Britain's Secret Terror Force Panorama


Britain's Secret Terror Force

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This programme contains some strong language and scenes which some

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viewers may find upsetting from the start. This is the story of the

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secret British Army unit set up to deal with enemies of the state on

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the streets of the United Kingdom. So what was the mission as you

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understood it? To draw out the IRA and to minimise their activities.

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Minimise their activities. In what way? If they needed shooting, they

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would be shot. Now, after 40 years of silence, members of this

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undercover unit speaks candidly about what they did for Queen and

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Country. We were not there to act like an army unit. We were there to

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act like a terror group. This is a 9mm SMG Sterling, a little bit

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beyond the normal SMG because it is fitted with a silencer. We picked up

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shells which would went right down the street for another 20 yards, it

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is a Sterling automatic. We have investigated the unit and discovered

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evidence that this branch of the British state sometimes behaved like

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that IRA and shot unarmed civilians. He thought he was going to die. And

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I told him, no. Tonight, we tracked down one soldier accused of firing

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on innocent citizens. Hello. Mr Williams. John Ware is my name. 40

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years on, the victims and their relatives still want answers. Oh,

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yes, we want the truth. We don't want to stop, to get to the truth.

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People like us had to make decisions and a horrendous pressure. And make

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the right decision. That is why I am here today and they are not.

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In January 1972, British paratroopers shot 26 unarmed

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civilians during a protest in Londonderry. 14 people died in what

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became known as Bloody Sunday. What happened next is obscure. The army

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say their men were fired on... Getting to the truth took nearly 40

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years and an enquiry costing nearly ?200 million. Some of those soldiers

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are now being investigated for murder and attempted murder. What

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happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable.

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Today, case files of the conflict's 3260 dead are being reviewed as part

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of the peace process. Our investigation has discovered another

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group of soldiers who now stand accused of shooting unarmed

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civilians in 1972. These soldiers were undercover and what they did

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has been airbrushed from the official record. But some have now

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emerged from the shadows. I was told it was a plainclothes small unit

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operating mainly in Belfast and it was called the MRF. Which stands

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for? It stand for Military Reaction Force. Seven former members of the

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MRF have spoken to us about the unit did. Three agreed to go in front of

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the cameras on condition that we disguised their identities. I

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travelled from Liverpool and ended up in Belfast on a very dark

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Knight, waiting on the harbour there, waiting for them to pick me

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up, unarmed and eventually ended up in Holywood. The barracks? Palace

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barracks. Inside the barracks was a big iron compound and it looks like

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a builder's storage yard. Anyway, we pulled up at the main gate of the

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compound and the gates just opened. We couldn't take anything, was even

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photographs, no ID cards, no letters with addresses on, nothing. Anything

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tying us to the military was totally out. We never got a uniform, very

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few people knew what rank anybody was. I knew the boss was a captain.

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These are the only known photographs of the MRF compound tucked away

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inside a British Army base where ordinary soldiers were forbidden

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entry. This top-secret unit had around 40

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men, hand-picked from across the British Army. These were selected

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men who have had experience, who were well trained, knew their

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weapons, reliability and all the rest of the things which makes a

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good soldier and put into teams and sent across. We were told we

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officially don't exist on paper. The unit doesn't exist on paper. And if

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you are caught, you will be killed. And if you are caught and killed,

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the Government would probably put out a story that you were just a

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soldier in plainclothes that was caught by accident. The unit carried

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out round-the-clock patrols of West Belfast, heartland of the IRA

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unmarked cars. The cover didn't always work. When I had my first

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operation there were three of us in this really clapped-out Avenger. I

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was the back-seat driver. We saw a car that was on the wanted list and

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all of a sudden we turned around and then there were the power behinds.

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-- they were up our behinds. We were carrying the personal weapon, a

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Browning. 9mm. All of a sudden they opened up with ArmaLites. All of the

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excitement going to the interviews, all of a sudden I am now in the

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firing line, in the back-seat of this bloody car that was absolutely

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clapped-out, petrified. This is the end before I even start. The car was

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riddled with bullets and not one of us were hit.

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MRF soldiers say they sometimes acted as bait, goading the IRA to

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come out and fight. The soldiers wanted to take the war to the enemy.

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This is a 9mm SMG, a Sterling, but this is a little bit beyond the

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normal SMG because it is fitted with a silencer. Why the silencer? Well,

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it is quiet. We were on special operations, soap, you know, we had

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to be silent. To kill silently? Yes, as simple as that.

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The military action Force was operating in what in 1972 was one of

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the world's most dangerous places. In the space of 16 minutes there

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were 13 blasts and sent people screaming from one place of safety

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to another, none of them knowing where the next explosion might come

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from. That year there were over 10,000 shootings. Nearly 500 died,

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5000 injured. There was evil in the air just about everywhere. The

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shooting of soldiers and police was not an everyday occurrence but

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certainly a week occurrence. Looking back now it was chaotic and

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horrendous. The IRA planted nearly 1800 bombs. An average of five a

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day. Take away the religious aspect and some of these enemies were just

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people who had got hold of weapons and they wanted to shoot somebody.

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They were pure gangsters because somebody had given them a gun. A

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soldier was shot on open ground after an earlier attack on an army

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post nearby. Belfast was on the edge of anarchy. The politicians turned

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to the Army to restore order. To the MRF went the task of

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infiltrating IRA strongholds to see more while not being seen. British

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soldiers trying to pass themselves off as local. So you needed a

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variety of different guises. Yes. There was the trolley to pull, road

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sweeping. Belfast City Council dustbins. We would use those on

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covert operations. For what purpose? To stand around in the street. To

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pose as adjustment. Yes, you could observe a house or people. I spent

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quite a long as a meths drinker. Just lining -- lying in the gutters

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in the streets. You would have a machine gun in a bin. You wouldn't

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have rubbish in the bin. You would have the machine gun in the bin. I

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had spare magazines strapped to my leg and I carried a PPK on the back

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of my belt, a Browning under my left and my radio on my right hand side.

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We were quite armed. You never attracted any suspicion? No. It

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takes a lot of courage and it is a cold courage. It is not the courage

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of hot blood, which soldiers in a firefight in conventional terms will

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find the adrenaline rounds and gives them that extra. Jackson had served

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in Belfast as the young paratrooper and eventually became head of the

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British Army. He says he was barely aware of the MRF's activities, but

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he does admire the courage they would have needed. And you know if

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you are discovered a pretty gruesome fate may well await you. Torture

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followed by murder. However, surveillance was just one part of

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the MRF's mission, according to the soldiers we spoke to. We had two

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basic arms. One was a surveillance, information, intelligence gathering

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organisation and the other side was hard-hitting counterterrorist unit.

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Tell me about the hard-hitting side. The hard-hitting side, we went out

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and shot the terrorists. Like they'd uniformed comrades, MRF soldiers

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were given stop on sight mugshots of wanted IRA members. They say they

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would sometimes do more than just stop them. If you had a player who

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was well-known who carried out quite a lot of assassinations, then he had

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to be taken out. Taken out -- meaning? Taken out. Killed? Yes.

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These were people # These were players, known shooters. Shot on

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sight if you saw them? They were known in the organisation. We were

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hunting down hard-core baby killers. Terrorists. People that would kill

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you without even thinking about it. Yellow bobbing killers themselves,

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they had no mercy for anybody. They would kill each other for opening

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their mouth. With over 10,000 shootings in 1972 it is simply not

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possible to say how many the MRF were involved in.

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NEWS ARCHIVE: The killings have all the hallmarks

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of sectarian murders. The men were Catholics and had left the pub where

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one was a barman. MRF operational records have been destroyed and the

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soldiers we have interviewed have avoided incriminating themselves or

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their comrades. What is clear though is that in 1972 some plainclothes

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soldiers did think it acceptable to shoot unarmed people.

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In April that year, brothers John and Gerry Conway were on their way

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to a fruit stall they ran in Belfast city centre. As usual I was

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delivering the newspapers, which I did every day. The Conway Brothers,

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Gary and that, the fruit then, that is how I knew Jerry, the fruit man.

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He just waved over and the next thing these two cars appeared out of

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nowhere, just appeared. A car pulled up alongside. A man

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wound down the back window, like that. Run! He ran towards the Falls

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Road. He turned back towards Ballymurphy. The next thing, these

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people jumped out and shot him. Bullet lodged there in me. Gerry had

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been running down the Whiterock, and our car was there, so he had come

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over to the car and jumped on top of it squealing, please don't shoot me,

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I have a wife and four wee children. I think at that stage he didn't

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realise that he was shot, you know. It's the first time I'd seen blood

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so thick. I know you cut yourself, you get blood. But I'd never seen -

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I'm sorry... Who did you think had shot you? I didn't know who it was.

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Plain-clothes soldiers had shot a couple of unarmed men mistaking them

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for two of the IRA's most deadly snipers. Witnesses heard the

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soldiers say they'd got Tommy "Toddler" Tolan and Jim Bryson. I

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says, "That's not Bryson, that's not Bryson. That's Gerry, he's a frui -

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that's wee Gerry the fruit man." By the time uniformed soldiers arrived,

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John Conway had vanished. His brother Gerry was badly wounded and

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taken to hospital by the Army where they still insisted he was IRA man

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Jim Bryson. I got on to the corridor I could hear my brother shouting.

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And this soldier kept insisting and said to my brother, "Tell me you're

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locking Bryson." This soldier would keep repeating he was Bryson. And I

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think if my brother said he was Bryson, they would have locking shot

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him, and that's my point of view. Even today, the Ministry of Defence

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refuse to say whether soldiers in this shooting were members of the

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MRF. And the MRF soldiers we've interviewed wouldn't comment on

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specific operations either. We were there in a position to go after the

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IRA and kill them when we found them. Whether they were armed or

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not? Occasionally, yes. It was shootings like that of the two

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unarmed Conway brothers that sparked rumours of an undercover Army unit

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engaged in assassinations. The Government gave this denial to

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Parliament. In no circumstances are soldiers employed to assassinate

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people or in any way which would involve deliberately going outside

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the law. Patrols work under normal military discipline and in

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accordance with the Yellow Card. The Yellow Card set out the rules under

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which soldiers were allowed to open fire. Troops were ordered not to

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shoot unless their lives, or the lives of others, were in immediate

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danger. The orders are if you can see a gunman, a man with a weapon,

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then you may shoot him. A man with a weapon. The use of force must be

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reasonable in the circumstances, what the Yellow Card set out to do

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was to give some codification to that word "reasonable". It was a

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guide for soldiers to say if you want to stay within the law, follow

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this? Precisely. You knew the rules of the Yellow Card? Yes, inside out.

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They didn't apply to the MRF? No. I just want to be clear about where

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the red line was as it were? I think it's a fuzzy red line. It would

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depend on the situation, how it developed. Whereas the uniform

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people they would be rigidly bound by it even down to the fact they had

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to carry the card or face court martial or at least get charged.

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There was some discretion allowed in your case? In the MRF's case? There

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would be, yes. If I've got a weapon, but I wasn't aiming the weapon at

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you, I was a legitimate target? If you had a weapon? But I wasn't

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aiming at you? No, you are supposed to be arrested. I know, but you

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didn't. No. You would do what? Shoot you. At the time, the Army's leading

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expert on counter-terrorism was this man, Brigadier Frank Kitson. A

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textbook he wrote became the Army's manual on counter-insurgency. In

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order to put an insurgency campaign down one must use a mix of measures,

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not just military measures. And it is sometimes necessary to do

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unpleasant things, which lose certain amount of allegiance for a

:19:47.:19:50.

moment in order to produce your overall result. Kitson was also

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commander in Belfast when the MRF was established. He had done much of

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his soldiering in the dying days of empire - fighting in the British

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colonies of Kenya and Malaya. Kitson departed Northern Ireland in April

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1972. Some of those he left behind had been schooled in the aggressive

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tactics of small colonial wars - some of which were illegal under

:20:19.:20:27.

British law. We'd seen Malaya, the fighting in Malaya, Cyprus, and

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things didn't always go by the book. In 1972, Tony Le Tissier was a Major

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in the Royal Military Police. He had been posted to Belfast to deal with

:20:43.:20:45.

a backlog of legal complaints against the Army. For the

:20:46.:20:51.

professional soldier, no, it was difficult to accept that this was

:20:52.:20:54.

the United Kingdom. It was a fighting situation for which you had

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been trained sort of thing and you were going to use the same methods

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here. There were elements in the Army that had imported a colonial

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approach to Northern Ireland? Virtually, the whole lot had

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imported this, it wasn't just elements. It was a strong theme

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within the, the armed forces, that was the experience that they were

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bringing to Northern Ireland, where it was not applicable. Well, I mean,

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you could just about do anything you wanted. Northern Ireland was firmly

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split along sectarian lines. Both Republican and Loyalist gunmen would

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drive into each other's areas and fire at unsuspecting civilians -

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these became known as drive-by shootings. Work began this morning

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on putting up permanent barricades to block side streets in part of

:21:57.:22:01.

Ballymacarret, the strongly Protestant district alongside the

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shipyard. Both Protestants and Catholics set up barricades to

:22:05.:22:08.

protect their communities. Both had lost faith in the British state's

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ability to protect them. Youths and men, masked and uniformed, armed

:22:17.:22:20.

with modern weapons patrol openly. They control completely entry and

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departure. The IRA would sometimes stage events like this for the

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cameras. In fact, barricades were often amateurish, with unarmed

:22:30.:22:34.

locals just "doing their bit" to protect their communities. But

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that's not how some MRF soldiers saw barricades. Barricades were illegal.

:22:39.:22:48.

And generally, a barricade in really bad area, there was almost someone

:22:49.:22:53.

always armed on that barricade. You may not see the weapon, but it's

:22:54.:22:56.

almost certain that somebody's going to be armed. We used to just plod

:22:57.:23:07.

along, do a quick assess of the situation, and then move in and take

:23:08.:23:12.

a few targets out and move along and let the uniform sort the rest out.

:23:13.:23:17.

When you say "take a few targets out", you mean individuals on the

:23:18.:23:21.

barricades? Yeah, and they were fully armed, displaying weapons.

:23:22.:23:28.

Another MRF soldier told us whether or not they could see weapons on a

:23:29.:23:32.

barricade, they'd sometimes, as he put it, give them a blast! We've

:23:33.:23:40.

investigated two incidents where witnesses say this happened with

:23:41.:23:49.

devastating consequences. The first was just before midnight. Aiden

:23:50.:23:55.

McAloon and Eugene Devlin were in a taxi taking them home from a disco.

:23:56.:24:01.

I remember saying at the time, "There's a car behind us" and

:24:02.:24:05.

somebody said, "Oh it wasn't much heed paid." We didn't pay much

:24:06.:24:13.

attention to it. We were tired and on our way home. This is the first

:24:14.:24:16.

time these men have told their story. Taxi turned around, dropped

:24:17.:24:27.

us off, we walked up Slievegallion Drive, there was a barricade further

:24:28.:24:32.

on up. Which was sparsely manned, five or six people, maybe. At that

:24:33.:24:38.

moment, an MRF patrol car came cruising by. GUNFIRE I thought it

:24:39.:24:50.

was all over. I thought it was the end. They were meaning to kill or

:24:51.:24:57.

maim someone that night and they were trying their damnedest to do

:24:58.:25:01.

that. Within hours of the shooting, the soldiers had made routine

:25:02.:25:04.

witness statements to the Royal Military Police - and we've

:25:05.:25:08.

unearthed those statements. They don't match what thele civilians

:25:09.:25:13.

have told us. As we approached the junction a car began to reverse on

:25:14.:25:17.

to the Andersontown Road. In the headlights of the reversing car, I

:25:18.:25:20.

saw a man at the junction. He was armed with a firearm which was aimed

:25:21.:25:27.

towards us. Did you see a rifle at all? No rifle. Did you have a rifle?

:25:28.:25:31.

No. Do you remember seeing a man with a rifle? Definitely not. Did

:25:32.:25:37.

you have a rifle? No. I heard a shot fired which could have been aimed at

:25:38.:25:41.

us or the reversing car. I then aimed at the man with the rifle and

:25:42.:25:49.

fired eight rounds from my SMG. Later that night, both victims say

:25:50.:25:55.

they were forensically tested by the police to see if they had handled

:25:56.:25:59.

firearms. The results were negative. They were out to do something that

:26:00.:26:02.

night. There was no-one had weapons at that barricade. After opening

:26:03.:26:11.

fire, the MRF car returned to the base. However, it was part of a

:26:12.:26:16.

two-car patrol, and the second one continued to circulate. Within

:26:17.:26:20.

minutes, five more men had been shot. GUNFIRE A man came to my door

:26:21.:26:36.

and told me that a man had been shot. I recognised him as Pat

:26:37.:26:43.

McVeigh, one of the parishionerers from my district. I knelt down

:26:44.:26:48.

beside him and gave him the last rites. Was he conscious? No, he was

:26:49.:26:54.

dead. Patrick McVeigh's family say he had been on his way home from the

:26:55.:26:58.

pub and had stopped to chat to some friends dismantling a makeshift

:26:59.:27:03.

barricade. I arrived home late and there was people standing in the

:27:04.:27:06.

hall, and I couldn't understand what was happening and the door opened

:27:07.:27:10.

and there was a neighbour, and when I walked in she just pulled me and

:27:11.:27:17.

said, "Your daddy's dead, he was shot" and obviously you're in

:27:18.:27:23.

denial, shaking your head, "No, no." At that stage, my mummy had been

:27:24.:27:28.

sedated by the doctor and, ah, that's how I found out. What was

:27:29.:27:41.

your dad like? Um, a good person, um, very loyal, hard-working, good

:27:42.:27:48.

to his children, um, just a nice person. I was horrified when I heard

:27:49.:27:57.

the man had been killed and I couldn't believe it. I just thinking

:27:58.:28:05.

to myself how lucky I had been to be alive. Patrick McVeigh and several

:28:06.:28:12.

other people were at this corner of Riverdale Park, a Ford Cortina swept

:28:13.:28:18.

up and a machine-gunner inside sprayed the group with at least 20

:28:19.:28:22.

bullets. The IRA propaganda machine was quick to exploit the shooting.

:28:23.:28:26.

Gerry O'Hare was then the IRA's Belfast spokesman. Were any of the

:28:27.:28:31.

men that you saw known to you to be involved in the IRA? No, absolutely

:28:32.:28:35.

not. There were people who, at night-time, would have come out and

:28:36.:28:39.

manned the barricades in their own areas and they had to be local

:28:40.:28:42.

people because they would have known who was coming in and coming out.

:28:43.:28:45.

You couldn't put people who didn't live in the area on there. We've

:28:46.:28:55.

learned the identity of the commander of the MRF car who opened

:28:56.:28:59.

fire with his machine-gun on Patrick McVeigh. Sergeant Clive Williams of

:29:00.:29:04.

the Royal Military Police - known as Taff. This is a rare picture of Taff

:29:05.:29:08.

Williams. Taken when he was in the MRF it's a grainy official

:29:09.:29:14.

photograph which shows him dressed in civvies. I would say he was

:29:15.:29:19.

fearless. Was he a compassionate man? With us, yes. Not with the

:29:20.:29:28.

enemy. He had a good feeling for it, did Taff Williams. Four hours after

:29:29.:29:32.

the shooting, Sergeant Williams gave his version of events in a statement

:29:33.:29:36.

to a fellow Sergeant in the Royal Military Police. One of the men in

:29:37.:29:41.

the group of four raised his weapon and fired three rounds at the

:29:42.:29:47.

vehicle. The wounded men and their clothes were swabbed to see if there

:29:48.:29:50.

was any evidence they had fired weapons. The forensic lab could find

:29:51.:30:02.

none. Tests in 1972 were not as reliable as they are today. However,

:30:03.:30:06.

police at the time was satisfied that none of the men had been armed.

:30:07.:30:11.

The army tried to cover up their involvement in this shooting. They

:30:12.:30:13.

called it a crime which was motiveless. Implying it was

:30:14.:30:21.

sectarian. The assumption was it was a group of loyalists that had done

:30:22.:30:25.

the shooting and that was a dangerous assumption because that

:30:26.:30:27.

increased the tension between the two communities. It was six weeks

:30:28.:30:33.

before Mike Patricia McVeigh learned her father had been killed by

:30:34.:30:39.

undercover soldiers and then only by chance, from a detective. Added

:30:40.:30:44.

route reacts? Astonished, astounded, angry. -- how did we react? The

:30:45.:30:51.

forces who were supposed to be protecting us had actually killed my

:30:52.:30:59.

father and injured four the men -- four other men. It didn't seem

:31:00.:31:06.

right. When I went home that night to go to bed and I took off my

:31:07.:31:12.

trousers, my knees were covered in his blood. I felt it dreadful,

:31:13.:31:20.

washing the blood of that man from my knees.

:31:21.:31:27.

One of the MRF soldiers we have spoken to were involved that night

:31:28.:31:34.

-- norm of the soldiers. But one did explain why those on a barricade

:31:35.:31:37.

should not have been given the benefit of the doubt.

:31:38.:31:43.

We were finding our targets and we were shooting at them. We shot, we

:31:44.:31:52.

found our targets and we eliminated them or neutralising them. We didn't

:31:53.:31:58.

go around town, blasting, shooting all over the place like you see on

:31:59.:32:02.

the TV. We were looking for our targets, finding them and taking

:32:03.:32:06.

them down. We may not have seen a weapon but more than likely there

:32:07.:32:10.

would have been weapons there is a vigilante patrol. It is possible

:32:11.:32:13.

they could have been shot at even if the weather hadn't -- the weapon

:32:14.:32:18.

hadn't been seen. On occasions the MRF would make an assumption that

:32:19.:32:21.

someone had a weapon even if you couldn't see one? Occasionally. And

:32:22.:32:29.

they would get shot? Occasionally. Some people would say that was

:32:30.:32:36.

murder. In fact, I think most people would say it was murder. It is

:32:37.:32:41.

possible. I wouldn't say that. But if you haven't seen a weapon and you

:32:42.:32:45.

haven't evidence there is a weapon there is an assumption you can't

:32:46.:32:50.

keep -- kill people on that basis, can you? You are not supposed to but

:32:51.:32:56.

we were in a terrorist conflict and people in that area, it all depends

:32:57.:33:02.

on where they are and what they are doing at the time and as far as we

:33:03.:33:06.

were concerned, as far as I was concerned and a few other people in

:33:07.:33:11.

the unit were concerned, people caught in a specific situation, a

:33:12.:33:15.

specific area, were part and parcel of the terrorist organisation.

:33:16.:33:25.

Six weeks later Sergeant Taff Williams once once again on patrol,

:33:26.:33:31.

one that would eventually land him in court. This is what local

:33:32.:33:37.

witnesses say happened. That once again innocent and unarmed civilians

:33:38.:33:38.

were shot. A lovely sunny day, around about

:33:39.:34:00.

lunchtime. I was just sitting, the door open. This Cortina drew up. A

:34:01.:34:07.

guy sitting in the back putter submachine gun out of the window. He

:34:08.:34:15.

opened fire. The bullet came through the door and hit in the chest, that

:34:16.:34:21.

is what happened on a sunny afternoon. I didn't really hear any

:34:22.:34:31.

shooting. I sort of smelt it. Then I got this lightness, I thought I was

:34:32.:34:38.

shot in the head, then I just collapsed, that was me.

:34:39.:34:47.

Eileen Shaw saw the whole incident from her kitchen window. The card

:34:48.:34:54.

game down on the wrong side of the road. The back man produced a gun of

:34:55.:34:58.

some sort, fired indiscriminately at these men. Sergeant Williams had

:34:59.:35:04.

fired several bursts from a machine gun, hitting four men. You got a

:35:05.:35:11.

bullet in the chest, just one question not Just one, it is enough.

:35:12.:35:16.

Has it caused you much difficulty since? Yes. Pain. I have to go to

:35:17.:35:29.

hospital to get pain injections. Painkillers. Everyday? Every day.

:35:30.:35:40.

Even today, 40 years on? Even today, 40 years. Taff Williams says he only

:35:41.:35:44.

fired on the man because they had opened up on him. He said a bullet

:35:45.:35:48.

had smashed his rear windscreen. We got to the hospital, we were swamped

:35:49.:35:54.

by the police for forensics. There was no traces of nothing. None of

:35:55.:36:01.

you were involved? Not one. At first the army once again covered up their

:36:02.:36:06.

involvement. Later that day they said plainclothes soldiers had been

:36:07.:36:11.

shot at and returned fire. Detectives from the Royal Ulster

:36:12.:36:17.

Constabulary were suspicious. I do remember the shooting on the Glen

:36:18.:36:22.

Road. I do remember rumours going around that it was some funny army

:36:23.:36:28.

unit roaming about West Belfast and other parts doing strange

:36:29.:36:35.

shootings. We didn't find out they were called the MRF. When detectives

:36:36.:36:41.

inspected Sergeant Williams' car, they suspected he'd smashed the rear

:36:42.:36:45.

window to make it look as if he had come under fire. Williams was

:36:46.:36:51.

eventually sent for trial at this now derelict Belfast courthouse,

:36:52.:36:54.

charged on three counts of attempted murder. However, we can reveal that

:36:55.:37:02.

the jury got only a partial picture. I was given the job of covering the

:37:03.:37:11.

Williams trial. Is not in here? As reporters, we had never seen any

:37:12.:37:15.

undercover people being hauled into court and charged and prosecuted. It

:37:16.:37:24.

didn't happen. Within the Ministry of Defence, alarm bells rang at the

:37:25.:37:27.

prospect of this secret unit being unmasked. Declassified files show

:37:28.:37:34.

just how determined MoD were to protect the MRF. There can be no

:37:35.:37:40.

useful purpose in admitting the admittance -- existence of any such

:37:41.:37:44.

organisation. There seems to be considerable advantage in

:37:45.:37:46.

maintaining as much confusion as possible. Sergeant Williams' victims

:37:47.:37:55.

sat in the public gallery to see and hear his testimony. He was the

:37:56.:38:01.

double of Omar Sharif. Being so swarthy. Williams was put-in my

:38:02.:38:09.

charge to take to court. I had to hand him over to the police there at

:38:10.:38:14.

the actual trial its self. Williams' evidence was that he was

:38:15.:38:18.

responding to fire that had hit is moving vehicle. He was asked how he

:38:19.:38:22.

could possibly have returned fire at the men who were now behind his car

:38:23.:38:26.

and receding rapidly into the distance. So he used the end of the

:38:27.:38:36.

pew to demonstrate this. He sat there the gun on the floor in front

:38:37.:38:40.

of him and picked it up and whipped it around like this in the firing

:38:41.:38:45.

position. It was done in a matter of a split second, you know. That

:38:46.:38:50.

wasn't the only bit of courtroom drama that -- there had also been an

:38:51.:38:56.

extraordinary revelation. Williams had opened fire not with a standard

:38:57.:39:01.

Army issue weapon but with a gun commonly used by the IRA, Thompson

:39:02.:39:07.

submachine gun. We didn't know until then that this organisation was

:39:08.:39:13.

using an -- that this organisation was using IRA weapons. If you are

:39:14.:39:18.

using a Thompson submachine gun, the forensics come along later, taking

:39:19.:39:22.

bullet holes out of the car, a wall or body, they will say that man shot

:39:23.:39:28.

with that machine gun had been an IRA killing. When challenged over

:39:29.:39:32.

the Tommy gun, Williams gave an explanation for why he had had the

:39:33.:39:36.

weapon which he had never mentioned in his police interviews. He told

:39:37.:39:42.

the jury he had been on a firing range that morning, demonstrating

:39:43.:39:47.

the characteristics of the IRA's favourite weapon. Williams he

:39:48.:39:54.

claimed he happened to have a Thompson submachine gun in the

:39:55.:39:58.

back-seat, which is comical, ludicrous. You just don't happen to

:39:59.:40:03.

have a Thompson under the back-seat of the car unless you are going to

:40:04.:40:06.

use it for some purpose and not very nice purpose. One piece of evidence

:40:07.:40:13.

the jury never heard was that the police suspected cover-up over the

:40:14.:40:19.

Thompson. Because Williams had lied to them. At first he told detectives

:40:20.:40:24.

he had fired a standard Army issue gun. When confronted with evidence

:40:25.:40:29.

of Thompson bullet casings, he changed his story. Williams also

:40:30.:40:35.

told the police this was the first and only time he had used the gun,

:40:36.:40:42.

but was that true? We found an officer from another regiment who

:40:43.:40:49.

told the military police in 1972 that he knew Williams sometimes went

:40:50.:40:53.

on patrol with the Thompson. Other former MRF soldiers independently

:40:54.:40:59.

told us the same story. Is it fair to say that it was Williams' weapon

:41:00.:41:06.

of choice? Yes. Because? Because he liked it. Because? It was powerful.

:41:07.:41:12.

It had knock-down power. It was a weapon that was associated to the

:41:13.:41:17.

terror groups. It was part of the disguise, which was perfect. If I

:41:18.:41:23.

had had access and permission, I would probably have used it as well.

:41:24.:41:27.

They were playing at being bandits, weren't they? They were meant to be

:41:28.:41:33.

IRA outlaws, that is what they were pretending to be, I presume. That is

:41:34.:41:38.

why they were in plainclothes and operating in plain vehicles and they

:41:39.:41:45.

had Thompson submachine guns. To what end? What was the military

:41:46.:41:53.

objective? No idea, no idea. After a brief trial where several key

:41:54.:41:57.

witnesses were not called to give evidence in person, the jury had to

:41:58.:42:01.

decide if they believe Williams in the face of witnesses whose accounts

:42:02.:42:08.

contradicted his. The evidence produced proof there were no guns,

:42:09.:42:14.

no bullet cases, that the windscreen was knocked out from the inside,

:42:15.:42:19.

there was a Thompson submachine gun and the evidence against him, he got

:42:20.:42:25.

cleared. How did you feel about that? Sickened. Williams was

:42:26.:42:29.

acquitted of attempted murder by a majority verdict. He was

:42:30.:42:34.

subsequently promoted, leaving the Army with the rank of captain and

:42:35.:42:41.

the military medal for bravery. Today, Williams lives on the other

:42:42.:42:46.

side of the world, so we went to find him to see if 40 years on he

:42:47.:42:50.

was prepared to answer questions about the people he had shot with

:42:51.:42:56.

the Thompson submachine gun. This is where we think Clive Williams

:42:57.:43:01.

lives. It has been quite difficult him down, but we called the house we

:43:02.:43:08.

are about to visit. His wife answered and said there was no such

:43:09.:43:12.

person living there, but we think he does live there. Anyway, we will

:43:13.:43:15.

soon find out. Hi, Mr Williams? Yes. Sorry to

:43:16.:43:31.

bother you, John Ware is my name. I am making a programme for the BBC.

:43:32.:43:37.

Not interested, go away. We have some questions to put you. We have

:43:38.:43:41.

some questions to put to you. And they are serious allegations about

:43:42.:43:45.

the number of people that you are alleged to have shot. A lot of

:43:46.:43:51.

people will say that your silence speaks for itself.

:43:52.:43:58.

One of the questions Williams would not discuss was how he came to have

:43:59.:44:02.

a Thompson submachine gun in the first place. Something else the jury

:44:03.:44:08.

wasn't told was that the Tommy gun used by Williams wasn't even owned

:44:09.:44:11.

by the army. In fact it belonged to this man. Hamish McGregor,

:44:12.:44:17.

29-year-old captain serving in Northern Ireland to Parra. He had

:44:18.:44:23.

previously seen active service in Aden, and winning the military Cross

:44:24.:44:28.

for gallantry. We had many casualties coming in and the

:44:29.:44:34.

soldiers behaved magnificently. In May 1972, McGregor joins the MRF and

:44:35.:44:38.

with him came his privately owned Thompson, which was kept in the MRF

:44:39.:44:42.

armoury. He officially became the unit's Commander 12 hours after

:44:43.:44:46.

Williams used the weapon to shoot four people. We wrote to McGregor,

:44:47.:44:54.

who retired as a Brigadier, to ask had he authorised Williams to take

:44:55.:44:58.

his Thompson on patrol? After a month, we heard nothing, so we paid

:44:59.:45:06.

him a visit. Mr Ware, I was going to the Post Office to post you a

:45:07.:45:10.

letter. I see. So I don't want to be interviewed. Thank you. McGregor's

:45:11.:45:15.

letter insisted that the only reason that the MRF had a Thompson was for

:45:16.:45:19.

training. However, our evidence seems compelling, that at least one

:45:20.:45:24.

of his men used it for more sinister purposes. By July 1972, the pressure

:45:25.:45:36.

was on for the MRF to get results. In Belfast this afternoon, as the

:45:37.:45:40.

streets were thronged with weekend shoppers, bombs exploded one another

:45:41.:45:46.

the other... The IRA had spectacularly breached the security

:45:47.:45:49.

cordon around Belfast city centre. In just 65 minutes, 19 bombs were

:45:50.:45:55.

exploded, killing nine and horribly maiming many others. Bloody Friday,

:45:56.:46:04.

is one of the worst days I can ever remember. It was a war zone. Report

:46:05.:46:11.

on this the heaviest days bombing since the Troubles began in Ulster.

:46:12.:46:16.

That has never gone from the back of my head. From that then, we were

:46:17.:46:20.

under a hell of a lot of pressure. We had to get results because people

:46:21.:46:24.

from above were screaming murder, to prevent all this happening. Results

:46:25.:46:28.

meaning what? Well, you know, to curb the IRA presence coming into

:46:29.:46:42.

Belfast. Officially, the MRF didn't exist. However, by autumn 1972,

:46:43.:46:47.

rumours about a trigger-happy undercover Army unit were rife. That

:46:48.:46:53.

September, another section of the MRF was involved in an incident

:46:54.:46:56.

which would make the unit a liability. It involved two young

:46:57.:47:05.

Catholic friends - Daniel Rooney and Brendan Brennan. The thing I

:47:06.:47:09.

remember is leaving the girlfriend's house, as I was turning into me own

:47:10.:47:18.

street I seen Daniel and met up and we started to talk about different

:47:19.:47:22.

things. We were just standing at the corner, and we were just standing

:47:23.:47:27.

having a conversation, the three of us. As we were standing talking, we

:47:28.:47:32.

noticed the cars coming down St James' Road with the, the lights

:47:33.:47:37.

full blast. They more or less glanced at us, and we looked at them

:47:38.:47:42.

and... Just suspicion. -- suspicious. Deirdre and I come down

:47:43.:47:52.

St James' Road, we were on the Falls Road and we were just chatting. And

:47:53.:47:57.

there only seemed to be a matter of minutes when a fella came out of one

:47:58.:48:01.

of the houses across the street and shouted to us, "Get off the corner

:48:02.:48:05.

because there's strange cars in the district." It was something about

:48:06.:48:09.

the car and the way it was driving and we just both of us then, just

:48:10.:48:15.

turned and ran. The car went by and we were talking about it. And

:48:16.:48:18.

that's, that's when the shooting started. GUNFIRE It just turned and

:48:19.:48:36.

came towards us and shot. I can remember thinking, "I'm gonna be

:48:37.:48:38.

killed here." He told me that he was shot and he

:48:39.:48:54.

thought he was going to die. And I told him no, he'd be alright. A

:48:55.:49:06.

bullet had torn through an artery. Daniel Rooney was just 18. I was

:49:07.:49:13.

actually in me own house when I was told that he was dead. And do you

:49:14.:49:24.

remember how you reacted? Yeah, I cried me eyes out. What was he like?

:49:25.:49:35.

Cheeky chap by, you know, girls all loved him and very pleasant coming

:49:36.:49:44.

going. -- cheeky chappie. Very happy-go-lucky, just out to have a

:49:45.:49:47.

good time and a good laugh. He would have been a kidder, you know, he

:49:48.:49:52.

would have had a joke with you and that, you know. The next day, the

:49:53.:49:56.

Army admitted plaipb clothed soldiers had been -- plain-clothed

:49:57.:50:00.

soldiers had been involved. 100 local women came out in protest. I

:50:01.:50:08.

run down and lifted one of them young lads, oh God, blood was just

:50:09.:50:13.

oozing out of them. One was shot in the back, right there in the whole

:50:14.:50:16.

back, the other one was shot right in the stomach. The Army's version

:50:17.:50:21.

of what happened is that a patrol of two cars with soldiers in civilian

:50:22.:50:25.

uniforms was coming up street when five shots were fired at them. The

:50:26.:50:29.

Army claimed that Daniel Rooney was a known IRA gunman. There is no

:50:30.:50:33.

credible evidence for this. The IRA have never claimed him as a member,

:50:34.:50:37.

and on this Republican memorial a few hundred yards from where he

:50:38.:50:40.

died, Daniel Rooney is commemorated as a civilian. There's a pattern

:50:41.:50:48.

here. This is the third shooting in a matter of months where MRF have

:50:49.:50:53.

been involved, they say they've seen gunmen and weapons, the wounded and

:50:54.:50:57.

the dead are tested, swabbed, on each and every occasion there is no

:50:58.:51:02.

positive test of being near the weapons. How do you explain that? I

:51:03.:51:08.

don't. What do you think the explanation, what do you think the

:51:09.:51:11.

explanation might be? Is it possible that the police that tested them

:51:12.:51:16.

didn't really test them? A lot of strange things happened in Ireland

:51:17.:51:19.

at that time. The Army didn't trust the police. The police didn't trust

:51:20.:51:26.

the Army. We didn't trust anybody. Nor in 1972 was there much trust in

:51:27.:51:32.

the ability of the Army to investigate itself. Fatal Army

:51:33.:51:37.

shootings were usually left to the Royal Military Police to

:51:38.:51:42.

investigate. The enquiries sometimes amounted to little more than a cosy

:51:43.:51:47.

chat. We would have a cup of coffee, we would discuss what happened and

:51:48.:51:53.

then we would hand our reports over. Did the Royal Military Police

:51:54.:51:56.

basically used to rewrite your reports? Erm, I think so. It is

:51:57.:52:02.

possible. They made some adjustments. I would imagine it was

:52:03.:52:08.

possible for people to oncoct stories under those circumstances. A

:52:09.:52:11.

section that had been involved in an action, or half a section had been

:52:12.:52:14.

involved in an action, sort of, you know, let's get this story together,

:52:15.:52:19.

boys. That would be possible. I'm not saying it happened. It would be

:52:20.:52:29.

possible. 3,260 people died in the 30-year conflict. Today, former

:52:30.:52:33.

detectives are reviewing all those deaths. They belong to the

:52:34.:52:38.

Historical Enquiries Team set up to assist the peace process. For many

:52:39.:52:43.

families, the HET is their last chance to find out who killed their

:52:44.:52:51.

relatives and why. You are still asking questions 40 years on? Oh

:52:52.:52:56.

yes, we want the truth. We don't want to stop. Some people would say

:52:57.:53:06.

you can't turn the clock back, you have to get on with your life? We

:53:07.:53:08.

have. But it's still there. By late 1972, the Army top brass

:53:09.:53:28.

were winding up the MRF. It appears that the Prime Minister, Edward

:53:29.:53:32.

Heath, had been informed why. At Heath's request, a top secret note

:53:33.:53:36.

reminded the military that whatever undercover unit replaced the MRF...

:53:37.:53:40.

Special care should be taken to operate within the law. There have

:53:41.:53:50.

been several occasions where you have acknowledged what the police

:53:51.:53:55.

would describe as "criminal behaviour". You would accept that?

:53:56.:54:00.

They would probably describe it as criminal behaviour, yeah. How would

:54:01.:54:03.

you describe it? Fighting terrorists. In an unconventional way

:54:04.:54:11.

and saving innocent people's lives, which we did. We asked the MRF's

:54:12.:54:17.

officer commanding about the claims made by his men. Hamish McGregor

:54:18.:54:22.

insisted to us that he ran a pretty tight ship and that the MRF was

:54:23.:54:27.

never tasked to hunt down IRA leaders and shoot them. That would

:54:28.:54:33.

have been against the law, he said, his unit had always abided by the

:54:34.:54:38.

Yellow Card rules. I am extremely disappointed that a very few have

:54:39.:54:45.

sensationalised a routine job and invented stish fictitious incidents

:54:46.:54:50.

to give the impression that the MRT was anything other than a

:54:51.:54:54.

properly-controlled and accountable unit. Whatever orders Captain

:54:55.:54:58.

McGregor gave, it seems they weren't enough to stop some of his soldiers

:54:59.:55:04.

opening fire on unarmed men. I'm not saying that anybody stood up and

:55:05.:55:11.

said you have to do this, it was a prototype counter-terrorist unit and

:55:12.:55:14.

we had to make up the procedures as we went along - and we did. Was it

:55:15.:55:18.

an understanding that you should open fire? On these top players,

:55:19.:55:24.

whether they were armed or unarmed? Or was it a specific order? We had

:55:25.:55:28.

to use our own initiative. That is why I was selected for this

:55:29.:55:33.

operation, to use my own initiative. The MRT was answerable to 39 Brigade

:55:34.:55:38.

under the command of Brigadier Alexander Boswell. The MRF was wound

:55:39.:55:45.

down after an MoD review concluded there was no provision for detailed

:55:46.:55:54.

command and control. So we asked Brigadier Alexander Boswell if that

:55:55.:56:00.

meant lethal MRF operations were not properly supervised. He declined to

:56:01.:56:06.

comment. Asked about the allegations that MRF soldiers shot unarmed men,

:56:07.:56:11.

the Ministry of Defence say they have referred this to the police to

:56:12.:56:16.

investigate. Your job was to hunt down the enemy? And to kill them,

:56:17.:56:21.

yes. That's what was done. Were they specifically sent out to... If you

:56:22.:56:25.

are talking about assassination squads, certainly not. We were there

:56:26.:56:31.

to do a job. To eliminate an enemy that was ruthless, dedicated to

:56:32.:56:36.

their cause. I totally reject the death squad. But, you know, put

:56:37.:56:43.

yourself in my situation. Yeah, we are on our homeland, we have a dirty

:56:44.:56:48.

war, a war that was out of control. We knew who the operators were. We

:56:49.:56:55.

knew who the shooters were. So what are you going to do about it, John?

:56:56.:56:59.

I'm asking you the question now. What are you going to do about it?

:57:00.:57:03.

Are you going to allow these people to carry on, killing innocent

:57:04.:57:08.

people? Planting bombs? Killing ordinary civilians? People in this

:57:09.:57:13.

country were killed. So how would you define it? I think you have

:57:14.:57:23.

answered the question. OK. The IRA surrendered its weapons largely

:57:24.:57:28.

because undercover soldiers and policemen crippled its ability to

:57:29.:57:35.

fight. The MRF was the prototype of this undercover war and the soldiers

:57:36.0:50:41

who have appeared on camera have done

0:50:420:50:43

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