07/06/2016 House of Commons

subscription to it, it will run for a maximum of half an hour. The limit

for frontbenchers and the backbencher involved you need to be

observed. -- do need. Ask the Minister to make a statement on NHS

commissioning in relation to HIV preexposure prophylaxis. Thank you,

Mr Speaker. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to this. HIV,

as a house is, can be a devastating illness. We know that preexposure

prophylaxis can make a difference to both those at risk of contracting

HIV and those who already HIV positive. It is crucial that we have

a full understanding of all the issues surrounding it, and as with

any new intervention, it must be researched in relation to clinical

and cost effectiveness. We have asked NIC to conduct a review of

true of ardour for it for HIV in high-risk groups. This indicates the

next step forward and will inform any subsequent steps will

commissioning. It will look at effectiveness, safety, patient

factors and resource implications. The summary will run alongside a

pilot scheme in which we are investing up to ?2 million. Public

Health England is currently identifying the most affected places

the pilot to take place. It's also important that temper macros not yet

licensed in the UK. As well as the pilot scheme -- PREP is not yet

licensed. It is only one of a range of activities to tackle HIV, which

is a covenant priority. It is also important to stress that the

challenge of some high-risk STI 's remains. Our 2-point formally and

pounds national -- ?2.4 million. The UK has world-class treatment

services. The UK is already ahead in reaching two of the UN aids roles of

90% diagnosed infection, 90% diagnosed on treatment, and 90%

viral suppression by 2020. In 2014, 17% of those living with HIV had

undiagnosed infection. But 91% of those diagnosed were on treatment,

of whom 95% were virally suppressed. We are determined to continue to

make real progress to meet these goals, and are considering carefully

the role that PREP can play in helping us get there. I thank the

Minister for that reply. This is a subject that we don't debate enough.

I'm grateful to you, Mr Speaker, for giving us the opportunity. 17 people

are diagnosed with HIV every day. It each year, there are thousands of

new infections. In the UK, there are more people living with HIV than

ever before. We know that PREP has the potential to be a game changer.

It has proven to be effective in stopping HIV transmission in almost

every single case. And yet, as result of this latest decision, this

life changing drug will remain inaccessible to people at risk of

HIV. Does the Minister share my concern about both the president

this sets for other preventative costs being shunted onto local

government by NHS England, and also can she explain why preexposure

prophylaxis is being dealt with differently to the correct

commissioning model, to PEEP, postexposure prophylaxis.

Specifically, I want to ask the Minister three questions. Does she

accept that under section 78, the mechanism by which the Secretary of

State can delegate power, the Health Secretary can give NHS England of

the power to commission treble. If show Bencic Spain why she hasn't

done this. If the government is, can she say how much additional funding

issue make available to councils? Can we assume that there will be no

further cuts to cut public health grounds, or is this just a case of

passing both responsibility August -- and the financial book. A joint

letter has been written to the public health minister requesting an

urgent meeting. Will she agree to meet with these stakeholders

deceiver way forward can be found without the need for costly

protracted legal action. It has been described as the beginning of the

end of the HIV epidemic. It's time for this ministers to show some

leadership, use the powers that she has and think again. Some of the

Shadow Minister's questions are simply ahead of the moment, as it

were. As I said, clearly in my statement, NHS England has made its

position clear in how it feels in terms of it being the Commissioner

based on a legal argument which they have published. No decision has been

made about who the Commissioner is. Clearly a decision, we need to reach

a decision, we have been discussing that earlier today. There are a

number of stages we have to go through. The drug is not even

licensed for the use of PREP in the UK, for use as PREP. We have set out

a series of stages that we are going to go through that will inform a

final decision. The questions he posed, we're not in a position to

make that judgment. There is more we need to know about clinical and cost

effectiveness, about the pilot. It isn't the case, there has been an

important study, but that was looking at clinical effectiveness.

There is a wider piece of work to be done, of which the pilot programme

we have announced is part. To understand where PREP fits in in

terms of clinical and cost effective list and how it fits into the HIV

prevention landscape broadly. Alongside other HIV interventions

that are commissioned. There is work to do, but we're not standing still,

we have announced the important pilot, committed many to it. We have

asked for an evidence review, and all of this will go into

consideration. First of all, could I say I agree with what the Shadow

Minister has said apart from one point. Which is asking my honourable

friend the Minister to show leadership. I can say as the

chairman on the all-party group and campaigned on many male sexual

health issues, that this minister has been supportive in addressing

many of the issues facing not just men's sexual health, but

particularly gay men's sexual health. I

I have lost too many friends over these two aids not to challenge this

decision. HIV infection rates in this country are on the increase.

Existing strategies are not working. And to suggest that we simply do the

same, going forward, is not acceptable. I have a minister in the

back row meeting of the Minister on 13th of June, will she except to

widen that to the other stakeholders? I think my honourable

friend for his kind words. This is an issue I take extremely seriously

and he's right to say we face a challenge when it to HIV rates and

particularly, as I said, STI rates, particularly in high risk

communities, and I stress again that it will no doubt have an important

part to play, it's not a silver bullet when it comes to sexual

infections, it is important to understand that. We have to continue

to look at a whole range of measures. I have recently met the

chief executive of the Terrence Higgins trust, we did touch on this,

I have a meeting coming up, I didn't respond to the question about the

meeting of stakeholder groups, and of course I will meet all the key

stakeholder groups, I have had informal discussions already on this

but of course I am open to having those discussions. Stakeholders were

involved in the discussions with NHS England, which is made its position

clear and there is a matter to go before the court on which I won't

comment further. And yes I except we need to do more and of course we all

share the concerns about rising HIV infection rates, particularly among

the community, I too have lost friends to the AIDS epidemic, as he

refers, and I take this extremely seriously as an issue but we do have

two follow a sensible process and that is what the government is

doing. I think anyone in this house is glad to see the results of the

study and the 85% reduction in new infections. I think there is more to

understand in that we didn't see was a good response in heterosexual

women, while we have over 40,000 HIV sufferers in the UK who are men who

have sex with men, we have 60,000 Iraq heterosexual or bisexual,

predominantly of African origin. We need to be thinking of them my main

complaint is not going through a process of looking at the nickel

evidence and making a decision. Why was the company not encouraged to

get through that earlier and go to NICE? I don't understand why we're

only going to NICE now, because that's the answer we need. I have to

say I think iteratively poured and it to have made the decision on,

it's not our job, it's your job, that's the most insulting bit to the

community. It's important as in Scotland, our Cabinet Secretary has

asked them to go through DNA, which they applied for and then SMC. They

are on the right path now that's where we should have gone first.

It's doubly worth clarifying that we asked NICE to take an evidence

review, not a technology assessment and issues about what drugs are

licensed for is an issue for drugs companies to take. So the issue

about whether the drug is licensed is not, the government doesn't

initiate that process, the drug company must. It's probably worth a

house noting that my understanding that when a drug is licensed for a

new purpose, the company could apply to the patents to be extended to

cover this news but again, that would be something the drug company

would do. On her first point, I agree that we do need to consider

the impact on women in the circumstances she describes and of

course that's one of the oddments for looking and carefully planning

this pilot programme and picking those factors into account -- one of

the arguments. The programme is correct but the French covenanters

already improved the drug and also understand the urgency of this since

the UK study funded by the MRC, the results are unequivocal and we need

to get this going now. Though she reflect upon the fact that the study

showed no difference in the incidence of other sexually

transmitted diseases so the message has to go out that a condom is

absolutely essential. His latter point is quite right in terms of the

impact, whether commissioned and by whoever, we would still have this

significant challenge in the way he described around STIs and

drug-resistant gonorrhoea, it's a problem we are increasingly aware

of. There are international comparisons we can look at, the

picture across the world, I have looked in some detail at this, is

that many countries are in broadly the same position as the UK. Try to

understand more about how, leaving aside the issue of clinical

effectiveness, how we look at how prep can be used as part of an HIV

prevention programme, in broad effectiveness and compare to other

available interventions. He is right, there is work to do and we

are not resting easy on this, we're moving forward and we want to work

and have these pilots working through and planning them, doing

that work now. Winter she expect this damaging buckpassing between

NHS England and local authorities, one of the disastrous results of the

2013 health and social care act, to be resolved, and partially agree it

would be far more appropriate for NHS England to be the Commissioner

of something like prep than local government, and will she be

cognisant of the danger that we are going back to the bad old days where

certain groups are being stigmatised, stigma is disastrous

with a public health policy, it'll result in an explosion of sexual

disease in this country if we don't always bear in mind the danger of

decisions by NHS England, also on hep C and drug treatment for that,

we'll have a disastrous impact on public health. The NHS in good

position is based on a legal argument and as it's likely to go

before the courts, it's not appropriate for me to comment

further. There was little discussion at Select Committee this morning

which some members were St Paul. In terms of working out how and where

it commissioned, clearly we do need to identify the Commissioner, I

don't accept his challenge around the issue around fragmentation, if

you look around the world, a whole series of front health systems, they

are all broadly going through the same process of understanding where

preps its -- different health systems. There are different options

but we need to go through this work. On his latter point on stigma, he is

right to identify that is a significant concern but I don't

except, he knows my personal attitude just tackling stigma, we

couldn't have made it clear that rising HIV rates, looking at the

challenges of things like can sex, oral front of mind and something we

have given time and thought of. I think my constituents would be

excited by the prospect that prep offers but would be disturbed that

every country around the world seems to be going through the same

process, duplicating and replicating and holding up potentially what

could be a very exciting development to combat the spread of HIV across

Africa, and many countries suffering from this far worse than we are,

they would be horrified by the thought of this process, getting

bogged down in a court, when this treatment, where it is available,

could do very real good. He is right to recognise that this has

potential, and is being used in some places internationally. The point I

was making is that there isn't a simple, one size fits all, solution,

different countries have different challenges. The level of HIV

prevalence in the services available to manage their problems, and manage

testing, are different in different countries, and performs a different

landscape into which prep might set about to give an example from

Africa, it was licensed last year and will be available for sex

workers in selected sites because HIV prevalence among female sex

workers is estimated to be just under 60% in South Africa. So there

are different contexts in which it is being taken forward and that is

just one of them. Will the Minister agree with me that

in the context of such a stretched budgets, the impression that local

authorities should fund PrEP, and an edge as England is the National

commission of PrEP and that is her position? I have been very clear

about the position of NHS England, and equally, I have said that no

decision has yet been made about commissioning. I don't except her

challenge around spending on public health, we have committed ?16

billion over the next five years on the public health Grant, over ?1

billion this year alone, ?300 million on vaccines that we by the

Department of Health has systemwide leadership through things like

sugary drinks levy, and the forthcoming childhood of Bay City

strategy, this is a red core upgrade intervention which was talked about.

-- childhood obesity. I would like to thank the Minister for her work

engaging with the LG BT community, which I know are quite concerned

about the last week's statement by NHS England. Given the disappointing

outcome of the PrEP review by NHS England and the worst of all

scenarios, a legal challenge, for the most committed finding a way

around the NHS England decision while a new trial is underway? Dishy

agree that the exhibitor Bennison could provide a perfect but from two

by pastors constricting system we have been talking about? I will

reflect on the latter point with my honourable friend the Minister for

life sciences, sat alongside me. I have made clear the position in

terms of the NHS position on commissioning and part of the

measures I had announced today, the NICE evidence review, the trial we

are going to plan for, will be moving forward with later in the

year, that is all part of understanding how we get to the

right decision, it's not something I'm going to make a snap decision on

now but we have set out a process by which we can get to that point. As

first chair of the all-party group on HIV and AIDS, I share a lot of

the concerns and a lot of people in the LG BT community will share

concerns about the current situation but I was disappointed that she

appeared to cast some doubt on the efficacy of PrEP, there are major

studies, 30,000 people are using it in the US and there is clear

evidence as to its efficacy, so give some hope the people out there that

this isn't a political, cost 's decision, will she use her section

78 powers and take the right vision on these matters? We haven't made a

decision on commissioning yet, let me be very clear, I completely

understand and accept the point about clinical effectiveness. The

point I was making was that there are wider considerations in terms of

how the commission something in the context of a whole series of HIV

prevention services. That's slightly different from clinical

effectiveness which the study showed good results on. So it's not a case

I'm saying it is not clinically effective, we just have to

understand more about how it sits in the context of everything else we do

and also about the cost effectiveness, the modelling work

that was undertaken indicated that PrEP can be cost-effective for some

high-risk groups but the period over which that cost effectiveness pays

back, needs to be more broadly understood. I don't doubt the

Minister's coming into this issue but she has to understand how this

looks to the outside world. -- commitment to this issue. This

government broadly decision to ban poppers but it looks as though they

have their head in the sand over PrEP, they get it in Israel, Kenya,

Canada, France, why are we so behind? I think the first point was

a bit of a red herring because I understand that has been resolved

but I don't except his criticism, -- accept his criticism. One of the

things that is disappointing is that members are forgetting that the UK

has a world leading position on HIV treatment, on many, in all the

lawyers are laid out. Our movement towards the goals as laid out to my

response to the urgent question, are very significant Soto said the UK is

somehow not a leader in this area of HIV treatment is not right. But

clearly we have acknowledged that PrEP has a role to play, we need to

understand more about what that is. Could do Minister clarify that she

is putting aside the clinical significance of this, I find it

quite confusing that you can put this clinical significance to one

side. Would you agree that HIV prevention in the UK has been a

leader for decades, but the process is now in threat because of her

decision, and which now think again? Not for the first time can I just

clarify that no decision has been made about the commissioning of

PrEP, so I'm not quite sure why he would say that. I have been very

clear about the clinical effectiveness. What I'm saying is,

there is more work to be done to understand the wider cost

effectiveness in the context of commissioning of HIV prevention more

broadly. My constituency. He was in the Borough of Southwark. What is

the government making of the impact of this policy change my

constituents, but also on the long-term indications from NHS of

PrEP not being available? There isn't a policy change. I've laid out

the position. I think it's important understand that even in the

modelling work that's being done, PrEP is not a silver bullet. It has

an important part to play going forward, but I think it is important

understand that it isn't a server bullet in terms of HIV prevention

and also doesn't go to some of the broader issues that entered in my

statement. -- silver bullet. This is another example in the over

bureaucratic review system for approving drugs in this country. Can

I draw her attention to the fact that NHS England promised ?2 million

to allow 500 people to do this? Does she understand the dismay that they

are now passing the buck and saying it's down to local authorities, who

it all know are incredibly cash strapped? NHS is seeking clarity

through the courts for their own position. No decision has been made

about who might be the final commission for PrEP, so it's not

quite right what he said. The ?2 million has been committed to the

pilot is important, and it will help to form our understanding of this

important intervention. Michael decisions he has an extraordinary

high incidence of HIV and AIDS, and some of it being undiagnosed. Our

local authority is the smallest unitary authority in the country,

has faced 50% of central government cuts. It has no prospect of being

able to fund a challenge of this size. Does the Minister understand

that this delay in sorting out who's going to pay for PrEP will lead to

the deaths of hundreds of people in Britain? Mr Speaker, PrEP as I have

mentioned already, is not actually yet licensed for use in this

country. We have set out a process by which we can understand far more

about how PrEP might fit into the landscape. She mentions and

Detective -- and Detective -- undetected HIV. The world's first

home testing service, last year the major HIV innovation fund which has

really come up with some extremely new and cutting edge ideas about how

to improve HIV detection and diagnosis. I fully accept that it's

a major challenge in her area, but actually PrEP is only one part of a

wider programme of work. I think the whips are pleased to see the arrival

of the right Honourable member. He is never knowingly been keen to be

hurried on anything. Could the Minister clarify the timescale

around the decision, evidenced reviews and trials can take months

and years. Clearly, in relation to what others because have said,

people haven't got months and years. In terms of decision, what is the

process, what are the timescale is that we can be reassured about or

not? The evidence review we have called for would expect to get in

the autumn. Planning is already underway, working on plans for the

pilot programme which would be over two year period. We would hope to be

getting that underweight wets the end of this year. Both of those

pieces of work are under way. -- underway towards the end of this

year. We want to make sure that it will be something we get back in the

relatively short-term. Can I just say to the Minister that I am

flabbergasted that she has come before the house today to say that

the legislation which her government introduced around the reorganisation

of the NHS is so incompetent that NHS England are now having to go to

court to work out who is actually entitled to commission these

services. How much public money is going to be spent on the legal case

that is going forward on this? I'm not in a position to comment on

that. I don't accept her central criticism. If she'd been present

this morning at the health select committee, she would have heard an

Arab evidence from myself and Duncan Selby. -- and hour of evidence.

Order. Point of order. As you know, the SSI plant on Teesside close with

the loss of 9000 jobs. Lord Heseltine could together with the

Secretary of State along with the Northern Power has Minister are in

my constituency launching the noble Lord's much awaited report in the

response to that crisis. I received notification of that by e-mail at

3pm yesterday, and a copy of the report itself at 620 this morning. I

have contacted the Secretary of State, and I do accept that he is

under the impression that I was properly contacted, but I can show

the house that I was not. I have searched those e-mails, colleagues

have received them, I have not. I'm asking for guidance if a report is

going to be delivered in my constituency about my constituency,

can we have some better direction to ministers about how they best

communicate that activity to members of Parliament. Rather than allegedly

or assuming, I should say, assuming that those e-mails are properly

communicated? There is a firm convention. If a member is intending

to visit the constituency of another member on official business, as

opposed to purely private or personal business, the member whose

constituency is being visited should be notified in advance. Nothing is

routing down anywhere in, but the courtesy would be to notify a member

in advance sufficiently that he or she could be present, or at least in

the vicinity in his or her own constituency if it was so wished. It

would rather depend on the circumstances of the event, but

there should be proper notice. In the case of ministers, this

requirement is actually stipulated in the ministerial code. If that has

not been complied with in this case, that is Roberta Ball. The honourable

gentleman has made his point -- that is regrettable. That'll be

communicated again in the forceful terms in which didn't gentleman

typically expresses himself to the Secretary of State. I hope it won't

be necessary for this point constantly to be raised and then

have to be underlined by me from the chair. It's really an elementary

courtesy, and I think a lot of people listening to our proceedings

will surely feel that colleagues can treat each other in a civil and

grown-up way, as would happen in other institutions. Indeed, I note

in the distance some agreement with the point that I have just made.

Point of order. And going to disappoint you, because it's a

follow on from that exact same point, although not regarding

ministers. I discovered that the honourable members for well in grant

Corby when my constituency last week, with the grassroots Out

campaign, so not on business but part of campaigning. They failed to

advise me in advance, and I wonder if you could just remind all members

that it is the case that we, by convention, notified in advance. I

may not have wished to be there alongside them, however. There are

also some of the issues, because factually incorrect information was

shared with my constituents. I fear that perhaps the member for

Wellingborough would be horrified to hear that he misled my constituents

in the same way that I'm horrified, and how could he correct that? About

a ledge of factually incorrect information being submitted to her

constituents. That is a matter of politics. Although I don't know the

people of the constituency, I dare say they can bear with stoicism and

fortitude proffering of views to them with which their locally

elected member of Parliament may disagree. That isn't a matter for

the chair. However, I don't think it is fishy, is a visit was undertaken

not by ministers, but by members engaged in professional designers.

The honourable lady should have been notified. I recognise that the

members of the moment in the context of the EU referendum campaign,

including doubtless the honourable gentleman the member for

Wellingborough and the honourable member for Corby, who may well be

visiting a great member of constituency in a concentrated

period. Nevertheless, the convention is an aborted courtesy, and it

should continue to apply. It is very difficult or time-consuming -- is a

courtesy. I hope that members will now do so. The issue we have just

discussed and the urgent issue regarding PrEP is one that I and

many other members consider to be of huge national importance. Despite

the fact of the drug, despite the numbers of people involved and the

great national interest, Parliament hasn't actually substantially

debated the issue aside from the urgent question that we have just

had this morning. Mr Speaker, as a new member of the house, and I

confess still trying to get my head around this place, although I

suspect I never will, can I ask you if it would be in order to seek a

standing order 24 to be on the issue of PrEP, and if it would be in order

how one might go about that? It's certainly open to the honourable

gentleman to seek such a debate. There's nothing improper about it,

but know that the honourable gentleman wouldn't seek advance

agreement from me in respect of an application which has not yet been

made, and whose terms therefore cannot be known to me. And upon

which it would wholly unreasonable to expect me to adjudicate. Apart

from that, his port was all right. -- his point was all right. What I

would say also is that the issue as the minister mentioned perfectly

properly, is a devolved matter. It can therefore be considered

elsewhere as well. Perfectly proper for it to be considered here. There

is a range of opportunities were to be considered. The mechanism he

mentions is a possible approach. There are also backbench business

committee debates, adjournment debates and debates in the name of

the relevant opposition party. I'm sure the honourable gentleman is an

very good terms with the powers that be in his own party, and if they

judge it a sufficient priority, they might choose to nominated as a

subject for such a debate. Knowing the Mr as I do, she would very

courteously come along if it was her responsibility to do so to listen to

the honourable member. -- knowing the Minister. And to speak as

appropriate. You may be interested as well that the all-party group is

holding its own debate and enquiry on the very issues and discussion

this afternoon and tomorrow, we would encourage all members to

attend. What a helpful man he is, he is a purveyor of information. If

that is the point of order, we will proceed. Presentation of Bill,

secretary. He Wales Bill. Thank you. The clerk will now proceed to read

the orders of the day. Investigatory Powers Bill to be further

considered. Now, thank you. Order. We begin with amendment 390, with

which it will be convenient to consider the new causes and

amendments listed on the selection paper. No? The honourable and

Leonard lady is not to declaim on this occasion. That was the name I

had. -- learned lady. Part six of the bill regarding the bulk Powers

is perhaps one of the most controversial sections within it.

I'm sorry, Mr Speaker, I rise to move the amendments in the name of

myself and my colleagues. The SNP is calling with part six and seven to

be shelved until such time as an argument for their inclusion has

been demonstrated by an independent review.

We believe the powers and part six should be removed until a

satisfactory case is made for these powers. The review ligament has

agreed to is most welcome but the government must get it right. -- the

government has agreed to. Yesterday we had sight of some detail of the

review a letter from the Minister, were particularly pleased to note

that one of the review team will be a barrister who has a great deal of

experience working as a special advocate acting against the

government in terrorism cases. That degree of balance is good and to be

welcomed. But the review needs to be given the time to do a thorough job

and we don't believe three months is necessarily going to be enough, and

even if it were, it would be the first time we've been promised a

date by which time a report will be published and then and then another.

Her words reflect the spirit of this debate has been conducted rout. The.

The reason the review is good to begin that it in the time frame she

describes is because the government is clear that the review will take

place while the bill is live, enjoying its passage through both

Houses of Parliament. It would be inappropriate to review wanted was

passed into law. My point is that the review should have happened

before now and even if the review was conducted within three months,

it would not be taking place here, the scrutiny, it will take place in

the other place by them as the House of Lords who are not elected to

represent people. They also confident the review will not have

different findings to those carried out in different countries. In other

words it is likely to find a bulk powders are not the not necessary. I

understand the government arguing that new clause file Alli five will

mean that other... Indeed it has been dubbed the privacy clause, how

can we trust the government... I will give way. I'm grateful to the

honourable lady, I said on the committee she mentioned there were

other means other than Bill Powers, is she going to delineate those to

the house? If he would care to exercise a little patience, he might

get the answer to that, might not, mind you. No, he will! Where was I?

So, regarding that other techniques, I understand the government is

arguing this is a political but my concern is, how can we trust their

commitment to privacy in this bill when the draft bill on the actual

bill, the significant change dealing with the needs for privacy to be of

primary importance in this bill entailed simply changing the name of

part one from the general protection is the general privacy protections,

not about works, it's about intent and action and changing one word

pleases nobody. Is she aware that there is a sunset clause, save these

powers are not available to be exercised, and if it is found these

powers are necessary, they will be a gap in our security services's

ability to combat terrorism? I will come onto onto that shortly because

I do have something in here about this, but the fundamental point is

this. Why should we as an as a parliament be expected to answer

that shortly because I do have something in here about this, but

the fundamental point is this. Why should we as an is a parliament be

expected about through legislation that is to be reviewed? It seems to

be an unprofessional way, to say the least, to do business. I would be

uncomfortable crossing fingers and hoping for the best of old appeal to

Labour colleagues to be more circumspect about trusting the

government with their vote today. Let's look at the USA. In the United

States, the revelations by Edward Snowden revealed the National

Security agency was running a book telephone the record programme, they

put up a strong case for maintaining the programme, they produced a

document of 50 for counterterrorism events in which the bulk powders

contributed to their success in countering the terrorism. -- bulk

powers. But there reviewed all cases and determined that only 12 of the

54 had any relevance to the use of bulk powers under section 215 of the

USA Patriot act. One of those groups, the President's review group

on intelligence review technologies, are well-respected and high-powered,

set up under the auspices of President Obama, concluded as

follows. Our review suggests that the information debited to

terrorists and mitigation by the use of section 215 was not essential to

preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely

manner, using conventional section 215 orders. The other body, the

privacy and civil liberties abroad, concluded similarly, they said they

had "Not identified a single instance involving a threat to the

United States in which a programme, ie the use of bulk powers, made a

complete difference to the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation"

. Or to the disruption of a terrorist attack. Whatever I think

the outcome of this review might be, and none of us know because it's not

happened yet, it is nonetheless a recognition that the government has

failed to convince both this house and wider society as to the

necessity of these powers. I will give way. Having regard to watch as

ever but the American experience, does she agree that it's absolutely

vital to review looked at the American experience, given that the

playback of a one of our chief allies, and that she agree that the

looked at the American experience? I think that with very helpful, if the

opposition would do that and could secure that, because although not go

to follow suit, we support the review, we're not saying, do as

America does, we have to conduct our own review but given the level they

have let into this, I think we need to have access... We have looked

into. I've already given away and I'm conscious of letting other

people get in. So the review is welcome, of course, not least

because it is hoped that David Anderson QC will do as Liberty have

called for and use this opportunity to challenge the evidence and

produce a thorough, conferences and unbiased exoneration of the

necessity of all bulk powers in the bill did a review call for a long

ago by the aforementioned Liberty and the government could have and

should have had it completed before asking us in this house to vote for

it. When we are dealing with something as broad as these

proposals for what is in effect bulk data harnessing from mainly innocent

citizens, it is incumbent upon the government to prove that there is an

operational case for these proposals, that these powers are

necessary, and to ensure the safe powers in place are rigorous, the

government has neither proven the operational case for these powers

nor has it delivered safeguards and oversight of sufficient calibre to

make these powers justifiable. I'm trying not to give way to often! I

must grateful. As I intervened in second reading, I appreciate the

powers are controversial but the one thing I am sure about is we do not

conduct data harvesting in this country. It simply does not happen.

The use of bulk powers is not for that purpose. It is for the purpose

of being able to examine material but in fact, even though it may be

done in bulk, it is being done in a way that does not out the

generalised harvesting of data for their examination, it simply isn't.

My answer to that is simply that if these laws allowed for bulk data

harvesting, then it can still happen, we can't just sit there

saying it will never happen. The SNP argument is not to do down our

security services or anyone else working to keep our constituents

safe, of course it isn't. We would fail as a parliament if we assert

our power on behalf of their constituents and failed to place

proper limitations on the scope the state to interfere in the lives of

private citizens. I had given way too many times. The use an analogy,

there are other people who want to speak, though. If it were to

authorise the opening the opening, scanning and retention of all mail

at a particular post of this in the hope we could one they go back once

we have found a suspicion about a certain user of that post office,

how constituents would rightly be marching upon this place demanding

that we stop such an outrage. Does the government really think people

using the Post Office would be content to believe all was well as

long as these letters were stored in a big safe to which only the good

guys had the key? Or they would only be read after warrant was required?

I don't think so. People are not that daft. And strangely, they not

that trusting. And yet the government is asking us to focus on

the issue of access and examination and ignore the massive combine

harvester in the room, the bulk data collection itself. The members

opposite me will groan that we are all entitled to express our opinions

on this hill, I would say. And we are entitled to have rigorous

scrutiny of this legislation. On the government and the crew on terms,

this abuse of public privacy is very limited use anyway, targeting powers

are far more effective and could resolve many of the privacy

concerns. If we have a justifiable case to access this information than

we already know who we should be targeting in terms of data

collection. Why are we wasting time and resources using bulk techniques

when it comes to that collection? I think forgiving way. The honourable

lady referred to known targets, but surely one of the advantages of bulk

data gathering is to find those unknown people, who are out there,

wishing to do us harm. I just don't have the honourable lady thinks

we're going to do that, the evidence reviewed by the committee showed

that the bulk powers are counter-productive because the sheer

scale of the data makes it impossible to analyse it adequately.

In fact, I believe the government used the limited capacity of the

security services to analyse bulk quantities of data as some form of

assurance, which was a little strange to say the least. I say this

to be helpful, but I fear the debate has moved on and she hasn't. The

truth of the matter is that the bulk powers she described work brought up

in the meeting and they established that there was validity and

necessity. She is arguing a general case on bulk rather than a case

about safeguards. I think the mist of that advice and I will pass that

advice onto all my constituents who have the same concerns -- I thank

the Minister. And he was concerned I am expressing here today. As we

know, this bill is supposed to be the basis for the sadistic makes for

some time, we're not future proofing the bill if we say it is find to

have this, because in 2016, we don't have a technical capability to

analyse them. Some of the present-day practices are reliant

upon 32-year-old laws, dating back to 1984. Of all years. If we get

this wrong now, there is every possible as it will enshrine in law

invasive practices that will only become feasible in the next 30

years. Perhaps for the most worrying parts is something the government

outlined as follows, bulk equipment interference is not targeted against

particular persons, organisations or locations or against equipment being

used for political activities, so it is an indiscriminate form of

interference which the system is vulnerable, not just our own

security services, using the power sparingly and hopefully

proportionally but to those looking to use Abdel Fattah al-Sisi profit

from broken security. If the front door of your house has been kicked

in by the police, it does not prevent a criminal entering after

their departure. Our concerns regarding the bulk powers are

connected to many of our concerns regarding the use of bulk data. At

the heart of the matter is the retention of intimate personal

details regarding the tens of millions of ordinary citizens of

this country who do not merit such information being held by the state.

We welcome the review of the use of bulk powers and recognise that as

part of the bill, it impacted by other sections and cannot stand in

isolation. If assets are required by other mechanisms in the bill, how

will they be dealt with and properly handled? As we stressed throughout,

the bill should be an easier to understand the substation clarifying

what is permitted and what is not, not providing a mechanism whereby we

rubber-stamp practices that were never pretty debated. Again, the

off-line analogy is instructive. If we were asked by the state to

deposit and mothership forms for various organisations, political

parties, campaign groups, golf clubs, direct debit details, health

records and other such bulk information, into a big safe, on the

understanding that only the security services would have access to it, we

would rightly booked at such a proposal. Just because a system is

being proposed online and without the consent of the individuals

concerned, doesn't make it acceptable, in many ways it makes it

much worse. I hope the Minister will address

that comparison. There are also some very real dangers that the mass mint

of bulk data sets could lead to citizens being investigated on

stereotypes and miscarriages of justice. Some miscarriages of

justice including that of the Birmingham six have been carried out

on the assumptions that predicate the analysis of bulk data sets.

People who take on the right boxes and yet just happened to be entirely

innocent. It is not that the government are not aware of the

problems they have created, the principles are targeting significant

areas appear in various guises in the bill. The government must fully

embrace both of these principles and apply them to the collection,

storage and the analysis of data. If they fail to do that, so far they

have, and they still cannot prove the operational assesses the these

intrusions into the private lives of your everyday citizen and so far

they have not proven that, then they should not expect the support of

this house for those measures. It is not acceptable on it should not be

acceptable for any government to ask for legislation that is about to be

reviewed to be nodded through. Every year in this and the other place

this house plays out in all its finally the historic role of

parliament in limiting the powers of the executive. Let us remember that

role when we vote on this unprecedented extension of powers we

see in this bill. The question is that the amendment

be made. Can I say to the Minister to respond or not at this stage?

Thank you. It is a pleasure to be able to participate in this debate.

I want for the moment to move the amendment standing with the name

intelligence and Security committee. Mr Deputy Speaker I would not be

doing justice to this debate on what is a matter of great and legitimate

public interest and importance if I were not to seek briefly to respond

to the perfectly reasonable fears expressed by the Honourable Lady for

classical North West, I hope I got... Trustees, I apologise. It

highlights the difficulty we have in this country certainly from Amazon:

but I dare say from members of the public and certainly for the NGOs

who are interested in civil liberties. -- certainly for members

of this Parliament. We must reconcile agencies are doing

with the powers with what those of us who have access to this

information by virtue of work actually see happening in reality. I

am not sure that this is a gap that is to reach. I can only do my best

to explain to the house and the honourable lady how ICT system

working. Of course I suppose in an ideal world it would always be

better if we could use targeted interception. If you know what it is

trying to intercept and you have reasonable grounds for doing it and

it is necessary and proportionate to do so then clearly that is what you

should be aiming to do. But the reality is that the use of the

Internet today in respect of the transfer of information is of such

an order that if there were not powers which in able the agencies to

look to intercept a look and then to search it to find what they're

looking for then it would in practice be very difficult for the

agencies to defend our security was against espionage and particularly

terrorism. That is the reality. And the point has been made repeatedly,

including in public by agency heads, certainly not give his evidence in

public to the intelligence and Security committee on the one in the

health the public hearing, when he explained that the idea that there

is bulk harvesting of data in order to carry out a detailed examination

of it is in fact fanciful. That is not what is happening. What is

happening is that there may be the retention of a bulk group of data in

which in reality the vast majority of it, in fact wildly over 90% of it

will never be looked at at all except insofar as it exists as the

few digits on a screen. What ultimately the agencies will be

interested in is the nugget or is he described it, the needle in the

haystack that they are actually looking for. The idea that the

privacy of an individual was going to be compromised if it's just so

happens that the -- that the Internet traffic has been caught in

that particular net is simply not real. That is the reality of what

goes on and if I may say to the now already in to the house, I do not

think it is very different from what was probably going on 100 years ago

when somebody suspected that there might be a letter in a mailbag

coming down from Glasgow to London which they could not necessarily

identify with some of the markers and handwriting, and they took the

entire mailbag, tipped it out as good to see if they could find the

letter they were looking for and then put all the other letters back

in the mailbag and send it on. The only realistic difference is at the

moment you don't have to spot the mailbag because the mail can be

transferred, you simply retain the data somewhere else. I appreciate

that this is an area where people will legitimately be anxious that

this could be capable of misuse. Of course it could be capable of

misuse, the honourable lady is right on anyone in this house was to raise

concerns about misuse, they are raising a perfectly legitimate

point. The question, I will give way to the honourable Leonard lady in a

moment, the question is what safeguards we can properly put in

legislation and also to the framework we create any democratic

and free society to try and ensure that this misuse will not and does

not occur and the committee but I am a chairman is part of the process of

trying to ensure that there is no such misuse. I give. I'm listening

very carefully to what he says because they know he's very

knowledgeable in this area but is he aware that during the committee, the

Guardian published an internal newsletter from MI6 from September

2011 but said that individuals within MI6 had been, quote, crossing

the line with the database use, working at addresses in order to

send birthday card, checking passport details to organise

personal travel, checking details of family members for personal

convenience and checking the details of colleagues to fill in service

forms on their behalf. Is he aware that there is internal recognition

of misuse of this data from the security services? I was aware of

that, it has been public knowledge for some time. So far as I'm

concerned as the chairman of the intelligence and Security committee

we take that very seriously. I believe V8 insisted that very

seriously as well and those who were involved in it were disciplined at

the point was made that however innocent the activity might appear,

looking up your friends address, it was not an acceptable thing to do.

And I certainly agree and that was one of the reasons why when we

debated yesterday I highlighted the issue of offences and was pleased to

get the response from a honourable friends of the Treasury bench that

they were taking the issue seriously because I do were a that some of the

potential offences, the penalties attached to it appeared to be

insufficient so I fully understand the point that the honourable

Leonard lady is making. But I think we must be careful before we

translate what appears to have happened in these cases into the

belief that there is some systematic abuse of the datasets which might be

held because that is what we were talking about. The datasets held by

agencies. So the material in it is being misused or put to some Farias

purpose which is not the just -- which is not legitimate for the

purposes of the debate. I thank him for giving way. If it's not the case

that there are many things in public life, a police computer, firearms,

all kinds of things which have the potential for misuse but the

potential for misuse is not a reason to eradicate them from public life

but that is a reason to ensure that there is a robust framework, and the

pointy maid, a proper system of penalties for those misuses rather

than just scrapping the whole capability because of potentially --

because of potential future missions. Because human society is

not perfect I'm afraid that eradicating every instance of

people, every instance of misconduct that might take place by people who

are public servants is likely to be impossible. What we must make sure

is that we have the proper safeguards in place and we have the

proper ethics in place. And yes basically repeat what said before,

my own experience is that the ethical standards of the agencies

are very high. That is not to say that one hasn't got to be vigilant

about maintaining it and it is not to say that there may not be

instances in the past where standards may have slipped. But

everything that I have seen and I think my fellow members of the

intelligence and Security committee have seen have consulate provided us

with you reassurance that those ethical standards are at the heart

of what they do. I seem to recollect Sir Robin think that if he asked his

staff that is something that was unethical then they would refuse to

do it. They would refuse to do it if I made the request of them. I simply

do that by way of framework. I do not want to take up too much of the

house of time. I will turn to the amendments tabled. The first group

is nine, ten and 11 and 12 and deals with an issue that goes right to the

heart of bulk powers which is operational purposes. In the

intelligence and Security committee's report on the draft Bill

Weaver critical of what appeared to us to be the lack of transparency

around operational purposes. Operational purposes are really of

the utmost importance, because it is those picking up what the honourable

lady has been saying, which actually provide the justification, Mr Deputy

Speaker, for examining material which has been collected using these

powers. If it falls outside a legitimate operational purpose you

cannot examine it. We recommended that in some form and in a system

with safeguarding national security, and those things are often difficult

to reconcile, we also want as far as it is possible to have been list of

those purposes published. We also recommended that the intelligence

and Security committee should have a role on behalf of Parliament

inscription arising if you'll classified list of operational

purposes. We also are concerned as we investigated the matter further

that we thought that in some cases the nature of the list of

operational purposes lacked clarity, as did the procedures for managing

it would remain largely, it seems to us, informal. In particular the way

in which you at an operational purpose to the list. This can be

done effectively by a senior officer within the organisation. The group

of amendments we have tabled is intended to give effect to error to

recommendations for greater scrutiny and transparency well at the same

time trying to create the formal mechanism for the establishment,

management and modification review of the list for operational

purposes. I give way. On that very point, I anticipated the honourable

gentleman with making this given his report, I have absolutely committed

to commit -- to considering the matter in the way he described and I

will go away with what he has said with the view to bringing further

commitments to be built to satisfy him and his committee on the

operational purposes. I'm very grateful to the Minister and I'll

keep that in mind. I will just take the house through what it is that we

propose they should understand. Firstly, in amendment nine, we have

set out that the operational purposes specialise in the warrant

must be specialise in a list maintained by the heads of the

details and services as purposes that they consider our operational

purposes where intercept -- register to data or information contained

through bulk data warrants if your face. In amendment ten, and

operational purpose may be specified in a list only with the approval of

the Secretary of State. To the point we are making is that we think that

when an operational purposes added to the list should go through the

Secretary of State and signed off by them and my understanding of the

Minister will be able to confirm that, is that the government doesn't

see any significant problem with introducing such a system and I see

the minister nodding so I'm very grateful to him. The Secretary of

State must only give approval is satisfied that the operational

purpose is specified in the greater level of detail and the descriptions

contained in section 121 so that is to ensure that the Minister

understands what it is that the agency is asking for, in adding an

operational purpose to its list. I give way. I thank the member for

giving way and going back to amendment nine and reducing the

list, is the never confident that the list will not be too

prescriptive and that those who want to find a way round that list will

be able to find a way around it? The list is clearly going to be

flexible, these lists have fixed ability and can be added to and

subtracted from. The other day-to-day operational purpose for

looking at bulk data. That is what should be there. Whereas at the

moment I have seen it as something of an informal process but

nevertheless, there is the suggestion it's not being followed

properly, I think it needs to be formalised more, that's what these

amendments are intended to do. We have also said that the list of

operational purposes should be reviewed at least annually by the

Prime Minister, that amendment 11. The one amendment which I think has

caused greater difficulty to the government and I do understand

difficulty, was our amendment 12, which was a request to the back

requirements of the investigatory Powers Commissioner and the

intelligence and Security committee should be kept informed of any

changes to the list of operational purposes in a timely manner. I say

that because I always stressed the point that we are not as a committee

there to monitor the activities of the intelligence agencies in

real-time. It's outside our remit to do that. The executive has to get on

with its decision-making but we do have the power to look at virtually

everything we want to, unless the Prime Minister denies us access

which as far as I'm aware has never happened in the time I have been

chairman, and we have the right to ask for the material and to be

briefed on what has been going on in the past. The impression I have had

is that the government would see no great objection to letting us see

how I list has been reviewed on an annual basis, but we took the view

that actually, timely is a bit more frequent than that. We think, I want

to make the position quite clear to the Minister and Treasury bench,

that we ought to be kept informed of these changes not the day after, but

certainly within a reasonable time frame so we can follow the changes

to operational purposes that take place and the merit of it is that

because we could if necessary ask for an evidence session, ask for the

head of an agency to come along and talk to us and explain what's going

on, we can provide that reassurance to the house but this system is

being operated greatly, that's the purpose behind this. I don't spate

the Minister to give me a completely positive response to amendment 12

and he has kindly intervened but what I would like him to do,

otherwise I would have been minded, but what I really want to do is

provide an assurance the government will give us careful consideration,

and come with a solution which enables the committee to do its job.

That is indeed the issue which is troubled us the most, he will

understand from what he has said already that the balance to be

struck between that kind of proper scrutiny and the ongoing operational

security operations which clearly will require a dynamic matter.

Striking that balance is critical, but I hear the tone and tenor of

what he has said and I'm happy to say, of course the government will

consider that carefully and continue discussions. On that basis I think

these will be probing amendments, I hope this will be properly resolved

as the matter goes to another place. And finally, we see the

investigatory Powers to include a summary of the operational purposes.

Although there is likely to be more limited than the full list, it would

be helpful if there was broad understanding. I am conscious of

time and I will press on. There is new clause three, as this is

important, I must take a moment of it. In the Intelligence and Security

Committee's report, we recommended that dataset warrants should be

removed from the bill on the basis that we thought the social inclusion

into privacy was sufficient to require specific approval by

ministers. But we then had, as has happened in the dollar group had

with government, further evidence, particularly from SIDS, regarding

the rationale for retaining class warrant in the bill, the evidence

highlighted that many of these datasets were covering the same

information or top of information. We consider a warrant would be

appropriate since the property considerations were identical.

However were we to accept warrants for personal datasets, then we do

need safeguards to ensure their use is limited, and we therefore

proposed three specific restrictions. The first is in

Russian to the most sensitive personal data, using the definitions

in the Data Protection Act 1998. That would prohibit the retention of

any dataset containing a specific quantity of data, relating to

register reliefs, physical or mental health, sexual life, face, the

second is not all out of the ordinary, in those circumstances, we

wouldn't consider a class warrant is appropriate and so that subsection

one B of the new clause three is designed to ensure such cases will

be referred to the Secretary of State and Commissioners by way of a

specific warrant. Finally we expressed concern that we shouldn't

get bulk personal datasets inflation and suggested that bulk personal

dataset warrant should be limited to 20 individual datasets. I want to

emphasise it an arbitrary figure in many ways, and the government has an

alternative approach, I am more than happy to listen. I do accept that if

you limit it to 20, it is possible the Home Secretary might be asked to

sign two identical datasets... The Home Secretary or Foreign

Secretary, depending on who it is, is aware of what it is is being

collected. I would like to emphasise that bulk personal datasets, which

we have seen the entire list, we have ever been of the opinion that

anything is being collected which is not legitimate and some of it is

pretty mundane, I can tell the house will stop that having been said, it

is right that the house should exercise some caution as to its

expansion because one can see that in certain circumstances it could

touch upon information which is regarded as highly sensitive. I

hesitate to intervene again but I hope these exchanges are proving

helpful to the house as well, this is an important issue he touches on.

I think he will acknowledge that the set an arbitrary figure would be

undesirable, but it certainly the case that the Home Secretary,

Foreign Secretary, Northern Ireland Secretary would want to take into

account numbers, and it seems to be any miracle Kay said he is making

which is not without merit, I am not sure that's a matter for the face of

the bill but it certainly should be dealt with. I'm grateful to the

minister again and yes, I entirely except that if the Minister can

produce an assurance that the passage of this bill through

parliament, there will be a protocol in place that we have access to

which sets out exactly how this will be managed in practice, and we can

provide reassurance to the house that is being followed, that would

satisfy the concerns I have about this. But I do think this is an

issue, because the world is made up of more and more bulk personal

datasets, or being collected in digital form, and there does need to

be a process in place to ensure that what is their illegitimately held,

and not just being added to in a way that could impact the outside

Minister's line of vision altogether. Unless they specifically

started asking questions. That sort of approach, on that basis I would

be happy to accept his assurance on that. I am less vexed about the

arbitrary nature but more interested in one age, what is meant by the

phrase, large, and can they indicate to what proportion that large would

be considered or the quantum of what large would be reconsidering a

personal dataset? The helpful really cross from the 98 legislation, it

would be useful to know what would be meant by that open suggestion.

Like everything else, we get it its ordinariness meaning. I can accept

that you may collect a dataset which although its content is innocuous,

and isn't used for personal data at all, there might be a nugget of

sensitive personal data which has crept into it in some strange,

unintended way. I accept that in those circumstances, predictions we

put in are the Surrey, the truth is that the agencies wouldn't even know

it was there. If we focus on the Data Protection Act, a person is

significant quantity of data, relating to race, physical or mental

health or sexual life, we're probably in quite a good place. I

don't think a court would have difficulty showing what falls on one

side of the line or other. Like everybody else, everything is open

to interpretation so I don't offer it as 100% perfection for the

honourable gentleman, but it's a way forward, most of us would understand

what sort of data would contain that sort of material. Could I then turn

also to amendment 24, also in this group. This is about specific

warrants about personal datasets, simply trying to ensure that here

too, we are far less concerned about these but this provision would cover

data again relating to a person's race, religious beliefs, physical or

mental health or sexual life and ensure that the Secretary of State

authorising the warrant would have the sensitivity of the data

highlighted for them as part of their overall consideration of the

necessity and proportionality of examining the dataset. It would be

excellent support of the government. But this would mean is that if there

was an intention for example to enquire the debugger acquire dataset

which clearly contained a great deal of information about people's

religious or political opinions, in no circumstances would that be drawn

to the attention of the Secretary of State, in asking him to sign off the

warrant so they were aware that was in fact what was sought. And

finally, in this list, I would just mention amendment 22 and 23, which

are really carry-overs from yesterday, and are about the renewal

of warrants that prevent to warrant extending over a 12 month period,

which I believe the government has accepted but couldn't be considered

yesterday. I apologised taking up so much of the house's time but I hope

these amendments may help clarify and improve some of the areas. Thank

you. We made good progress today in the house, so we now have clarity

about the terms of the independent review of bulk powers, we have an

overarching privacy clause, we have a strict test the judicial

commissioners, protection for trade union activities, and an undertaking

from the sinister the general to consider how to amend the bill to

make it absolutely clear that whistle-blowers will make disclosure

to the IPC without fear of prosecution. I hope we can make as

good progress today. Let me start with this. Yesterday, one of the

amendments that was made and is now on the face of the bill, is the

requirement for judicial commissioners to consider necessity

and proportionality with a sufficient degree of care to ensure

the judicial commissioners comply with the general duties in racial to

privacy. That amendment was made in relation to clause 21 which relates

to intercept warrants. They were dealing with powers, and the

commissioners have a important role and are important safeguards to the

issue of warrants involving bulk powers. It is important we have

clarity in the house today, that the tighter scrutiny that is on the face

of the bill in relation to clause 21 applies equally to all other

exercises of authorisation carried out or approval carried out by

judicial commissioners, including whether exercising their powers in

the nation to look warrants. Otherwise there is a risk of the

tests, one under clause 21 and one under the other clauses that apply

to bulk powers, there is a real danger when it comes to combined

warrants, where judicial commissioners would be asked to

carry out different tests, and it is important that the bulk powers have

every bit as close scrutiny as the intercept warrants.

I would ask if the Minister could make clear in his submission to this

house that the test is of general application across all the functions

the judicial commissioners whether it is in solution to the warrant

under section 21 or in relation to bulk powers and other provisions in

the ill because I think that would be a helpful extension of safeguards

in relation to bulk powers. Can I then turned to the bulk powers

themselves? As the honourable member from Glasgow North East has pointed

out, the bulk powers are very wide and I think what concerns her

constituents concerns my constituents and many other

constituents is that inevitably the bulk powers will be applied to add

impact upon people who are not themselves suspected of any

wrongdoing whatsoever, it is an inevitability when bulk powers are

used and that is a real concern. I'm sure members of the public have

spoken to in many of the members of the house are concerned. I give way.

Before the moves on to these wider issues, and I can sense he's about

to do that, let me deal with the application of the content of the

manuscript amendment which he rightly said was specified in part.

He is right to say that the principles that underpin that

amendment should apply to the whole of the Ville and as the bill enjoyed

its further passage I would be sure that that is the case legislatively

soak if we need to move further amendments to make that clear then

we will. I am grateful for that intervention to clarify the position

because that is an important additional measure in relation to

the powers so I'm grateful for that. We will of course move forward any

amendments necessary to achieve that end. The powers are very wide, they

do inevitably impact on people who are not suspected of doing anything

wrong at all. They inevitably will impact, it is impossible to ensure

they would impact, an legally privileged material, all material

that involves journalistic material, journalistic sources or indeed MPs

correspondence. It would be good if a way could be achieved of excluding

the material from the operational bulk powers but it is not possible

to do so so that is why the concern about bulk powers. It involves

ordinary members of the public are done nothing wrong, it involves the

potential to capture legally privileged material, journalistic

material and in the correspondence. I will come the safeguards, because

it is important to understand why there is concerns about bulk powers.

I know he's very good on whistle-blowing but I'm sure that

ministers do not respond to whistles. David Davis. I was not

intending to be discourteous, the point I wanted to pick up with the

spokesman, the Labour spokesman, is this. He said that it is not

possible to screen out the correspondence of the various

privileged groups you described. This issue came up at the IPT with

respect to one of the Wilson doctrine cases. That was the

assertion made by the government banister at the time so I went to a

number of experts, Ross Anderson among others and they said it was

privately possible. A great deal is already done to take out dross and

issues like pornography and so on and it is perfectly possible to

screen out targeted groups as well. I'm grateful for that intervention,

we will obviously very interested to hear how that could be done at the

outset. As I'm sure the Minister word. Just to be the make two

points. I am making the point to emphasise why there is such concern

about bulk powers. It may well be that it is possible depending on the

parameters set to reduce the likelihood of obtaining bulk powers

material that is sensitive and one shape or form. I do not think it is

possible to eliminate it and it may well be that it is that the

filtering says that most of that is actually done rather than the

initial exercise of the bulk power. I am not here seeking to explain or

justify why bulk powers inevitably capture this information, I am

simply explain why it is that I think so many concerned about the

bulk powers and that is why from Labour's point of view we have been

clear that given the breadth of the bulk powers the operational case for

them must be properly made and must be properly reviewed. And by the

safeguards must be viewed. As far as the safeguards are concerned that is

an issue which may need to be revisited. When this bill is on the

other place. Because the honourable member knows, the case of Thomas and

David Davis, currently midway between the Court of Justice in

European Union and Court of Appeal which though it touches on existing

legislation and retention powers may have applications and knowledge to

this bill when it has further consideration and certainly would be

important when it comes to consideration of safeguards. I also

in passing echoing the concerns of the Right Honourable member from the

concealed English into operational purposes which came up in the Bill

committee, as well. As for the review, the first stage is has the

operational case been made out? I referred yesterday to the exchange

of letters between myself and the Minister, I hope they have been made

available, I think they have been made a veiled the house and so

everyone has them and I just want to make it clear what the record for

the house what was being asked for and what the response was an essay

at the outset this was a constructive exchange of letters and

moved a significant issue significantly further forward. What

I set out in my letter to the Minister of State for security was

that the review to be carried out by us should be secured by a barrister

and a technical expert with experience of corporate

investigations, that the review should examine the operational case

for bulk powers in the Bill not merely respective of the utility of

the powers that also the necessity, that the review should have access

to an necessary information as is needed to undertake the review

effectively, including all information provided to the

intelligence and Security committee and the review should take about

three months to complete and report to the Prime Minister contemporary

findings to inform the Lords committee consideration of part six

and seven of the bill. The reply for the Minister was, it is important as

members who have had the opportunity to read it will appreciate because

the reply from the Minister made clear in the stands, I can confirm

that the basic framework for the review will be a set out in your

letter, and then it went on to say David Hanson has hand-picked his

team and we are confident that together they have the range and

depth of knowledge needed to undertake a cob round to review and

I was the reaction is that David Anderson should take the members of

his team that he thought at the competency to help them with the

review that he has been asked to independently carry out. I'm pleased

that he has done that and I am assured by him that he is very happy

with the choices and the skills that he has now got as a result of that

exercise. In relation, the letter from the Minister of State Security

goes on to say in allusion to your second point, and this is really

important, it is absolutely the case that this review will assess the

specific question of whether the bulk capabilities provided for an

necessary. The review team will critically appraise a need for bulk

capabilities that will include an assessment of whether the same

result could have been achieved for alternative investigative methods.

This goes to the heart of the issue because if that is the focus of the

review then that will give comfort to the Labour team no doubt also to

the SNP notwithstanding the concerns and also to our constituents about

the review. I give way. This year he with me that the timetable of this

independent review is such that whether the laws will have time to

scrutinise it and debate it, the Commons want, and does he agree with

me that this is not acceptable in a democracy? I am grateful for that

intervention. I have been asking for this review for some time and my

preference was always that it would have been available to us now but in

fairness, and in keeping with what I said yesterday about the exercise we

have been conducting, I recognise that this was a very big ask of the

government at this stage in the legislation, particularly in light

of the pre-legislative scrutiny, and I'm inclined always to look on the

positive side and I think the fact that there is the review now in the

Thames that we have asked for is very important. Of course when one

looks back at anything one can always make the argument that it

should have been done earlier. It would be good if we had a review at

this stage, I accept that, and that is why I have put the argument

forward as I did before. I do emphasise just how significant this

was and what a significant change of position this has been for the

government and it is a positive and constructive one that we are very

grateful for. These powers mostly already exist and this is about

existing power so in some sense the question by the Right Honourable

Lady is different to what it normally would be. We have powers

there and we may not change them as the result of the delay, but this

does have an implication on how soon we review the whole package and how

soon become back and we legislate. It has long seemed to me that this

is a piece of legislation which lends itself to almost annual review

and annual renewal and annual reform. Maybe the way to deal with

that problem is to ensure that in another part of this business we get

a relatively rapid review and reform of this legislation. I do think

there is a case for frequent review, quite what form that takes is a

matter to discuss at the next batch of amendments. I take the point that

in many instances most of the bulk powers are powers currently

available and being used. But as I said yesterday, that does not mean

that we should not scrutinise them now through the passage of this bill

because this is the first time that Parliament has had the chance to

examine and scrutinise these provisions because this influence

around. What has happened in the past few years is quite

extraordinary in terms of the change position in allusion to the level of

the powers and the fact that they are on the statutes. What would be

wrong is to say that since the exist that we used more general provisions

in the past, that means that we should not ask for the operational

case to be made now and haven't scrutinised. I think this is the

right way of doing it. Even though one might say it should have been

done five or ten or 15 years ago when things were different. I will

give way. That is why a focus on this are cities, not merely utility.

It would have been very easy to have focused on utility and that he

emphasised earlier, this is about establishing to the satisfaction of

independent people that these powers are necessary. I thank you and I

think that were necessary is very important in all of this. And as I

say, the ability of the review team to assess whether the same result

could have been achieved from alternative investigative methods is

something which is very reported to that exercise in the outcome. The

letter goes on to say that all necessary information and access at

me before the review will be provided and we are absolutely clear

that there is nothing to be gained in much to be lost by in any way

restricting the review team access to sites -- too sensitive and

classified material where it is necessary to inform the review

process. And on the issue of timing your correct that review will be

conducted in time to inform Paolo's consideration of parts six and seven

of the committee. The is a complete and constructive response and I

think that will help a great deal in the way that the review is received.

Can I just say this, the review is very important. It is not just an

exercise for us in this house are those in the other place, it is an

exercise for the public and because the Right Honourable and learned

member from Beaconsfield said there are members of this house who have

had access to as seen in operation some of the powers, either in

previous roles or in briefings that have been given to members of

various committees. But it is not enough for members of the public any

more, nor should it be, for politicians to stand up and simply

say well I have had its demonstrated to me that these powers are

necessary or have been used in a particular way. They have the right

to have as much information as possible to make that decision for

themselves. Of course I will. I think the Honourable member for

taking the intervention. If the review comes back and says that the

bulk powers are not necessary, what will the Labour Party do then?

I'll assess that at the time. It depends what the report says. If the

report calls into question any of the powers, that'll be something

that we will all want to consider and I would want to consider as

well. I think anybody, it would be difficult for anybody in this house

or the other place to make a case for a bulk power which an

independent reviewer has said is unnecessary but let us wait until we

get that stage and see what the review actually says. It goes to the

point about confidence in the review. It is the question of

publication. I think it is important that the report of the review is

publicly available. Obviously, I understand that David Anderson and

his team are going to see highly sensitive material and will have

unrestricted access and that means that the detail in any public report

will inevitably be limited and wiping debris body understands that.

I think it is very important that the report is published as, most of

David Anderson's reports have been, in form, so that they can be read by

members of this house, the other place and numbers of the public who

seek reassurance about the confidence of the review. I'll give

way twice. I thank the honourable gentleman for giving way. I think

this issue goes to the heart of why this bill is particularly difficult.

This house depends on members of the intelligence and Security committee

who in private sessions have found out how these powers are being used

and then report in a way that ends up being redacted to this house

about their confidence in them and we have a duty to ensure that the

public is as well-informed as is possible in concert with our needs

to protect national security about how these things work. That is the

challenge and it is one of the reasons why this house has bound

this ill quite a difficult matter to deal with. I agree with the

sentiments. Conventions and attitudes change. It was once a

convention, to take an example from my past, that a prosecution wouldn't

give regions for its decision. That has changed. Politicians who have to

particular information can assure the public by simply saying they

have had access our well and truly over. That presents problems and

difficulties into what can be put in the public domain. She is right that

these are sensitive, delicate, and secret matters when it comes to

operational concern. He is absolutely right that we should put

as much information as possible in the report. Clearly, he is right

that there will be access to security cleared information of a

highly sensitive nature but that should not stub as being as clear as

we can be to this house and more widely as to why it is decided that

these powers are necessary or not. I'm grateful for that intervention

and I will take it in the spirit it is put forward. Maximum publicity

within the constraints with which highly sensitive information is

being looked at. The first point of the review is to make sure his

lordships can perform the scrutiny function. They are not going to be

able to do that if they do not have the information to assist them in

their deliberations. The terms of the review are a material and

important step forward and we are grateful for the information about

the publication of the review when it is complete. That takes me to

medical records. I can deal with this swiftly. Does he agree with me

that the necessity of all powers is an very not just to give the public

confidence but to give confidence to the intelligence agencies who must

use them. They are scrupulous about acting within the law and we owe it

to them to award powers that they can be satisfied are both necessary

and enjoyed public support. I do agree. I have emphasised to the

security services that there is value in this exercise from their

perspective in making the operational case for the powers that

they do exercise and wish to continue exercising. It is another

good reason for the review. Turning to medical records. There has been

an ongoing concern raised by, I think, the centre he, in fairness,

for the first time and then by Labour in the Bill committee about

access to medical records. As far as Labour is concerned and I'm sure it

is a shared position, the concern has been about patient information

as defined by section 251 of the National health act. That relates to

mental health, adult social care, child social care and health

services. I don't need to spell out for the house why many members of

the public, my constituents and those of many members are deeply

concerned about the very notion of the security and intelligence

services having access an able basis to those sorts of very sensitive

records. We laid an amendment, therefore, in the Bill committee

introducing a high threshold for the exercise of powers in relation to

those records, they are reflected in amendments 303 to 305 before the

house today. The government has laid new clause 14 in response to the

demands that we have made. Although new clause 14 is not in the same

form as amendments 303-305, on my analysis it does cover mental health

records, adult social care records, child social care records and health

records because of the way it is framed with sub-clause six. If now

and add some convenient point, the minister could indicate whether it

does cover those records then I can indicate that I would not move

towards a vote for those amendments. Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. Thank

you very much indeed. There is a golden rule in my household. When in

doubt, turn to Kipling. Not the exceedingly good baker but our

rather excellent writer. He can effectively summarise, and I wasn't

intending to speak on these move is, apart from having heard the case

deployed by the SNP and the case deployed by the honourable and learn

a gentleman from the Labour Party. On the latter point, I concur and

support what he said entirely. But the approach now of the SNP which we

have heard since second reading at, certainly is a golden thread that

ran through committee, is one, I think, of serious annoyance to me.

I'm pretty certain, to colleagues. I'm absolutely certain of huge

anxiety to our constituents. The honourable lady for Glasgow North

East obviously has constituents very different to mine. She and I sat on

the immigration Bill committee, as did the Shadow minister, some little

while ago, no constituent of hers had ever raised the issue of

immigration. All constituents, according to the honourable lady,

have raised with her these huge Glasgow concerns about baulk powers.

I want to give the honourable lady the benefit of the words of Roger

Kipling. I think what the SNP has demonstrated, I don't personalise

this to the honourable lady, I make it as a general point to her party,

power without responsibility has been the prerogative of the harlot

throughout the ages. They are using their position of power to

effectively, in my judgment, as they have continually sought to do, to

undermine both the confidence of this house and of the country in the

robustness and the ethics of our security services. Who every day,

day in and day out, seek to use and require and I agree with the point

made by the Shadow Minister, that require the public confidence that

they have them in order to make sure that they have the right skills and

tools to keep our constituents safe. I'm going to take the honourable and

landed lady first and then I will take the honourable gentleman. I

very much resent what he is saying. Compton Mackenzie was one of the

members of British security services and in Scotland we have one of the

best records of crime prevention in the world. In Scotland we have

responsibility and we are in a successful third term and will he

please reconsider his remarks which we on these benches and most people

in Scotland would find most offensive. Once she has calmed down

from her anxiety I would only say that Compton Mackenzie must be

turning in his grave. There is a significant dereliction of duty. One

would think... Maybe this might be the case in Scotland, then if it is

the case, the honourable lady must forgive my ignorance, there is no

organised crime, no paedophiles, no people traffickers, no terrorists,

no drug dealers, no people who are trying to do is ill. Maybe in the

analogy of my right honourable and learned friend it is the view of the

SNP that a rifling through a mail sack, the identification of a hand

on equal pen will be sufficient to interrupt some terrible deed. That

may well be the case. That would satisfy their constituents. It will

not satisfy mine. My constituents look for the government of the day,

irrespective of what stripe it is, that it deploys with seriousness and

democratic accountability the first duty of the state which is to

protect the realm of its citizens. I hope the honourable gentleman will

accept that I hold no brief for the Scottish National Party. I struggle

many days to hold any for them. But can I offer him the opportunity to

reflect on what he has said about the duty of the SNP members and

others others, including a substantial number on his own

benches. One of ours would seek to undermine -- Nantes of us would seek

to undermine the security services that it is our duty to ensure that

the powers given to them by this house are necessary and

proportionate. That is the work in which with we are engaged here. If

we are to talk about a breach of duty, it would the a breach of our

duty if we were not do that. Can I just say, you want to catch my eye

very shortly. I don't want to hear the speech twice. Short

interventions. I don't wish to reflect or reconsider how I have

positioned this. In this house, we have to be incredibly careful about

what we say and how we say it and how it can be understood or

construed. The Labour front bench have been very clear and I welcome

their position. But for the last 12 months, almost since we had a debate

in this place on that Thursday in July of last year on the Anderson

report, there has been, certainly, my take, that those who are bringing

together the collective was done of the honourable lady's party have

watched too many reruns of the enemy of the state and have read too many

books where they presuppose that those honest men and women who under