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Now on BBC News it's time for HARDtalk. | 0:00:02 | 0:00:04 | |
Welcome to HARDtalk. | 0:00:07 | 0:00:08 | |
I'm Stephen Sackur. | 0:00:09 | 0:00:10 | |
The military threats facing the Western world have | 0:00:10 | 0:00:12 | |
changed dramatically. | 0:00:12 | 0:00:13 | |
The West's military doctrine and capabilities | 0:00:13 | 0:00:18 | |
have failed to keep up. | 0:00:18 | 0:00:20 | |
That's the view of my guest today - not an outside observer, | 0:00:20 | 0:00:24 | |
but, until last year, one of the most senior generals | 0:00:24 | 0:00:26 | |
in the British Armed Forces. | 0:00:26 | 0:00:28 | |
General Sir Richard Barrons led the UK's Joint Forces Command. | 0:00:28 | 0:00:31 | |
He's fought in wars, from the Falklands to | 0:00:31 | 0:00:37 | |
the Middle East and Afghanistan. | 0:00:37 | 0:00:42 | |
-- the Balkans. | 0:00:42 | 0:00:43 | |
How vulnerable is the West in the new balance of | 0:00:43 | 0:00:46 | |
global military power? | 0:00:46 | 0:00:49 | |
General Sir Richard Barrons, welcome to HARDtalk. | 0:00:53 | 0:00:54 | |
Thank you very much. | 0:01:12 | 0:01:15 | |
How comfortable are you in a civilian suit and out of uniform? | 0:01:15 | 0:01:20 | |
Well, after nearly 40 years of service in the military, | 0:01:20 | 0:01:24 | |
this is still in transition. | 0:01:24 | 0:01:26 | |
In transition! | 0:01:26 | 0:01:26 | |
Well, let's call upon your authority and experience, both | 0:01:26 | 0:01:29 | |
with your new suit on, but with your uniform | 0:01:29 | 0:01:32 | |
still in the cupboard. | 0:01:32 | 0:01:35 | |
How, or what, would you define as the most pressing military threat | 0:01:35 | 0:01:38 | |
facing the Western world today? | 0:01:38 | 0:01:41 | |
I think it's a very complex answer to what, on the surface, | 0:01:41 | 0:01:44 | |
is a simple question. | 0:01:44 | 0:01:46 | |
But I think we have to recognise that we are at something | 0:01:46 | 0:01:49 | |
of a strategic inflection point where the world we've known | 0:01:50 | 0:01:52 | |
for the last 25 years is changing very rapidly, | 0:01:52 | 0:01:57 | |
and not changing to the advantage of the West and Europe, in particular. | 0:01:57 | 0:02:02 | |
So we have to acknowledge that are a new range of risks out there. | 0:02:02 | 0:02:05 | |
And indeed the way conflict and confrontation is prosecuted, | 0:02:05 | 0:02:08 | |
in terms of both method and thinking and ideas and capability, | 0:02:08 | 0:02:11 | |
has changed. | 0:02:11 | 0:02:12 | |
If you bundle all that together, we are looking at a mix | 0:02:12 | 0:02:15 | |
of threats from Russia, as well as from terrorism. | 0:02:15 | 0:02:18 | |
Am I to take it from what you've just said that you believe right | 0:02:18 | 0:02:22 | |
now that the assumptions being made and the posture being adopted | 0:02:22 | 0:02:25 | |
by the key Western military powers - and, let's face it, we're talking | 0:02:25 | 0:02:29 | |
about the United States and the UK as well, maybe | 0:02:29 | 0:02:32 | |
you could call in France - they've got it wrong? | 0:02:32 | 0:02:34 | |
I think it's to be expected that many of the Western powers, | 0:02:34 | 0:02:39 | |
particularly in Europe, are running on assumptions that | 0:02:39 | 0:02:42 | |
reflect all our adult experiences from the end of the Cold War, | 0:02:42 | 0:02:46 | |
where we didn't feel any existential risk to our homeland. | 0:02:46 | 0:02:50 | |
We felt that the Western way was holding primacy in the world, | 0:02:50 | 0:02:54 | |
and we had an initiative on how the world would actually turn out. | 0:02:54 | 0:02:58 | |
And I think that is eroding very quickly. | 0:02:58 | 0:03:01 | |
So, complacency is what you are suggesting? | 0:03:01 | 0:03:03 | |
A combination of hubris, for sure, complacency. | 0:03:03 | 0:03:05 | |
But also a preoccupation with our own internal business, | 0:03:05 | 0:03:07 | |
such as Brexit or austerity, which has caused us not | 0:03:07 | 0:03:10 | |
to look at these things. | 0:03:10 | 0:03:11 | |
But even as you say this, I'm mindful of the fact that one | 0:03:11 | 0:03:16 | |
of the key issues of our day - and we experience it sadly | 0:03:16 | 0:03:23 | |
almost daily or weekly, with bombs going off in western | 0:03:23 | 0:03:27 | |
cities, Istanbul or further afield - is this notion that there | 0:03:27 | 0:03:30 | |
is a threat to the West's homelands, and that threat is from | 0:03:30 | 0:03:34 | |
jihadist extremist terror. | 0:03:34 | 0:03:40 | |
Are you suggesting that is the wrong way of looking | 0:03:40 | 0:03:43 | |
at the threat to our homeland? | 0:03:43 | 0:03:44 | |
I'm suggesting it's only part of the problem. | 0:03:44 | 0:03:46 | |
So, yes of course, there's an existential risk, | 0:03:46 | 0:03:49 | |
a risk to our way of life from people like the so-called | 0:03:49 | 0:03:52 | |
Islamic State, who will bring whatever weapons they may | 0:03:52 | 0:03:54 | |
bring to bear. | 0:03:54 | 0:03:56 | |
So we are used to the idea now of shootings, such | 0:03:56 | 0:03:59 | |
as in the nightclub, and the use of explosions. | 0:03:59 | 0:04:01 | |
Just recently in our own media, a recognition from the British | 0:04:01 | 0:04:04 | |
government of the potential risk from weapons of mass destruction. | 0:04:04 | 0:04:07 | |
But the fact is, in the modern age the risk to our homeland | 0:04:07 | 0:04:10 | |
and our interests abroad are greater than that and they must include, | 0:04:10 | 0:04:14 | |
clearly, cyber, but also the evolution of advanced precision | 0:04:14 | 0:04:17 | |
ballistics missiles and a new generation of aircraft | 0:04:17 | 0:04:19 | |
and cruise missiles. | 0:04:19 | 0:04:20 | |
But whose missiles? | 0:04:20 | 0:04:21 | |
Are you suggesting, because you're not actually using the word, | 0:04:21 | 0:04:23 | |
but are you suggesting to me that Russia, which we know now has very | 0:04:23 | 0:04:27 | |
sophisticated precision missiles, not least based in Kaliningrad, | 0:04:27 | 0:04:33 | |
right on the border of Europe, within easy reach of Berlin. | 0:04:33 | 0:04:36 | |
Are you suggesting that Russia should be regarded | 0:04:36 | 0:04:38 | |
today as an active threat to European security? | 0:04:38 | 0:04:45 | |
I think we need to look at the potential of Russian capability. | 0:04:45 | 0:04:49 | |
So, I'm absolutely not suggesting we are at imminent risk of a major | 0:04:49 | 0:04:53 | |
armed confrontation with Russia. | 0:04:53 | 0:04:54 | |
And I think most Russian leaders would say that was fanciful talk | 0:04:54 | 0:04:58 | |
anyway, and absolutely not in their interest. | 0:04:58 | 0:05:00 | |
But if you look at the evolution of capability, then there are now | 0:05:00 | 0:05:03 | |
things in the Russian military inventory that could cause great | 0:05:03 | 0:05:06 | |
harm, not just to the UK, but to our European | 0:05:06 | 0:05:09 | |
neighbours as well. | 0:05:09 | 0:05:12 | |
As you say that, I think of Donald Trump. | 0:05:12 | 0:05:15 | |
He is about to become president of the United States of America. | 0:05:15 | 0:05:18 | |
In the recent days and weeks he's described how smart | 0:05:18 | 0:05:21 | |
he thinks Vladimir Putin is. | 0:05:21 | 0:05:23 | |
He's actually sided with Vladimir Putin in a very important | 0:05:23 | 0:05:27 | |
argument about the allegation that Russia meddled in the American | 0:05:27 | 0:05:31 | |
presidential election, using its cyber capabilities. | 0:05:31 | 0:05:39 | |
Donald Trump has sided with a Russian leader against his | 0:05:39 | 0:05:44 | |
own security establishment. | 0:05:44 | 0:05:47 | |
And yet you're here sitting with me, telling me that Russia has | 0:05:47 | 0:05:51 | |
to be regarded, in terms of its capability, as a threat | 0:05:51 | 0:05:54 | |
to the West's interests. | 0:05:54 | 0:05:55 | |
What's going on? | 0:05:55 | 0:05:56 | |
Well, I think we have to allow Mr Trump some room to manoeuvre, | 0:05:56 | 0:06:00 | |
since he's not yet the president, and one would expect to see a very | 0:06:00 | 0:06:03 | |
strenuous conversation between Mr Trump and the formidable | 0:06:04 | 0:06:06 | |
machine that resides in Washington that will give him | 0:06:06 | 0:06:08 | |
intelligence and advice. | 0:06:08 | 0:06:09 | |
He's just told us that he doesn't actually believe what he hears | 0:06:09 | 0:06:17 | |
from his own intelligence agencies. | 0:06:18 | 0:06:19 | |
That is, in a sense, the great import of this argument, | 0:06:19 | 0:06:22 | |
over what the Russians did in US election. | 0:06:22 | 0:06:24 | |
My first point is, let's allow that discussion to mature a little bit | 0:06:24 | 0:06:27 | |
as Mr Trump takes office. | 0:06:27 | 0:06:29 | |
But in terms of capability, I'm in absolutely no doubt | 0:06:29 | 0:06:32 | |
that Russia, and others, have invested very thoughtfully | 0:06:32 | 0:06:34 | |
over the last 15 years in evolving their military | 0:06:34 | 0:06:36 | |
capability to do two important things. | 0:06:36 | 0:06:40 | |
One is, keep Nato out of their territory, their airspace, | 0:06:40 | 0:06:43 | |
their waters and their land in the investment of things | 0:06:43 | 0:06:45 | |
like advanced air defence. | 0:06:45 | 0:06:46 | |
But also to invest in capabilities that in very sophisticated ways can | 0:06:46 | 0:06:50 | |
bring harm in an opportunistic way. | 0:06:50 | 0:06:51 | |
Not in a grand, strategic assault, but in an opportunistic way, | 0:06:51 | 0:06:54 | |
to Berlin or London. | 0:06:54 | 0:06:55 | |
And cyber is an important part of that. | 0:06:55 | 0:06:57 | |
There's quite a rich conversation about cyber. | 0:06:58 | 0:06:59 | |
But we also have to recognise that in the Russian inventory | 0:06:59 | 0:07:03 | |
are capabilities that could deliver conventional - so not | 0:07:03 | 0:07:05 | |
nuclear = conventional, precision effects in our homeland. | 0:07:05 | 0:07:07 | |
And that's not a comfortable place that we would want to be. | 0:07:07 | 0:07:19 | |
Until eight or so months ago, you were one of the top six generals | 0:07:19 | 0:07:23 | |
in the UK Armed Forces. | 0:07:23 | 0:07:24 | |
You actively were on duty as the Ukraine crisis | 0:07:25 | 0:07:27 | |
unfolded, for example. | 0:07:27 | 0:07:28 | |
What do you take from that, in terms of the way the West has | 0:07:28 | 0:07:32 | |
responded and is still trying to respond by ramping up Nato | 0:07:32 | 0:07:35 | |
capability and forces on the eastern flank directly facing Russia? | 0:07:35 | 0:07:40 | |
Would you say that the West on your watch and after it has | 0:07:40 | 0:07:43 | |
reacted with strength and credibility or not? | 0:07:43 | 0:07:51 | |
Nothing like enough yet. | 0:07:51 | 0:07:52 | |
I think it's a very, very difficult proposition for any government. | 0:07:52 | 0:07:55 | |
Because in our adult experience we have not had a confrontation | 0:07:55 | 0:07:58 | |
or conflict with Russia. | 0:07:58 | 0:07:59 | |
And nobody wants to go back to the Cold War. | 0:07:59 | 0:08:02 | |
And nobody is talking about, actually, a reset of the Cold War. | 0:08:02 | 0:08:05 | |
The dynamics now are very different. | 0:08:05 | 0:08:07 | |
I think the primacy of terrorism as a risk consumes an awful lot | 0:08:07 | 0:08:11 | |
of government attention, resources and bandwidth, | 0:08:11 | 0:08:12 | |
and we would all understand that. | 0:08:12 | 0:08:14 | |
I think the effect of austerity since 2008 has made public | 0:08:14 | 0:08:17 | |
spending decisions really, really difficult, and so there's | 0:08:17 | 0:08:19 | |
no enthusiasm to think about unpalatable events that have | 0:08:19 | 0:08:21 | |
not yet occurred that would cause perhaps difficult | 0:08:21 | 0:08:24 | |
and different spending choices. | 0:08:24 | 0:08:38 | |
I'm interested to know what you think is actually | 0:08:38 | 0:08:43 | |
happening on the ground. | 0:08:43 | 0:08:44 | |
Michael Fallon, the British Defence Minister, Secretary, | 0:08:44 | 0:08:46 | |
said only a few weeks ago to a Parliamentary Committee, | 0:08:46 | 0:08:49 | |
he said that he thought Britain and Nato would be ready to fight | 0:08:49 | 0:08:52 | |
a war with Russia if necessary in two years' time. | 0:08:52 | 0:08:55 | |
Is that good enough, and is it even true? | 0:08:55 | 0:08:58 | |
I don't know, since I don't work in the Ministry | 0:08:58 | 0:09:00 | |
of Defence any longer. | 0:09:00 | 0:09:05 | |
You were there until eight months ago. | 0:09:05 | 0:09:07 | |
Not much has changed, frankly. | 0:09:07 | 0:09:08 | |
Well, there would have to have been a massive acceleration in planning, | 0:09:08 | 0:09:12 | |
capability and in discussion with our Nato partners | 0:09:12 | 0:09:14 | |
for a two-year horizon to be ready, deliverable. | 0:09:14 | 0:09:16 | |
Always something can be done. | 0:09:16 | 0:09:24 | |
But the fact is, we have to look at the state of Nato as an alliance | 0:09:24 | 0:09:28 | |
which has gone through progressive demobilisation, for very | 0:09:28 | 0:09:30 | |
good reasons during the aftermath of the Cold War. | 0:09:30 | 0:09:33 | |
And it now sits with a lot of capability which is not | 0:09:33 | 0:09:36 | |
held at high readiness. | 0:09:36 | 0:09:37 | |
And in any case, quite a lot of Nato capability is not designed to deal | 0:09:37 | 0:09:41 | |
with the sort of things that Russia is now able to present. | 0:09:41 | 0:09:46 | |
You are using very diplomatic language, but I know, | 0:09:46 | 0:09:49 | |
and of course you know, that your real views came out last | 0:09:49 | 0:09:52 | |
September in a memo that ended up in the newspapers when you talked | 0:09:52 | 0:09:57 | |
about the deliberate withering of Britain's defence capabilities. | 0:09:57 | 0:09:59 | |
You listed in terms of naval power, air power, manpower on the ground, | 0:09:59 | 0:10:05 | |
all of the different ways in which, in your view, the British military | 0:10:05 | 0:10:08 | |
was being hollowed out. | 0:10:08 | 0:10:09 | |
And Britain, of course, being - outside America - | 0:10:09 | 0:10:12 | |
perhaps the most important member of Nato. | 0:10:12 | 0:10:16 | |
And I think that is absolutely So. | 0:10:16 | 0:10:23 | |
I also think it's entirely understandable in the sense that | 0:10:23 | 0:10:26 | |
if you look at the passage of our history since the end | 0:10:26 | 0:10:29 | |
of the Cold War, in the absence of that sense of a threat | 0:10:29 | 0:10:33 | |
from Russia, and with many other compelling things to spend | 0:10:33 | 0:10:36 | |
the public purse on, why wouldn't you take some risk | 0:10:36 | 0:10:38 | |
with your defence capability? | 0:10:38 | 0:10:39 | |
And my point is, first of all, let's be honest with ourselves | 0:10:39 | 0:10:43 | |
about the state of Western defence. | 0:10:43 | 0:10:44 | |
This is much more than the UK. | 0:10:44 | 0:10:46 | |
But, secondly, let's look at the world as it's really turning | 0:10:46 | 0:10:49 | |
out, and ask ourselves the question, OK, so if we are in the place | 0:10:49 | 0:10:53 | |
we are now for good and understandable reasons, | 0:10:53 | 0:10:55 | |
is it the right answer for the future? | 0:10:55 | 0:10:57 | |
Can you guarantee that the future going forward will be as reasonably | 0:10:57 | 0:11:01 | |
benign as the recent past? | 0:11:01 | 0:11:02 | |
And if you can't, then you may have to do some different things and make | 0:11:02 | 0:11:06 | |
some different choices. | 0:11:06 | 0:11:07 | |
Well, I come back to the central fact that the Western | 0:11:07 | 0:11:10 | |
world faces right now, which is that in a few days' time | 0:11:10 | 0:11:13 | |
Donald Trump will be the de facto leader of the Western world, | 0:11:13 | 0:11:16 | |
the most important man in Nato. | 0:11:16 | 0:11:18 | |
Not only has he talked about the smartness of Vladimir Putin, | 0:11:18 | 0:11:21 | |
he has said he will consider whether the United States | 0:11:21 | 0:11:24 | |
under his watch should recognise Russian sovereignty over the Crimea, | 0:11:24 | 0:11:26 | |
ie, recognise the annexation of what was Ukrainian territory. | 0:11:26 | 0:11:29 | |
He has suggested that Nato members who don't meet the spending | 0:11:29 | 0:11:32 | |
commitments of at least 2% of GDP on military expenditure will have | 0:11:32 | 0:11:35 | |
to go their own way. | 0:11:35 | 0:11:37 | |
And that Nato, in effect, would be over, finished. | 0:11:37 | 0:11:39 | |
This is the man that you are now saying has to take responsibility | 0:11:39 | 0:11:43 | |
for leading the West in a much more proactive building up | 0:11:43 | 0:11:46 | |
of military resources. | 0:11:46 | 0:11:51 | |
Well, I currently want to stick with the hope, | 0:11:51 | 0:11:53 | |
as Mr Trump takes office, a richer discussion with his | 0:11:53 | 0:11:56 | |
new team, with the organs of state in Washington and with his allies, | 0:11:56 | 0:12:00 | |
will make it clearer to Mr Trump that we have all bought | 0:12:00 | 0:12:03 | |
into collective security. | 0:12:03 | 0:12:04 | |
Certainly since the end of the Second World War. | 0:12:04 | 0:12:08 | |
That it's not in the US's interests to break with Nato, | 0:12:08 | 0:12:11 | |
or to cause Article 5 to be... | 0:12:11 | 0:12:16 | |
When you look at his tweets, when you look at his mindset, | 0:12:16 | 0:12:19 | |
how worried are you? | 0:12:19 | 0:12:21 | |
I'm worried, but I would want now to be in the position | 0:12:21 | 0:12:24 | |
where I would like to give him the time to have that discussion | 0:12:24 | 0:12:28 | |
with his own people. | 0:12:28 | 0:12:29 | |
Fascinating, you keep talking about, "I hope he will talk | 0:12:29 | 0:12:32 | |
to his own people." | 0:12:32 | 0:12:33 | |
You know some of his key appointees very, very well. | 0:12:33 | 0:12:36 | |
Thinking about General Mattis, who is now going to be | 0:12:36 | 0:12:38 | |
Defence Secretary. | 0:12:38 | 0:12:41 | |
We're talking about the other generals, one of whom is now his | 0:12:41 | 0:12:44 | |
National Security Adviser, a very controversial figure indeed. | 0:12:44 | 0:12:47 | |
Other generals who have been appointed to Homeland Security. | 0:12:47 | 0:12:49 | |
Talk about another one being Director of Intelligence. | 0:12:49 | 0:12:52 | |
These were guys who worked with in the field, general to general. | 0:12:52 | 0:12:57 | |
Yes, I count them as friends. | 0:12:57 | 0:12:58 | |
I admire them. | 0:12:58 | 0:13:01 | |
They are uniquely experienced in the business of confrontation | 0:13:01 | 0:13:05 | |
and conflict, and they know their business. | 0:13:05 | 0:13:07 | |
And they have learnt their business through hard yards, principally | 0:13:07 | 0:13:10 | |
in Iraq and Afghanistan. | 0:13:10 | 0:13:14 | |
They are military men with no experience of statecraft | 0:13:14 | 0:13:16 | |
or diplomacy whatsoever. | 0:13:16 | 0:13:18 | |
Yeah, so if you ask them for a cool, clear, genuinely strategic | 0:13:18 | 0:13:22 | |
experienced military view, then there are almost nobody better | 0:13:22 | 0:13:27 | |
in the world to give that advice. | 0:13:28 | 0:13:31 | |
But these are guys who know how to fight wars. | 0:13:31 | 0:13:33 | |
Now we're talking about political roles, being the head | 0:13:34 | 0:13:36 | |
of the Defence Department, the boss in the Pentagon. | 0:13:36 | 0:13:38 | |
That's not a job for a bloke in uniform. | 0:13:38 | 0:13:41 | |
That's a job for a bloke like you now, with a suit on. | 0:13:41 | 0:13:44 | |
They are now faced with a very difficult transition. | 0:13:44 | 0:13:47 | |
I have such confidence in their character and their abilities | 0:13:47 | 0:13:50 | |
and experience that I think they will be able to seize this | 0:13:50 | 0:13:53 | |
transition into what is clearly a political and policy role, | 0:13:53 | 0:13:56 | |
but it's going to be difficult. | 0:13:56 | 0:14:00 | |
Why do you have such confidence? | 0:14:00 | 0:14:02 | |
In the United Kingdom there is no way that generals fresh out | 0:14:02 | 0:14:07 | |
of uniform, men such as yourself, could be hoisted into political jobs | 0:14:07 | 0:14:12 | |
like being Defence Secretary. | 0:14:12 | 0:14:13 | |
Why do you think it's appropriate that it happens | 0:14:13 | 0:14:16 | |
in the United States? | 0:14:16 | 0:14:17 | |
I think in the United States there is a cultural difference. | 0:14:17 | 0:14:20 | |
So the role of senior retired military in commercial and political | 0:14:20 | 0:14:23 | |
and public life in the US is cast in a different way | 0:14:23 | 0:14:26 | |
than it is in the United Kingdom, where people are genuinely | 0:14:26 | 0:14:29 | |
uncomfortable with it in the United Kingdom. | 0:14:29 | 0:14:31 | |
I also think that these folk are used to operating | 0:14:31 | 0:14:34 | |
at the genuinely strategic level. | 0:14:34 | 0:14:35 | |
They are soldier-statesmen. | 0:14:35 | 0:14:36 | |
They will find it relatively easy to make the transition | 0:14:36 | 0:14:39 | |
into the political space because as senior commanders | 0:14:39 | 0:14:41 | |
they so often operated in support of that. | 0:14:41 | 0:14:46 | |
There's a phrase that Gordon Adams, a very respected professor | 0:14:46 | 0:14:49 | |
at the American University School of International Services coined. | 0:14:49 | 0:14:51 | |
He says there's no risk of a military coup in the United States | 0:14:51 | 0:14:55 | |
under Donald Trump, but given the nature of his appointments, | 0:14:55 | 0:14:58 | |
there is what I call, he says, a "Velvet militarisation of American | 0:14:58 | 0:15:02 | |
foreign and national security policy." | 0:15:02 | 0:15:03 | |
Do you see what he's driving at? | 0:15:03 | 0:15:05 | |
Absolutely I do. | 0:15:05 | 0:15:06 | |
I don't think it's proven, but I think if you fill your | 0:15:06 | 0:15:09 | |
administration with a lot of senior military leaders then people | 0:15:09 | 0:15:12 | |
are going to make that accusation of them. | 0:15:12 | 0:15:14 | |
But if you ask Jim Mattis and John Kelly for their view of how | 0:15:14 | 0:15:18 | |
the world turns, then I think you would get a much | 0:15:18 | 0:15:21 | |
more sophisticated answer. | 0:15:21 | 0:15:22 | |
You know them very well. | 0:15:22 | 0:15:24 | |
You just told me you regard them as friends. | 0:15:24 | 0:15:27 | |
It's quite obvious that actually the British government doesn't have | 0:15:27 | 0:15:30 | |
that many strong contacts with the people at the heart | 0:15:30 | 0:15:32 | |
of the Trump team. | 0:15:32 | 0:15:34 | |
At least one Conservative MP has suggested that people | 0:15:34 | 0:15:37 | |
like you should be deployed to reach out to these new top figures | 0:15:37 | 0:15:41 | |
in the Trump administration, in a sense, general to general. | 0:15:41 | 0:15:43 | |
Are you prepared to do that? | 0:15:43 | 0:15:45 | |
Does the government want you to do that, more importantly? | 0:15:45 | 0:15:48 | |
Of course I'm prepared to do it, because I know these people well. | 0:15:48 | 0:15:51 | |
But I don't think it's ever been done successfully. | 0:15:51 | 0:15:54 | |
First of all, Jim Mattis would have to want it and find it useful. | 0:15:54 | 0:15:57 | |
And even if they did, we invest a lot in currently serving | 0:15:57 | 0:16:01 | |
officers and senior officials and politicians | 0:16:01 | 0:16:04 | |
who own that relationship. | 0:16:04 | 0:16:05 | |
And they would have to do think it's helpful for somebody like me to come | 0:16:05 | 0:16:09 | |
and have a supporting role and actually, | 0:16:09 | 0:16:11 | |
that's pretty unlikely. | 0:16:11 | 0:16:16 | |
Yeah, the truth is that also there are things being said by, | 0:16:16 | 0:16:19 | |
for example, Michael Flynn, the general who is now going to be | 0:16:19 | 0:16:22 | |
the National Security Adviser to the president inside | 0:16:22 | 0:16:25 | |
the White House, his suggestion that there is something | 0:16:25 | 0:16:27 | |
fundamentally dangerous about Islam. | 0:16:27 | 0:16:29 | |
But if you were to talk to him you would have to say, | 0:16:29 | 0:16:35 | |
"Would you not?" | 0:16:35 | 0:16:36 | |
This kind of language is completely inflammatory, | 0:16:36 | 0:16:38 | |
unacceptable and unhelpful. | 0:16:38 | 0:16:39 | |
Yes. | 0:16:39 | 0:16:43 | |
Well, we would have to be able to have that sort of conversation, | 0:16:43 | 0:16:47 | |
but the advantage of deploying friends and colleagues is that | 0:16:47 | 0:16:50 | |
you can have that sort of conversation. | 0:16:50 | 0:16:52 | |
But actually, so can our ambassador in Washington. | 0:16:52 | 0:16:54 | |
So can the defence attachment... | 0:16:54 | 0:16:55 | |
Oh, come on, do you seriously think the Trump administration | 0:16:55 | 0:16:58 | |
is going to...? | 0:16:58 | 0:16:59 | |
Well, we know he's not going to listen to the UK ambassador | 0:16:59 | 0:17:02 | |
in Washington, because he thinks Nigel Farage should be UK | 0:17:02 | 0:17:05 | |
ambassador in Washington. | 0:17:05 | 0:17:05 | |
I'm not making a flippant point, I'm making a serious point. | 0:17:05 | 0:17:08 | |
The British government, with its own view of what is in | 0:17:08 | 0:17:11 | |
the West's security interests, is going to have very little to no | 0:17:11 | 0:17:15 | |
leverage with Donald Trump. | 0:17:15 | 0:17:16 | |
I think it's going to have to assume very little leverage to start with, | 0:17:16 | 0:17:19 | |
and then it's going to have to build it. | 0:17:20 | 0:17:22 | |
But I come back to the point that it is in the United States' | 0:17:22 | 0:17:26 | |
interests to continue to invest in the collective security | 0:17:26 | 0:17:28 | |
arrangements represented by Nato. | 0:17:28 | 0:17:29 | |
And a discussion with senior partners in Nato must be | 0:17:29 | 0:17:32 | |
a good thing. | 0:17:32 | 0:17:33 | |
And perhaps we still allow time for that to happen. | 0:17:33 | 0:17:36 | |
We've talked a lot about Nato, and, of course, underlying our | 0:17:36 | 0:17:39 | |
conversation has been the notion that there is a Russian | 0:17:39 | 0:17:41 | |
assertiveness stroke aggressiveness at play right now that changes a lot | 0:17:41 | 0:17:44 | |
of the dynamic within Nato. | 0:17:44 | 0:17:46 | |
Yeah. We haven't talked about China. | 0:17:46 | 0:17:47 | |
But many people, not least Barack Obama with his so-called | 0:17:47 | 0:17:50 | |
pivot to Asia, believes that actually the key national security | 0:17:50 | 0:17:53 | |
interest for America going forward lay in the Pacific | 0:17:53 | 0:17:55 | |
and in relation to China. | 0:17:55 | 0:18:02 | |
Donald Trump says he doesn't even feel bound by the traditional | 0:18:02 | 0:18:05 | |
recognition of the One China Policy. | 0:18:05 | 0:18:07 | |
So, put your mind towards broader horizons of Asia, the Pacific, | 0:18:07 | 0:18:10 | |
and the US and the East. | 0:18:10 | 0:18:11 | |
Do you see problems there, too? | 0:18:11 | 0:18:13 | |
I do, because I think we recognise we live in the Asian century. | 0:18:13 | 0:18:17 | |
The power and wealth and the power of decision is shifting east | 0:18:17 | 0:18:20 | |
over this century. | 0:18:20 | 0:18:22 | |
You can see the beginnings of a clash between a resurgent | 0:18:22 | 0:18:25 | |
Chinese exceptionalism and an American exceptionalism that | 0:18:25 | 0:18:27 | |
we've all grown up with. | 0:18:27 | 0:18:28 | |
And probably the focus for that is the South China Sea | 0:18:28 | 0:18:32 | |
where China has made it clear, I think since 1948, that it regards | 0:18:32 | 0:18:35 | |
the South China Sea as sovereign waters. | 0:18:35 | 0:18:37 | |
And the United States and many other nations in the region and elsewhere | 0:18:37 | 0:18:40 | |
subscribe to the UN Convention on the Law of Sea and say, | 0:18:40 | 0:18:44 | |
no, these are part of the global commons. | 0:18:44 | 0:18:46 | |
And those are two fundamentally irreconcilable positions. | 0:18:46 | 0:18:48 | |
So if China's ambition is to keep the US out of the South China Sea, | 0:18:48 | 0:18:52 | |
or at least the US military out of the South China Sea, | 0:18:52 | 0:18:55 | |
and the US under Mr Trump take the view that this is part | 0:18:55 | 0:18:59 | |
of the global commons - one third of the world trade flows | 0:18:59 | 0:19:02 | |
through those waters - then there's going to be, | 0:19:02 | 0:19:05 | |
at the very least, a difficult discussion coming. | 0:19:05 | 0:19:10 | |
So, you've painted a picture of a world over the next few years | 0:19:10 | 0:19:13 | |
that has to acknowledge the power and assertiveness, | 0:19:13 | 0:19:15 | |
not just of Russia, but of China as well. | 0:19:15 | 0:19:20 | |
Yes. | 0:19:21 | 0:19:21 | |
And you've nodded to it, but I now want your explicit view | 0:19:21 | 0:19:24 | |
on the rise of new forms of unconventional warfare, | 0:19:24 | 0:19:27 | |
and in particular cyber warfare, as it's loosely termed. | 0:19:27 | 0:19:29 | |
Let's leave aside whatever the Russians did or didn't do | 0:19:29 | 0:19:32 | |
during the US presidential campaign, but it seems to me that there | 0:19:32 | 0:19:35 | |
is an issue today about whether the West, which is of course | 0:19:35 | 0:19:38 | |
the richest bloc, and arguably the technologically most advanced | 0:19:38 | 0:19:41 | |
bloc, actually has a military edge when it comes to the use, | 0:19:41 | 0:19:44 | |
the employment, of these cyber tactics. | 0:19:44 | 0:19:50 | |
What do you think? | 0:19:50 | 0:19:51 | |
This is a work in progress. | 0:19:51 | 0:19:53 | |
In terms of intellectual ability, then the bright minds that sit | 0:19:53 | 0:19:56 | |
in Silicon Valley, in Washington, in Cheltenham at GCHQ, | 0:19:56 | 0:19:59 | |
they are as good as anybody in the world. | 0:19:59 | 0:20:01 | |
But the fact is, Russia has, according to some research, | 0:20:01 | 0:20:06 | |
perhaps a million programmers perhaps connected to 40 | 0:20:06 | 0:20:08 | |
organised cybercrime rings. | 0:20:08 | 0:20:09 | |
So in terms of capacity, Russia has a much more developed | 0:20:09 | 0:20:16 | |
approach to cyber relationships. | 0:20:16 | 0:20:25 | |
I think it comes back to this point that in the West, | 0:20:26 | 0:20:29 | |
for so long, we haven't really felt a risk to our homeland, | 0:20:29 | 0:20:32 | |
and yet we are open societies and building ever more connected | 0:20:32 | 0:20:35 | |
societies, so we have created vulnerabilities. | 0:20:35 | 0:20:37 | |
I think what we need to do now is recognise those vulnerabilities | 0:20:37 | 0:20:40 | |
and harden our act up and organise better to deal with the risks. | 0:20:40 | 0:20:43 | |
So are we doing it? | 0:20:43 | 0:20:45 | |
That critique I cited earlier of you saying that in Britain | 0:20:45 | 0:20:48 | |
we are allowing our defence capabilities to wither on the vine, | 0:20:48 | 0:20:56 | |
I think you did make one specific point about a failure to really | 0:20:57 | 0:21:00 | |
conceive of just how important this new cyber warfare capacity is. | 0:21:00 | 0:21:03 | |
How vulnerable are we in Britain? | 0:21:03 | 0:21:05 | |
I think in its simplest terms, we have to recognise that war | 0:21:05 | 0:21:08 | |
between advanced states or even fairly advanced states, | 0:21:08 | 0:21:10 | |
won't necessarily be focused on the destruction of Armed Forces | 0:21:10 | 0:21:13 | |
or the carpet bombing of citizens, as we have seen | 0:21:13 | 0:21:15 | |
so tragically in Aleppo. | 0:21:15 | 0:21:17 | |
It might well be fought simply by dismantling daily life | 0:21:17 | 0:21:20 | |
through the assault on critical national infrastructure. | 0:21:20 | 0:21:22 | |
And cyber is the obvious way of doing that. | 0:21:22 | 0:21:30 | |
There are obviously other more kinetic means available. | 0:21:30 | 0:21:32 | |
So the challenge for the West, and this is much more than just | 0:21:32 | 0:21:35 | |
the UK, is, we are probably used to dealing with a single event, | 0:21:35 | 0:21:39 | |
such as the cyber assault on Sony, or the Ukrainian power grid. | 0:21:39 | 0:21:42 | |
But in the future, if we are going to play our part in modern conflict, | 0:21:42 | 0:21:46 | |
then we've got to deal with strategic cyber risk | 0:21:46 | 0:21:49 | |
and protect our critical national infrastructure, | 0:21:49 | 0:21:50 | |
protect our way of life. | 0:21:50 | 0:21:53 | |
And that means a more thoughtful organisation. | 0:21:53 | 0:21:55 | |
It probably means different laws, in fact, to share the responsibility. | 0:21:55 | 0:21:58 | |
We are almost at an end. | 0:21:58 | 0:22:00 | |
This phrase you just used, "If we are to play our part..." | 0:22:00 | 0:22:03 | |
It seems to me the narrative you've given me suggests that for years, | 0:22:03 | 0:22:07 | |
the West's publics haven't been fully engaged or even willing | 0:22:07 | 0:22:09 | |
to play their part, because they haven't wanted to ramp | 0:22:09 | 0:22:12 | |
up the expenditures in new areas of defence capacity in a way that | 0:22:12 | 0:22:15 | |
would allow the West to keep an edge. | 0:22:16 | 0:22:18 | |
Yes. | 0:22:18 | 0:22:19 | |
So what's going to change the dynamic? | 0:22:19 | 0:22:21 | |
Is it going to have to be the real threat of war... | 0:22:21 | 0:22:24 | |
..That will, in a sense, wake the West up? | 0:22:24 | 0:22:26 | |
I think there is enough evidence in a cool, hard look at the state | 0:22:26 | 0:22:30 | |
of western defence, a cool, hard look at the way the world | 0:22:30 | 0:22:33 | |
is changing, for governments to mount what governments should do, | 0:22:33 | 0:22:36 | |
which is a properly rigorous investigation to come | 0:22:36 | 0:22:38 | |
to some conclusions. | 0:22:38 | 0:22:39 | |
And then make different choices about public expenditure, | 0:22:39 | 0:22:41 | |
which can be done. | 0:22:41 | 0:22:42 | |
That's really, really difficult, because public opinion will think | 0:22:42 | 0:22:45 | |
it's slightly strange, or we are simply going to have | 0:22:45 | 0:22:47 | |
to hope that bad things don't happen, and then when bad | 0:22:47 | 0:22:55 | |
things do happen... | 0:22:55 | 0:22:56 | |
It's not a great defence strategy, is it? | 0:22:56 | 0:22:58 | |
I wonder whether you now would say, as a final thought, whether you now | 0:22:58 | 0:23:02 | |
would say, mea culpa, I didn't shout loud enough | 0:23:02 | 0:23:04 | |
about these issues when I was actually in place, | 0:23:04 | 0:23:07 | |
one of the top six generals in the country, | 0:23:07 | 0:23:09 | |
to make a difference. | 0:23:09 | 0:23:10 | |
It's all right now that you've left to jump up and down and say we've | 0:23:10 | 0:23:14 | |
got a real problem, but you didn't actually change very much | 0:23:14 | 0:23:17 | |
when you were there with your uniform on. | 0:23:17 | 0:23:19 | |
I accept that. | 0:23:19 | 0:23:20 | |
What I don't accept is that I didn't say these things when I was surfing, | 0:23:20 | 0:23:24 | |
because I did. | 0:23:24 | 0:23:25 | |
And I said it over a number of years. | 0:23:25 | 0:23:28 | |
So somebody wasn't listening. | 0:23:28 | 0:23:29 | |
Well... | 0:23:29 | 0:23:29 | |
The politicians weren't listening or you were just getting an easy | 0:23:29 | 0:23:32 | |
out for yourself. | 0:23:32 | 0:23:33 | |
Maybe I didn't explain it well enough, or I didn't | 0:23:33 | 0:23:35 | |
win the argument... | 0:23:36 | 0:23:36 | |
I certainly didn't win the argument. | 0:23:36 | 0:23:42 | |
But actually I think as events unfold, the arguments I have been | 0:23:43 | 0:23:46 | |
making for some time, are being reinforced by events, | 0:23:46 | 0:23:48 | |
and so maybe these conversations have their time. | 0:23:48 | 0:23:50 | |
And maybe that time is now. | 0:23:50 | 0:23:52 | |
Do you really believe that? Well, I want to believe it. | 0:23:52 | 0:23:55 | |
Because I think the longer we ignore these trends, | 0:23:55 | 0:23:57 | |
the greater the risk is that we just present ourselves as strategic | 0:23:57 | 0:24:01 | |
victims-in-waiting in a difficult world. | 0:24:01 | 0:24:02 | |
We have to end there. | 0:24:02 | 0:24:03 | |
General Sir Richard Barrons, thank you very much indeed | 0:24:03 | 0:24:06 | |
for being on HARDtalk. | 0:24:06 | 0:24:07 | |
Thank you so much. | 0:24:07 | 0:24:24 | |
Hi there. | 0:24:24 | 0:24:26 |