Carlos Ghosn - CEO, Renault-Nissan HARDtalk


Carlos Ghosn - CEO, Renault-Nissan

Similar Content

Browse content similar to Carlos Ghosn - CEO, Renault-Nissan. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!

Transcript


LineFromTo

cross Antarctica on foot in temperatures of minus 90 degrees

:00:01.:00:11.
:00:11.:00:16.

Celsius. Now it's time for HARDtalk.

:00:16.:00:19.

HARDtalk is in Paris, headquarters of one of the world's biggest

:00:19.:00:22.

carmakers, Renault, long regarded as a jewel in the crown of French

:00:22.:00:32.
:00:32.:00:35.

industry. But a jewell that has lost much of its lustre. Despite

:00:35.:00:37.

joining forces with the Japanese giant Nissan, Renault has seen

:00:37.:00:40.

sales and profits slump which is making the French government

:00:40.:00:44.

nervous. Carlos Ghosn is the CEO of Renault and Nissan. He turned

:00:44.:00:54.
:00:54.:01:14.

Nissan's fortunes around but can he do the same for Renault?

:01:14.:01:20.

Carlos Ghosn, welcome to HARDtalk. Thank you. Right now, Renault

:01:20.:01:25.

appears to be running on empty, the business is not performing well,

:01:25.:01:35.
:01:35.:01:38.

why? Any business in Europe is not having the business go well. I

:01:38.:01:44.

think Renault, if you take market share, if you take volume of sales,

:01:44.:01:50.

yes, the performance is not good, it should be much better next year.

:01:50.:01:55.

We will have new products that will help us regain market share. In

:01:55.:02:02.

financial terms, I think we are not doing much better than the

:02:02.:02:08.

competitors. I would say it is a mixed picture of resistance on

:02:08.:02:16.

sales because of an older line-up which were changed in 2013. Reggae

:02:16.:02:25.

in the balance sheet and in the profit results. When Europe is in

:02:25.:02:31.

trouble, Renault, of necessity, is also in trouble. You are so tied to

:02:31.:02:36.

the European economy. To see the impact of Europe on car

:02:36.:02:39.

manufacturing, you should see the footprint of car manufacturing in

:02:39.:02:49.

Europe. In the case of Renault, this percentage is 50%. 25% in

:02:49.:02:54.

France. This is a footprint that is not to your advantage. The European

:02:54.:03:04.
:03:04.:03:07.

market is sinking, minus eight -- 8%. You need to be sure that you

:03:07.:03:13.

are going to be crossing this period with a good balance sheet,

:03:13.:03:19.

with a positive cash flow and positive results. Don't you need to

:03:19.:03:24.

be sure, in a strategic sense, you are shifting away from this

:03:24.:03:30.

alliance upon European markets? The message is that Renault has been

:03:30.:03:35.

too reliant on its core, traditional European market. When

:03:35.:03:39.

we launched the winter plan two years ago, we said we were shifting

:03:40.:03:45.

away from Europe. It does not mean we are abandoning Europe, we have

:03:45.:03:52.

the ambition to stay the second largest brand in Europe. We are

:03:52.:03:56.

going to be acting in a very effective way with a lot of

:03:56.:04:01.

products coming. At the same time, we recognise the weakness on

:04:01.:04:08.

depending 50% on any market. Not only Europe. The same with Nissan

:04:08.:04:15.

depending too much and Japan. Much of your investments and strategy is

:04:16.:04:23.

about developing in other markets. Just to stick with Europe. What is

:04:23.:04:27.

striking, at Renault you are performing so much worse than your

:04:27.:04:31.

competitors in Germany. Sales across the French and European

:04:31.:04:36.

markets are down quite significantly, you look at BMW,

:04:36.:04:41.

Mercedes, they are looking at increases. They are doing well. Is

:04:41.:04:50.

this really a story about a leading business exhibiting all the

:04:50.:04:57.

problems that France generally has, becoming increasingly uncompetitive

:04:57.:05:02.

with Germany. I do not think you can extrapolate to this level. I

:05:02.:05:09.

cannot talk about my competitors. We are looking only at sales. Here

:05:09.:05:16.

are just summarising... I am looking at productivity and

:05:16.:05:21.

economic efficiency. You should take a look at the economic profit,

:05:21.:05:28.

the cash flow, these are the most significant indicators for us. At

:05:28.:05:32.

the end of the year everyone will publish their results, then you'll

:05:32.:05:37.

have a good opinion. We have a specific, difficult point, the

:05:37.:05:42.

renewal of our product line. When you find yourself in this

:05:42.:05:48.

particular week point, about to renew some major cars inAt, you

:05:48.:05:56.

have a seasonal decrees of their market share, it does not mean that

:05:56.:06:01.

will be much more competitive, but there is an automatic translation.

:06:01.:06:05.

This is not to say there is no problem, we have a problem in

:06:05.:06:11.

Europe. This is not a Renault problem. In the end, aren't we

:06:11.:06:15.

looking at a fundamental problem for your company and France as a

:06:16.:06:20.

country, which is about the need to restructure, to make labour markets

:06:20.:06:28.

more efficient, to make workers more productive, to close down some

:06:28.:06:31.

of the overcapacity in the business sector? Isn't that what you need to

:06:31.:06:37.

be doing now? If you are talking about Renault specifically, Renault

:06:37.:06:43.

do not need restructuring. Renault needs to gain competitiveness in

:06:43.:06:49.

France. How to do that? Many things depend on the government, which the

:06:49.:06:54.

government has already announced their intention to increase

:06:54.:06:56.

flexibility, increase competitiveness with some specific

:06:56.:07:03.

measures. We are happy we are not talking about it, but acting on it.

:07:04.:07:08.

We have competitiveness that we have to do as a car company by

:07:08.:07:14.

negotiating internally with our unions, that is taking place now.

:07:14.:07:19.

That is allowing Renault in France to be more competitive. It is not

:07:19.:07:25.

just about government and company, it is a combination of both. This

:07:25.:07:34.

is the nub of the issue. In France it is extraordinarily difficult to

:07:34.:07:38.

tell the unions to change. We have seen her show try and close down

:07:38.:07:48.

one of its big plant. -- Peugeot. It has caused huge political

:07:48.:07:52.

controversy. Will you say to the unions, the French government, you

:07:52.:07:57.

also need to shed a significant whatever

:07:57.:08:02.

whatever is needed by the company. I am not going to do it if it is

:08:02.:08:07.

not needed. Coming back to your questions, you need to shed this

:08:07.:08:14.

and that, you cannot put the same menu for car manufacturers. Every

:08:15.:08:20.

car manufacturer has different problems to face. Our problems go

:08:20.:08:25.

through negotiations with unions. We should come to a conclusion in

:08:25.:08:31.

January. Will the work force be slimmed down? We are in the middle

:08:31.:08:37.

of a negotiation, I cannot tell you the conclusion. We are going to

:08:37.:08:42.

gain competitiveness. When you gain competitiveness, it means a lot of

:08:42.:08:49.

things in terms of productivity, flexibility, in terms of using

:08:49.:08:53.

people on different sides depending on the evolution of the market.

:08:53.:08:58.

This is what I see, you talk about competitiveness, the French

:08:58.:09:04.

government, which has a 15% stake in Renault, the French government

:09:04.:09:10.

takes making statements like from the industry minister, who says we

:09:10.:09:15.

want Renault to become more French. He is putting enormous pressure on

:09:15.:09:21.

you to ramp up investment. minister of industry in any country

:09:22.:09:29.

who does not say the same thing... You said, yet acknowledged that

:09:29.:09:35.

Renault can produce a model 10% cheaper in Turkey than in a French

:09:35.:09:42.

plan. Your message to the industry minister in Paris, why would we ran

:09:42.:09:45.

up investment in France when we can make the same cars much cheaper in

:09:45.:09:50.

Turkey and sell them to French people? I am glad you are running

:09:50.:09:57.

for my job. We have capacities that are established. Outplayed in

:09:57.:10:07.
:10:07.:10:10.

Turkey is false. -- our plant in Turkey is full. You have to

:10:10.:10:14.

consider your existing capacity. Shutting down capacity has a cost,

:10:14.:10:20.

it is not free. We want a balance between running in the most

:10:20.:10:26.

efficient way the existing capacity in Europe, at the same time,

:10:26.:10:29.

increasing capacity is in low cost markets. That allows us to have a

:10:29.:10:34.

positive cashflow and results. are trying to finesse a very

:10:34.:10:39.

difficult position you have with the French government. You said not

:10:39.:10:42.

so long ago, you talked about the fact it is much cheaper to produce

:10:42.:10:49.

the same car in Turkey. You said, Renault could disappear in its

:10:49.:10:54.

current form. What did you mean when you said that? Come on, I

:10:54.:11:01.

would say the same thing for Nissan or any company. It was answering a

:11:01.:11:06.

question, if you are big enough nothing can happen to you, any

:11:06.:11:12.

company can disappear if you are not doing the basic things to

:11:12.:11:22.
:11:22.:11:23.

remain competitiveness. I want to draw one comparison. When the US

:11:23.:11:29.

massive car makers, Chrysler, GM, were in trouble 3-4 years ago, the

:11:29.:11:32.

whole basis of the government stepping in and bailing them out

:11:32.:11:38.

was that they would have to change fundamentally. You have a close

:11:38.:11:40.

relationship with the French government, they have a stake in

:11:40.:11:46.

your company. The message from the French government seems to be, we

:11:46.:11:51.

will support you and prop you up as long as you do not restructure. As

:11:51.:11:56.

long as you keep these thousands of jobs in France, even if they do not

:11:56.:12:03.

make sense any more. Let me correct you, the government did not pour

:12:03.:12:09.

billions of dollars into Renault. They gave us a line with an

:12:09.:12:15.

interest rate when all the banks were not giving any loans anymore.

:12:15.:12:19.

This was reimbursed way before its term. I do not want to give the

:12:19.:12:25.

impression that the government is pouring money into the car industry.

:12:25.:12:28.

That did not happen. I do not think the kind of pressure you receive

:12:28.:12:32.

from the French government is any different to what I'm feeling in

:12:32.:12:42.
:12:42.:12:44.

many countries where I'm working. When the government is a

:12:44.:12:53.

shareholder, it has a double voice. Speaking as the government and as a

:12:53.:12:55.

shareholder. The difference between Europe and what is happening with

:12:55.:13:02.

the GM and Chrysler, if you are making losses, your balance sheets

:13:03.:13:08.

are twisted, now you are in trouble. When you look at the balance sheet

:13:08.:13:18.
:13:18.:13:22.

Nissan performs better than Renault? It has had smaller

:13:22.:13:29.

exposure. Nissan has bigger exposure to China. You said that

:13:29.:13:32.

you were pleased that the government of Francois Hollande is

:13:33.:13:36.

taking some measures to help business, corporate tax breaks over

:13:37.:13:43.

the next three or four years. I put it to you that if you look at the

:13:43.:13:46.

overall climate under Francois Hollande, think about the

:13:46.:13:51.

significant tax rises, particularly for the riches French people, if

:13:51.:13:57.

you look at the message he has delivered on the welfare state, on

:13:57.:14:06.

employment law, on, for example, the determination to stop companies

:14:06.:14:09.

from closing down inefficient plants and threatening to national

:14:09.:14:14.

Wiseton, this is not a business- friendly environment. --

:14:14.:14:22.

nationalise them. Would you agree? What is important for me is the

:14:22.:14:25.

Government acts on competitiveness. They must establish a competitive

:14:25.:14:34.

base. Is this a business-friendly environment in France today? I am a

:14:34.:14:38.

business person. I do not judge people on that basis. For the

:14:38.:14:43.

moment, I am watching carefully for the competitiveness lob which has

:14:43.:14:50.

been passed. I will judge on that. More than any other businessman I

:14:50.:14:55.

have met, you travel the world, you call yourself a citizen of the

:14:55.:15:04.

world, rather than a country, how worried you by the lack of

:15:04.:15:08.

competitiveness in France and Western Europe on the whole? I am

:15:08.:15:13.

worried about it as long as there is no action about it. My big

:15:13.:15:18.

concern is that we have a problem, we are talking about it and we are

:15:18.:15:25.

not acting on it. I feel that we're going to have an action on it so I

:15:25.:15:30.

feel a little bit more reassured. This is about the Government making

:15:30.:15:36.

some decisions. Companies have to make decisions. They have to make

:15:36.:15:41.

specific agreements. What is good now if the situation became so

:15:41.:15:49.

dramatic that everybody is keen to act. There is no room for another

:15:49.:15:54.

report, another analysis, another study. We have came to the

:15:54.:15:59.

conclusion that decisions are being made. Another specific point I want

:15:59.:16:04.

to raise, you had one very difficult incident at this company

:16:04.:16:07.

when you and other senior executives became convinced that

:16:07.:16:11.

some of your colleagues had been selling confidential secrets about

:16:11.:16:17.

your electric parts to outsiders. You went public with it. Three men

:16:17.:16:22.

were named and shamed. It then turned out that you were completely

:16:22.:16:31.

wrong. They had not been selling secrets. Officially, we re-

:16:31.:16:35.

established the people and corrected what had been done.

:16:35.:16:39.

was too late to correct the damage you had done to three individuals.

:16:39.:16:45.

Never too late to do the right thing. It can be too late to do the

:16:45.:16:49.

right thing. Maybe the right thing you should have done, frankly, is

:16:49.:16:56.

resigned. These are companies, businesses, you have boards and

:16:56.:17:03.

shareholders. They decide not on the function of unemotional burst

:17:03.:17:08.

on an incident but the true value of the company, the value of the

:17:08.:17:13.

business. Everything which happened at Renault in this unfortunate set

:17:13.:17:18.

of events went in the best interest of the shareholders. You said there

:17:18.:17:22.

was more trouble proof that you were 100 % sure that these guys

:17:22.:17:28.

were guilty. It is a question of judgment. In the end, did you

:17:28.:17:32.

exhibit such poor judgment that the faith of the staff and the public

:17:32.:17:36.

in your leadership of the company was under threat? When you are

:17:36.:17:40.

reliant on information coming from people that you trust, your make a

:17:40.:17:44.

judgment based on that information. It was not the judgment that was

:17:44.:17:48.

wrong, it was the information. That is a different story. A final

:17:48.:17:52.

thought on the way in which you handled an extremely burdensome

:17:52.:17:58.

corporate responsibility, you are the CEO of Renault. You are also

:17:58.:18:04.

the CEO of Nissan. There is an alliance between the two. You have

:18:04.:18:08.

to spend a substantial chunk of your time every year in Japan and a

:18:08.:18:11.

substantial chunk in Paris as well as a substantial chunk looking

:18:11.:18:16.

after global interests. Is that possible? Is this unique alliance,

:18:16.:18:21.

it is not a merger but an alliance, is it in the best interests of the

:18:21.:18:27.

companies? My mandate at Nissan comes at the two years to renewal.

:18:27.:18:35.

My mandate at Renault comes every four years to renewal. When I was

:18:35.:18:40.

elected to become the CEO of Renault, people knew when they were

:18:40.:18:45.

voting that I would be taking those jobs. I was already the CEO of

:18:45.:18:50.

Nissan. And as you know, I was the main artisan of the turnaround of

:18:50.:18:54.

Nissan in 1999. I have been running the company for years. The

:18:54.:19:01.

shareholders voted knowing. That is what intrigues me. You succeeded in

:19:01.:19:05.

turning around Nissan. You have not succeeded in turning around Renault.

:19:05.:19:10.

You have finally found a job that is too tough for you. Doing the two

:19:10.:19:15.

at once is too tough. I don't think that you should link both.

:19:15.:19:23.

cannot help it. For the last four years, you have to admit that there

:19:23.:19:31.

have been enough outside events, head wins, particularly against

:19:31.:19:35.

journalist car manufacturers in Europe between the crisis of 2008

:19:35.:19:40.

to the eurozone crisis to the slump in Europe. How come these guys turn

:19:40.:19:46.

around Nissan? To acknowledge the performance is good. It is growing

:19:46.:19:51.

well with an exceptional balance sheet. How come these guys perform

:19:51.:19:56.

so well and, at the same time, having such an average

:19:57.:20:01.

performance... That is what everybody is asking. It is because

:20:01.:20:08.

it is tough in Europe and that is it. It is not because I am all the

:20:08.:20:13.

sudden biased and I go to Japan and an excellent. Maybe you and, let's

:20:13.:20:18.

be honest, it is down to you, you are the boss, units and strategic

:20:18.:20:22.

errors. You have not put enough resources, when it comes to Renault

:20:22.:20:28.

in particular, into China, India, other emerging markets. You are big

:20:28.:20:32.

in Russia and Brazil which you have not, particularly in China, been

:20:32.:20:37.

quick enough to respond to the changing world. This is one

:20:37.:20:44.

interpretation of the fact. Is it true? In 2000, when Nissan into

:20:44.:20:49.

China and 2002, we made the decision, I made the decision at

:20:49.:20:55.

that moment with the former CEO of rare not to say, let's not going to

:20:55.:21:00.

the same market. Let's divide. -- of Renault. Renault went to Russia,

:21:00.:21:06.

India, Brazil. Nissan went to China. That is one of the reason is that

:21:06.:21:10.

Renault was not yet in China. bottom line is that Renault, and we

:21:10.:21:17.

have spoken about her French it is, it has to be much less European and

:21:17.:21:21.

much more focused on all of these emerging markets. It has to work in

:21:21.:21:27.

China. That is what has been done for the next development. Russia,

:21:27.:21:33.

Brazil, Renault is growing there. They have announced a project in

:21:33.:21:37.

China for stopped a final thought about the future and about growth.

:21:37.:21:46.

-- China. You, Carlos Ghosn, have made a massive bet on electric

:21:46.:21:52.

vehicles. Look at the figures. The Nissan model sells maybe 30,000

:21:52.:21:57.

worldwide. You have got a tiny fraction of 1% of the global car

:21:57.:22:01.

market in electric vehicles. You were telling the world that by 2016

:22:01.:22:07.

there will be 1.5 million and that very soon after 10 %, you say, of

:22:07.:22:12.

all car sales will be electric vehicles. That has to be fantasy.

:22:12.:22:18.

like to be present things. I sit and 2020, 10 % of the market when

:22:18.:22:24.

the car is available. It is different when there is no car.

:22:24.:22:30.

country in the world it could be possible. 10 % of the market in the

:22:30.:22:34.

markets where you have an offer on electric cars. That is the US,

:22:34.:22:41.

China, Japan. It is excluding countries like Brazil, India.

:22:41.:22:48.

said that by a 2020, 10 % of all cars and the US and China will be a

:22:48.:22:53.

letter. 10 % of the market. That is what I said. When you announce an

:22:53.:22:59.

innovation, the first and you have a blip in cells, you see it is a

:22:59.:23:04.

mistake. That is not want to work. It is about persistence. It is

:23:04.:23:08.

about continuing to enhance the product and listened to what the

:23:09.:23:13.

consumers are saying. Why they are not buying it and pursuits. We will

:23:13.:23:18.

continue to pursue. If you are a shareholder, there must, point are

:23:18.:23:22.

you look at the evidence and say you have got it wrong. I do not

:23:22.:23:27.

think we can say that. Getting this one wrong means there is no future

:23:27.:23:30.

for the electric car for this industry. That is what it means. I

:23:31.:23:35.

am not ready to do that. A lot of people will come to electric cars,

:23:35.:23:40.

little by little. The only question is, how fast is it going to

:23:40.:23:46.

increase? This is not 30 years down the road. For you, not turning back

:23:46.:23:52.

on your strategy. No, no turning back. On the contrary, it is

:23:52.:23:57.

sticking to it, seeing the potential, modifying the product. I

:23:57.:24:01.

think the product will have new infrastructure. It is one of the

:24:01.:24:04.

reasons people are not buying new electric cars, they are worried

:24:04.:24:08.

about the existence of the infrastructure. They want to know

:24:08.:24:12.

where they're going to be charging their car if they leave their home

:24:12.:24:16.

or leave the office. We're going market by market and sold and the

:24:16.:24:20.

Download Subtitles

SRT

ASS