Browse content similar to Ben Bernanke, Former Chairman, US Federal Reserve. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
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with the former governor of America's | :00:00. | :00:09. | |
Seven years ago Wall Street was close to meltdown. | :00:10. | :00:15. | |
The world economy was feeling the full force of the financial | :00:16. | :00:21. | |
crash that changed long-held assumptions about the stability | :00:22. | :00:23. | |
My guest today was in the eye of that storm. | :00:24. | :00:29. | |
Ben Bernanke was chairman of the Federal Reserve, | :00:30. | :00:34. | |
the US central bank, and he took decisions then that continue to | :00:35. | :00:37. | |
Can we be confident the right lessons have been learned | :00:38. | :00:42. | |
You've had years to reflect on those momentous events of 2008. | :00:43. | :01:20. | |
Now you look back on it would you have done many things differently? | :01:21. | :01:30. | |
Well, you know, running up to the crisis we didn't | :01:31. | :01:33. | |
identify everything that would happen and even in 2007-8, we were | :01:34. | :01:38. | |
trying to balance different risks we were looking at between inflation, | :01:39. | :01:45. | |
moral hazard, all kinds of things. | :01:46. | :01:47. | |
Once we understood the depth and severity of the crisis, | :01:48. | :01:49. | |
we attacked it with all the tools we could put together | :01:50. | :01:52. | |
and we stabilised the financial system. | :01:53. | :01:53. | |
--there. Certainly there was, part of what happened we thought... | :01:54. | :02:03. | |
I say we, the market participants, regulators, everyone, | :02:04. | :02:06. | |
thought financial crises were a thing of the past, at least | :02:07. | :02:08. | |
The Federal Reserve was created 100 years ago primarily to fight | :02:09. | :02:27. | |
Yes, there was complacency and that contributed no doubt to excessive | :02:28. | :02:30. | |
There is much talk to the degree of people like you did not understand | :02:31. | :02:34. | |
some of the complex derivatives and different products in the financial | :02:35. | :02:38. | |
marketplace and actually we now know that were so prevalent and important | :02:39. | :02:42. | |
that when they fell apart because of dodgy mortgages and everything else, | :02:43. | :02:47. | |
the whole system began to unravel, and you did not understand it. | :02:48. | :02:50. | |
We understood individual instruments and how they worked. | :02:51. | :02:55. | |
What nobody understood, including the financial institutions | :02:56. | :02:59. | |
was how exposed they were to sub-prime mortgages and other types | :03:00. | :03:02. | |
It was financial panic that created the crisis. | :03:03. | :03:07. | |
It was not the sub-prime mortgages themselves. | :03:08. | :03:10. | |
In responding to it, and we talk of a period late-2007, in particular | :03:11. | :03:20. | |
2008, and there were key moments like the spring 2008 when you | :03:21. | :03:27. | |
decided to bail out one big bank, Bear Stearns, but by autumn of the | :03:28. | :03:31. | |
same year, such was the level of the crisis you decided you | :03:32. | :03:34. | |
When you make those decisions, were you in a way following your gut? | :03:35. | :03:42. | |
As an academic economic historian I studied financial panics back to | :03:43. | :03:50. | |
It has always been the job of central banks to lend in a financial | :03:51. | :03:59. | |
panic and be a lender of last resort and that is most of what we did | :04:00. | :04:02. | |
when we addressed the failures of companies like Bear Stearns. | :04:03. | :04:05. | |
We were trying to prevent the panic going to a new level of fear, | :04:06. | :04:12. | |
but most of what we did was provide cash to the financial system so they | :04:13. | :04:16. | |
could fund themselves when other lenders would not provide cash. | :04:17. | :04:19. | |
You were trying to wrestle down the level | :04:20. | :04:21. | |
It has to be said the most momentous decision | :04:22. | :04:31. | |
of all was September 2008, when you along with the US Treasury | :04:32. | :04:33. | |
and other key players, decided you would not, you could not save a key | :04:34. | :04:40. | |
We did not have the tools necessary to save Lehman Brothers. | :04:41. | :04:50. | |
It was deeply in the red, no one would buy it. | :04:51. | :04:54. | |
We understood, unlike most of the commentators, | :04:55. | :04:58. | |
How can it be so many people second-guess what you have just said | :04:59. | :05:12. | |
to me, including the boss of Lehman, Dick Fuld, he said plainly | :05:13. | :05:15. | |
afterwards Lehman had adequate collateral. | :05:16. | :05:17. | |
You could have got involved realistically, responsibly. | :05:18. | :05:19. | |
You chose not to for political reasons. | :05:20. | :05:21. | |
The bankruptcy judge found huge holes. | :05:22. | :05:32. | |
After the fact we found they were worse off than we thought they were. | :05:33. | :05:36. | |
The head of Lehman had strong incentives to | :05:37. | :05:45. | |
be very optimistic in terms of what the assets of Lehman were worth. | :05:46. | :05:49. | |
I think about what Dick Fuld has said since and people like the CEO | :05:50. | :05:53. | |
of Merrill Lynch, and they have looked at your record and they say | :05:54. | :05:56. | |
You got so burned by putting money into Bear Stearns and being hammered | :05:57. | :06:06. | |
by the public and some politicians for avoiding the | :06:07. | :06:08. | |
consequences of moral hazard, for not appreciating banks have to be | :06:09. | :06:11. | |
You were hammered for it and then politically decided you | :06:12. | :06:15. | |
If that were true why did we save AIG the next day? | :06:16. | :06:29. | |
It was a political disaster. The difference was,. | :06:30. | :06:42. | |
we had the tools because AIG had insurance subsidiaries. | :06:43. | :06:44. | |
Moral hazard becomes a meaningless concept. | :06:45. | :06:45. | |
The idea you should let the market do its worst | :06:46. | :06:48. | |
if businessmen make bad decisions they have to pay the consequences. | :06:49. | :06:50. | |
You abided by the principle of moral hazard | :06:51. | :06:52. | |
What we understood was that allowing major financial institutions to | :06:53. | :06:57. | |
collapse in the middle of the worst financial panic probably in US | :06:58. | :07:00. | |
Moral hazards are an important problem. | :07:01. | :07:03. | |
We also addressed it during the crisis by imposing tough terms | :07:04. | :07:15. | |
It is not the case that allowing those firms | :07:16. | :07:19. | |
You say you abided by the principle of moral hazard | :07:20. | :07:23. | |
You made it plain in your book and elsewhere you thought the | :07:24. | :07:30. | |
management of AIG was incompetent, irresponsible, frankly useless. | :07:31. | :07:33. | |
Yet you threw billions in their direction. | :07:34. | :07:37. | |
Not because we wanted to save AIG per se, because we cared about | :07:38. | :07:41. | |
AIG shareholders, but rather that we understood that the collapse of the | :07:42. | :07:46. | |
world's largest insurance company in the middle of the biggest financial | :07:47. | :07:52. | |
crisis would have been catastrophic not for just AIG but the entire US | :07:53. | :07:55. | |
There should have been painful consequences | :07:56. | :07:57. | |
The biggest CEOs, bosses of financial institutions | :07:58. | :08:10. | |
like AIG that were so badly run, how many of them were really punished? | :08:11. | :08:13. | |
I'm talking about more severe penalties than firing, | :08:14. | :08:20. | |
The Federal Reserve is not an enforcement agency. | :08:21. | :08:24. | |
The Department of Justice has that responsibility. | :08:25. | :08:32. | |
I am suggesting that you with your loud and influential voice | :08:33. | :08:37. | |
might have said at the time and soon after, moral hazard and the | :08:38. | :08:41. | |
consequences for real people in the real economy are so severe these | :08:42. | :08:46. | |
people, for all the abuses they carried out, have to be punished | :08:47. | :08:49. | |
It would not have been the right thing to do. | :08:50. | :08:54. | |
I was in a different lane, in the Federal Reserve, | :08:55. | :08:56. | |
I was not in the Department of Justice, it was their call. | :08:57. | :08:59. | |
I believe they should have addressed this more directly, | :09:00. | :09:04. | |
responsibility. What they chose to do was fine the large firms billions | :09:05. | :09:13. | |
of dollars and I think it would have made more sense if they pursued | :09:14. | :09:16. | |
Now that you are free to talk openly, what did you make of the | :09:17. | :09:21. | |
CEOs of the biggest banks you dealt with on the crisis phone in 2008, | :09:22. | :09:30. | |
these guys? Many of them were complacent and took too much risk. | :09:31. | :09:41. | |
You cannot say this one person or that person... | :09:42. | :09:43. | |
Government failed, Congress failed, the public failed. | :09:44. | :09:51. | |
It was a complex phenomenon that many people came up short. | :09:52. | :09:55. | |
A lot of the masters of the universe you talk about did very poorly, | :09:56. | :10:01. | |
not necessarily in a criminal way, they just made bad investments. | :10:02. | :10:07. | |
It was a system failure and many people including the Fed | :10:08. | :10:09. | |
and regulators bore responsibility for that. | :10:10. | :10:11. | |
I am trying to bring it down to a human level. | :10:12. | :10:16. | |
Do you feel this group of individuals, very influential, | :10:17. | :10:22. | |
greed? Do you feel you could take a moral position and judgment on them? | :10:23. | :10:30. | |
I think what many of them did was not good business, not just in the | :10:31. | :10:40. | |
sense of taking excessive risk but of not paying sufficient attention | :10:41. | :10:43. | |
Some companies sold securities that were clearly not in the interests | :10:44. | :10:47. | |
of the buyers and that is bad business and immoral. | :10:48. | :10:50. | |
So the question today is, has that immorality been weeded out | :10:51. | :10:59. | |
by regulation and other instruments so it could never happen again? | :11:00. | :11:03. | |
I don't know about never happen again, never is | :11:04. | :11:10. | |
a long time, but there has been improvement in oversight | :11:11. | :11:13. | |
regulation and safety of the financial system which was the goal. | :11:14. | :11:15. | |
Paul Volcker, one of the most respected voices in Wall Street, | :11:16. | :11:19. | |
he worries that, yes there has been a lot of legislation that has | :11:20. | :11:28. | |
reformed the banking system, but he still worries that Wall Street is | :11:29. | :11:31. | |
vulnerable and Wall Street cannot be confident something | :11:32. | :11:33. | |
It would be foolish to say this could never happen, | :11:34. | :11:46. | |
But I think the system is stronger and safer | :11:47. | :11:50. | |
If we had some of the safeguards we have now then, I think we would | :11:51. | :12:01. | |
On the Democrat side, partly because Bernie Sanders, a socialist | :12:02. | :12:11. | |
populist is running against. | :12:12. | :12:13. | |
Hillary Clinton thinks there should be more banking regulation. | :12:14. | :12:15. | |
In the future she wants senior executives and financial companies | :12:16. | :12:18. | |
to feel more pain and to basically find a legislative way of inflicting | :12:19. | :12:21. | |
more pain on them if their companies abuse the system and cost | :12:22. | :12:24. | |
I think there are a lot of tools that have been created | :12:25. | :12:46. | |
by Dodd Frank and international agreements that if properly | :12:47. | :12:48. | |
Let's talk about some of the key decisions you took. | :12:49. | :12:55. | |
The big idea of your tenure at the Fed. | :12:56. | :12:59. | |
In terms of interest rates, you slash them down to almost zero. | :13:00. | :13:04. | |
You introduced the idea of greater transparency on interest | :13:05. | :13:08. | |
rates, to indicate to the public, forward guidance, we will keep them | :13:09. | :13:12. | |
at this level for a long time in a way you had not been clear before. | :13:13. | :13:16. | |
On interest rates, did you foresee they would be close | :13:17. | :13:18. | |
I thought there would be more recovery by now in terms | :13:19. | :13:26. | |
Unemployment came down faster than we thought so | :13:27. | :13:36. | |
Is it worrying for the long-term health of the US economy that you | :13:37. | :13:41. | |
have had cheap money, virtually free borrowing for so long yet growth is | :13:42. | :13:44. | |
Again there has been progress but I would say the main issue is there | :13:45. | :13:51. | |
has been too much reliance on the Fed and central banks in general. | :13:52. | :13:56. | |
Central banks are carrying most of the load for supporting the | :13:57. | :14:00. | |
recovery and use the tools they have which means lower interest rates. | :14:01. | :14:04. | |
A better balance between monetary and fiscal policy and other policies | :14:05. | :14:09. | |
would take some of the burden away from central banks | :14:10. | :14:12. | |
You can talk about slashing interest rates being a conventional tool, | :14:13. | :14:18. | |
but you went unconventional early on with quantitative easing. | :14:19. | :14:24. | |
I suppose it's another way of talking about pumping new money | :14:25. | :14:27. | |
You did that to the scale of trillions of dollars. | :14:28. | :14:34. | |
The critics will say you essentially put the US economy | :14:35. | :14:37. | |
on a drug that was treating the symptoms but not the | :14:38. | :14:40. | |
The US economy needs massive structural reform and | :14:41. | :14:53. | |
by making money so cheap, you gave inefficient companies licence to | :14:54. | :14:56. | |
continue doing business rather than ensuring only the fittest survived. | :14:57. | :15:01. | |
The Fed Reserve did what it's supposed to do | :15:02. | :15:05. | |
which is to provide monetary policy support it needs to help jobs come | :15:06. | :15:08. | |
The US economy has been the strongest recovery of any | :15:09. | :15:13. | |
Look at Europe, which did not take these policies. | :15:14. | :15:21. | |
Crowing about how well you are doing is not impressive because Europe | :15:22. | :15:24. | |
A big part of the reason is monetary policy was not as aggressive | :15:25. | :15:32. | |
You can say you are doing well compared with Europe but compared | :15:33. | :15:45. | |
with historic recoveries from other recessions in the US you are not | :15:46. | :15:48. | |
Latest figures suggest there is no reason to be confident | :15:49. | :15:52. | |
There are two things about the recovery besides monetary policy. | :15:53. | :15:55. | |
Fiscal policy has not carried its load. | :15:56. | :16:00. | |
The Fed and central banks have had to do most of the work. | :16:01. | :16:05. | |
To be clear, when you say fiscal policy has not delivered | :16:06. | :16:08. | |
You are asking me what is the economic analysis | :16:09. | :16:16. | |
and I am telling you since central banks are required to do most | :16:17. | :16:19. | |
of the heavy lifting they have had to rely on the tools they have. | :16:20. | :16:22. | |
What is your judgment on the politics of this? | :16:23. | :16:29. | |
What the Congress and President have done. | :16:30. | :16:33. | |
I think the Congress was too quick to cut spending, to have fiscal | :16:34. | :16:36. | |
All of those things have been a drag on recovery which has made it | :16:37. | :16:44. | |
harder for the Fed and other central banks to get recovery. | :16:45. | :16:47. | |
That is interesting because you were appointed by George W Bush and most | :16:48. | :16:55. | |
saw you as a right of centre guy, a Republican. You are telling me the | :16:56. | :17:01. | |
republicans who have controlled Congress for a while have been | :17:02. | :17:05. | |
responsible for a misguided reading of what the economy needs. I said | :17:06. | :17:11. | |
openly and frequently when I was chairman that short-term cuts of the | :17:12. | :17:18. | |
type being done were not wise and the attacks on the deficit should be | :17:19. | :17:23. | |
long-term and address longer-term issues. The Republican party has a | :17:24. | :17:27. | |
bunch of people running for presidency. Most of them say they | :17:28. | :17:32. | |
want to slim down government further. They are deeply suspicious | :17:33. | :17:37. | |
of federal institutions, including the Federal Reserve. They want to | :17:38. | :17:41. | |
slash taxes and don't seem to believe in spending on | :17:42. | :17:45. | |
infrastructure. What do you make a fair analysis? You nominee were a | :17:46. | :17:51. | |
Republican. I am a moderate, centrist, I do not take extreme | :17:52. | :17:55. | |
views of left or right. Going back the past years I think the fiscal | :17:56. | :18:00. | |
policy was not sufficiently supportive. There is benefit to | :18:01. | :18:03. | |
doing good infrastructure investment. I wonder how you reflect | :18:04. | :18:09. | |
on what has happened in Europe. There has been a debate about the | :18:10. | :18:14. | |
wisdom of those territories. It has perhaps reached its extreme form in | :18:15. | :18:18. | |
Greece and the argument on how to get its economy on track. Germany | :18:19. | :18:23. | |
saying budget responsibility has to be at the centre and Greece must run | :18:24. | :18:29. | |
surpluses even though they wrestle with the national debt which is 175% | :18:30. | :18:36. | |
of GDP. Does this focus on austerity make sense? Greece has no choice if | :18:37. | :18:41. | |
it is to pay its debt. The rest of Europe is not doing its part, | :18:42. | :18:46. | |
fulfilling its part of the bargain. There is no need to Germany to have | :18:47. | :18:51. | |
so much austerity and no need for such a trade surplus. If Europe were | :18:52. | :18:55. | |
more prosperous it would be easier for Greece to get the recovery to | :18:56. | :19:01. | |
pay debts. What about the UK? You are in London and you look at the UK | :19:02. | :19:05. | |
economy. We perform better in London and you look at the UK economy. We | :19:06. | :19:09. | |
perform better than is time to loosen the ties of Ulster rarity. Do | :19:10. | :19:15. | |
you think austerity went too far in the UK? It probably did, it did most | :19:16. | :19:21. | |
places. It seems to be less of a problem now and I would say the Bank | :19:22. | :19:27. | |
of England followed Fed policies, more or less the same going back to | :19:28. | :19:33. | |
2008 and that has been one reason by the UK has recovered more | :19:34. | :19:37. | |
effectively. I wonder if you reflected on this when you sat in | :19:38. | :19:41. | |
the grand office in the Federal Reserve in Washington, inequality | :19:42. | :19:47. | |
under your watch raise significantly in the United States. The rich | :19:48. | :19:52. | |
despite the economic problems did rather well through most of your | :19:53. | :19:56. | |
period and the middle class and working class and the poor | :19:57. | :20:01. | |
particularly did not do well at all. The gap has risen. Was it part of | :20:02. | :20:05. | |
your job to worry about that? It is part of my job as an economist to | :20:06. | :20:11. | |
worry. This is a long-term and important problem. Very important. | :20:12. | :20:18. | |
It goes back at least to the 70s. We have had 40 years of globalisation | :20:19. | :20:22. | |
and technical and structural change that have increased inequality. It | :20:23. | :20:29. | |
is not one the Fed can do much about. The Fed is supposed to do | :20:30. | :20:34. | |
plenty about inflation. That is the core thing you monitor. You are | :20:35. | :20:39. | |
supposed to do something about unemployment. Why could you not also | :20:40. | :20:45. | |
as your remit have to look at the levels of inequality? Some of the | :20:46. | :20:51. | |
things you did like quantitative easing would too many economists be | :20:52. | :20:56. | |
a policy that exacerbates inequality. It helps the banks and | :20:57. | :21:00. | |
people with capital. It does not help the poor and the working class. | :21:01. | :21:07. | |
That is nonsense. Qualitative easing creates jobs and jobs is the most | :21:08. | :21:12. | |
important the Fed can do to help the middle and working class recover. | :21:13. | :21:16. | |
These long-term trends are important. I follow them closely. | :21:17. | :21:23. | |
They are not related in any way to monetary policy. They are related to | :21:24. | :21:28. | |
long-term developments in the US economy. Around the world they are | :21:29. | :21:32. | |
happening elsewhere. Larry Elliott is an economist and he said Q E | :21:33. | :21:37. | |
encouraged financial speculation in property shares and commodities. He | :21:38. | :21:41. | |
said the bankers and shareholders did well out of it but for the | :21:42. | :21:46. | |
ordinary folk of the US, handing a check directly to the public would | :21:47. | :21:50. | |
get more money into the economy. That is possibly true but the Fed | :21:51. | :21:58. | |
cannot hand out checks. I have looked at this in detail. The Fed | :21:59. | :22:02. | |
uses the tools it has to get the economy to recover and hit low | :22:03. | :22:08. | |
interest rates. If you look at the implications of Fed policy for | :22:09. | :22:13. | |
inequality, the most important one is the fact QE has supported job | :22:14. | :22:18. | |
recovery, unemployment has fallen to 5%. It would not have done so | :22:19. | :22:24. | |
without monetary policy support which is the most important thing | :22:25. | :22:27. | |
for the average person. You are still influential in economics. | :22:28. | :22:36. | |
Qualitative easing has drawn close in the US and it is clear interest | :22:37. | :22:41. | |
rates will rise soon. How difficult will it be to manage that and not | :22:42. | :22:49. | |
destabilise the global economy? Quantitative easing itself is no | :22:50. | :22:54. | |
longer an issue, that ended a year ago, and the unwinding of the Fed | :22:55. | :22:58. | |
balance sheet will take place over a number of years and will not be an | :22:59. | :23:02. | |
issue for the economy markets. The raising of interest rates which the | :23:03. | :23:07. | |
Fed can do without unwinding quantitative easing. And will mean a | :23:08. | :23:13. | |
stronger dollar. That is tough monetary policy decision like | :23:14. | :23:17. | |
decisions we have seen in the past. It is nothing much to do with | :23:18. | :23:23. | |
quantitative easing. Given the strengthening dollar and rising US | :23:24. | :23:27. | |
interest rates, weakness in China and other emerging markets, there | :23:28. | :23:33. | |
could be real destabilisation across the world economy. It is exactly the | :23:34. | :23:38. | |
challenge the Fed is looking at. The US economy domestically is doing | :23:39. | :23:42. | |
pretty well and households are in better shape and the housing sector | :23:43. | :23:48. | |
and autos are doing well. It is moving forward pretty well. The | :23:49. | :23:53. | |
headwinds are coming globally from emerging markets and elsewhere. That | :23:54. | :23:57. | |
is the trade-off and concern the Fed has to look at. How worried should | :23:58. | :24:06. | |
with the? Emerging markets have not -- markets have not responded to the | :24:07. | :24:11. | |
slowdown in China and there are risks there may be but it is hard to | :24:12. | :24:15. | |
know and that is the balancing act the Fed will have to take. Thank | :24:16. | :24:17. | |
you. | :24:18. | :24:19. |