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Welcome to HARDtalk, I am Stephen Sackur. | :00:00. | :00:18. | |
This summer, Iraqis can perhaps see a glimmer of light amid the darkness | :00:19. | :00:21. | |
that's enveloped their country for so long. | :00:22. | :00:25. | |
The country's second city, Mosul, is no longer in the hands | :00:26. | :00:28. | |
of jihadist fanatics, with the so-called Islamic State | :00:29. | :00:30. | |
But will any semblance of stability and unity follow? | :00:31. | :00:47. | |
My guest today is veteran Vice President Ayad Allawi. | :00:48. | :00:52. | |
Let's begin with the fallout from Iraq's national army victory over | :00:53. | :01:29. | |
so-called Islamic State in Mosul. Your Prime Minister, Mr Abadi, | :01:30. | :01:32. | |
hailed it as a great victory for Iraq. There was a sense of | :01:33. | :01:37. | |
triumphalism in his voice. Are you feeling triumphant today? Not | :01:38. | :01:44. | |
really. Winning a battle or two was not like winning the war. We want to | :01:45. | :01:49. | |
win the war against extremism and against terrorism. In Mosul of | :01:50. | :01:54. | |
course this was a good in achievement but indeed we have not | :01:55. | :02:02. | |
to Lucite of the people of most Oar and what he international community | :02:03. | :02:11. | |
did -- Mosul. And I want them that this is not the end of the story. I | :02:12. | :02:18. | |
want Abadi, I want the President, we need to win the war, and winning the | :02:19. | :02:27. | |
war should be political. By abolishing extremism as a whole from | :02:28. | :02:31. | |
society, and this can only be done by having a political process and by | :02:32. | :02:35. | |
having a quality amongst the people of Iraq. So, so, just to stick with | :02:36. | :02:42. | |
the military situation for a second, I one of the leaders for the Iraqi | :02:43. | :02:48. | |
armed forces in Mosul the other day and he said they would retake Tal | :02:49. | :02:56. | |
Afar, another town under IS control within days and the military ever | :02:57. | :02:59. | |
since they can eradicate the caliphate on Iraqi soil but you seem | :03:00. | :03:05. | |
to be saying it's not as simple as that. I don't think we are going to | :03:06. | :03:11. | |
see the end of ISIS at all. It will be with us for a long time not only | :03:12. | :03:16. | |
in Iraq but it will spread, it is spreading already. It has reached to | :03:17. | :03:24. | |
Thailand and to the Philippines eastwards and definitely to Europe | :03:25. | :03:29. | |
westwards. But in Iraq you are suggesting, what, they won't hold | :03:30. | :03:33. | |
territory so much as conduct an underground insurgency? Holding | :03:34. | :03:37. | |
territories is finished for them. But they will do insurgency, perform | :03:38. | :03:46. | |
insurgencies and embark on insurgencies and resorting to the | :03:47. | :03:49. | |
terrorist activities of explosions and killing associations. That is | :03:50. | :03:55. | |
why we have to win the war rather than battles. One aspect of Iraq's | :03:56. | :04:01. | |
approach to the Mosul conflict and the wider struggle against IS is the | :04:02. | :04:09. | |
allegation among many quarters, not least from the Kurdish leader, that | :04:10. | :04:15. | |
with the focus on the military struggle the Iraqi government has | :04:16. | :04:18. | |
consistently failed to prepare for the post battle political and | :04:19. | :04:23. | |
humanitarian settlement. Absolutely correct. Well, you're part of that | :04:24. | :04:30. | |
government. I have said it. I was the first one to say this. Neither | :04:31. | :04:35. | |
the humanitarian aspect was respected and treated well, nor the | :04:36. | :04:41. | |
fact that looking beyond the military activities, looking into | :04:42. | :04:47. | |
the political horizon of what should happen, this has not happened in two | :04:48. | :04:55. | |
areas, and I told Abdai, by the way. Let's talk basic human rights. I am | :04:56. | :04:59. | |
sure Mr vice president you have seen the shocking videos... Shocking. Of | :05:00. | :05:07. | |
what appear to be Iraqi forces executing men, we don't know who | :05:08. | :05:11. | |
they are, in Mosul after the end of the conflict. We've seen one graphic | :05:12. | :05:16. | |
video of an individual being thrown off a cliff and shot. How can the | :05:17. | :05:22. | |
Iraqi government allow this to happen, given the history of Iraq | :05:23. | :05:29. | |
over the last 15 years? Because this plays into more extremism. Because | :05:30. | :05:33. | |
this has gone out of the hands of the government. This has gone into | :05:34. | :05:37. | |
the militia ares and to the lawless people, and indeed to a government | :05:38. | :05:46. | |
that is unable to control the situation in Mosul. This is one I | :05:47. | :05:49. | |
refer to the collateral damage that has been happening. Let alone what I | :05:50. | :05:57. | |
have witnessed and seen myself, people living, displaced people, | :05:58. | :06:01. | |
living really beneath what animals live in Iraq. The UN has said the | :06:02. | :06:08. | |
humanitarian crisis in and around Loza today is so pressing... It is a | :06:09. | :06:15. | |
ticking bomb, it will explode in our face in future, I assure you. -- | :06:16. | :06:20. | |
Mosul. There are thousands without parents, without families coming out | :06:21. | :06:25. | |
of tunnels and rooms in Mosul and no one it seems in your government has | :06:26. | :06:29. | |
a clue what to do with them. There is bitterness now amongst the | :06:30. | :06:33. | |
people. The people are quite bitter, especially the people who are living | :06:34. | :06:37. | |
in tents, who are refusing to go back to Mosul, people who have had | :06:38. | :06:41. | |
their parents to streak in the conflict, and people who are left in | :06:42. | :06:48. | |
the shelters. There is bitterness there and it will only increase with | :06:49. | :06:53. | |
time, and it will be an exploding bomb. This is what nobody looked at. | :06:54. | :06:59. | |
The humanitarian side. I keep reminding myself you are the vice | :07:00. | :07:02. | |
president of the country. You may tell me that is meaningless, that | :07:03. | :07:05. | |
you are a figurehead. Or alternatively what on earth are you | :07:06. | :07:09. | |
doing about it? Because your government needs to be held to | :07:10. | :07:14. | |
account. Of course, I agree. And I have raised this issue in the | :07:15. | :07:18. | |
meetings with the Prime Minister and with the President, of course. And I | :07:19. | :07:22. | |
have been raising this issue in the media, and in the meetings, but | :07:23. | :07:29. | |
nothing is happening. They say the military conflict should take | :07:30. | :07:36. | |
precedence in the conflict. But the humanitarian issue is really very | :07:37. | :07:41. | |
bad. And, indeed, the political horizon of what may happen in future | :07:42. | :07:44. | |
is very bad. We have been talking for a few minutes and on every | :07:45. | :07:48. | |
aspect of what we discuss in Mosul and the security situation around | :07:49. | :07:53. | |
Mosul, you seem to be saying that the government you represent as vice | :07:54. | :07:57. | |
president is incapable of imposing its will and its authority. And is | :07:58. | :08:01. | |
actually stoking the flames of the conflict which, although we have | :08:02. | :08:06. | |
just seen Mosul "Liberated" in your view it is actually going to get | :08:07. | :08:12. | |
worse. Well, they don't want to see the reality, the government, they | :08:13. | :08:17. | |
don't want to see the humanitarian side, although they speak about it. | :08:18. | :08:21. | |
And they don't want to see the political side. But I am getting a | :08:22. | :08:25. | |
feeling that you are pretty powerless in this situation. On the | :08:26. | :08:28. | |
bigger picture, that of the militias and indeed the popular mobilisation | :08:29. | :08:32. | |
forces as well, we know that five of the largest of the popular | :08:33. | :08:39. | |
mobilisation forces, including the Badder brigade for example, they | :08:40. | :08:43. | |
have support, money and direct assistance from Tehran. Now, what | :08:44. | :08:51. | |
should be done about that? -- Badr. Well, that has always been a problem | :08:52. | :08:56. | |
for Iraq. And I want since a long time ago that Iran is moving | :08:57. | :08:59. | |
gradually, systematically to controlling the situation in Iraq. | :09:00. | :09:05. | |
You know, let me exclaimed one thing which is very important. The vice | :09:06. | :09:12. | |
president, the President, the president do not have any executive | :09:13. | :09:15. | |
powers. I am getting that feeling during this interview... It is more | :09:16. | :09:23. | |
or less protocol. Yes. And I joined them because of the reconciliation | :09:24. | :09:27. | |
process, which was undermined. To be blunt about it, you are there as a | :09:28. | :09:39. | |
figleaf. Yes, yes, yes. And they useful figleaf. As long as you sit | :09:40. | :09:47. | |
as vice president you are giving some sort of credibility to a | :09:48. | :09:51. | |
government which you appear to be saying, is in essence right now | :09:52. | :09:58. | |
being run by the Iranians. Not run completely by the Iranians but Iran | :09:59. | :10:02. | |
is making the macro and micro decisions. The macro decisions | :10:03. | :10:08. | |
started in 2010 when we won the elections and the United States | :10:09. | :10:12. | |
sided with the Iranians then. What colour you think the US and Iran | :10:13. | :10:17. | |
ensured that you, even though your coalition actually won the most | :10:18. | :10:21. | |
seats, you didn't take power, and you're saying it was the combination | :10:22. | :10:26. | |
of the United States and Iran... ? Air I made it clear that it would | :10:27. | :10:32. | |
run against Allawi, and the Americans were with this and this | :10:33. | :10:37. | |
was conveyed to us of course by Biden, the vice president of the | :10:38. | :10:41. | |
United States, that we are not ready to accept that, that Iran will | :10:42. | :10:46. | |
intervene in Iraq and we are going to pull out from Iraq, so we will | :10:47. | :10:51. | |
have to toe the rope with Iran. I mean, Prime Minister al Maliki | :10:52. | :10:58. | |
seemed close with Tehran. It always seemed Prime Minister al Abadi was | :10:59. | :11:07. | |
somewhat less beholden to Iran. He is, yes, but he is overpowered. By? | :11:08. | :11:15. | |
Iranian forces. Sylla money, who is sometimes seen on Iraqi territory, | :11:16. | :11:20. | |
he spends a great deal of time surgery Dick Lee planning Iran's | :11:21. | :11:28. | |
role. Tactically. We are talking about the command of the | :11:29. | :11:34. | |
revolutionary forces. He spends more time in Iraq and in Iran. The more | :11:35. | :11:38. | |
you tell me about what is happening in your country today as you see it, | :11:39. | :11:44. | |
the more I am thinking that any talk of Mosul's liberation being a | :11:45. | :11:48. | |
watershed moment, something Iraqis can hold onto as a sign that things | :11:49. | :11:53. | |
are going to and get better, it is wrong. I don't see this happening | :11:54. | :11:59. | |
personally. I called for political resolutions. That will lead to | :12:00. | :12:04. | |
equality in Iraq. I call that they should stop by -- bifercation, which | :12:05. | :12:13. | |
is happening these days. They should really take care of the displaced. | :12:14. | :12:17. | |
They should stop the... I spoke to the leaders of the liberation, by | :12:18. | :12:25. | |
the way, and I told them that the only person eligible is those who | :12:26. | :12:29. | |
joined the army and the police. Iraq should not have two parallel armies, | :12:30. | :12:35. | |
both for the mobilisation and in the ordinary army and police. And I told | :12:36. | :12:40. | |
this to Abadi and I said this to the media. But we don't have executive | :12:41. | :12:45. | |
powers. Even the president doesn't have executive powers. This is | :12:46. | :12:49. | |
contrary to the Constitution, by the way. The Constitution says that the | :12:50. | :12:55. | |
President, the presidency, should oversee the implementation of the | :12:56. | :13:00. | |
Constitution. If you are so concerned about these threats to | :13:01. | :13:06. | |
unity in Iraq, and the preponderance of militias and mobilisation units | :13:07. | :13:11. | |
in the end represent sectarian forces inside your country, why oh | :13:12. | :13:17. | |
why have you in recent weeks decided to throw in your lot politically | :13:18. | :13:31. | |
with Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the firebrand members of the political | :13:32. | :13:38. | |
situation? No, no, I never signed any political deal. But we are | :13:39. | :13:43. | |
trying to explore who is closest to us in terms of the basic issues in | :13:44. | :13:48. | |
Iraq. And so far he is the closest as far as the quality, as far as | :13:49. | :13:56. | |
anti- sectarian, as far as attacking Iran. But forgive me, Muqtada | :13:57. | :14:01. | |
al-Sadr is trusted by no one in the Sunni community and now you appear | :14:02. | :14:06. | |
with your party and your coalition intent on using him to try to win | :14:07. | :14:10. | |
power in the next Iraqi election. It is opportunism... No, no, no. I | :14:11. | :14:17. | |
haven't signed any agreement with him, believe me. I am saying is on | :14:18. | :14:21. | |
TV, open TV. I haven't signed any agreement. We are talking to all | :14:22. | :14:32. | |
parties in Iraq, Sunni, Shia, Baathist, believe me, we want to | :14:33. | :14:36. | |
forge any kind of coalition ultimately. We don't feel now is the | :14:37. | :14:41. | |
time for coalitions and definitely I don't feel that I am ready to force | :14:42. | :14:47. | |
agreements and coalition with any sectarian force at all. I am | :14:48. | :14:51. | |
secular. I am against sectarianism. I am against this and I am not going | :14:52. | :14:58. | |
to move away from this position at all. | :14:59. | :15:04. | |
Let's's talk about the Kurds. The Kurdish regional area. In just a | :15:05. | :15:15. | |
month or so, September 25, we are going to see a referendum organised | :15:16. | :15:20. | |
by the ruler of the Kurdish region. Yes or no to Kurdish independence. | :15:21. | :15:28. | |
It is predicted that the Kurdish people are going to vote yes. What | :15:29. | :15:34. | |
impact will that have on Iraq's chances of staying as a unitary | :15:35. | :15:43. | |
state? It would be dismantled completely. That is why I spoke to | :15:44. | :15:50. | |
some of those in Kurdistan who I am going to see once I get back to | :15:51. | :15:59. | |
Iraq. I think the referendum is pretty much sure. The dismemberment | :16:00. | :16:07. | |
of Iraq would makes the Kurds the losers in this case. Do you believe | :16:08. | :16:12. | |
that this referendum could hasten a future conflict between the Baghdad | :16:13. | :16:17. | |
government... Yes, it will, I am sure. Even the regional governments | :16:18. | :16:26. | |
and the Kurds. You mean war? Well, conflict... Taking it step-by-step. | :16:27. | :16:35. | |
There will be complex. I don't think any of the regions will acknowledge | :16:36. | :16:46. | |
this. Neither Iran or Turkey... It has been conveyed to me that Iran is | :16:47. | :16:53. | |
putting pressure, this was discussed last week, Iran is putting a lot of | :16:54. | :16:56. | |
pressure on the Kurds, because they don't accept what is happening. The | :16:57. | :17:01. | |
Iranian is, let alone the Kurds... Your message to the Kurds is, be | :17:02. | :17:09. | |
careful what you wish for? Yes, and rationalise even the question. This | :17:10. | :17:16. | |
is very important. One factor in all of these publications... | :17:17. | :17:22. | |
Self-determination is something in the nature of Iraq. Independence | :17:23. | :17:27. | |
from Iraq is something else. Really, the wording of the questions should | :17:28. | :17:33. | |
be very clear. One factor we have... This is what the Iraqi government | :17:34. | :17:37. | |
should focus on when they talk to Mosul. The referendum has to take | :17:38. | :17:44. | |
place. They cannot run away from this. But there is another way of | :17:45. | :17:49. | |
rationalising the issue of the referendum in the questioning. The | :17:50. | :17:57. | |
statement that should come out on this issue of the referendum, if | :17:58. | :18:03. | |
they continue this is to separate Iraq and Kurdistan, this is going to | :18:04. | :18:08. | |
be very bad for everybody in the region, not only Iraq. This is the | :18:09. | :18:15. | |
promises that have been laid down, I am not blaming anybody but powers | :18:16. | :18:23. | |
including the United States have a hand in this, when they occupied | :18:24. | :18:29. | |
Iraq... They dismantled the whole country. I was going to ask you | :18:30. | :18:33. | |
about the United States. One factor we have not discussed is the role of | :18:34. | :18:38. | |
the United States. President Trump, for the last six months in power in | :18:39. | :18:45. | |
Washington... Do you believe the Americans are actually understanding | :18:46. | :18:50. | |
just how dangerous the situation in Iraq is? I don't think they are | :18:51. | :18:54. | |
understanding, I don't think they want to understand. I think even be | :18:55. | :19:00. | |
a conflict on Isis, they were only thinking on the functionality side | :19:01. | :19:04. | |
of things. They wouldn't even look at how to prepare for post- Isis, | :19:05. | :19:14. | |
what to do in Mosul and elsewhere. America have a very distinct | :19:15. | :19:18. | |
imagination for the greater Middle East area. Donald Trump has made it | :19:19. | :19:25. | |
plain that as far as he is concerned, his primary focus and | :19:26. | :19:27. | |
responsibility is to destroy so-called Islamic State and protect | :19:28. | :19:33. | |
America from terrorism in Iraq, in Syria, and that is, beyond all else, | :19:34. | :19:39. | |
his objective. Fine, we don't dispute this. On the other hand, he | :19:40. | :19:45. | |
should take into account care of what is legal and political, as well | :19:46. | :19:55. | |
as... Taking care of Iraq and the future of Iraq, because after all, | :19:56. | :19:59. | |
they hold legal responsibility when they dismantle the country. Iraq | :20:00. | :20:07. | |
wanted US forces out, Obama withdrew all forces in 2011. Do you think | :20:08. | :20:12. | |
American forces me to come back? No, no, I am not suggesting this. I am | :20:13. | :20:20. | |
suggesting that the United States should have clear policies and they | :20:21. | :20:24. | |
need to advise the Iraqi government because they have a moral obligation | :20:25. | :20:30. | |
to do so -- need. They have a legal obligation to do so. They are | :20:31. | :20:36. | |
defending the United States in the world from Islamic State, but Iraq | :20:37. | :20:39. | |
is the theatre for this conflict. They need to be more careful and | :20:40. | :20:44. | |
work more clearly with the moral as well as the other obligations. | :20:45. | :20:50. | |
Talking about the moral obligations, have you met Donald Trump? Not yet. | :20:51. | :20:56. | |
You said not long ago, there is a vacuum in the overall leadership in | :20:57. | :20:59. | |
the world. Really pointing a finger at the Americans. Gas. You said the | :21:00. | :21:04. | |
Americans need to get back to their role as the international power. | :21:05. | :21:12. | |
Yes. I agree with this statement -- Yes. Not using the military. But to | :21:13. | :21:18. | |
exercise their political role as well as the military role. There is | :21:19. | :21:24. | |
a vacuum in the leadership. In world leadership. There is nothing. In the | :21:25. | :21:31. | |
end, you can't blame anybody else for the state of Iraq today. You and | :21:32. | :21:38. | |
your generation... I just want to develop the sport. We have spoken | :21:39. | :21:44. | |
several times and it seems your generation of Iraq, the post- Saddam | :21:45. | :21:52. | |
generation of Iraqi leaders, have failed to deliver stability, in | :21:53. | :21:58. | |
unity and the most basic security to the people of your country. I agree, | :21:59. | :22:03. | |
and this is not because of the fault of politicians only. It is the | :22:04. | :22:07. | |
dismantlement of the state, the institutions of the state of Iraq | :22:08. | :22:11. | |
that had to do with occupation. We are paying the price now. Not only | :22:12. | :22:18. | |
was Saddam overthrown, but the state of Iraq was overthrown. The army, | :22:19. | :22:23. | |
the security, the intelligence. The judiciary. The process of | :22:24. | :22:33. | |
political... Politicising the dismantling. There was a vacuum in | :22:34. | :22:40. | |
Iraq. We first spoke many years ago, and I wonder if we speak again in | :22:41. | :22:45. | |
ten years, you actually believe Iraq as we know it today will exist. We | :22:46. | :22:49. | |
have talked about your belief that Islamic State is not eradicated and | :22:50. | :22:54. | |
that the struggle will continue, and the Terror and the violence. We have | :22:55. | :22:58. | |
talked about the Kurds and your belief that there could be a | :22:59. | :23:01. | |
conflict looming with the Kurdish in the north of your country. Yes. Iraq | :23:02. | :23:07. | |
doesn't seem to have a viable future? For now, there is that | :23:08. | :23:12. | |
sense. But it is something that is changing in Iraq. The movement of | :23:13. | :23:18. | |
the people, talking to the clerics of the Shia and Sunni, they are | :23:19. | :23:27. | |
calling for a civic state, for dismantling sectarianism and moving | :23:28. | :23:31. | |
towards an equal citizenship. That is talk, and the reality on the | :23:32. | :23:36. | |
ground is that the sectarian militia, popular mobilisation | :23:37. | :23:44. | |
forces, these sad... The clerics are aware, this was due to be | :23:45. | :23:48. | |
mobilisation of people, millions went to the streets. -- these are. | :23:49. | :23:56. | |
This is change. This is very clear change. The government are starting | :23:57. | :24:00. | |
to impose these popular organisations. Other issues are not | :24:01. | :24:07. | |
being taken into account. But the mood of the populace has changed in | :24:08. | :24:11. | |
Iraq. This is what you should encourage. Ayad Allawi, we have to | :24:12. | :24:18. | |
end there, but thank you very much. Thank you. | :24:19. | :24:34. |