Browse content similar to 04/11/2015. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
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Did Islamic State put a bomb on a Russian airliner? This was the | 0:00:01 | 0:00:06 | |
Foreign Secretary less than an hour ago after a meeting of the Cobra | 0:00:07 | 0:00:13 | |
emergency committee. We have concluded there is a significant | 0:00:14 | 0:00:16 | |
possibility the crash was caused by an explosive device on-board the | 0:00:17 | 0:00:21 | |
aircraft. As the investigation continues more than 15,000 British | 0:00:22 | 0:00:24 | |
holiday-makers in Sharm el-Sheikh will be brought home but there will | 0:00:25 | 0:00:29 | |
be no more British flights to the resort. A terra specialist and | 0:00:30 | 0:00:32 | |
diplomat will tell us what they think is on. -- terra. | 0:00:33 | 0:00:37 | |
Also tonight, the government plans allowing | 0:00:38 | 0:00:39 | |
for extensive online surveillance were put out in the open today. | 0:00:40 | 0:00:44 | |
We will be joined by the journalist who broke the Edward Snowden | 0:00:45 | 0:00:52 | |
revelations. Can we strike the right balance? | 0:00:53 | 0:00:54 | |
In a school for deaf children, we reveal the perpetrator of | 0:00:55 | 0:00:57 | |
Vision of the UK followed by Ireland to put a stop to flights to and from | 0:00:58 | 0:01:41 | |
Sharm el-Sheikh just as the Egyptian president arrived in the UK. | 0:01:42 | 0:01:45 | |
Tonight, Philip Hammond said the threat was such there will be no | 0:01:46 | 0:01:49 | |
British flights to and from the resort where there remains 15,000 | 0:01:50 | 0:01:53 | |
British tourists. This evening the Prime Minister has chaired another | 0:01:54 | 0:01:58 | |
Cobra meeting at which we have reviewed information we have | 0:01:59 | 0:01:59 | |
available from a range of sources. As a result of that review, | 0:02:00 | 0:02:04 | |
we have concluded that there is a significant possibility that that | 0:02:05 | 0:02:06 | |
crash was caused by an explosive Earlier this evening, we delayed the | 0:02:07 | 0:02:09 | |
return to the UK of British-bound flights that were on the ground at | 0:02:10 | 0:02:16 | |
Sharm el-Sheikh while we conducted a Unfortunately we have concluded we | 0:02:17 | 0:02:36 | |
have to change our travel advice and we are advising against all but | 0:02:37 | 0:02:40 | |
essential travel by air through Sharm el-Sheikh airport, which means | 0:02:41 | 0:02:46 | |
there will be no UK passenger flights out to Sharm el-Sheikh from | 0:02:47 | 0:02:51 | |
now. Passengers who are on the ground in Sharm el-Sheikh will be | 0:02:52 | 0:02:57 | |
returned to the UK. We are working with the airlines and Egyptian | 0:02:58 | 0:03:00 | |
authorities to put in place emergency procedures for additional | 0:03:01 | 0:03:04 | |
screening and additional security to ensure they can get home safely, | 0:03:05 | 0:03:10 | |
either on their original return dates or if they wish to leave | 0:03:11 | 0:03:14 | |
earlier, on an earlier date, although I should emphasise we are | 0:03:15 | 0:03:19 | |
not changing our advice with regard to the threat level in the Sharm | 0:03:20 | 0:03:25 | |
el-Sheikh resort itself. I recognise this action will cause immense | 0:03:26 | 0:03:30 | |
disruption and inconvenience to many people and I apologise to the people | 0:03:31 | 0:03:34 | |
this evening who have gone out to the airport and have had to go back | 0:03:35 | 0:03:40 | |
to their hotels. I also recognise the immense impact this will have on | 0:03:41 | 0:03:46 | |
the Egyptian economy. But we have to put the safety and security of | 0:03:47 | 0:03:50 | |
British nationals above all other considerations. When we are in | 0:03:51 | 0:03:56 | |
possession of information we will not hesitate to act on it in order | 0:03:57 | 0:04:02 | |
to protect that security and we will take whatever criticisms we | 0:04:03 | 0:04:05 | |
receive. We have to act in the interests of British nationals. | 0:04:06 | 0:04:14 | |
Our chief international correspondent joins us. Reaction as | 0:04:15 | 0:04:21 | |
you are getting it in Cairo. To a number of things, first the idea it | 0:04:22 | 0:04:25 | |
probably according to the British was a bomb, and secondly not only | 0:04:26 | 0:04:31 | |
have British experts gone to the airport at Sharm el-Sheikh, but | 0:04:32 | 0:04:36 | |
there will be no more flights, whatever they found tonight, led to | 0:04:37 | 0:04:39 | |
the decision there will be no more flights. I have spoken to Egypt's | 0:04:40 | 0:04:45 | |
Foreign Minister who is absolutely furious, saying Britain has jumped | 0:04:46 | 0:04:49 | |
to conclusions and come out with what he described as an unwarranted | 0:04:50 | 0:04:54 | |
statement even before investigation is concluded. He said it had been | 0:04:55 | 0:04:59 | |
catastrophic for the millions of Egyptians who depend on tourism. You | 0:05:00 | 0:05:06 | |
heard Philip Hammond expressing regret for Egyptians who work in the | 0:05:07 | 0:05:11 | |
tourism sector, but you have to bear in mind, even in the worst times in | 0:05:12 | 0:05:16 | |
Egypt, and there have been turbulent moments, Sharm el-Sheikh always | 0:05:17 | 0:05:20 | |
seemed somehow far from the violence. The tourists kept coming | 0:05:21 | 0:05:25 | |
stop the amount of British tourists, they used to be 2 million British | 0:05:26 | 0:05:30 | |
tourists, making up the second-largest group, that is down | 0:05:31 | 0:05:34 | |
to one million and that is certain to come down more, in Sharm | 0:05:35 | 0:05:38 | |
el-Sheikh and other parts of Egypt, because the question will be | 0:05:39 | 0:05:42 | |
raised, how secure is Egypt? I spoke to President Sisi before he came to | 0:05:43 | 0:05:50 | |
London, insisting that Egypt was under control of Egyptian forces and | 0:05:51 | 0:05:54 | |
if there is a doubt about that it is a doubt too many for people wanting | 0:05:55 | 0:05:59 | |
to go on holiday. President Sisi arriving in the UK tonight and | 0:06:00 | 0:06:03 | |
Philip Hammond has been clear there is some information the British | 0:06:04 | 0:06:07 | |
Government has that leads them to believe British tourists will not be | 0:06:08 | 0:06:12 | |
safe flying to or from Sharm el-Sheikh, which is a serious | 0:06:13 | 0:06:18 | |
allegation. It is a very serious allegation. The Foreign Minister | 0:06:19 | 0:06:24 | |
said they had taken in hand security precautions around Sharm el-Sheikh | 0:06:25 | 0:06:28 | |
airport, recognised by the British, although they say there has not been | 0:06:29 | 0:06:32 | |
enough. It is more than Britain, there are statements coming from the | 0:06:33 | 0:06:36 | |
US, who are saying similar things to the British. You remember the same | 0:06:37 | 0:06:41 | |
thing happened with Tunisia, when Philip Hammond came out and said, we | 0:06:42 | 0:06:48 | |
have decided after the terrible attack at a resort, it was no longer | 0:06:49 | 0:06:53 | |
safe for British tourist, which provoked a furious reaction among | 0:06:54 | 0:06:58 | |
Tunisians, who like Egypt depend on tourism. You have the balance | 0:06:59 | 0:07:03 | |
between the interest of British lives and livelihoods of people of | 0:07:04 | 0:07:09 | |
this region, for tourism is one of the last threads in their failing | 0:07:10 | 0:07:15 | |
economies and that now is at risk. Our diplomatic editor has been | 0:07:16 | 0:07:23 | |
following the story today. Attention is now focused on Sharm | 0:07:24 | 0:07:28 | |
el-Sheikh airport, which British security experts on their way to | 0:07:29 | 0:07:33 | |
test its anti-terrorist defences. As they work, there are fears that 224 | 0:07:34 | 0:07:40 | |
lives may have been taken by a non-smuggled on board the Russian | 0:07:41 | 0:07:46 | |
airliner. My own assumption was that it was probably more likely to be | 0:07:47 | 0:07:51 | |
mechanical, but given the statement Downing Street has put out, I think | 0:07:52 | 0:08:00 | |
we have to assume there is some basis on which to assume a bomb | 0:08:01 | 0:08:08 | |
might have been involved. At the crash site, rescue workers are still | 0:08:09 | 0:08:14 | |
gathering remains and evidence. But the facts are crystallising that the | 0:08:15 | 0:08:20 | |
plane exploded at high altitudes. Yesterday the Americans revealed | 0:08:21 | 0:08:24 | |
their satellites detected that blast. Today it Egyptian | 0:08:25 | 0:08:28 | |
investigators confirmed what had happened, although they held open | 0:08:29 | 0:08:34 | |
the possibility a catastrophic failure could have caused it. In the | 0:08:35 | 0:08:40 | |
past 24 hours the UK has received intelligence confirming the bomb | 0:08:41 | 0:08:43 | |
theory. We put safety as a priority and that is why we have taken the | 0:08:44 | 0:08:48 | |
measures we have taken today. There have been people sent from the UK | 0:08:49 | 0:08:52 | |
today to review security arrangements at the airport. That is | 0:08:53 | 0:08:57 | |
taking place and it is when that review is completed we will allow | 0:08:58 | 0:09:01 | |
flights there tonight to depart. At the end of September America issued | 0:09:02 | 0:09:09 | |
a travel advisory saying Egypt and much of the Sinai peninsula was | 0:09:10 | 0:09:13 | |
dangerous but insisting Sharm el-Sheikh was safe. Two days ago the | 0:09:14 | 0:09:17 | |
US Embassy in Cairo change that, telling staff to avoid anywhere in | 0:09:18 | 0:09:21 | |
the Sinai Peninsula and Sharm el-Sheikh itself was deemed too | 0:09:22 | 0:09:25 | |
risky. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry responded by asking why the embassy | 0:09:26 | 0:09:33 | |
had done such a thing? A measure of their sensitivity to anything that | 0:09:34 | 0:09:37 | |
might cripple the tourist trade. TRANSLATION: This is one way to nail | 0:09:38 | 0:09:44 | |
the stability of Egypt and image of Egypt. The plane was at 31,000 feet | 0:09:45 | 0:09:52 | |
altitude. This area is under our full control. With his leader | 0:09:53 | 0:09:58 | |
arriving tonight to protests in London, the Egyptian Foreign | 0:09:59 | 0:10:01 | |
Minister expressed his disappointment the UK acted before | 0:10:02 | 0:10:07 | |
the official enquiry had reached any definitive conclusion. | 0:10:08 | 0:10:09 | |
Diplomatically, Britain's timing could not have been much worse. I | 0:10:10 | 0:10:16 | |
have spoken to the Egyptian Foreign Minister and I recognise his | 0:10:17 | 0:10:22 | |
concern. Of course this will have a negative impact for Egypt, but with | 0:10:23 | 0:10:27 | |
respect to him, he has not seen all the information we have, and while | 0:10:28 | 0:10:32 | |
we regard the Egyptians as important partners, we want to work with them | 0:10:33 | 0:10:37 | |
not just on airport security but all aspects of the development of their | 0:10:38 | 0:10:41 | |
record me, and the building of Anglo Egyptian relations, when we see | 0:10:42 | 0:10:46 | |
something we believe represents a threat to British nationals we have | 0:10:47 | 0:10:51 | |
to act. And the other consequences have to be dealt with, but we cannot | 0:10:52 | 0:10:57 | |
ignore that information. Tonight, up to 20,000 British holiday-makers are | 0:10:58 | 0:11:02 | |
still in Sharm el-Sheikh, with flights suspended. The government | 0:11:03 | 0:11:05 | |
will soon announce how those who want to come home can do so. Mark is | 0:11:06 | 0:11:12 | |
with me now. What do we know about what happened to this plane? Has | 0:11:13 | 0:11:17 | |
something changed in view of intelligence? In terms of what has | 0:11:18 | 0:11:22 | |
happened in the past 24 hours, it is not a piece of intelligence that | 0:11:23 | 0:11:27 | |
clearly attributes this act to Islamic State in Sinai, nobody is | 0:11:28 | 0:11:32 | |
saying that. They are talking about a real possibility, may well have, | 0:11:33 | 0:11:38 | |
this kind of thing. It appears it goes back to analysis of material | 0:11:39 | 0:11:42 | |
gathered in the run-up to the attack by interception of communications. | 0:11:43 | 0:11:50 | |
The Americans seem to have had this material and interpreted it before | 0:11:51 | 0:11:53 | |
we did hence the statement from the Cairo embassy to staff to avoid | 0:11:54 | 0:11:55 | |
Sharm el-Sheikh on the 2nd of November. We now seem to have it. | 0:11:56 | 0:12:01 | |
The Foreign Secretary's words imply it came through that sort of | 0:12:02 | 0:12:05 | |
arrangement and Egypt does not yet have that material. It suggests | 0:12:06 | 0:12:09 | |
whatever you want to call it, planning for an attack, possibly not | 0:12:10 | 0:12:15 | |
specifying an aeroplane, but in the Sharm el-Sheikh area, which is why | 0:12:16 | 0:12:20 | |
the area itself is deemed unsafe. Particular to Britain is the fact it | 0:12:21 | 0:12:25 | |
is a popular destination for British tourists. Do you think we will have | 0:12:26 | 0:12:33 | |
any conclusive evidence? If they find evidence of an explosion on the | 0:12:34 | 0:12:38 | |
plane and trace back how exactly a bomb was put on them would give you | 0:12:39 | 0:12:44 | |
conclusive answers. For the moment, everybody is playing it through | 0:12:45 | 0:12:48 | |
their own prism. The UK, the country that puts the safety of its people | 0:12:49 | 0:12:53 | |
first and believes it is right to collect information on a large scale | 0:12:54 | 0:12:57 | |
because it can give clues to this sort of activity and allow you to | 0:12:58 | 0:13:01 | |
give warning. Egypt hoping it will not be a bomb because that will be | 0:13:02 | 0:13:09 | |
devastating for the tourist industry, and Russia trying to | 0:13:10 | 0:13:11 | |
project, until it is conclusively proven, that this was not a bomb. To | 0:13:12 | 0:13:15 | |
discuss the significance of the events today I am joined by the | 0:13:16 | 0:13:21 | |
former director of global counterterrorism at MI6. In London | 0:13:22 | 0:13:27 | |
UK's former ambassador to Egypt and from Oxford, an analyst who | 0:13:28 | 0:13:35 | |
specialises in Islamic State. What do you make of this gathering of | 0:13:36 | 0:13:40 | |
intelligence prior to the airliner being downed, which seems to lead to | 0:13:41 | 0:13:44 | |
the conclusion there was an explosion? Yes indeed it seems to be | 0:13:45 | 0:13:51 | |
that conclusion. Certainly there must be something serious and | 0:13:52 | 0:13:54 | |
credible in the way of intelligence that suggests that, or else the | 0:13:55 | 0:13:58 | |
Foreign Secretary would not make that statement. As was pointed out, | 0:13:59 | 0:14:03 | |
it has not been ascribed yet to Islamic State, although clearly | 0:14:04 | 0:14:08 | |
Islamic State would be the main suspect. What's more Islamic State | 0:14:09 | 0:14:13 | |
has twice claimed responsibility, including today when it said again | 0:14:14 | 0:14:17 | |
it was responsible for bringing down this Russian plane and did not | 0:14:18 | 0:14:22 | |
reveal how it had done it but saying it would do so in due course. If it | 0:14:23 | 0:14:30 | |
is Islamic State or a cell of Islamic State, what does that say | 0:14:31 | 0:14:33 | |
about the organisation's capability? I think it says a number | 0:14:34 | 0:14:42 | |
of things. We must not forget the local operations and tension in | 0:14:43 | 0:14:49 | |
Sinai mounting as there is increasing Islamic. We must not | 0:14:50 | 0:15:01 | |
forget Islamic State has a global reach and ambitions. This is in part | 0:15:02 | 0:15:06 | |
a message, perhaps, to Russian potential recruits, saying to them | 0:15:07 | 0:15:13 | |
they are not forgotten in the fight. From the point of view of the | 0:15:14 | 0:15:17 | |
diplomatic relationship with Egypt, as a former ambassador, we hear the | 0:15:18 | 0:15:21 | |
Egyptian Foreign Minister has taken this badly, but is the bigger point | 0:15:22 | 0:15:27 | |
is that the worry or accusation would be Egypt cannot manage the | 0:15:28 | 0:15:29 | |
terror threat? The Egyptians are understandably | 0:15:30 | 0:15:34 | |
upset. They should remember that Britain has had the strongest record | 0:15:35 | 0:15:39 | |
of supporting positive travel advice wherever possible, wherever it is | 0:15:40 | 0:15:42 | |
consistent with the safety of our citizens. We are the ones who kept | 0:15:43 | 0:15:46 | |
our advice open for Sharm el-Sheikh, or during the time after the | 0:15:47 | 0:15:50 | |
revolution when others closed it off. Recently, after the attack in | 0:15:51 | 0:15:56 | |
February last year, we again kept it open when others closed it off. We | 0:15:57 | 0:16:00 | |
have taken things very seriously and very positively. Nobody can fault us | 0:16:01 | 0:16:09 | |
on that. You know Egypt extremely well. And in the aftermath of the | 0:16:10 | 0:16:15 | |
airliner being downed, or whatever happened, there was all sorts of | 0:16:16 | 0:16:19 | |
conversations on BBC Radio programmes about the poorest nature | 0:16:20 | 0:16:23 | |
of security at Sharm el-Sheikh. What is your experience of Sharm | 0:16:24 | 0:16:27 | |
el-Sheikh airport? It's a continuous process. Whenever human security is | 0:16:28 | 0:16:35 | |
involved, to keep tightening up, to keep reforming, and there were times | 0:16:36 | 0:16:41 | |
when we were co-operating closely, we had experts coming from London. | 0:16:42 | 0:16:46 | |
We have had a active programme, much appreciated by the Egyptian Civil | 0:16:47 | 0:16:51 | |
Aviation of training in detection at airports, so this is a continuation | 0:16:52 | 0:16:56 | |
of that, really. We have taken the unusual step of grounding flights to | 0:16:57 | 0:17:00 | |
Britain for the moment. Indeed for the foreseeable future it seems. Sir | 0:17:01 | 0:17:05 | |
Richard Barrett, if it is IS, what do you think the Russian reaction to | 0:17:06 | 0:17:10 | |
this will be? I think it is very significant if it is Islamic State. | 0:17:11 | 0:17:15 | |
Up till now, the Islamic State has been about state building, about | 0:17:16 | 0:17:18 | |
attracting people to join it in Iraq and Syria. And where people can't, | 0:17:19 | 0:17:23 | |
it's encouraged them to commit attacks, and we have seen a few | 0:17:24 | 0:17:26 | |
minor attacks committed by individuals, or small groups of | 0:17:27 | 0:17:30 | |
people, which may have been inspired by the Islamic State, but certainly | 0:17:31 | 0:17:33 | |
not planned and directed. Here, this is a very major terrorist attack, | 0:17:34 | 0:17:38 | |
probably about the most major terrorist attack on an airline since | 0:17:39 | 0:17:44 | |
9/11. So it has huge significance and it changes our perception of the | 0:17:45 | 0:17:55 | |
Islamic State as being some sort of terrorist group into something | 0:17:56 | 0:17:58 | |
other. That changes several equations within Syria as well, the | 0:17:59 | 0:18:03 | |
Russian equation, you know, the Russian engagement now, has that | 0:18:04 | 0:18:07 | |
encouraged terrorists to attack more directly Russian targets? We know | 0:18:08 | 0:18:12 | |
there are at least 2,500 Russians fighting be the Islamic State. The | 0:18:13 | 0:18:15 | |
equation of people on the other side in that should they be supplying | 0:18:16 | 0:18:20 | |
weapons now to any party in Syria which might then fall into the hands | 0:18:21 | 0:18:30 | |
of the Islamic State. Katherine Brown, you said IS was looking for a | 0:18:31 | 0:18:34 | |
global reach. Do you think this would be the moment, if it is indeed | 0:18:35 | 0:18:41 | |
IS, where IS does change, you know, you have heard Sir Richard say that | 0:18:42 | 0:18:45 | |
the terror threat level will be upped because of this? Yes, I think | 0:18:46 | 0:18:50 | |
it's worth remembering that Islamic State are rooted in local politics | 0:18:51 | 0:18:55 | |
and it has always proclaimed that territories are important to itself | 0:18:56 | 0:18:58 | |
and to its legitimacy. What is important here is that by targeting | 0:18:59 | 0:19:04 | |
a Russian plane, sorry, Russian tourists, it is suggesting to | 0:19:05 | 0:19:07 | |
Russian recruits to come to Islamic State and say they care about that | 0:19:08 | 0:19:11 | |
fight. I'd suggest that really it remains very much a localised | 0:19:12 | 0:19:16 | |
ambition at the moment and that other groups are trying to affiliate | 0:19:17 | 0:19:20 | |
with Islamic State to tap into the resources and the funding that it | 0:19:21 | 0:19:25 | |
has. But also the groups that are claiming affiliation with Islamic | 0:19:26 | 0:19:34 | |
State are longer-standing groups, they have long had complaints | 0:19:35 | 0:19:38 | |
against the Egyptian state in relation to Gaza but also in | 0:19:39 | 0:19:43 | |
relation to jobs in Sinai. Just on that basis, then, if it is a | 0:19:44 | 0:19:49 | |
disparate number of groups, it will make it much harder to crackdown on, | 0:19:50 | 0:19:55 | |
to find them? James Watt? The Egyptians have been facing this | 0:19:56 | 0:19:59 | |
problem for a long time. There are many people in Sinai, or around | 0:20:00 | 0:20:04 | |
Sharm el-Sheikh, who want the tourist industry to thrive and | 0:20:05 | 0:20:06 | |
continue. It isn't simply a police operation. There is a strong local | 0:20:07 | 0:20:11 | |
community interest in keeping that very important economic resource | 0:20:12 | 0:20:15 | |
going. We have now President al-Sisi, who has been in the country | 0:20:16 | 0:20:18 | |
for less than four hours. I know you are not involved in the visit. It | 0:20:19 | 0:20:24 | |
will be a diplomatic minefield, isn't it? It is a very good chance | 0:20:25 | 0:20:28 | |
to explain it to him, and I'm sure, when he sees the facts, he will | 0:20:29 | 0:20:31 | |
react positively. Thank you very much. | 0:20:32 | 0:20:34 | |
If it becomes clear that the intelligence | 0:20:35 | 0:20:35 | |
about a possible explosion on board the downed Russian plane did not | 0:20:36 | 0:20:37 | |
come from the wreckage, it begs the question - was it at least in part | 0:20:38 | 0:20:41 | |
If so, it could be a boost for the Government's plans, unveiled | 0:20:42 | 0:20:48 | |
today for extensive surveillance powers for our digital age. | 0:20:49 | 0:20:53 | |
The plans include the requirement for Internet providers to hold data | 0:20:54 | 0:20:57 | |
on what websites we all visit for 12 months - measures ministers say are | 0:20:58 | 0:21:01 | |
But the balance between protecting privacy and enabling agencies to | 0:21:02 | 0:21:07 | |
operate in the digital age is still heavily disputed - | 0:21:08 | 0:21:10 | |
particularly since Edward Snowden leaked details of mass surveillance | 0:21:11 | 0:21:14 | |
We asked Nick Hopkins to look at how it might work. | 0:21:15 | 0:21:27 | |
Today, we discovered the boundaries of our surveillance state. What the | 0:21:28 | 0:21:36 | |
spies want to spy on. The police want to pry on. And why. Who will | 0:21:37 | 0:21:41 | |
stop these intrusive powers from being abused? So how would this work | 0:21:42 | 0:21:46 | |
in practice? Let's look at three examples. In the first, police | 0:21:47 | 0:21:51 | |
receive a tip-off that a teacher and a pupil are having an illegal | 0:21:52 | 0:21:55 | |
relationship and are regularly talking on the phone. Both deny it. | 0:21:56 | 0:22:00 | |
A detective who wants to see their phone records has to get the OK from | 0:22:01 | 0:22:08 | |
two specialist police officers. They will decide if getting this | 0:22:09 | 0:22:10 | |
information is necessary and proportionate. They say he can. A | 0:22:11 | 0:22:14 | |
print-out of the numbers called show the two haven't been in contact and | 0:22:15 | 0:22:18 | |
the officer concludes the initial claims were false. | 0:22:19 | 0:22:30 | |
In another case, a university student has been radicalised and the | 0:22:31 | 0:22:34 | |
police want to know more. The police officer gets the OK from two | 0:22:35 | 0:22:37 | |
colleagues. He is allowed to get basic details of who the suspect has | 0:22:38 | 0:22:42 | |
called and e-mailed and what websites he has looked at. If the | 0:22:43 | 0:22:45 | |
detective wants further information, he has to seek a warrant from the | 0:22:46 | 0:22:50 | |
Home Secretary and a judge. They give their approval and the police | 0:22:51 | 0:22:54 | |
can now listen to the suspect's phone conversations and read his | 0:22:55 | 0:23:00 | |
e-mails. A final example - local councils, a | 0:23:01 | 0:23:05 | |
little less serious, perhaps, but supposing they suspect someone of | 0:23:06 | 0:23:09 | |
selling fake watches. In theory, they can go via a magistrate to get | 0:23:10 | 0:23:14 | |
hold of phone data. But the new law prevents them accessing the | 0:23:15 | 0:23:18 | |
suspect's Internet records. This draft law appears to have clipped | 0:23:19 | 0:23:23 | |
their wings. Judges signing warrants was one of Theresa May's concessions | 0:23:24 | 0:23:29 | |
to privacy campaigners. But they say it's a con. Judges can only say no | 0:23:30 | 0:23:36 | |
on certain limited grounds. The arguments have already begun. | 0:23:37 | 0:23:43 | |
Joining me now from Rio is the journalist who broke the Edward | 0:23:44 | 0:23:50 | |
Snowden story, and here with me is David Anderson. David Anderson, | 0:23:51 | 0:23:54 | |
presumably, you were the man with oversight, you must have some | 0:23:55 | 0:23:59 | |
concerns, don't you, at what Liberty say also be a breathtaking attack on | 0:24:00 | 0:24:03 | |
the Internet security of every man, woman and child in our country? I | 0:24:04 | 0:24:07 | |
have oversight of the terrorism law. I did a report on the surveillance. | 0:24:08 | 0:24:11 | |
There are three judges who have oversight of surveillance. What this | 0:24:12 | 0:24:18 | |
law is trying to add to the dizzying range of powers the intelligence | 0:24:19 | 0:24:22 | |
agencies already have is one more power, albeit quite a serious one, | 0:24:23 | 0:24:26 | |
and that's the power to require service providers in this country to | 0:24:27 | 0:24:30 | |
keep Internet records. You seem to be suggesting the dizzying range of | 0:24:31 | 0:24:33 | |
powers are necessary? Dizzying range? The reason I welcome this | 0:24:34 | 0:24:37 | |
Bill is, for the first time in this country, and there aren't many | 0:24:38 | 0:24:41 | |
countries who have done this, it sets out in terms what these powers | 0:24:42 | 0:24:45 | |
are. They would have surprised a lot of people two or three years ago. | 0:24:46 | 0:24:51 | |
They are all set out there. Is there something to be said for that, what | 0:24:52 | 0:24:55 | |
this Bill does is put it all out in the open? Yeah, I agree with what Mr | 0:24:56 | 0:25:02 | |
Anderson has just said. Before Edward Snowden came forward, the | 0:25:03 | 0:25:06 | |
thing that bothered him the most is not the spying itself, but the fact | 0:25:07 | 0:25:12 | |
this was implemented in total secrecy in democracies. His argument | 0:25:13 | 0:25:15 | |
was if we are going to allow the government to spy on everything we | 0:25:16 | 0:25:18 | |
are doing on the Internet, the government should have to come | 0:25:19 | 0:25:21 | |
forward to say this is what we are doing, we want your permission under | 0:25:22 | 0:25:24 | |
the law to do it. It is the first time they have been forced to do it. | 0:25:25 | 0:25:28 | |
That is a positive step. The British Government, we are the first | 0:25:29 | 0:25:31 | |
government to mandate Internet providers to store a year's worth of | 0:25:32 | 0:25:36 | |
browsing history. By the same token, do you think the fact it is out in | 0:25:37 | 0:25:42 | |
the open makes that OK? No, to be perfectly honest, I don't think a | 0:25:43 | 0:25:46 | |
Bill like this would be presentable, let alone viable in other Western | 0:25:47 | 0:25:50 | |
country, besides the UK, which does tend to be on the far end of the | 0:25:51 | 0:25:54 | |
pro-surveillance spectrum. It is radical to say that every single | 0:25:55 | 0:25:59 | |
person's browsing history must be kept and stored and made available | 0:26:00 | 0:26:02 | |
to the Government if the Government wants it. Even the judicial review | 0:26:03 | 0:26:07 | |
that Theresa May was pitching today, as the Conservative MP David Davis | 0:26:08 | 0:26:12 | |
pointed out today, it is an illusion because the narrow scope of that | 0:26:13 | 0:26:15 | |
review makes it that it is going to be a rubber-stamp. Is it an | 0:26:16 | 0:26:20 | |
illusion? I think judicial authorisation will be a big | 0:26:21 | 0:26:22 | |
improvement. I pushed very hard for it in my report. There is no point | 0:26:23 | 0:26:26 | |
doing it if the judge is going to be a rubber-stamp. This has to be | 0:26:27 | 0:26:30 | |
judges who are properly supported, technically, legally, who are able | 0:26:31 | 0:26:33 | |
to get into the issues and who are, from time to time, able to say no. | 0:26:34 | 0:26:38 | |
Judges aren't democratically accountable? Neither is the | 0:26:39 | 0:26:41 | |
Secretary of State when it comes to warrants. You name me one example of | 0:26:42 | 0:26:45 | |
a warrant in respect of which the Secretary of State has been held to | 0:26:46 | 0:26:48 | |
account in Parliament. It doesn't happen, partly because it's a | 0:26:49 | 0:26:52 | |
criminal offence to disclose the existence of the warrant. Do you | 0:26:53 | 0:26:55 | |
accept as far as journalism is concerned, by holding and having | 0:26:56 | 0:27:02 | |
access to a year's worth of records, a source, a journalistic source | 0:27:03 | 0:27:07 | |
could be as it were jigsawed identified in one way and that is an | 0:27:08 | 0:27:11 | |
erosion of our liberty? What the Bill has sought to do is to build on | 0:27:12 | 0:27:16 | |
the existing practice by making sure that there is never any application | 0:27:17 | 0:27:21 | |
for a journalist's communication data without the authorisation of a | 0:27:22 | 0:27:24 | |
judge. We have to assume the judges are going to be alert to that point. | 0:27:25 | 0:27:30 | |
It is fair to say that there isn't exactly a public outcry about this | 0:27:31 | 0:27:39 | |
in as much as the latest report says 53% in a survey backed the | 0:27:40 | 0:27:42 | |
Government and there is cross-party support for this: Do you think the | 0:27:43 | 0:27:47 | |
mood, and because of what we have been talking about, about the | 0:27:48 | 0:27:52 | |
possibility that the IS was involved in that airline downing, that | 0:27:53 | 0:27:56 | |
actually people support this in the insecure age in which we live? Yeah, | 0:27:57 | 0:28:08 | |
of course. Fear is a potent motivator. I think it is so crucial | 0:28:09 | 0:28:14 | |
to note that allowing the Government to do bulk surveillance, which is | 0:28:15 | 0:28:20 | |
what this Bill allows, it makes it harder to find people plotting | 0:28:21 | 0:28:23 | |
terrorist attacks than when you are focussed on the specific individuals | 0:28:24 | 0:28:27 | |
and concentrating on them, when you have reason to believe they are | 0:28:28 | 0:28:31 | |
engaged in a terrorist attack, that bulk surveillance makes it more | 0:28:32 | 0:28:34 | |
difficult, not more easy, not easier for the Government to break those | 0:28:35 | 0:28:41 | |
plots up. So, it's a big broad brush hammer, to crack a nut? You have to | 0:28:42 | 0:28:45 | |
wonder if it makes it more difficult, why they are spending all | 0:28:46 | 0:28:48 | |
this money doing it. It is perhaps that they are not as smart... I was | 0:28:49 | 0:28:56 | |
sceptical about this. I went into this as an independent person with a | 0:28:57 | 0:29:01 | |
fresh pair of eyes. And what I saw, I got GCHQ to talk me through | 0:29:02 | 0:29:06 | |
examples of how did bulk collection produced disruption of a major | 0:29:07 | 0:29:10 | |
terrorist attack. They gave me six. People can look at them. I hope | 0:29:11 | 0:29:14 | |
other people will have a chance to question GCHQ, as I did, to look at | 0:29:15 | 0:29:21 | |
the contemporaneous intelligence reports. I wonder, the authorities | 0:29:22 | 0:29:28 | |
seem to be behind the renegades all the time and every time you put a | 0:29:29 | 0:29:32 | |
new piece of legislation out, someone devises some special hacking | 0:29:33 | 0:29:37 | |
ability to get round everything. Are you worried about whether this is | 0:29:38 | 0:29:42 | |
going to work at all? Well, I think - as far as what Mr Anderson said, | 0:29:43 | 0:29:47 | |
if you go into the GCHQ's offices and they show you what they want you | 0:29:48 | 0:29:51 | |
to see, they can probably convince you of anything they want you to | 0:29:52 | 0:29:54 | |
know. What surveillance experts have said, people who have worked in | 0:29:55 | 0:29:58 | |
these agencies have said, mass surveillance makes it harder. Every | 0:29:59 | 0:30:02 | |
tyrant in the world is on the world for surveillance technology, not | 0:30:03 | 0:30:06 | |
because they want to stop terrorism, but the more you know about your | 0:30:07 | 0:30:09 | |
population, the more power you have over it. That is the reason that | 0:30:10 | 0:30:14 | |
governments have always saw mass, broad surveillance. It is a really | 0:30:15 | 0:30:16 | |
important point to know. Thank you. As work on the Goddard Inquiry into | 0:30:17 | 0:30:20 | |
historical child abuse in England and Wales continues, a report | 0:30:21 | 0:30:23 | |
by Newsnight and See Hear can for the first time name the perpetrator | 0:30:24 | 0:30:26 | |
of horrific abuse carried out at a London school for deaf children | 0:30:27 | 0:30:31 | |
over three decades. The abuser was allowed to prey | 0:30:32 | 0:30:36 | |
on the school's pupils even after he was convicted of | 0:30:37 | 0:30:39 | |
indecently assaulting two of them, and barred by the Department for | 0:30:40 | 0:30:42 | |
Education from being a proprietor His victims, who fought | 0:30:43 | 0:30:44 | |
and failed to win justice, Apologies, we had planned to bring | 0:30:45 | 0:30:56 | |
you a report on the history and successive UK grime music. We will | 0:42:49 | 0:42:52 | |
have it for you later this week. Good night. | 0:42:53 | 0:42:57 |