Spring Budget 2017 Committee Select Committees


Spring Budget 2017 Committee

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Thank you for coming in to give evidence to us today, on this, how

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should I describe it, a mini budget, a sort of three quarters budget,

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settling on a smaller size by historical standards. People are

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mentioning it on the size and I think some of the greatest budgets

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of the post-war years generated very short read books so I don't think we

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should use that as a criteria. Can I begin with national insurance

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contributions? Do you think it is right that the self-employed should

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be compensated through the tax system for the additional risks they

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take? And how easy is it to identify these risks? It is worth saying

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first of all that the tax benefit is really very big, so relative to the

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employer and employee contributions, 22%, self-employed, facing a much

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smaller tax than that. I think it's pretty hard on the whole to justify

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anything like the scale of tax. The question is, do you think there

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should be something that is justified? Is there something to

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justify that? Historically, there has been a justification, which is

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that the self-employed are entitled to significantly smaller state

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benefits than employees. That gap is almost completely closed now,

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particularly with the introduction of a single to your pension, so the

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only difference in terms of benefits and job-seeker's allowance, that

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might imply a difference in national insurance rates of up to one

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percentage point. Certainly no more than that. Other differences are,

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first of all, very different according to the type of

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self-employment people are in... Let's talk about the genuinely

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self-employed, the self-employed self-employed, not people who might

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usually be in the employed sector. Let's concentrate at that end of the

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spectrum. Then you need to think about what exactly it is you want to

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compensate or subsidise for? Do you want to compensate or subsidised

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for, as he was saying, the additional risk people are taking?

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We need to ask, is the best way of doing that this? And why do we want

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to subsidise risk? We don't subsidise all risk. And if you do

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want to do it, why do it through the tax system in a blanket way, which

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subsidises or helps people who are not taking risks due to finding some

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better way of achieving that. Thirdly, you want to think about the

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scale. As I suggested, the scale is big at the moment. Do you think

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National Trust contributions are a pure tax? Yes. And therefore the

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contributory principle which suggests they have a complicated

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relationship, is gradually going? It is very little left of the

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contributing principle. It is now very hard to avoid getting the full

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single tier. There are small groups who will not achieve that and the

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pension is by far and away the biggest part of what is supposed to

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be... To summarise, you think that if there is a differential, it can

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be justified on the basis of what they receive, the self-employed, the

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differential to be self-employed should be very small? And that's

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from eternity. -- maternity. And if it is to be larger, for example

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compensation for risk, we need to think more clearly about what risks

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are entailed and it's your view they probably should not be dealt with

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through the tax system but through public spending? ? I think we need,

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on that second point, to think more clearly about what it is that we

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value from a societal point of view about the self-employed. We need to

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think carefully about... I'm asking you that question. I'm hoping you

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have thought carefully about it. They've lose the argument out there

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that, the enterprise culture drives economies and keeps them flexible.

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And I think it is hard to justify the current tax system on the basis

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of that argument. So you do not agree with that argument? No. Just

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one question, do you mean people are one question, do you mean people are

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allowed to keep their own money and therefore it is not a subsidy? When

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we think about tax subsidies, we can do it in different ways but on the

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whole, when one is talking about paying someone less for doing

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similar things, one can think about it at a subsidy. If you assume it is

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the Government's money first... Horizontal equity. It is the tax

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money on the Government is not getting a subsidy by not taking your

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money and I think realistically that is important because it slowly shows

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the angle you're coming from. To put it another way, you're charging

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other people more tax in order to reduce the tax on another group. Not

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necessarily to do anything else, you're just charging people more tax

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but I think it is important because it gives an indication of where

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you're coming from. You're in favour of higher taxes, which worries me.

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Absolutely not. We're talking about horizontal equity between people. If

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you want to lower rate of tax across the board, that is absolutely, I

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think there is a case, it is harder to make a case for treating this

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group differently from that group when they do similar things and that

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creates complexity and cost to the economy and to those who are not

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benefiting from the reduced amount. But you made a case for higher tax

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for self-employment? I want to come on to a specific point. Can I ask

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your view, because only ?3000 exemption for small companies, the

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first employee, national insurance contributions by employers, because

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they can situating Dessie Mee to say he used to employ ten people and now

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they have full setup is as their own company because that gives them

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?30,000 of employers contribution for free. And I just wonder where

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you went into the distorting effect of specific tax incentives. And more

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broadly, the danger of having things unintended consequences. That is the

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point we are making, that particular subsidy, if I can use that word, it

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is not surprising it has that effect because it creates a clear incentive

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in the system to do that, as does treating self-employed and employ

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people very differently, which is one of the reasons we are always

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having cases about whether someone is self employed or unemployed, when

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you create very different tax treatments of similar activities,

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you create these incentives to change your behaviour purely for tax

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reasons. And have you done any work specifically on the ?3000 limit? I

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don't know whether empirically that would be possible. We don't have the

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data for that we have looked at other bits of the tax system. You

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can see that individuals respond to tax incentives. Whatever data we

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have, people respond sharply to tax incentives. There was a measure the

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Autumn Statement which make changes. We'd like to see to what extent the

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Government reduced this problem. Can now talk about the issue of

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forestalling, which created revenue the Government did not get because

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people took forestalling action. How much consultation can you have

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safely without creating a fairly large amount of forestalling?

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Whopper constituting the Government should have? Yes. But it's clearly a

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difficult balance. There are some issues where you don't particularly

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neat consultation, you can avoid forestalling. For example, moving

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the top rate, 40-50, about 45, there did not need to be consultation

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about that but giving one year's notice created a lot of

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forestalling. On dividend tax changes, I don't know how much

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consultation is intended to, as there is clearly another set of

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changes coming in next year, which we've been given a full year's

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notice of. But clearly, if you give people the opportunity to do it, you

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create a lot of forestalling, so the balance of risk in terms of issues

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like dividend taxation is clearly towards forestalling. Do you think

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that the tax approach to dividends should be the same as the approach

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to earning? In the 1970s, there was a surplus tax at quite a high level

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and now, on earned income is more favourably taxed than earned income.

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Is this something you think is sensible in terms of encouraging

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savings and so forth or is it something you feel is distorted?

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Well, you're getting the right to the, I mean, right at the centre of

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the way the tax system works. Broadly speaking, we want to be

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taxing at big thing rate but adjusting the tax base, so you are

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not producing incentives to save and invest and offset any savings or

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investment that you are doing against the rate. What that would do

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effectively would be to provide more generous treatment for the

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investments, for example, the self-employed charge a higher rate

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of tax on the returns they therefore make. That is quite a big change.

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That is not simply increasing the rate of tax on investment income. It

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is reducing the base in order to ensure you're not taxing the

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returns, that the normal returns are saving in investment.

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Do you get that by reducing corporation tax if they keep the

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money within the company? Rather the reverse, in the sense that whilst

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you are doing investments, you would be effectively paying no tax on the

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returns to that investment but you would be paying a higher rate of tax

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on the rest of the return that you are making. In terms of the

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complications caused by having the different rates, you move into many

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anti-avoidance mechanisms to stop people moving things around. Do you

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think that one of these that might be useful might be to get back to

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the old close company rules where dividends attract different rates

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from not closed companies? I don't think it would be better. Whenever

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you put boundaries on the tax system and you try to define a set of

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companies, then you obviously give in -- incentives to be one type of

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company rather than another. You might fix one problem but you might

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create another problem. There is no economically good reason to treat

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those types of companies differently. It is a sticking

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plaster, we can't do the proper things so we will fiddle these

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things to get these guys out. It is better to sort out the tax breaks

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and the rates and it is applicable to all types of individuals

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regardless of the type of company they organise themselves under. That

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would be a simpler system and a more uniform rate? It would be a simpler

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system in the sense that you would get rid of lots of boundaries in the

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tax system and get rid of a lot of allowances, or you could do if you

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wanted to, you would be narrowing the tax base in the sense that some

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investment is taxed which would be taken out of tax. You would be able

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to slash the tax base but then you would lose revenue. You could choose

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the rate you thought was applicable. Final question on this. Do you want

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me to go onto the welfare cap? Do you think it meets the Treasury's

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six principles of tax contributions? Changing the rate year by year. It's

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unfortunate that it has happened in a non-joined up way. For the

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self-employed we have had two changes in the last couple of years,

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giving them pension and making changes to the class four. If we

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introduced this ?5,000 dividend just the years ago and now we are taking

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it down to ?2000, it doesn't look like a clear strategy over time,

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taking all of that together in one go would have made an awful lot more

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sense. Thank you. If I can move completely onto the welfare cap.

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Starting with first principles. Do you think it is a good idea to do

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legislate for caps, or for spending targets, which you then don't meet

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so you are just the way of meeting them? Or can this lead to bad

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policy-making and misallocation of resources. Miss Anderson, you look

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very keen to answer this. In a perfect world, we want policy makers

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to make the right decisions and explain them clearly. The whole

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point of the welfare cap is that spending might turn out to be more

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than you intended and rather than cutting it back you take an easier

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choice of cutting something else or just ignore it. We are in a world

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where policymakers are not making perfect decisions and hiding

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problems and pushing them into the future. Having a cap that says if

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spending goes above a certain level that you can choose in advance, what

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you can do is rein back below that level and make the decision to

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explain why. I think the operation of it so far has hardly been great.

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We've had only one breach of the cap and at that moment the Chancellor

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decided not to do a whole load of welfare cuts that he'd announced a

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few months earlier. We can't say the cap has been tested and proven to

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lead to better policy-making as a result. Alongside, we have the

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welfare change report which I think is a very good innovation. And the

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new Chancellor has made some new changes to the welfare cap,

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adjusting the benefits spend for changes in inflation, I think, was a

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good move. The move to assessing it every five years, I think is a bad

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move. I think cynically that it won't be tested until after the new

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general election which means it can't have been said to be breached.

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It becomes so flexible it becomes meaningless? None of the fiscal

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targets can be breached in this Parliament, unfortunately. It makes

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it easy to hit. We wouldn't want a 0% margin. The other thing they have

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done is say that if welfare spending has crept up big, inflation --

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because of inflation. 3% is a bit bigger than what Mr Osborne chose to

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have. How arbitrary you think the things included in the cap and those

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not is? 52% of welfare spending is within the cap and the rest isn't.

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Is this important or is it just a fair part of pensions policy? The

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report is focusing on all of welfare spending, we still have a check on

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the whole lot. The state pension is excluded where reasonably we have

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argued that we want to think about that in long-term view. The desire

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to push up the pension age if longevity keeps rising. Which is

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right because the current ageing population wouldn't suffer from an

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increase in the state pension. The other thing they are excluding our

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very cyclical benefits which again I don't think we really want to model

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up with the, temporarily, jobseeker's allowance is costing a

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lot more because temporarily in employment is higher. We don't want

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that to bundle up with pension or disability benefits going up in a

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much more cyclical way. I think we do need more of a conversation about

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what the cost of the triple lock has been and whether that is a cost we

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want to bear. Just before we move onto approach to public spending. A

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target that is much more fixed than the cap for welfare, doesn't this

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lead to a distortions in expenditure that you're trying to achieve

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something that is based on so many moving parts that he is absolutely

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right is extremely difficult but depends on you making decisions. The

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welfare cap is constraining policy in a good way, stopping you hiding

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problems that are appearing. The overseas aid target is very

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different in that it is always going to cost not .7% of our GNI, you may

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argue whether that is too high or low, maybe you should care about how

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much bang for your buck you are getting from this money rather than

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how much you are a spending. If you're going to have austerity, you

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are having less money for education, the list goes on. You really

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constrain the Chancellor in responding to circumstances. What

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I'm poking away at is whether you think it is good policy but rather

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bad economics? I started saying we want policy makers to make the right

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decisions and we don't want to constrain them at all. If we suspect

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that sometimes people get tempted into letting problems being hidden

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away we might want to put constraints in place. Elsewhere, you

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might think it is reasonable for those seeking election to set out

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what they will do in certain circumstances and if you want to

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pledge, whatever the world looks like, we will spend not .7% of GNI

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in our manifesto, I don't think you can stop people from doing that.

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Stephen Hammond. You made a comment about not thinking there was a clear

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strategy in terms of some tax policies. You were very critical of

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the tiered approach and the effect that had in terms of stamp duty. Do

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you take the same approach to the reforms of probate? It's the same

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structure, a slab structure. Your steak goes over a certain level,

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then there's a big increase in the amount of probate duty that you pay

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and that never feels like a very sensible structure. That said, the

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opportunities for... There will be some opportunities for gaining that

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but my guess is that the economic consequences of that will be smaller

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than the stamp duty changes. It will create some incentives to gain the

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estate around those levels. You think it will be relatively small

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opportunities. You don't think a lot of people will take the decision to

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give away a lot of their estate to avoid those levels in time? With a

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40% marginal rate, it is only a few thousand pounds of difference in the

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estate which will very quickly be accounted for in a 40% marginal rate

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which will soon outweigh any effect of the probate duty where the

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maximum is 20,000. I think it's not a very sensible structure but I

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don't think it will have some impact, relative to stamp duty it is

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a smaller one. Nevertheless, it is causing some odd incentives. On a

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wider basis, do you think it is a disincentive to save? That probate

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charge is so small that if it does create any disincentives, it is not

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one we'd ever be able to measure. It is small relative to other things

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that are happening in the system. Relative of 40% marginal rate on

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inheritance which is ?40,000 for every ?100,000, a maximum of ?20,000

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in a probate for ?2 million estate which would otherwise have

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inheritance tax of well over half a million, I think, I don't disagree

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with what you are saying in principle, I think indirectly it is

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pretty small. I take the point it is small in scale. Are you concerned...

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Two things that come out of that. In terms of the principal, although it

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is technically not a tax, do you think there was significant and

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sufficient consultation prior to it being implemented, given that all

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the consultation there was, it was relatively given two, showed almost

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total opposition. Is there a tendency to just do it anyway. I

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wasn't aware of the consultation or the scale of it. I can't really give

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a sensible answer to that. You said technically it's not a tax but the

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when I are saying that it is a tax because of its structure and they

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are saying that rather than the old probate the D government incurs

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costs and you can offset those but it doesn't count as a tax because

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you can set it out as net. The ONS are saying that the income it gets

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from probate, knocking it off that it would be tax receipt so their

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view is that the ONS will deem this to be as tax because of its

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structure. I take the point that you have made a couple times that

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empirically it is small. Do you think there is an overall message

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coming from them the government that there is a disincentive to save most

:26:24.:26:28.

of the measures it is introducing at the moment. Over the last few years

:26:29.:26:33.

we have had changes moving in different directions so clearly the

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incentive to save in a pension for higher earners has been reduced very

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significantly. Not just high earners. Because of the way the cap

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is calculated. You will hit the lifetime allowance if you are

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earning ?35,000 after 15 years of saving. Given auto enrolment that's

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proven the incentives. The limits for ices have doubled since 2010.

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That is a big increase in incentive. The LISA provide something that for

:27:19.:27:21.

many people is a better bet than a pension. Five years ago you could

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put in 25 times as much into a pension as you could in an ice. Now

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you can only put in twice as much in any year with a lifetime limit on

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the pension but there isn't on the LISA. We've had quite a radical

:27:38.:27:42.

change in the savings incentives away from the pension shape which is

:27:43.:27:46.

tax-free now, taxed when it comes out towards the ice shape which is

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tax-free now, tax-free when it comes out. A year ago, we didn't make the

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big changes to pensions we consulted on, gradually we have moved to a

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savings map, a savings world which is much more towards the ice type

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savings. Would be any benefit if the lifetime

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allowance was done away with? So, the lifetime allowance, if that was

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done away with, that would move it towards pensions and the main group

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that would help would be those not fortunate enough to be in defined

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benefit schemes because getting to the lifetime allowance, given the

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annual allowance limits, is going to be hard work for someone putting

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money into a defined contributions scheme. E-fit in ?40,000 a year,

:28:44.:28:49.

you'd have to do that for quite a number of years... The way you

:28:50.:28:54.

factor it up, you can get there quickly. Double-mac you're likely to

:28:55.:29:01.

get there easier through a defined contributions scheme. Clearly, it

:29:02.:29:10.

would simplify the system and help a significant group of system and get

:29:11.:29:15.

rid of what is a distortion in the system. Equally, the way in which

:29:16.:29:26.

the allowance is tapered over 150,000, between hundred and 50000

:29:27.:29:30.

and 210,000, is a very odd distortion in the system. Given the

:29:31.:29:39.

fact that most people are... The movement away from pensions and

:29:40.:29:49.

benefits to boards ISA is a sensible move? I don't have a terribly strong

:29:50.:29:53.

view about which is the better way of doing things. I think it is not

:29:54.:30:00.

been an entirely transparent move. There was a consultation on a fairly

:30:01.:30:03.

transparent move that was pulled away from. I think giving people a

:30:04.:30:07.

choice is acceptable. I think there's a strong case for having

:30:08.:30:13.

that choice. I think I have more of a problem with the annual... In a

:30:14.:30:18.

sense, it is up to Government to decide how much it thinks it is

:30:19.:30:22.

reasonable to give tax incentives for people for over their lifetime

:30:23.:30:27.

but why want to constrain people on their annual amount, as well as

:30:28.:30:31.

their lifetime amount, I struggle with. So, I think, if I wanted to

:30:32.:30:38.

liberalise one of those, I would choose the annual rather than

:30:39.:30:40.

lifetime because that would give people the freedom to put in money

:30:41.:30:48.

when and if they can. And we spoke about the self-employed and said

:30:49.:31:00.

that within a 1 million tap, some people may be disproportionately

:31:01.:31:05.

unemployed. If you want to say everyone can put money into a

:31:06.:31:08.

pension, why did you want to punish those people want to make

:31:09.:31:11.

contributions because their income happens to fluctuate a lot. One

:31:12.:31:18.

group of those is the self-employed. Can we just mention the LISA? There

:31:19.:31:29.

has been mixed publicity about this. Some around whether it created

:31:30.:31:34.

unnecessary risk. Last year, he said, Mr Johnson, there are people

:31:35.:31:45.

losing employer contributions. A lot of the risk statement has been about

:31:46.:31:48.

people transferring out of a pension scheme into the LISA. Your view last

:31:49.:31:57.

year that most people recognise that. Is that remain your view?

:31:58.:32:02.

Particularly with the evidence so far, that the nudge from people to

:32:03.:32:08.

do that is very effective, the extent to which people are not going

:32:09.:32:15.

to actively not to Imrul. It is clear people are not taking that

:32:16.:32:18.

active kind of decision. I think there is some risk around the LISA.

:32:19.:32:23.

There is some potential confusion created by the LISA because up until

:32:24.:32:28.

now, it has been clear that for pretty much everyone, the pension is

:32:29.:32:35.

the more tax advantaged method of saving, so long as you're happy to

:32:36.:32:40.

keep something stuck there until you are somewhat older. The LISA is more

:32:41.:32:47.

tax advantaged method of saving for those who cannot get an employer

:32:48.:32:52.

contribution and I suppose the danger is it my muddy the waters,

:32:53.:32:55.

muddy the advice, muddy the clarity of little bit but it is an

:32:56.:33:01.

additional choice that people have. On the analysis you have done, under

:33:02.:33:05.

any circumstances where it LISA would be better value for a safer

:33:06.:33:16.

than where there is a DC screen? If the employer contribution is

:33:17.:33:23.

smaller, the upfront contribution to the two is obviously 20% of what

:33:24.:33:27.

you're putting him. If the employer contribution is less than that, I

:33:28.:33:31.

don't know where they cut off ears, but if the contribution is only a

:33:32.:33:35.

couple of hundred pounds, then a LISA may be worth more. But you

:33:36.:33:42.

can't access the money from a pension so for an age like 55,

:33:43.:33:49.

something like that, whereas with the LISA, you can access that at any

:33:50.:33:52.

point, if you are buying your first home... Which makes it an attractive

:33:53.:34:02.

product for young people. Although it is not universal, it is likely to

:34:03.:34:08.

be successful as a product to those who are looking for that purpose and

:34:09.:34:15.

some of the naysayers are prepared to offer that product... It is ?1000

:34:16.:34:23.

upfront bonus, I can't see why that would not be attractive. Thank you.

:34:24.:34:33.

I'm going to focus on the issues of social care and business rates. I

:34:34.:34:40.

will be serving for another year so I think I should declare that and I

:34:41.:34:44.

am part of a Local Government Association as well. I want to begin

:34:45.:34:49.

with social care. There was some additional help in the budget to

:34:50.:34:55.

make the demands of the social care crisis but we see a range of

:34:56.:34:59.

estimates about what the actual funding gap is. As IFS pretty clear

:35:00.:35:03.

number on what you think the funding gap is on social care spending by

:35:04.:35:11.

2020? I don't think you can put a cap on it but what I can say is that

:35:12.:35:17.

if all of the money, and this is an if, if all the money that has been

:35:18.:35:21.

allocated to social care in the budget goes on social care spending,

:35:22.:35:23.

that will take Spending Review back to where it was in 2010. So, if all

:35:24.:35:29.

the money goes, it is a big increase, 7%, 8%, but there are

:35:30.:35:37.

three caveats. Firstly, it is not entirely clear all that money will

:35:38.:35:43.

have to go to social care because councils will have a degree of

:35:44.:35:45.

autonomy over how that money is spent. Secondly, given that if it

:35:46.:35:53.

does not go, that is a sudden change and will that then gets bent as

:35:54.:35:57.

carefully as it could be? Thirdly, whilst there is as much money per

:35:58.:36:03.

adult as there was in 2010, there are an awful lot more older people

:36:04.:36:08.

needing social care. So the age adjustment or real amount will still

:36:09.:36:16.

be less than it was in 2010. Yeah, my personal view is that social care

:36:17.:36:21.

pressures are such that I imagine lots of councils will put this money

:36:22.:36:24.

where it should go which is in social care about your right to

:36:25.:36:28.

question whether or not the impact will be felt in the way like. Also,

:36:29.:36:36.

following debates in Parliament, we often have debates about where

:36:37.:36:43.

spending is going and whether it sits relative to the past but your

:36:44.:36:46.

right to point out that the nature of the population, the ageing

:36:47.:36:51.

population, means there are greater amount of services, so on that

:36:52.:36:55.

basis, the LGA, the Nuffield Trust, the health foundation, Apple said

:36:56.:36:59.

the budget announcements are insufficient to tackle the scale of

:37:00.:37:03.

pressure in adult social care. Does the IFS agree with this assessment?

:37:04.:37:07.

We don't have a view on what the right amount of money to spend us.

:37:08.:37:16.

This will leave spending per adult, one should take account of need and

:37:17.:37:20.

age, significantly lower than it was in 2010 but relative to 2016-17, it

:37:21.:37:29.

is a substantial increase, certainly in a year, and that is a significant

:37:30.:37:36.

change. In your opening remarks on the project, in reference to plans

:37:37.:37:41.

for a social care green paper, you called for a little less

:37:42.:37:45.

conversation, a little more action, citing Elvis Presley! What did you

:37:46.:37:54.

have in mind? Well, the reason for that statement is that there has

:37:55.:38:02.

been an awful lot of consultations, green papers, reviews on social care

:38:03.:38:08.

over the last several years. There was a very extensive and well

:38:09.:38:12.

thought out set of proposals that Andrew Lamont came up with 4-5 years

:38:13.:38:19.

ago, which had an emphasis put on the back burner but I doubt whether

:38:20.:38:26.

a further set of reviews on, but anything that has not been known

:38:27.:38:31.

from some of those previous pieces of work and in the end, a big

:38:32.:38:37.

high-level policy decision needs to be taken about the appropriate way

:38:38.:38:42.

of funding social care. So, essentially, I was saying, the truth

:38:43.:38:45.

is we have the information we need, is just a question of the political

:38:46.:38:48.

choice about the extent to which we want this to be privately funded and

:38:49.:38:53.

the extent to which we want a bit more state funding in, and whether

:38:54.:38:58.

you wanted to be local or centrally funded. It is not that I know the

:38:59.:39:03.

answer, it is that I think the Chancellor, Prime Minister, and

:39:04.:39:05.

others have enough information to make a decision because it has been

:39:06.:39:10.

reviewed so many times before. But while the Government is in listening

:39:11.:39:13.

mode with the green paper you are not pointing to particular

:39:14.:39:18.

approaches or policy solutions? There's a lot to be said, as I was

:39:19.:39:27.

indicating, for... This is a risk, I have suggested what I think local

:39:28.:39:33.

authorities would do but in terms of the outcomes we would like to see,

:39:34.:39:38.

there is a risk around whether or not all parts of the system will

:39:39.:39:41.

pull in the right direction and will have the right level of resource to

:39:42.:39:45.

do so. For example, one of the ways in which the NHS needs to manage the

:39:46.:39:50.

pressures on its resource base is to do with the issue of delayed

:39:51.:39:54.

discharges. If local authorities are not in a position to make sure care

:39:55.:39:59.

is provided in a residential community-based setting, the latest

:40:00.:40:04.

problem will continue. How big a risk to the IFS think this is?

:40:05.:40:20.

Again, it's hard to put specific numbers on that but it is striking

:40:21.:40:26.

speaking to people running NHS organisations, their first priority

:40:27.:40:31.

is not more money for them, it's my money for the social care system to

:40:32.:40:37.

prevent the situation you describe. So, clearly this is something

:40:38.:40:42.

terribly important to deal with and as the budget document points out,

:40:43.:40:49.

it is also something which is different in different local

:40:50.:40:52.

authorities, dealing with the specifics as well as the general

:40:53.:40:58.

level of funding is important but I totally agree with the premise of

:40:59.:41:03.

your question, is that dealing with this bottleneck in the system well

:41:04.:41:09.

help write the way back in the health service. One of the

:41:10.:41:13.

challenges we face is, in terms of trying to influence not just

:41:14.:41:17.

Government policy but Government resource allocation over the coming

:41:18.:41:24.

period, is how we determine the question that you were unable to

:41:25.:41:28.

answer outset, which is how much resource, how much money is needed

:41:29.:41:32.

to deal with the social care crisis? I think in some of your answers you

:41:33.:41:36.

have indicated that absolute funding is not the right method to consider

:41:37.:41:41.

because alongside the funding pot, you have to consider the pressures

:41:42.:41:46.

and the changing population, other particular metrics we should be

:41:47.:41:51.

using? It is difficult for us to push the Government allocate more

:41:52.:41:55.

resources without a substantial evidence base so I'm the IFS has not

:41:56.:42:01.

come out with a figure on what the resource pressure might be. We are

:42:02.:42:08.

not in a position I would never say that the right amount to spend is X.

:42:09.:42:17.

We can point out how it relates to a changing level of demand and clearly

:42:18.:42:20.

amount of money going in is not kept up anything like with the increased

:42:21.:42:22.

level of demand in terms of need. It is also provided informally and

:42:23.:42:46.

informal care resources have gone up. A swiftly increasing number have

:42:47.:42:59.

private resources of their own. If one is going to review this whole

:43:00.:43:05.

set of issues, you want to take account of all of that as well as

:43:06.:43:09.

the increasing levels of need to determine how to fund it, what level

:43:10.:43:15.

is right. We can't give your number and say it is an extra X billion. I

:43:16.:43:28.

understand. I guess the Chancellor's flexibility to draw an extra funding

:43:29.:43:33.

to meet pressures like adult social care has been heavily constrained by

:43:34.:43:39.

the commitments made by his predecessor in the Conservative

:43:40.:43:44.

manifesto. Given the social care pressures, where the concentrations

:43:45.:43:49.

of wealth far, it was a mistake to rule out increases in inheritance

:43:50.:43:56.

tax, for example, do you think? If people don't need it, should it be

:43:57.:44:05.

passed on elsewhere? Earle that is a big choice. The tax threshold has

:44:06.:44:13.

been frozen for a long period and has continued to be so. Inheritance

:44:14.:44:19.

tax has been biting more. The main home allowance coming in in April

:44:20.:44:25.

will bring back down again. If there is to be a review, as indicated by

:44:26.:44:32.

the Chancellor, I think it's unfortunate that you rule out what

:44:33.:44:43.

might be reviewed. It is one of those political questions that

:44:44.:44:45.

chancellors need to provide answers to. I want to move on to the issue

:44:46.:44:56.

of business rates. There was, I guess, business rates generally and

:44:57.:45:00.

then there was this discount for pubs. Just beginning up on that one

:45:01.:45:10.

side issue which seem to me to derive from special pleading by

:45:11.:45:15.

affective backbench lobbies rather than most pressing need, even on the

:45:16.:45:20.

discount for pubs it got good headlines but it was pretty small

:45:21.:45:26.

beer. In terms of the pressures that pubs are facing. Would you agree?

:45:27.:45:34.

Yes. It's a small business, it's a small amount of money. Not as bad as

:45:35.:45:43.

Johnny Reynolds, last night with the Chancellor not excelling at his

:45:44.:45:48.

spreadsheets. If we want a simpler tax system we should apply business

:45:49.:45:54.

rates uniformly but if we want special cases, if we do decide we'd

:45:55.:45:57.

like to have more pubs, you might think about the best way to allow

:45:58.:46:03.

that to happen. It might not be the business rates system. It is likely

:46:04.:46:09.

to be temporary. Why would you want pubs supported for a short period of

:46:10.:46:14.

time. It would look rather odd. In some ways, you have opened up the

:46:15.:46:18.

area I wanted to go into regarding business rates. You pointed to a

:46:19.:46:22.

more substantial reform of the business rates system. The

:46:23.:46:29.

government has made a mistake by trying to tinker with the system as

:46:30.:46:34.

they've gone along rather than to address in a holistic sense, the

:46:35.:46:37.

whole issue of business rates, whether they are fit for persons,

:46:38.:46:41.

the impact they are having on the success or otherwise of businesses

:46:42.:46:45.

across the UK. It probably would have been better for the government

:46:46.:46:48.

to reflected on reform of the system before embarking in the way that

:46:49.:46:56.

they have. Is that fair criticism? There may be short-term issues of

:46:57.:47:00.

people surprised by unpleasant increases in their rates bills that

:47:01.:47:04.

may require some transitional relief. The problems are twofold. We

:47:05.:47:10.

shouldn't go seven years without revaluation. We should have them

:47:11.:47:13.

more frequently so people won't see such big changes in their bills,

:47:14.:47:19.

over such a small period of time you won't have bigger changes in the tax

:47:20.:47:24.

base across the country. The other thing we should do is focus the tax

:47:25.:47:28.

more on the value of the business land, not the property that sits on

:47:29.:47:35.

the land. One of my concerns, particularly as a London MP is that

:47:36.:47:40.

property prices in this city have spiralled out of control. There has

:47:41.:47:43.

got to be a place on high streets throughout the city, whether they're

:47:44.:47:50.

in the city or the suburbs, not just for big national brands, but also

:47:51.:47:56.

the small independent businesses, family businesses, whether that's

:47:57.:48:00.

the halal butcher or the local hairdresser. Do you think this is

:48:01.:48:09.

another example where London and the overheating of the property market

:48:10.:48:16.

in London is skewing the national debate and there's a good case for

:48:17.:48:20.

devolution of this policy on a London wide level? You're right.

:48:21.:48:33.

This is very much a London issue. London is the only area where an

:48:34.:48:38.

average business rates have risen quite significantly. One effect of

:48:39.:48:43.

that is a significant increase in the redistribution of those business

:48:44.:48:47.

rates from London to the rest of the country. That reflects the fact that

:48:48.:48:51.

is in a sense what business rates are for. It's supposed to reflect

:48:52.:48:56.

the value of property rising much more here than elsewhere. That's a

:48:57.:49:01.

separate question from your one about high streets and butchers, and

:49:02.:49:05.

so on. If we think that there are sorts of businesses that we want to

:49:06.:49:12.

support, differentially from the rest, then we want to be very clear

:49:13.:49:15.

about why we want to do that and either do that from within the

:49:16.:49:20.

business rates system in a consistent way, or do it in some

:49:21.:49:24.

other way. If you think there is something valuable their unique to

:49:25.:49:28.

divide a policy to achieve what we actually want we want to achieve.

:49:29.:49:35.

The answer is not put a blanket reduction on business rates on all

:49:36.:49:39.

shops, for example. You indicated the merits of business rates as they

:49:40.:49:47.

previously operated which was that receipts can then be redistributed

:49:48.:49:51.

equitably to fund different services across the country. Even though it

:49:52.:49:58.

is characterised as a London issue, it's very much an issue for a local

:49:59.:50:01.

authority like mine which is a commuter suburb in London. So, if I

:50:02.:50:09.

were there leader of Westminster or the leader of Camden, I would be

:50:10.:50:14.

very much in favour of greater business rates in and because that

:50:15.:50:18.

gives me a huge pot of money to spend on local services. As a former

:50:19.:50:26.

deputy leader of Redbridge I'm less enthusiastic about the concentration

:50:27.:50:30.

of resources in zone one. Do you think this is an issue that the

:50:31.:50:35.

government ought to reconsider as part of a broader look at business

:50:36.:50:40.

rates? The business rates that will be retained are only the marginal

:50:41.:50:47.

increase as a revaluation of property. What it means is that a 1%

:50:48.:50:54.

increase in the business rate property in Westminster will be

:50:55.:50:57.

worth an enormous amount of money whereas a 1% increase in any other

:50:58.:51:00.

local authority would be very little. The value of growth to

:51:01.:51:06.

Westminster would be very big. Equally, the cost of contraction

:51:07.:51:10.

will also be very big whereas the value or cost of that happening in

:51:11.:51:15.

other local authorities would be very much smaller. It's important to

:51:16.:51:22.

be clear. The reason this has been happening from London to the rest of

:51:23.:51:29.

the country is the simple value increase in property throughout the

:51:30.:51:33.

country is not going to be retained. About discretionary support. Do you

:51:34.:51:40.

think this is sufficient and where'd you think it should be concentrated?

:51:41.:51:49.

Where is the need for relief? It is being concentrated in London, as you

:51:50.:51:53.

would expect, given that's where most of the increases are happening.

:51:54.:51:59.

I just don't think we have a few, similar to your previous question,

:52:00.:52:04.

about sufficiency. This is about... The key point as Carl is making,

:52:05.:52:11.

this is resulting in 40 plus percent increases in some people's business

:52:12.:52:15.

rates pretty much overnight. The main reason is we've left it seven

:52:16.:52:19.

years since revaluation and there's been a lot of relative change. I

:52:20.:52:25.

think there is a lot of problems with the tax that changes like that

:52:26.:52:28.

overnight. The best way of getting around that is doing the

:52:29.:52:33.

re-valuation much more frequently. The second best way is to provide

:52:34.:52:38.

some proper transitional relief of the extent that can help some of

:52:39.:52:41.

those businesses facing big overnight changes and it will help.

:52:42.:52:48.

So the relief is effectively concentrated to the areas where most

:52:49.:52:54.

needed? That's my understanding. It's going to be allocated across

:52:55.:52:58.

the country according to those areas that saw the biggest increases.

:52:59.:53:05.

Whether you want to pick some businesses that have a larger

:53:06.:53:09.

proportional increase, they will be able to target it. It will be a

:53:10.:53:14.

choice for them. It's not fashionable to stick up for greater

:53:15.:53:18.

spending or support for London but in this case it's needed. We need

:53:19.:53:23.

all the friends we can get to stick up for greater funding concentration

:53:24.:53:28.

in London. I have handbag to you. When you were talking about this

:53:29.:53:35.

cliff edge problem needing more frequent re-evaluation. As you know,

:53:36.:53:40.

these are quite difficult to manage, and minister to flee they are quite

:53:41.:53:45.

complex. Have you examined the possibility of using indexation

:53:46.:53:50.

followed by periodic adjustment where the indexation gets out of

:53:51.:53:56.

line. It would be a neat way through the problem is full revaluation was

:53:57.:54:03.

very expensive. You would just increase by the average and over

:54:04.:54:08.

every few years you would do a proper re-evaluation and then move

:54:09.:54:11.

forward with that. You could even compensate with people who felt have

:54:12.:54:19.

been harshly treated by an average in an area. But you've not examine

:54:20.:54:27.

that approach at all? Not the practicality but in theory we have

:54:28.:54:34.

said it may well be the way. Modern technology, big date is the

:54:35.:54:39.

fashionable phrase, the collection through modern technology required

:54:40.:54:43.

to do that indexation now makes that approach possible where is it didn't

:54:44.:54:48.

ten years ago. It would seem that it is much cheaper to do now than it

:54:49.:54:54.

used to be. I don't think it is completely implausible that you

:54:55.:54:58.

could do that. Measuring profits is not easy either but we managed to do

:54:59.:55:04.

it on a annual basis. We could do something broad brush every year and

:55:05.:55:07.

something more complex less frequently. Isn't it overall fairer.

:55:08.:55:14.

After all, people have been paying rates higher than they should for

:55:15.:55:18.

part of that seven-year period and another group have been collecting a

:55:19.:55:22.

windfall before they hit this cliff edge for which they are now going to

:55:23.:55:27.

get some relief. That is the harsh Inland Revenue, HMRC view of the

:55:28.:55:34.

matter. You can see that there is a shred of truth in it. Do not agree?

:55:35.:55:39.

I agree with that. Were trying to tax people on the rent they are

:55:40.:55:43.

paying. It would seem more natural to do that on the current year, just

:55:44.:55:47.

as with the council tax it seems pretty odd to tax you on what your

:55:48.:55:54.

house was worth the 1991 as opposed to what it is worth in 2017. That's

:55:55.:56:00.

a much bigger cliff edge problem but it's not one I'm going to

:56:01.:56:02.

cross-examine you on at the moment. He said that there were two problems

:56:03.:56:08.

with the house versus property question on the tax. Isn't there a

:56:09.:56:16.

third, which is the appeals system. The appeals system must be fast

:56:17.:56:25.

enough. Even if it's not quite as rigorous as the current system in

:56:26.:56:30.

ensuring that everybody gets the exactly the right answer from the

:56:31.:56:36.

appeals system. It must be fast enough to allow a frequent process

:56:37.:56:39.

of re-evaluation or indexation to be appropriate. Without it, the appeals

:56:40.:56:45.

for the previous year would be carrying on while you were enjoying

:56:46.:56:54.

or suffering a alteration to the rate. In cases where you get it

:56:55.:57:00.

wrong, you want a fair and swift appeals system to set that right.

:57:01.:57:05.

You know the government have announced reforms in this area, have

:57:06.:57:09.

you looked at those? I haven't looked at those. You have no view on

:57:10.:57:14.

whether that is going to take the trip? No.

:57:15.:57:27.

There are different amounts of money put aside by different authorities.

:57:28.:57:37.

Another reason for supposing my concern is justified. Yes. The

:57:38.:57:41.

impact on authority budgets according to what they end up with

:57:42.:57:46.

on the appeal and how well-prepared they would be very different and

:57:47.:57:48.

significant between different authorities. Bespoke a moment ago

:57:49.:57:56.

about this huge cliff edge in the system. All the way from 1991-2

:57:57.:58:07.

through two growth in this cliff edge. Having given serious thought

:58:08.:58:14.

about how to deal with that? Well, in terms of how you would transition

:58:15.:58:18.

towards where we are at the moment, not in detail, I think it would be

:58:19.:58:25.

fair to say... Well, have you at all? The book consequence of moving

:58:26.:58:31.

from where we are to something based on current values, we have looked at

:58:32.:58:37.

that any bit of detail the scale of change, the transitional

:58:38.:58:45.

arrangements you could Britain would be of the kind one normally does,

:58:46.:58:54.

which is to say that in X years' time, we'll get you from your junior

:58:55.:58:57.

and the amount you pay will go up accordingly. A second question, it

:58:58.:59:10.

is true there are furnaces in the present system -- on fair elements.

:59:11.:59:22.

The biggest of all is the absence of any appreciation of the consequences

:59:23.:59:36.

of House price movements in central London. Which means that people have

:59:37.:59:50.

moved into what would have been a much higher tax than the old rates

:59:51.:59:57.

but who are now capped out through council tax banding systems. You

:59:58.:00:06.

have a view on how to address that? There's a lot of money involved

:00:07.:00:11.

there, by the way. A very large proportion of what people consider

:00:12.:00:16.

to be uncollected taxes in that area. And we see the same sort of

:00:17.:00:20.

thing I'm stamp duty with a high fraction is collected from

:00:21.:00:23.

transactions in central London, reflecting exactly what you are

:00:24.:00:29.

saying. Some argue it is a rough and ready substitute. And one can

:00:30.:00:39.

understand. From practical point of view, it is easier to collect deputy

:00:40.:00:43.

but clearly more damaging in the sense that it creates... Have you

:00:44.:00:48.

done any work on what could or should be done to deal with that

:00:49.:00:53.

aspect of the unfairness in the absence of a re-evaluation? Because

:00:54.:01:06.

we haven't had a re-evaluation. I am just stressing that particular

:01:07.:01:09.

aspect. Without a re-evaluation, all that you presumably could do would

:01:10.:01:16.

be to... OK, rather than speculate, I'm asking if you have thought that

:01:17.:01:20.

through? Do you think it might be helpful if the IFS did some work on

:01:21.:01:27.

these things we are identifying that have not been thought through that

:01:28.:01:30.

are quite important? I think there may be some merit. I struggle with

:01:31.:01:37.

the idea of making changes without a re-evaluation. Lots of people have

:01:38.:01:46.

come forward with prudent proposals. And these things have ended their

:01:47.:01:53.

manifestos. -- ended up in manifestos. So, I am very surprised

:01:54.:02:03.

by the reply you have just given. It is clear the re-evaluation is a

:02:04.:02:14.

massive political undertaking. We need to see what re-evaluation is to

:02:15.:02:18.

find a political system and we can look at the poll tax to see what

:02:19.:02:24.

that does. I'm asking you to think through a more modest valuation. I

:02:25.:02:30.

am struggling to see how you could make changes without re-evaluation.

:02:31.:02:37.

You haven't addressed it or thought about it so why don't you come back

:02:38.:02:42.

to us when you have. Anglesey will see what we can think of but it is

:02:43.:02:45.

hard to think of doing something that doesn't address current values.

:02:46.:02:49.

Can we expect something from the IFS on this or not? I can't think of

:02:50.:02:54.

anything that doesn't address current values. You're asking me

:02:55.:03:00.

right on the spot. If you have done something that includes

:03:01.:03:05.

re-evaluation or did something and that was much easier, that would be

:03:06.:03:10.

extremely interesting also. Continuing with this local

:03:11.:03:16.

Government seen, where have most of the cuts to local Government fallen

:03:17.:03:25.

up to now. As you know, the cuts are essentially from Central Hall

:03:26.:03:32.

subsidies, central redistribution to local Government, over the years up

:03:33.:03:35.

until this year on last year. Most of those came as straight percentage

:03:36.:03:44.

cuts to the central Government. Because that grant is and certain

:03:45.:03:51.

types of Labour authorities are more dependent on a cramped and others.

:03:52.:03:55.

Some authorities have spent more and those are intended Metropolitan

:03:56.:03:59.

authorities, including in London and those with teamwork deprived

:04:00.:04:04.

population because they were more dependent on grants. So, Nagatomo,

:04:05.:04:11.

there have been those more grant dependent local authorities which

:04:12.:04:13.

tend to be poorer and some metropolitan areas. Going forward,

:04:14.:04:20.

the formula is being adjusted such that the impact on overall budgets

:04:21.:04:25.

will be similar across different local authorities. Thank you. Yes. I

:04:26.:04:32.

guess there are two dimensions one could look at. One is a geographical

:04:33.:04:39.

and the other is the dimension of which services. Have you looked at

:04:40.:04:44.

either of those? Have you done analysis? Could you shared with us?

:04:45.:04:51.

Thank you. I want to ask you questions in particular about the

:04:52.:05:04.

schools budget funding. In 2015, you said, current or day-to-day spending

:05:05.:05:07.

on schools in England has been relatively protected. Is that still

:05:08.:05:13.

the case? Relative to most other public services, yes. If you think

:05:14.:05:18.

that the current spending on schools up until 2015, spending per pupil

:05:19.:05:26.

actually grew a small amount, compared with 2010-15, largely

:05:27.:05:29.

because there was a significant increase in premiums on average

:05:30.:05:33.

across schools, there was an increase. If you look at the time

:05:34.:05:37.

period, 2015-20, school spending is being frozen in real terms, means a

:05:38.:05:47.

real terms cut of 7% per pupil. So, there is a change there and spending

:05:48.:05:50.

is falling for people going forward, where is did not fall under the last

:05:51.:05:56.

Government. If you look at the period of 2010-20, that is a

:05:57.:06:00.

significantly less generous settlement than many other public

:06:01.:06:12.

services received. -- more generous. I think it is 8%. Do you think these

:06:13.:06:18.

reductions in per-pupil funding can be achieved without any impact on

:06:19.:06:20.

outcomes for children? It is not as strong as you might

:06:21.:06:44.

expect to be. If you look at spending the system, it has really

:06:45.:06:58.

been hit substantially. Relating that outcomes, even at scale of

:06:59.:07:00.

change would be difficult, so I don't know the answer that question.

:07:01.:07:06.

OK. The Government has chosen spend some money on new selective Free

:07:07.:07:16.

Schools, I think nearly ?1 billion over the whole period. Had that been

:07:17.:07:21.

spread across the entire schools budget, what would the impact on the

:07:22.:07:25.

per-pupil reduction has been, do you know? I don't have that number to

:07:26.:07:30.

hand. Is it possible for you to work that out? I think that might be

:07:31.:07:36.

capital spending and the pupil numbers are just gave you were

:07:37.:07:42.

day-to-day spending. That's true. They are slightly different things

:07:43.:07:49.

but supposing it was being spent on capital, it was spent on... And

:07:50.:07:56.

maybe this was a question for the ABI and I didn't ask them this

:07:57.:08:06.

yesterday, but, have the forecast current budget, spend on schooling

:08:07.:08:10.

over the next five years, taking account of these additional places?

:08:11.:08:16.

How will that work? For example, I have got 50 schools in my

:08:17.:08:24.

constituency. Where there to be a new free school setup in my

:08:25.:08:29.

constituency, where with the current funding for that come from? Would it

:08:30.:08:36.

mean the cuts to the schools which are already facing cuts would be

:08:37.:08:43.

even greater? Me to come back to you on the funding of Free Schools. OK,

:08:44.:08:52.

the people funding is falling because the number of is increasing.

:08:53.:09:00.

Is there any evidence that Free Schools are being set up in places

:09:01.:09:03.

where the pressure on school places the greatest? We haven't looked

:09:04.:09:10.

specifically. The National Audit Office has led to an included there

:09:11.:09:14.

are certainly some evidence that they are being set up where that is

:09:15.:09:22.

not the case. OK, so you think this is more something for the National

:09:23.:09:25.

Audit Office than for you to look into? As I say, I think this is

:09:26.:09:29.

something that the National Audit Office has looked into. OK. I won't

:09:30.:09:40.

ask you any more about it but I will just ask you one more question but

:09:41.:09:44.

links school funding to distribution. As you know, in the

:09:45.:09:50.

way the Government is measuring distributional impact of all the

:09:51.:09:57.

changes they are making, they're not just looking at taxes and benefits,

:09:58.:10:01.

there are also looking at public services. Is there any dates are

:10:02.:10:08.

suggesting who would benefit from the preschool places? Whether that

:10:09.:10:12.

will be evenly across income distribution or skewed in some other

:10:13.:10:17.

way? I'm pretty sure the answer to that is that no, there isn't. Do you

:10:18.:10:23.

think it's because the numbers are so small that it wouldn't make any

:10:24.:10:26.

difference for the think they might be significant? I'm just trying to

:10:27.:10:35.

think... Finding data which tells you the incomes of the parents of

:10:36.:10:38.

children going to Free Schools and how that with others, it's not

:10:39.:10:43.

something I'm aware of, I'm afraid... OK, fine. The Chancellor

:10:44.:10:55.

did not, in the tables he published on distribution, did not split out

:10:56.:11:02.

his November measures from his March measures. I think you did split that

:11:03.:11:07.

out in what he published, would you just like to set out what the

:11:08.:11:15.

distributional impacts of the two events were separately? So, we split

:11:16.:11:21.

out, we certainly looked at last week's announcement and of course

:11:22.:11:26.

they were actually extremely small overall, broadly slightly regressive

:11:27.:11:31.

because of the extra dividend tax and national insurance payments paid

:11:32.:11:36.

people higher up the earnings distribution. If you look at

:11:37.:11:41.

everything that has been announced since 2015, so, in this Parliament,

:11:42.:11:46.

you get clearly big losses towards the possibility of distribution but

:11:47.:11:53.

there are substantial cuts to tax credits and benefits, at least a

:11:54.:11:57.

freeze to benefits, which gives you a distributional chart with big

:11:58.:12:00.

reductions at the bottom and much less going on towards the top. I

:12:01.:12:06.

cannot remember what was in the November statement to be honest!

:12:07.:12:20.

The 2015 announcements were more significant.

:12:21.:12:25.

You mean the freeze on benefits and the other one? The set of measures

:12:26.:12:34.

announced in July 2015 are the most significant measures affecting

:12:35.:12:37.

households. Everything else is small relative to that.

:12:38.:12:41.

Yes, now there is one line in the Budget which no-one seems to have

:12:42.:12:45.

taken into account. I'm interested in it.

:12:46.:12:51.

It's line 26. Tax credit debt enhanced collection. This is

:12:52.:12:56.

described as a previously announced welfare policy decision, however,

:12:57.:13:03.

over the final three years of the survey period, this raises over half

:13:04.:13:09.

a billion, ?500 million. I'm puzzled by this. I wondered if you knew what

:13:10.:13:15.

was going on here? I can't understand how it can be a

:13:16.:13:20.

previously announced decision but only now people are seeing that this

:13:21.:13:25.

is ?500 million taken from the tax credit system. Do you know what is

:13:26.:13:32.

going on? By previously announced it is between the autumn statement and

:13:33.:13:37.

the Budget. So not on Budget Day but before Budget Day but not announced

:13:38.:13:42.

before the Autumn Statement, which is why it is making it to this table

:13:43.:13:46.

and not the next table in the document.

:13:47.:13:50.

What is this change? We took evidence six months ago from

:13:51.:14:02.

Concentrix who did a big exercise in checking out fraud in the tax credit

:14:03.:14:07.

system, they seriously overdid this and a lot of people suffered as a

:14:08.:14:11.

consequence, so what is this line 26? What is going on here, do you

:14:12.:14:19.

know? I know the information in paragraph 352. Announced at the

:14:20.:14:26.

start of February it was announced, and it's... It's something that they

:14:27.:14:35.

are doing with their powers to use something called direct earnings

:14:36.:14:38.

attachments, I don't know that wording.

:14:39.:14:41.

It means if you decide somebody has been overpaid you can make a legal

:14:42.:14:46.

order to get it from their salary? So there is more use of those

:14:47.:14:48.

powers. Yep.

:14:49.:14:54.

Well, in looking at the distributional charts you made,

:14:55.:14:58.

where you looked at the freeze on benefits, did you take account of

:14:59.:15:03.

this as well? I would have thought that ?500 million was nonnegligible?

:15:04.:15:11.

We didn't. Per year it is a small amount relative to the measures to

:15:12.:15:18.

limit the freeze on welfare payments for benefits, the cuts to tack

:15:19.:15:23.

credits it is small to that. The data that we use would not allow us

:15:24.:15:27.

to include this measure if we wanted to. We don't have the evidence who

:15:28.:15:32.

receives more than they should have done, so don't know who to pay as a

:15:33.:15:39.

result. If we wanted to we couldn't. And on a sense of scale this is

:15:40.:15:46.

about 100 million a year, against ?12 billion a year, so you would not

:15:47.:15:50.

be able to see it on a chart. OK. Thank you.

:15:51.:15:56.

You looked at the impact of the next changes that the Chancellor

:15:57.:16:01.

announced, did you look at the changes to dividend taxation on the

:16:02.:16:05.

distribution charge is there impact on those? We don't have the date aa

:16:06.:16:11.

to look at that. It hits the people towards the top of the distribution.

:16:12.:16:12.

Yes. The O BR says that the top end of

:16:13.:16:33.

the distribution is the top end, the salary expression at the top end of

:16:34.:16:38.

the distribution, do you agree with that? We don't have separate

:16:39.:16:43.

estimates. I think that the O BR are saying that one they will lose the

:16:44.:16:50.

highest earners as the French bankers move back to Paris, for

:16:51.:16:53.

example and the other is that the level of pay in financial services,

:16:54.:16:58.

that they refer to, may do less well than it otherwise would have done.

:16:59.:17:02.

So we don't have anything looking forward. We looked back, and

:17:03.:17:07.

clearly, this is not Brexit related but it is clearly the case that the

:17:08.:17:13.

earnings distribution has compressed over the last five or six years and

:17:14.:17:22.

indeed the 90 percentile fall in relative earnings in the middle to

:17:23.:17:28.

the bottom going forward, the O BR are set out assumptions there but we

:17:29.:17:34.

have not done our own nor are in the position to do with regards to

:17:35.:17:41.

project ex-s over the distribution. Thank you very much for giving

:17:42.:17:45.

evidence. There have been a number of exchanges where we appreciate you

:17:46.:17:50.

would do some work for Parliament and we would be grateful if you gave

:17:51.:17:54.

serious thought to it and come back as to what you think could be

:17:55.:18:01.

accomplished. If not, suggest how it may be accomplished and in some

:18:02.:18:07.

detail. We would like to look at that you are after all, a public

:18:08.:18:14.

funded institution and Parliament needs resources of your type to

:18:15.:18:20.

enable it to perform its job properly. Thank you very much.

:18:21.:18:31.

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