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We will again be having to beat a fairly speedy retreat just after a | :00:17. | :00:25. | |
quarter past 11 because of the need for colleagues to get down to the | :00:26. | :00:29. | |
chamber to secure their places for Prime Minister's Questions. | :00:30. | :00:40. | |
is my pleasure to introduce this session of our enquiry into UK | :00:41. | :00:46. | |
military operations in Syria and Iraq. We have three panellists | :00:47. | :00:52. | |
representing a wide range of views, all from a media background and I | :00:53. | :00:56. | |
would be grateful if you could introduce yourselves and see a | :00:57. | :01:00. | |
sentence or two about your background and your connection with | :01:01. | :01:07. | |
the events we will be discussing. I am Anthony Lloyd, a foreign | :01:08. | :01:11. | |
correspondent to the Times. I have worked there for 23 years. I have | :01:12. | :01:15. | |
reported numerous conflicts around the world. I started reporting in | :01:16. | :01:21. | |
Syria in early 2012. I took about 15 trips to rebel held areas. I have | :01:22. | :01:26. | |
reported extensively from Iraq since 2003 and was the last 15 months ago. | :01:27. | :01:35. | |
Former diplomatic editor at Sky News, I have been to Iraq and Syria | :01:36. | :01:44. | |
12 times. Currently writing books. Patrick Cockburn, I work for the | :01:45. | :01:50. | |
Independent. I first went to Iraq in 1977 and I have been going back | :01:51. | :01:54. | |
frequently ever since. Syria I visited frequently before and during | :01:55. | :02:07. | |
the current conflict. I have written a book called Chaos and caliphate | :02:08. | :02:14. | |
which is coming out. Before that I wrote a book on the rise of Islamic | :02:15. | :02:23. | |
State. Would you say has been the impact of the UK road in the | :02:24. | :02:27. | |
international coalition and in particular the extension of UK air | :02:28. | :02:36. | |
strikes to Syria? I don't think a great deal, partly because British | :02:37. | :02:47. | |
participation is militarily limited. Somewhat more extensive in Iraq and | :02:48. | :02:53. | |
stop I think it is worth bearing in mind, whatever everyone is saying | :02:54. | :02:59. | |
about Syria, what happens in Syria is largely determined by what | :03:00. | :03:05. | |
happens in Iraq and vice versa. The terror strikes have had an effect. | :03:06. | :03:12. | |
Islamic State cannot hold fixed positions against a hostile airpower | :03:13. | :03:18. | |
overhead with partners on the ground. We saw this when Islamic | :03:19. | :03:25. | |
State was trying to take territory from the Kurds. They lost 2000. The | :03:26. | :03:34. | |
whole of call Barney is smashed to bits. It seemed to me about 70% of | :03:35. | :03:43. | |
it is gone. Much of the city has gone. I don't think it is enough, | :03:44. | :03:52. | |
and you were near enough, to do more than we can Islamic State. | :03:53. | :04:00. | |
Because what happened in Syrian cities, you have a five story | :04:01. | :04:09. | |
building, four stories have civilians, the first floor has | :04:10. | :04:13. | |
Islamic State fighters, unless you are going to bring down the whole | :04:14. | :04:15. | |
building, you will not eliminate them. So Islamic State continues, it | :04:16. | :04:25. | |
still has a powerful military force, it still has finances. These have | :04:26. | :04:34. | |
been weakened but they are still there. Its enemies still remain | :04:35. | :04:52. | |
divided with differing goals. There are animated things that your power | :04:53. | :04:54. | |
can achieve, but there are limitations to it. -- and Ahmed of | :04:55. | :05:01. | |
things. Could I ask you to differentiate between where relevant | :05:02. | :05:03. | |
between Iraq and Syria? Because there are clear differences in the | :05:04. | :05:07. | |
effort being made in those countries. I think it's a limited | :05:08. | :05:15. | |
effect militarily but important politically. I think the overall | :05:16. | :05:22. | |
effect is the UK not to be playing that role, it diminishes the sum and | :05:23. | :05:28. | |
it means somebody else has to take the burden. Politically it is | :05:29. | :05:31. | |
important. We should not underestimate British expertise and | :05:32. | :05:36. | |
the missions that have flown. There are hundreds, and they do not always | :05:37. | :05:43. | |
end in kinetic activity, it is called. I do not think we should | :05:44. | :05:46. | |
underestimate the importance of the British militarily and politically | :05:47. | :05:52. | |
on a large basis. That crosses the border and I always felt it was odd | :05:53. | :05:59. | |
that a plane had to stop militarily with an artificial border, anyway, | :06:00. | :06:05. | |
and the world was about to placate in, apparently, the way the vote | :06:06. | :06:12. | |
went last year and it hasn't. Air was about credibility and the | :06:13. | :06:17. | |
problems that would have been connected to the UK not participated | :06:18. | :06:21. | |
in air strikes, that would have been greater in terms of political | :06:22. | :06:26. | |
credibility and the UK's role as a credible ally within the coalition. | :06:27. | :06:32. | |
The actual minimal nature UK air strikes have not had a huge impact | :06:33. | :06:36. | |
on the battlefield. There are periods angles to it. The presence | :06:37. | :06:40. | |
of British special forces in Iraq has had greater coupling effect | :06:41. | :06:46. | |
because they can call on other people's aircraft. Overall, the | :06:47. | :06:52. | |
effects of air power on Islamic State has been very significant over | :06:53. | :06:56. | |
the past few months and they have lost up to 40% of the territory they | :06:57. | :07:02. | |
originally held. In which country? Over role, particularly common in | :07:03. | :07:07. | |
Iraq. Particularly in Iraq. I do not know what the protected is in Syria | :07:08. | :07:12. | |
but the trend is the same in Syria. -- percentage. Losing ground. That | :07:13. | :07:17. | |
is not the solution, it is a trend. Before you come in, I want to take | :07:18. | :07:20. | |
up something you said earlier, you said something about air power in | :07:21. | :07:25. | |
support of forces on the ground. There are forces on the ground, | :07:26. | :07:30. | |
quite clearly, we have identified them in Iraq and there is a big air | :07:31. | :07:35. | |
effort by the British in support of those forces on the ground. It is | :07:36. | :07:38. | |
harder to identify forces on the ground in Syria. Do you or your | :07:39. | :07:44. | |
colleagues, once they have come in, do you have any evidence that the | :07:45. | :07:48. | |
strikes that the United Kingdom has been making in Syria have been in | :07:49. | :07:54. | |
support of identifiable formations or forces on the ground as opposed | :07:55. | :08:00. | |
to strikes against individuals or against static storage facilities, | :08:01. | :08:04. | |
for example. I do not know how far they are going with the ground | :08:05. | :08:10. | |
forces fighting Islamic State in alliance, so to speak, with the US | :08:11. | :08:20. | |
led coalition of which Britain is part, the Syrian Kurds. There have | :08:21. | :08:29. | |
only been 232 air strikes by non-US coalition forces, minimal compared | :08:30. | :08:35. | |
to the Americans. I think there are a few in support of the Kurds, but | :08:36. | :08:45. | |
otherwise not. One point that Anthony was making about losing 40%, | :08:46. | :08:50. | |
we need to bear in mind, these maps that we see in newspapers and on | :08:51. | :08:55. | |
television, showing 40% loss or gain or something, these are countries | :08:56. | :09:01. | |
that a large portion of them are desert or semi it doesn't make much | :09:02. | :09:06. | |
and if you lose a percentage here or there, it is really publishing | :09:07. | :09:12. | |
centres account. The military pressure on Islamic State is partly | :09:13. | :09:16. | |
the Kurds, partly the Syrian army. You can see this. People were | :09:17. | :09:20. | |
denying the Syrian army and the Russians were fighting Islamic State | :09:21. | :09:26. | |
but it is really, to my men, propaganda. As you can see it, | :09:27. | :09:30. | |
Palmyra, which was recaptured not so long ago, and Alice well known place | :09:31. | :09:39. | |
-- ate less well known airbase which Islamic State had been besieging for | :09:40. | :09:44. | |
one year, in both cases the Syrian army was able to take these places | :09:45. | :09:52. | |
with air support from the Russians. Russian and Syrian air power has a | :09:53. | :09:55. | |
rather different purpose, which is to separate the civilian from the | :09:56. | :10:05. | |
fighters. A classic counterinsurgency tactic, were you | :10:06. | :10:11. | |
born everything. I have no evidence of the British air strikes in Syria | :10:12. | :10:18. | |
in support of specific groups. I hear what Patrick said about a race | :10:19. | :10:22. | |
and desert but there is no doubt about it, significant at large | :10:23. | :10:25. | |
population centres that were held by cases are no longer in Isis's | :10:26. | :10:35. | |
control. Just out of that, colleagues will follow up on some | :10:36. | :10:38. | |
other strands but, from your perception, is there more that the | :10:39. | :10:50. | |
UK should be doing? And if so, what? I think we talk about this in | :10:51. | :10:53. | |
military terms but this is a very, located gorilla Mac political war, | :10:54. | :10:58. | |
things that we should be doing. -- gorilla war. We need to understand | :10:59. | :11:05. | |
what is happening there. If one is thinking how do weaken and eliminate | :11:06. | :11:11. | |
Islamic State, I think the most important thing is to ensure it is | :11:12. | :11:18. | |
encircled. It almost is now. With most of the circuit board are being | :11:19. | :11:22. | |
taken by the Syrian Kurds -- Turkish border. There is quite a small gap | :11:23. | :11:31. | |
between the river and Aleppo. I think politically, Britain should be | :11:32. | :11:35. | |
doing everything it can, militarily, to make sure the gap is closed. That | :11:36. | :11:41. | |
is the route that terrorists take, they're going to come here and to | :11:42. | :11:44. | |
Europe. This is very important to clause that and it was has been | :11:45. | :11:49. | |
important. When one looks at this whole crisis, it is insoluble, too | :11:50. | :11:58. | |
complicated, but this prevents people of thinking of concrete | :11:59. | :12:00. | |
solutions to concrete problems like that. I think they should increase | :12:01. | :12:08. | |
support to the Kurds. The ivy growing forces for the Raqqa | :12:09. | :12:13. | |
operation. The Russians, partly retaking Palmyra has made that thing | :12:14. | :12:17. | |
come closer. Raqqa will fall at some point. The UK should be supporting | :12:18. | :12:21. | |
the Kurds. The UK should also be doing a lot of homework. Once Isis | :12:22. | :12:31. | |
is defeated, they will spring up elsewhere, Isis Mark two. I hope the | :12:32. | :12:41. | |
people who look at these things are up to speed with jabba al nusra | :12:42. | :12:45. | |
because I think they are longer threat to Syria his Isis. Jabba al | :12:46. | :12:53. | |
nusra is a long-term entity in Syria, yes. I agree. There is | :12:54. | :12:56. | |
opportunity for a long-term solution. It can bolster its | :12:57. | :13:01. | |
existing support of rescue workers inside Syria. It supports and helps | :13:02. | :13:06. | |
train and equip the guys who grub around in the rubble, barrel bomb | :13:07. | :13:10. | |
buildings, trying to pull people out. It can offer more places to | :13:11. | :13:20. | |
Syrian refugees. It can look at revising its special forces | :13:21. | :13:22. | |
deployments, which so far very limited to Iraq. It should be aware | :13:23. | :13:30. | |
that the political solution and military activity are quite out of | :13:31. | :13:37. | |
step at the moment. I just want to ask you for your immediate reaction | :13:38. | :13:43. | |
to the story that was in the media yesterday, the headline for the | :13:44. | :13:48. | |
Times, for example, President Assad has been secretly collaborating with | :13:49. | :13:52. | |
Isis, defectors tapers reveal. Patrick, you give us an example that | :13:53. | :13:59. | |
President Assad has taken Palmyra and another town. It is suggested in | :14:00. | :14:07. | |
these leaked, handwritten notes that in fact there was some sort of | :14:08. | :14:11. | |
collusion between President Assad and Isis. On that manoeuvre. Do you | :14:12. | :14:17. | |
believe that has any basis? I thought these documents and I am | :14:18. | :14:20. | |
very dubious about it. First of all, some of them have selective quotes. | :14:21. | :14:27. | |
Some of these documents have been released in different places. | :14:28. | :14:32. | |
Saying, artillery has not been moved from Palmyra to other areas, | :14:33. | :14:38. | |
omitting the bit that they have been moved to another place, near where | :14:39. | :14:45. | |
the Government positions are. There are arguments about, yes, there is | :14:46. | :14:50. | |
trade between the two but in all this area and Iraq and Syria, the | :14:51. | :14:56. | |
smuggling areas of the world, yes, if you're in the Syrian Kurdish | :14:57. | :15:01. | |
area, you find a lot of the stuff has come from Beirut because Islamic | :15:02. | :15:07. | |
State wants to charge $300 per truck coming through, they are very short | :15:08. | :15:11. | |
of money, so there is trade. Illicit trade. It does not mean political | :15:12. | :15:19. | |
combination. You know, then you can produce an argument, is it an | :15:20. | :15:22. | |
President Assad's interest to fight Islamic state? In some extent, yes, | :15:23. | :15:28. | |
that means the rest of the world is hostile to Islamic state, the | :15:29. | :15:30. | |
alternative to him. He did not create that situation. He is taking | :15:31. | :15:35. | |
advantage of opportunities. I think this sort of... Basically, I think | :15:36. | :15:44. | |
that using these documents for partisan political points, I do not | :15:45. | :15:52. | |
think the evidence is there. If you look at where the fighting is, east | :15:53. | :16:01. | |
of Aleppo, around Palmyra, it is privately obvious that President | :16:02. | :16:06. | |
Assad is fighting, Syrian army is fighting Islamic State. This | :16:07. | :16:09. | |
material is supposed to have come from the same people who supplied | :16:10. | :16:14. | |
Sky News, your former bosses, what you make of it? I am agnostic. I | :16:15. | :16:25. | |
remain to be convinced. It is widely believed throughout the Middle East | :16:26. | :16:28. | |
that is the case and they do not rule it out. What is the case? | :16:29. | :16:34. | |
Sorry, the Government has always colluded with various, including | :16:35. | :16:43. | |
jabba al nusra, Islamic -- Islamist organisations. They said this would | :16:44. | :16:49. | |
happen, the Islamists would come to the forefront, so it's in their | :16:50. | :16:53. | |
interest to promulgate that. I am agnostic because I think it is | :16:54. | :17:00. | |
plausible but I have not seen the evidence and, for example, the | :17:01. | :17:04. | |
artillery pieces were used as evidence that when they removed them | :17:05. | :17:10. | |
from Palmeiro, as the Syrians were advancing, -- Palmyra, it was | :17:11. | :17:13. | |
evidence presented that they have been moved to Lee Mack told to move | :17:14. | :17:19. | |
their artillery out of Palmyra. That sounds like common sense will stop | :17:20. | :17:22. | |
if you are making a strategic withdrawal, they knew they were | :17:23. | :17:27. | |
massed in formations, they did not want to get hit, of course they ran | :17:28. | :17:30. | |
away, another word for withdrawal, as the army knows, I do not see it | :17:31. | :17:39. | |
as proof of collusion. I only see it as potential collusion. But it is | :17:40. | :17:45. | |
equally likely that they withdrew tactically. There was certainly some | :17:46. | :17:52. | |
fierce fighting around Palmyra and a bulk of the President Assad regime | :17:53. | :17:57. | |
military power was supplied by Hezbollah and Russian special forces | :17:58. | :18:01. | |
teams, some of whom killed Russians and Palmyra. I am not saying that is | :18:02. | :18:05. | |
evidence against any deal but if there was a deal, there was also | :18:06. | :18:10. | |
some very fierce fighting. As for the overall picture, both things are | :18:11. | :18:15. | |
true. President Assad is in a fierce fight with Islamic State. The Assad | :18:16. | :18:18. | |
regime had a long-term evidentially proven relationship with jihadi | :18:19. | :18:25. | |
organisations that are based in Syria. As far back as 2003 and | :18:26. | :18:31. | |
before. We are seeing most recently, couple of years ago, released by the | :18:32. | :18:35. | |
resume that numerous Islamist prisoners from jail so that they can | :18:36. | :18:39. | |
return to the rank of the revolution and change the shape of the | :18:40. | :18:42. | |
revolution. It suited their resume to do that. That was one of the | :18:43. | :18:49. | |
questions I was going to ask. Cross that one of my list of things I | :18:50. | :18:54. | |
wanted to ask you. I wonder if you could differentiate between the | :18:55. | :18:59. | |
future and the potential capability in terms of Iraq and Syria because I | :19:00. | :19:07. | |
am wondering about the ability for ground forces and air power to | :19:08. | :19:14. | |
combine to actually defeat Daesh in both countries. Is it enough? We | :19:15. | :19:20. | |
cannot do it with air power alone but I wonder if the ground forces | :19:21. | :19:25. | |
are also willing and are they actually able watermark? | :19:26. | :19:34. | |
There are strong indications the Iraqi army has reconstituted itself. | :19:35. | :19:43. | |
It has not performed well. That does not bode well for the operation on | :19:44. | :19:50. | |
Mosul, nevertheless, in the long term, they will be successful but it | :19:51. | :19:54. | |
will take an American air power and the Kurds coming from north. Rack, I | :19:55. | :20:01. | |
think as a better chance of falling sooner. Again, it will not happen | :20:02. | :20:09. | |
with the support of the UK, the USA and the coalition. It would be | :20:10. | :20:16. | |
impossible without that as you know, it is politically impossible to get | :20:17. | :20:21. | |
public support for ground operations, proper ground | :20:22. | :20:25. | |
operations, by the UK, other than special forces. I do not see the two | :20:26. | :20:30. | |
countries as separate. They are entirely connected. If you squeeze | :20:31. | :20:36. | |
rack, people will go to Mosul, if you squeeze Mosul, people will go to | :20:37. | :20:37. | |
rack. Iraqi special forces retake Mosul. I | :20:38. | :20:55. | |
was up and down the front and what strikes me about military formations | :20:56. | :20:59. | |
is that there are not many of them. The Iraqi army used to be famous for | :21:00. | :21:05. | |
both battalions, the money goes to the Defence Ministry and the | :21:06. | :21:08. | |
officers. I think that is certainly still happening. I know Iraq as a | :21:09. | :21:17. | |
National Security Council, some months ago the army people came and | :21:18. | :21:23. | |
wanted more money for salaries and they were told not another sense | :21:24. | :21:29. | |
unless you tell us how many soldiers you have got. They were back it with | :21:30. | :21:36. | |
better with 36,000 less soldiers. That is illustrative of the general | :21:37. | :21:41. | |
situation. The Kurds are the same. There aren't that number on the | :21:42. | :21:47. | |
front line. You can have a genuine injury in Ramada -- Ramadi. Most of | :21:48. | :22:00. | |
Ramadi is in ruins. Sancha, the Kurds did the same thing. These are | :22:01. | :22:06. | |
places where the military action is from the air. The consequence is the | :22:07. | :22:11. | |
place is devastated. This really isn't a victory in any full sense | :22:12. | :22:21. | |
and Islamic State is reverting to guerrilla tactics. They are now -- | :22:22. | :22:25. | |
not fighting to the last man in these places. The extent to which | :22:26. | :22:32. | |
these victories are going to need to the collapse of the Islamic State I | :22:33. | :22:37. | |
think has been exaggerated. We should also prepare yourselves for | :22:38. | :22:47. | |
how bad Mosul will probably be. Stalingrad is bandied around for a | :22:48. | :22:50. | |
much by the media and elsewhere but Mosul really has the potential to be | :22:51. | :22:57. | |
really quite catastrophic given how the fight will go both from the | :22:58. | :23:02. | |
defenders and the attackers. Mosul will be pretty bloody awful. | :23:03. | :23:11. | |
Military victory is usually only possible when there is a confluence | :23:12. | :23:17. | |
of circumstances, such as airpower. Either a concentration of a coherent | :23:18. | :23:24. | |
group, semi-coherent group, like the Iraqi army, or an ethnic disparity | :23:25. | :23:27. | |
between something like a Kurdish area in Syria where it is easier to | :23:28. | :23:36. | |
drive out the Islamic State. Where are those circumstances do not make | :23:37. | :23:41. | |
them it is far more difficult. One of the problems, I think rack is | :23:42. | :23:49. | |
much more likely to go before Mosul. The Syrian Kurds are the most | :23:50. | :23:53. | |
effective ground force against Islamic State in the region. The | :23:54. | :23:57. | |
effectiveness outside Kurdish areas would be limited. In Mosul I cannot | :23:58. | :24:03. | |
see anything happening quickly because the forces gathered around | :24:04. | :24:06. | |
Mosul are so desperate. You have the Iraqi army. They have not performed | :24:07. | :24:15. | |
well. You have the Kurdish Depeche Mode, the KTP and other groupings as | :24:16. | :24:19. | |
well that answer to slightly different commanders. Then you have | :24:20. | :24:26. | |
Shia groups, some of which are Iranian backed, some of which are | :24:27. | :24:30. | |
not Iranian backed. There are all sorts of different foreign interests | :24:31. | :24:35. | |
in and around Mosul and a huge population. No one is talking about | :24:36. | :24:41. | |
what happens after the date Mosul is recaptured or how indeed Kurdish | :24:42. | :24:44. | |
regional government could support an influx of hundreds of thousands more | :24:45. | :24:48. | |
refugees when it cannot pay its own government workers their salaries. | :24:49. | :24:58. | |
The political situation is so public image. From the Kurdish point of | :24:59. | :25:03. | |
view, although they are the main ground forces against Islamic State | :25:04. | :25:06. | |
backed by US and British airpower, they wonder what will happen | :25:07. | :25:13. | |
supposing they defeat Islamic State because at the moment everybody | :25:14. | :25:16. | |
loves them because they are fighting Islamic State, but if Islamic State | :25:17. | :25:20. | |
goes down then they are vulnerable to what the Turks do to resurgent | :25:21. | :25:27. | |
powers in Damascus and Baghdad. It isn't necessarily in their interests | :25:28. | :25:32. | |
to take Mosul work for this war to end any time soon. Would you like to | :25:33. | :25:39. | |
comment on that? One thing I have wondered about, you have all cited | :25:40. | :25:44. | |
the Kurds as the fiercest and best organised fighters, but what of the | :25:45. | :25:52. | |
long-term consequences of the backing of those Kurdish movements? | :25:53. | :26:00. | |
The genie is out of the bottle. Kurdistan National Assembly never | :26:01. | :26:03. | |
went away but it is now back on the front burner. They will want a | :26:04. | :26:11. | |
report after this. They are dysfunctional themselves between | :26:12. | :26:14. | |
Iraq and the two entities within Iraq. Long-term, I am thinking a | :26:15. | :26:27. | |
federal Syria and federal Iraq. That might not be politically so the | :26:28. | :26:31. | |
bowl. At some point, when we play our minimal political role with the | :26:32. | :26:36. | |
Kurds and tell them what it is that we would agreed afterwards as part | :26:37. | :26:44. | |
of the negotiations, I think we should be rewarding them somehow I | :26:45. | :26:48. | |
doubt it will be with the state and so managing expectations might be | :26:49. | :26:54. | |
useful because there is a potential for, once Islamic State is speaking, | :26:55. | :26:59. | |
there is the potential for Syria being partially back together in a | :27:00. | :27:02. | |
federal state but the fighting could still continue because the Kurds | :27:03. | :27:05. | |
will not get what they want from this. They stood on the sidelines | :27:06. | :27:09. | |
for a long time seeing you guys get on with it and only when they were | :27:10. | :27:13. | |
forced to did they move and they are not moving for a unitary Syria, they | :27:14. | :27:19. | |
are moving for a unitary Kurdistan have some form. Again, we have to | :27:20. | :27:25. | |
make our decisions about how far we could that. You have all pointed out | :27:26. | :27:39. | |
the difficulties in taking Mosul, is it important in the fight against | :27:40. | :27:46. | |
Islamic State to take Mosul? One thing the Islamic State has is that | :27:47. | :27:51. | |
it is a state. Its ideology is we have instead. Other people have | :27:52. | :27:56. | |
talked about a caliphate, we have established a real Islamic State. | :27:57. | :28:01. | |
This is a big ideological blow if that state goes down. They are | :28:02. | :28:04. | |
different from other types of organisations like Al-Qaeda. | :28:05. | :28:12. | |
Secondly, it is important in terms of security. The terrorist attacks | :28:13. | :28:17. | |
we have seen in Brussels, Paris, potentially here, what makes them | :28:18. | :28:20. | |
different from terrorist attacks in the past is that they do have the | :28:21. | :28:26. | |
resources of what is a de facto organised state behind them. Money, | :28:27. | :28:33. | |
expertise, so forth. For both those reasons it is very important to | :28:34. | :28:40. | |
eliminate Islamic State and the most important element in that is Mosul. | :28:41. | :28:44. | |
That is what put them on the order stage, when they captured Mosul in | :28:45. | :28:52. | |
2014. Troops on the ground, their capacity to take Mosul might be | :28:53. | :28:56. | |
omitted, does that mean the West has to do more? The Americans are | :28:57. | :29:02. | |
pushing for a quick attack on Mosul but they are finding they have been | :29:03. | :29:09. | |
drawn in more and more because an Iraqi division has moved east of | :29:10. | :29:13. | |
Mosul. When it came to fighting, it wasn't to be found the Americans | :29:14. | :29:22. | |
lost one or two people and so the British official attitude as I | :29:23. | :29:28. | |
understand it is much more cautious. Islamic State has not really been | :29:29. | :29:32. | |
fighting, it has been fighting for Ramadi, but not to the last man like | :29:33. | :29:38. | |
that Barney. In Mosul they will fight everywhere and they will see | :29:39. | :29:41. | |
the city levelled before they give it up. The blow to them is equally | :29:42. | :29:51. | |
political, militarily and psychological. They introduced a | :29:52. | :29:58. | |
currency. When you lose that psychological idea that you are a | :29:59. | :30:04. | |
state... I knew Hamish working quite well. He used the command a Nato | :30:05. | :30:09. | |
brigade. He is utterly convinced there will be mass use of chemical | :30:10. | :30:12. | |
weapons in the fight for Mosul. I don't know that. Mr Gordon believes | :30:13. | :30:19. | |
that. You cannot just surround Islamic State and leave them alone. | :30:20. | :30:28. | |
They are in perpetual metastases. They are treating children all the | :30:29. | :30:35. | |
time. They grow, they expand. Mosul is the seed of the caliphate, Mosul | :30:36. | :30:40. | |
must be retaken. There is an Armageddon scenario for Mosul, but | :30:41. | :30:44. | |
in the Middle East, it works in a different way. Surround Mosul, you | :30:45. | :30:50. | |
get a lot of dissatisfied local tribes, give them money and they | :30:51. | :30:54. | |
sort out their own problems. It may well be that there are not that many | :30:55. | :31:02. | |
Islamic State members. I don't know. You might find that if there was | :31:03. | :31:06. | |
enough incentive, which there is not at the moment, then people in Mosul | :31:07. | :31:12. | |
might be more inclined to take up arms themselves against Islamic | :31:13. | :31:15. | |
State. There is not that incentive at the moment and I should think | :31:16. | :31:18. | |
people in Mosul are very worried about what happens to them and their | :31:19. | :31:28. | |
future after Islamic State. In Iraq, earlier this year, one thing we were | :31:29. | :31:34. | |
talking about quite a lot was the heparin of towns that have been | :31:35. | :31:39. | |
recaptured with IEDs and the inability of communities to return | :31:40. | :31:43. | |
because everything was booby-trapped. His deep military and | :31:44. | :31:54. | |
political impact of retaking towns, while I appreciate the damage that | :31:55. | :31:58. | |
can do psychologically to Islamic State, is it mitigated if the local | :31:59. | :32:04. | |
people cannot return because we cannot rebuild those communities? | :32:05. | :32:16. | |
What is the impact of that? How does it impact belief in the Iraqi and | :32:17. | :32:25. | |
Syrian states? No one expects much from the Iraqi state. These are very | :32:26. | :32:32. | |
sectarian societies. Outside of Ramadi, there is a report yesterday, | :32:33. | :32:37. | |
1000 young men held in a warehouse with a tiny owner without enough | :32:38. | :32:47. | |
space to lie down or anything else. Local people are truly terrified of | :32:48. | :33:00. | |
the Iraqi army and security forces. The problem is that none of these | :33:01. | :33:06. | |
cities are really being recaptured. Most of them are in ruins after | :33:07. | :33:10. | |
reds. The situation makes them completely insecure even in Syrian | :33:11. | :33:18. | |
Kurdish held areas. I have travelled there and they are meant to be safer | :33:19. | :33:22. | |
than other areas, this is comparative, they are still very | :33:23. | :33:28. | |
dangerous places. He asked what we could do to help, this is something | :33:29. | :33:34. | |
we have expertise in. As Patrick says, Iraq might not make this a | :33:35. | :33:38. | |
priority and this is a decades long thing. The sooner you start, the | :33:39. | :33:45. | |
better. It is easier to remove IEDs than to be built buildings. The | :33:46. | :33:49. | |
problem is when people come home the buildings have been flattened in the | :33:50. | :33:55. | |
fighting. I think one thing, going back to an earlier question which | :33:56. | :33:59. | |
fits into what you asked, I think the UK could give far better help if | :34:00. | :34:04. | |
the system of resupply and logistics was more straightforward. As it is, | :34:05. | :34:09. | |
you are all aware, we give the Kurds 50 calibre machine guns a year and a | :34:10. | :34:15. | |
half ago. They haven't had ammunition for months and months and | :34:16. | :34:20. | |
months, despite repeated requests and official high-level requests | :34:21. | :34:23. | |
because the gym of resupply goes through Baghdad and as soon as it | :34:24. | :34:27. | |
goes to Baghdad you have a complex prism and no oversight to what | :34:28. | :34:31. | |
happens. The same as with IEDs removal. | :34:32. | :34:37. | |
When Parliament or the decision to enter into air strikes, we were told | :34:38. | :34:45. | |
at the time about the 70,000 moderates. That were available on | :34:46. | :34:54. | |
the ground. What is your current assessment of the situation in | :34:55. | :35:01. | |
regard to the Syrian opposition forces? Was the 70,008 Mraz? It is | :35:02. | :35:09. | |
impossible to tell. 70,002, if it was true, not a cohesive figure. It | :35:10. | :35:15. | |
was a rather optimistic tally of different groups and what they may | :35:16. | :35:20. | |
be. I challenge anybody, even the most seasoned observer, to be ill to | :35:21. | :35:27. | |
work out on the ground in a largely Islamist rebel movement, a largely | :35:28. | :35:33. | |
majority Islamist rebel movement, with Selassie groups among them, | :35:34. | :35:36. | |
made actually in a post-conflict Syria, be good to men aren't these | :35:37. | :35:42. | |
and have favourable relations with the West. -- Salafi. It may be bad | :35:43. | :35:48. | |
to minorities and have an aggressive relationship with the West. Who | :35:49. | :35:54. | |
would be against with Al-Qaeda. It is very difficult to work out. | :35:55. | :35:58. | |
Suffice to say, the majority of the rebel movement is Islamist. Whatever | :35:59. | :36:05. | |
that means. Islamist. I made myself very popular in 2012 by arguing | :36:06. | :36:09. | |
this, in 2011 it had been taken over. Young students, the Democrats | :36:10. | :36:14. | |
that came out, have been completely shut to one side. The opposition is | :36:15. | :36:20. | |
Islamist. That is deadly, -- different saying the majority of | :36:21. | :36:23. | |
non-armed opposition to Assad are Islamist. The majority of the armed | :36:24. | :36:29. | |
opposition are Islamist. I have not been 40 Mac years, these guys have | :36:30. | :36:37. | |
been the -- two years. I never met a moderate armed person, but I met a | :36:38. | :36:43. | |
lot of armed groups. I find it a test of those who believe in the | :36:44. | :36:50. | |
70,000 armed secular and non-Islamist gunmen that the people | :36:51. | :36:56. | |
who say this never actually say that from territory held by moderate | :36:57. | :37:05. | |
7000. -- 70,000. They must hold territory, be an important figure on | :37:06. | :37:08. | |
the map. But reports of the existence, from Beirut, Eastern | :37:09. | :37:14. | |
Bill, nobody actually goes their -- Istanbul. In some case academics who | :37:15. | :37:17. | |
have not been in Syria for five years. We should be dubious about | :37:18. | :37:24. | |
this. The Americans were recently saying moderate forces should move | :37:25. | :37:30. | |
away from Al Misra, within Aleppo, so that it could be attacked. They | :37:31. | :37:35. | |
cannot do that because, as my colleagues have just said, the armed | :37:36. | :37:38. | |
opposition is dominated by extreme Islamist. They know that if they | :37:39. | :37:49. | |
moved away, and extreme factions disappeared, they will be for the | :37:50. | :37:54. | |
Syrian army. If there is sufficient forces to unseat Assad? Then there | :37:55. | :38:02. | |
is an equally aggressive force waiting to replace him? Is it an | :38:03. | :38:08. | |
equally aggressive Islamic force waiting to replace Assad? Yes, but | :38:09. | :38:14. | |
Assad is not going to go. It is a strange aspect of this. I am not | :38:15. | :38:19. | |
saying whether it is good or bad, since 2012 Keeble has said that he | :38:20. | :38:22. | |
is bound to go, the opposition was pushing this idea, at that stage | :38:23. | :38:27. | |
there were 14 provincial capitals, he has lost two. The population of | :38:28. | :38:33. | |
Syria should be about 23 million at the moment because there are 6 | :38:34. | :38:39. | |
million refugees, 10 million of those are in Government held areas, | :38:40. | :38:44. | |
2 million in IS held areas, 2 million Kurds, 2 million non-IS | :38:45. | :38:49. | |
position. That is the balance of power. I do not think there is any | :38:50. | :38:54. | |
chance Assad will go. I know we are running out of time, this was the | :38:55. | :39:00. | |
very point I wanted to make. It was in the list of questions. May I | :39:01. | :39:05. | |
threw this in? This was written in May of 2011, reading reports you | :39:06. | :39:10. | |
would be forgiven for thinking Syrian people were rising up as one | :39:11. | :39:13. | |
to overthrow a regime on its last legs. They are three main flaws in | :39:14. | :39:18. | |
this analysis. It goes on to explain why, the demographics, the Kurds, | :39:19. | :39:26. | |
the Christians, the analytes, when you added them all up, you realised | :39:27. | :39:32. | |
that this was not going to fall. If idiot journalists can work this out, | :39:33. | :39:35. | |
the political class should be able to work this out. We had Egypt, we | :39:36. | :39:42. | |
had Libya, two leaders had gone, I think the political class would do | :39:43. | :39:46. | |
that, grand standard left right and centre, demanded Assad should go, | :39:47. | :39:49. | |
that that his back against the wall and give him nowhere to go and I | :39:50. | :39:53. | |
think that was a mistake for us to be calling all the time, go, go, go, | :39:54. | :39:59. | |
existing and we have repeated for six years and we have now got | :40:00. | :40:03. | |
ourselves into the position where he could go sort of, bet, but not | :40:04. | :40:07. | |
necessarily right now, as if it is a policy. Forgive me for the extended | :40:08. | :40:12. | |
rant, but it was a political mistake that the political class needs the | :40:13. | :40:16. | |
thing much harder about when this happened again. Do you really want | :40:17. | :40:21. | |
to push this person into a corner? Be sure before the bridge. That | :40:22. | :40:25. | |
statement was restated from the Dispatch Box yesterday. With the | :40:26. | :40:32. | |
next emergency... I see what you mean, don't worry about the time, we | :40:33. | :40:38. | |
have another 20 minutes. I want to bring in Phil and Anthony, because | :40:39. | :40:44. | |
he was to follow up on these points. I come from a slightly different | :40:45. | :40:49. | |
angle. There is a middle way with Assad and that is neither to make | :40:50. | :40:54. | |
his removal a precondition, as had mistakenly been done previously, but | :40:55. | :40:59. | |
certainly that is not to accept his long-term position of power in | :41:00. | :41:03. | |
Syria. For a number of very good reasons. First of all, you will | :41:04. | :41:07. | |
never have peace, nor an end to the war in Syria, with Assad, the leader | :41:08. | :41:16. | |
of a minority group, in power. You only have extreme Islamist and | :41:17. | :41:22. | |
Islamist groups in Syria because of Assad's behaviour. To my mind, | :41:23. | :41:27. | |
here's the primary cancer in this. The secondary cancer may be | :41:28. | :41:29. | |
extremely dramatic threatening and all the rest of it but it has come | :41:30. | :41:36. | |
about because of the behaviour of that particular regime. It is | :41:37. | :41:42. | |
nonsensical to presume and say, right, the town spread new | :41:43. | :41:45. | |
transitional Government should be that Assad goes. Neither should he | :41:46. | :41:50. | |
be accepted long-term because, if you do swing your support and | :41:51. | :41:54. | |
acceptance of Assad long-term, never thinks will happen. First of all, | :41:55. | :41:58. | |
you will get a dramatic rise in western recruits, not only to | :41:59. | :42:03. | |
Islamic state, to other jihadi movements. Furious over its change | :42:04. | :42:10. | |
stands when the motivation to join IS is thrown to so many recruits as | :42:11. | :42:15. | |
being the hypocrisy of the West. And its double standards. Imagine what | :42:16. | :42:17. | |
the invitations would be if we were to accept Assad. You would also | :42:18. | :42:25. | |
crumble the coalition if you through your weight behind or acceptance | :42:26. | :42:32. | |
behind Assad. You may, Qatar, Saudi, Turkey, would not accept it. More | :42:33. | :42:38. | |
and more to me it would be obscene morally but it would also be | :42:39. | :42:40. | |
practically absurd, it would not work. Look at the demographics in | :42:41. | :42:46. | |
Syria. Fast majority, Sunni populace. Assad is in the white | :42:47. | :42:53. | |
minority. You can look at the examples in Iraq or, and in | :42:54. | :42:58. | |
Afghanistan, all the rest of it, Assad will not be able to take Syria | :42:59. | :43:05. | |
or reinstate peace in Syria as it stands. Neither as an entity | :43:06. | :43:10. | |
himself, because he attracts so much hostility for what he has done a | :43:11. | :43:14. | |
practically with the forces he has got. As to his removal and long-term | :43:15. | :43:18. | |
strength, I would say the one thing Russian intervention has proved is | :43:19. | :43:23. | |
that Assad's survival is almost entirely dependent on Russian | :43:24. | :43:25. | |
intervention. There is a positive and a negative to that. Can I make | :43:26. | :43:34. | |
one point? The biggest ally of Assad is not Russia but Iran. The whole | :43:35. | :43:41. | |
Shia and this band from Iran, Iraq, Syria, if we called the Allies as we | :43:42. | :43:47. | |
do Shia, and Levin on, see this as an existential struggle, they are | :43:48. | :43:51. | |
never going to let the other side win. It is often seen as the | :43:52. | :43:56. | |
Russians are the crucial thing, this really isn't the case, it is Iran | :43:57. | :44:01. | |
and Shia access, that brought band of territory north of Saudi Arabia | :44:02. | :44:08. | |
and south of Turkey. The Prime Minister, in his evidence to the | :44:09. | :44:12. | |
Liaison Committee masks himself rhetorically, is there a third way | :44:13. | :44:15. | |
between a dash style state and President Assad the pitcher | :44:16. | :44:21. | |
remaining in charge? My answer would be there has to be a third way, we | :44:22. | :44:25. | |
have to find a third way -- bitch. It seems to me that what you are | :44:26. | :44:32. | |
saying is what the theorists call a 0-sum game. You appear -- butcher. | :44:33. | :44:41. | |
If you align with any faction in this, you are automatically making | :44:42. | :44:44. | |
enemies of the other faction. Is that what you are telling us? I | :44:45. | :44:49. | |
think that is true but it is the wrong approach. I think the approach | :44:50. | :44:54. | |
should be to reduce the level of violence in the war, but the Islamic | :44:55. | :45:00. | |
State and Assad, the extremes, benefit from war because each site | :45:01. | :45:03. | |
think we have no alternative but the other. If we were with the education | :45:04. | :45:08. | |
Ministry in Baghdad, they may not like Assad that must but they prefer | :45:09. | :45:13. | |
him to the other side. They may murder you and turn you into a | :45:14. | :45:16. | |
refugee. We need to bring down the level of violence through | :45:17. | :45:24. | |
international cutting off of supply and money on weapons. Then you can | :45:25. | :45:29. | |
begin... You're going to have real politics will stop the people around | :45:30. | :45:32. | |
Assad would no longer feel so threatened by the Islamic State, | :45:33. | :45:36. | |
that they had to stick by asset. We get away what Northern Ireland used | :45:37. | :45:41. | |
to call the politics of the last atrocity. People are so terrified | :45:42. | :45:45. | |
they stick to the most militant members of the faction. That is the | :45:46. | :45:49. | |
way to go. I think otherwise the situation is, as it has been | :45:50. | :45:53. | |
described, there is not a third way within the conflict and thinking | :45:54. | :45:56. | |
there is is simply a way of prolonging the conflict. Any further | :45:57. | :46:02. | |
comments? I surprise myself disagreeing with Patrick, I think | :46:03. | :46:06. | |
there's a third way and it is the only way that you to seek otherwise | :46:07. | :46:10. | |
there is total surrender by war and the victory of the other. That is | :46:11. | :46:14. | |
simply impossible. I do not know what the third way is that I know | :46:15. | :46:17. | |
that is the correct path to follow and that will require huge | :46:18. | :46:23. | |
compromises politically with Russia and that may bring sanctions on | :46:24. | :46:28. | |
Ukraine, thing that will be part of the price. I think there will be big | :46:29. | :46:31. | |
combo misers to make and we should not be frightened of making them. | :46:32. | :46:37. | |
Victory by any faction outright is impossible and not desirable. There | :46:38. | :46:43. | |
will be a third way. A wide range of views there, I have Phil and then | :46:44. | :46:50. | |
Richard. I think we have covered a lot of ground there but I think if | :46:51. | :46:53. | |
we could have some kind of definitive answer to these | :46:54. | :46:58. | |
questions. Do you think Russia's action has assured that Assad will | :46:59. | :47:01. | |
remain in power? Shall we accept that as the new norm and accept him | :47:02. | :47:07. | |
as being the leader? The evil genius of what Britain has done is to | :47:08. | :47:12. | |
assure Assad cannot lose. -- Vladimir Putin. Once he cannot lose, | :47:13. | :47:16. | |
eventually the other side, I believe, it will filter down and | :47:17. | :47:21. | |
that means we cannot win. That leans towards the third way. I think | :47:22. | :47:30. | |
absolutely yes -- guaranteed that they cannot lose. Yes. But I do not | :47:31. | :47:38. | |
think... I think there is a positive to Assad's medium-term survival | :47:39. | :47:43. | |
thanks to Russia. I think he is entirely dependent on Russia and I | :47:44. | :47:47. | |
think, to take issue with what Patrick said earlier, there had been | :47:48. | :47:51. | |
no shortage of Hezbollah or Iranian special forces recruits from across | :47:52. | :47:55. | |
the world to support the regime, but they were on the back foot last | :47:56. | :48:01. | |
autumn, they were losing ground. It was looking like there could be a | :48:02. | :48:04. | |
tilt away from the resume and the machine heartland areas. It was not | :48:05. | :48:08. | |
until Russian air strikes came in at the tables turned. The only positive | :48:09. | :48:12. | |
I see out of that is that, providing you keep dialogue with Russia, | :48:13. | :48:17. | |
providing America does, Assad, who knows his survival is dependent on | :48:18. | :48:24. | |
Russia, if you can sway Russia, it is long-term interest with the state | :48:25. | :48:28. | |
in Syria that they are not best vested in Assad, there is a | :48:29. | :48:35. | |
potential positive outcome. Could one get rid of Assad but keep the | :48:36. | :48:40. | |
resume? Would that make any difference? Is there an alternative | :48:41. | :48:47. | |
to the regime? All this talk about there to be a third way, but nobody | :48:48. | :48:52. | |
knows what it is, means you very rapidly get into wishful thinking. | :48:53. | :48:56. | |
One has to take things as they are. I think they need to, as I said, | :48:57. | :49:02. | |
reduce the level of violence and we are beginning to have that because | :49:03. | :49:08. | |
of the US and Russia are beginning to have ceasefires with tremendous | :49:09. | :49:14. | |
spurts of violence in between. If it goes that way, then I think that you | :49:15. | :49:25. | |
can begin to get back into a situation where the armed opposition | :49:26. | :49:30. | |
is dominated by extreme Salafi jihadis. Islamic state and so forth. | :49:31. | :49:36. | |
A lesser degree of violence then we begin to have real politics | :49:37. | :49:41. | |
happening again. I do not think Assad... People think that one side | :49:42. | :49:44. | |
or the other is going to collapse, with my experience in Iraq and | :49:45. | :49:50. | |
Syria, they have their constituency, they are nearly pressed back, but | :49:51. | :49:53. | |
they will always find a way of stoning business. | :49:54. | :50:01. | |
The sheer and the rest of the region will not let us all. They think it | :50:02. | :50:12. | |
will be them next. I think the way forward is it a degree of | :50:13. | :50:15. | |
cooperation with Russia, try to reduce the level of violence, begin | :50:16. | :50:20. | |
to try to get the refugees back at some stage. A big chunk of the | :50:21. | :50:27. | |
population are in at Dublin on for Jordan were heading for Europe. I | :50:28. | :50:39. | |
think that is the way to go to see what real measures can be done to | :50:40. | :50:45. | |
mitigate violence and to remedy the consequences of the violence. We | :50:46. | :50:54. | |
need to move on. Just a comment on the 70,000. I have never been of the | :50:55. | :51:00. | |
opinion that there are people in uniforms, formed as part of that | :51:01. | :51:06. | |
figure. 70,000 is not .32% of the pre-Civil War population. Surely it | :51:07. | :51:13. | |
is conceivable that there are 70,000 people out there who, given the | :51:14. | :51:19. | |
right circumstances, they just have an AK-47 under the bed but they | :51:20. | :51:25. | |
could be convinced to work with us. Is that too ridiculous concept? How | :51:26. | :51:37. | |
can you prove the number? Let's make it 60,000. I just do not see how it | :51:38. | :51:43. | |
is possible to extrapolate, not being on the ground, not doing | :51:44. | :51:47. | |
opinion polls were phoning people opt in or how many people are rebels | :51:48. | :51:51. | |
were moderate rebels. You are better off asking the Prime Minister. There | :51:52. | :52:00. | |
is a misconception that 70,000 guys with guns are not an army. They | :52:01. | :52:05. | |
could be easily destroyed by any properly organised well trained | :52:06. | :52:08. | |
armed force. Almost every young man in Iraq has begun. That is not an | :52:09. | :52:16. | |
army. They don't really count. I think the same is true in Syria. In | :52:17. | :52:27. | |
Syria, you find the regime in your town, your village. You might find | :52:28. | :52:33. | |
enough angry, probably Islamist young men who have been thrown out | :52:34. | :52:37. | |
of their area by Islamic State who, given the right motivation, might | :52:38. | :52:41. | |
want to go back and fight Islamic State in that area. Whether or not | :52:42. | :52:46. | |
they will be friendly to the west, to Israel, whether they would be | :52:47. | :52:50. | |
long-term allies in the region were shared the same foreign policy as | :52:51. | :52:54. | |
ours is rather another issue. Most rebel groups are more intent on | :52:55. | :52:57. | |
fighting sad that they are fighting Islamic State. Can I ask about that | :52:58. | :53:10. | |
though? It is very much in the news at the moment. In December 2012, you | :53:11. | :53:17. | |
wrote an article, Anthony, in the times which, it has been argued | :53:18. | :53:26. | |
changed government policy. It is depressingly similar then to what is | :53:27. | :53:31. | |
going on now. He talked about shells exploding in streets, chopping up a | :53:32. | :53:35. | |
group of four men in a weight so grotesque I cannot describe it here. | :53:36. | :53:40. | |
Cries of we are hungry and give us bread stocked my journey. If that | :53:41. | :53:44. | |
was happening then, what is happening now? Is this a policy of | :53:45. | :53:54. | |
webinars in the migrant crisis? Is this the steel regime going to sink | :53:55. | :54:01. | |
any lower? Is there anything worse it can do in terms of what it can | :54:02. | :54:04. | |
inflict on the population of this city? It is very difficult to | :54:05. | :54:14. | |
describe even having covered 15 or 20 conflicts around the world | :54:15. | :54:17. | |
something as extreme as is happening in Aleppo. It was a good deal worse | :54:18. | :54:26. | |
when I was last there. Admittedly I haven't been back for a year and a | :54:27. | :54:31. | |
half. The last time I went I went to a school that had been bombed on | :54:32. | :54:36. | |
sports day. One bomb had heard a girl against the wall and blast that | :54:37. | :54:42. | |
are outlined in black on the wall. She was nine or ten years old. So | :54:43. | :54:47. | |
was blasted into the corridor. That sort of stuff happens the whole | :54:48. | :54:55. | |
time. It is a terrible vision. It is very difficult to explain to people | :54:56. | :54:59. | |
here because it is so extreme. I don't know. But the property causes | :55:00. | :55:11. | |
a page on the other side. We have fighter planes and helicopters that | :55:12. | :55:19. | |
could drop humanitarian aid in an area the size of this room. We could | :55:20. | :55:26. | |
land on a bit of rough ground so the White helmets were some organisation | :55:27. | :55:31. | |
could get there. Is it conceivable we could negotiate with the Russians | :55:32. | :55:35. | |
and the regime to create protections around a hospital for... He is | :55:36. | :55:47. | |
calling for that and he is right. Would that be safe. Could there be | :55:48. | :55:52. | |
in this lush an assurance from the regime to make sure they would be | :55:53. | :55:58. | |
safe? I couldn't guarantee they would be shot down by the people | :55:59. | :56:03. | |
they were trying to help. These people are very angry. Keep in mind | :56:04. | :56:14. | |
we are intervening in the Civil War are two sides each other and have | :56:15. | :56:18. | |
real constituencies. The people killed in Aleppo over the past | :56:19. | :56:29. | |
couple of weeks, it was 132 killed by government barrel bombs and | :56:30. | :56:34. | |
shelling and 84 killed by rebel shelling in government-held areas. | :56:35. | :56:43. | |
All this is horrible, but it doesn't mean that it isn't a civil war which | :56:44. | :56:47. | |
we should be very careful about not getting sucked into because of | :56:48. | :56:58. | |
humanitarian, very genuine and understandable, humanitarian | :56:59. | :57:01. | |
concerns. Most people who because of bombing or shelling, they die in | :57:02. | :57:14. | |
battles. Is that true? Most people die through kinetic... Yes. They die | :57:15. | :57:24. | |
on both sides in the fighting. The Syrian army have lost 80 5000. We | :57:25. | :57:32. | |
had about 49 children killed by Russian and regime are strikes. The | :57:33. | :57:42. | |
accurate figures stopped being counted about a year ago. I think | :57:43. | :57:56. | |
that in Aleppo, the idea that one could suddenly intervene and start | :57:57. | :58:00. | |
dropping humanitarian supplies, all these things bring enormous | :58:01. | :58:04. | |
difficulties. We should be very careful before plugging into this | :58:05. | :58:13. | |
war. I think the only way is to try to reduce the level of violence | :58:14. | :58:17. | |
generally. Nobody is going to win this war, it will go on and on. I am | :58:18. | :58:24. | |
conscious of the time. I just wanted to say, there are those, some on | :58:25. | :58:31. | |
this committee who believe that the best chance of creating some form of | :58:32. | :58:38. | |
secular, more tolerant society in Syria means that we have two be much | :58:39. | :58:47. | |
more understanding of the regime's position. If we really do go down | :58:48. | :58:55. | |
that route, are we not ignoring the fact that many minorities, including | :58:56. | :58:59. | |
Christians, have been massacred as freely by his regime as his Islamic | :59:00. | :59:11. | |
enemies such Mark minorities generally are terrified of the other | :59:12. | :59:22. | |
side. The Islamic Army which controls eastern regions produced a | :59:23. | :59:27. | |
video saying what they thought of a small minority group. They said they | :59:28. | :59:34. | |
are not Islamists and we think it is OK to kill them and take them as | :59:35. | :59:40. | |
slaves. Imagine what you feel if you come from a community like that. You | :59:41. | :59:44. | |
might not like Assad but it is better than the other side. We | :59:45. | :59:52. | |
should have an understanding of their position without supporting | :59:53. | :59:55. | |
it. There are whispers you can make to them, reminding them that Russia | :59:56. | :00:03. | |
and Iran, neither of them are signatories to the Hague Convention. | :00:04. | :00:08. | |
You can whisper that no one is coming after you. You absolutely | :00:09. | :00:12. | |
need to understand that Christians, other whites, other minorities do | :00:13. | :00:19. | |
fear Islamist 's ticking over. Baby steps all the way. I think it is | :00:20. | :00:31. | |
worth trying to get air drops in. That is not taking sides. It is | :00:32. | :00:35. | |
taking the side of civilians. There is a way forward you have to try. | :00:36. | :00:40. | |
Part of that is understanding that not all of Syria was against Assad | :00:41. | :00:46. | |
and a significant number of people in the country do not like him, but | :00:47. | :00:51. | |
nor do they like the alternative and within that, there is some way that | :00:52. | :00:57. | |
people like yourselves can push policies towards an endgame which is | :00:58. | :01:05. | |
somewhat off yet. Everyone should be very clear about what it involves, | :01:06. | :01:12. | |
understanding Assad and use words like guarantees for minorities. | :01:13. | :01:17. | |
Remember the seas are photographs that came out of the man who | :01:18. | :01:20. | |
documented the torture victims on behalf of the regime. This was | :01:21. | :01:25. | |
11,000 tortured to death corpses that he was tasked with | :01:26. | :01:32. | |
photographing in a short period. Amnesty International said that up | :01:33. | :01:35. | |
to 65,000 people or more have been disappeared by the regime. Human | :01:36. | :01:41. | |
rights watch studied those photographs and found them to be | :01:42. | :01:45. | |
genuine, talked about crimes against humanity. The United Nations | :01:46. | :01:49. | |
commission of enquiry which looked at that report said the government | :01:50. | :01:55. | |
of Syria is responsible for acts mad to extermination and crimes against | :01:56. | :01:59. | |
humanity. I understand people who want to understand Assad, but I am | :02:00. | :02:04. | |
convinced that the regime is the primary cancer. It might have exist | :02:05. | :02:11. | |
in the middle term but do not delude yourselves that by closing up to | :02:12. | :02:15. | |
Assad we might swing round our long-term interests you. It won't | :02:16. | :02:26. | |
work. I am addressing them not you. I want to give analysts the last | :02:27. | :02:31. | |
word. I am conscious of Coloccini have not had a chance to ask | :02:32. | :02:36. | |
colleagues. One or two are offering to forego that and that is | :02:37. | :02:40. | |
appreciated. Bob and Ruth, would you very quickly like to put a final | :02:41. | :02:45. | |
point, one after the other and we will have a final word from each. | :02:46. | :02:51. | |
Anthony, Tim and Patrick have covered my question pretty well. | :02:52. | :02:56. | |
Fundamentally, there are people in Syria who are frightened sick that | :02:57. | :03:01. | |
Islamic State were murdered them and therefore they are setting with | :03:02. | :03:05. | |
Assad. I think that is the answer I would get from all three and that | :03:06. | :03:12. | |
would be my question is answered. I am not going to ask my question but | :03:13. | :03:16. | |
I will ask something else. It became clear that we had shared language or | :03:17. | :03:24. | |
understanding of history or any possible way forward for dialogue | :03:25. | :03:27. | |
and yesterday, when the minister was talking about Aleppo and refugees he | :03:28. | :03:33. | |
still could not give us any answers. Everyone kept saying we need to | :03:34. | :03:36. | |
bring Russia to the table but no real mechanism of initiating that | :03:37. | :03:41. | |
debate and discussion. Relations are at a low that, in my lifetime, are | :03:42. | :03:48. | |
at their lowest. What way do you think we should engage with the | :03:49. | :03:52. | |
Russians? You have all talked about it but I have no clear path for how | :03:53. | :03:54. | |
we have those conversations? And easy question for you! | :03:55. | :04:08. | |
Volunteers? There is a way. They have things they want. It is a | :04:09. | :04:13. | |
compromise. I agree with the passionate icebergs to the Mac | :04:14. | :04:19. | |
outbursts about Assad and all the crimes but I thought think, just | :04:20. | :04:24. | |
stop it somehow. If that requires the compromises to get out of the | :04:25. | :04:29. | |
country, to Moscow with quiet assurances, which I am allowed to | :04:30. | :04:33. | |
say and you are not, fine. As for the Rogers, they have all sorts of | :04:34. | :04:37. | |
things they want. It is a case of how much -- Russians. It is a case | :04:38. | :04:44. | |
of how much you can give them. They are a player and have made | :04:45. | :04:48. | |
themselves so. You have got to talk to them because if you do not, it | :04:49. | :04:52. | |
does not get settled. Talk to them, find out what they want, reduce the | :04:53. | :04:56. | |
violence, think about federal Syria, find alternative leaders and model | :04:57. | :05:07. | |
your way for -- foreword to the next couple of years. You must keep | :05:08. | :05:15. | |
talking to Russia. As I was saying earlier, the Russian relationship | :05:16. | :05:18. | |
with Assad, there is a positive side to that. Russia is the persuader. | :05:19. | :05:26. | |
What I also wanted to say is that, regardless of outside decisions and | :05:27. | :05:32. | |
foreign policy, war is not something that is that long-term and intense | :05:33. | :05:35. | |
that can be turned off the attack by outside powers, war is about what | :05:36. | :05:40. | |
goes on in the street, in a village, in a valley, and the emotions in | :05:41. | :05:44. | |
this conflict are far hotter than can be gals to buy some foreign | :05:45. | :05:54. | |
policy decision. -- diarist. There are decisions that can be taken. | :05:55. | :06:04. | |
They may not like what the outside powers tell them to do with money | :06:05. | :06:11. | |
and weapons and the support. The US and ourselves and the Russians have | :06:12. | :06:18. | |
that influence. The Turks, the Saudis, the Iranians also have | :06:19. | :06:22. | |
influence there. There is always a danger, when this comes up, trying | :06:23. | :06:30. | |
to explain what comes up in Syria, that explanation can look like | :06:31. | :06:33. | |
justification, of course I am not justifying, but I cannot think of a | :06:34. | :06:38. | |
way to solve this. We need to take the situation as it is and reduce | :06:39. | :06:43. | |
the violence and improve it. If the other way is not there, to look for | :06:44. | :06:48. | |
another way is an abdication of responsibility to my mind. Are the | :06:49. | :06:57. | |
Russians going to let this regime be displaced? Are the Iranians? Nil | :06:58. | :07:01. | |
will stop this is not going to happen. Can we mitigate what I | :07:02. | :07:07. | |
regime does by talking to their Russians? Yes, I think we can and | :07:08. | :07:11. | |
the Americans with some success, had been doing this, because we have had | :07:12. | :07:15. | |
ceasefires for the first time in five years in different areas. They | :07:16. | :07:20. | |
are like the ceasefires in the Lebanese civil war, everybody mocks | :07:21. | :07:23. | |
them and you can see where they are not working but in many areas less | :07:24. | :07:26. | |
people had been killed than were being killed before. This is the way | :07:27. | :07:33. | |
to go. You cannot say to the Russians, Assad is going to go and, | :07:34. | :07:41. | |
by the way, we want you to pressure him to not drop bombs on civilian | :07:42. | :07:45. | |
places, to have ceasefires and so forth. I think there's a lack of | :07:46. | :07:53. | |
realism there, in which one eventually becomes complicit in this | :07:54. | :07:57. | |
ongoing tragedy. Thank you all very much indeed, we'd love to go on | :07:58. | :08:01. | |
longer but we cannot. If there is the possibility of our staff | :08:02. | :08:05. | |
submitting the few extra questions to you for replying in writing, | :08:06. | :08:09. | |
would that be acceptable? We are very grateful and greed. We have | :08:10. | :08:13. | |
covered a huge range of views and topics. -- grateful indeed. Session | :08:14. | :08:21. | |
is included, order, order. -- concluded. | :08:22. | :08:44. | |
The Palace of Westminster, with its many stone figures, is the ultimate | :08:45. | :08:49. | |
Gothic revival | :08:50. | :08:50. |