Browse content similar to Bassma Kodmani, Member of the negotiating team of the Syrian opposition. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
Line | From | To | |
---|---|---|---|
Now on BBC News, Hardtalk. | 0:00:00 | 0:00:07 | |
Welcome to HARDtalk, | 0:00:07 | 0:00:08 | |
I'm Stephen Sackur. | 0:00:08 | 0:00:10 | |
After six years of terrible bloodshed, could 2017 dramatically | 0:00:10 | 0:00:15 | |
shift the dynamic of the Syria conflict? | 0:00:15 | 0:00:18 | |
Change is in the air. | 0:00:18 | 0:00:21 | |
Aleppo has fallen to the Assad regime and a ceasefire deal brokered | 0:00:21 | 0:00:24 | |
by Russia and Turkey is just about folding. | 0:00:24 | 0:00:29 | |
Moscow's dominant role in the diplomatic endgame is now | 0:00:29 | 0:00:32 | |
undisputed with Ankara playing a pivotal role as well. | 0:00:32 | 0:00:36 | |
My guest is Bassma Kodmani of the negotiating | 0:00:36 | 0:00:39 | |
team of the Syrian opposition. | 0:00:39 | 0:00:41 | |
Is it time for the moderate rebels to accept their de facto defeat? | 0:00:41 | 0:00:50 | |
Bassma Kodmani in Paris, welcome to HARDtalk. | 0:01:15 | 0:01:20 | |
Hello, Stephen, thank you. | 0:01:20 | 0:01:22 | |
It's a pleasure to have you on the programme. | 0:01:22 | 0:01:25 | |
Let me start with a question that comes directly from the New Year. | 0:01:25 | 0:01:29 | |
Do you see 2017 bringing with it better prospects | 0:01:29 | 0:01:33 | |
for an end to the conflict in Syria then we have seen at any time | 0:01:33 | 0:01:37 | |
in the previous, almost, six years? | 0:01:37 | 0:01:43 | |
I do, carefully optimistic, but I do. | 0:01:43 | 0:01:47 | |
I do hope and we are working towards making 2017 the end | 0:01:47 | 0:01:52 | |
of the disaster of the tragedy and the beginning of | 0:01:52 | 0:01:57 | |
a political transition. | 0:01:57 | 0:01:59 | |
That is what we are hoping for and the coming | 0:01:59 | 0:02:03 | |
weeks will tell us whether we are moving in that direction | 0:02:03 | 0:02:06 | |
but there is certainly a turning point and | 0:02:06 | 0:02:10 | |
certainly something to build on at the moment | 0:02:10 | 0:02:13 | |
with the new players that have asserted themselves and I think | 0:02:13 | 0:02:17 | |
there is space for diplomacy now if the signals coming out | 0:02:17 | 0:02:22 | |
from Moscow and from Turkey as well as, very | 0:02:22 | 0:02:26 | |
carefully, from Tehran, if these signals are sincere then | 0:02:26 | 0:02:32 | |
we have some hope for a political settlement, yes. | 0:02:32 | 0:02:36 | |
I want to talk about the key players and their | 0:02:36 | 0:02:39 | |
signals in a minute but just taking up your phrase about a turning | 0:02:39 | 0:02:42 | |
point. | 0:02:42 | 0:02:43 | |
Would it be fair to say that the defeat of the anti-Assad | 0:02:43 | 0:02:46 | |
forces in Aleppo was a fundamental turning point? | 0:02:46 | 0:02:54 | |
Certainly, the military confrontation has turned | 0:02:54 | 0:02:57 | |
to the advantage of the Assad regime. | 0:02:57 | 0:03:01 | |
Why? | 0:03:01 | 0:03:02 | |
Simply because it had the full and massive support of Russian air | 0:03:02 | 0:03:07 | |
force on one hand and pro-Iranian militia, sectarian militias on the | 0:03:07 | 0:03:13 | |
ground as ground forces. | 0:03:13 | 0:03:15 | |
Very little was done by Assad's forces, it was by one key regional | 0:03:15 | 0:03:21 | |
power and one key international power so it was obvious the outcome | 0:03:21 | 0:03:25 | |
was not going to be in favour of the opposition. | 0:03:25 | 0:03:29 | |
But one needs to look back five years ago or even six years ago | 0:03:29 | 0:03:34 | |
when the uprising started. | 0:03:34 | 0:03:35 | |
Those who rose up against Assad had no arms, no military means | 0:03:35 | 0:03:40 | |
at all so we are looking at a confrontation | 0:03:40 | 0:03:45 | |
that is ending militarily but the ingredients for a conflict | 0:03:45 | 0:03:50 | |
and the confrontation is still there. | 0:03:50 | 0:03:56 | |
If we are going to build on the military balance of forces, | 0:03:56 | 0:04:00 | |
I don't think we will go very far in either defeating terrorism | 0:04:00 | 0:04:06 | |
in Syria or in ending the conflict and having | 0:04:06 | 0:04:10 | |
a satisfactory political transition. | 0:04:10 | 0:04:14 | |
The people of Syria and goodness knows that they | 0:04:14 | 0:04:17 | |
have suffered so much, they have seen well over 300,000 | 0:04:17 | 0:04:22 | |
of their people killed, they have seen 12 million and more | 0:04:22 | 0:04:26 | |
displaced including 5 million who have left | 0:04:26 | 0:04:28 | |
the country altogether. | 0:04:28 | 0:04:30 | |
With that in mind, is this the right time for you in the so-called | 0:04:30 | 0:04:34 | |
moderate anti-Assad opposition who have been aligned | 0:04:34 | 0:04:38 | |
with the United States and the Saudis in particular, | 0:04:38 | 0:04:42 | |
would it be the right time to acknowledge that you have | 0:04:42 | 0:04:44 | |
lost out here? | 0:04:44 | 0:04:46 | |
You wanted Assad to go and those who have prevailed, | 0:04:46 | 0:04:50 | |
the Russians in particular and the Iranians as well, | 0:04:50 | 0:04:52 | |
they are the people who are insistent that Assad | 0:04:52 | 0:04:55 | |
need not and will not go? | 0:04:55 | 0:05:00 | |
To be fair to the opposition, it has sought support | 0:05:00 | 0:05:05 | |
from democratic countries, it has received very little support | 0:05:05 | 0:05:10 | |
and obviously the Assad regime has received massive support. | 0:05:10 | 0:05:14 | |
Russia has decided Syria would be the place where it | 0:05:14 | 0:05:17 | |
would signal its international power, stature and military might. | 0:05:17 | 0:05:22 | |
We have seen it happen on our territory. | 0:05:22 | 0:05:25 | |
It is not because we chose to align ourselves | 0:05:25 | 0:05:28 | |
with this or that party. | 0:05:28 | 0:05:31 | |
We as Syrians are asking for dignity, | 0:05:31 | 0:05:34 | |
rights, freedom and security and the right to life today | 0:05:34 | 0:05:39 | |
for every Syrian and for that to happen, we will be | 0:05:39 | 0:05:43 | |
working with any country serious about organising and facilitating | 0:05:43 | 0:05:47 | |
a political transition. | 0:05:47 | 0:05:50 | |
We have tried it with Assad himself directly for ten years, | 0:05:50 | 0:05:56 | |
then the population rose against Assad for six years. | 0:05:56 | 0:06:00 | |
Did not receive any concession, none whatsoever. | 0:06:00 | 0:06:03 | |
We look to all the powers in this world and if Russia | 0:06:03 | 0:06:07 | |
is serious about brokering a settlement in Syria, | 0:06:07 | 0:06:11 | |
it will find a partner among the moderate opposition, | 0:06:11 | 0:06:14 | |
both military and political. | 0:06:15 | 0:06:17 | |
These are people who the moderate political opposition | 0:06:17 | 0:06:21 | |
is very clear about. | 0:06:21 | 0:06:24 | |
The state needs to remain. | 0:06:24 | 0:06:25 | |
There has to be continuity of governance, we need to restore | 0:06:25 | 0:06:28 | |
security to Syria because we know the international community | 0:06:28 | 0:06:33 | |
is worried about international terrorism coming out of Syria. | 0:06:33 | 0:06:39 | |
If I may, let me read between the lines. | 0:06:39 | 0:06:41 | |
You acknowledge the Russians are driving the process, | 0:06:41 | 0:06:45 | |
no question. | 0:06:45 | 0:06:47 | |
The Americans with Obama in his final days as president, | 0:06:47 | 0:06:50 | |
with Donald Trump singing a very different tune, | 0:06:50 | 0:06:52 | |
the Americans aren't really in this game at the moment | 0:06:52 | 0:06:55 | |
and as far as you're concerned, you are now ready, are you, | 0:06:55 | 0:06:58 | |
to undertake the peace negotiations the Russians want, | 0:06:58 | 0:07:03 | |
to be, they say, hosted in Astana, Kazakhstan, with the Turks | 0:07:03 | 0:07:06 | |
and the Iranians playing key roles with no sign of the Americans? | 0:07:06 | 0:07:13 | |
Are you with your team in the high negotiations council | 0:07:13 | 0:07:16 | |
of the opposition prepared to participate | 0:07:16 | 0:07:19 | |
in that process? | 0:07:19 | 0:07:23 | |
Look, I believe if these talks were to take place in Astana | 0:07:23 | 0:07:26 | |
or Geneva or any other place, if they are placed under the terms | 0:07:26 | 0:07:31 | |
of reference, if the terms for the talks are clear, | 0:07:31 | 0:07:36 | |
if they refer to UN resolutions which Russia has voted for, | 0:07:36 | 0:07:41 | |
there is no problem in participating in such a process. | 0:07:41 | 0:07:44 | |
Russia is brokering a cessation of hostilities on the ground. | 0:07:44 | 0:07:48 | |
If this holds, the parties will be ready to go | 0:07:48 | 0:07:52 | |
whether they are military or political. | 0:07:52 | 0:07:55 | |
What we would like to see is certainly the new US | 0:07:55 | 0:07:58 | |
administration step in and take some responsibility in brokering | 0:07:58 | 0:08:04 | |
this political arrangement. | 0:08:04 | 0:08:08 | |
We have Russia telling us it is serious about | 0:08:08 | 0:08:10 | |
political settlement. | 0:08:10 | 0:08:13 | |
We have Turkey playing a positive role but so far we have not | 0:08:13 | 0:08:17 | |
had a positive role from Iran. | 0:08:17 | 0:08:19 | |
Let us admit that Iran has been the key spoiler. | 0:08:19 | 0:08:23 | |
Sectarian militias on the ground are our key problem today in Syria. | 0:08:23 | 0:08:28 | |
They are fuelling jihadis on the opposition side. | 0:08:28 | 0:08:33 | |
What we need as a priority is a coalition of countries, | 0:08:33 | 0:08:38 | |
and the Trump administration should be part of that, | 0:08:38 | 0:08:41 | |
to push out both sectarian militias who are poisoning | 0:08:41 | 0:08:45 | |
the ground inside Syria. | 0:08:45 | 0:08:47 | |
I will push you on this a little bit. | 0:08:47 | 0:08:49 | |
You can say what should happen and what you | 0:08:49 | 0:08:51 | |
would like to happen but let's deal with reality, | 0:08:51 | 0:08:53 | |
what is happening. | 0:08:53 | 0:08:54 | |
The US is not playing a role and the UN, frankly, | 0:08:54 | 0:08:57 | |
has been sidetracked as well. | 0:08:57 | 0:08:58 | |
The Russians are dominating the diplomacy right now and I want | 0:08:58 | 0:09:01 | |
a simple yes or no answer. | 0:09:01 | 0:09:04 | |
Are you prepared to go to peace talks that are brokered | 0:09:04 | 0:09:07 | |
and controlled by Russia? | 0:09:07 | 0:09:11 | |
The Russians who don't see a reason to insist that Assad be | 0:09:11 | 0:09:13 | |
removed from power. | 0:09:13 | 0:09:15 | |
Are you prepared to undertake and participate in those talks under | 0:09:15 | 0:09:19 | |
Russian auspices? | 0:09:19 | 0:09:23 | |
The Russians are referring to the UN resolutions. | 0:09:23 | 0:09:27 | |
If that is clearly the case, there is no problem in participating. | 0:09:27 | 0:09:31 | |
The opposition can go. | 0:09:31 | 0:09:32 | |
What I'm saying is the Trump administration, the US Congress, | 0:09:32 | 0:09:36 | |
are clearly coming out against Iranian behaviour | 0:09:36 | 0:09:41 | |
across the Middle East because it has really destabilised the region. | 0:09:41 | 0:09:45 | |
That is where we can expect the Trump administration will play | 0:09:45 | 0:09:50 | |
a role in pressuring Iran to limit its presence | 0:09:50 | 0:09:54 | |
across the region. | 0:09:54 | 0:09:56 | |
It's Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, everywhere in the region | 0:09:56 | 0:10:00 | |
and we have a real problem there with the Shia militias | 0:10:00 | 0:10:04 | |
on the ground. | 0:10:04 | 0:10:05 | |
We cannot get rid of Sunni jihadis whether it is Daesh, | 0:10:05 | 0:10:09 | |
Al Nusra, radical groups, if we have this poisonous presence | 0:10:09 | 0:10:15 | |
of Shia militias on the side of the regime. | 0:10:15 | 0:10:18 | |
This is where Iran needs to come to terms | 0:10:18 | 0:10:21 | |
with what needs to happen on the ground in order for Syria | 0:10:21 | 0:10:24 | |
to see a peaceful settlement. | 0:10:24 | 0:10:26 | |
On one point of detail, yesterday a coalition of 12 | 0:10:26 | 0:10:29 | |
or so different anti-Assad forces on the ground said | 0:10:29 | 0:10:33 | |
they were going to reject any further diplomacy under | 0:10:33 | 0:10:37 | |
the Russian-Astana tent because of what they described as systematic | 0:10:37 | 0:10:46 | |
violations of the ceasefire agreement by Assad forces | 0:10:46 | 0:10:48 | |
on the ground. | 0:10:48 | 0:10:53 | |
If that your position as well or you prepared to say | 0:10:53 | 0:10:56 | |
that the ceasefire is holding in a satisfactory way? | 0:10:56 | 0:11:01 | |
Unfortunately the ceasefire is not holding. | 0:11:01 | 0:11:04 | |
These groups are the ones who signed with | 0:11:04 | 0:11:07 | |
Russia and Russia signed on behalf of the regime, | 0:11:07 | 0:11:09 | |
an agreement for cessation of hostilities. | 0:11:09 | 0:11:12 | |
The groups abided by the ceasefire and the Syrian regime | 0:11:12 | 0:11:16 | |
is not abiding. | 0:11:16 | 0:11:18 | |
What the groups are asking is for our Russia to get the Assad | 0:11:18 | 0:11:22 | |
regime to behave, to comply and enforce the cessation | 0:11:22 | 0:11:26 | |
of hostilities. | 0:11:26 | 0:11:28 | |
If it is credible, a political negotiation can happen. | 0:11:28 | 0:11:32 | |
These groups are willing to go to Astana, they signed, | 0:11:32 | 0:11:36 | |
they said they were going and now we see the other side is not | 0:11:36 | 0:11:39 | |
respecting any of that. | 0:11:39 | 0:11:42 | |
We need Russia to put pressure needed, and it can do so, | 0:11:42 | 0:11:46 | |
on Iran and the Syrian regime if it was a political settlement. | 0:11:46 | 0:11:52 | |
I personally believe that Russia today has an interest in finding | 0:11:52 | 0:11:59 | |
an exit strategy through a political settlement. | 0:11:59 | 0:12:01 | |
I would expect it will do so. | 0:12:01 | 0:12:06 | |
Have you and other negotiators who have aimed | 0:12:06 | 0:12:08 | |
your efforts mostly at the UN track in Geneva, have you reached out | 0:12:08 | 0:12:13 | |
with key Russian officials? | 0:12:13 | 0:12:21 | |
Through the United Nations we have contacts with | 0:12:21 | 0:12:24 | |
everyone involved in this crisis. | 0:12:24 | 0:12:28 | |
With respect, I don't mean through the UN track. | 0:12:28 | 0:12:30 | |
The Financial Times reported last month that some | 0:12:30 | 0:12:33 | |
moderate leaders had covert and secret talks with Russian | 0:12:33 | 0:12:39 | |
officials hosted by the Turks in Ankara. | 0:12:39 | 0:12:41 | |
Have you been involved in that? | 0:12:41 | 0:12:44 | |
The Turks have hosted talks with military groups | 0:12:44 | 0:12:48 | |
and lots of political figures from the opposition have also been | 0:12:48 | 0:12:52 | |
in touch directly with Russia. | 0:12:52 | 0:12:55 | |
Some have gone to Moscow and some have met them elsewhere. | 0:12:55 | 0:12:58 | |
There are many messages passed on to the Russians and they know | 0:12:58 | 0:13:02 | |
exactly where the opposition stands and what it is willing to negotiate. | 0:13:02 | 0:13:08 | |
Really, the problem today is not so much Russia and the opposition. | 0:13:08 | 0:13:12 | |
They know each other, or they understand each | 0:13:12 | 0:13:14 | |
other's position. | 0:13:14 | 0:13:16 | |
We are willing to operate and negotiate under the political | 0:13:16 | 0:13:23 | |
transition, fine, we can go to a negotiation | 0:13:23 | 0:13:26 | |
on political transition... | 0:13:26 | 0:13:30 | |
If I may say, we have talked before and you have always in the past | 0:13:30 | 0:13:34 | |
said, you know what, it's quite simple, the removal | 0:13:34 | 0:13:36 | |
of Assad, no role for us that in the transition. | 0:13:36 | 0:13:40 | |
That is a dealbreaker dealbreaker for us. | 0:13:40 | 0:13:43 | |
We cannot sign anything or engage in any process that involves Assad. | 0:13:43 | 0:13:47 | |
It seems to me that you must be changing your mind. | 0:13:47 | 0:13:50 | |
If you say you believe in Russia's good faith | 0:13:50 | 0:13:54 | |
and believe in their desire to see the conflict ended, | 0:13:54 | 0:13:57 | |
we know the Russians don't feel that Assad has | 0:13:57 | 0:13:59 | |
to go so presumably, to have given ground | 0:13:59 | 0:14:02 | |
on that, have you? | 0:14:02 | 0:14:05 | |
Look, can I say very simply, we read the international equation. | 0:14:05 | 0:14:10 | |
Here's the balance of forces on the ground, here is what Russia | 0:14:10 | 0:14:13 | |
is seeking to achieve, a political settlement, | 0:14:13 | 0:14:17 | |
fine, along the lines of resolutions in the UN, | 0:14:17 | 0:14:20 | |
to talk about political transition. | 0:14:20 | 0:14:21 | |
That is fine for us. | 0:14:22 | 0:14:24 | |
What Assad becomes is how he behaves in these negotiations. | 0:14:24 | 0:14:29 | |
Is he in a position to make concessions, to yield some | 0:14:29 | 0:14:33 | |
of his prerogatives, a lot of his prerogatives, | 0:14:33 | 0:14:36 | |
most of his prerogatives, any of his prerogatives, | 0:14:36 | 0:14:39 | |
to a transition government? | 0:14:39 | 0:14:41 | |
If that is the case then the discussion changes but do | 0:14:41 | 0:14:44 | |
you think the opposition... | 0:14:44 | 0:14:47 | |
He might be leading the transition. | 0:14:47 | 0:14:49 | |
He cannot lead it. | 0:14:49 | 0:14:50 | |
What? | 0:14:50 | 0:14:52 | |
He obviously cannot lead it. | 0:14:52 | 0:14:54 | |
He is not showing any indication other than destroying communities | 0:14:54 | 0:14:57 | |
and starving people. | 0:14:57 | 0:15:00 | |
We need to see some behaviour that is positive on the other side, | 0:15:00 | 0:15:04 | |
then we will have a partner for peace. | 0:15:04 | 0:15:06 | |
If we don't, I think Russia will come to terms with the fact | 0:15:06 | 0:15:10 | |
that it doesn't have a party on the other side and cannot ask | 0:15:10 | 0:15:13 | |
the opposition to do much to work with Assad if Assad doesn't | 0:15:13 | 0:15:16 | |
want to work with the opposition. | 0:15:16 | 0:15:19 | |
The equation is fairly easy, you know. | 0:15:19 | 0:15:22 | |
We are not asking for Assad to go away the day we enter negotiations. | 0:15:22 | 0:15:27 | |
We are talking about negotiations in which there are give and take. | 0:15:27 | 0:15:31 | |
We need prisoners out, we need women and children to be | 0:15:31 | 0:15:35 | |
safe and to be released also from prisons. | 0:15:35 | 0:15:38 | |
We need the disappeared, to have news about them. | 0:15:38 | 0:15:43 | |
We need to have the bombings stop and barrel bombs stop | 0:15:43 | 0:15:46 | |
being thrown at civilians. | 0:15:46 | 0:15:49 | |
I'm sorry to repeat myself. | 0:15:49 | 0:15:51 | |
I don't want to get stuck on this issue, but one last time, | 0:15:51 | 0:15:54 | |
it does seem to me that you have given ground on the role of Assad. | 0:15:54 | 0:15:58 | |
You are now acknowledging to me that Assad will be a key figure | 0:15:58 | 0:16:02 | |
in the negotiations. | 0:16:02 | 0:16:03 | |
He won't just be removed, it will be Assad in many ways | 0:16:03 | 0:16:07 | |
who is the figure deciding what he can give. | 0:16:07 | 0:16:13 | |
Look, the power of Assad is very little. | 0:16:13 | 0:16:15 | |
He has nuisance power, yes, but those who are negotiating, | 0:16:15 | 0:16:20 | |
the decision-making power is in Moscow and Tehran. | 0:16:20 | 0:16:24 | |
Unfortunately there is no Syrian regime that can | 0:16:24 | 0:16:29 | |
still decide on a yes or no. | 0:16:29 | 0:16:31 | |
That is why we are talking to Russia. | 0:16:31 | 0:16:35 | |
We will be talking to the countries and parties that support | 0:16:35 | 0:16:38 | |
the Assad regime, not so much the regime itself. | 0:16:38 | 0:16:42 | |
We need to find some reasonable voices over there, | 0:16:42 | 0:16:45 | |
we have not seen them so far, he has prevented them from rising | 0:16:45 | 0:16:49 | |
and if negotiations can bring those reasonable voices out and if we can | 0:16:49 | 0:16:53 | |
talk to them and have them safely talk to us without being themselves | 0:16:53 | 0:16:58 | |
punished for showing some reasonable behaviour, then we will have | 0:16:58 | 0:17:03 | |
a negotiated process. | 0:17:03 | 0:17:05 | |
Otherwise I think Russia will understand, Iran is more difficult, | 0:17:05 | 0:17:09 | |
but Russia will understand that it doesn't have a helpful partner out | 0:17:09 | 0:17:13 | |
there and needs to work differently with the opposition. | 0:17:13 | 0:17:17 | |
Everything we are talking about is couched in terms | 0:17:17 | 0:17:19 | |
of Moscow, Putin, Russia. | 0:17:19 | 0:17:20 | |
Let's reflect on how we got to where we are today. | 0:17:20 | 0:17:23 | |
Do you feel desperately let down, maybe even betrayed | 0:17:23 | 0:17:28 | |
by the Obama administration? | 0:17:28 | 0:17:32 | |
I think the Obama administration has opted out. | 0:17:32 | 0:17:35 | |
It should have played the role that was what a US role | 0:17:35 | 0:17:40 | |
should be in this region. | 0:17:40 | 0:17:43 | |
Opting out of this region is abandoning certain | 0:17:43 | 0:17:47 | |
responsibilities vis-a-vis Syria but also vis-a-vis the whole region, | 0:17:47 | 0:17:50 | |
Iraq, the Gulf countries. | 0:17:50 | 0:17:54 | |
We are in a region where the US was a key player. | 0:17:54 | 0:17:58 | |
It cannot just pull out as it did and in the case of Syria, | 0:17:58 | 0:18:01 | |
it is the Syrian population, yes, that is paying the price. | 0:18:01 | 0:18:04 | |
Yes, we are disappointed. | 0:18:04 | 0:18:06 | |
Obama, he steered away from obviously any significant | 0:18:06 | 0:18:10 | |
military action against Assad. | 0:18:10 | 0:18:13 | |
It looked possible for a while, he walked away from it. | 0:18:13 | 0:18:17 | |
He talked, or at least Hillary Clinton talked | 0:18:17 | 0:18:19 | |
for a while about some sort of aerial intervention | 0:18:19 | 0:18:21 | |
to establish safe havens. | 0:18:21 | 0:18:23 | |
They walked very long, long way from that. | 0:18:23 | 0:18:25 | |
They talked about training moderate forces on the ground. | 0:18:25 | 0:18:28 | |
Well, the training programme turned out to be pitiful. | 0:18:28 | 0:18:31 | |
Actually farcical. | 0:18:31 | 0:18:34 | |
So when you look at all of those elements of what the administration | 0:18:34 | 0:18:38 | |
talked about and didn't deliver, give me your final verdict as Obama | 0:18:38 | 0:18:42 | |
is about to leave office. | 0:18:42 | 0:18:46 | |
Well, I believe he should have thought of where security, | 0:18:46 | 0:18:51 | |
how to restore security in Syria and today that is our concern. | 0:18:51 | 0:18:56 | |
The Obama administration has decided that there was no possibility | 0:18:56 | 0:19:01 | |
to challenge Russia. | 0:19:01 | 0:19:03 | |
He certainly should have challenged Russia at some point | 0:19:03 | 0:19:06 | |
and at those turning points, he failed us, he certainly did. | 0:19:06 | 0:19:10 | |
But what we are looking at today is can we bring | 0:19:10 | 0:19:13 | |
back security to Syria? | 0:19:13 | 0:19:15 | |
Because this is the concern of the international community. | 0:19:15 | 0:19:18 | |
Unfortunately, no one is thinking of Assad. | 0:19:18 | 0:19:20 | |
Assad can sit there, they don't see the risk | 0:19:20 | 0:19:22 | |
and they don't see the link between terrorism rising | 0:19:22 | 0:19:25 | |
and Assad staying in power. | 0:19:25 | 0:19:28 | |
Fine, but what we are seeing today is if you want to bring | 0:19:28 | 0:19:32 | |
an alternative to the horrible, criminal system that we have | 0:19:32 | 0:19:37 | |
in Syria, then we have to have a security plan for this | 0:19:37 | 0:19:41 | |
country and we need the cooperation of every country. | 0:19:41 | 0:19:44 | |
We need the US, we need Russia. | 0:19:44 | 0:19:46 | |
Your message to Donald Trump then, Donald Trump the man who says | 0:19:46 | 0:19:50 | |
Vladimir Putin is very smart and who also says that when it comes | 0:19:50 | 0:19:53 | |
to analysing the serious situation, his objective and his overriding | 0:19:53 | 0:19:58 | |
concern is smashing the jihadists in so-called Islamic State. | 0:19:58 | 0:20:03 | |
It doesn't seem to be in getting rid of Assad whatsoever. | 0:20:03 | 0:20:07 | |
So your message to Trump? | 0:20:07 | 0:20:11 | |
The message to Trump is get the foreign fighters out of Syria. | 0:20:11 | 0:20:15 | |
Shia militias, pro-Iranian, they are Iraqis, they are Afghans, | 0:20:15 | 0:20:19 | |
they are Iranians, they are not Syrians and on the other side, | 0:20:19 | 0:20:22 | |
there are jihadis who are foreigners and we want them out of the country. | 0:20:22 | 0:20:27 | |
This is what the international community needs to help | 0:20:27 | 0:20:31 | |
the reasonable Syrians in order to achieve the coming | 0:20:31 | 0:20:33 | |
weeks and months. | 0:20:33 | 0:20:35 | |
That's when we can have the ground for a political settlement. | 0:20:35 | 0:20:37 | |
We don't have much time left and I just want you now to reflect | 0:20:37 | 0:20:41 | |
on the six years that have brought us here. | 0:20:41 | 0:20:43 | |
You have been actively involved with the opposition throughout | 0:20:43 | 0:20:46 | |
that six-year period and here we are with | 0:20:46 | 0:20:48 | |
Russia in the ascendancy, with the Americans opted out | 0:20:48 | 0:20:52 | |
and with Donald Trump singing a tune that doesn't sound | 0:20:52 | 0:20:55 | |
like it is going to suit you very well, and on the ground, | 0:20:55 | 0:20:58 | |
the opposition forces defeated in Aleppo and on the defensive | 0:20:58 | 0:21:03 | |
in those pockets of territory they still retain. | 0:21:03 | 0:21:07 | |
Is it time for you to quit, for the opposition to say, | 0:21:07 | 0:21:10 | |
we tried, we failed, the country has been ruined | 0:21:10 | 0:21:14 | |
and the best thing now is to walk away and accept defeat | 0:21:14 | 0:21:19 | |
because that is the only way we can save further life? | 0:21:19 | 0:21:26 | |
This is our country. | 0:21:26 | 0:21:28 | |
We cannot give up. | 0:21:28 | 0:21:29 | |
Giving up makes no sense. | 0:21:29 | 0:21:33 | |
What we are looking to achieve... | 0:21:33 | 0:21:35 | |
Well, it makes sense when you are saving lives. | 0:21:35 | 0:21:38 | |
Well, no, it is not, because coming under Assad's | 0:21:38 | 0:21:42 | |
control tomorrow morning, if that is to happen, | 0:21:42 | 0:21:44 | |
is also under Shia militias. | 0:21:44 | 0:21:48 | |
Again, Assad has no capacity to control the country, to govern it. | 0:21:48 | 0:21:54 | |
Neither the legitimacy nor the capacity, the military capacity. | 0:21:54 | 0:21:58 | |
He needs those foreign troops to be on the ground, | 0:21:58 | 0:22:01 | |
so it is too late to imagine a scenario of Assad returning | 0:22:01 | 0:22:05 | |
and retaking control of the whole country. | 0:22:05 | 0:22:07 | |
That is not going to happen because he cannot do it. | 0:22:07 | 0:22:10 | |
Even if Russia wants him to do it, he cannot achieve it. | 0:22:10 | 0:22:16 | |
Quickly, what Russia seems to want, as best as we can understand, | 0:22:16 | 0:22:19 | |
it is that they want a much more federal system, Assad | 0:22:19 | 0:22:23 | |
to still be president, much more autonomy to the different | 0:22:23 | 0:22:26 | |
regions of Syria, which would then recognise the rights | 0:22:26 | 0:22:28 | |
of all of the different ethnic groupings within the country, | 0:22:28 | 0:22:32 | |
a looser system but one in which still has Assad | 0:22:32 | 0:22:36 | |
at its federal centre. | 0:22:36 | 0:22:37 | |
Could you imagine accepting that? | 0:22:37 | 0:22:42 | |
I think the Russians will themselves realise that that is not | 0:22:42 | 0:22:44 | |
going to work with Assad. | 0:22:44 | 0:22:46 | |
We want decentralisation, we want a loose control from the centre, | 0:22:46 | 0:22:51 | |
we want obviously a democratic, participative system, | 0:22:51 | 0:22:54 | |
so we are not disagreeing here and we are saving we need | 0:22:54 | 0:22:58 | |
security and fighting terrorism. | 0:22:58 | 0:23:00 | |
We are on the side of the international community on this. | 0:23:00 | 0:23:03 | |
Is Assad on the side of the international community? | 0:23:03 | 0:23:05 | |
That is the real question to ask. | 0:23:05 | 0:23:07 | |
Is he willing to fight those jihadi groups because the Shia groups | 0:23:07 | 0:23:11 | |
are just as jihadi as Daesh group, so that is what we need to achieve. | 0:23:11 | 0:23:16 | |
Is Assad a partner in doing that? | 0:23:16 | 0:23:18 | |
I don't believe he has shown any indication of that and this | 0:23:18 | 0:23:21 | |
is where we believe the opposition is showing every sign | 0:23:21 | 0:23:25 | |
that it is part of the solution and that with it builds security | 0:23:25 | 0:23:29 | |
capacity and governance capacity for a future Syria. | 0:23:29 | 0:23:35 | |
Do you think we will be having this conversation again | 0:23:35 | 0:23:37 | |
at the beginning of 2018, with Syria still at war | 0:23:37 | 0:23:39 | |
or will it be over by then? | 0:23:39 | 0:23:42 | |
I think war will be over by then. | 0:23:42 | 0:23:44 | |
I think the parties are exhausted and I do believe that | 0:23:44 | 0:23:47 | |
in 2018, we will be talking about what we have reconstructed | 0:23:47 | 0:23:52 | |
so far and how we have brought legitimate governance | 0:23:52 | 0:23:55 | |
to the different areas of Syria. | 0:23:55 | 0:23:58 | |
That is my belief and that is what we are fighting for. | 0:23:58 | 0:24:00 | |
We will end on that positive note. | 0:24:00 | 0:24:02 | |
Bassma Kodmani, thank you very much for joining me from Paris. | 0:24:02 | 0:24:07 | |
We | 0:24:39 | 0:24:40 | |
We had | 0:24:40 | 0:24:40 |