Browse content similar to Sellafield's Nuclear Safety Failings. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
Line | From | To | |
---|---|---|---|
Tonight on Panorama - | 0:00:03 | 0:00:05 | |
Serious safety concerns at Britain's most hazardous | 0:00:05 | 0:00:08 | |
nuclear facility revealed by the people who were in charge. | 0:00:08 | 0:00:12 | |
It's a race against the clock. It's a ticking clock. | 0:00:12 | 0:00:15 | |
Someday, that clock's going to run out and there'll be a problem. | 0:00:15 | 0:00:18 | |
We'll show how years of neglect have left parts of Sellafield | 0:00:18 | 0:00:22 | |
rundown and vulnerable. | 0:00:22 | 0:00:24 | |
It was just not up to standard. | 0:00:25 | 0:00:27 | |
It was like... It was a different world to me. | 0:00:27 | 0:00:30 | |
A nuclear site where there aren't | 0:00:31 | 0:00:34 | |
always enough workers to meet minimum safety levels... | 0:00:34 | 0:00:37 | |
It defies belief, actually, | 0:00:37 | 0:00:39 | |
that anything could be working at below safe staffing levels. | 0:00:39 | 0:00:42 | |
..where radioactive plutonium and uranium are stored in | 0:00:42 | 0:00:46 | |
degrading plastic bottles... | 0:00:46 | 0:00:49 | |
This stuff should have been kept in a very, very safe place, | 0:00:49 | 0:00:52 | |
because it was very dangerous. | 0:00:52 | 0:00:54 | |
The organisation is now focusing on putting right some | 0:00:54 | 0:00:58 | |
underinvestments of the past. | 0:00:58 | 0:01:01 | |
..and where insiders fear a serious accident. | 0:01:01 | 0:01:05 | |
If there's a fire there, it could generate | 0:01:05 | 0:01:08 | |
a plume of radiological waste that will go across Western Europe. | 0:01:08 | 0:01:11 | |
Sellafield is officially | 0:01:28 | 0:01:30 | |
Britain's most hazardous nuclear site. | 0:01:30 | 0:01:34 | |
Almost all of our nuclear waste comes here and stays here. | 0:01:34 | 0:01:38 | |
Some of the material will be dangerous for hundreds of | 0:01:40 | 0:01:43 | |
thousands of years. | 0:01:43 | 0:01:46 | |
You'd expect day to day safety to be beyond reproach. | 0:01:46 | 0:01:50 | |
You'd be wrong. | 0:01:50 | 0:01:52 | |
I arrived thinking there would be a level of excellence, a level | 0:01:54 | 0:01:57 | |
of engineering competence far exceeding anything I'd seen before. | 0:01:57 | 0:02:02 | |
But it became fairly evident that all those things were not there. | 0:02:02 | 0:02:05 | |
This man helped run some of Sellafield's | 0:02:09 | 0:02:11 | |
most important nuclear facilities. | 0:02:11 | 0:02:14 | |
Now he's turned whistleblower. | 0:02:15 | 0:02:17 | |
Were you ever worried about what you saw? Every day. Why? | 0:02:20 | 0:02:24 | |
Ultimately, I think something will happen there. | 0:02:24 | 0:02:27 | |
There will be an omission or somebody will die. | 0:02:27 | 0:02:29 | |
We've also seen hundreds of documents from 2012 to | 0:02:35 | 0:02:40 | |
earlier this year that showed the reality of life inside Sellafield. | 0:02:40 | 0:02:45 | |
In this programme, we will show you safety problem after safety | 0:02:47 | 0:02:51 | |
problem here at Sellafield. | 0:02:51 | 0:02:53 | |
Now, each is shocking in its own right, but taken together, | 0:02:53 | 0:02:57 | |
they paint a frightening picture of the way this place is run. | 0:02:57 | 0:03:00 | |
Sellafield is not a power station. | 0:03:06 | 0:03:08 | |
It stores and re-processors nuclear waste. | 0:03:08 | 0:03:12 | |
A lot of what happens here is very complicated. | 0:03:12 | 0:03:16 | |
But some of the problems we've found are pretty basic. | 0:03:16 | 0:03:19 | |
Take staffing levels. | 0:03:22 | 0:03:24 | |
Many of the plants on the site need a minimum number of workers on | 0:03:24 | 0:03:28 | |
shift just to keep them safe. | 0:03:28 | 0:03:30 | |
But we've discovered that parts of Sellafield can't even manage that. | 0:03:31 | 0:03:36 | |
How dangerous is below minimum safety? | 0:03:38 | 0:03:41 | |
If you had an incident, | 0:03:41 | 0:03:43 | |
you would not be able to react to it accordingly. | 0:03:43 | 0:03:45 | |
So if something went wrong, you couldn't deal with it? Yeah. | 0:03:45 | 0:03:48 | |
So on those days, it's just luck that something didn't go wrong. | 0:03:48 | 0:03:52 | |
Correct. | 0:03:52 | 0:03:54 | |
Now, minimum safe manning levels can | 0:03:54 | 0:03:57 | |
apply to teams as well as whole plants. | 0:03:57 | 0:03:59 | |
They are a long way below normal staffing levels. | 0:03:59 | 0:04:03 | |
If a plant has say 60 workers, the minimum might be just six. | 0:04:05 | 0:04:10 | |
Our leaked documents from 2012 and 2013 show minimum levels | 0:04:10 | 0:04:16 | |
were routinely breached. | 0:04:16 | 0:04:19 | |
One month, it happened 19 times. | 0:04:19 | 0:04:21 | |
It is incredible. | 0:04:23 | 0:04:26 | |
It defies belief, actually, | 0:04:26 | 0:04:27 | |
that anything could be working at below safe staffing levels. | 0:04:27 | 0:04:31 | |
I think that falls squarely with management, | 0:04:31 | 0:04:33 | |
because how could that be allowed to happen? | 0:04:33 | 0:04:36 | |
There is no excuse. | 0:04:36 | 0:04:37 | |
The leaked documents say any deviation from the safe | 0:04:37 | 0:04:41 | |
minimum manning levels is not acceptable. | 0:04:41 | 0:04:45 | |
Sellafield says the situation has improved. | 0:04:45 | 0:04:48 | |
But minimum safety levels are still | 0:04:48 | 0:04:50 | |
being breached on average once a week. | 0:04:50 | 0:04:53 | |
What happens, then? If you haven't got enough people, what do you do? | 0:04:53 | 0:04:56 | |
I mean, you make alternative arrangements. | 0:04:56 | 0:04:58 | |
So the things that have to be done get done and facilities are | 0:04:58 | 0:05:01 | |
shut down if in fact we are not able to operate them in the way | 0:05:01 | 0:05:04 | |
that we want to. | 0:05:04 | 0:05:07 | |
What do you think about the fact | 0:05:07 | 0:05:09 | |
that it's at a level that's dangerous? | 0:05:09 | 0:05:11 | |
It's not at a level that's dangerous. | 0:05:11 | 0:05:13 | |
Below minimum standards is dangerous, isn't it? No, it is not. | 0:05:13 | 0:05:16 | |
Why is it listed as below minimum standards, then? It's below minimum. | 0:05:16 | 0:05:19 | |
Well, you have a standard and report on it, | 0:05:19 | 0:05:22 | |
but the important thing is the plant managers are able to take | 0:05:22 | 0:05:26 | |
other steps in order to maintain safe operations at all times. | 0:05:26 | 0:05:30 | |
Our whistleblower was concerned about another very basic | 0:05:33 | 0:05:37 | |
safety failing. Sellafield has thousands of sensors and alarms. | 0:05:37 | 0:05:42 | |
He says when he was there, | 0:05:42 | 0:05:44 | |
staff frequently reset alarms without investigating the cause. | 0:05:44 | 0:05:50 | |
What are these alarms drawing attention to? | 0:05:52 | 0:05:54 | |
It could be a door has been opened, a fire door, fairly benign, | 0:05:54 | 0:05:58 | |
right up to getting a leakage of effluent. | 0:05:58 | 0:06:01 | |
But which alarm is important? | 0:06:01 | 0:06:03 | |
You kind of lose sense of which are the important ones and which | 0:06:03 | 0:06:06 | |
are the not-so-important ones. | 0:06:06 | 0:06:08 | |
So they get reset. | 0:06:08 | 0:06:10 | |
Just reset? Yeah. | 0:06:10 | 0:06:12 | |
ALARM | 0:06:12 | 0:06:14 | |
And we've seen a report that shows alarms were being ignored at | 0:06:14 | 0:06:18 | |
several of Sellafield's nuclear facilities. | 0:06:18 | 0:06:21 | |
Two plants had an unacceptable rate of alarms, | 0:06:21 | 0:06:25 | |
more than 1,000 going off every day. | 0:06:25 | 0:06:28 | |
Sellafield says the report was about software-based alarms, | 0:06:30 | 0:06:34 | |
rather than the hardwired alarms that are important for safety. | 0:06:34 | 0:06:38 | |
And the government body responsible for Sellafield says there | 0:06:39 | 0:06:42 | |
isn't a problem. | 0:06:42 | 0:06:44 | |
Our whistleblower says that because there are so many alarms, | 0:06:44 | 0:06:47 | |
that they are just reset almost immediately. No. | 0:06:47 | 0:06:51 | |
There is not a problem with alarms being ignored. | 0:06:51 | 0:06:53 | |
How can you be so sure? | 0:06:53 | 0:06:55 | |
Because we keep a constant surveillance on what is | 0:06:55 | 0:06:57 | |
happening on alarms across the piece. We carry out investigations. | 0:06:57 | 0:07:00 | |
Sellafield carries out investigations, | 0:07:00 | 0:07:02 | |
the regulator carries out investigations. | 0:07:02 | 0:07:04 | |
There are examples where the number of alarms that people are | 0:07:04 | 0:07:06 | |
responding to is large. I think that was his point. | 0:07:06 | 0:07:08 | |
Those alarms are promptly responded to, is my point. | 0:07:08 | 0:07:11 | |
We've also discovered that liquid containing radioactive | 0:07:16 | 0:07:20 | |
plutonium and uranium is being stored in thousands of | 0:07:20 | 0:07:24 | |
plastic bottles in a laboratory fume cupboard. | 0:07:24 | 0:07:27 | |
The bottles were only designed for temporary storage and | 0:07:29 | 0:07:33 | |
some were degrading. | 0:07:33 | 0:07:34 | |
Sellafield has been working for years to remove them. | 0:07:36 | 0:07:41 | |
But right now, on the site, there are more than 2,000 plastic | 0:07:41 | 0:07:45 | |
bottles containing plutonium and uranium. | 0:07:45 | 0:07:48 | |
There was a period a number of years ago in one of the facilities | 0:07:51 | 0:07:56 | |
where some waste materials were being stored broadly in the | 0:07:56 | 0:07:59 | |
way you described. | 0:07:59 | 0:08:01 | |
We've been working to get that material into proper storage. | 0:08:01 | 0:08:05 | |
This stuff should have been kept in a very, very safe place, | 0:08:05 | 0:08:08 | |
because it was very dangerous, and it was placed in | 0:08:08 | 0:08:10 | |
a plastic container which was degrading in a cupboard. | 0:08:10 | 0:08:13 | |
What does that tell us about the way this place is run? | 0:08:13 | 0:08:16 | |
It says that the organisation is now focusing on putting right | 0:08:16 | 0:08:22 | |
some underinvestments of the past in order to support the hazard | 0:08:22 | 0:08:26 | |
reduction mission that the site has. And so that's what we're doing. | 0:08:26 | 0:08:30 | |
Sellafield later told us that any plutonium and uranium samples | 0:08:31 | 0:08:35 | |
are kept securely, and that to imply that such material is | 0:08:35 | 0:08:40 | |
inappropriately managed is simply not true. | 0:08:40 | 0:08:43 | |
Many of Sellafield's problems date back decades. | 0:08:49 | 0:08:54 | |
In 2008, the government tried to sort them out. | 0:08:54 | 0:08:58 | |
It awarded the contract to run Sellafield to an American-led | 0:08:58 | 0:09:01 | |
consortium, Nuclear Management Partners, or NMP. | 0:09:01 | 0:09:04 | |
Now, many of the problems we're showing were happening while | 0:09:08 | 0:09:12 | |
NNP was in charge. | 0:09:12 | 0:09:13 | |
But for the first time, | 0:09:16 | 0:09:18 | |
some of the Americans who managed the site have agreed to speak. | 0:09:18 | 0:09:22 | |
They say they had | 0:09:22 | 0:09:24 | |
no idea just how bad Sellafield was before they took over. | 0:09:24 | 0:09:28 | |
Our site managers were saying, "I've never seen anything like this. | 0:09:31 | 0:09:35 | |
"We've got to get it fixed." | 0:09:35 | 0:09:37 | |
What sort of state was the infrastructure like at Sellafield? | 0:09:37 | 0:09:39 | |
Very poor. | 0:09:39 | 0:09:41 | |
Very poor. | 0:09:41 | 0:09:43 | |
I can tell you that there are very hazardous materials there, | 0:09:43 | 0:09:46 | |
as you know, and there were situations where facilities | 0:09:46 | 0:09:52 | |
or equipment were on the verge of breaking down. | 0:09:52 | 0:09:55 | |
The condition of the facility and equipment was below what they | 0:09:58 | 0:10:02 | |
had understood it to be. It wasn't up to standard. | 0:10:02 | 0:10:07 | |
They were far behind best practice. | 0:10:07 | 0:10:09 | |
Could it have continued as it was? | 0:10:09 | 0:10:11 | |
I would not have allowed it to continue. | 0:10:11 | 0:10:14 | |
Without sounding too dramatic, this is a race against the clock. | 0:10:17 | 0:10:20 | |
It is a ticking clock, OK? | 0:10:20 | 0:10:21 | |
Someday, that clock's going to run out and there'll be a problem. | 0:10:21 | 0:10:25 | |
NMP says safety and performance at | 0:10:27 | 0:10:30 | |
Sellafield improved across the board. | 0:10:30 | 0:10:32 | |
But our whistleblower says parts of the infrastructure were still | 0:10:34 | 0:10:38 | |
seriously rundown. | 0:10:38 | 0:10:40 | |
Each plant has got a number of complicated systems that are | 0:10:43 | 0:10:46 | |
keeping you safe - | 0:10:46 | 0:10:48 | |
electrical systems, ventilation systems, power distribution systems. | 0:10:48 | 0:10:52 | |
The hard infrastructure, the pipework, the bridges, | 0:10:52 | 0:10:55 | |
most of this was built 50s, 60s, 70s, | 0:10:55 | 0:10:57 | |
and the maintenance really wasn't there to stop it failing. | 0:10:57 | 0:11:01 | |
We've obtained a report written by NMP in 2013. | 0:11:04 | 0:11:10 | |
It used these pictures to show just how rundown the site had become. | 0:11:10 | 0:11:16 | |
The report says years of neglect had led to intolerable conditions. | 0:11:16 | 0:11:23 | |
And minutes of a safety committee highlight failures in the | 0:11:23 | 0:11:27 | |
supplies of water, electricity, and other essential services. | 0:11:27 | 0:11:32 | |
Now, Sellafield says things have improved. | 0:11:32 | 0:11:36 | |
But at a nuclear facility, these basics can't be allowed to fail. | 0:11:36 | 0:11:41 | |
What do you think of a place like Sellafield having poor | 0:11:41 | 0:11:44 | |
electricity supply, poor steam supply? | 0:11:44 | 0:11:47 | |
It's not acceptable. | 0:11:47 | 0:11:49 | |
There is no other way to say it. It wasn't acceptable. | 0:11:49 | 0:11:52 | |
What we've been told is that it's dangerously rundown. | 0:11:54 | 0:11:57 | |
We've seen reports that talk of years of neglect, | 0:11:57 | 0:11:59 | |
intolerable conditions. | 0:11:59 | 0:12:01 | |
That doesn't sound safe, does it? | 0:12:01 | 0:12:03 | |
Well, I don't accept the wording that's used. | 0:12:03 | 0:12:05 | |
Which bit of the wording? Well, dangerously rundown. | 0:12:05 | 0:12:08 | |
I don't accept that. Years of neglect, intolerable conditions? | 0:12:08 | 0:12:11 | |
There are elements that are run down. | 0:12:11 | 0:12:13 | |
There are elements that are classed as intolerable under the HSE's | 0:12:13 | 0:12:16 | |
definition of intolerable, which means - | 0:12:16 | 0:12:18 | |
it is not a natural language definition of the intolerable - | 0:12:18 | 0:12:21 | |
what it means is that you must spend money to improve it, | 0:12:21 | 0:12:23 | |
and that's what we're doing. | 0:12:23 | 0:12:26 | |
So what are the risks if the infrastructure's faulty? | 0:12:29 | 0:12:33 | |
Well, we've been able to piece together the events from | 0:12:38 | 0:12:41 | |
November 2013, when Sellafield's | 0:12:41 | 0:12:45 | |
poor condition led to a serious incident. | 0:12:45 | 0:12:48 | |
An electricity substation has been badly wired, | 0:12:52 | 0:12:56 | |
and at ten to seven that morning.. | 0:12:56 | 0:12:58 | |
EXPLOSION | 0:12:58 | 0:13:00 | |
..it blows. | 0:13:00 | 0:13:01 | |
ALARM | 0:13:03 | 0:13:04 | |
Some of these site's nuclear facilities lose power. | 0:13:04 | 0:13:07 | |
Part of an emergency safety system also fails. | 0:13:09 | 0:13:13 | |
In one of the treatment plants, an evacuation begins. | 0:13:16 | 0:13:20 | |
The power cut means the ventilation systems stopped working. | 0:13:20 | 0:13:25 | |
Radioactive dust is spreading through parts of the building. | 0:13:25 | 0:13:28 | |
An internal report said it was believed to be the worst | 0:13:31 | 0:13:35 | |
level of contamination in this plant's history. | 0:13:35 | 0:13:39 | |
It took a year to make safe. | 0:13:39 | 0:13:41 | |
But there is a second part to this story. | 0:13:43 | 0:13:47 | |
A week later, the American consortium's top managers | 0:13:47 | 0:13:50 | |
appeared before Parliament. | 0:13:50 | 0:13:52 | |
Sellafield's then managing director Tony Price was asked about the leak. | 0:13:55 | 0:14:00 | |
But he didn't tell MPs about how serious the situation was. | 0:14:00 | 0:14:05 | |
To be clear, the workers were wearing special suits and | 0:14:24 | 0:14:27 | |
respirators. That's not the impression I got in committee. | 0:14:27 | 0:14:29 | |
He assured me it was all fine. | 0:14:29 | 0:14:31 | |
It was a whole year before things were fine. | 0:14:31 | 0:14:33 | |
Well, that's misleading Parliament. That's a very serious matter. | 0:14:33 | 0:14:36 | |
I'm just gobsmacked, really, that someone could come and tell | 0:14:36 | 0:14:39 | |
me something that just was patently not the case. | 0:14:39 | 0:14:42 | |
Sellafield later wrote to the committee twice with | 0:14:42 | 0:14:45 | |
clarification about the incident. | 0:14:45 | 0:14:48 | |
But MPs weren't given the complete picture for another 15 months. | 0:14:48 | 0:14:53 | |
Do you understand why people might get nervous that very senior | 0:14:53 | 0:14:57 | |
figures at Sellafield seemed to be not entirely straight with | 0:14:57 | 0:15:02 | |
something like Parliament? | 0:15:02 | 0:15:04 | |
Well, if that were true, then of course I would understand that. | 0:15:04 | 0:15:08 | |
Well, in what way is it not true? | 0:15:08 | 0:15:10 | |
Where am I getting this wrong? | 0:15:10 | 0:15:11 | |
He said that things were back to normal. | 0:15:11 | 0:15:13 | |
It took a year for things to go back to normal, | 0:15:13 | 0:15:15 | |
and that's what he told parliament. | 0:15:15 | 0:15:17 | |
What had returned within a few days was the normal electrical | 0:15:18 | 0:15:26 | |
supplies, the normal ventilation, and what have you. | 0:15:26 | 0:15:29 | |
The production capability of that one line did not return back | 0:15:29 | 0:15:34 | |
into availability for the 12 months. | 0:15:34 | 0:15:37 | |
So say we're on the parliamentary committee now, | 0:15:37 | 0:15:39 | |
and I'm asking you, four days after the event, | 0:15:39 | 0:15:41 | |
"Are things back to normal?" What would you say to me? | 0:15:41 | 0:15:44 | |
Well, that's completely hypothetical. | 0:15:45 | 0:15:47 | |
I don't know what I would say. | 0:15:47 | 0:15:49 | |
I think the answer is no, isn't it? It took a year to clean up. | 0:15:49 | 0:15:52 | |
Well... Let's cut to the chase here. | 0:15:52 | 0:15:54 | |
It looks, doesn't it, like he wasn't being straight? | 0:15:54 | 0:15:57 | |
There's no way that gentleman was spinning the story. | 0:15:57 | 0:16:00 | |
NMP told us that at the time of the hearing, Mr Price could not | 0:16:02 | 0:16:06 | |
have possibly known the full extent of the problem. | 0:16:06 | 0:16:10 | |
It said the safety and security of Sellafield have always been | 0:16:10 | 0:16:14 | |
the overriding priorities, and that over the past eight years, | 0:16:14 | 0:16:18 | |
the site achieved the best overall safety in its history. | 0:16:18 | 0:16:22 | |
Sellafield admits that some areas of the site currently pose an | 0:16:26 | 0:16:30 | |
intolerable risk. | 0:16:30 | 0:16:32 | |
One of the worst is an old concrete storage pond. | 0:16:34 | 0:16:37 | |
Radioactive waste was dumped here for more than 50 years. | 0:16:38 | 0:16:43 | |
These are old, decrepit structures, | 0:16:46 | 0:16:48 | |
holding quite a large quantity of nuclear waste. | 0:16:48 | 0:16:51 | |
And it's quite worrying to see that things haven't moved on quick | 0:16:51 | 0:16:55 | |
enough to get that waste out | 0:16:55 | 0:16:56 | |
and put it somewhere safer. | 0:16:56 | 0:16:59 | |
As this footage shows, the bottom of the pond is covered in sediment. | 0:17:02 | 0:17:07 | |
The nuclear waste has corroded to form a radioactive sludge. | 0:17:07 | 0:17:12 | |
Now, Sellafield has started to remove it, | 0:17:12 | 0:17:15 | |
but internal documents say the pond has numerous cracks. | 0:17:15 | 0:17:20 | |
Some are seeping. | 0:17:20 | 0:17:22 | |
There were some hundreds of cracks. | 0:17:23 | 0:17:27 | |
Some of which were showing detectable leakage either by | 0:17:27 | 0:17:30 | |
radiation measurement or by seeing fluids. | 0:17:30 | 0:17:33 | |
It doesn't mean that all of a sudden, | 0:17:33 | 0:17:35 | |
the pond was going to empty out into the ground. | 0:17:35 | 0:17:37 | |
With continued neglect, nobody doing anything, | 0:17:37 | 0:17:41 | |
we repaired the major leak area already but absent that, | 0:17:41 | 0:17:45 | |
and continuing degradation, sooner or later, there will be | 0:17:45 | 0:17:48 | |
a big crack, a big leak, and then there's going to be battle stations. | 0:17:48 | 0:17:52 | |
It was a different world for me. | 0:17:54 | 0:17:56 | |
And not a good one? Not a good one. | 0:17:56 | 0:17:58 | |
Not a good one. It was not... | 0:17:58 | 0:18:01 | |
It was not up to commercial nuclear standards and... Erm... | 0:18:01 | 0:18:06 | |
It was just not up to standard. | 0:18:08 | 0:18:10 | |
Experts say it is unlikely the pond will collapse. But it's possible. | 0:18:12 | 0:18:18 | |
And that could mean radiation spreading beyond Sellafield. | 0:18:18 | 0:18:22 | |
If the pond was to catastrophically collapse, | 0:18:22 | 0:18:26 | |
and water was to drain down, this type of fuel burns in air. | 0:18:26 | 0:18:32 | |
If it burns, it means particles are dispersed into the atmosphere, so | 0:18:32 | 0:18:36 | |
you'd be in a situation where you'd be in the laps of the gods here. | 0:18:36 | 0:18:39 | |
Would it go out to sea? Would it go inland? | 0:18:39 | 0:18:42 | |
Would a deposit on a village or whatever? | 0:18:42 | 0:18:44 | |
It could be a significant radioactive plume maybe | 0:18:44 | 0:18:47 | |
stretching to 100 to 150km. | 0:18:47 | 0:18:50 | |
We've been told that there are hundreds of cracks. | 0:18:53 | 0:18:56 | |
Is that accurate? | 0:18:56 | 0:18:58 | |
Concrete structures have cracks in them and there are indeed | 0:18:58 | 0:19:01 | |
hundreds in the walls of that building. | 0:19:01 | 0:19:04 | |
But some are leaking? | 0:19:04 | 0:19:05 | |
There are a small number, a small proportion which are... | 0:19:05 | 0:19:09 | |
Do show signs of let's say seepage over the years. | 0:19:09 | 0:19:15 | |
And those are the ones that I monitor to establish that | 0:19:15 | 0:19:18 | |
there is no issue. | 0:19:18 | 0:19:20 | |
It's been said to us by several people that one of the | 0:19:20 | 0:19:22 | |
possibilities is if that pond leaks, it would create a fire. | 0:19:22 | 0:19:26 | |
The material in there is pyrophoric. It would burst into flames. | 0:19:26 | 0:19:29 | |
And that would create a very dangerous plume. | 0:19:29 | 0:19:32 | |
Is that something that you're concerned about? | 0:19:32 | 0:19:35 | |
I think that's a... | 0:19:35 | 0:19:38 | |
That particular scenario is very extreme. | 0:19:38 | 0:19:41 | |
But possible? Is very extreme. | 0:19:41 | 0:19:45 | |
All that is necessary to prevent that sort of fuel setting | 0:19:45 | 0:19:50 | |
fire is to keep it wet. | 0:19:50 | 0:19:52 | |
That's all that's necessary. | 0:19:53 | 0:19:55 | |
Another highly dangerous area of Sellafield is another old | 0:19:57 | 0:20:02 | |
nuclear waste dump. | 0:20:02 | 0:20:04 | |
This time, the waste is stored in silos in a concrete building. | 0:20:04 | 0:20:08 | |
They're built by people hastily in the 1950s because they needed | 0:20:10 | 0:20:14 | |
places to store these materials. | 0:20:14 | 0:20:17 | |
So these are not the kind of facilities that were intended | 0:20:17 | 0:20:20 | |
to hold waste for a long period of time. | 0:20:20 | 0:20:22 | |
The silos are now so degraded Sellafield says they too pose | 0:20:22 | 0:20:27 | |
an intolerable risk. | 0:20:27 | 0:20:29 | |
As this footage shows, they contain metal and other radioactive waste. | 0:20:29 | 0:20:35 | |
It's material that would burn on contact with air. | 0:20:35 | 0:20:39 | |
We've got a cleanup program involving one of these | 0:20:39 | 0:20:42 | |
facilities that's scheduled to take another 20 or 25 years. | 0:20:42 | 0:20:45 | |
We don't have a lot of confidence that building is going to | 0:20:45 | 0:20:48 | |
hold up another 20 or 25 years. | 0:20:48 | 0:20:50 | |
It doesn't mean we think it's going to fall down tomorrow. | 0:20:50 | 0:20:53 | |
But as time goes by, it gets worse. | 0:20:53 | 0:20:55 | |
The radioactive material shown in this Sellafield footage needs | 0:20:58 | 0:21:02 | |
to be removed before the silos degrade too far. | 0:21:02 | 0:21:06 | |
But we've discovered that Sellafield spent nine years and more | 0:21:06 | 0:21:09 | |
than ?200 million on a plan that was shelved. | 0:21:09 | 0:21:13 | |
It included a robotic arm that was supposed to reach inside and | 0:21:15 | 0:21:18 | |
retrieve the waste | 0:21:18 | 0:21:20 | |
but was never built. | 0:21:20 | 0:21:22 | |
A leaked report says poor leadership had allowed the project to | 0:21:24 | 0:21:28 | |
drift out of control. | 0:21:28 | 0:21:30 | |
What happened to that ?200 million? | 0:21:30 | 0:21:32 | |
The vast majority of the money that's been spent on that | 0:21:32 | 0:21:35 | |
project, the building of the superstructure, | 0:21:35 | 0:21:37 | |
the means of cutting holes, | 0:21:37 | 0:21:38 | |
the means of putting doors over the holes etc, will still be used. | 0:21:38 | 0:21:41 | |
The specific robotic arm won't be used, | 0:21:41 | 0:21:43 | |
because we've now got a better technology. | 0:21:43 | 0:21:45 | |
But that's completely different to saying that we've... | 0:21:45 | 0:21:48 | |
In your phrase wasted ?200 million. | 0:21:48 | 0:21:50 | |
I don't accept that at all. | 0:21:50 | 0:21:51 | |
But 11 years after work started, | 0:21:53 | 0:21:56 | |
Sellafield still hasn't removed any waste from this building. | 0:21:56 | 0:22:00 | |
If things do go wrong, | 0:22:08 | 0:22:10 | |
it's vital Sellafield can deal with an emergency. | 0:22:10 | 0:22:13 | |
The site has its own fire service. | 0:22:15 | 0:22:18 | |
In 2012, a report by the nuclear regulator said it does not | 0:22:18 | 0:22:23 | |
have the level of capability required to respond to the | 0:22:23 | 0:22:27 | |
nuclear emergencies effectively. | 0:22:27 | 0:22:30 | |
And a Sellafield report from 2013 says significant gaps exist | 0:22:30 | 0:22:36 | |
in all major aspects of emergency management. | 0:22:36 | 0:22:40 | |
Significant gaps exist in all major aspects of emergency planning? | 0:22:40 | 0:22:44 | |
This is not a very attractive picture, is it? | 0:22:44 | 0:22:46 | |
We've done a huge amount of work in recent years in order to | 0:22:46 | 0:22:51 | |
ensure that the fire and rescue services are in a position to | 0:22:51 | 0:22:55 | |
continue to support the site's safe operation. | 0:22:55 | 0:22:58 | |
We keep going through the different areas, sir, and you tell me that all | 0:22:58 | 0:23:02 | |
is well, so either I'm wrong every time, or you're slightly in denial? | 0:23:02 | 0:23:06 | |
We are absolutely not in denial. | 0:23:06 | 0:23:07 | |
Safety is our priority and we are managing a very complex site, | 0:23:07 | 0:23:13 | |
which has got a great deal of hazardous radioactive | 0:23:13 | 0:23:15 | |
materials on it, so these are not simple, straightforward decisions. | 0:23:15 | 0:23:19 | |
The last two and a half years have | 0:23:19 | 0:23:21 | |
seen significant improvements on the site. | 0:23:21 | 0:23:24 | |
We have put particular pressure on Sellafield to make | 0:23:24 | 0:23:27 | |
improvements in this area. | 0:23:27 | 0:23:30 | |
Those improvements are now by and large realised and we are | 0:23:30 | 0:23:33 | |
happy with the standards that the site's achieving. | 0:23:33 | 0:23:37 | |
But some parts of Sellafield are kept open even when everyone | 0:23:39 | 0:23:43 | |
agrees there are safety problems. | 0:23:43 | 0:23:46 | |
Take Magnox, one of the main reprocessing plants on the site. | 0:23:46 | 0:23:51 | |
In 2014, it marked its 50th anniversary. | 0:23:51 | 0:23:55 | |
This is a facility that has run safely for 50 years, | 0:23:56 | 0:24:00 | |
52,000 tonnes, and it's run safely in one of the heaviest, | 0:24:00 | 0:24:04 | |
most regulated industries in the world. | 0:24:04 | 0:24:07 | |
But a report from the nuclear regulator says | 0:24:08 | 0:24:11 | |
a few months earlier, there'd been an incident that could | 0:24:11 | 0:24:14 | |
potentially have been fatal for workers. | 0:24:14 | 0:24:17 | |
And then there was another incident that could have resulted in | 0:24:18 | 0:24:22 | |
a criticality, a nuclear reaction that could have killed someone. | 0:24:22 | 0:24:26 | |
But these warnings from the regulator are dismissed by | 0:24:28 | 0:24:31 | |
the government official in charge of Sellafield. | 0:24:31 | 0:24:35 | |
It says in the report that these were potentially fatal. | 0:24:35 | 0:24:37 | |
That someone's view. I don't accept that view. | 0:24:37 | 0:24:39 | |
So you'd don't accept reports, so what's the point in having | 0:24:39 | 0:24:42 | |
a report if it's investigated, it says it | 0:24:42 | 0:24:43 | |
is a potentially fatal incident, and you just dismiss that? | 0:24:43 | 0:24:46 | |
No, I'm not dismissing it. You just did. No, I didn't. | 0:24:46 | 0:24:48 | |
What I said is I disagree with an element of | 0:24:48 | 0:24:50 | |
a particularly emotive statement about near fatal. | 0:24:50 | 0:24:53 | |
I absolutely accept that there are elements in that which were not | 0:24:53 | 0:24:56 | |
as we wished them to be. | 0:24:56 | 0:24:57 | |
Actions have been taken to make sure that they've been improved. | 0:24:57 | 0:25:00 | |
A broader view was taken as to what was the right thing to do in | 0:25:00 | 0:25:03 | |
the best overall interests of safety on that site. | 0:25:03 | 0:25:06 | |
Over the following year, | 0:25:06 | 0:25:08 | |
there were two more serious safety failures at the Magnox plant. | 0:25:08 | 0:25:12 | |
The regulator published this extraordinary report. | 0:25:12 | 0:25:16 | |
It says it would normally consider | 0:25:18 | 0:25:20 | |
closure because of the safety problems. | 0:25:20 | 0:25:23 | |
But then it also says that that would lead to | 0:25:24 | 0:25:27 | |
a dangerous pileup of nuclear waste. | 0:25:27 | 0:25:30 | |
So although further breaches and safety are likely, | 0:25:30 | 0:25:34 | |
Magnox is allowed to carry on running. | 0:25:34 | 0:25:37 | |
If the plant wasn't safe, | 0:25:41 | 0:25:43 | |
we wouldn't have allowed it to continue operating. | 0:25:43 | 0:25:45 | |
But what we did was we made a balanced decision, | 0:25:45 | 0:25:48 | |
looking at the strengths and weaknesses that the plant | 0:25:48 | 0:25:53 | |
has and we felt that allowing continued operation under | 0:25:53 | 0:25:59 | |
close supervision was the right course of action. | 0:25:59 | 0:26:03 | |
Magnox is like much of the Sellafield site. | 0:26:03 | 0:26:06 | |
There are risks to keeping it open, but it's too important to close. | 0:26:06 | 0:26:11 | |
But if Sellafield can't be closed down, | 0:26:13 | 0:26:15 | |
no matter how poorly it performs, where does that leave me and you? | 0:26:15 | 0:26:19 | |
Where does it leave the general public? Well, paying the tag. | 0:26:19 | 0:26:23 | |
And that price tag keeps on rising. | 0:26:25 | 0:26:27 | |
Sellafield's main job, reprocessing, | 0:26:27 | 0:26:30 | |
is due to finish within four years. | 0:26:30 | 0:26:33 | |
But the cleanup may take 100 years. | 0:26:33 | 0:26:37 | |
We've now been told it could cost as much as ?162 billion. | 0:26:37 | 0:26:44 | |
It is unimaginable for most taxpayers, this amount of money. | 0:26:45 | 0:26:48 | |
It's enormous. | 0:26:48 | 0:26:49 | |
And they've got to just be really much more transparent about | 0:26:49 | 0:26:52 | |
how they're working out the costs. | 0:26:52 | 0:26:55 | |
It does feel like a blank cheque. | 0:26:55 | 0:26:57 | |
How much is this going to cost the nation, to clean up Sellafield? | 0:26:57 | 0:27:00 | |
Oh, I don't know. | 0:27:00 | 0:27:02 | |
There are financial projections over the planned period which goes | 0:27:03 | 0:27:08 | |
out more than 100 years. | 0:27:08 | 0:27:10 | |
They are simply projections. | 0:27:10 | 0:27:12 | |
The American consortium had been criticised over rising costs. | 0:27:15 | 0:27:20 | |
Its contract to run Sellafield was terminated in April. | 0:27:20 | 0:27:24 | |
The government says it wanted direct control, | 0:27:25 | 0:27:28 | |
and it insists Sellafield is safe. | 0:27:28 | 0:27:31 | |
So there are 10,000 people who work at Sellafield. | 0:27:32 | 0:27:35 | |
They all live in the local community. | 0:27:35 | 0:27:37 | |
I live two miles from the site. | 0:27:37 | 0:27:39 | |
There's no way that anybody like that, me or others, | 0:27:39 | 0:27:43 | |
would choose to live on the doorstep of something if we thought we were | 0:27:43 | 0:27:46 | |
putting ourselves and our communities at risk. No way at all. | 0:27:46 | 0:27:48 | |
So absolutely the site remains safe | 0:27:48 | 0:27:51 | |
today and it will remain safe tomorrow and it will remain | 0:27:51 | 0:27:53 | |
safe into the future. | 0:27:53 | 0:27:55 | |
But our whistleblower worries that safety is an ongoing and real risk. | 0:27:58 | 0:28:04 | |
What's the thing that most worries you about Sellafield? | 0:28:04 | 0:28:08 | |
It's the fire in one of the silos or one of the processing plants. | 0:28:08 | 0:28:12 | |
If there's a fire there, it could generate | 0:28:12 | 0:28:15 | |
a plume of radiological waste that will go across Western Europe. | 0:28:15 | 0:28:19 | |
This is the world's most complex nuclear facility. | 0:28:23 | 0:28:27 | |
But we have found poor management, rundown infrastructure, | 0:28:29 | 0:28:33 | |
and safety failings. | 0:28:33 | 0:28:34 | |
Sellafield - the nuclear site that struggles with the basics. | 0:28:36 | 0:28:40 | |
It's a real labour of love. | 0:29:14 | 0:29:15 | |
That's why we're giving you extra tips... | 0:29:15 | 0:29:15 | |
A garden takes time to perfect. | 0:29:15 | 0:29:18 | |
It needs patience to get just right. | 0:29:18 | 0:29:21 |