Browse content similar to Spring Budget 2017 Committee. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
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Thank you for coming in to give evidence to us today, on this, how | :00:54. | :01:01. | |
should I describe it, a mini budget, a sort of three quarters budget, | :01:02. | :01:06. | |
settling on a smaller size by historical standards. People are | :01:07. | :01:14. | |
mentioning it on the size and I think some of the greatest budgets | :01:15. | :01:18. | |
of the post-war years generated very short read books so I don't think we | :01:19. | :01:25. | |
should use that as a criteria. Can I begin with national insurance | :01:26. | :01:33. | |
contributions? Do you think it is right that the self-employed should | :01:34. | :01:35. | |
be compensated through the tax system for the additional risks they | :01:36. | :01:41. | |
take? And how easy is it to identify these risks? It is worth saying | :01:42. | :01:48. | |
first of all that the tax benefit is really very big, so relative to the | :01:49. | :01:54. | |
employer and employee contributions, 22%, self-employed, facing a much | :01:55. | :02:00. | |
smaller tax than that. I think it's pretty hard on the whole to justify | :02:01. | :02:07. | |
anything like the scale of tax. The question is, do you think there | :02:08. | :02:11. | |
should be something that is justified? Is there something to | :02:12. | :02:17. | |
justify that? Historically, there has been a justification, which is | :02:18. | :02:22. | |
that the self-employed are entitled to significantly smaller state | :02:23. | :02:27. | |
benefits than employees. That gap is almost completely closed now, | :02:28. | :02:30. | |
particularly with the introduction of a single to your pension, so the | :02:31. | :02:36. | |
only difference in terms of benefits and job-seeker's allowance, that | :02:37. | :02:41. | |
might imply a difference in national insurance rates of up to one | :02:42. | :02:45. | |
percentage point. Certainly no more than that. Other differences are, | :02:46. | :02:49. | |
first of all, very different according to the type of | :02:50. | :02:53. | |
self-employment people are in... Let's talk about the genuinely | :02:54. | :02:57. | |
self-employed, the self-employed self-employed, not people who might | :02:58. | :03:01. | |
usually be in the employed sector. Let's concentrate at that end of the | :03:02. | :03:05. | |
spectrum. Then you need to think about what exactly it is you want to | :03:06. | :03:10. | |
compensate or subsidise for? Do you want to compensate or subsidised | :03:11. | :03:13. | |
for, as he was saying, the additional risk people are taking? | :03:14. | :03:18. | |
We need to ask, is the best way of doing that this? And why do we want | :03:19. | :03:24. | |
to subsidise risk? We don't subsidise all risk. And if you do | :03:25. | :03:28. | |
want to do it, why do it through the tax system in a blanket way, which | :03:29. | :03:32. | |
subsidises or helps people who are not taking risks due to finding some | :03:33. | :03:38. | |
better way of achieving that. Thirdly, you want to think about the | :03:39. | :03:42. | |
scale. As I suggested, the scale is big at the moment. Do you think | :03:43. | :03:49. | |
National Trust contributions are a pure tax? Yes. And therefore the | :03:50. | :03:56. | |
contributory principle which suggests they have a complicated | :03:57. | :04:01. | |
relationship, is gradually going? It is very little left of the | :04:02. | :04:05. | |
contributing principle. It is now very hard to avoid getting the full | :04:06. | :04:11. | |
single tier. There are small groups who will not achieve that and the | :04:12. | :04:16. | |
pension is by far and away the biggest part of what is supposed to | :04:17. | :04:20. | |
be... To summarise, you think that if there is a differential, it can | :04:21. | :04:28. | |
be justified on the basis of what they receive, the self-employed, the | :04:29. | :04:30. | |
differential to be self-employed should be very small? And that's | :04:31. | :04:41. | |
from eternity. -- maternity. And if it is to be larger, for example | :04:42. | :04:48. | |
compensation for risk, we need to think more clearly about what risks | :04:49. | :04:54. | |
are entailed and it's your view they probably should not be dealt with | :04:55. | :04:58. | |
through the tax system but through public spending? ? I think we need, | :04:59. | :05:03. | |
on that second point, to think more clearly about what it is that we | :05:04. | :05:08. | |
value from a societal point of view about the self-employed. We need to | :05:09. | :05:14. | |
think carefully about... I'm asking you that question. I'm hoping you | :05:15. | :05:17. | |
have thought carefully about it. They've lose the argument out there | :05:18. | :05:26. | |
that, the enterprise culture drives economies and keeps them flexible. | :05:27. | :05:29. | |
And I think it is hard to justify the current tax system on the basis | :05:30. | :05:34. | |
of that argument. So you do not agree with that argument? No. Just | :05:35. | :05:41. | |
one question, do you mean people are one question, do you mean people are | :05:42. | :05:47. | |
allowed to keep their own money and therefore it is not a subsidy? When | :05:48. | :05:56. | |
we think about tax subsidies, we can do it in different ways but on the | :05:57. | :05:59. | |
whole, when one is talking about paying someone less for doing | :06:00. | :06:05. | |
similar things, one can think about it at a subsidy. If you assume it is | :06:06. | :06:12. | |
the Government's money first... Horizontal equity. It is the tax | :06:13. | :06:16. | |
money on the Government is not getting a subsidy by not taking your | :06:17. | :06:19. | |
money and I think realistically that is important because it slowly shows | :06:20. | :06:25. | |
the angle you're coming from. To put it another way, you're charging | :06:26. | :06:28. | |
other people more tax in order to reduce the tax on another group. Not | :06:29. | :06:33. | |
necessarily to do anything else, you're just charging people more tax | :06:34. | :06:37. | |
but I think it is important because it gives an indication of where | :06:38. | :06:42. | |
you're coming from. You're in favour of higher taxes, which worries me. | :06:43. | :06:47. | |
Absolutely not. We're talking about horizontal equity between people. If | :06:48. | :06:50. | |
you want to lower rate of tax across the board, that is absolutely, I | :06:51. | :06:56. | |
think there is a case, it is harder to make a case for treating this | :06:57. | :06:59. | |
group differently from that group when they do similar things and that | :07:00. | :07:03. | |
creates complexity and cost to the economy and to those who are not | :07:04. | :07:08. | |
benefiting from the reduced amount. But you made a case for higher tax | :07:09. | :07:14. | |
for self-employment? I want to come on to a specific point. Can I ask | :07:15. | :07:22. | |
your view, because only ?3000 exemption for small companies, the | :07:23. | :07:25. | |
first employee, national insurance contributions by employers, because | :07:26. | :07:32. | |
they can situating Dessie Mee to say he used to employ ten people and now | :07:33. | :07:35. | |
they have full setup is as their own company because that gives them | :07:36. | :07:40. | |
?30,000 of employers contribution for free. And I just wonder where | :07:41. | :07:47. | |
you went into the distorting effect of specific tax incentives. And more | :07:48. | :07:56. | |
broadly, the danger of having things unintended consequences. That is the | :07:57. | :08:06. | |
point we are making, that particular subsidy, if I can use that word, it | :08:07. | :08:11. | |
is not surprising it has that effect because it creates a clear incentive | :08:12. | :08:15. | |
in the system to do that, as does treating self-employed and employ | :08:16. | :08:18. | |
people very differently, which is one of the reasons we are always | :08:19. | :08:23. | |
having cases about whether someone is self employed or unemployed, when | :08:24. | :08:27. | |
you create very different tax treatments of similar activities, | :08:28. | :08:30. | |
you create these incentives to change your behaviour purely for tax | :08:31. | :08:36. | |
reasons. And have you done any work specifically on the ?3000 limit? I | :08:37. | :08:41. | |
don't know whether empirically that would be possible. We don't have the | :08:42. | :08:48. | |
data for that we have looked at other bits of the tax system. You | :08:49. | :08:52. | |
can see that individuals respond to tax incentives. Whatever data we | :08:53. | :08:56. | |
have, people respond sharply to tax incentives. There was a measure the | :08:57. | :09:09. | |
Autumn Statement which make changes. We'd like to see to what extent the | :09:10. | :09:17. | |
Government reduced this problem. Can now talk about the issue of | :09:18. | :09:23. | |
forestalling, which created revenue the Government did not get because | :09:24. | :09:30. | |
people took forestalling action. How much consultation can you have | :09:31. | :09:36. | |
safely without creating a fairly large amount of forestalling? | :09:37. | :09:39. | |
Whopper constituting the Government should have? Yes. But it's clearly a | :09:40. | :09:48. | |
difficult balance. There are some issues where you don't particularly | :09:49. | :09:53. | |
neat consultation, you can avoid forestalling. For example, moving | :09:54. | :10:01. | |
the top rate, 40-50, about 45, there did not need to be consultation | :10:02. | :10:06. | |
about that but giving one year's notice created a lot of | :10:07. | :10:11. | |
forestalling. On dividend tax changes, I don't know how much | :10:12. | :10:15. | |
consultation is intended to, as there is clearly another set of | :10:16. | :10:19. | |
changes coming in next year, which we've been given a full year's | :10:20. | :10:26. | |
notice of. But clearly, if you give people the opportunity to do it, you | :10:27. | :10:30. | |
create a lot of forestalling, so the balance of risk in terms of issues | :10:31. | :10:36. | |
like dividend taxation is clearly towards forestalling. Do you think | :10:37. | :10:46. | |
that the tax approach to dividends should be the same as the approach | :10:47. | :10:52. | |
to earning? In the 1970s, there was a surplus tax at quite a high level | :10:53. | :11:01. | |
and now, on earned income is more favourably taxed than earned income. | :11:02. | :11:06. | |
Is this something you think is sensible in terms of encouraging | :11:07. | :11:09. | |
savings and so forth or is it something you feel is distorted? | :11:10. | :11:15. | |
Well, you're getting the right to the, I mean, right at the centre of | :11:16. | :11:21. | |
the way the tax system works. Broadly speaking, we want to be | :11:22. | :11:27. | |
taxing at big thing rate but adjusting the tax base, so you are | :11:28. | :11:34. | |
not producing incentives to save and invest and offset any savings or | :11:35. | :11:38. | |
investment that you are doing against the rate. What that would do | :11:39. | :11:45. | |
effectively would be to provide more generous treatment for the | :11:46. | :11:49. | |
investments, for example, the self-employed charge a higher rate | :11:50. | :11:55. | |
of tax on the returns they therefore make. That is quite a big change. | :11:56. | :12:02. | |
That is not simply increasing the rate of tax on investment income. It | :12:03. | :12:11. | |
is reducing the base in order to ensure you're not taxing the | :12:12. | :12:16. | |
returns, that the normal returns are saving in investment. | :12:17. | :12:21. | |
Do you get that by reducing corporation tax if they keep the | :12:22. | :12:31. | |
money within the company? Rather the reverse, in the sense that whilst | :12:32. | :12:37. | |
you are doing investments, you would be effectively paying no tax on the | :12:38. | :12:42. | |
returns to that investment but you would be paying a higher rate of tax | :12:43. | :12:45. | |
on the rest of the return that you are making. In terms of the | :12:46. | :12:53. | |
complications caused by having the different rates, you move into many | :12:54. | :12:58. | |
anti-avoidance mechanisms to stop people moving things around. Do you | :12:59. | :13:03. | |
think that one of these that might be useful might be to get back to | :13:04. | :13:09. | |
the old close company rules where dividends attract different rates | :13:10. | :13:15. | |
from not closed companies? I don't think it would be better. Whenever | :13:16. | :13:19. | |
you put boundaries on the tax system and you try to define a set of | :13:20. | :13:24. | |
companies, then you obviously give in -- incentives to be one type of | :13:25. | :13:34. | |
company rather than another. You might fix one problem but you might | :13:35. | :13:38. | |
create another problem. There is no economically good reason to treat | :13:39. | :13:42. | |
those types of companies differently. It is a sticking | :13:43. | :13:47. | |
plaster, we can't do the proper things so we will fiddle these | :13:48. | :13:52. | |
things to get these guys out. It is better to sort out the tax breaks | :13:53. | :13:57. | |
and the rates and it is applicable to all types of individuals | :13:58. | :14:01. | |
regardless of the type of company they organise themselves under. That | :14:02. | :14:07. | |
would be a simpler system and a more uniform rate? It would be a simpler | :14:08. | :14:14. | |
system in the sense that you would get rid of lots of boundaries in the | :14:15. | :14:19. | |
tax system and get rid of a lot of allowances, or you could do if you | :14:20. | :14:24. | |
wanted to, you would be narrowing the tax base in the sense that some | :14:25. | :14:31. | |
investment is taxed which would be taken out of tax. You would be able | :14:32. | :14:41. | |
to slash the tax base but then you would lose revenue. You could choose | :14:42. | :14:48. | |
the rate you thought was applicable. Final question on this. Do you want | :14:49. | :14:54. | |
me to go onto the welfare cap? Do you think it meets the Treasury's | :14:55. | :15:03. | |
six principles of tax contributions? Changing the rate year by year. It's | :15:04. | :15:11. | |
unfortunate that it has happened in a non-joined up way. For the | :15:12. | :15:17. | |
self-employed we have had two changes in the last couple of years, | :15:18. | :15:25. | |
giving them pension and making changes to the class four. If we | :15:26. | :15:32. | |
introduced this ?5,000 dividend just the years ago and now we are taking | :15:33. | :15:36. | |
it down to ?2000, it doesn't look like a clear strategy over time, | :15:37. | :15:41. | |
taking all of that together in one go would have made an awful lot more | :15:42. | :15:48. | |
sense. Thank you. If I can move completely onto the welfare cap. | :15:49. | :15:53. | |
Starting with first principles. Do you think it is a good idea to do | :15:54. | :16:00. | |
legislate for caps, or for spending targets, which you then don't meet | :16:01. | :16:08. | |
so you are just the way of meeting them? Or can this lead to bad | :16:09. | :16:14. | |
policy-making and misallocation of resources. Miss Anderson, you look | :16:15. | :16:20. | |
very keen to answer this. In a perfect world, we want policy makers | :16:21. | :16:23. | |
to make the right decisions and explain them clearly. The whole | :16:24. | :16:30. | |
point of the welfare cap is that spending might turn out to be more | :16:31. | :16:35. | |
than you intended and rather than cutting it back you take an easier | :16:36. | :16:39. | |
choice of cutting something else or just ignore it. We are in a world | :16:40. | :16:44. | |
where policymakers are not making perfect decisions and hiding | :16:45. | :16:47. | |
problems and pushing them into the future. Having a cap that says if | :16:48. | :16:52. | |
spending goes above a certain level that you can choose in advance, what | :16:53. | :16:56. | |
you can do is rein back below that level and make the decision to | :16:57. | :17:03. | |
explain why. I think the operation of it so far has hardly been great. | :17:04. | :17:08. | |
We've had only one breach of the cap and at that moment the Chancellor | :17:09. | :17:12. | |
decided not to do a whole load of welfare cuts that he'd announced a | :17:13. | :17:17. | |
few months earlier. We can't say the cap has been tested and proven to | :17:18. | :17:23. | |
lead to better policy-making as a result. Alongside, we have the | :17:24. | :17:27. | |
welfare change report which I think is a very good innovation. And the | :17:28. | :17:33. | |
new Chancellor has made some new changes to the welfare cap, | :17:34. | :17:37. | |
adjusting the benefits spend for changes in inflation, I think, was a | :17:38. | :17:43. | |
good move. The move to assessing it every five years, I think is a bad | :17:44. | :17:48. | |
move. I think cynically that it won't be tested until after the new | :17:49. | :17:55. | |
general election which means it can't have been said to be breached. | :17:56. | :18:02. | |
It becomes so flexible it becomes meaningless? None of the fiscal | :18:03. | :18:08. | |
targets can be breached in this Parliament, unfortunately. It makes | :18:09. | :18:12. | |
it easy to hit. We wouldn't want a 0% margin. The other thing they have | :18:13. | :18:21. | |
done is say that if welfare spending has crept up big, inflation -- | :18:22. | :18:31. | |
because of inflation. 3% is a bit bigger than what Mr Osborne chose to | :18:32. | :18:37. | |
have. How arbitrary you think the things included in the cap and those | :18:38. | :18:44. | |
not is? 52% of welfare spending is within the cap and the rest isn't. | :18:45. | :18:49. | |
Is this important or is it just a fair part of pensions policy? The | :18:50. | :18:55. | |
report is focusing on all of welfare spending, we still have a check on | :18:56. | :19:00. | |
the whole lot. The state pension is excluded where reasonably we have | :19:01. | :19:04. | |
argued that we want to think about that in long-term view. The desire | :19:05. | :19:08. | |
to push up the pension age if longevity keeps rising. Which is | :19:09. | :19:13. | |
right because the current ageing population wouldn't suffer from an | :19:14. | :19:23. | |
increase in the state pension. The other thing they are excluding our | :19:24. | :19:26. | |
very cyclical benefits which again I don't think we really want to model | :19:27. | :19:33. | |
up with the, temporarily, jobseeker's allowance is costing a | :19:34. | :19:39. | |
lot more because temporarily in employment is higher. We don't want | :19:40. | :19:41. | |
that to bundle up with pension or disability benefits going up in a | :19:42. | :19:48. | |
much more cyclical way. I think we do need more of a conversation about | :19:49. | :19:51. | |
what the cost of the triple lock has been and whether that is a cost we | :19:52. | :19:58. | |
want to bear. Just before we move onto approach to public spending. A | :19:59. | :20:06. | |
target that is much more fixed than the cap for welfare, doesn't this | :20:07. | :20:11. | |
lead to a distortions in expenditure that you're trying to achieve | :20:12. | :20:14. | |
something that is based on so many moving parts that he is absolutely | :20:15. | :20:22. | |
right is extremely difficult but depends on you making decisions. The | :20:23. | :20:30. | |
welfare cap is constraining policy in a good way, stopping you hiding | :20:31. | :20:35. | |
problems that are appearing. The overseas aid target is very | :20:36. | :20:39. | |
different in that it is always going to cost not .7% of our GNI, you may | :20:40. | :20:48. | |
argue whether that is too high or low, maybe you should care about how | :20:49. | :20:52. | |
much bang for your buck you are getting from this money rather than | :20:53. | :20:59. | |
how much you are a spending. If you're going to have austerity, you | :21:00. | :21:06. | |
are having less money for education, the list goes on. You really | :21:07. | :21:16. | |
constrain the Chancellor in responding to circumstances. What | :21:17. | :21:24. | |
I'm poking away at is whether you think it is good policy but rather | :21:25. | :21:31. | |
bad economics? I started saying we want policy makers to make the right | :21:32. | :21:35. | |
decisions and we don't want to constrain them at all. If we suspect | :21:36. | :21:40. | |
that sometimes people get tempted into letting problems being hidden | :21:41. | :21:44. | |
away we might want to put constraints in place. Elsewhere, you | :21:45. | :21:48. | |
might think it is reasonable for those seeking election to set out | :21:49. | :21:52. | |
what they will do in certain circumstances and if you want to | :21:53. | :21:55. | |
pledge, whatever the world looks like, we will spend not .7% of GNI | :21:56. | :22:00. | |
in our manifesto, I don't think you can stop people from doing that. | :22:01. | :22:13. | |
Stephen Hammond. You made a comment about not thinking there was a clear | :22:14. | :22:18. | |
strategy in terms of some tax policies. You were very critical of | :22:19. | :22:23. | |
the tiered approach and the effect that had in terms of stamp duty. Do | :22:24. | :22:28. | |
you take the same approach to the reforms of probate? It's the same | :22:29. | :22:35. | |
structure, a slab structure. Your steak goes over a certain level, | :22:36. | :22:40. | |
then there's a big increase in the amount of probate duty that you pay | :22:41. | :22:44. | |
and that never feels like a very sensible structure. That said, the | :22:45. | :22:51. | |
opportunities for... There will be some opportunities for gaining that | :22:52. | :22:56. | |
but my guess is that the economic consequences of that will be smaller | :22:57. | :23:01. | |
than the stamp duty changes. It will create some incentives to gain the | :23:02. | :23:08. | |
estate around those levels. You think it will be relatively small | :23:09. | :23:12. | |
opportunities. You don't think a lot of people will take the decision to | :23:13. | :23:17. | |
give away a lot of their estate to avoid those levels in time? With a | :23:18. | :23:24. | |
40% marginal rate, it is only a few thousand pounds of difference in the | :23:25. | :23:30. | |
estate which will very quickly be accounted for in a 40% marginal rate | :23:31. | :23:35. | |
which will soon outweigh any effect of the probate duty where the | :23:36. | :23:40. | |
maximum is 20,000. I think it's not a very sensible structure but I | :23:41. | :23:45. | |
don't think it will have some impact, relative to stamp duty it is | :23:46. | :23:55. | |
a smaller one. Nevertheless, it is causing some odd incentives. On a | :23:56. | :24:02. | |
wider basis, do you think it is a disincentive to save? That probate | :24:03. | :24:12. | |
charge is so small that if it does create any disincentives, it is not | :24:13. | :24:17. | |
one we'd ever be able to measure. It is small relative to other things | :24:18. | :24:22. | |
that are happening in the system. Relative of 40% marginal rate on | :24:23. | :24:28. | |
inheritance which is ?40,000 for every ?100,000, a maximum of ?20,000 | :24:29. | :24:33. | |
in a probate for ?2 million estate which would otherwise have | :24:34. | :24:38. | |
inheritance tax of well over half a million, I think, I don't disagree | :24:39. | :24:43. | |
with what you are saying in principle, I think indirectly it is | :24:44. | :24:47. | |
pretty small. I take the point it is small in scale. Are you concerned... | :24:48. | :24:54. | |
Two things that come out of that. In terms of the principal, although it | :24:55. | :24:59. | |
is technically not a tax, do you think there was significant and | :25:00. | :25:04. | |
sufficient consultation prior to it being implemented, given that all | :25:05. | :25:09. | |
the consultation there was, it was relatively given two, showed almost | :25:10. | :25:15. | |
total opposition. Is there a tendency to just do it anyway. I | :25:16. | :25:22. | |
wasn't aware of the consultation or the scale of it. I can't really give | :25:23. | :25:29. | |
a sensible answer to that. You said technically it's not a tax but the | :25:30. | :25:38. | |
when I are saying that it is a tax because of its structure and they | :25:39. | :25:41. | |
are saying that rather than the old probate the D government incurs | :25:42. | :25:47. | |
costs and you can offset those but it doesn't count as a tax because | :25:48. | :25:54. | |
you can set it out as net. The ONS are saying that the income it gets | :25:55. | :26:00. | |
from probate, knocking it off that it would be tax receipt so their | :26:01. | :26:05. | |
view is that the ONS will deem this to be as tax because of its | :26:06. | :26:13. | |
structure. I take the point that you have made a couple times that | :26:14. | :26:20. | |
empirically it is small. Do you think there is an overall message | :26:21. | :26:23. | |
coming from them the government that there is a disincentive to save most | :26:24. | :26:28. | |
of the measures it is introducing at the moment. Over the last few years | :26:29. | :26:33. | |
we have had changes moving in different directions so clearly the | :26:34. | :26:41. | |
incentive to save in a pension for higher earners has been reduced very | :26:42. | :26:44. | |
significantly. Not just high earners. Because of the way the cap | :26:45. | :26:50. | |
is calculated. You will hit the lifetime allowance if you are | :26:51. | :26:57. | |
earning ?35,000 after 15 years of saving. Given auto enrolment that's | :26:58. | :27:05. | |
proven the incentives. The limits for ices have doubled since 2010. | :27:06. | :27:18. | |
That is a big increase in incentive. The LISA provide something that for | :27:19. | :27:21. | |
many people is a better bet than a pension. Five years ago you could | :27:22. | :27:27. | |
put in 25 times as much into a pension as you could in an ice. Now | :27:28. | :27:33. | |
you can only put in twice as much in any year with a lifetime limit on | :27:34. | :27:37. | |
the pension but there isn't on the LISA. We've had quite a radical | :27:38. | :27:42. | |
change in the savings incentives away from the pension shape which is | :27:43. | :27:46. | |
tax-free now, taxed when it comes out towards the ice shape which is | :27:47. | :27:53. | |
tax-free now, tax-free when it comes out. A year ago, we didn't make the | :27:54. | :28:00. | |
big changes to pensions we consulted on, gradually we have moved to a | :28:01. | :28:06. | |
savings map, a savings world which is much more towards the ice type | :28:07. | :28:10. | |
savings. Would be any benefit if the lifetime | :28:11. | :28:21. | |
allowance was done away with? So, the lifetime allowance, if that was | :28:22. | :28:26. | |
done away with, that would move it towards pensions and the main group | :28:27. | :28:32. | |
that would help would be those not fortunate enough to be in defined | :28:33. | :28:36. | |
benefit schemes because getting to the lifetime allowance, given the | :28:37. | :28:39. | |
annual allowance limits, is going to be hard work for someone putting | :28:40. | :28:43. | |
money into a defined contributions scheme. E-fit in ?40,000 a year, | :28:44. | :28:49. | |
you'd have to do that for quite a number of years... The way you | :28:50. | :28:54. | |
factor it up, you can get there quickly. Double-mac you're likely to | :28:55. | :29:01. | |
get there easier through a defined contributions scheme. Clearly, it | :29:02. | :29:10. | |
would simplify the system and help a significant group of system and get | :29:11. | :29:15. | |
rid of what is a distortion in the system. Equally, the way in which | :29:16. | :29:26. | |
the allowance is tapered over 150,000, between hundred and 50000 | :29:27. | :29:30. | |
and 210,000, is a very odd distortion in the system. Given the | :29:31. | :29:39. | |
fact that most people are... The movement away from pensions and | :29:40. | :29:49. | |
benefits to boards ISA is a sensible move? I don't have a terribly strong | :29:50. | :29:53. | |
view about which is the better way of doing things. I think it is not | :29:54. | :30:00. | |
been an entirely transparent move. There was a consultation on a fairly | :30:01. | :30:03. | |
transparent move that was pulled away from. I think giving people a | :30:04. | :30:07. | |
choice is acceptable. I think there's a strong case for having | :30:08. | :30:13. | |
that choice. I think I have more of a problem with the annual... In a | :30:14. | :30:18. | |
sense, it is up to Government to decide how much it thinks it is | :30:19. | :30:22. | |
reasonable to give tax incentives for people for over their lifetime | :30:23. | :30:27. | |
but why want to constrain people on their annual amount, as well as | :30:28. | :30:31. | |
their lifetime amount, I struggle with. So, I think, if I wanted to | :30:32. | :30:38. | |
liberalise one of those, I would choose the annual rather than | :30:39. | :30:40. | |
lifetime because that would give people the freedom to put in money | :30:41. | :30:48. | |
when and if they can. And we spoke about the self-employed and said | :30:49. | :31:00. | |
that within a 1 million tap, some people may be disproportionately | :31:01. | :31:05. | |
unemployed. If you want to say everyone can put money into a | :31:06. | :31:08. | |
pension, why did you want to punish those people want to make | :31:09. | :31:11. | |
contributions because their income happens to fluctuate a lot. One | :31:12. | :31:18. | |
group of those is the self-employed. Can we just mention the LISA? There | :31:19. | :31:29. | |
has been mixed publicity about this. Some around whether it created | :31:30. | :31:34. | |
unnecessary risk. Last year, he said, Mr Johnson, there are people | :31:35. | :31:45. | |
losing employer contributions. A lot of the risk statement has been about | :31:46. | :31:48. | |
people transferring out of a pension scheme into the LISA. Your view last | :31:49. | :31:57. | |
year that most people recognise that. Is that remain your view? | :31:58. | :32:02. | |
Particularly with the evidence so far, that the nudge from people to | :32:03. | :32:08. | |
do that is very effective, the extent to which people are not going | :32:09. | :32:15. | |
to actively not to Imrul. It is clear people are not taking that | :32:16. | :32:18. | |
active kind of decision. I think there is some risk around the LISA. | :32:19. | :32:23. | |
There is some potential confusion created by the LISA because up until | :32:24. | :32:28. | |
now, it has been clear that for pretty much everyone, the pension is | :32:29. | :32:35. | |
the more tax advantaged method of saving, so long as you're happy to | :32:36. | :32:40. | |
keep something stuck there until you are somewhat older. The LISA is more | :32:41. | :32:47. | |
tax advantaged method of saving for those who cannot get an employer | :32:48. | :32:52. | |
contribution and I suppose the danger is it my muddy the waters, | :32:53. | :32:55. | |
muddy the advice, muddy the clarity of little bit but it is an | :32:56. | :33:01. | |
additional choice that people have. On the analysis you have done, under | :33:02. | :33:05. | |
any circumstances where it LISA would be better value for a safer | :33:06. | :33:16. | |
than where there is a DC screen? If the employer contribution is | :33:17. | :33:23. | |
smaller, the upfront contribution to the two is obviously 20% of what | :33:24. | :33:27. | |
you're putting him. If the employer contribution is less than that, I | :33:28. | :33:31. | |
don't know where they cut off ears, but if the contribution is only a | :33:32. | :33:35. | |
couple of hundred pounds, then a LISA may be worth more. But you | :33:36. | :33:42. | |
can't access the money from a pension so for an age like 55, | :33:43. | :33:49. | |
something like that, whereas with the LISA, you can access that at any | :33:50. | :33:52. | |
point, if you are buying your first home... Which makes it an attractive | :33:53. | :34:02. | |
product for young people. Although it is not universal, it is likely to | :34:03. | :34:08. | |
be successful as a product to those who are looking for that purpose and | :34:09. | :34:15. | |
some of the naysayers are prepared to offer that product... It is ?1000 | :34:16. | :34:23. | |
upfront bonus, I can't see why that would not be attractive. Thank you. | :34:24. | :34:33. | |
I'm going to focus on the issues of social care and business rates. I | :34:34. | :34:40. | |
will be serving for another year so I think I should declare that and I | :34:41. | :34:44. | |
am part of a Local Government Association as well. I want to begin | :34:45. | :34:49. | |
with social care. There was some additional help in the budget to | :34:50. | :34:55. | |
make the demands of the social care crisis but we see a range of | :34:56. | :34:59. | |
estimates about what the actual funding gap is. As IFS pretty clear | :35:00. | :35:03. | |
number on what you think the funding gap is on social care spending by | :35:04. | :35:11. | |
2020? I don't think you can put a cap on it but what I can say is that | :35:12. | :35:17. | |
if all of the money, and this is an if, if all the money that has been | :35:18. | :35:21. | |
allocated to social care in the budget goes on social care spending, | :35:22. | :35:23. | |
that will take Spending Review back to where it was in 2010. So, if all | :35:24. | :35:29. | |
the money goes, it is a big increase, 7%, 8%, but there are | :35:30. | :35:37. | |
three caveats. Firstly, it is not entirely clear all that money will | :35:38. | :35:43. | |
have to go to social care because councils will have a degree of | :35:44. | :35:45. | |
autonomy over how that money is spent. Secondly, given that if it | :35:46. | :35:53. | |
does not go, that is a sudden change and will that then gets bent as | :35:54. | :35:57. | |
carefully as it could be? Thirdly, whilst there is as much money per | :35:58. | :36:03. | |
adult as there was in 2010, there are an awful lot more older people | :36:04. | :36:08. | |
needing social care. So the age adjustment or real amount will still | :36:09. | :36:16. | |
be less than it was in 2010. Yeah, my personal view is that social care | :36:17. | :36:21. | |
pressures are such that I imagine lots of councils will put this money | :36:22. | :36:24. | |
where it should go which is in social care about your right to | :36:25. | :36:28. | |
question whether or not the impact will be felt in the way like. Also, | :36:29. | :36:36. | |
following debates in Parliament, we often have debates about where | :36:37. | :36:43. | |
spending is going and whether it sits relative to the past but your | :36:44. | :36:46. | |
right to point out that the nature of the population, the ageing | :36:47. | :36:51. | |
population, means there are greater amount of services, so on that | :36:52. | :36:55. | |
basis, the LGA, the Nuffield Trust, the health foundation, Apple said | :36:56. | :36:59. | |
the budget announcements are insufficient to tackle the scale of | :37:00. | :37:03. | |
pressure in adult social care. Does the IFS agree with this assessment? | :37:04. | :37:07. | |
We don't have a view on what the right amount of money to spend us. | :37:08. | :37:16. | |
This will leave spending per adult, one should take account of need and | :37:17. | :37:20. | |
age, significantly lower than it was in 2010 but relative to 2016-17, it | :37:21. | :37:29. | |
is a substantial increase, certainly in a year, and that is a significant | :37:30. | :37:36. | |
change. In your opening remarks on the project, in reference to plans | :37:37. | :37:41. | |
for a social care green paper, you called for a little less | :37:42. | :37:45. | |
conversation, a little more action, citing Elvis Presley! What did you | :37:46. | :37:54. | |
have in mind? Well, the reason for that statement is that there has | :37:55. | :38:02. | |
been an awful lot of consultations, green papers, reviews on social care | :38:03. | :38:08. | |
over the last several years. There was a very extensive and well | :38:09. | :38:12. | |
thought out set of proposals that Andrew Lamont came up with 4-5 years | :38:13. | :38:19. | |
ago, which had an emphasis put on the back burner but I doubt whether | :38:20. | :38:26. | |
a further set of reviews on, but anything that has not been known | :38:27. | :38:31. | |
from some of those previous pieces of work and in the end, a big | :38:32. | :38:37. | |
high-level policy decision needs to be taken about the appropriate way | :38:38. | :38:42. | |
of funding social care. So, essentially, I was saying, the truth | :38:43. | :38:45. | |
is we have the information we need, is just a question of the political | :38:46. | :38:48. | |
choice about the extent to which we want this to be privately funded and | :38:49. | :38:53. | |
the extent to which we want a bit more state funding in, and whether | :38:54. | :38:58. | |
you wanted to be local or centrally funded. It is not that I know the | :38:59. | :39:03. | |
answer, it is that I think the Chancellor, Prime Minister, and | :39:04. | :39:05. | |
others have enough information to make a decision because it has been | :39:06. | :39:10. | |
reviewed so many times before. But while the Government is in listening | :39:11. | :39:13. | |
mode with the green paper you are not pointing to particular | :39:14. | :39:18. | |
approaches or policy solutions? There's a lot to be said, as I was | :39:19. | :39:27. | |
indicating, for... This is a risk, I have suggested what I think local | :39:28. | :39:33. | |
authorities would do but in terms of the outcomes we would like to see, | :39:34. | :39:38. | |
there is a risk around whether or not all parts of the system will | :39:39. | :39:41. | |
pull in the right direction and will have the right level of resource to | :39:42. | :39:45. | |
do so. For example, one of the ways in which the NHS needs to manage the | :39:46. | :39:50. | |
pressures on its resource base is to do with the issue of delayed | :39:51. | :39:54. | |
discharges. If local authorities are not in a position to make sure care | :39:55. | :39:59. | |
is provided in a residential community-based setting, the latest | :40:00. | :40:04. | |
problem will continue. How big a risk to the IFS think this is? | :40:05. | :40:20. | |
Again, it's hard to put specific numbers on that but it is striking | :40:21. | :40:26. | |
speaking to people running NHS organisations, their first priority | :40:27. | :40:31. | |
is not more money for them, it's my money for the social care system to | :40:32. | :40:37. | |
prevent the situation you describe. So, clearly this is something | :40:38. | :40:42. | |
terribly important to deal with and as the budget document points out, | :40:43. | :40:49. | |
it is also something which is different in different local | :40:50. | :40:52. | |
authorities, dealing with the specifics as well as the general | :40:53. | :40:58. | |
level of funding is important but I totally agree with the premise of | :40:59. | :41:03. | |
your question, is that dealing with this bottleneck in the system well | :41:04. | :41:09. | |
help write the way back in the health service. One of the | :41:10. | :41:13. | |
challenges we face is, in terms of trying to influence not just | :41:14. | :41:17. | |
Government policy but Government resource allocation over the coming | :41:18. | :41:24. | |
period, is how we determine the question that you were unable to | :41:25. | :41:28. | |
answer outset, which is how much resource, how much money is needed | :41:29. | :41:32. | |
to deal with the social care crisis? I think in some of your answers you | :41:33. | :41:36. | |
have indicated that absolute funding is not the right method to consider | :41:37. | :41:41. | |
because alongside the funding pot, you have to consider the pressures | :41:42. | :41:46. | |
and the changing population, other particular metrics we should be | :41:47. | :41:51. | |
using? It is difficult for us to push the Government allocate more | :41:52. | :41:55. | |
resources without a substantial evidence base so I'm the IFS has not | :41:56. | :42:01. | |
come out with a figure on what the resource pressure might be. We are | :42:02. | :42:08. | |
not in a position I would never say that the right amount to spend is X. | :42:09. | :42:17. | |
We can point out how it relates to a changing level of demand and clearly | :42:18. | :42:20. | |
amount of money going in is not kept up anything like with the increased | :42:21. | :42:22. | |
level of demand in terms of need. It is also provided informally and | :42:23. | :42:46. | |
informal care resources have gone up. A swiftly increasing number have | :42:47. | :42:59. | |
private resources of their own. If one is going to review this whole | :43:00. | :43:05. | |
set of issues, you want to take account of all of that as well as | :43:06. | :43:09. | |
the increasing levels of need to determine how to fund it, what level | :43:10. | :43:15. | |
is right. We can't give your number and say it is an extra X billion. I | :43:16. | :43:28. | |
understand. I guess the Chancellor's flexibility to draw an extra funding | :43:29. | :43:33. | |
to meet pressures like adult social care has been heavily constrained by | :43:34. | :43:39. | |
the commitments made by his predecessor in the Conservative | :43:40. | :43:44. | |
manifesto. Given the social care pressures, where the concentrations | :43:45. | :43:49. | |
of wealth far, it was a mistake to rule out increases in inheritance | :43:50. | :43:56. | |
tax, for example, do you think? If people don't need it, should it be | :43:57. | :44:05. | |
passed on elsewhere? Earle that is a big choice. The tax threshold has | :44:06. | :44:13. | |
been frozen for a long period and has continued to be so. Inheritance | :44:14. | :44:19. | |
tax has been biting more. The main home allowance coming in in April | :44:20. | :44:25. | |
will bring back down again. If there is to be a review, as indicated by | :44:26. | :44:32. | |
the Chancellor, I think it's unfortunate that you rule out what | :44:33. | :44:43. | |
might be reviewed. It is one of those political questions that | :44:44. | :44:45. | |
chancellors need to provide answers to. I want to move on to the issue | :44:46. | :44:56. | |
of business rates. There was, I guess, business rates generally and | :44:57. | :45:00. | |
then there was this discount for pubs. Just beginning up on that one | :45:01. | :45:10. | |
side issue which seem to me to derive from special pleading by | :45:11. | :45:15. | |
affective backbench lobbies rather than most pressing need, even on the | :45:16. | :45:20. | |
discount for pubs it got good headlines but it was pretty small | :45:21. | :45:26. | |
beer. In terms of the pressures that pubs are facing. Would you agree? | :45:27. | :45:34. | |
Yes. It's a small business, it's a small amount of money. Not as bad as | :45:35. | :45:43. | |
Johnny Reynolds, last night with the Chancellor not excelling at his | :45:44. | :45:48. | |
spreadsheets. If we want a simpler tax system we should apply business | :45:49. | :45:54. | |
rates uniformly but if we want special cases, if we do decide we'd | :45:55. | :45:57. | |
like to have more pubs, you might think about the best way to allow | :45:58. | :46:03. | |
that to happen. It might not be the business rates system. It is likely | :46:04. | :46:09. | |
to be temporary. Why would you want pubs supported for a short period of | :46:10. | :46:14. | |
time. It would look rather odd. In some ways, you have opened up the | :46:15. | :46:18. | |
area I wanted to go into regarding business rates. You pointed to a | :46:19. | :46:22. | |
more substantial reform of the business rates system. The | :46:23. | :46:29. | |
government has made a mistake by trying to tinker with the system as | :46:30. | :46:34. | |
they've gone along rather than to address in a holistic sense, the | :46:35. | :46:37. | |
whole issue of business rates, whether they are fit for persons, | :46:38. | :46:41. | |
the impact they are having on the success or otherwise of businesses | :46:42. | :46:45. | |
across the UK. It probably would have been better for the government | :46:46. | :46:48. | |
to reflected on reform of the system before embarking in the way that | :46:49. | :46:56. | |
they have. Is that fair criticism? There may be short-term issues of | :46:57. | :47:00. | |
people surprised by unpleasant increases in their rates bills that | :47:01. | :47:04. | |
may require some transitional relief. The problems are twofold. We | :47:05. | :47:10. | |
shouldn't go seven years without revaluation. We should have them | :47:11. | :47:13. | |
more frequently so people won't see such big changes in their bills, | :47:14. | :47:19. | |
over such a small period of time you won't have bigger changes in the tax | :47:20. | :47:24. | |
base across the country. The other thing we should do is focus the tax | :47:25. | :47:28. | |
more on the value of the business land, not the property that sits on | :47:29. | :47:35. | |
the land. One of my concerns, particularly as a London MP is that | :47:36. | :47:40. | |
property prices in this city have spiralled out of control. There has | :47:41. | :47:43. | |
got to be a place on high streets throughout the city, whether they're | :47:44. | :47:50. | |
in the city or the suburbs, not just for big national brands, but also | :47:51. | :47:56. | |
the small independent businesses, family businesses, whether that's | :47:57. | :48:00. | |
the halal butcher or the local hairdresser. Do you think this is | :48:01. | :48:09. | |
another example where London and the overheating of the property market | :48:10. | :48:16. | |
in London is skewing the national debate and there's a good case for | :48:17. | :48:20. | |
devolution of this policy on a London wide level? You're right. | :48:21. | :48:33. | |
This is very much a London issue. London is the only area where an | :48:34. | :48:38. | |
average business rates have risen quite significantly. One effect of | :48:39. | :48:43. | |
that is a significant increase in the redistribution of those business | :48:44. | :48:47. | |
rates from London to the rest of the country. That reflects the fact that | :48:48. | :48:51. | |
is in a sense what business rates are for. It's supposed to reflect | :48:52. | :48:56. | |
the value of property rising much more here than elsewhere. That's a | :48:57. | :49:01. | |
separate question from your one about high streets and butchers, and | :49:02. | :49:05. | |
so on. If we think that there are sorts of businesses that we want to | :49:06. | :49:12. | |
support, differentially from the rest, then we want to be very clear | :49:13. | :49:15. | |
about why we want to do that and either do that from within the | :49:16. | :49:20. | |
business rates system in a consistent way, or do it in some | :49:21. | :49:24. | |
other way. If you think there is something valuable their unique to | :49:25. | :49:28. | |
divide a policy to achieve what we actually want we want to achieve. | :49:29. | :49:35. | |
The answer is not put a blanket reduction on business rates on all | :49:36. | :49:39. | |
shops, for example. You indicated the merits of business rates as they | :49:40. | :49:47. | |
previously operated which was that receipts can then be redistributed | :49:48. | :49:51. | |
equitably to fund different services across the country. Even though it | :49:52. | :49:58. | |
is characterised as a London issue, it's very much an issue for a local | :49:59. | :50:01. | |
authority like mine which is a commuter suburb in London. So, if I | :50:02. | :50:09. | |
were there leader of Westminster or the leader of Camden, I would be | :50:10. | :50:14. | |
very much in favour of greater business rates in and because that | :50:15. | :50:18. | |
gives me a huge pot of money to spend on local services. As a former | :50:19. | :50:26. | |
deputy leader of Redbridge I'm less enthusiastic about the concentration | :50:27. | :50:30. | |
of resources in zone one. Do you think this is an issue that the | :50:31. | :50:35. | |
government ought to reconsider as part of a broader look at business | :50:36. | :50:40. | |
rates? The business rates that will be retained are only the marginal | :50:41. | :50:47. | |
increase as a revaluation of property. What it means is that a 1% | :50:48. | :50:54. | |
increase in the business rate property in Westminster will be | :50:55. | :50:57. | |
worth an enormous amount of money whereas a 1% increase in any other | :50:58. | :51:00. | |
local authority would be very little. The value of growth to | :51:01. | :51:06. | |
Westminster would be very big. Equally, the cost of contraction | :51:07. | :51:10. | |
will also be very big whereas the value or cost of that happening in | :51:11. | :51:15. | |
other local authorities would be very much smaller. It's important to | :51:16. | :51:22. | |
be clear. The reason this has been happening from London to the rest of | :51:23. | :51:29. | |
the country is the simple value increase in property throughout the | :51:30. | :51:33. | |
country is not going to be retained. About discretionary support. Do you | :51:34. | :51:40. | |
think this is sufficient and where'd you think it should be concentrated? | :51:41. | :51:49. | |
Where is the need for relief? It is being concentrated in London, as you | :51:50. | :51:53. | |
would expect, given that's where most of the increases are happening. | :51:54. | :51:59. | |
I just don't think we have a few, similar to your previous question, | :52:00. | :52:04. | |
about sufficiency. This is about... The key point as Carl is making, | :52:05. | :52:11. | |
this is resulting in 40 plus percent increases in some people's business | :52:12. | :52:15. | |
rates pretty much overnight. The main reason is we've left it seven | :52:16. | :52:19. | |
years since revaluation and there's been a lot of relative change. I | :52:20. | :52:25. | |
think there is a lot of problems with the tax that changes like that | :52:26. | :52:28. | |
overnight. The best way of getting around that is doing the | :52:29. | :52:33. | |
re-valuation much more frequently. The second best way is to provide | :52:34. | :52:38. | |
some proper transitional relief of the extent that can help some of | :52:39. | :52:41. | |
those businesses facing big overnight changes and it will help. | :52:42. | :52:48. | |
So the relief is effectively concentrated to the areas where most | :52:49. | :52:54. | |
needed? That's my understanding. It's going to be allocated across | :52:55. | :52:58. | |
the country according to those areas that saw the biggest increases. | :52:59. | :53:05. | |
Whether you want to pick some businesses that have a larger | :53:06. | :53:09. | |
proportional increase, they will be able to target it. It will be a | :53:10. | :53:14. | |
choice for them. It's not fashionable to stick up for greater | :53:15. | :53:18. | |
spending or support for London but in this case it's needed. We need | :53:19. | :53:23. | |
all the friends we can get to stick up for greater funding concentration | :53:24. | :53:28. | |
in London. I have handbag to you. When you were talking about this | :53:29. | :53:35. | |
cliff edge problem needing more frequent re-evaluation. As you know, | :53:36. | :53:40. | |
these are quite difficult to manage, and minister to flee they are quite | :53:41. | :53:45. | |
complex. Have you examined the possibility of using indexation | :53:46. | :53:50. | |
followed by periodic adjustment where the indexation gets out of | :53:51. | :53:56. | |
line. It would be a neat way through the problem is full revaluation was | :53:57. | :54:03. | |
very expensive. You would just increase by the average and over | :54:04. | :54:08. | |
every few years you would do a proper re-evaluation and then move | :54:09. | :54:11. | |
forward with that. You could even compensate with people who felt have | :54:12. | :54:19. | |
been harshly treated by an average in an area. But you've not examine | :54:20. | :54:27. | |
that approach at all? Not the practicality but in theory we have | :54:28. | :54:34. | |
said it may well be the way. Modern technology, big date is the | :54:35. | :54:39. | |
fashionable phrase, the collection through modern technology required | :54:40. | :54:43. | |
to do that indexation now makes that approach possible where is it didn't | :54:44. | :54:48. | |
ten years ago. It would seem that it is much cheaper to do now than it | :54:49. | :54:54. | |
used to be. I don't think it is completely implausible that you | :54:55. | :54:58. | |
could do that. Measuring profits is not easy either but we managed to do | :54:59. | :55:04. | |
it on a annual basis. We could do something broad brush every year and | :55:05. | :55:07. | |
something more complex less frequently. Isn't it overall fairer. | :55:08. | :55:14. | |
After all, people have been paying rates higher than they should for | :55:15. | :55:18. | |
part of that seven-year period and another group have been collecting a | :55:19. | :55:22. | |
windfall before they hit this cliff edge for which they are now going to | :55:23. | :55:27. | |
get some relief. That is the harsh Inland Revenue, HMRC view of the | :55:28. | :55:34. | |
matter. You can see that there is a shred of truth in it. Do not agree? | :55:35. | :55:39. | |
I agree with that. Were trying to tax people on the rent they are | :55:40. | :55:43. | |
paying. It would seem more natural to do that on the current year, just | :55:44. | :55:47. | |
as with the council tax it seems pretty odd to tax you on what your | :55:48. | :55:54. | |
house was worth the 1991 as opposed to what it is worth in 2017. That's | :55:55. | :56:00. | |
a much bigger cliff edge problem but it's not one I'm going to | :56:01. | :56:02. | |
cross-examine you on at the moment. He said that there were two problems | :56:03. | :56:08. | |
with the house versus property question on the tax. Isn't there a | :56:09. | :56:16. | |
third, which is the appeals system. The appeals system must be fast | :56:17. | :56:25. | |
enough. Even if it's not quite as rigorous as the current system in | :56:26. | :56:30. | |
ensuring that everybody gets the exactly the right answer from the | :56:31. | :56:36. | |
appeals system. It must be fast enough to allow a frequent process | :56:37. | :56:39. | |
of re-evaluation or indexation to be appropriate. Without it, the appeals | :56:40. | :56:45. | |
for the previous year would be carrying on while you were enjoying | :56:46. | :56:54. | |
or suffering a alteration to the rate. In cases where you get it | :56:55. | :57:00. | |
wrong, you want a fair and swift appeals system to set that right. | :57:01. | :57:05. | |
You know the government have announced reforms in this area, have | :57:06. | :57:09. | |
you looked at those? I haven't looked at those. You have no view on | :57:10. | :57:14. | |
whether that is going to take the trip? No. | :57:15. | :57:27. | |
There are different amounts of money put aside by different authorities. | :57:28. | :57:37. | |
Another reason for supposing my concern is justified. Yes. The | :57:38. | :57:41. | |
impact on authority budgets according to what they end up with | :57:42. | :57:46. | |
on the appeal and how well-prepared they would be very different and | :57:47. | :57:48. | |
significant between different authorities. Bespoke a moment ago | :57:49. | :57:56. | |
about this huge cliff edge in the system. All the way from 1991-2 | :57:57. | :58:07. | |
through two growth in this cliff edge. Having given serious thought | :58:08. | :58:14. | |
about how to deal with that? Well, in terms of how you would transition | :58:15. | :58:18. | |
towards where we are at the moment, not in detail, I think it would be | :58:19. | :58:25. | |
fair to say... Well, have you at all? The book consequence of moving | :58:26. | :58:31. | |
from where we are to something based on current values, we have looked at | :58:32. | :58:37. | |
that any bit of detail the scale of change, the transitional | :58:38. | :58:45. | |
arrangements you could Britain would be of the kind one normally does, | :58:46. | :58:54. | |
which is to say that in X years' time, we'll get you from your junior | :58:55. | :58:57. | |
and the amount you pay will go up accordingly. A second question, it | :58:58. | :59:10. | |
is true there are furnaces in the present system -- on fair elements. | :59:11. | :59:22. | |
The biggest of all is the absence of any appreciation of the consequences | :59:23. | :59:36. | |
of House price movements in central London. Which means that people have | :59:37. | :59:50. | |
moved into what would have been a much higher tax than the old rates | :59:51. | :59:57. | |
but who are now capped out through council tax banding systems. You | :59:58. | :00:06. | |
have a view on how to address that? There's a lot of money involved | :00:07. | :00:11. | |
there, by the way. A very large proportion of what people consider | :00:12. | :00:16. | |
to be uncollected taxes in that area. And we see the same sort of | :00:17. | :00:20. | |
thing I'm stamp duty with a high fraction is collected from | :00:21. | :00:23. | |
transactions in central London, reflecting exactly what you are | :00:24. | :00:29. | |
saying. Some argue it is a rough and ready substitute. And one can | :00:30. | :00:39. | |
understand. From practical point of view, it is easier to collect deputy | :00:40. | :00:43. | |
but clearly more damaging in the sense that it creates... Have you | :00:44. | :00:48. | |
done any work on what could or should be done to deal with that | :00:49. | :00:53. | |
aspect of the unfairness in the absence of a re-evaluation? Because | :00:54. | :01:06. | |
we haven't had a re-evaluation. I am just stressing that particular | :01:07. | :01:09. | |
aspect. Without a re-evaluation, all that you presumably could do would | :01:10. | :01:16. | |
be to... OK, rather than speculate, I'm asking if you have thought that | :01:17. | :01:20. | |
through? Do you think it might be helpful if the IFS did some work on | :01:21. | :01:27. | |
these things we are identifying that have not been thought through that | :01:28. | :01:30. | |
are quite important? I think there may be some merit. I struggle with | :01:31. | :01:37. | |
the idea of making changes without a re-evaluation. Lots of people have | :01:38. | :01:46. | |
come forward with prudent proposals. And these things have ended their | :01:47. | :01:53. | |
manifestos. -- ended up in manifestos. So, I am very surprised | :01:54. | :02:03. | |
by the reply you have just given. It is clear the re-evaluation is a | :02:04. | :02:14. | |
massive political undertaking. We need to see what re-evaluation is to | :02:15. | :02:18. | |
find a political system and we can look at the poll tax to see what | :02:19. | :02:24. | |
that does. I'm asking you to think through a more modest valuation. I | :02:25. | :02:30. | |
am struggling to see how you could make changes without re-evaluation. | :02:31. | :02:37. | |
You haven't addressed it or thought about it so why don't you come back | :02:38. | :02:42. | |
to us when you have. Anglesey will see what we can think of but it is | :02:43. | :02:45. | |
hard to think of doing something that doesn't address current values. | :02:46. | :02:49. | |
Can we expect something from the IFS on this or not? I can't think of | :02:50. | :02:54. | |
anything that doesn't address current values. You're asking me | :02:55. | :03:00. | |
right on the spot. If you have done something that includes | :03:01. | :03:05. | |
re-evaluation or did something and that was much easier, that would be | :03:06. | :03:10. | |
extremely interesting also. Continuing with this local | :03:11. | :03:16. | |
Government seen, where have most of the cuts to local Government fallen | :03:17. | :03:25. | |
up to now. As you know, the cuts are essentially from Central Hall | :03:26. | :03:32. | |
subsidies, central redistribution to local Government, over the years up | :03:33. | :03:35. | |
until this year on last year. Most of those came as straight percentage | :03:36. | :03:44. | |
cuts to the central Government. Because that grant is and certain | :03:45. | :03:51. | |
types of Labour authorities are more dependent on a cramped and others. | :03:52. | :03:55. | |
Some authorities have spent more and those are intended Metropolitan | :03:56. | :03:59. | |
authorities, including in London and those with teamwork deprived | :04:00. | :04:04. | |
population because they were more dependent on grants. So, Nagatomo, | :04:05. | :04:11. | |
there have been those more grant dependent local authorities which | :04:12. | :04:13. | |
tend to be poorer and some metropolitan areas. Going forward, | :04:14. | :04:20. | |
the formula is being adjusted such that the impact on overall budgets | :04:21. | :04:25. | |
will be similar across different local authorities. Thank you. Yes. I | :04:26. | :04:32. | |
guess there are two dimensions one could look at. One is a geographical | :04:33. | :04:39. | |
and the other is the dimension of which services. Have you looked at | :04:40. | :04:44. | |
either of those? Have you done analysis? Could you shared with us? | :04:45. | :04:51. | |
Thank you. I want to ask you questions in particular about the | :04:52. | :05:04. | |
schools budget funding. In 2015, you said, current or day-to-day spending | :05:05. | :05:07. | |
on schools in England has been relatively protected. Is that still | :05:08. | :05:13. | |
the case? Relative to most other public services, yes. If you think | :05:14. | :05:18. | |
that the current spending on schools up until 2015, spending per pupil | :05:19. | :05:26. | |
actually grew a small amount, compared with 2010-15, largely | :05:27. | :05:29. | |
because there was a significant increase in premiums on average | :05:30. | :05:33. | |
across schools, there was an increase. If you look at the time | :05:34. | :05:37. | |
period, 2015-20, school spending is being frozen in real terms, means a | :05:38. | :05:47. | |
real terms cut of 7% per pupil. So, there is a change there and spending | :05:48. | :05:50. | |
is falling for people going forward, where is did not fall under the last | :05:51. | :05:56. | |
Government. If you look at the period of 2010-20, that is a | :05:57. | :06:00. | |
significantly less generous settlement than many other public | :06:01. | :06:12. | |
services received. -- more generous. I think it is 8%. Do you think these | :06:13. | :06:18. | |
reductions in per-pupil funding can be achieved without any impact on | :06:19. | :06:20. | |
outcomes for children? It is not as strong as you might | :06:21. | :06:44. | |
expect to be. If you look at spending the system, it has really | :06:45. | :06:58. | |
been hit substantially. Relating that outcomes, even at scale of | :06:59. | :07:00. | |
change would be difficult, so I don't know the answer that question. | :07:01. | :07:06. | |
OK. The Government has chosen spend some money on new selective Free | :07:07. | :07:16. | |
Schools, I think nearly ?1 billion over the whole period. Had that been | :07:17. | :07:21. | |
spread across the entire schools budget, what would the impact on the | :07:22. | :07:25. | |
per-pupil reduction has been, do you know? I don't have that number to | :07:26. | :07:30. | |
hand. Is it possible for you to work that out? I think that might be | :07:31. | :07:36. | |
capital spending and the pupil numbers are just gave you were | :07:37. | :07:42. | |
day-to-day spending. That's true. They are slightly different things | :07:43. | :07:49. | |
but supposing it was being spent on capital, it was spent on... And | :07:50. | :07:56. | |
maybe this was a question for the ABI and I didn't ask them this | :07:57. | :08:06. | |
yesterday, but, have the forecast current budget, spend on schooling | :08:07. | :08:10. | |
over the next five years, taking account of these additional places? | :08:11. | :08:16. | |
How will that work? For example, I have got 50 schools in my | :08:17. | :08:24. | |
constituency. Where there to be a new free school setup in my | :08:25. | :08:29. | |
constituency, where with the current funding for that come from? Would it | :08:30. | :08:36. | |
mean the cuts to the schools which are already facing cuts would be | :08:37. | :08:43. | |
even greater? Me to come back to you on the funding of Free Schools. OK, | :08:44. | :08:52. | |
the people funding is falling because the number of is increasing. | :08:53. | :09:00. | |
Is there any evidence that Free Schools are being set up in places | :09:01. | :09:03. | |
where the pressure on school places the greatest? We haven't looked | :09:04. | :09:10. | |
specifically. The National Audit Office has led to an included there | :09:11. | :09:14. | |
are certainly some evidence that they are being set up where that is | :09:15. | :09:22. | |
not the case. OK, so you think this is more something for the National | :09:23. | :09:25. | |
Audit Office than for you to look into? As I say, I think this is | :09:26. | :09:29. | |
something that the National Audit Office has looked into. OK. I won't | :09:30. | :09:40. | |
ask you any more about it but I will just ask you one more question but | :09:41. | :09:44. | |
links school funding to distribution. As you know, in the | :09:45. | :09:50. | |
way the Government is measuring distributional impact of all the | :09:51. | :09:57. | |
changes they are making, they're not just looking at taxes and benefits, | :09:58. | :10:01. | |
there are also looking at public services. Is there any dates are | :10:02. | :10:08. | |
suggesting who would benefit from the preschool places? Whether that | :10:09. | :10:12. | |
will be evenly across income distribution or skewed in some other | :10:13. | :10:17. | |
way? I'm pretty sure the answer to that is that no, there isn't. Do you | :10:18. | :10:23. | |
think it's because the numbers are so small that it wouldn't make any | :10:24. | :10:26. | |
difference for the think they might be significant? I'm just trying to | :10:27. | :10:35. | |
think... Finding data which tells you the incomes of the parents of | :10:36. | :10:38. | |
children going to Free Schools and how that with others, it's not | :10:39. | :10:43. | |
something I'm aware of, I'm afraid... OK, fine. The Chancellor | :10:44. | :10:55. | |
did not, in the tables he published on distribution, did not split out | :10:56. | :11:02. | |
his November measures from his March measures. I think you did split that | :11:03. | :11:07. | |
out in what he published, would you just like to set out what the | :11:08. | :11:15. | |
distributional impacts of the two events were separately? So, we split | :11:16. | :11:21. | |
out, we certainly looked at last week's announcement and of course | :11:22. | :11:26. | |
they were actually extremely small overall, broadly slightly regressive | :11:27. | :11:31. | |
because of the extra dividend tax and national insurance payments paid | :11:32. | :11:36. | |
people higher up the earnings distribution. If you look at | :11:37. | :11:41. | |
everything that has been announced since 2015, so, in this Parliament, | :11:42. | :11:46. | |
you get clearly big losses towards the possibility of distribution but | :11:47. | :11:53. | |
there are substantial cuts to tax credits and benefits, at least a | :11:54. | :11:57. | |
freeze to benefits, which gives you a distributional chart with big | :11:58. | :12:00. | |
reductions at the bottom and much less going on towards the top. I | :12:01. | :12:06. | |
cannot remember what was in the November statement to be honest! | :12:07. | :12:20. | |
The 2015 announcements were more significant. | :12:21. | :12:25. | |
You mean the freeze on benefits and the other one? The set of measures | :12:26. | :12:34. | |
announced in July 2015 are the most significant measures affecting | :12:35. | :12:37. | |
households. Everything else is small relative to that. | :12:38. | :12:41. | |
Yes, now there is one line in the Budget which no-one seems to have | :12:42. | :12:45. | |
taken into account. I'm interested in it. | :12:46. | :12:51. | |
It's line 26. Tax credit debt enhanced collection. This is | :12:52. | :12:56. | |
described as a previously announced welfare policy decision, however, | :12:57. | :13:03. | |
over the final three years of the survey period, this raises over half | :13:04. | :13:09. | |
a billion, ?500 million. I'm puzzled by this. I wondered if you knew what | :13:10. | :13:15. | |
was going on here? I can't understand how it can be a | :13:16. | :13:20. | |
previously announced decision but only now people are seeing that this | :13:21. | :13:25. | |
is ?500 million taken from the tax credit system. Do you know what is | :13:26. | :13:32. | |
going on? By previously announced it is between the autumn statement and | :13:33. | :13:37. | |
the Budget. So not on Budget Day but before Budget Day but not announced | :13:38. | :13:42. | |
before the Autumn Statement, which is why it is making it to this table | :13:43. | :13:46. | |
and not the next table in the document. | :13:47. | :13:50. | |
What is this change? We took evidence six months ago from | :13:51. | :14:02. | |
Concentrix who did a big exercise in checking out fraud in the tax credit | :14:03. | :14:07. | |
system, they seriously overdid this and a lot of people suffered as a | :14:08. | :14:11. | |
consequence, so what is this line 26? What is going on here, do you | :14:12. | :14:19. | |
know? I know the information in paragraph 352. Announced at the | :14:20. | :14:26. | |
start of February it was announced, and it's... It's something that they | :14:27. | :14:35. | |
are doing with their powers to use something called direct earnings | :14:36. | :14:38. | |
attachments, I don't know that wording. | :14:39. | :14:41. | |
It means if you decide somebody has been overpaid you can make a legal | :14:42. | :14:46. | |
order to get it from their salary? So there is more use of those | :14:47. | :14:48. | |
powers. Yep. | :14:49. | :14:54. | |
Well, in looking at the distributional charts you made, | :14:55. | :14:58. | |
where you looked at the freeze on benefits, did you take account of | :14:59. | :15:03. | |
this as well? I would have thought that ?500 million was nonnegligible? | :15:04. | :15:11. | |
We didn't. Per year it is a small amount relative to the measures to | :15:12. | :15:18. | |
limit the freeze on welfare payments for benefits, the cuts to tack | :15:19. | :15:23. | |
credits it is small to that. The data that we use would not allow us | :15:24. | :15:27. | |
to include this measure if we wanted to. We don't have the evidence who | :15:28. | :15:32. | |
receives more than they should have done, so don't know who to pay as a | :15:33. | :15:39. | |
result. If we wanted to we couldn't. And on a sense of scale this is | :15:40. | :15:46. | |
about 100 million a year, against ?12 billion a year, so you would not | :15:47. | :15:50. | |
be able to see it on a chart. OK. Thank you. | :15:51. | :15:56. | |
You looked at the impact of the next changes that the Chancellor | :15:57. | :16:01. | |
announced, did you look at the changes to dividend taxation on the | :16:02. | :16:05. | |
distribution charge is there impact on those? We don't have the date aa | :16:06. | :16:11. | |
to look at that. It hits the people towards the top of the distribution. | :16:12. | :16:12. | |
Yes. The O BR says that the top end of | :16:13. | :16:33. | |
the distribution is the top end, the salary expression at the top end of | :16:34. | :16:38. | |
the distribution, do you agree with that? We don't have separate | :16:39. | :16:43. | |
estimates. I think that the O BR are saying that one they will lose the | :16:44. | :16:50. | |
highest earners as the French bankers move back to Paris, for | :16:51. | :16:53. | |
example and the other is that the level of pay in financial services, | :16:54. | :16:58. | |
that they refer to, may do less well than it otherwise would have done. | :16:59. | :17:02. | |
So we don't have anything looking forward. We looked back, and | :17:03. | :17:07. | |
clearly, this is not Brexit related but it is clearly the case that the | :17:08. | :17:13. | |
earnings distribution has compressed over the last five or six years and | :17:14. | :17:22. | |
indeed the 90 percentile fall in relative earnings in the middle to | :17:23. | :17:28. | |
the bottom going forward, the O BR are set out assumptions there but we | :17:29. | :17:34. | |
have not done our own nor are in the position to do with regards to | :17:35. | :17:41. | |
project ex-s over the distribution. Thank you very much for giving | :17:42. | :17:45. | |
evidence. There have been a number of exchanges where we appreciate you | :17:46. | :17:50. | |
would do some work for Parliament and we would be grateful if you gave | :17:51. | :17:54. | |
serious thought to it and come back as to what you think could be | :17:55. | :18:01. | |
accomplished. If not, suggest how it may be accomplished and in some | :18:02. | :18:07. | |
detail. We would like to look at that you are after all, a public | :18:08. | :18:14. | |
funded institution and Parliament needs resources of your type to | :18:15. | :18:20. | |
enable it to perform its job properly. Thank you very much. | :18:21. | :18:31. |