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Now on BBC News, it's time for Hardtalk. | :00:00. | :00:10. | |
Welcome to HARDtalk. I am Stephen Sackur. So-called Islamic State has | :00:11. | :00:17. | |
the intent and the capacity to mount major terrorist attacks in the heart | :00:18. | :00:22. | |
of Europe. Does Europe have the right tools to effectively counter | :00:23. | :00:26. | |
that challenge? My guest today is Rob Wainwright, the head of Europol. | :00:27. | :00:32. | |
It is the EU's joint policing agency tasked with enhancing Europe's | :00:33. | :00:37. | |
response to major cross-border security and criminal threats. With | :00:38. | :00:43. | |
the EU's record on external border security and intelligence sharing | :00:44. | :00:45. | |
patchy at best, is Europol just a sticking plaster on a gaping wound? | :00:46. | :01:15. | |
Rob Wainwright, welcome to HARDtalk. Thank you. Can we start with some | :01:16. | :01:23. | |
definitions when I use the word Europol, it sounds a little bit like | :01:24. | :01:26. | |
a European police force but of course that is not what you are. | :01:27. | :01:30. | |
Then you give me a quick definition of what Europol is supposed to do? | :01:31. | :01:35. | |
No formal police powers. What we do is support national authorities to | :01:36. | :01:38. | |
fight crime and terrorism. We provide access to a unique platform, | :01:39. | :01:43. | |
connecting 600 agencies through the intelligence gateway. We provide | :01:44. | :01:48. | |
intelligence notifications daily and weekend award and weekend award made | :01:49. | :01:51. | |
30,000 operations a year. Therefore, we can help the authorities to fight | :01:52. | :01:55. | |
the most dangerous terrorist gangs in Europe. And intelligence gateway, | :01:56. | :02:04. | |
you say. But it depends on how much intelligence states are allowing | :02:05. | :02:08. | |
through that gateway into your computers and your officers. How | :02:09. | :02:11. | |
much are they letting through? That is the challenge we face over the | :02:12. | :02:17. | |
20- 25 year history, building the trust of what is a conservative | :02:18. | :02:20. | |
policing community. I would say in fields like cyber crime we are | :02:21. | :02:24. | |
pretty much getting access to everything and we are involved in | :02:25. | :02:28. | |
all of the major cases across Europe right now. Terrorism is taking | :02:29. | :02:32. | |
longer because it is much more sensitive. We have an improved | :02:33. | :02:35. | |
record over the last few years but it's not good enough. There is a | :02:36. | :02:38. | |
trust problem, isn't there? There is a familiarity problem. We have | :02:39. | :02:47. | |
tripled the information we are dealing with. On terrorism we are | :02:48. | :02:50. | |
dealing with sensitive national cases touching on the most sensitive | :02:51. | :02:56. | |
part of national security. And, whereas we are providing support for | :02:57. | :02:59. | |
example in the aftermath of the dreadful attacks in Paris, it is not | :03:00. | :03:04. | |
quite yet across-the-board. Know, and partly because agencies like MI5 | :03:05. | :03:08. | |
in the UK, which you were once a senior member of, are not entirely | :03:09. | :03:12. | |
happy with the notion of giving their crown jewels of intelligence | :03:13. | :03:16. | |
to other European nations -- No. Because frankly, we know that the | :03:17. | :03:19. | |
closest intelligence relationship the UK has is with the other English | :03:20. | :03:25. | |
speaking nations of the world, the United States, Australia, New | :03:26. | :03:27. | |
Zealand and Canada are. There is a real problem. There is an important | :03:28. | :03:33. | |
way in which the way they deal with this. I would not want to get in the | :03:34. | :03:38. | |
way of that. The same for European agencies. Critically, we connect | :03:39. | :03:41. | |
that exclusive world with the mainstream police world. What we saw | :03:42. | :03:45. | |
from the Paris attacks, for example, suspect had criminal backgrounds. It | :03:46. | :03:51. | |
raises the importance of making sure, therefore, that in the | :03:52. | :03:56. | |
totality of these efforts, we can get the best out of all databases | :03:57. | :04:00. | |
not just in the intelligence world. I am glad you raised Paris. After | :04:01. | :04:05. | |
the horrible atrocities, there was an awful lot of scrutiny over what | :04:06. | :04:09. | |
agencies across Europe had known and what they had shared and done. It | :04:10. | :04:13. | |
turned out that several of the key players in the plot, and the attacks | :04:14. | :04:18. | |
come at were known to different police forces. The French, the | :04:19. | :04:23. | |
Belgian, the Dutch forces. They had done different suspicious things in | :04:24. | :04:27. | |
those different jurisdictions and no one had shared all this information | :04:28. | :04:30. | |
and put it into one pot. Have things changed? Since Paris we've seen | :04:31. | :04:35. | |
significant increases in sharing through Europol which has led | :04:36. | :04:39. | |
directly to ministers deciding to establish for the first time a | :04:40. | :04:43. | |
dedicated counterterrorism centre at Europol, so things are definitely | :04:44. | :04:48. | |
changing. What Paris showed is it was not good enough and there was a | :04:49. | :04:52. | |
fragmented picture of the suspects which led to only a partial exchange | :04:53. | :04:57. | |
of information between authorities. We have huge challenges ahead of us | :04:58. | :05:00. | |
in the face of what is certainly the most serious terrorist threat we've | :05:01. | :05:05. | |
faced in at least a decade. It sounds grand when you say we've | :05:06. | :05:09. | |
learned a lot since November, and we have set up a counterterrorist | :05:10. | :05:14. | |
centre. Back to basics. You don't have any independent power of | :05:15. | :05:17. | |
investigation. You can't launch your own investigations. You don't have | :05:18. | :05:22. | |
power of arrest. When we talk about policing, you can't really do any | :05:23. | :05:26. | |
policing. We don't have formal police powers but what we provide is | :05:27. | :05:31. | |
intelligent everyday that is connecting investigations between | :05:32. | :05:35. | |
different countries. Providing intelligence connections that are | :05:36. | :05:38. | |
not known to those investigators and that is the nature of fighting this | :05:39. | :05:45. | |
global threat. You are not providing it at receiving it. Maybe you are | :05:46. | :05:49. | |
handing it on but it is coming from somewhere else because you are not | :05:50. | :05:53. | |
launching your own investigations. We have over 100 and at the centre | :05:54. | :05:58. | |
of this massive intelligence unit -- 100 analysts. They are uniquely | :05:59. | :06:02. | |
identifying connections between countries and they are the ones | :06:03. | :06:05. | |
adding value and providing investigative leads to the | :06:06. | :06:10. | |
authorities. Back to Paris. One thing we learnt is the alleged | :06:11. | :06:16. | |
mastermind, who is now dead, of the operation, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who | :06:17. | :06:21. | |
died in a police raid after the terrible attacks in Paris, it turns | :06:22. | :06:25. | |
out he had crossed Europe several times. He had been to Syria. He had | :06:26. | :06:30. | |
come back. He had almost mocked the inability of the European police | :06:31. | :06:32. | |
forces to stop him even though he was known to them. Now, after that | :06:33. | :06:40. | |
the French Foreign Minister said, if he has been able to travel from | :06:41. | :06:44. | |
Syria to front it means that there are failings, fundamental failings, | :06:45. | :06:48. | |
in the whole European system. Can you sit here with me today and say | :06:49. | :06:51. | |
that those failings have been addressed and rectified? They are | :06:52. | :06:55. | |
being addressed right now and what I can say is the sad reality of what | :06:56. | :06:59. | |
we saw in Paris was this was one that got through. Of the many plots | :07:00. | :07:02. | |
Europe has faced in the last couple of years, sadly this one got | :07:03. | :07:06. | |
through. The threat is so dynamic, operating across a dispersed | :07:07. | :07:13. | |
community of 5000 people, fragmented information known about them, moving | :07:14. | :07:17. | |
freely across borders, and it is difficult to monitor all of them 24 | :07:18. | :07:21. | |
hours a day. It means we cannot actually reduce the threat to zero. | :07:22. | :07:25. | |
And that is the nature of the threat we are facing. Of course we have to | :07:26. | :07:28. | |
learn lessons from Paris and double the efforts but that is the reality | :07:29. | :07:34. | |
of what we face. Has there been sit thickened terror attacks thwarted | :07:35. | :07:40. | |
since November 2015? I can't talk about that because ongoing | :07:41. | :07:45. | |
investigations we are party to but I can see many plots have been | :07:46. | :07:49. | |
successfully... What Europeans and indeed the world want to know is | :07:50. | :07:52. | |
that things might have changed, maybe the balance between the | :07:53. | :07:59. | |
terrorist capabilities and the policing counter response. The | :08:00. | :08:01. | |
balance might have changed somewhat as lessons have been learned. It | :08:02. | :08:07. | |
would be useful to know of specific things that have been achieved and | :08:08. | :08:12. | |
plots thwarted since November 2015. A considerable amount of ongoing | :08:13. | :08:17. | |
investigations in many countries are going on and achievements are being | :08:18. | :08:21. | |
made to identify and disrupt. Of course I can't go into operational | :08:22. | :08:26. | |
details. But what Paris also showed was that the threat from ISIS has | :08:27. | :08:29. | |
moved up a gear. Deliberate intention by them to carry out | :08:30. | :08:36. | |
international network attacks on the west in a way we've not seen in | :08:37. | :08:40. | |
Europe before. These indiscriminate public shootings, suicide belts. | :08:41. | :08:45. | |
We've not seen that before. It was a deliberate challenge laid down by | :08:46. | :08:47. | |
so-called Islamic State which we are determined to meet. Interesting you | :08:48. | :08:52. | |
say the terrorist capability has been ratcheted up in a sense. After | :08:53. | :08:58. | |
November some interesting things were said by senior members of the | :08:59. | :09:00. | |
security services in the UK, and observers, Michael Clarke, director | :09:01. | :09:07. | |
general of RUSI. He said security services know their lives have | :09:08. | :09:11. | |
become more difficult. He says the scale of ISIS's activities and the | :09:12. | :09:16. | |
spread of encryption, a new level of encryption that tech companies help | :09:17. | :09:21. | |
hold on to provide after Snowden's revelations, he says all of it makes | :09:22. | :09:26. | |
it true that there has been a golden age for the investigators for the | :09:27. | :09:29. | |
counter-terror guys and that golden age has come to an end. Would you | :09:30. | :09:33. | |
agree? I think the golden age is changing. We face very many serious | :09:34. | :09:39. | |
threats. We can only remember how we felt after 9/11. We've responded | :09:40. | :09:45. | |
each time strongly and effectively defeated those forms of terrorism | :09:46. | :09:48. | |
and I think we will do it again. You talk about the Internet. It has | :09:49. | :09:52. | |
become a defining feature of the way in which IS prop against the threat. | :09:53. | :09:58. | |
The way it is using technology in particular the Internet to | :09:59. | :10:00. | |
radicalise individuals -- propagates. It is a much more | :10:01. | :10:05. | |
advanced propaganda tool that we have seen before. And behind it, | :10:06. | :10:11. | |
yes, encryption plays a part. So we have to change the response. You are | :10:12. | :10:16. | |
one of the senior voices in that counterterror community. Have you | :10:17. | :10:22. | |
talked to the community and said, look, the degree of encryption you | :10:23. | :10:26. | |
are putting on your devices and communications tools, makes it | :10:27. | :10:28. | |
almost impossible for us to safeguard our communities? That is a | :10:29. | :10:34. | |
consistent message coming out of the community. The way in which these | :10:35. | :10:38. | |
tools, certainly on the Dark Net, are exploited by serious criminals | :10:39. | :10:41. | |
and terrorists has made it harder for counterterrorism without doubt. | :10:42. | :10:46. | |
What the response the executives, the guys run the sites and | :10:47. | :10:49. | |
companies, give to you, what do they say to you? We've seen that in | :10:50. | :10:55. | |
public in the way in which the chiefs of Apple have made their | :10:56. | :10:59. | |
position. It has not been a very constructive debate between those | :11:00. | :11:02. | |
advocates of security on one side and those for almost absolute | :11:03. | :11:06. | |
privacy on the other. It has been a zero-sum game. They don't trust you. | :11:07. | :11:13. | |
Post Snowden they see the big state, on a pan-European basis, the | :11:14. | :11:19. | |
big state wants to monitor everyone's communications all the | :11:20. | :11:22. | |
time. Snowden change a lot of things in that sense and we have to rebuild | :11:23. | :11:29. | |
that trust. There are shafts of daylight in this sense that what we | :11:30. | :11:33. | |
are doing is helping monitor the way IS is operating online. We are | :11:34. | :11:38. | |
working with social media platforms to identify the most interest | :11:39. | :11:41. | |
accounts and remove them as quickly as possible. I can tell you in that | :11:42. | :11:46. | |
area, based entirely on voluntary co-operation, no enforcement powers | :11:47. | :11:48. | |
from Europol, all of the major social media platforms are working | :11:49. | :11:52. | |
very well with us. What about going after the money trail? You've made | :11:53. | :11:57. | |
it a key commitment after terrorist financing in Europe. So how are you | :11:58. | :12:03. | |
doing it? The reality is across the law enforcement community we have | :12:04. | :12:08. | |
built a very elaborate anti- money laundering regime. Only 20% of | :12:09. | :12:14. | |
suspicious transactions reported to the communities in Europe are | :12:15. | :12:18. | |
followed up on. A lot of work has to be done. At Europol we have specific | :12:19. | :12:24. | |
programmes, working with America to provide unique needs on terrorist | :12:25. | :12:28. | |
financing. Over 1500 given to French investigations are loan following | :12:29. | :12:31. | |
the Paris attack. There are significant resources. We have to | :12:32. | :12:34. | |
deliver them in a concerted way. Where are the weak link s right now? | :12:35. | :12:43. | |
Let me talk about Belgium. They say they have 400 citizens right now in | :12:44. | :12:47. | |
Syria, or believed about to go there. There are another four or 500 | :12:48. | :12:51. | |
apparently hoovered Belgian say have been radicalise to an extremely | :12:52. | :12:56. | |
dangerous level. -- who the Belgians say. The number they have | :12:57. | :13:01. | |
to keep tabs on these people is far fewer than the number of threats | :13:02. | :13:05. | |
they have identified. That would suggest to me that in a country like | :13:06. | :13:10. | |
Belgium the resources thrown at this problem are completely inadequate. | :13:11. | :13:13. | |
It is for them to decide for themselves. They are not working | :13:14. | :13:18. | |
alone. They are working in that case along with French investigators. We | :13:19. | :13:22. | |
know that they not. With respect, November Paris showed that. From | :13:23. | :13:27. | |
what I have seen, there has been considerable bilateral cooperation. | :13:28. | :13:32. | |
They are also making use of the supercharged European platforms we | :13:33. | :13:36. | |
are developing. I know that you want to talk strong game but | :13:37. | :13:38. | |
supercharged? What is your annual budget? Only 100 million. Tiny! You | :13:39. | :13:47. | |
should ask what is the size of the community we are networking with, | :13:48. | :13:51. | |
over 600 agencies, managing thousands of sensitive intelligence | :13:52. | :13:56. | |
exchanges daily. (CROSSTALK). You only have a couple of 100 staff, 100 | :13:57. | :14:00. | |
million budget. You are going to be overrun. We are not overrun. We are | :14:01. | :14:05. | |
on top of the game and we are supporting more than 30,000 | :14:06. | :14:08. | |
investigations per year in countering crime and terrorism. This | :14:09. | :14:12. | |
is in the face of a changing threat. I understand that. It is | :14:13. | :14:16. | |
something that we are determined to play an important part in meeting. | :14:17. | :14:22. | |
Some politicians have looked at your size. They would say the mismatch | :14:23. | :14:26. | |
between your ambition and the scale of the task you face and your | :14:27. | :14:31. | |
resources and say it is time to talk about something different, not | :14:32. | :14:35. | |
Europol as a token institution, but let's create a pan-European | :14:36. | :14:41. | |
equivalent of the FBI and CIA, a truly pan-European security agency. | :14:42. | :14:48. | |
Realistic? No. When you talk about the Brexit, you can imagine what the | :14:49. | :14:56. | |
British and other publics around Europe would think about having a | :14:57. | :15:00. | |
federal CIA or FBI, the time might come, especially with the threat and | :15:01. | :15:04. | |
the way it is developing, but at the moment it's not realistic and it's a | :15:05. | :15:09. | |
difficult environment in Europe compared to America. When he former | :15:10. | :15:16. | |
Belgian p.m. And federalist said terrorism is borderless and we have | :15:17. | :15:21. | |
to make terrorism gathering borderless, he is talking | :15:22. | :15:24. | |
fantastical rubbish? He is expressing the frustration in the | :15:25. | :15:27. | |
political class in Europe. The attacks in Paris showed the level of | :15:28. | :15:31. | |
corporation isn't good enough and that lays down the challenge in the | :15:32. | :15:34. | |
police community and intelligence community to up their game, improve | :15:35. | :15:40. | |
their intelligence gathering corporation. Communication is always | :15:41. | :15:45. | |
going to get solid binational tensions, jealousies, mistrusts. | :15:46. | :15:48. | |
We've talked about them in this interview. Do you as a senior | :15:49. | :15:52. | |
policing and intelligence officer wish that Europe could get the point | :15:53. | :15:56. | |
of borderless intelligence gathering? I think we can do that | :15:57. | :16:01. | |
without creating an FBI, because we're providing the framework in is | :16:02. | :16:05. | |
to Jewish and slight Europol and others to allow for pretty seamless | :16:06. | :16:09. | |
intelligence Corporation -- institutions like. That's not quite | :16:10. | :16:13. | |
happening on terrorism at the moment. For good reason I'm sure, | :16:14. | :16:19. | |
you try to put a very positive spin on what's happening in Europe at the | :16:20. | :16:23. | |
moment. Isn't the fundamental problem and challenge the chaos | :16:24. | :16:26. | |
created by the migration crisis? That is undermining all the good | :16:27. | :16:30. | |
work you're trying to do. 2015 was a pretty sizeable year for Europe, | :16:31. | :16:37. | |
you're right, the mike in crisis and the worst terrorist threat in ten | :16:38. | :16:39. | |
years and the conflation of those two things... -- migrant crisis. You | :16:40. | :16:46. | |
think there is a conflation, the terrorists are aware of the chaos | :16:47. | :16:50. | |
caused by the migration crisis and they are exploiting it? Both of them | :16:51. | :16:54. | |
have security dimensions, the extent to which they are emanating from the | :16:55. | :16:58. | |
same source is open to debate. I don't think there is a system, I | :16:59. | :17:02. | |
don't think Islamic State are systematically using the migration | :17:03. | :17:06. | |
route everyday. To get people to Europe? On we know one or two of the | :17:07. | :17:12. | |
Paris attackers have used the migration route into Europe. And we | :17:13. | :17:16. | |
have seen the way in which the underground economy produces fake | :17:17. | :17:19. | |
documents, including Syrian passports, feeding into the criminal | :17:20. | :17:24. | |
underworld and terrorist groups as well. It might be a growing problem | :17:25. | :17:28. | |
but it's not yet a significant one, much less than not .01% of migrants | :17:29. | :17:35. | |
are related in anyway to terrorism. -- zero .01%. You reacted to Paris | :17:36. | :17:39. | |
by creating a new counterterrorism centre. I know you have a special | :17:40. | :17:45. | |
migration unit as well to look at people smuggling and people | :17:46. | :17:48. | |
trafficking. How many people are in that unit? We only have 20 or 30 in | :17:49. | :17:54. | |
that Europe as well -- unit as well. It comes down to the resource | :17:55. | :17:58. | |
issue, you have such a big task in front of you and you have so few | :17:59. | :18:03. | |
resources, 20 or 30 people? There are hundreds of thousands of | :18:04. | :18:06. | |
migrants coming into Europe this year, millions, and you have 20 or | :18:07. | :18:12. | |
30 people? You have to count the community they are servicing, the | :18:13. | :18:16. | |
European police network of trafficking teams for example is | :18:17. | :18:20. | |
much larger of course, and they are feeding into our communication | :18:21. | :18:23. | |
exchange -- information exchange everyday. From that we have | :18:24. | :18:29. | |
discovered 40,000 people smugglers and 18,000 traffickers. We are | :18:30. | :18:33. | |
managing to support cases in the hundreds of thousands despite that | :18:34. | :18:37. | |
size. You misunderstand the point of the service that Europol is | :18:38. | :18:42. | |
providing, it's working rather well actually. I think I'm trying to get | :18:43. | :18:47. | |
their. It's more about crunching the data and feeding analysis back to | :18:48. | :18:51. | |
member state governments, is that sort of what you're doing? To use a | :18:52. | :18:56. | |
business analogy, we are part of the platform economy. That's jargon, I | :18:57. | :19:01. | |
don't know what that is, means? Uber is the largest taxi company but it | :19:02. | :19:11. | |
doesn't have a vehicle, air B doesn't have any properties. We can | :19:12. | :19:15. | |
still provide a relevant part of our business sector, which is policing. | :19:16. | :19:20. | |
You have to to be effective work with governments who are delivering | :19:21. | :19:24. | |
on the ground in terms of policing and security. On the migration | :19:25. | :19:28. | |
question, let's talk about Greece, it's patenting obvious that Greece | :19:29. | :19:32. | |
is utterly failing to secure its part of the European frontier. That | :19:33. | :19:37. | |
is a huge problem for people like you, is it not? Greece got | :19:38. | :19:41. | |
completely overwhelmed by the scale of the threat that happened and | :19:42. | :19:47. | |
10,000 migrants entering the Greek islands everyday. It was extremely | :19:48. | :19:52. | |
challenging for them. You're right, extremely challenging, is the only | :19:53. | :19:58. | |
right security response to say, for now at least, Greece has to be | :19:59. | :20:03. | |
exiled from Schengen. To have freedom of movement start at | :20:04. | :20:07. | |
Greece's external border is jeopardising the security of all of | :20:08. | :20:12. | |
Europe. It has since changed, it has since been 45 by hundreds of border | :20:13. | :20:15. | |
guard officials that have come from other countries to support Greece. | :20:16. | :20:20. | |
We are all helping to upgrade the technical architecture and helping | :20:21. | :20:25. | |
them deal with that. Greece's defences are certainly | :20:26. | :20:28. | |
strengthening. It's important Europe sticks together to protect ourselves | :20:29. | :20:33. | |
commonly from these security threats. When the Hungarians talk | :20:34. | :20:36. | |
about at least for now suspending Greece from Schengen, with your | :20:37. | :20:41. | |
influence and authority you would say no way? I have no influence over | :20:42. | :20:47. | |
such a political decision. The head of Europol carries a voice these | :20:48. | :20:51. | |
days. I am advising ministers that we need to make sure we can do the | :20:52. | :20:57. | |
things that can already work better, information exchange, | :20:58. | :21:00. | |
operation co-ordination to clamp down on the people smuggling gangs | :21:01. | :21:04. | |
that are making this situation much worse. They flooded into this market | :21:05. | :21:10. | |
in an entrepreneurial way in 2015 providing legal services... And | :21:11. | :21:14. | |
trafficking children? Yes, some of them trafficking children, and we | :21:15. | :21:18. | |
are concerned about the number of unaccompanied minors that have | :21:19. | :21:21. | |
arrived in Europe over the last year that have frankly gone missing in | :21:22. | :21:25. | |
the system and are vulnerable in some cases. A shocking failure that | :21:26. | :21:30. | |
they have reached the" Safety" of the European Union and then they | :21:31. | :21:35. | |
have gone missing in their thousands. Yes, but there is an | :21:36. | :21:40. | |
innocent explanation to most of it. We know some children have escaped, | :21:41. | :21:44. | |
if I can call it that, from children's homes and have gone to | :21:45. | :21:48. | |
meet up with a family friend somewhere perhaps. There aren't | :21:49. | :21:51. | |
necessarily thousands of children currently being exploited, but they | :21:52. | :21:56. | |
are definitely vulnerable to that. We have seen an increasing rate of | :21:57. | :22:01. | |
exportation over the recent years, though. I need to ask you about one | :22:02. | :22:06. | |
more issue, you're a Welshman and you're a Brit, you must be looking | :22:07. | :22:11. | |
at the debate in the UK, the Brexit, whether to stay or leave the | :22:12. | :22:16. | |
European Union. If the UK votes to leave the European Union, with the | :22:17. | :22:20. | |
UK have to leave the Europol framework? Yes. You would have to | :22:21. | :22:26. | |
quit? I think so, yes. In that sense, yes. This is obviously not | :22:27. | :22:31. | |
about me. It's not about you but it's about Europol. David Cameron, | :22:32. | :22:36. | |
one of his developing arguments seems to be, if we leave the | :22:37. | :22:39. | |
European Union then it's a massive security problem for the UK not | :22:40. | :22:43. | |
least because all of these people currently being controlled by | :22:44. | :22:47. | |
British and French immigration and the control officers on the French | :22:48. | :22:50. | |
side of the channel will be allowed to move across the Channel and the | :22:51. | :23:00. | |
process and therefore camped out in England and not in France any more. | :23:01. | :23:03. | |
Is that you're reading? We have been talking about in this interview the | :23:04. | :23:05. | |
extent to which terrorist and other threats have become international. | :23:06. | :23:07. | |
The real security threats that we face today travel to the UK, arrived | :23:08. | :23:12. | |
here, crossing through Europe in particular. Whether the UK is in or | :23:13. | :23:19. | |
out of the EU, we still have to have significant, even more advanced | :23:20. | :23:22. | |
Corporation with European neighbours. It could be harder if we | :23:23. | :23:27. | |
leave the EU? You can do that outside the EU but it will be more | :23:28. | :23:31. | |
costly and certainly much less effective. The UK would be accenting | :23:32. | :23:34. | |
itself from having access to the kind of well-developed arrangements | :23:35. | :23:41. | |
that have existed now and over the last 40 years. In this debate there | :23:42. | :23:44. | |
are many sides to the argument, I understand that, but I don't see any | :23:45. | :23:49. | |
security benefits for the UK leaving the EU. You're saying something the | :23:50. | :23:54. | |
potentially politically explosive. You're saying Britain is going to | :23:55. | :24:02. | |
suffer severe detrimental effects in security terms if it leaves the EU? | :24:03. | :24:06. | |
I didn't say that, I said it would make Britain's job harder to fight | :24:07. | :24:09. | |
crime and terrorism because it wouldn't have the same access to | :24:10. | :24:13. | |
very well-developed European corporation mechanisms that are in | :24:14. | :24:17. | |
place today. Rob Wainwright, thank you very much for being on | :24:18. | :24:21. | |
HARDtalk. Thank you. Thank you very much. | :24:22. | :24:22. |