we see today are and the different positions that

citizens take, are based between what we could describe as mobile an

non-Noble Citizens. We have a group of citizens that see themselves as

mobile and part of an open world in which they use their mobility. Even

when they don't physically move, their understanding of the world is

shaped by that mobile conception. We have another group of citizens I

will call nonmobile that have a vision of the world that is the

opposite in that respect. If I think that something that we can learn is

that one of the problems, perhaps the major shortcoming of European

Union citizenship is that is seen as a citizenship only for mobile

citizens. Non--mobile citizens see themselves as strangers to the

concept of European citizenships, strangers to the benefits of

European integration. This means that we need to work on rendering

the benefits clear to this other set of citizens. It also means something

else that is less discussed and that might seem paradoxical at first

sight. One of the problems of European citizenship is that its

discourse, its language, is only focussed on rights. You don't really

have citizens until those citizens understand that they also have

duties. We have never articulated, never developed the conception of

duties for European citizens. In my view, the instrument for that is

actually to link it to another discussion in the European Union, a

discussion that in five years ago I stressed very much in a report to

this Parliament that is on own resources. I have to say, it's an

old obsession of mine. If there is one issue that I think is the

transformative issue for all of the issues of the European Union, its

own resources. I think, as I put it, it's the poisonous tree of

everything else. The way the union is funded is structured in such a

way that first doesn't render clear to citizens how the burden is shared

between them, doesn't make clear to citizens the benefits of the

European Union and transforms any discussion on the European Union in

the zero game. If one essential element of constructing a genuine

European citizenship is by redesigning own resources and

leaking those own resources with an understanding for citizens on how

the burden is shared between them and at the same time by linking

those own resources in a way that I would like to the added value of the

European Union. For example, by linking those own resources with

areas of taxation that member states can no longer individually

effectively impose. And by doing that, actually the European Union is

doing something member states can no longer do. It's reinstating tax

justice in when member states can no longer do it. So I think one crucial

aspect that we need to think about European citizenship is that one.

One final point that I think is crucial on the entire way that

Brexit will be dealt and it's linked with the broader reforms the

European Union may have to take. Should Brexit be linked or not with

the broader debates on the reforms of the European Union? To a large

extent, this is a reproduction of a debate that took place before the

referendum. If you remember, when the special regime for the UK was

discussed in order to even avoid exit, the strong argument at the

time was, let's not embark on a big debate, let's deal with this in a

very narrow as an exceptional regime in other not to open up a Pandora

box, it didn't -- in other words not to open up a Pandora box. It didn't

work. In my view, it's probably better to link it with the broader

contalksal debate under the European Union. Why? For three reasons; the

first because whatever you will end up deciding on Brexit, whatever will

be decided will require unanimity and ratification in all member

states in all likelihood. Article 50 doesn't. It's a qualified majority.

Unless there is a real Brexit, I think that will be and we'll be back

for the European Union and it will be dramatic for the United Kingdom.

If that is not the case, then any agreement on exit in Article 50 will

have to take place at the same time that you conclude a new agreement

with the United Kingdom and this new agreement in the United Kingdom can

very likely require Norwich Union any morety and ratification even in

the member states -- unanimity. If you have to undergo the processes

maybe perhaps to do it together as part of a broader package of reforms

in the European Union. You might find a solution is that

you might otherwise have because you can create opportunities for

trade-offs. The third one is that, actually, I will not exclude the

possibility for that will allow a final solution worked the UK will

leave and stay at the same time. If, for example, there is broader reform

of the European Union with different circles of integration, nothing

prevents for an alternative agreement with the United Kingdom to

correspond to one of these weaker forms of integration. That will give

one possibility to an extent for the United Kingdom to leave and at the

same time to stay in a weaker form. Of course, this raises the issue of

constitutional amendments and I will conclude with that. I think that is

the other democratic deficit that no one talks about in the European

Union. It is also a democratic deficit when you cannot

constitutionally amend yourself, because you are making any new

generation bound by what was decided in the past. We really need to face,

I understand the difficulties and white no one wants to open any new

process of treaty amendments. I wrote that for many years that I

thought it was better not to open a big constitutional discussion and

try to constitutionally amend the European Union without a treaty

amendment. That is to interpretation by the court. The point is

comparably needed to face that issue. Some years ago I met with a

colleague of mine from jail and we had a proposal we called the South

African proposal. What it called the South African proposal? There had a

similar problem with the end of apartheid. They wanted a

constitution that would reflect the interests of the majority of the

population, but at the same time they also needed a document that

could somehow be vetoed and accepted by all the different communities.

So, what they did was to agree first on a charter of very fundamental

principles that could be vetoed by any of those groups. The

constitution then had to conform with that charter and could be

approved by a qualified majority, but its conformity with those

fundamental principles was controlled by the Constitutional

Court of South Africa. What I propose is a new mechanism of treaty

amendment in the European Union where you have an intergovernmental

conference that will first decide and deliberate just on a general set

of principles and this will be with ratification in national parliaments

and with referendums if necessary. The deal document would then be

drafted. It could be drafted even by representatives would be selected at

the same time that the ratification of the basic document was being

ratified. It is the deal document compliance of conformity with the

basic principles which would be controlled by an ad hoc judicial

body composed of the presidents of the supreme Courts of the different

member states. This is one way of untangling and freeing us and it

will not be easy, I understand, but it might be one possibility is to

take a step forward in terms of treaty amendments for the European

Union. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak. We have put

your finger on of very sensitive issues.