UK Relations with Russia Committee Select Committees

Order, order, welcome to this afternoon's session. Our first

regarding relations with Russia. I would be grateful if you would

identify yourself for the record. Lecturer in security policy at the

University of Birmingham. Thank you. Thank you to both of you for coming

to give evidence. This is the scene setter for our inquiry into our

relations with Russia. We are planning a visit there fairly

shortly so this is very helpful to others. Some questions will be

general. But I will be more than delighted for you to give specifics

and help educate others. If I can start with an open question, without

inviting you to read a book, can you in it what are the overall goals of

Russian foreign policy? I think to start off we need to take a broader

look at how Russia sees the international environment. As

shifting balance of global power, the Russians have talked about the

ideal being a multi-border world or drug or a polycentric world order, a

world order which is marked by instability or anarchy and an

increasing tendency towards the use of force in international relations.

In the context of the last couple of years, and global environment in

which Europe in particular no longer plays a central role. In which

Western norms and values are not seen as paramount, they are not seen

as a reference point for Russia and have been criticised as not being

legitimate by Moscow. Moscow sees state sovereignty as paramount. It

supports incumbent legitimate governments, as in the case of

Syria. It is against liberal intervention as a means of dealing

with difficult situations with conflicts. As far as overall goals,

Andrew will continue on those. In the case of the sillier conflict and

perhaps Ukraine conflict, Russia sees itself as a great power once

again after difficult period in the 1990s, independent of Western

interest. It wants to further Eurasian integration, preventing the

further encroachment of Western influence on its own sphere of

privileged interests. It is trying as a result of the estrangement with

Nato and the EU to develop its own non-Western lead regional

integration so on a regional scale, our collective security treatment

organisation and an organisation which has become increasingly

important -- important, the Shanghai cooperation Organisation which has

recently been joined by India and Pakistan so obviously a large

grouping of states. I've already mentioned Western intervention in

sovereign states, in terms of its dealings with Europe, Russia prefers

to deal on a bilateral basis with the European member states rather

when -- rather than with Nato and EU, organisations Russia has serious

problems with. It had along time problems with Nato and since 2004,

much more defensive attitude with their European union. Finally, again

I alluded to this before, it wants to manage international crises where

possible through the United Nations and is still a member of the

permanent five so it can veto resolutions it does not like. It can

change the facts on the ground and dictate the parameters of any

crisis, at least in most cases. Derek has been very thorough. I

would add some points. The overall drive and Russian goals on the

international stage, to meet their position as the ubiquitous power,

one that has Russia at the centre of the map stretching across many time

zones and regions in the world. It is a ubiquitous world power and also

wants to create a position for Russia as an indispensable Mark.

This means they want and need to have a seat at the table otherwise

they are concerned they will be on the menu. This means they see a

different world to the UK on the one hand. They have drawn different

conclusions from the same international developments.

Different conclusions from the same body of evidence. They are working

to an international environment that is dominated by regime change,

current revolutions and the Arab Spring. In practical terms this

means domestic politics and foreign policy are closely bound together.

First, Russia is trying to be as sovereign independent state which

would mean that Russia is prepared for a 21st century instability, so

looking ahead into the century of instability. Secondly, and ever was

international architecture where the post-2nd World War architecture,

need to and the EU is no longer relevant their view. It is becoming

decreasing the relevant. Third, Russian foreign policy is

increasingly guided towards a counter colour revolution, putting

Russia first and against regime change and diplomacy and operations,

that includes Syria. Can I follow up on one of the comments. You said

that the Western norms were no longer seen as a reference point.

Where is that debated in Russia? They are members of the Council of

Europe. Subject to the convention, the European convention. Where is

the debate in Russia about asserting some kind of socially conservative

different view of the world in a sense, an antithesis to liberal

western Europe? Is there not a part of Russian identity which would like

to be accepted and part of the values we aspire to? Does he want to

commend? -- come in. Now, if you could add the question. You have

raised an interesting point. For many years, there has been an

ambivalence and still is. An ambivalence in Russian foreign

policy between being a sovereign, tournaments global power and

regional power and essentially looking after its domestic order

being projected internationally and the recognition of interdependence,

particularly with Europe and with other powers. This has run through

the last 25 years since the break-up of the USSR.

What is often forgotten is that for a long time, Russia was genuinely in

my feud negotiating norms with the European Union to an extent also

with Nato and trying to find some kind of accommodation. But the

political class saw a series of conflicts and crisis is starting

with Nato's intervention in Kosovo were Russia did not have a voice.

That was a big shock for the Russian political class. We had the US-led

invasion of Iraq and we had the colour revolutions in Georgia and

particularly in Ukraine in 2004 and then we had the war with Georgia and

South city in 2008 and end of the beer and Syria crisis and all the

time, the Russians have been in their own view marginalised and

sidelined and they are increasingly seen by the West, and this is a

direct quote from something that President Obama said, as being on

the wrong side of history and the Russians do not accept that. So

now... Now you have the situation where the more conservative

sovereign state trends in Russian foreign policy has leaked to the

four and has monopolised not only narratives and the rhetoric that

Russian foreign policy comes out with but also to a large extent, not

completely, but to a large extent also a policy-making, practical

policy-making. At the moment, it is becoming increasingly difficult for

Western organisations and political leaders to actually go to Moscow and

actually come out with anything positive. We were in Berlin three or

four months ago talking to the chap who heads the Russian and you region

programme in foreign relation and Germany has more or less lead to the

response and he said that the foreigners to go to Moscow

to bring some proposals to the table to bring some proposals to the table

talks to the Foreign Minister there. talks to the Foreign Minister there.

At the moment, that is causing difficulties. We could talk about

the potential political military implications of that in a while.

Might I add a footnote? I think it is important that it is noted here

that neither at the Russian leadership nor indeed more broadly

in Russian society is there an acceptance of Western values. I

think we made me is that when you go to Russia. On the one hand, the

Russian leadership has noted on numerous occasions that they do not

want to accept our values and that Russian democracy will come in its

own time and in its own way, a Russian way. On several occasions,

it has been stated that we simply don't want to be embraced in those

terms. We will come to it in our old course. Mr Putin himself has stated

on numerous occasions that he looks at some of the developments between

the European Union and liberalism there that we think of an

antithetical terms of what should be happening in Russia. In terms of

broader society, I think it is worth noting that when we talk about

socially conservative, we are talking about socially conservatism

with a small sea. A Paul recently -- a poll recently said 70% of the pop

duration of Russia could be said to be socialists and of those 20% are

Communist. The Communist party is always second in the elections. That

is the main... It is not just a party of protest, that represents a

substantial part of the population so when we talk about our values we

also look at Russia asking if there are a liberal parties in protest is,

unfortunately from a British perspective, and from a British

parliamentarian perspective, those who would be a keen to seeing the

world in the same way as us are very much in a minority. The Communist

party has been all over it the place. The Communist party in

Bristol whole range of points. We are talking about Russian domestic

politics. They are a long way from what we would issue to be in terms

of our values. They represent something rather different to a

Western value, Western European Western value, Western European

Union value. How long have you... ? You mentioned our values and you

mentioned being on the wrong side of history that if you look at the

recent Afghan war, the Russians have been saying far more sensible things

than the West. They say far more sensible things about dealing with

Isis than any of the Western politicians do and in Syria, the

Geneva talks would not be anywhere without all that dreadful bombing

recently so is there an argument there on the right side of history?

Should I come in here? Without seeming to ingratiate myself with

your good surf the Maxell, I do believe that the Russians have had a

fairly strong argument for Syria. Back in 2012, we had the action

group of Syrian meeting in Geneva and issued a communique in June two

3012 stop roughly a year later we had a summit and again the world

summers, including Putin who was part of that, this was before the

Ukraine crisis, issued a communique talking about an inclusive

transition. Everyone then goes home. The Western powers forget about

that, the opposition comes back and says we cannot communicate with

Assad. We can talk about Assad in a moment. We will not countenance any

inclusive political transition. The Russian view is that you have to

negotiate however bad Assad is. There are elements within the

opposition. The Russian says the opposition has been infiltrated by

Islamic state three or four years ago before we even talked about

Islamic state. They were infiltrated by riot radical elements and there

was no real opposition that could have talked with Assad. So the West

and Russia on the other side, I think both sides bear responsibility

for what happened and then there was a lot of drift. We had two or three

years of drift. Appalling loss of life, disruption of Syria virtually

putting the end to it as a court hearing state and in, as Lavrov put

it quite blatantly in a meeting with Putin, to change the facts on the

ground. Effectively, they wanted to allow Syrian regime, obviously with

Russia behind it, to negotiate from position of strength. That is kind

of free version from the principles, the original principles of what

Russia sees as traditional international law to more of a power

play. But nevertheless, it did change the facts on the ground and

now we are coming towards peace. Not a happy piece and I am not bad

classical star scholar but I think Tacitus said, they make a Desert and

call it peace. No one comes out of this particularly with good

credentials but the Russians did have some points which they were

pushing. The traditional international law, the primary

responsibility of the United Nations which actually passed to security

council resolutions which backs up the action group and Syria decision

was relieved just ignore it. And so, I think both sides bear... We seem

to have much more of a take on reality. We saw Assad a couple of

weeks ago and one of the things he said was that the Russians wouldn't

let the Syrian state fall. Not soft, the Syrian state. As far as we know,

they are on the right side of history. We could perhaps learn from

them. Sorry Canada is finished. The problem here is that initially and

even now the Russians are saying they are not supporting Assad, they

are supporting the legitimate regime which was back to what I was talking

about before and what was mentioned before about Noel regime change in

the Western style, so there is that our principle at work there. The

problem is, of course, that Assad is insisting pretty much in most of his

speech is insisting that he is not speech is insisting that he is not

willing to move on. I believe Assad does their on the balance of

evidence responsibility for the majority of the death and

destruction. The problem is that Russia might be on the right side of

traditional international law, but in terms of the normative aspect,

the idea of responsibility to protect populations which is not an

international legal mob that is an international law which is

developing, then Russian is on the wrong side of that and that is

really what I think the reference to being on the wrong side of history

is. But isn't this the problem? We make mistakes and see things grow

much in terms of our principles which is great, but actually, it

should be about interest and their analysis were now of keeping Syrian

state net there is surely more sensible than most of the West.

There is an argument there. I think that the Russians fail to bring up

very much constructive to the table, that is the problem. They talk a lot

about observing humanitarian norms but they are not always 100% behind

it if it interferes with the principle, as I say, of retaining

the sovereign power in Syria. There are other aspects, other normative

aspects which the Russians talk about and they have engaged with the

responsibilities to protect the norm. They did not veto the Nato

intervention in Libya for example, but when it became the case of

regime change, then that's really... What's happened in Syria is really a

knock-on effect from what happened in Libya. I was going to invite

Doctor Monaghan to speak. I think we need to be careful about talking

about the right side of history. It is a rather Whiggish approach to

history and the progressive sort of nature that revolutions will always

result in a good thing and if they are successful. I do not think we

should be thinking about right or wrong side of history whether they

are on the wrong side or not stop the Russians do not see it in the

same way. They have made it very clear that they do not see history

in the same kind of progressive light of optimism at the end of the

Cold War and so on. There is a long Scotian now that we could have that

actually the two points that I would relate to specifically that you have

said, the Afghan war, they said some sensible things. Perhaps more than

us, but they did offer on numerous occasions the knowledge that they

had about that. And we said, no, we do not need that. When I say we, I

used to be employed by Natal but it was not just Nato, it was also at a

UK level. No thanks, we are all right. Several years later, oh,

you're leaving Afghanistan, we have also done that. Would you like

advice? And we said no, it is all fine. So on some occasions, there

are opportunities perhaps to listen to some of the things of the

Russians say. That does not mean that we have to agree with it that

just because we agree to be necklace and does not mean we agree. -- just

because we must and does not mean we agree. From the beginning in Syria,

the Russians have been sceptical of the progressive nature of the Arab

Spring which was supposed to immediately bring a flowering of

liberalism and democracy to north Africa and actually most of the

Russian discussion has been a long lines of, that hasn't really worked,

Hazard? Look at Libya and Syria. There may be other countries that we

may wish to point to. But let's take those two as primary examples. There

is something to the Russian argument in that sense that we are

actually... When you go around creating regime change, what you do

is not lead to a flourishing of democracy. This is the more Chrissy

on the end of gun barrels and what that creates is a vacuum, a power

vacuum, leading to wider instability. We can disagree over

whether it is democracy at the end of a gun barrel or not, but that is

the Russian position and actually the position in Libya is not very

good. Can I just very quickly adds to something Andrew said about

Russia being sceptical about the Arab Spring. Foreign Minister Lavrov

has repeatedly in speeches and articles talked about the fact that

this stems from Russia's own history. Concern over the fact that

a sudden violent upheaval never really achieved its aims and I

think, really you're talking about going back to the Bolshevik

resolution which obviously set Russian backed six or seven decades.

Is that position by Mr Putin? It is pretty much backed up via Mr Putin.

The end of the Soviet Union was the greatest disaster of the 20th

century? Now, he said it was the greatest geopolitical disaster. You

have taken a phrase which is from a much longer speech, 11 years ago

that was referring to several specific things about many ethnic

Russians and others being left outside their country. He had a very

specific meaning in mind. If you want to use Mr Putin as examples, I

would point you to a speech in 2014, the March speech, also the speech

after the annexation of Crimea. These more recent speeches will

guide you towards Russian foreign policy. So he doesn't want to

recreate a position where Russian speakers are... A greater Russian

Empire? The greater Russian Empire, now but our collective Security

Treaty organisation, as Eurasian economic union, creating Russia as a

hub is not the same, we're not going back to some form of Soviet Union.

We may be going forward to some different kind of union in the 21st

century, but it's not quite the same as some kind of socket Empire. --

Soviet empire. Delighted to have year, the evidence about Russia is

breathtaking so it's good to have your perspective. You mentioned the

European Union, in 2004 when there were 11 countries, new countries

entering the European Union, Russia was consulted about this because

there would be ramifications on Russia, that has not happened over

Ukraine, they have been excluded but there will be an impact on Russia

because that is movement agreement with Ukraine so any agreement with

EU would allow EU goods to come to Russia without any customs, could

you speak about that? One element I was not sure about that question,

you see Ukraine will not be a member of the European union I think? The

European union has had talks with the Ukraine about some sort of

agreement. Russia has been excluded from the stocks yet Russia has a

bilateral agreements with Ukraine for free movement of goods. If

Ukraine becomes a member of the European union, we will be able to

export goods... Would you mind, I did not interrupt you. Order. We

could export goods to the Ukraine without tireless and then those

goods could be sent to Russia without tireless because of their

agreement with this EIS. In negotiating the free trade agreement

with Ukraine and the other agreement which are now, as first January last

year enforced, 1st of January this year it came into force. If the EU

did meet with the Russians to talk about potential impact on Russia,

Ukraine trade. They gave the Russians a fair hearing but in the

end the EU was not prepared, it is quite strong on regulatory issues.

It was not prepared to let Russia interfere with Ukraine's sovereign

choice of specific regulatory parts they were prepared to sign up to. So

the Russians were heard but in the end, pretty much all their views

were not taken into consideration. My school projects that as their

European union effectively taking over Ukraine's sovereignty when in

fact Russia would like a voice in limiting Ukraine's sovereignty and

their ability to move towards European integration so the Russians

have a point that they have trade agreements with the Ukraine. I am

not a great specialist in this but apparently that is not

incompatibility with Ukraine associating with the association

agreement for free trade agreement and some kind of free trade

agreement with Russia, those two things can operate but Russia is

after ultimately for Ukraine to join the Eurasian economic union. Or to

remain neutral. And not to move further towards Europe. You talked

about a brick wall with Sergei Lavrov, also supported by Foreign

Secretary having a conversation with lover of which would not cleared up

much further in the Russian position. -- Sergei Lavrov. What

does Russia want out of the West? What is there that week is usefully

engage with to try and meet some kind of compromise so we can give

them, where Kimiko -- concede to them? Given that understanding about

the position of the West. I think I am referring to a paper Andrew wrote

last year. He said the problem is, this is strange and 18 Russia and

Western organisations means that the dynamic is often projected as one of

either confronting Moscow or appeasing Russia. There is a neat,

if I am right, I think there is a need to get away from that and try

to look at the roots of the problem and begin again to negotiate the

fundamentals, especially on political and military security

issues. There is a danger, from several reports, highlighting

potential problems of an inadvertent conflict sparking a greater

conflagration. Arms control agreements at the moment and

concerns over hybrid warfare by Russia, all of these things, nobody

talked about it three years ago and is now a big problem. Fundamentally,

initially, we need to get back and even revisit the Helsinki

principles, to get back to try to lay down those fundamental

political, military security principles, including following up

on the Vienna document on security building measures. How we go beyond

that will depend on how the Ukraine crisis plays out. If the two sides

can come together, the European union and Russia, or western Russia,

cannot do it over the heads of Ukraine. Both Nato and EU have made

this clear, it has to involve the sovereign decision of Ukraine so

they have to bring PF in. The two sides have to be brought together to

negotiate a settlement to the Ukraine's constitutional crisis...

They have federalised. Can you talk about Ukraine? There are a number of

points. We have to be careful about talking about engage or concede at

the moment. Engage we talked about for a decade or more. It has not led

to any specific developments. What does Russia won't? What can we do

about it? The Russian position in Europe is clear, they want a new

European Security Treaty. This has been advanced by numerous Russian

leaderships, most recently by the presidency of 2008, it was called

after the president but it had been formulated under President Putin's

Administration. It is a leadership team offering this idea. This was

pushed into the core food crisis, rejected by Nato. The basic idea was

formulated and circulated and it was full of legal problems and in

contradiction to some of the fundamental points of Atlantic

security. What would we want out of this? As a foot note, although this

has been moved to one side in the process, the Russians have not been

given up on this. They have been perceiving this with diplomacy ever

since. Can I ask, activity in Ukraine over the last couple of

years, what does that tell us about their wider strategic goals? It

tells us a number of points and I was focused on the Euro Atlantic

architecture, that is the real problem. Ukraine is a serious

problem in its own right but it means we view the European Security

order very differently. We talk about interstate, the indivisibility

of security in terms of the three baskets of security whereas the

Russians viewed differently, to mean that you'll Atlantic security is

divided. It is not indivisible. There is an eastern level with

guarantees and there is a need to EU guarantee which is political and

legally binding. So there's a distinction, already at two tier

Atlantic security. In effect you see Russia emphasising this distinction

with the Budapest Memorandum. It's not legally binding for instance,

unlike if the Russians had gone to war with the Nato member state.

That's the lesson from Ukraine? Yes. How about contrasting that with

Syria? I would draw a significant difference with that. There are some

links. The Russian leadership sees the attempt to create our regime

change, a colour revolution in both states. The operation in Ukraine was

to ensure that the Crimea did not fall out of Russian strategic

control, hence the annexation. Second there is the possibility of

creating a federalisation... Do you really think they thought they would

lose the Crimea? Yes and it is understandable because the Ukrainian

government was renting out the main bees to them at Sebastopol at a very

high fee. It is one of their main strategic concerns that either the

price would be raised yet again or indeed the deal would be cut

entirely. Ukrainian government might have

said, we will have Nato ships. That is less important than the base

being removed from Russian control. For me, that is the primary reason

for the Crimean operation. The second element is the federalisation

of Ukraine which keeps a more broadly diverted sense of power

within Ukraine. I would reiterate that although Ukraine is a very

serious problem and serious disagreement between Russia and

Nato, and the EU, the real problem that demonstrates is the flaw is

that we have in terms of the Euro Atlantic architecture because

similar problems we are now worried about in other regions. If I may

draw the difference between Syria and Ukraine, the Russians in effect

operated before the regime change could take place. So entering Syria

first was anti aircraft equivalent to prevent an Anglo-Saxon lead,

French led bombing campaign to remove Assad from power, that is why

they went in. Secondly, propping up the power. You are seeing a series

of learning and developing operations about how to prevent

colour revolutions from taking place. If they had a hint or

suggestion that there was a possibility of a colour revolution

taking place in a former Soviet space, you would see similar

operations. Very quickly, something Andrew referred to, Nato has never

gone back on the pledge made at the Bucharest summit in 2008 that

Ukraine and Georgia, an open door policy for them to be admitted to

Nato. Most of the main member states are against that now but in the

recent period it was noticeable that that pledge was reiterated in the

case of Georgia but not for Ukraine. Nato is dragging its feet and they

like to state this as a principle but realistically they do not want

to take on the foreign policy problems that Ukraine and Georgia

contain but it is something which was good looks that seriously. your

second question... Actually, the first point would be, decide what we

want to do. As far as I'm aware there is no clear coherent policy,

either at Nato level or European Union level, or indeed at UK

national level, of where we want to be with the Russians in, let's say

2020, at the end of this Parliament return. There is no lengthy public

discussion of that or detailed nature of that. So what we're

talking about, where can we engage or concede, it often... Policy often

seems to me to be very reactive, constant state of surprise. It makes

the discussion of negotiations and diplomacy quite difficult. If you

are constantly being surprised, we had in 2008 the then Foreign

Secretary David Manor band saying the Russia- Georgia war was a rude

awakening. Gretchen at the David Miliband. You can get the terms were

used when Russia annexed Crimea, a rude awakening. This is because

we're not paying attention to what is happening in Russia. We'll come

onto British policy later. With your indulgence... It's all over to you

for the next few minutes. Obviously, I get the impression that Russia

wants to give as little as possible away about what its plans are

politically and militarily, for obvious reasons. To link the hybrid

warfare techniques that we used to get Russia into Ukraine, and into

Crimea with the unexpected moves, certainly surprising moves, emerging

when they started to build up in Syria... Can I ask both of the

witnesses, do they feel that this is part of breaking up this sort of

neighbourhood that was more or less very much under their control 20

years ago, 25 years ago? And that there is a policy of now trying to

create almost frozen states in many cases? As an alternative to seeing

Nato move further east and the EU move further east. And, also,

encroachment of its interests in the Middle East. You got one or two

ideas. When you say the Russians want to give away as little as

possible on plans and military developing. I disagree with you.

Russian strategic planning is made explicit, the mate decrees of 2012

set out a strategic agenda that is ambitious, yes, but entirely clear.

-- May decrees. As far as its military plans, yes, and please do

come back on me if you find this interesting, the Russian system

doesn't work well. It acknowledged by its leadership to do so so they

are putting it under intense pressure to build it into a capable

system. It is tantamount to state mobilisation. This is all made for

the public, this is discussed. Wasn't it UK where they denied

point-blank... Ireland having lunch with the ambassador at his residence

in London with the then chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the

Russian ambassador said to me, point-blank, Russian troops weren't

in Ukraine. Two weeks later it was out that they were there and he was

on TV explaining the fact. They were in Russian uniforms without Russian

insignia. They didn't make it plain what their intentions were, they

just went in. There are two separate questions going on here. When we

talk about their strategic agenda and operational agenda, it stated

extremely clearly, published in our foreign policy concept, national

security strategies. Before you are asking is, are there special

operations forces operations secret? Yes, of course they are. It was a

surprise for some people that special operations forces went in

and did what they did. For those watching specifically, and I know

this was the case, people were being briefed here, people were briefing,

saying, actually, this is going to happen. There was evidence already

this is the case. Satellite evidence and they still denied it. It will

certainly taking place within the MoD and I know there were at least

some in the think tank community who were saying, watch out, something's

coming. There were a series of measures indicated a meeting of the

Security Council... Can you say any more about the sources? There's a

question we've got dressed as a committee about whether the Foreign

Office has the capacity to understand Russia properly. And you

are beginning to develop quite a strong critique. That from what I'm

reading of it, actually our capacity to understand Russia is woeful. Now,

I want you to challenge that, did our own intelligence services tell

us this, was it think tank is, does the government understand this? If I

may, there are two questions to this. I'm keen to provide a

secondary answer. This is a very important question because first of

all there are serious limitations to Russian capacity in the UK and

throughout Western Europe at the moment, and the US. That's because

for the last 25 years Russia hasn't been a priority. So resources have

been wound down on it. What resources there are, there are still

some, generally focused on civil society and democracy, because that

is where the funding has been. There are very few people who are experts

on the Russian economy. And even fewer expert on the Russian

military. Even fewer still, we can count on one hand, who are real

experts on the Russian security system. Would it be correct to

characterise the system as... Varies you, knowledgeable authority, nobody

in the Foreign Office to read what you are writing? Not quite. In a

nutshell... You said it was common knowledge who knew... There are now

3-4 balls in the airfield. The capacity to understand what you

know... Are so limited, so stretched inside the office, and have ditched

all the expertise they have. There are some people there in an eastern

research group, within the system, there are new people in the embassy

learning very quickly, also in the MoD, people. It's not only the

number. It's a very important point had like to make, it's not only the

number of expertise, because people are sending the information up, but

it hits the glass ceiling. Very senior level decision-making. We

wouldn't do that, so the Russians would do it. It's what I would call

unknown millions, if you will. In terms of varied expertise. --

unknown knowns. When there is information that doesn't chime with

our own understanding of the world, it's rejected. I can perhaps offer

some specifics in a different environment, but I would be hesitant

to name names as to how I know this was taken. Clearly, Ukraine was

still a big issue while the Syria war was developing. Again, out of

the blue. Satellites saw it, American intelligence knew about it

probably before anybody else did it. Again, we saw the troop build-up

from the air. But again, talking up the blue, no discussion about

stopping bloodshed in Syria. I thought if there is any way of

deflecting attention away from Ukraine, that is certainly a great

way to do it. That would have been the main objective but I'm sure it

took a lot of attention away from Russian activity. Andrew already

referred to the fact some fundamental principles, such as

trying to avoid regime change etc... Are two things are... It's a

tactical move as well as strategic. Sending troops into Syria is the

best way to take attention away from Ukraine. He gave an hour-long

interview on American TV saying what we're going to do before he went to

New York. Richie McCaw Mr Putin gave an hour-long interview. It was an

English yet people were still surprised when they did it. You have

to be a little careful here about what we're talking. The Russians

have been talking about Syria since 2011. So if we're a bit surprised

about what they say, and what they do, and I don't here include special

operations forces, because it tends to be surprising, as I hope ours

are, to. We've only got ourselves to blame. Because we're not listening.

One thing I would say, if you want to make a link between Ukraine and

Syria, Nato was very surprised, I talk to people in nature 18 months

ago, who were surprised Russia now has the capacity to move something

like 50,000 men and a relatively rapid reaction force, up and down

borders, and to do the kind of things they did in Ukraine, as well

as being backed up by if not the absolute top of the range, then some

very decent military kit. In terms of anti-aircraft missiles, the temp

three macro. Russia's and defensive capabilities. -- the S400. There has

been an increase in state procurement of modern weapon

systems. So they have financial difficulties, it's sad to continue

until 2020. The State Department programme until 2020. Correction

macro state armament. We need people who are looking at this and taking

the decision. If I can get two examples in response to the

question, I'll be able to absorb the knowledge they have? -- are we able

to absorb the knowledge? The research group, staffed by excellent

people who stay in the group for many years, tremendous amount of

knowledge on an academic level about Russia. Something like five or six

of them dealing with the entire post-Soviet space less Dick states,

looking at politics, security etc. -- plus Baltic states. They try

their best. It is laughable, really. In the Ministry of Defence, I was

there with a couple of colleagues to or three years ago talking to the

defence economics Department. And a chap there had been there 25 years.

He joined at a time when there was something like two dozen people

looking at the Soviet defence industry, defence capabilities and

economy. He was the last one working full-time on it and he's since

retired to write the good beer guide, apparently. The Ministry of

Defence is now up as well. Seriously understaffed. You are talking about

Russia, still the biggest manufacturer and biggest exporter of

armaments. And you tell me the MoD has no real capacity to look at

that. Academia can maybe make up some of the shortfall, Chatham House

can make up some of the shortfall. If Russia is important, and I

believe it is important once again, it's never really went away but it

has certainly come back, the committee might... I shouldn't tell

you what to write but the committee might make that point to the

government. And what we need to do in the future. It comes to, right

down to, something the LSE commission wrote a report on quite

recently. I would advise you to have a look at it, really very

interesting, saying the kind of multidisciplinary knowledge Andrew

referred to, the language knowledge, Russian language, other minority

languages, you know, we need to pay attention to that. Obviously we

can't influence the education, Secretary of State for Education,

but it's something which is referred to time and again and something the

country never seems to do anything about. We are pressed for time and

have to move on to counterterrorism. Sergey Lavrov says if it moves like

a terrorist and looks like a terrorist, it is a terrorist.

Clearly there was a difference between what Russia believes a

terrorist is and what we believe are terrorists. As Russia have a clear

policy on counterterrorism? Yes. What is it then? It's differs from

ours, yeah. Do you want to go first was to mark I was going to say, I

organised... It was the third week of November 2013, I remember the

date very well because the week after that Mr yellow coverage

decided not to sign the association agreement and everything kicked off

so there was no further cooperation. -- news to wit Mr Yanukovic. We

talked about counterterrorism. There was a lot to talk about, the fact

that between Nato and Russia there were some positive movements in

terms of joint threat assessments, looking at how we might deal with

terrorism together. The findings of that particular workshop were that

the views on how to deal with terrorism differ. The Russians think

the European Union and Nato are not the best organisations to deal with

it. And that it needs to be dealt with in wider international

organisations. The fine thing was that it is not something that can

kick-start the relationship. There was a lot of talk after 2001, after

9/11 that Putin effectively said to George Bush, we can work together to

defeat terrorism. I think that kind of idea is completely gone now. It's

not something which can really lay the basis for a really kind of deep

cooperative relationship. It's important to contextualise this in

the longer relationship. The Russians define terrorism

differently to us, they define the solution Sir Freddie to us, and the

outcome differently to us, in Syria. -- the solutions frankly to us.

Shortly put, the aim is to defeat terrorism any measure possible. Mr

Putin has implement it a series of robust measures within Russia that

I'm sure you are familiar with. Objection in the North Caucasus.

People speak of Mr Medvedev of being more liberal, being a more posts

offer Soviet -- post-Soviet individual. He has said, I'm

president, we must root this out. Even the cleanest and even those who

cook for them, will face the full brunt of Russian power. Anybody

against the regime. Amazing that the definition? No, people who take up

arms against the state within the regime is defined as a terrorist. Do

they define terrorist in Syria similarly? They would define Islamic

State and other organisations as being terrorist. The difference with

us is that they don't see a distinction between extremists are

moderates. You may remember in 2013 when someone was released, a video

from one of the organisations we supported, didn't view as

terrorists, Mr Putin pointed out the individuals were indulging in

cannibalism. They have a very different view of what terrorist

organisations are and do, they are much more robust about it than we

are. I think it's worth pointing out that the example about how we differ

is Chechnya. How for instance the Russians adopted a very robust

series of measures, went to war in Chechnya twice, then have flooded it

with money. This undermines the UK- Russia relationship, but there is of

it. Because we provided asylum for a number of Chechens, individuals. The

Russians have said, how can you be against terrorism if you provide a

sign for these individuals? So, often what you find is a set of

concerns in Russia that the UK indulges in double standards. I have

literally two words to that. It's a problem of the whole of the North

Caucasus now. There are fewer problems in Chechnya at the moment,

far more problems in Dagestan. It's across the North Caucasus. Something

you might explore when you go to Moscow is how Russia plans to deal

with the return of foreign fighters who have been in Syria. That is

something which is very much on the European radar over the last couple

of years. To try to get some sense of what both sides might agree on in

that respect. And I ask you both, sounds like you are more or less

agree on, the likelihood of their being some sort of consensus between

the West and Russia over visible cooperation on radical Islamic

terrorism or which groups are terrorists and which not, is pretty

nigh in possible. If there are joint threat assessments, that the two

sides can agree on, maybe the experience of the last two or three

years that Europe has had might be something worth revisiting. At the

moment I don't really think... There isn't that kind of solid basis for a

far-reaching, you know, shared policy.

More broadly than Islamic State, a realistic discussion of real

consensus, shared interests about identifying who these people are and

how we will deal with them will be very difficult to achieve. The

Russians think about 4500 people from the former Sword Beach union

have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq and yes that is the concern that

they will go home. Therefore measures are being taken to enhance

security. I think they will be more robust in Russia potentially than

hear. There are domestic approaches. Do Russia regard Hezbollah as

terrorists, given the our allies of Assad? What is their attitude to

Hamas? Good question. Moscow has actually talk to Hezbollah and Hamas

in the past. Beneath the, I wouldn't like to say I can give an

authoritative and so but they might see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

as something separate in terms of reference to what is happening in

Syria and elsewhere now. Moscow wants to be seen to be brokering

some kind of... It doesn't have as much influence as America's... They

have signed up to the principles which includes things Hamas have not

accepted. The point about tactics, terrorism is a form of tactic used

by some political movements, given the Russian position in Chechnya and

elsewhere, presumably they are against the use of violent means?

The Russians are also prepared to do in certain cases, which includes

Hamas and Hezbollah, is to try and find elements which are not overt

lead Jihadist but two are perhaps fighting for self determination and

get some inclusive political dialogue under way. The difference

between Islamic State... I am looking for what specifically they

define as terrorism. A conference was held last week in Moscow in

which all of the senior military turned up and many defence ministers

from around the world. It was held to discuss, global terrorism and

colour revolutions. There was an interesting link made between these

two. I think it is well worth the time of the committee finding some

of the speeches which were made and will be online. I am not sure they

will be in English, but the speeches, certainly by Foreign

Minister Sergei Lavrov will be translated into English and these

will guide you into a clearer indication of some of the

ambiguities that there are in these questions. It is interesting from my

point of view as a British researcher to see how they link

terrorism and colour revolutions together and that is what they see

happening in Syria. Can we to sanctions. Thank you very much. --

turn to. I am sure you know that at the French National Assembly and

motion was put forward last week, a non-binding resolution, urging the

government to lift economic sanctions and other retaliation

measures imposed on Russia by the European Union. Although it is a

non-binding article in the French parliament, the former Prime

Minister welcomed the vote. There is a general consensus is it me put

pressure on the government ahead of the next revision of sanctions in

July 20 16. Bearing that in mind, do you think we also should call for a

recession of sanctions against Russia? It has been notable,

probably testament to the shock that the Ukraine crisis had in Europe,

that actually the sanctions line has held quite well. Even in Germany,

where obviously Germany has the greatest share of trade of EU member

states with Russia, even the business constituencies, they might

crumble but they more or less support that kind of line. It is

held throughout Europe. How long it can last without some kind of

resolution of the Ukraine conflict is open to question. The problem I

think is less to do with appeasing Russia and more to do with what

actually sanctions are doing to the Russian economy. A colleague of mine

has written about this, they are pushing the Russians into a more

state-controlled state directed economy. They are looking about

mobilisation of national subsidies, import solutions, greater state

support to enterprises to make up for sanctions. This is a problem

because it tends to separate the Russian political economy from the

European political economy in a big way so that the EU idea of

constructive relationship with Moscow, which would create

stability, security and prosperity between the borders is really pretty

much content end now. That is not an argument for getting rid of

sanctions immediately. It is an argument for the EU and Russia,

Western member states as well, to sit down and tried to see what can

we do year? Ultimately, we need to come back to the fact that there

seems to be nobody to talk to in Moscow. They have to try to find

somebody. If the Russians are unwilling to talk, there may have to

prolong the sanctions. It is not the politicians who suffer, it is the

producers hear it in the United Kingdom. I could give you a lot of

examples, from Shropshire, we have taken a lot of delegations to Russia

in the past and built-up relationships with daily products,

all of that has been washed down the drain. The dairy industry is in

crisis at the moment. Can be compartmentalised this between

implementation of the agreement and the separate issue which is crime

year? I have been to Crimea on a number of occasions and can tell you

without fear of contradiction, I do not believe the Russians will ever

give up Crimea. I agree. The purpose of sanctions is to do something

tangible. The Russians are never going to give up Crimea so what is

the point of having sanctions. I take your point. I agree with that.

Even if we disregard their nationalist narrative, the Russians

have annexed Crimea and there is nothing we can do about it. Whether

there can be a longer term agreement on how to Ukraine and Russia could,

if you like, revive some kind of approach to Crimea which will allow

some kind of shared influence. I cannot actually see a wee out of it.

If Europe is going to link the end of sanctions exclusively to the

Crimean situation, we are in prolong hole. I cannot see a wee out of it.

At the time of the Crimea crisis, we warned about this issue and I am

glad you agree with me that the prospect of convincing the Russians

to change their policy on Crimea is futile. I will give way.

That is confirmation that Russia is basically torn up the Helsinki

agreements that Russia believes enforceable change to the borders of

Europe because of that is the position, what is the point of

having agreements of any kind with Russia if Russia breaches? The

Russians have come out with quasi legal arguments. Fundamentally the

region who the borders. They would refer back to Kosovo. The UK did not

accept the annexation by the Soviet Union of Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania. We still had embassies in London. Why should we accept the

annexation of Crimea? It may take 100 years but ultimately the

Estonians and Latvians are now independent. I am not suggesting we

should accept it but I am suggesting if we use this as a primary

instrument to try and change Russian minds... I ensure Russian minds will

not be changed now. There might be a completely different regime in 50

years' time and then people can have self-determination rather than being

taken over. Which is really what I was trying to say... We need to keep

on talking about it and trying to find ways to share this. We are

meant to be taking evidence... Can I get back to the question? On the

issue of sanctions, is it your understanding and I have been

hearing anecdotal evidence of polling by Western organisations in

crime year but is it your understanding that although they did

their referendum differently to the way we would've done it, that the

people of Crimea consider themselves to be part of Russia and under

normal circumstances, conducting a referendum as we would do it, is it

your analysis that they would vote to remain part of Russia, yes or no?

I think the problem is you have a lot of minorities. You might get a

majority vote in a free and fair referendum but that could be seen in

the immediate reform era of rejoining Russia. Crimea is not in

the greatest economic sheep. What will Russia do in the future then?

-- economic sheep. Can Russia continue to subsidise another drain

on the Russian economy? We have a similar situation in another region

were Russia now has these strategic treaties with these two regions

which ties them into subsidising, to effectively making them part, like a

creeping annexation and making them part of Russia. Russia has a

responsibility for the regions now. Russia cannot do that kind of thing

in Death Valley especially if you get a situation where the economy

really does begin to suffer. In four years' time we might be

having a different conversation. Maybe Crimea suffers... If the

situation changed, as I think it may well do in the next two, three, four

years and Russia was prepared to come back and talk with Europe.,

Moore constructively about European security, the memorandum on conflict

resolution and other security and trade issues, we might in three or

four years' time be looking at a different situation. I think it is

in Russia's interests to again begin to engage with Europe. I'm probably

against 98% of expert opinion... CROSSTALK.

The title is the United Kingdom relations with Russia. I suspect I

will trespass on the patient of my colleagues if I continue to tap your

enthusiasm, we could go on all night. The session has been

fascinating in terms of setting out the background. I want to turn

attention to British Russian relations. Doctor Monaghan, I can

see... A small footnote. We should be careful about assuming there

might be a self-determination referendum in Bynea, not every

government is given to holding regular referenda. It would be very

unlikely that the Russian leadership at the moment which decided to offer

a referendum on that in the Crimea. It is worth pointing out, since you

asked the question about sanctions, first, I think there is ample

evidence to suggest they are being circumvented by second, ample

evidence to suggest import substitution is taking place,

therefore, it is weakening the impact for future potential

sanctions and therefore the tools for dealing with Russia perhaps.

Third, it is viewed in Moscow as part of economic warfare. I'm sure

you are all aware we are at economic war with Russia: that is what Moscow

thinks. It's worth bearing in mind, what is it we want to achieve with

sanctions? Is it to reverse Russian policy in Ukraine, punish them for

it, deter them from doing anything else? It is somewhat unclear to me.

Finally it's worth planning, I think, for a post sections era,

because I think unity across Europe has been impressive, has been

probably beyond many people's expectations, but it is also clear,

as you've indicated, there are plenty of people across Europe, not

only fans, but other member states of the European Union, not happy

with the sanctions regime. Even if it's not this year, next year, maybe

we'll see something else. It's worth starting to think about what a

post-sanctions environment would be like, over in the European Union and

for the UK nationally because I think that is where we'll be in a

couple of years' time. Already starting to think in those times

will begin to shift where we are going, which hopefully leads us on

to the boys about UK- Russia relations. Thank you for your

indulgence. A few quick questions. I'm happy to

be here most of the evening, this session is fascinating. Honestly, I

promise not to take long. Seeking clarification. Can I just start by

saying I agree with virtually everything you've said, I think that

myself... We can express our opinions in the report we write.

It's the opinions of the witnesses we are seeking. I have three quick

questions, the chair asked a question about the fact that the

Russians are not sharing some of our norms... You gave an explanation as

to how that happened. The opinion that you tell us what is happening

in Russia, are the ordinary people in Russia acting with their

government's policy on these issues or is there variation between what

the political classes and the ruling classes think about how we approach

international affairs, and different to what the ordinary people

approach? Are they synced or is their separation of opinion? I think

Putin has pretty much broad support. Whenever there are elections people

say elections are not free and fair. There is monopolisation of the media

etc, it's a problem, if not, outright gerrymandering. Putin would

have a pretty healthy majority. He has been seen as delivering on two

key things that a government has to deliver on, security and welfare.

The emphasis more on security at the moment. Even their welfare is taking

a knock because of low oil prices, which, by the way, are much more

detrimental to the Russian economy than sanctions... But the twin

impact of low oil prices and sanctions, there is still a

reasonable amount of support. Some of that is perhaps artificially, if

you like, supported or... By the government, in the sense that the

government does obviously have a lot of influence over the media. Without

a doubt thereof edgily no independent newspapers, television

is just a kind of drip feed of atrial text of. -- of patriotic

stuff. The low socio- economic groups... Compares with the 1880s

and 1990s, this is still a very stable period for them. Among

younger people, we were chatting about this before we came in, the

thought might be that the younger generation would be, you know, more

liberal and open. It's not necessarily the case, the younger

generation probably does understand more about the outside world and

Europe, but there is still a strong patriotically among them. They

believe in Russia. If the West continues to query the Ligist Missy

of Putin, I mean, for me it's always the wrong thing to do, Putin is a

popular leader. Second question... On British - Russian relations?

Yeah. Can I? Can I add a footnote? The next question I wanted to ask

is, this is just too... From what you've said... It's not the case

that our Foreign Office or senior politicians in the UK or the rest of

the world... It's not the case they don't know, it's just they are not

interested in knowing because they have their own policies that they

want to pursue? We're covering that later. This deliberate invading

of... Not recognising that information, about it being passed

up, but people at the top are rejecting it? There is a strong

degree of mirror imaging, the British leadership and many others

in Western Europe and the United States perhaps as well, think, we

wouldn't do that, therefore the Russians won't do that. The fact

they've come to the decision with different evidence, different

understanding of the evidence, means we tend to get it wrong. If I might

answer your first point, three points I would make quite quickly,

first, Putin tends to work very hard on acknowledging what it is the

Russian population wants and responding to the Russian

population. A very good example is the direct line twice a year when he

holds an afternoon session and people can call in. Yes, we can say

it's stage-managed, but actually things happen as a result. Even

during the conversation we have people being arrested and so on this

year, things being fixed, implementation. He does focus on

what the population wants. Second, he tends to work in terms of

specific concrete ideas such as financial support from economic

questions, that kind of thing, whereas the opposition tends to work

in terms of human rights and values, that's not what gains a lot of

traction. Third, Mr Putin is supported but he is also busy

learning how to mobilise his own population in support of him. Ever

since the 2004-2005, the Russian leadership is learning how to put

people on the street and it's worth noting the largest demonstration

since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been pro-Putin once.

There is an election later this year, it's worth pointing out there

is a distinction between Mr Putin, who is popular, and the United

Russia party, the main parliamentary party, which is substantially less

popular. And I think it's a point you could explore. If you push this

point of the gap between the leadership on the relation it would

be understanding in Russian terms as the British, talking about the

possibility for regime change in Russia. It's a reasonable question,

sitting in London, but the signal received in Moscow would be, they

are looking for a gap between the leadership and the population. Be

aware of the translation of the signal. On the Litvinenko report,

what has been the impact of the Litvinenko affair and the report on

UK- Russia relations? I think Andrew would probably be the better want to

talk about this at great length, but it didn't do us any favours, put it

that way. Particularly, I mean, it took along time for the final to

come out, particularly I think those last 18 little words in which the

view of the writer of the report was that Putin probably knew about and

approved the killing of Litvinenko. It's a serious thing, for a

government to execute foreign nationals, effectively, on the

streets of foreign country, is something which I don't think we can

in anyway... We have to talk to them about that. Inevitably, eventually,

we'll have too... Do you agree with the common? -- koruna. Sir Robert

Owen? I've got a lot of the questions about the whole Litvinenko

affair. -- with the coroner. Why did he meet these two characters twice

cost what were they talking about? Do you think his basic conclusion

was correct, the coroner? I'm not 100% sure. The right of the report

was careful 100% sure that Putin sat down and

signed a thing stating, we will eliminate Litvinenko. The reason I

say that is because the FSB has become a kind of almost law unto

itself, semi-privatised party of the security agencies, slightly out of

control. Plenty of people will disagree with that. Really? The

security services are out of control? I don't think necessarily

some of the things that go on, some of the score settling that takes

place in current and former FSB, is all sentient by the leadership. I

probably will be in a minority and I will like you completely trashed...

Not at all. It's worth remembering this is a decade-old question, he

was murdered in 2006 so all the responses you see now, don't forget

what took place in 2006-2007, the end of the partnership in certain

areas that was quite successful, intelligence and Security particular

are the very good example, once the murder took place and there was this

flawed co-operation if one can call it that, the contention between the

sides, actually the British response was forthright. Yes, one can

criticise it from outside. If the more we can say not enough was done.

But there were attempts to try to address the relationship. The

relationship has never recovered since. The Litvinenko affair has

been a repeating iceberg for the relationship whereby each time we've

tried to resuscitate the relationship it has hit the

Litvinenko iceberg and sank. The relationship has worked

economically, but politically has hardly got off the ground again

since 2006-7. I would say that is a substantial effect and it keeps

coming back to affect policy and attempt to revitalise the

relationship. Do you think it was because our government responded

appropriately and therefore the Russians didn't like that or is it

that we didn't respond appropriately? Do you think what we

did was appropriate and, if not, could it have done things

differently? Teams went to Russia to purse to the

evidence and other actions and policies were put into play. There

are limitations to what can be done, the Russians would not extradite him

and sent back so the UK government could continue to demand and it

would be rejected. Subsequently, there have been difficulties in

establishing quite what has taken place in public. You ask but not all

of the evidence was made public so it is difficult to see whether one

agrees with the coroner or not because we no decisions were taken

in private. I have read the report and looks convincing, it is a shame

the word probably was used because it became politically chalked right

away by the Russians. Probably, what does this mean was the

counterattack. There are things which could have been done better in

delivering the message. After that there were also cases where the

British ambassador and UK journalists have been harassed in

Moscow. There has been a little bit of a campaign against UK figures. I

do not know how far that has gone but certainly it has left a very

unpleasant taste in the mouth as filers UK- Russia relations are

concerned. If I understand correctly, their harassment of

Ambassador Brenton, I do not wish to overstate it was due to him turning

up to opposition meetings. But a lot of this became bound up in the

relationship, there was a spy scandal, concern about the British

Council, pressure on the British Council and pressure on Ambassador

Brenton, disagreement over governance of Chechnya and many

other issues. In many ways, the murder of Litvinenko was part of a

fairly substantial collapse in relations between early 2006 and

although we to the rational Georgian conflict. I was working with

Margaret Beckett in the Foreign Office when she was Foreign

Secretary when this happened, but certainly I agree with Dr Mona

El-Farra on these matters. The thing which struck me on that point was

how long it has taken for this report to finally come out. That is

my first concern. When it finally did come out, the timing was

interesting I thought. Secondly, you mentioned the harassment of someone

at the British Council, rather than show any form of contrition or

regret, even if not accepting responsibility, the Russian state

went in the opposite direction and try to cause problems. Do you not

feel the Russian government could handle this differently and the

situation of coldness between us would not be as bad as it is? I

think both sides could have handled it differently with the benefit of

hindsight. I am not sure that necessarily it would be wise to have

expected the Russians to have acted differently or more sympathetically.

I would not as soon that they will necessarily handle similar instances

sympathetically in the future. -- assurance. It would be nice to

assure them that both governments would go back that the deterioration

of relations would be avoided. Pressure on the British Council and

Ambassador Brenton, the spy scandal, this all happened together, within

the space of a year or two, plus the disagreement about governance of

check year and so on. This was not just about Litvinenko. In how many

countries do you think Russia has allegedly carried out an operation

similar to the Litvinenko exercise, where they eliminated their

perceived opponents? I think there have been several cases in Europe.

In the Gulf. It is not entirely certain where the Russian

government's actions begin. Some of them have been a result of the

Chechen president. It is a marquee areas. Somebody is probably written

something interesting about it, I am not sure. How exceptional was

Litvinenko? That up obviously been accusations other opponents have

copped it. There was the killing of Mr Yandarbiyev in the Gulf. People

were arrested and imprisoned for that. I would also see Kata Mara, at

a guess but I would have to look that up. Russian Mr Yandarbiyev

agents were arrested for the killing of. There have also been killing in

other European states such as Austria. This is all alleged,

naturally, and subject to process of court. Also these things are

sometimes quite difficult to prove. How many other towns have any of

these people been given immunity by being put on Putin's party's list

and elected to the Duma? Please do proceed a case of -- do follow the

case of Mr Yandarbiyev. I think you'll find it informative because

my understanding is that the Russian leadership lobbied for the release

of the two agency wearing prison and allegedly, they were decorated when

they returned. So he was promoted to the Duma, that is the point I'm

making. It is kind of thumbing their noses, I think. Can I get you back

to your earlier and sewers to the chairman about the lack of

understanding year of Russia's internal position? What is your

assessment of the vulnerability of the Russian economy and the Russian

State? Do you think your assessment would be shared by the foreign and

Commonwealth office? I think they probably would. Some of the best

political economists, including a former colleague of mine, Phil

Hansen, has written a series of papers. A current colleague, Richard

Connelly, I would recommend you read his papers as well. They seem to be

united in the opinion that the Russian economy can continue for

quite a long period, it will not completely implode, but as time goes

on, the potential for modernisation and re-injecting dynamism into the

economy is receding. Be specific on this. Given the fall in the gas and

oil prices, in the revenue of the state and in the GDP, and the

abysmal public health and declining population or at least lowlife

expectancy, young people trying to call, and all the elite putting

their assets into properties in London and elsewhere, is this kind

of colony going to have any future except as a producer of raw

materials for China? I think it is something the Putin government is

well aware of, structural reform is needed. They have liberal

economists. The former finance minister is now putting together

some kind of strategic economic plan and he is well-known as a liberal

economist. The problem is fundamentally political and that is

whether Putin and the people who really make the decisions are

prepared to tinker with the system of political economy which is beset

by corruption and inefficiency. I be prepared to do something fundamental

to change that? Resigns to date are that they talk about it a lot and

tinker around the edges, but there is not the will to take it all in.

There is potential for some kind of reform but at the moment, the

current governing elite is not prepared to go down that route. I

would only partly agree. My first question would be, vulnerability to

what, if I was Russian I would ask, what vulnerability and to whom? You

mention the fall in goal and gas prices. Generally they are using

their way up. We do not know what the situation will be an 18 month.

You mention the decline in population, that is true but has

stabilised in the last three up to four years. It will decline in the

next decade or so but behind the United States, Russia is the second

highest immigration state in the world. Do not forget 5 million

ethnic Russians have migrated to Russia from Ukraine saw the

population has stabilised. I offer this as Food For Thought, no one is

saying the Russian economy is in rude health. There is obsolescence

throughout industry, serious problems, decrepit infrastructure

and so on but do not bank on the economy just continuing in decline.

It may be the case but if the oil price goes up, it will be refloated.

What we see is that the Russian leadership understands the problems

in the Russian state rather well. It may not see reforms in the same way

as we do, implementing liberal reform, but we what we do see is

emergency measures to improve efficiency, salt filings of quite

senior people because they have not been effective in their positions,

attempts to conduct waste management because there are issues raised in

the Russian economy, to try and find extra money and a little bit of

sequestration which is taking place in the military also. There is a

series effort at the moment to put the economy on a mobilisation

fitting, which is tantamount to providing serious support for the

hydrocarbon sector but also using the defence industry as a locomotive

for growth. That is not the kind of reform we would call capital are

reform but it is still our version of small reforms.

So that is the old Leninist model? I would agree with that. It is not a

Soviet economy but it is not centralised in the same way. It uses

the defence industry as a locomotive which is stated policy, import

subsidisation and that kind of thing. This is a country that is

moving to protect its economy and to be able to conduct an independent

and stable policy. We are just add... Now, we have to try and get

through this. I have given myself an artificial target of seven o'clock

otherwise I'm going to lose the patience of my colleagues. To pick

up on your view of whether the UK has the right to take a relatively

tough stance towards Russia, there was an interview with the top

commander of US and allied forces in Europe in which he talked about the

intelligence being effectively affixed commodity and Fred time the

tactical focus was on the Middle East, Iraq one and two, Afghanistan

and terrorism and counterterrorism and only really strategically on

Russia, namely the nuclear issue. He talked about Russia moving on from

not accepting the hand of partnership towards that the legend

stands so my question is, is the refocusing of intelligence assets

beginning to deliver? The general still thinks there is a way to go,

but there has been a re-focusing. Have we refocused our own

intelligence assets well enough to begin to understand better and

analyse what is happening, and what could happen in Russia? Is the

language of belligerence the right language, and I are right to take

this relatively tough stance towards Russia? Was the commander talking

about US intelligence or... ? He was talking as commander. Use the deputy

commander of Nato. He is not the deputy. If the refocusing beginning

to deliver? I am slightly sceptical. From my position, there are certain

boxes being ticked but I do not see any great shift of resources

dedicated to this question. Yes, it is taking place somewhat invariable

terms but in terms of real financial resources or equipment resources, it

is not. There is a certain danger about refocusing. Having not paid

attention for the last 25 years, we are now over reacting to a surprise

which I think makes a very open to confusion. People are now talking

about only specific aspects of Russia. On the language of

belligerence and toss stands, if you want your belligerent language from

the Russians, please feel free to use belligerent language because the

Russians will not step back and return to the sympathetic response

we mentioned earlier. Tough language will be met with tough language. As

we build towards Warsaw I think you will see plenty of that coming

through. If Nato says they are going to enlarge the Alliance Colin --

Alliance, develop the rapid readiness action plan and so on, the

Russians will reciprocate. They will remind us that Russia is a nuclear

state as they have done in the past. The question is not about the

language of belligerence and toss stands, it is working out where we

want to go with the Russians and then starting to admit a policy that

will lead us to that. If we see the Russians are not being nice and we

disagree with them, good luck, that will not take us anywhere. It will

leave us in an unprepared position for dealing with some of the

challenges and disagreements we undoubtably have with the Russians

both at European I see you. I will take as support.

Despite all of the rhetoric following Ukraine and the Syrian

crisis, I do not get the sense that the US, the UK and they some of the

big European powers actually have Russia at the top of the agenda

again yet. I do not get that sense. If you'd read the US national

security strategy is very little on Russia. They are concerned about the

middle East and Asia Pacific is potential for a lot of instability.

From that that point of view, the language of belligerence, it seems

to be the most baleful result of the UK and crisis has been this

information war. It is not just the grandstanding of politicians, it is

becoming ingrained in exchanges at the United Nations, in the OSCE

where you have the Americans on one side in the OSCE supporting the

Ukraine. It is mudslinging all the time. The United Kingdom were not

part of the Memphis talks, we are not part of the Normandy for and yet

people are telling us and I believe that the United Kingdom is the most

vocal critical country of Russia and hostile with them. The Foreign

Secretary was challenged on this by the MP for Birmingham when she asked

are you going to be talking to Mr lover of on the phone and he said

there is not much point because my conversations with them are never

very fruitful. Do you think that our own Foreign Secretary and our own

Prime Minister ought to be doing more to engage with the Russian

government, such as the Germans are doing? We have lost something over

the last ten or 15 years. It is important for Britain in the same

way it is for us to Act with Russia's international institutions.

There is still no real substitute for the those kind of political

bilateral relationships which can sometimes come if not lead to a

complete meeting of minds, that is how diplomacy is done, then I think

the UK, we have had problems with trade and the Litvinenko situation,

probably nothing that other countries have experienced. We have

lost sight of Russia. Russia has been weighed down the policy agenda

for Britain over the last 15 or 20 years. How we recover that is

difficult. You need a senior member of the diplomatic corps could be in

Russia. Someone who understands the country. We need to continue to put

that effort in. To do more to engage with the Russians, I am not sure the

comparisons with the Germans is necessarily right. The Germans had a

much larger relationship with the Russians than we did until the

sanctions. German business dealing in Russia was a very substantial.

Before we start to engage with the Russians, we have to work out what

we want from the Russians and what the Russians might want from us.

There is no point in going to Moscow saying we want this review

the Russians will say we want back. What do Russian policymakers, how

did they proceed Britain and our policies? I think, I have read some

stuff from the Russian Academy of sciences Institute of Europe, the

British experts there, including a senior figure who has had a lot to

do with Nato and the peace and security committee, they seem to see

the UK not entirely verily, but there is something in there. They

see us as an extension of the US. The US and UK positions are very

close and the US, despite everything, is still probably, the

Russian attitude to them is more negative than European countries.

From that point of view, we are not seeing... We are seen as a country

like the US. We were always prone to come if not bellicose rhetoric

toward Russia, then a critical attitude, for reasons we have

explored. Britain is not seen as a likely serious primary partner for

Russia. That is the feeling I get. We are seen in the Russian

Federation as part of the Anglo-Saxon world and therefore part

of a warned that is in decline, in strategic decline. At the same time

there are surprises when the UK cut back its military forces as it did

after 2010. There is astonishment at this. Why would we do that? Again,

it is worth emphasising that the Russians often point to the British

when it comes to questions of regime change and the use of soft power and

colour revolutions. That is one element. There is an ambiguity to be

stated here. It returns to the question of state and official

policy, which is outlined in those terms, but in the population there

is an ambiguity to this. There is sympathy for British culture,

literature, the British way of doing things at a societal level. That

doesn't mean they want to be like us, that doesn't mean they want to

do what we want them to do, it just means there are certain affinities,

cultural affinities, personal affinities, that kind of thing, as

well as business affinities. There are certain things that happened

beyond the state relationship stop the state relationship is a cautious

one from Moscow. Cautious and not very favourable. It has been a

really excellent session. Thank you very much. The meeting is now