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Ben Bernanke, Former Chairman, US Federal Reserve

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with the former governor of America's

:00:00.:00:09.

Seven years ago Wall Street was close to meltdown.

:00:10.:00:15.

The world economy was feeling the full force of the financial

:00:16.:00:21.

crash that changed long-held assumptions about the stability

:00:22.:00:23.

My guest today was in the eye of that storm.

:00:24.:00:29.

Ben Bernanke was chairman of the Federal Reserve,

:00:30.:00:34.

the US central bank, and he took decisions then that continue to

:00:35.:00:37.

Can we be confident the right lessons have been learned

:00:38.:00:42.

You've had years to reflect on those momentous events of 2008.

:00:43.:01:20.

Now you look back on it would you have done many things differently?

:01:21.:01:30.

Well, you know, running up to the crisis we didn't

:01:31.:01:33.

identify everything that would happen and even in 2007-8, we were

:01:34.:01:38.

trying to balance different risks we were looking at between inflation,

:01:39.:01:45.

moral hazard, all kinds of things.

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Once we understood the depth and severity of the crisis,

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we attacked it with all the tools we could put together

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and we stabilised the financial system.

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--there. Certainly there was, part of what happened we thought...

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I say we, the market participants, regulators, everyone,

:02:04.:02:06.

thought financial crises were a thing of the past, at least

:02:07.:02:08.

The Federal Reserve was created 100 years ago primarily to fight

:02:09.:02:27.

Yes, there was complacency and that contributed no doubt to excessive

:02:28.:02:30.

There is much talk to the degree of people like you did not understand

:02:31.:02:34.

some of the complex derivatives and different products in the financial

:02:35.:02:38.

marketplace and actually we now know that were so prevalent and important

:02:39.:02:42.

that when they fell apart because of dodgy mortgages and everything else,

:02:43.:02:47.

the whole system began to unravel, and you did not understand it.

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We understood individual instruments and how they worked.

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What nobody understood, including the financial institutions

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was how exposed they were to sub-prime mortgages and other types

:03:00.:03:02.

It was financial panic that created the crisis.

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It was not the sub-prime mortgages themselves.

:03:08.:03:10.

In responding to it, and we talk of a period late-2007, in particular

:03:11.:03:20.

2008, and there were key moments like the spring 2008 when you

:03:21.:03:27.

decided to bail out one big bank, Bear Stearns, but by autumn of the

:03:28.:03:31.

same year, such was the level of the crisis you decided you

:03:32.:03:34.

When you make those decisions, were you in a way following your gut?

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As an academic economic historian I studied financial panics back to

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It has always been the job of central banks to lend in a financial

:03:51.:03:59.

panic and be a lender of last resort and that is most of what we did

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when we addressed the failures of companies like Bear Stearns.

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We were trying to prevent the panic going to a new level of fear,

:04:06.:04:12.

but most of what we did was provide cash to the financial system so they

:04:13.:04:16.

could fund themselves when other lenders would not provide cash.

:04:17.:04:19.

You were trying to wrestle down the level

:04:20.:04:21.

It has to be said the most momentous decision

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of all was September 2008, when you along with the US Treasury

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and other key players, decided you would not, you could not save a key

:04:34.:04:40.

We did not have the tools necessary to save Lehman Brothers.

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It was deeply in the red, no one would buy it.

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We understood, unlike most of the commentators,

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How can it be so many people second-guess what you have just said

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to me, including the boss of Lehman, Dick Fuld, he said plainly

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afterwards Lehman had adequate collateral.

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You could have got involved realistically, responsibly.

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You chose not to for political reasons.

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The bankruptcy judge found huge holes.

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After the fact we found they were worse off than we thought they were.

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The head of Lehman had strong incentives to

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be very optimistic in terms of what the assets of Lehman were worth.

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I think about what Dick Fuld has said since and people like the CEO

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of Merrill Lynch, and they have looked at your record and they say

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You got so burned by putting money into Bear Stearns and being hammered

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by the public and some politicians for avoiding the

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consequences of moral hazard, for not appreciating banks have to be

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You were hammered for it and then politically decided you

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If that were true why did we save AIG the next day?

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It was a political disaster. The difference was,.

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we had the tools because AIG had insurance subsidiaries.

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Moral hazard becomes a meaningless concept.

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The idea you should let the market do its worst

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if businessmen make bad decisions they have to pay the consequences.

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You abided by the principle of moral hazard

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What we understood was that allowing major financial institutions to

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collapse in the middle of the worst financial panic probably in US

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Moral hazards are an important problem.

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We also addressed it during the crisis by imposing tough terms

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It is not the case that allowing those firms

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You say you abided by the principle of moral hazard

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You made it plain in your book and elsewhere you thought the

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management of AIG was incompetent, irresponsible, frankly useless.

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Yet you threw billions in their direction.

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Not because we wanted to save AIG per se, because we cared about

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AIG shareholders, but rather that we understood that the collapse of the

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world's largest insurance company in the middle of the biggest financial

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crisis would have been catastrophic not for just AIG but the entire US

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There should have been painful consequences

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The biggest CEOs, bosses of financial institutions

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like AIG that were so badly run, how many of them were really punished?

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I'm talking about more severe penalties than firing,

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The Federal Reserve is not an enforcement agency.

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The Department of Justice has that responsibility.

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I am suggesting that you with your loud and influential voice

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might have said at the time and soon after, moral hazard and the

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consequences for real people in the real economy are so severe these

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people, for all the abuses they carried out, have to be punished

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It would not have been the right thing to do.

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I was in a different lane, in the Federal Reserve,

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I was not in the Department of Justice, it was their call.

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I believe they should have addressed this more directly,

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responsibility. What they chose to do was fine the large firms billions

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of dollars and I think it would have made more sense if they pursued

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Now that you are free to talk openly, what did you make of the

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CEOs of the biggest banks you dealt with on the crisis phone in 2008,

:09:22.:09:30.

these guys? Many of them were complacent and took too much risk.

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You cannot say this one person or that person...

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Government failed, Congress failed, the public failed.

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It was a complex phenomenon that many people came up short.

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A lot of the masters of the universe you talk about did very poorly,

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not necessarily in a criminal way, they just made bad investments.

:10:02.:10:07.

It was a system failure and many people including the Fed

:10:08.:10:09.

and regulators bore responsibility for that.

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I am trying to bring it down to a human level.

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Do you feel this group of individuals, very influential,

:10:17.:10:22.

greed? Do you feel you could take a moral position and judgment on them?

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I think what many of them did was not good business, not just in the

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sense of taking excessive risk but of not paying sufficient attention

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Some companies sold securities that were clearly not in the interests

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of the buyers and that is bad business and immoral.

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So the question today is, has that immorality been weeded out

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by regulation and other instruments so it could never happen again?

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I don't know about never happen again, never is

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a long time, but there has been improvement in oversight

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regulation and safety of the financial system which was the goal.

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Paul Volcker, one of the most respected voices in Wall Street,

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he worries that, yes there has been a lot of legislation that has

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reformed the banking system, but he still worries that Wall Street is

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vulnerable and Wall Street cannot be confident something

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It would be foolish to say this could never happen,

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But I think the system is stronger and safer

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If we had some of the safeguards we have now then, I think we would

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On the Democrat side, partly because Bernie Sanders, a socialist

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populist is running against.

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Hillary Clinton thinks there should be more banking regulation.

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In the future she wants senior executives and financial companies

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to feel more pain and to basically find a legislative way of inflicting

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more pain on them if their companies abuse the system and cost

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I think there are a lot of tools that have been created

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by Dodd Frank and international agreements that if properly

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Let's talk about some of the key decisions you took.

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The big idea of your tenure at the Fed.

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In terms of interest rates, you slash them down to almost zero.

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You introduced the idea of greater transparency on interest

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rates, to indicate to the public, forward guidance, we will keep them

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at this level for a long time in a way you had not been clear before.

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On interest rates, did you foresee they would be close

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I thought there would be more recovery by now in terms

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Unemployment came down faster than we thought so

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Is it worrying for the long-term health of the US economy that you

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have had cheap money, virtually free borrowing for so long yet growth is

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Again there has been progress but I would say the main issue is there

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has been too much reliance on the Fed and central banks in general.

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Central banks are carrying most of the load for supporting the

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recovery and use the tools they have which means lower interest rates.

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A better balance between monetary and fiscal policy and other policies

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would take some of the burden away from central banks

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You can talk about slashing interest rates being a conventional tool,

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but you went unconventional early on with quantitative easing.

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I suppose it's another way of talking about pumping new money

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You did that to the scale of trillions of dollars.

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The critics will say you essentially put the US economy

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on a drug that was treating the symptoms but not the

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The US economy needs massive structural reform and

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by making money so cheap, you gave inefficient companies licence to

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continue doing business rather than ensuring only the fittest survived.

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The Fed Reserve did what it's supposed to do

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which is to provide monetary policy support it needs to help jobs come

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The US economy has been the strongest recovery of any

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Look at Europe, which did not take these policies.

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Crowing about how well you are doing is not impressive because Europe

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A big part of the reason is monetary policy was not as aggressive

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You can say you are doing well compared with Europe but compared

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with historic recoveries from other recessions in the US you are not

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Latest figures suggest there is no reason to be confident

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There are two things about the recovery besides monetary policy.

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Fiscal policy has not carried its load.

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The Fed and central banks have had to do most of the work.

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To be clear, when you say fiscal policy has not delivered

:16:06.:16:08.

You are asking me what is the economic analysis

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and I am telling you since central banks are required to do most

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of the heavy lifting they have had to rely on the tools they have.

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What is your judgment on the politics of this?

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What the Congress and President have done.

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I think the Congress was too quick to cut spending, to have fiscal

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All of those things have been a drag on recovery which has made it

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harder for the Fed and other central banks to get recovery.

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That is interesting because you were appointed by George W Bush and most

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saw you as a right of centre guy, a Republican. You are telling me the

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republicans who have controlled Congress for a while have been

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responsible for a misguided reading of what the economy needs. I said

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openly and frequently when I was chairman that short-term cuts of the

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type being done were not wise and the attacks on the deficit should be

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long-term and address longer-term issues. The Republican party has a

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bunch of people running for presidency. Most of them say they

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want to slim down government further. They are deeply suspicious

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of federal institutions, including the Federal Reserve. They want to

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slash taxes and don't seem to believe in spending on

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infrastructure. What do you make a fair analysis? You nominee were a

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Republican. I am a moderate, centrist, I do not take extreme

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views of left or right. Going back the past years I think the fiscal

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policy was not sufficiently supportive. There is benefit to

:18:01.:18:03.

doing good infrastructure investment. I wonder how you reflect

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on what has happened in Europe. There has been a debate about the

:18:10.:18:14.

wisdom of those territories. It has perhaps reached its extreme form in

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Greece and the argument on how to get its economy on track. Germany

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saying budget responsibility has to be at the centre and Greece must run

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surpluses even though they wrestle with the national debt which is 175%

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of GDP. Does this focus on austerity make sense? Greece has no choice if

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it is to pay its debt. The rest of Europe is not doing its part,

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fulfilling its part of the bargain. There is no need to Germany to have

:18:47.:18:51.

so much austerity and no need for such a trade surplus. If Europe were

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more prosperous it would be easier for Greece to get the recovery to

:18:56.:19:01.

pay debts. What about the UK? You are in London and you look at the UK

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economy. We perform better in London and you look at the UK economy. We

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perform better than is time to loosen the ties of Ulster rarity. Do

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you think austerity went too far in the UK? It probably did, it did most

:19:16.:19:21.

places. It seems to be less of a problem now and I would say the Bank

:19:22.:19:27.

of England followed Fed policies, more or less the same going back to

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2008 and that has been one reason by the UK has recovered more

:19:34.:19:37.

effectively. I wonder if you reflected on this when you sat in

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the grand office in the Federal Reserve in Washington, inequality

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under your watch raise significantly in the United States. The rich

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despite the economic problems did rather well through most of your

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period and the middle class and working class and the poor

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particularly did not do well at all. The gap has risen. Was it part of

:20:02.:20:05.

your job to worry about that? It is part of my job as an economist to

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worry. This is a long-term and important problem. Very important.

:20:12.:20:18.

It goes back at least to the 70s. We have had 40 years of globalisation

:20:19.:20:22.

and technical and structural change that have increased inequality. It

:20:23.:20:29.

is not one the Fed can do much about. The Fed is supposed to do

:20:30.:20:34.

plenty about inflation. That is the core thing you monitor. You are

:20:35.:20:39.

supposed to do something about unemployment. Why could you not also

:20:40.:20:45.

as your remit have to look at the levels of inequality? Some of the

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things you did like quantitative easing would too many economists be

:20:52.:20:56.

a policy that exacerbates inequality. It helps the banks and

:20:57.:21:00.

people with capital. It does not help the poor and the working class.

:21:01.:21:07.

That is nonsense. Qualitative easing creates jobs and jobs is the most

:21:08.:21:12.

important the Fed can do to help the middle and working class recover.

:21:13.:21:16.

These long-term trends are important. I follow them closely.

:21:17.:21:23.

They are not related in any way to monetary policy. They are related to

:21:24.:21:28.

long-term developments in the US economy. Around the world they are

:21:29.:21:32.

happening elsewhere. Larry Elliott is an economist and he said Q E

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encouraged financial speculation in property shares and commodities. He

:21:38.:21:41.

said the bankers and shareholders did well out of it but for the

:21:42.:21:46.

ordinary folk of the US, handing a check directly to the public would

:21:47.:21:50.

get more money into the economy. That is possibly true but the Fed

:21:51.:21:58.

cannot hand out checks. I have looked at this in detail. The Fed

:21:59.:22:02.

uses the tools it has to get the economy to recover and hit low

:22:03.:22:08.

interest rates. If you look at the implications of Fed policy for

:22:09.:22:13.

inequality, the most important one is the fact QE has supported job

:22:14.:22:18.

recovery, unemployment has fallen to 5%. It would not have done so

:22:19.:22:24.

without monetary policy support which is the most important thing

:22:25.:22:27.

for the average person. You are still influential in economics.

:22:28.:22:36.

Qualitative easing has drawn close in the US and it is clear interest

:22:37.:22:41.

rates will rise soon. How difficult will it be to manage that and not

:22:42.:22:49.

destabilise the global economy? Quantitative easing itself is no

:22:50.:22:54.

longer an issue, that ended a year ago, and the unwinding of the Fed

:22:55.:22:58.

balance sheet will take place over a number of years and will not be an

:22:59.:23:02.

issue for the economy markets. The raising of interest rates which the

:23:03.:23:07.

Fed can do without unwinding quantitative easing. And will mean a

:23:08.:23:13.

stronger dollar. That is tough monetary policy decision like

:23:14.:23:17.

decisions we have seen in the past. It is nothing much to do with

:23:18.:23:23.

quantitative easing. Given the strengthening dollar and rising US

:23:24.:23:27.

interest rates, weakness in China and other emerging markets, there

:23:28.:23:33.

could be real destabilisation across the world economy. It is exactly the

:23:34.:23:38.

challenge the Fed is looking at. The US economy domestically is doing

:23:39.:23:42.

pretty well and households are in better shape and the housing sector

:23:43.:23:48.

and autos are doing well. It is moving forward pretty well. The

:23:49.:23:53.

headwinds are coming globally from emerging markets and elsewhere. That

:23:54.:23:57.

is the trade-off and concern the Fed has to look at. How worried should

:23:58.:24:06.

with the? Emerging markets have not -- markets have not responded to the

:24:07.:24:11.

slowdown in China and there are risks there may be but it is hard to

:24:12.:24:15.

know and that is the balancing act the Fed will have to take. Thank

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you.

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