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This programme contains some strong language and scenes which some | :00:00. | :00:07. | |
viewers may find upsetting from the start. This is the story of the | :00:08. | :00:12. | |
secret British Army unit set up to deal with enemies of the state on | :00:13. | :00:16. | |
the streets of the United Kingdom. So what was the mission as you | :00:17. | :00:24. | |
understood it? To draw out the IRA and to minimise their activities. | :00:25. | :00:28. | |
Minimise their activities. In what way? If they needed shooting, they | :00:29. | :00:34. | |
would be shot. Now, after 40 years of silence, members of this | :00:35. | :00:38. | |
undercover unit speaks candidly about what they did for Queen and | :00:39. | :00:44. | |
Country. We were not there to act like an army unit. We were there to | :00:45. | :00:54. | |
act like a terror group. This is a 9mm SMG Sterling, a little bit | :00:55. | :00:57. | |
beyond the normal SMG because it is fitted with a silencer. We picked up | :00:58. | :01:03. | |
shells which would went right down the street for another 20 yards, it | :01:04. | :01:09. | |
is a Sterling automatic. We have investigated the unit and discovered | :01:10. | :01:14. | |
evidence that this branch of the British state sometimes behaved like | :01:15. | :01:21. | |
that IRA and shot unarmed civilians. He thought he was going to die. And | :01:22. | :01:33. | |
I told him, no. Tonight, we tracked down one soldier accused of firing | :01:34. | :01:39. | |
on innocent citizens. Hello. Mr Williams. John Ware is my name. 40 | :01:40. | :01:45. | |
years on, the victims and their relatives still want answers. Oh, | :01:46. | :01:51. | |
yes, we want the truth. We don't want to stop, to get to the truth. | :01:52. | :02:01. | |
People like us had to make decisions and a horrendous pressure. And make | :02:02. | :02:05. | |
the right decision. That is why I am here today and they are not. | :02:06. | :02:17. | |
In January 1972, British paratroopers shot 26 unarmed | :02:18. | :02:24. | |
civilians during a protest in Londonderry. 14 people died in what | :02:25. | :02:35. | |
became known as Bloody Sunday. What happened next is obscure. The army | :02:36. | :02:38. | |
say their men were fired on... Getting to the truth took nearly 40 | :02:39. | :02:42. | |
years and an enquiry costing nearly ?200 million. Some of those soldiers | :02:43. | :02:48. | |
are now being investigated for murder and attempted murder. What | :02:49. | :02:55. | |
happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable. | :02:56. | :03:05. | |
Today, case files of the conflict's 3260 dead are being reviewed as part | :03:06. | :03:14. | |
of the peace process. Our investigation has discovered another | :03:15. | :03:19. | |
group of soldiers who now stand accused of shooting unarmed | :03:20. | :03:24. | |
civilians in 1972. These soldiers were undercover and what they did | :03:25. | :03:29. | |
has been airbrushed from the official record. But some have now | :03:30. | :03:39. | |
emerged from the shadows. I was told it was a plainclothes small unit | :03:40. | :03:44. | |
operating mainly in Belfast and it was called the MRF. Which stands | :03:45. | :03:49. | |
for? It stand for Military Reaction Force. Seven former members of the | :03:50. | :03:56. | |
MRF have spoken to us about the unit did. Three agreed to go in front of | :03:57. | :04:02. | |
the cameras on condition that we disguised their identities. I | :04:03. | :04:06. | |
travelled from Liverpool and ended up in Belfast on a very dark | :04:07. | :04:11. | |
Knight, waiting on the harbour there, waiting for them to pick me | :04:12. | :04:17. | |
up, unarmed and eventually ended up in Holywood. The barracks? Palace | :04:18. | :04:27. | |
barracks. Inside the barracks was a big iron compound and it looks like | :04:28. | :04:32. | |
a builder's storage yard. Anyway, we pulled up at the main gate of the | :04:33. | :04:38. | |
compound and the gates just opened. We couldn't take anything, was even | :04:39. | :04:42. | |
photographs, no ID cards, no letters with addresses on, nothing. Anything | :04:43. | :04:49. | |
tying us to the military was totally out. We never got a uniform, very | :04:50. | :04:54. | |
few people knew what rank anybody was. I knew the boss was a captain. | :04:55. | :04:59. | |
These are the only known photographs of the MRF compound tucked away | :05:00. | :05:04. | |
inside a British Army base where ordinary soldiers were forbidden | :05:05. | :05:05. | |
entry. This top-secret unit had around 40 | :05:06. | :05:16. | |
men, hand-picked from across the British Army. These were selected | :05:17. | :05:23. | |
men who have had experience, who were well trained, knew their | :05:24. | :05:28. | |
weapons, reliability and all the rest of the things which makes a | :05:29. | :05:31. | |
good soldier and put into teams and sent across. We were told we | :05:32. | :05:39. | |
officially don't exist on paper. The unit doesn't exist on paper. And if | :05:40. | :05:47. | |
you are caught, you will be killed. And if you are caught and killed, | :05:48. | :05:51. | |
the Government would probably put out a story that you were just a | :05:52. | :05:54. | |
soldier in plainclothes that was caught by accident. The unit carried | :05:55. | :06:03. | |
out round-the-clock patrols of West Belfast, heartland of the IRA | :06:04. | :06:08. | |
unmarked cars. The cover didn't always work. When I had my first | :06:09. | :06:14. | |
operation there were three of us in this really clapped-out Avenger. I | :06:15. | :06:22. | |
was the back-seat driver. We saw a car that was on the wanted list and | :06:23. | :06:27. | |
all of a sudden we turned around and then there were the power behinds. | :06:28. | :06:37. | |
-- they were up our behinds. We were carrying the personal weapon, a | :06:38. | :06:47. | |
Browning. 9mm. All of a sudden they opened up with ArmaLites. All of the | :06:48. | :06:52. | |
excitement going to the interviews, all of a sudden I am now in the | :06:53. | :06:56. | |
firing line, in the back-seat of this bloody car that was absolutely | :06:57. | :07:01. | |
clapped-out, petrified. This is the end before I even start. The car was | :07:02. | :07:05. | |
riddled with bullets and not one of us were hit. | :07:06. | :07:15. | |
MRF soldiers say they sometimes acted as bait, goading the IRA to | :07:16. | :07:21. | |
come out and fight. The soldiers wanted to take the war to the enemy. | :07:22. | :07:29. | |
This is a 9mm SMG, a Sterling, but this is a little bit beyond the | :07:30. | :07:33. | |
normal SMG because it is fitted with a silencer. Why the silencer? Well, | :07:34. | :07:41. | |
it is quiet. We were on special operations, soap, you know, we had | :07:42. | :07:46. | |
to be silent. To kill silently? Yes, as simple as that. | :07:47. | :07:53. | |
The military action Force was operating in what in 1972 was one of | :07:54. | :07:58. | |
the world's most dangerous places. In the space of 16 minutes there | :07:59. | :08:10. | |
were 13 blasts and sent people screaming from one place of safety | :08:11. | :08:14. | |
to another, none of them knowing where the next explosion might come | :08:15. | :08:19. | |
from. That year there were over 10,000 shootings. Nearly 500 died, | :08:20. | :08:27. | |
5000 injured. There was evil in the air just about everywhere. The | :08:28. | :08:31. | |
shooting of soldiers and police was not an everyday occurrence but | :08:32. | :08:36. | |
certainly a week occurrence. Looking back now it was chaotic and | :08:37. | :08:42. | |
horrendous. The IRA planted nearly 1800 bombs. An average of five a | :08:43. | :08:53. | |
day. Take away the religious aspect and some of these enemies were just | :08:54. | :08:58. | |
people who had got hold of weapons and they wanted to shoot somebody. | :08:59. | :09:02. | |
They were pure gangsters because somebody had given them a gun. A | :09:03. | :09:07. | |
soldier was shot on open ground after an earlier attack on an army | :09:08. | :09:12. | |
post nearby. Belfast was on the edge of anarchy. The politicians turned | :09:13. | :09:13. | |
to the Army to restore order. To the MRF went the task of | :09:14. | :09:30. | |
infiltrating IRA strongholds to see more while not being seen. British | :09:31. | :09:35. | |
soldiers trying to pass themselves off as local. So you needed a | :09:36. | :09:47. | |
variety of different guises. Yes. There was the trolley to pull, road | :09:48. | :09:51. | |
sweeping. Belfast City Council dustbins. We would use those on | :09:52. | :09:56. | |
covert operations. For what purpose? To stand around in the street. To | :09:57. | :10:01. | |
pose as adjustment. Yes, you could observe a house or people. I spent | :10:02. | :10:11. | |
quite a long as a meths drinker. Just lining -- lying in the gutters | :10:12. | :10:17. | |
in the streets. You would have a machine gun in a bin. You wouldn't | :10:18. | :10:21. | |
have rubbish in the bin. You would have the machine gun in the bin. I | :10:22. | :10:27. | |
had spare magazines strapped to my leg and I carried a PPK on the back | :10:28. | :10:31. | |
of my belt, a Browning under my left and my radio on my right hand side. | :10:32. | :10:36. | |
We were quite armed. You never attracted any suspicion? No. It | :10:37. | :10:45. | |
takes a lot of courage and it is a cold courage. It is not the courage | :10:46. | :10:49. | |
of hot blood, which soldiers in a firefight in conventional terms will | :10:50. | :10:56. | |
find the adrenaline rounds and gives them that extra. Jackson had served | :10:57. | :11:02. | |
in Belfast as the young paratrooper and eventually became head of the | :11:03. | :11:07. | |
British Army. He says he was barely aware of the MRF's activities, but | :11:08. | :11:11. | |
he does admire the courage they would have needed. And you know if | :11:12. | :11:20. | |
you are discovered a pretty gruesome fate may well await you. Torture | :11:21. | :11:26. | |
followed by murder. However, surveillance was just one part of | :11:27. | :11:30. | |
the MRF's mission, according to the soldiers we spoke to. We had two | :11:31. | :11:37. | |
basic arms. One was a surveillance, information, intelligence gathering | :11:38. | :11:41. | |
organisation and the other side was hard-hitting counterterrorist unit. | :11:42. | :11:47. | |
Tell me about the hard-hitting side. The hard-hitting side, we went out | :11:48. | :11:54. | |
and shot the terrorists. Like they'd uniformed comrades, MRF soldiers | :11:55. | :12:01. | |
were given stop on sight mugshots of wanted IRA members. They say they | :12:02. | :12:05. | |
would sometimes do more than just stop them. If you had a player who | :12:06. | :12:10. | |
was well-known who carried out quite a lot of assassinations, then he had | :12:11. | :12:17. | |
to be taken out. Taken out -- meaning? Taken out. Killed? Yes. | :12:18. | :12:26. | |
These were people # These were players, known shooters. Shot on | :12:27. | :12:31. | |
sight if you saw them? They were known in the organisation. We were | :12:32. | :12:39. | |
hunting down hard-core baby killers. Terrorists. People that would kill | :12:40. | :12:44. | |
you without even thinking about it. Yellow bobbing killers themselves, | :12:45. | :12:48. | |
they had no mercy for anybody. They would kill each other for opening | :12:49. | :12:53. | |
their mouth. With over 10,000 shootings in 1972 it is simply not | :12:54. | :12:58. | |
possible to say how many the MRF were involved in. | :12:59. | :13:03. | |
NEWS ARCHIVE: The killings have all the hallmarks | :13:04. | :13:07. | |
of sectarian murders. The men were Catholics and had left the pub where | :13:08. | :13:11. | |
one was a barman. MRF operational records have been destroyed and the | :13:12. | :13:15. | |
soldiers we have interviewed have avoided incriminating themselves or | :13:16. | :13:21. | |
their comrades. What is clear though is that in 1972 some plainclothes | :13:22. | :13:28. | |
soldiers did think it acceptable to shoot unarmed people. | :13:29. | :13:36. | |
In April that year, brothers John and Gerry Conway were on their way | :13:37. | :13:43. | |
to a fruit stall they ran in Belfast city centre. As usual I was | :13:44. | :13:52. | |
delivering the newspapers, which I did every day. The Conway Brothers, | :13:53. | :14:02. | |
Gary and that, the fruit then, that is how I knew Jerry, the fruit man. | :14:03. | :14:07. | |
He just waved over and the next thing these two cars appeared out of | :14:08. | :14:10. | |
nowhere, just appeared. A car pulled up alongside. A man | :14:11. | :14:24. | |
wound down the back window, like that. Run! He ran towards the Falls | :14:25. | :14:40. | |
Road. He turned back towards Ballymurphy. The next thing, these | :14:41. | :14:52. | |
people jumped out and shot him. Bullet lodged there in me. Gerry had | :14:53. | :14:57. | |
been running down the Whiterock, and our car was there, so he had come | :14:58. | :15:05. | |
over to the car and jumped on top of it squealing, please don't shoot me, | :15:06. | :15:09. | |
I have a wife and four wee children. I think at that stage he didn't | :15:10. | :15:16. | |
realise that he was shot, you know. It's the first time I'd seen blood | :15:17. | :15:19. | |
so thick. I know you cut yourself, you get blood. But I'd never seen - | :15:20. | :15:29. | |
I'm sorry... Who did you think had shot you? I didn't know who it was. | :15:30. | :15:34. | |
Plain-clothes soldiers had shot a couple of unarmed men mistaking them | :15:35. | :15:39. | |
for two of the IRA's most deadly snipers. Witnesses heard the | :15:40. | :15:44. | |
soldiers say they'd got Tommy "Toddler" Tolan and Jim Bryson. I | :15:45. | :15:52. | |
says, "That's not Bryson, that's not Bryson. That's Gerry, he's a frui - | :15:53. | :16:00. | |
that's wee Gerry the fruit man." By the time uniformed soldiers arrived, | :16:01. | :16:05. | |
John Conway had vanished. His brother Gerry was badly wounded and | :16:06. | :16:13. | |
taken to hospital by the Army where they still insisted he was IRA man | :16:14. | :16:21. | |
Jim Bryson. I got on to the corridor I could hear my brother shouting. | :16:22. | :16:26. | |
And this soldier kept insisting and said to my brother, "Tell me you're | :16:27. | :16:40. | |
locking Bryson." This soldier would keep repeating he was Bryson. And I | :16:41. | :16:44. | |
think if my brother said he was Bryson, they would have locking shot | :16:45. | :16:48. | |
him, and that's my point of view. Even today, the Ministry of Defence | :16:49. | :16:51. | |
refuse to say whether soldiers in this shooting were members of the | :16:52. | :16:57. | |
MRF. And the MRF soldiers we've interviewed wouldn't comment on | :16:58. | :16:59. | |
specific operations either. We were there in a position to go after the | :17:00. | :17:03. | |
IRA and kill them when we found them. Whether they were armed or | :17:04. | :17:13. | |
not? Occasionally, yes. It was shootings like that of the two | :17:14. | :17:17. | |
unarmed Conway brothers that sparked rumours of an undercover Army unit | :17:18. | :17:22. | |
engaged in assassinations. The Government gave this denial to | :17:23. | :17:26. | |
Parliament. In no circumstances are soldiers employed to assassinate | :17:27. | :17:31. | |
people or in any way which would involve deliberately going outside | :17:32. | :17:35. | |
the law. Patrols work under normal military discipline and in | :17:36. | :17:38. | |
accordance with the Yellow Card. The Yellow Card set out the rules under | :17:39. | :17:46. | |
which soldiers were allowed to open fire. Troops were ordered not to | :17:47. | :17:50. | |
shoot unless their lives, or the lives of others, were in immediate | :17:51. | :17:55. | |
danger. The orders are if you can see a gunman, a man with a weapon, | :17:56. | :18:00. | |
then you may shoot him. A man with a weapon. The use of force must be | :18:01. | :18:08. | |
reasonable in the circumstances, what the Yellow Card set out to do | :18:09. | :18:11. | |
was to give some codification to that word "reasonable". It was a | :18:12. | :18:18. | |
guide for soldiers to say if you want to stay within the law, follow | :18:19. | :18:25. | |
this? Precisely. You knew the rules of the Yellow Card? Yes, inside out. | :18:26. | :18:35. | |
They didn't apply to the MRF? No. I just want to be clear about where | :18:36. | :18:39. | |
the red line was as it were? I think it's a fuzzy red line. It would | :18:40. | :18:44. | |
depend on the situation, how it developed. Whereas the uniform | :18:45. | :18:47. | |
people they would be rigidly bound by it even down to the fact they had | :18:48. | :18:52. | |
to carry the card or face court martial or at least get charged. | :18:53. | :18:56. | |
There was some discretion allowed in your case? In the MRF's case? There | :18:57. | :19:01. | |
would be, yes. If I've got a weapon, but I wasn't aiming the weapon at | :19:02. | :19:05. | |
you, I was a legitimate target? If you had a weapon? But I wasn't | :19:06. | :19:10. | |
aiming at you? No, you are supposed to be arrested. I know, but you | :19:11. | :19:14. | |
didn't. No. You would do what? Shoot you. At the time, the Army's leading | :19:15. | :19:27. | |
expert on counter-terrorism was this man, Brigadier Frank Kitson. A | :19:28. | :19:32. | |
textbook he wrote became the Army's manual on counter-insurgency. In | :19:33. | :19:37. | |
order to put an insurgency campaign down one must use a mix of measures, | :19:38. | :19:41. | |
not just military measures. And it is sometimes necessary to do | :19:42. | :19:46. | |
unpleasant things, which lose certain amount of allegiance for a | :19:47. | :19:50. | |
moment in order to produce your overall result. Kitson was also | :19:51. | :19:57. | |
commander in Belfast when the MRF was established. He had done much of | :19:58. | :20:01. | |
his soldiering in the dying days of empire - fighting in the British | :20:02. | :20:08. | |
colonies of Kenya and Malaya. Kitson departed Northern Ireland in April | :20:09. | :20:14. | |
1972. Some of those he left behind had been schooled in the aggressive | :20:15. | :20:18. | |
tactics of small colonial wars - some of which were illegal under | :20:19. | :20:27. | |
British law. We'd seen Malaya, the fighting in Malaya, Cyprus, and | :20:28. | :20:38. | |
things didn't always go by the book. In 1972, Tony Le Tissier was a Major | :20:39. | :20:42. | |
in the Royal Military Police. He had been posted to Belfast to deal with | :20:43. | :20:45. | |
a backlog of legal complaints against the Army. For the | :20:46. | :20:51. | |
professional soldier, no, it was difficult to accept that this was | :20:52. | :20:54. | |
the United Kingdom. It was a fighting situation for which you had | :20:55. | :20:57. | |
been trained sort of thing and you were going to use the same methods | :20:58. | :21:00. | |
here. There were elements in the Army that had imported a colonial | :21:01. | :21:04. | |
approach to Northern Ireland? Virtually, the whole lot had | :21:05. | :21:09. | |
imported this, it wasn't just elements. It was a strong theme | :21:10. | :21:12. | |
within the, the armed forces, that was the experience that they were | :21:13. | :21:15. | |
bringing to Northern Ireland, where it was not applicable. Well, I mean, | :21:16. | :21:23. | |
you could just about do anything you wanted. Northern Ireland was firmly | :21:24. | :21:35. | |
split along sectarian lines. Both Republican and Loyalist gunmen would | :21:36. | :21:40. | |
drive into each other's areas and fire at unsuspecting civilians - | :21:41. | :21:45. | |
these became known as drive-by shootings. Work began this morning | :21:46. | :21:56. | |
on putting up permanent barricades to block side streets in part of | :21:57. | :22:01. | |
Ballymacarret, the strongly Protestant district alongside the | :22:02. | :22:04. | |
shipyard. Both Protestants and Catholics set up barricades to | :22:05. | :22:08. | |
protect their communities. Both had lost faith in the British state's | :22:09. | :22:16. | |
ability to protect them. Youths and men, masked and uniformed, armed | :22:17. | :22:20. | |
with modern weapons patrol openly. They control completely entry and | :22:21. | :22:25. | |
departure. The IRA would sometimes stage events like this for the | :22:26. | :22:29. | |
cameras. In fact, barricades were often amateurish, with unarmed | :22:30. | :22:34. | |
locals just "doing their bit" to protect their communities. But | :22:35. | :22:38. | |
that's not how some MRF soldiers saw barricades. Barricades were illegal. | :22:39. | :22:48. | |
And generally, a barricade in really bad area, there was almost someone | :22:49. | :22:53. | |
always armed on that barricade. You may not see the weapon, but it's | :22:54. | :22:56. | |
almost certain that somebody's going to be armed. We used to just plod | :22:57. | :23:07. | |
along, do a quick assess of the situation, and then move in and take | :23:08. | :23:12. | |
a few targets out and move along and let the uniform sort the rest out. | :23:13. | :23:17. | |
When you say "take a few targets out", you mean individuals on the | :23:18. | :23:21. | |
barricades? Yeah, and they were fully armed, displaying weapons. | :23:22. | :23:28. | |
Another MRF soldier told us whether or not they could see weapons on a | :23:29. | :23:32. | |
barricade, they'd sometimes, as he put it, give them a blast! We've | :23:33. | :23:40. | |
investigated two incidents where witnesses say this happened with | :23:41. | :23:49. | |
devastating consequences. The first was just before midnight. Aiden | :23:50. | :23:55. | |
McAloon and Eugene Devlin were in a taxi taking them home from a disco. | :23:56. | :24:01. | |
I remember saying at the time, "There's a car behind us" and | :24:02. | :24:05. | |
somebody said, "Oh it wasn't much heed paid." We didn't pay much | :24:06. | :24:13. | |
attention to it. We were tired and on our way home. This is the first | :24:14. | :24:16. | |
time these men have told their story. Taxi turned around, dropped | :24:17. | :24:27. | |
us off, we walked up Slievegallion Drive, there was a barricade further | :24:28. | :24:32. | |
on up. Which was sparsely manned, five or six people, maybe. At that | :24:33. | :24:38. | |
moment, an MRF patrol car came cruising by. GUNFIRE I thought it | :24:39. | :24:50. | |
was all over. I thought it was the end. They were meaning to kill or | :24:51. | :24:57. | |
maim someone that night and they were trying their damnedest to do | :24:58. | :25:01. | |
that. Within hours of the shooting, the soldiers had made routine | :25:02. | :25:04. | |
witness statements to the Royal Military Police - and we've | :25:05. | :25:08. | |
unearthed those statements. They don't match what thele civilians | :25:09. | :25:13. | |
have told us. As we approached the junction a car began to reverse on | :25:14. | :25:17. | |
to the Andersontown Road. In the headlights of the reversing car, I | :25:18. | :25:20. | |
saw a man at the junction. He was armed with a firearm which was aimed | :25:21. | :25:27. | |
towards us. Did you see a rifle at all? No rifle. Did you have a rifle? | :25:28. | :25:31. | |
No. Do you remember seeing a man with a rifle? Definitely not. Did | :25:32. | :25:37. | |
you have a rifle? No. I heard a shot fired which could have been aimed at | :25:38. | :25:41. | |
us or the reversing car. I then aimed at the man with the rifle and | :25:42. | :25:49. | |
fired eight rounds from my SMG. Later that night, both victims say | :25:50. | :25:55. | |
they were forensically tested by the police to see if they had handled | :25:56. | :25:59. | |
firearms. The results were negative. They were out to do something that | :26:00. | :26:02. | |
night. There was no-one had weapons at that barricade. After opening | :26:03. | :26:11. | |
fire, the MRF car returned to the base. However, it was part of a | :26:12. | :26:16. | |
two-car patrol, and the second one continued to circulate. Within | :26:17. | :26:20. | |
minutes, five more men had been shot. GUNFIRE A man came to my door | :26:21. | :26:36. | |
and told me that a man had been shot. I recognised him as Pat | :26:37. | :26:43. | |
McVeigh, one of the parishionerers from my district. I knelt down | :26:44. | :26:48. | |
beside him and gave him the last rites. Was he conscious? No, he was | :26:49. | :26:54. | |
dead. Patrick McVeigh's family say he had been on his way home from the | :26:55. | :26:58. | |
pub and had stopped to chat to some friends dismantling a makeshift | :26:59. | :27:03. | |
barricade. I arrived home late and there was people standing in the | :27:04. | :27:06. | |
hall, and I couldn't understand what was happening and the door opened | :27:07. | :27:10. | |
and there was a neighbour, and when I walked in she just pulled me and | :27:11. | :27:17. | |
said, "Your daddy's dead, he was shot" and obviously you're in | :27:18. | :27:23. | |
denial, shaking your head, "No, no." At that stage, my mummy had been | :27:24. | :27:28. | |
sedated by the doctor and, ah, that's how I found out. What was | :27:29. | :27:41. | |
your dad like? Um, a good person, um, very loyal, hard-working, good | :27:42. | :27:48. | |
to his children, um, just a nice person. I was horrified when I heard | :27:49. | :27:57. | |
the man had been killed and I couldn't believe it. I just thinking | :27:58. | :28:05. | |
to myself how lucky I had been to be alive. Patrick McVeigh and several | :28:06. | :28:12. | |
other people were at this corner of Riverdale Park, a Ford Cortina swept | :28:13. | :28:18. | |
up and a machine-gunner inside sprayed the group with at least 20 | :28:19. | :28:22. | |
bullets. The IRA propaganda machine was quick to exploit the shooting. | :28:23. | :28:26. | |
Gerry O'Hare was then the IRA's Belfast spokesman. Were any of the | :28:27. | :28:31. | |
men that you saw known to you to be involved in the IRA? No, absolutely | :28:32. | :28:35. | |
not. There were people who, at night-time, would have come out and | :28:36. | :28:39. | |
manned the barricades in their own areas and they had to be local | :28:40. | :28:42. | |
people because they would have known who was coming in and coming out. | :28:43. | :28:45. | |
You couldn't put people who didn't live in the area on there. We've | :28:46. | :28:55. | |
learned the identity of the commander of the MRF car who opened | :28:56. | :28:59. | |
fire with his machine-gun on Patrick McVeigh. Sergeant Clive Williams of | :29:00. | :29:04. | |
the Royal Military Police - known as Taff. This is a rare picture of Taff | :29:05. | :29:08. | |
Williams. Taken when he was in the MRF it's a grainy official | :29:09. | :29:14. | |
photograph which shows him dressed in civvies. I would say he was | :29:15. | :29:19. | |
fearless. Was he a compassionate man? With us, yes. Not with the | :29:20. | :29:28. | |
enemy. He had a good feeling for it, did Taff Williams. Four hours after | :29:29. | :29:32. | |
the shooting, Sergeant Williams gave his version of events in a statement | :29:33. | :29:36. | |
to a fellow Sergeant in the Royal Military Police. One of the men in | :29:37. | :29:41. | |
the group of four raised his weapon and fired three rounds at the | :29:42. | :29:47. | |
vehicle. The wounded men and their clothes were swabbed to see if there | :29:48. | :29:50. | |
was any evidence they had fired weapons. The forensic lab could find | :29:51. | :30:02. | |
none. Tests in 1972 were not as reliable as they are today. However, | :30:03. | :30:06. | |
police at the time was satisfied that none of the men had been armed. | :30:07. | :30:11. | |
The army tried to cover up their involvement in this shooting. They | :30:12. | :30:13. | |
called it a crime which was motiveless. Implying it was | :30:14. | :30:21. | |
sectarian. The assumption was it was a group of loyalists that had done | :30:22. | :30:25. | |
the shooting and that was a dangerous assumption because that | :30:26. | :30:27. | |
increased the tension between the two communities. It was six weeks | :30:28. | :30:33. | |
before Mike Patricia McVeigh learned her father had been killed by | :30:34. | :30:39. | |
undercover soldiers and then only by chance, from a detective. Added | :30:40. | :30:44. | |
route reacts? Astonished, astounded, angry. -- how did we react? The | :30:45. | :30:51. | |
forces who were supposed to be protecting us had actually killed my | :30:52. | :30:59. | |
father and injured four the men -- four other men. It didn't seem | :31:00. | :31:06. | |
right. When I went home that night to go to bed and I took off my | :31:07. | :31:12. | |
trousers, my knees were covered in his blood. I felt it dreadful, | :31:13. | :31:20. | |
washing the blood of that man from my knees. | :31:21. | :31:27. | |
One of the MRF soldiers we have spoken to were involved that night | :31:28. | :31:34. | |
-- norm of the soldiers. But one did explain why those on a barricade | :31:35. | :31:37. | |
should not have been given the benefit of the doubt. | :31:38. | :31:43. | |
We were finding our targets and we were shooting at them. We shot, we | :31:44. | :31:52. | |
found our targets and we eliminated them or neutralising them. We didn't | :31:53. | :31:58. | |
go around town, blasting, shooting all over the place like you see on | :31:59. | :32:02. | |
the TV. We were looking for our targets, finding them and taking | :32:03. | :32:06. | |
them down. We may not have seen a weapon but more than likely there | :32:07. | :32:10. | |
would have been weapons there is a vigilante patrol. It is possible | :32:11. | :32:13. | |
they could have been shot at even if the weather hadn't -- the weapon | :32:14. | :32:18. | |
hadn't been seen. On occasions the MRF would make an assumption that | :32:19. | :32:21. | |
someone had a weapon even if you couldn't see one? Occasionally. And | :32:22. | :32:29. | |
they would get shot? Occasionally. Some people would say that was | :32:30. | :32:36. | |
murder. In fact, I think most people would say it was murder. It is | :32:37. | :32:41. | |
possible. I wouldn't say that. But if you haven't seen a weapon and you | :32:42. | :32:45. | |
haven't evidence there is a weapon there is an assumption you can't | :32:46. | :32:50. | |
keep -- kill people on that basis, can you? You are not supposed to but | :32:51. | :32:56. | |
we were in a terrorist conflict and people in that area, it all depends | :32:57. | :33:02. | |
on where they are and what they are doing at the time and as far as we | :33:03. | :33:06. | |
were concerned, as far as I was concerned and a few other people in | :33:07. | :33:11. | |
the unit were concerned, people caught in a specific situation, a | :33:12. | :33:15. | |
specific area, were part and parcel of the terrorist organisation. | :33:16. | :33:25. | |
Six weeks later Sergeant Taff Williams once once again on patrol, | :33:26. | :33:31. | |
one that would eventually land him in court. This is what local | :33:32. | :33:37. | |
witnesses say happened. That once again innocent and unarmed civilians | :33:38. | :33:38. | |
were shot. A lovely sunny day, around about | :33:39. | :34:00. | |
lunchtime. I was just sitting, the door open. This Cortina drew up. A | :34:01. | :34:07. | |
guy sitting in the back putter submachine gun out of the window. He | :34:08. | :34:15. | |
opened fire. The bullet came through the door and hit in the chest, that | :34:16. | :34:21. | |
is what happened on a sunny afternoon. I didn't really hear any | :34:22. | :34:31. | |
shooting. I sort of smelt it. Then I got this lightness, I thought I was | :34:32. | :34:38. | |
shot in the head, then I just collapsed, that was me. | :34:39. | :34:47. | |
Eileen Shaw saw the whole incident from her kitchen window. The card | :34:48. | :34:54. | |
game down on the wrong side of the road. The back man produced a gun of | :34:55. | :34:58. | |
some sort, fired indiscriminately at these men. Sergeant Williams had | :34:59. | :35:04. | |
fired several bursts from a machine gun, hitting four men. You got a | :35:05. | :35:11. | |
bullet in the chest, just one question not Just one, it is enough. | :35:12. | :35:16. | |
Has it caused you much difficulty since? Yes. Pain. I have to go to | :35:17. | :35:29. | |
hospital to get pain injections. Painkillers. Everyday? Every day. | :35:30. | :35:40. | |
Even today, 40 years on? Even today, 40 years. Taff Williams says he only | :35:41. | :35:44. | |
fired on the man because they had opened up on him. He said a bullet | :35:45. | :35:48. | |
had smashed his rear windscreen. We got to the hospital, we were swamped | :35:49. | :35:54. | |
by the police for forensics. There was no traces of nothing. None of | :35:55. | :36:01. | |
you were involved? Not one. At first the army once again covered up their | :36:02. | :36:06. | |
involvement. Later that day they said plainclothes soldiers had been | :36:07. | :36:11. | |
shot at and returned fire. Detectives from the Royal Ulster | :36:12. | :36:17. | |
Constabulary were suspicious. I do remember the shooting on the Glen | :36:18. | :36:22. | |
Road. I do remember rumours going around that it was some funny army | :36:23. | :36:28. | |
unit roaming about West Belfast and other parts doing strange | :36:29. | :36:35. | |
shootings. We didn't find out they were called the MRF. When detectives | :36:36. | :36:41. | |
inspected Sergeant Williams' car, they suspected he'd smashed the rear | :36:42. | :36:45. | |
window to make it look as if he had come under fire. Williams was | :36:46. | :36:51. | |
eventually sent for trial at this now derelict Belfast courthouse, | :36:52. | :36:54. | |
charged on three counts of attempted murder. However, we can reveal that | :36:55. | :37:02. | |
the jury got only a partial picture. I was given the job of covering the | :37:03. | :37:11. | |
Williams trial. Is not in here? As reporters, we had never seen any | :37:12. | :37:15. | |
undercover people being hauled into court and charged and prosecuted. It | :37:16. | :37:24. | |
didn't happen. Within the Ministry of Defence, alarm bells rang at the | :37:25. | :37:27. | |
prospect of this secret unit being unmasked. Declassified files show | :37:28. | :37:34. | |
just how determined MoD were to protect the MRF. There can be no | :37:35. | :37:40. | |
useful purpose in admitting the admittance -- existence of any such | :37:41. | :37:44. | |
organisation. There seems to be considerable advantage in | :37:45. | :37:46. | |
maintaining as much confusion as possible. Sergeant Williams' victims | :37:47. | :37:55. | |
sat in the public gallery to see and hear his testimony. He was the | :37:56. | :38:01. | |
double of Omar Sharif. Being so swarthy. Williams was put-in my | :38:02. | :38:09. | |
charge to take to court. I had to hand him over to the police there at | :38:10. | :38:14. | |
the actual trial its self. Williams' evidence was that he was | :38:15. | :38:18. | |
responding to fire that had hit is moving vehicle. He was asked how he | :38:19. | :38:22. | |
could possibly have returned fire at the men who were now behind his car | :38:23. | :38:26. | |
and receding rapidly into the distance. So he used the end of the | :38:27. | :38:36. | |
pew to demonstrate this. He sat there the gun on the floor in front | :38:37. | :38:40. | |
of him and picked it up and whipped it around like this in the firing | :38:41. | :38:45. | |
position. It was done in a matter of a split second, you know. That | :38:46. | :38:50. | |
wasn't the only bit of courtroom drama that -- there had also been an | :38:51. | :38:56. | |
extraordinary revelation. Williams had opened fire not with a standard | :38:57. | :39:01. | |
Army issue weapon but with a gun commonly used by the IRA, Thompson | :39:02. | :39:07. | |
submachine gun. We didn't know until then that this organisation was | :39:08. | :39:13. | |
using an -- that this organisation was using IRA weapons. If you are | :39:14. | :39:18. | |
using a Thompson submachine gun, the forensics come along later, taking | :39:19. | :39:22. | |
bullet holes out of the car, a wall or body, they will say that man shot | :39:23. | :39:28. | |
with that machine gun had been an IRA killing. When challenged over | :39:29. | :39:32. | |
the Tommy gun, Williams gave an explanation for why he had had the | :39:33. | :39:36. | |
weapon which he had never mentioned in his police interviews. He told | :39:37. | :39:42. | |
the jury he had been on a firing range that morning, demonstrating | :39:43. | :39:47. | |
the characteristics of the IRA's favourite weapon. Williams he | :39:48. | :39:54. | |
claimed he happened to have a Thompson submachine gun in the | :39:55. | :39:58. | |
back-seat, which is comical, ludicrous. You just don't happen to | :39:59. | :40:03. | |
have a Thompson under the back-seat of the car unless you are going to | :40:04. | :40:06. | |
use it for some purpose and not very nice purpose. One piece of evidence | :40:07. | :40:13. | |
the jury never heard was that the police suspected cover-up over the | :40:14. | :40:19. | |
Thompson. Because Williams had lied to them. At first he told detectives | :40:20. | :40:24. | |
he had fired a standard Army issue gun. When confronted with evidence | :40:25. | :40:29. | |
of Thompson bullet casings, he changed his story. Williams also | :40:30. | :40:35. | |
told the police this was the first and only time he had used the gun, | :40:36. | :40:42. | |
but was that true? We found an officer from another regiment who | :40:43. | :40:49. | |
told the military police in 1972 that he knew Williams sometimes went | :40:50. | :40:53. | |
on patrol with the Thompson. Other former MRF soldiers independently | :40:54. | :40:59. | |
told us the same story. Is it fair to say that it was Williams' weapon | :41:00. | :41:06. | |
of choice? Yes. Because? Because he liked it. Because? It was powerful. | :41:07. | :41:12. | |
It had knock-down power. It was a weapon that was associated to the | :41:13. | :41:17. | |
terror groups. It was part of the disguise, which was perfect. If I | :41:18. | :41:23. | |
had had access and permission, I would probably have used it as well. | :41:24. | :41:27. | |
They were playing at being bandits, weren't they? They were meant to be | :41:28. | :41:33. | |
IRA outlaws, that is what they were pretending to be, I presume. That is | :41:34. | :41:38. | |
why they were in plainclothes and operating in plain vehicles and they | :41:39. | :41:45. | |
had Thompson submachine guns. To what end? What was the military | :41:46. | :41:53. | |
objective? No idea, no idea. After a brief trial where several key | :41:54. | :41:57. | |
witnesses were not called to give evidence in person, the jury had to | :41:58. | :42:01. | |
decide if they believe Williams in the face of witnesses whose accounts | :42:02. | :42:08. | |
contradicted his. The evidence produced proof there were no guns, | :42:09. | :42:14. | |
no bullet cases, that the windscreen was knocked out from the inside, | :42:15. | :42:19. | |
there was a Thompson submachine gun and the evidence against him, he got | :42:20. | :42:25. | |
cleared. How did you feel about that? Sickened. Williams was | :42:26. | :42:29. | |
acquitted of attempted murder by a majority verdict. He was | :42:30. | :42:34. | |
subsequently promoted, leaving the Army with the rank of captain and | :42:35. | :42:41. | |
the military medal for bravery. Today, Williams lives on the other | :42:42. | :42:46. | |
side of the world, so we went to find him to see if 40 years on he | :42:47. | :42:50. | |
was prepared to answer questions about the people he had shot with | :42:51. | :42:56. | |
the Thompson submachine gun. This is where we think Clive Williams | :42:57. | :43:01. | |
lives. It has been quite difficult him down, but we called the house we | :43:02. | :43:08. | |
are about to visit. His wife answered and said there was no such | :43:09. | :43:12. | |
person living there, but we think he does live there. Anyway, we will | :43:13. | :43:15. | |
soon find out. Hi, Mr Williams? Yes. Sorry to | :43:16. | :43:31. | |
bother you, John Ware is my name. I am making a programme for the BBC. | :43:32. | :43:37. | |
Not interested, go away. We have some questions to put you. We have | :43:38. | :43:41. | |
some questions to put to you. And they are serious allegations about | :43:42. | :43:45. | |
the number of people that you are alleged to have shot. A lot of | :43:46. | :43:51. | |
people will say that your silence speaks for itself. | :43:52. | :43:58. | |
One of the questions Williams would not discuss was how he came to have | :43:59. | :44:02. | |
a Thompson submachine gun in the first place. Something else the jury | :44:03. | :44:08. | |
wasn't told was that the Tommy gun used by Williams wasn't even owned | :44:09. | :44:11. | |
by the army. In fact it belonged to this man. Hamish McGregor, | :44:12. | :44:17. | |
29-year-old captain serving in Northern Ireland to Parra. He had | :44:18. | :44:23. | |
previously seen active service in Aden, and winning the military Cross | :44:24. | :44:28. | |
for gallantry. We had many casualties coming in and the | :44:29. | :44:34. | |
soldiers behaved magnificently. In May 1972, McGregor joins the MRF and | :44:35. | :44:38. | |
with him came his privately owned Thompson, which was kept in the MRF | :44:39. | :44:42. | |
armoury. He officially became the unit's Commander 12 hours after | :44:43. | :44:46. | |
Williams used the weapon to shoot four people. We wrote to McGregor, | :44:47. | :44:54. | |
who retired as a Brigadier, to ask had he authorised Williams to take | :44:55. | :44:58. | |
his Thompson on patrol? After a month, we heard nothing, so we paid | :44:59. | :45:06. | |
him a visit. Mr Ware, I was going to the Post Office to post you a | :45:07. | :45:10. | |
letter. I see. So I don't want to be interviewed. Thank you. McGregor's | :45:11. | :45:15. | |
letter insisted that the only reason that the MRF had a Thompson was for | :45:16. | :45:19. | |
training. However, our evidence seems compelling, that at least one | :45:20. | :45:24. | |
of his men used it for more sinister purposes. By July 1972, the pressure | :45:25. | :45:36. | |
was on for the MRF to get results. In Belfast this afternoon, as the | :45:37. | :45:40. | |
streets were thronged with weekend shoppers, bombs exploded one another | :45:41. | :45:46. | |
the other... The IRA had spectacularly breached the security | :45:47. | :45:49. | |
cordon around Belfast city centre. In just 65 minutes, 19 bombs were | :45:50. | :45:55. | |
exploded, killing nine and horribly maiming many others. Bloody Friday, | :45:56. | :46:04. | |
is one of the worst days I can ever remember. It was a war zone. Report | :46:05. | :46:11. | |
on this the heaviest days bombing since the Troubles began in Ulster. | :46:12. | :46:16. | |
That has never gone from the back of my head. From that then, we were | :46:17. | :46:20. | |
under a hell of a lot of pressure. We had to get results because people | :46:21. | :46:24. | |
from above were screaming murder, to prevent all this happening. Results | :46:25. | :46:28. | |
meaning what? Well, you know, to curb the IRA presence coming into | :46:29. | :46:42. | |
Belfast. Officially, the MRF didn't exist. However, by autumn 1972, | :46:43. | :46:47. | |
rumours about a trigger-happy undercover Army unit were rife. That | :46:48. | :46:53. | |
September, another section of the MRF was involved in an incident | :46:54. | :46:56. | |
which would make the unit a liability. It involved two young | :46:57. | :47:05. | |
Catholic friends - Daniel Rooney and Brendan Brennan. The thing I | :47:06. | :47:09. | |
remember is leaving the girlfriend's house, as I was turning into me own | :47:10. | :47:18. | |
street I seen Daniel and met up and we started to talk about different | :47:19. | :47:22. | |
things. We were just standing at the corner, and we were just standing | :47:23. | :47:27. | |
having a conversation, the three of us. As we were standing talking, we | :47:28. | :47:32. | |
noticed the cars coming down St James' Road with the, the lights | :47:33. | :47:37. | |
full blast. They more or less glanced at us, and we looked at them | :47:38. | :47:42. | |
and... Just suspicion. -- suspicious. Deirdre and I come down | :47:43. | :47:52. | |
St James' Road, we were on the Falls Road and we were just chatting. And | :47:53. | :47:57. | |
there only seemed to be a matter of minutes when a fella came out of one | :47:58. | :48:01. | |
of the houses across the street and shouted to us, "Get off the corner | :48:02. | :48:05. | |
because there's strange cars in the district." It was something about | :48:06. | :48:09. | |
the car and the way it was driving and we just both of us then, just | :48:10. | :48:15. | |
turned and ran. The car went by and we were talking about it. And | :48:16. | :48:18. | |
that's, that's when the shooting started. GUNFIRE It just turned and | :48:19. | :48:36. | |
came towards us and shot. I can remember thinking, "I'm gonna be | :48:37. | :48:38. | |
killed here." He told me that he was shot and he | :48:39. | :48:54. | |
thought he was going to die. And I told him no, he'd be alright. A | :48:55. | :49:06. | |
bullet had torn through an artery. Daniel Rooney was just 18. I was | :49:07. | :49:13. | |
actually in me own house when I was told that he was dead. And do you | :49:14. | :49:24. | |
remember how you reacted? Yeah, I cried me eyes out. What was he like? | :49:25. | :49:35. | |
Cheeky chap by, you know, girls all loved him and very pleasant coming | :49:36. | :49:44. | |
going. -- cheeky chappie. Very happy-go-lucky, just out to have a | :49:45. | :49:47. | |
good time and a good laugh. He would have been a kidder, you know, he | :49:48. | :49:52. | |
would have had a joke with you and that, you know. The next day, the | :49:53. | :49:56. | |
Army admitted plaipb clothed soldiers had been -- plain-clothed | :49:57. | :50:00. | |
soldiers had been involved. 100 local women came out in protest. I | :50:01. | :50:08. | |
run down and lifted one of them young lads, oh God, blood was just | :50:09. | :50:13. | |
oozing out of them. One was shot in the back, right there in the whole | :50:14. | :50:16. | |
back, the other one was shot right in the stomach. The Army's version | :50:17. | :50:21. | |
of what happened is that a patrol of two cars with soldiers in civilian | :50:22. | :50:25. | |
uniforms was coming up street when five shots were fired at them. The | :50:26. | :50:29. | |
Army claimed that Daniel Rooney was a known IRA gunman. There is no | :50:30. | :50:33. | |
credible evidence for this. The IRA have never claimed him as a member, | :50:34. | :50:37. | |
and on this Republican memorial a few hundred yards from where he | :50:38. | :50:40. | |
died, Daniel Rooney is commemorated as a civilian. There's a pattern | :50:41. | :50:48. | |
here. This is the third shooting in a matter of months where MRF have | :50:49. | :50:53. | |
been involved, they say they've seen gunmen and weapons, the wounded and | :50:54. | :50:57. | |
the dead are tested, swabbed, on each and every occasion there is no | :50:58. | :51:02. | |
positive test of being near the weapons. How do you explain that? I | :51:03. | :51:08. | |
don't. What do you think the explanation, what do you think the | :51:09. | :51:11. | |
explanation might be? Is it possible that the police that tested them | :51:12. | :51:16. | |
didn't really test them? A lot of strange things happened in Ireland | :51:17. | :51:19. | |
at that time. The Army didn't trust the police. The police didn't trust | :51:20. | :51:26. | |
the Army. We didn't trust anybody. Nor in 1972 was there much trust in | :51:27. | :51:32. | |
the ability of the Army to investigate itself. Fatal Army | :51:33. | :51:37. | |
shootings were usually left to the Royal Military Police to | :51:38. | :51:42. | |
investigate. The enquiries sometimes amounted to little more than a cosy | :51:43. | :51:47. | |
chat. We would have a cup of coffee, we would discuss what happened and | :51:48. | :51:53. | |
then we would hand our reports over. Did the Royal Military Police | :51:54. | :51:56. | |
basically used to rewrite your reports? Erm, I think so. It is | :51:57. | :52:02. | |
possible. They made some adjustments. I would imagine it was | :52:03. | :52:08. | |
possible for people to oncoct stories under those circumstances. A | :52:09. | :52:11. | |
section that had been involved in an action, or half a section had been | :52:12. | :52:14. | |
involved in an action, sort of, you know, let's get this story together, | :52:15. | :52:19. | |
boys. That would be possible. I'm not saying it happened. It would be | :52:20. | :52:29. | |
possible. 3,260 people died in the 30-year conflict. Today, former | :52:30. | :52:33. | |
detectives are reviewing all those deaths. They belong to the | :52:34. | :52:38. | |
Historical Enquiries Team set up to assist the peace process. For many | :52:39. | :52:43. | |
families, the HET is their last chance to find out who killed their | :52:44. | :52:51. | |
relatives and why. You are still asking questions 40 years on? Oh | :52:52. | :52:56. | |
yes, we want the truth. We don't want to stop. Some people would say | :52:57. | :53:06. | |
you can't turn the clock back, you have to get on with your life? We | :53:07. | :53:08. | |
have. But it's still there. By late 1972, the Army top brass | :53:09. | :53:28. | |
were winding up the MRF. It appears that the Prime Minister, Edward | :53:29. | :53:32. | |
Heath, had been informed why. At Heath's request, a top secret note | :53:33. | :53:36. | |
reminded the military that whatever undercover unit replaced the MRF... | :53:37. | :53:40. | |
Special care should be taken to operate within the law. There have | :53:41. | :53:50. | |
been several occasions where you have acknowledged what the police | :53:51. | :53:55. | |
would describe as "criminal behaviour". You would accept that? | :53:56. | :54:00. | |
They would probably describe it as criminal behaviour, yeah. How would | :54:01. | :54:03. | |
you describe it? Fighting terrorists. In an unconventional way | :54:04. | :54:11. | |
and saving innocent people's lives, which we did. We asked the MRF's | :54:12. | :54:17. | |
officer commanding about the claims made by his men. Hamish McGregor | :54:18. | :54:22. | |
insisted to us that he ran a pretty tight ship and that the MRF was | :54:23. | :54:27. | |
never tasked to hunt down IRA leaders and shoot them. That would | :54:28. | :54:33. | |
have been against the law, he said, his unit had always abided by the | :54:34. | :54:38. | |
Yellow Card rules. I am extremely disappointed that a very few have | :54:39. | :54:45. | |
sensationalised a routine job and invented stish fictitious incidents | :54:46. | :54:50. | |
to give the impression that the MRT was anything other than a | :54:51. | :54:54. | |
properly-controlled and accountable unit. Whatever orders Captain | :54:55. | :54:58. | |
McGregor gave, it seems they weren't enough to stop some of his soldiers | :54:59. | :55:04. | |
opening fire on unarmed men. I'm not saying that anybody stood up and | :55:05. | :55:11. | |
said you have to do this, it was a prototype counter-terrorist unit and | :55:12. | :55:14. | |
we had to make up the procedures as we went along - and we did. Was it | :55:15. | :55:18. | |
an understanding that you should open fire? On these top players, | :55:19. | :55:24. | |
whether they were armed or unarmed? Or was it a specific order? We had | :55:25. | :55:28. | |
to use our own initiative. That is why I was selected for this | :55:29. | :55:33. | |
operation, to use my own initiative. The MRT was answerable to 39 Brigade | :55:34. | :55:38. | |
under the command of Brigadier Alexander Boswell. The MRF was wound | :55:39. | :55:45. | |
down after an MoD review concluded there was no provision for detailed | :55:46. | :55:54. | |
command and control. So we asked Brigadier Alexander Boswell if that | :55:55. | :56:00. | |
meant lethal MRF operations were not properly supervised. He declined to | :56:01. | :56:06. | |
comment. Asked about the allegations that MRF soldiers shot unarmed men, | :56:07. | :56:11. | |
the Ministry of Defence say they have referred this to the police to | :56:12. | :56:16. | |
investigate. Your job was to hunt down the enemy? And to kill them, | :56:17. | :56:21. | |
yes. That's what was done. Were they specifically sent out to... If you | :56:22. | :56:25. | |
are talking about assassination squads, certainly not. We were there | :56:26. | :56:31. | |
to do a job. To eliminate an enemy that was ruthless, dedicated to | :56:32. | :56:36. | |
their cause. I totally reject the death squad. But, you know, put | :56:37. | :56:43. | |
yourself in my situation. Yeah, we are on our homeland, we have a dirty | :56:44. | :56:48. | |
war, a war that was out of control. We knew who the operators were. We | :56:49. | :56:55. | |
knew who the shooters were. So what are you going to do about it, John? | :56:56. | :56:59. | |
I'm asking you the question now. What are you going to do about it? | :57:00. | :57:03. | |
Are you going to allow these people to carry on, killing innocent | :57:04. | :57:08. | |
people? Planting bombs? Killing ordinary civilians? People in this | :57:09. | :57:13. | |
country were killed. So how would you define it? I think you have | :57:14. | :57:23. | |
answered the question. OK. The IRA surrendered its weapons largely | :57:24. | :57:28. | |
because undercover soldiers and policemen crippled its ability to | :57:29. | :57:35. | |
fight. The MRF was the prototype of this undercover war and the soldiers | :57:36. | 0:50:41 | |
who have appeared on camera have done | 0:50:42 | 0:50:43 |