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For ten years, Pakistan has said it's an ally of the West. | 0:00:04 | 0:00:09 | |
Yet in a prison cell in Afghanistan, | 0:00:13 | 0:00:16 | |
a captured suicide bomber alleges that this year, | 0:00:16 | 0:00:19 | |
a Pakistani intelligence officer trained him to kill Western troops. | 0:00:19 | 0:00:24 | |
TRANSLATION: The Pakistani man said that in Afghanistan, there are non-believers. | 0:00:24 | 0:00:31 | |
We are obliged to carry out jihad. | 0:00:31 | 0:00:33 | |
This series tells the hidden story of how, | 0:00:35 | 0:00:38 | |
after 9/1, Pakistan deceived America and the West. | 0:00:38 | 0:00:43 | |
You didn't have to be Sherlock Holmes to put the dots together. | 0:00:47 | 0:00:51 | |
I told the President, Pakistan was playing a double game | 0:00:51 | 0:00:54 | |
and double-dealing us. | 0:00:54 | 0:00:57 | |
We did know extraordinary things - | 0:00:57 | 0:01:01 | |
the Taliban sending out instructions saying that so-and-so | 0:01:01 | 0:01:04 | |
should report for a bomb-making course at a camp in Pakistan. | 0:01:04 | 0:01:09 | |
It's a story of how America struck back. | 0:01:09 | 0:01:12 | |
The Pakistanis wised up to what was going on a little too late. | 0:01:14 | 0:01:19 | |
TRANSLATION: What difference does it make if he's alive or dead? | 0:01:22 | 0:01:25 | |
20, 40, 100 people like Osama die every day. | 0:01:25 | 0:01:28 | |
Told by senior intelligence officials, diplomats | 0:01:30 | 0:01:34 | |
and the Taliban themselves, | 0:01:34 | 0:01:36 | |
it's also the story of how and why Pakistan continues to give secret support to the insurgents. | 0:01:36 | 0:01:42 | |
-TRANSLATION: -The tanks arrived. | 0:01:44 | 0:01:47 | |
The first passed, then the second, the third. I fired at it. | 0:01:47 | 0:01:52 | |
I frankly remember thinking, "We're dead." | 0:01:55 | 0:01:58 | |
Above all, it is the story of how Pakistan, a supposed ally, | 0:02:00 | 0:02:03 | |
stands accused of causing the deaths of thousands of coalition soldiers | 0:02:03 | 0:02:08 | |
in Afghanistan - deaths that continue to this day. | 0:02:08 | 0:02:12 | |
As long as they have fighters that are sheltered | 0:02:16 | 0:02:19 | |
away from what we can do, we are limited in how much we can get done. | 0:02:19 | 0:02:23 | |
It is the most secret of the many secrets in Pakistan. | 0:02:23 | 0:02:28 | |
The stakes here are huge. | 0:02:29 | 0:02:32 | |
Mystery still surrounds how Osama Bin Laden came to be | 0:02:56 | 0:02:59 | |
hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan. | 0:02:59 | 0:03:02 | |
The climax of the largest manhunt in history has brought few answers. | 0:03:06 | 0:03:11 | |
But one man has a remarkable story that he believes solves the mystery. | 0:03:11 | 0:03:15 | |
His name is Amrullah Saleh and he was head of Afghan intelligence. | 0:03:20 | 0:03:24 | |
It was a triumphant moment for all of us that Bin Laden was killed | 0:03:26 | 0:03:32 | |
and he was killed in Abbottabad. | 0:03:32 | 0:03:35 | |
It was confirmation of the fact that we believed for so many years. | 0:03:35 | 0:03:42 | |
In 2006, Saleh uncovered evidence that Bin Laden | 0:03:43 | 0:03:48 | |
was living in comfort in a Pakistani town. | 0:03:48 | 0:03:52 | |
In the mountains of northeast Afghanistan, | 0:03:57 | 0:04:00 | |
Afghan intelligence officers captured a Pakistani - Syed Akbar. | 0:04:00 | 0:04:05 | |
They believed he was smuggling weapons to the Taliban. | 0:04:06 | 0:04:10 | |
His interrogation produced an extraordinary claim. | 0:04:10 | 0:04:15 | |
The most revealing and shocking part of Syed Akbar's story is... | 0:04:15 | 0:04:22 | |
he confessed to us that he escorted Bin Laden from one location | 0:04:22 | 0:04:27 | |
to another, and the information we had was suggesting Manshera | 0:04:27 | 0:04:33 | |
as the town where Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda was hiding. | 0:04:33 | 0:04:38 | |
Manshera is in Pakistan, just 12 miles from Abbottabad. | 0:04:39 | 0:04:43 | |
Then came another revelation. | 0:04:44 | 0:04:47 | |
After doing a very thorough, professional investigation, | 0:04:47 | 0:04:51 | |
we found out that he was a serving officer of ISI. | 0:04:51 | 0:04:56 | |
It was an astonishing conclusion. | 0:04:56 | 0:05:00 | |
The ISI - Inter-Services Intelligence - | 0:05:00 | 0:05:03 | |
is the Pakistani intelligence service. | 0:05:03 | 0:05:06 | |
Publicly, Pakistan was one of America's closest allies in the hunt for Al-Qaeda. | 0:05:06 | 0:05:12 | |
Syed Akbar, the alleged Pakistani spy, | 0:05:14 | 0:05:18 | |
is in a high-security prison in Kabul. | 0:05:18 | 0:05:21 | |
He denies helping escort Bin Laden. | 0:05:21 | 0:05:23 | |
But Afghan intelligence believed their information was correct. Their spy chief travelled to Pakistan | 0:05:38 | 0:05:44 | |
with his president, Hamid Karzai. | 0:05:44 | 0:05:46 | |
President Karzai handed the information to Pakistan's leader, Pervez Musharraf. | 0:05:48 | 0:05:54 | |
He banged the table and looked at President Karzai and said, | 0:05:55 | 0:06:00 | |
"Am I president of banana republic? | 0:06:00 | 0:06:03 | |
"If not, then how can you tell me | 0:06:05 | 0:06:08 | |
"Bin Laden is hiding in a settled area of Pakistan?" | 0:06:08 | 0:06:12 | |
I said, "Well, this is the information, | 0:06:12 | 0:06:16 | |
"so you can go and check it." | 0:06:16 | 0:06:19 | |
Now, it happens after so many years, | 0:06:25 | 0:06:28 | |
that Bin Laden was about 12 miles from that location. | 0:06:28 | 0:06:32 | |
Why they should be so blind of the facts of the environment within their own country? | 0:06:32 | 0:06:38 | |
But in public, America and the West clung to their belief | 0:06:45 | 0:06:50 | |
that Pakistan was one of their closest allies. | 0:06:50 | 0:06:53 | |
PRESIDENT BUSH: In Afghanistan, America, our 25 NATO allies | 0:06:56 | 0:07:00 | |
and 15 partner nations are helping the Afghan people | 0:07:00 | 0:07:03 | |
defend their freedom and rebuild their country. | 0:07:03 | 0:07:07 | |
A nation that was once a safe haven for Al-Qaeda | 0:07:08 | 0:07:11 | |
is now a young democracy where people are looking to the future with new hope. | 0:07:11 | 0:07:17 | |
Yet as President Bush spoke, the truth on the ground was different. | 0:07:21 | 0:07:25 | |
British and other NATO troops were under ferocious attack. | 0:07:30 | 0:07:34 | |
After 9/11, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had been | 0:07:34 | 0:07:37 | |
overthrown for refusing to surrender Bin Laden. | 0:07:37 | 0:07:41 | |
Now, they were back, re-armed and re-organised. | 0:07:41 | 0:07:46 | |
The losses were steadily increasing, very, very serious. | 0:07:46 | 0:07:51 | |
For every soldier killed, four or five were very seriously injured. | 0:07:51 | 0:07:58 | |
Secretly, British spies were uncovering evidence that | 0:07:58 | 0:08:02 | |
Afghanistan's neighbour, Pakistan - and its intelligence service, | 0:08:02 | 0:08:05 | |
the ISI - were driving the Taliban resurgence. | 0:08:05 | 0:08:09 | |
The British ambassador to Afghanistan was receiving the top-secret intelligence. | 0:08:09 | 0:08:16 | |
We did know, I mean, extraordinary things like rotas for people | 0:08:16 | 0:08:20 | |
to go back on training courses to Pakistan. | 0:08:20 | 0:08:23 | |
The Taliban sending out instructions saying that so-and-so should | 0:08:23 | 0:08:28 | |
report for a bomb-making course. And then regular rumours - never substantiated - | 0:08:28 | 0:08:34 | |
that ISI officers were with the insurgents. | 0:08:34 | 0:08:38 | |
The Pakistanis deny all such allegation. | 0:08:40 | 0:08:42 | |
General Athar Abbas speaks for the Pakistani military, | 0:08:42 | 0:08:46 | |
including the ISI. | 0:08:46 | 0:08:48 | |
All the facts on the ground, the evidence, | 0:08:49 | 0:08:52 | |
they all speak contrary to this perception that the state | 0:08:52 | 0:08:56 | |
or the ISI is in support of these groups, is providing | 0:08:56 | 0:09:01 | |
the sanctuaries, providing the material support, et cetera. | 0:09:01 | 0:09:06 | |
Yet one Taliban commander tells a very different story. | 0:09:16 | 0:09:20 | |
He claims that in 2008, he was ordered to go to a camp in Pakistan. | 0:09:20 | 0:09:25 | |
TRANSLATION: It was a big valley by a green mountain | 0:09:28 | 0:09:34 | |
and there were no buildings, only tents. | 0:09:34 | 0:09:36 | |
Speaking for the first time, the commander who fights | 0:09:37 | 0:09:41 | |
under the name Najib alleges that his training was overseen | 0:09:41 | 0:09:45 | |
by officers from Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI. | 0:09:45 | 0:09:50 | |
He is still fighting Western forces and hid his face. | 0:09:50 | 0:09:55 | |
TRANSLATION: The military would arrive in cars at 8am and leave at 4pm. | 0:09:55 | 0:10:01 | |
They were wearing military uniforms, the uniforms of the ISI. | 0:10:05 | 0:10:09 | |
The Taliban commander claims that the Pakistanis | 0:10:17 | 0:10:21 | |
gave advanced training to thousands of fighters at the camp. | 0:10:21 | 0:10:24 | |
A Taliban cameraman took these exclusive pictures at another training camp in Pakistan. | 0:10:24 | 0:10:30 | |
TRANSLATION: The military commanders gave us | 0:10:33 | 0:10:37 | |
specialised weapons training, both theoretically and practically. | 0:10:37 | 0:10:43 | |
And we were shown how to fire at the enemy from different positions. | 0:10:47 | 0:10:51 | |
That summer, in 2008, | 0:10:53 | 0:10:56 | |
Taliban attacks in Afghanistan reached their highest level yet. | 0:10:56 | 0:11:01 | |
When he left the camp, Commander Najib said he used his new skills to attack an American convoy. | 0:11:09 | 0:11:15 | |
The tanks arrived. | 0:11:20 | 0:11:22 | |
We prepared the ambush. | 0:11:27 | 0:11:30 | |
The first passed, then the second, the third. I fired at it. | 0:11:40 | 0:11:46 | |
The tank caught fire and there was an explosion inside it. | 0:11:51 | 0:11:56 | |
All the people were killed, and we escaped. | 0:11:56 | 0:12:01 | |
In the 1990s, Pakistan had helped create the Taliban, | 0:12:09 | 0:12:13 | |
to prevent Afghanistan falling under the influence of India, Pakistan's enduring enemy. | 0:12:13 | 0:12:20 | |
Support for the Taliban still ran through the highest levels | 0:12:20 | 0:12:23 | |
of Pakistan's intelligence establishment. | 0:12:23 | 0:12:28 | |
Eventually it is they who are going to be on our borders. | 0:12:28 | 0:12:31 | |
We have to co-exist with them, we have to learn to live with them. | 0:12:31 | 0:12:34 | |
Can we afford to have a hostile Afghanistan on our back? | 0:12:34 | 0:12:39 | |
No, we cannot. | 0:12:39 | 0:12:41 | |
The collective wisdom of the nation says | 0:12:41 | 0:12:44 | |
we must continue to have good linkages with the Taliban. | 0:12:44 | 0:12:48 | |
It is in Pakistan's national interest, | 0:12:48 | 0:12:50 | |
and I think everybody knows that it is in Pakistan's national interest. | 0:12:50 | 0:12:56 | |
The Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, | 0:12:56 | 0:12:59 | |
monitored the Taliban resurgence with dismay. | 0:12:59 | 0:13:02 | |
He constantly warned his Western allies that Pakistan was to blame. | 0:13:02 | 0:13:07 | |
Like so many things with Karzai, he exaggerated, | 0:13:10 | 0:13:14 | |
he got it out of proportion, he was paranoid. | 0:13:14 | 0:13:17 | |
But he was right to be worried about Pakistan. | 0:13:20 | 0:13:23 | |
We were wrong to be quite as dismissive as we were about those concerns. | 0:13:23 | 0:13:29 | |
But by 2008, those concerns could no longer be dismissed. | 0:13:36 | 0:13:40 | |
Rising casualties meant that Pakistan's role came under ever-closer scrutiny. | 0:13:42 | 0:13:47 | |
Mary Beth Long was in charge of coordinating America's policy | 0:13:55 | 0:13:59 | |
with that of its NATO allies. | 0:13:59 | 0:14:01 | |
It was clear, | 0:14:03 | 0:14:05 | |
particularly to the soldiers | 0:14:05 | 0:14:06 | |
and to the leaders of the guys on the ground, in the field, | 0:14:06 | 0:14:11 | |
that Pakistani lack of critical involvement | 0:14:11 | 0:14:15 | |
was resulting in deaths of Afghan police in larger numbers than probably anything, | 0:14:15 | 0:14:23 | |
Afghan national army, but Canadians, Dutch, Brits and US, | 0:14:23 | 0:14:29 | |
and the maiming, in particular, of even more. | 0:14:29 | 0:14:34 | |
Yet, for the moment, neither America, nor its allies, | 0:14:35 | 0:14:38 | |
wanted to confront the possibility that Pakistan was double-crossing them. | 0:14:38 | 0:14:43 | |
Somehow, because the Pakistani dimension was too difficult, | 0:14:44 | 0:14:49 | |
too enormous, we just sort of shut it out, | 0:14:49 | 0:14:51 | |
and pretended that by pushing the insurgents around Helmand, | 0:14:51 | 0:14:56 | |
or out of bits of Helmand, that was somehow solving the problem. | 0:14:56 | 0:15:00 | |
But Pakistan's double game was about to become impossible to ignore. | 0:15:01 | 0:15:05 | |
Ahmed Jawad was a shopkeeper who worked opposite the Indian embassy | 0:15:07 | 0:15:12 | |
in the Afghan capital of Kabul. | 0:15:12 | 0:15:14 | |
EXPLOSION | 0:16:03 | 0:16:07 | |
SIRENS BLARE | 0:16:23 | 0:16:25 | |
I remember being in my embassy, hearing the explosion, | 0:16:29 | 0:16:33 | |
feeling the shockwaves, | 0:16:33 | 0:16:35 | |
then seeing the vast pall of black smoke rising over central Kabul. | 0:16:35 | 0:16:41 | |
It was a sophisticated attack, sophisticated because | 0:16:41 | 0:16:46 | |
they had chosen the right time to cause maximum casualties. | 0:16:46 | 0:16:52 | |
A suicide bomber had killed 58 people. | 0:16:56 | 0:16:59 | |
Multiple sources of information, human sources, | 0:17:01 | 0:17:05 | |
technical sources, circumstantial evidence, | 0:17:05 | 0:17:08 | |
all combined making us believe it was the work of Haqqani Network. | 0:17:08 | 0:17:15 | |
Jalaluddin Haqqani was the leader of the most lethal Taliban faction. | 0:17:18 | 0:17:22 | |
The Haqqani group had brought | 0:17:22 | 0:17:25 | |
the tactic of suicide bombs to Afghanistan. | 0:17:25 | 0:17:29 | |
This was one of their attacks on a military base. | 0:17:29 | 0:17:32 | |
In the 1980s, the ISI had funnelled American arms to Haqqani | 0:17:41 | 0:17:46 | |
to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. | 0:17:46 | 0:17:49 | |
General Hamid Gul had directed that operation. | 0:17:49 | 0:17:53 | |
Haqqani's a wonderful man. He's a very, very... He is not ambitious. | 0:17:54 | 0:17:58 | |
He doesn't want to rule, he doesn't want to control things. | 0:17:58 | 0:18:02 | |
Those people who came in contact with him, | 0:18:02 | 0:18:05 | |
they have great, high regard for him, for his character qualities, | 0:18:05 | 0:18:09 | |
for his truthfulness, | 0:18:09 | 0:18:12 | |
for his steadfastness, I would say. | 0:18:12 | 0:18:17 | |
It seemed Haqqani's close relationship with the ISI had continued. | 0:18:18 | 0:18:23 | |
Just before the attack on the Indian embassy, | 0:18:23 | 0:18:26 | |
American intelligence agencies intercepted calls between | 0:18:26 | 0:18:29 | |
senior ISI officials and Haqqani fighters planning a major operation. | 0:18:29 | 0:18:34 | |
Mike Waltz saw the intelligence. | 0:18:34 | 0:18:38 | |
Through information and a series of events, | 0:18:38 | 0:18:42 | |
it became pretty clear that the Pakistanis | 0:18:42 | 0:18:46 | |
were behind the Haqqani Network, which was behind the bombing. | 0:18:46 | 0:18:49 | |
A question was being answered of how high in the Pakistani state this went. | 0:18:49 | 0:18:55 | |
And the answer was pretty high. That, to many of us, was something that crossed the line. | 0:18:55 | 0:19:03 | |
What we're talking about is a small cell in the ISI, | 0:19:04 | 0:19:10 | |
never knowingly exposed to Western eyes, | 0:19:10 | 0:19:13 | |
who are in touch with the Taliban, with the Haqqani Network. | 0:19:13 | 0:19:18 | |
It is the most secret of the many secrets in Pakistan. | 0:19:18 | 0:19:22 | |
The bombing of the Indian embassy was a turning point. | 0:19:28 | 0:19:33 | |
From that moment, the NATO allies, above all America, | 0:19:33 | 0:19:36 | |
no longer trusted Pakistan to fight alongside them against the Taliban. | 0:19:36 | 0:19:42 | |
I think finally people had started to run out of steam, frankly. | 0:19:42 | 0:19:46 | |
It became clear that whatever it was we thought we could do, we weren't getting there. | 0:19:46 | 0:19:51 | |
The frustration of our inability to be effective otherwise | 0:19:51 | 0:19:55 | |
turned the administration and the leadership to say, | 0:19:55 | 0:19:57 | |
OK, what other tools do we have in our toolbox? | 0:19:57 | 0:19:59 | |
For the first time, | 0:20:05 | 0:20:07 | |
US special forces were authorised to mount secret raids into Pakistan, | 0:20:07 | 0:20:11 | |
still publicly a valued ally, to hunt down the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. | 0:20:11 | 0:20:16 | |
The first target was near the Pakistani town of Angoor Adda. | 0:20:18 | 0:20:23 | |
I heard it in the morning, on the radio or television or whatever. | 0:20:25 | 0:20:30 | |
There was news that the American forces have crossed the border, | 0:20:30 | 0:20:35 | |
they have gone to a hamlet kind of a place | 0:20:35 | 0:20:39 | |
and they've killed some women and children. | 0:20:39 | 0:20:42 | |
US officials claim the dead were Al-Qaeda fighters. | 0:20:49 | 0:20:52 | |
There was outrage in Pakistan, which continued to deny | 0:20:54 | 0:20:57 | |
any involvement in the bombing of the Indian embassy. | 0:20:57 | 0:21:01 | |
Hypothetically, let's say even that the intelligence had contacts | 0:21:06 | 0:21:11 | |
with the Haqqanis, it does not translate to the ISI helping | 0:21:11 | 0:21:17 | |
the Haqqani group to do the bombing. Those are two different things. | 0:21:17 | 0:21:21 | |
I was very perturbed, because I thought that the Americans have kind of crossed the red line. | 0:21:21 | 0:21:28 | |
The Pakistanis turned off the supply lines | 0:21:28 | 0:21:32 | |
for NATO forces in Afghanistan. | 0:21:32 | 0:21:35 | |
In January 2009, 85% of everything | 0:21:35 | 0:21:38 | |
every NATO soldier ate, drank and shot arrived via Pakistan. | 0:21:38 | 0:21:44 | |
When the Pakistanis turned off the supply lines, | 0:21:44 | 0:21:47 | |
we went onto half rations, just about immediately. | 0:21:47 | 0:21:51 | |
In response, the Americans let it be known there would be no more raids. | 0:21:53 | 0:21:58 | |
The first attempt to fight back against what America | 0:21:58 | 0:22:01 | |
now saw as Pakistan's double game had failed. | 0:22:01 | 0:22:05 | |
A new president would take up the challenge. | 0:22:06 | 0:22:10 | |
PRESIDENT OBAMA: We know the challenges that tomorrow will bring | 0:22:15 | 0:22:20 | |
are the greatest of our lifetime. | 0:22:20 | 0:22:22 | |
President Barack Obama's key advisor on Afghanistan | 0:22:22 | 0:22:26 | |
was a 30-year veteran of the CIA. | 0:22:26 | 0:22:28 | |
The United States and its NATO allies faced catastrophic | 0:22:28 | 0:22:32 | |
defeat in Afghanistan, a war that was being lost, | 0:22:32 | 0:22:37 | |
and being lost at a very rapid pace. | 0:22:37 | 0:22:40 | |
Trying to turn that situation round was an urgent calling. | 0:22:40 | 0:22:44 | |
Now, an atrocity unfolded that proved to the new president | 0:22:45 | 0:22:50 | |
that Pakistan and its institutions were out of control. | 0:22:50 | 0:22:54 | |
I began telling the president-elect that everything pointed back to Pakistan. | 0:22:54 | 0:22:59 | |
It was a defining moment. | 0:22:59 | 0:23:01 | |
GUNFIRE | 0:23:03 | 0:23:06 | |
Ten gunmen rampaged through the Indian city of Mumbai, | 0:23:07 | 0:23:12 | |
killing 170 people. | 0:23:12 | 0:23:14 | |
The gunmen were from a Pakistani militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba. | 0:23:16 | 0:23:21 | |
This had the signature of Lashkar-e-Taiba all over it, | 0:23:21 | 0:23:24 | |
from the very moment the attacks began, | 0:23:24 | 0:23:27 | |
and once you linked it back to Lashkar-e-Taiba, | 0:23:27 | 0:23:31 | |
you linked it back to the Pakistani intelligence service. | 0:23:31 | 0:23:35 | |
Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, had founded Lashkar-e-Taiba to fight its arch-enemy, India. | 0:23:35 | 0:23:41 | |
But Pakistan claimed it had nothing to do with the Mumbai attack. | 0:23:41 | 0:23:46 | |
I said obviously even we understand | 0:23:46 | 0:23:49 | |
that there were links back with Pakistan, | 0:23:49 | 0:23:53 | |
there's no two things about it. | 0:23:53 | 0:23:54 | |
But then linking it with the government, the ISI? | 0:23:54 | 0:23:57 | |
That is where we disagree, and we say no, there were no links. | 0:23:57 | 0:24:01 | |
The CIA later received intelligence that is said showed the ISI | 0:24:04 | 0:24:10 | |
were directly involved in training the Mumbai gunmen. | 0:24:10 | 0:24:14 | |
President Obama had already decided to act. | 0:24:18 | 0:24:21 | |
The phone rang and a familiar voice came on and said, | 0:24:21 | 0:24:24 | |
"Hi, Bruce, it's Barack. I have an offer for you." | 0:24:24 | 0:24:28 | |
Riedel was asked to investigate the secret Pakistan, | 0:24:30 | 0:24:33 | |
hidden from the West. | 0:24:33 | 0:24:36 | |
He reviewed every scrap of intelligence America had | 0:24:39 | 0:24:43 | |
about Pakistan's involvement with terrorist groups and, above all, the Taliban. | 0:24:43 | 0:24:47 | |
Our own intelligence was unequivocal. | 0:24:53 | 0:24:57 | |
In Afghanistan, we saw an insurgency that was not only getting | 0:24:57 | 0:25:02 | |
passive support from the Pakistani army | 0:25:02 | 0:25:05 | |
and the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, but getting active support. | 0:25:05 | 0:25:10 | |
Pakistan was raising money, it was training the Taliban, | 0:25:10 | 0:25:13 | |
even sending in experts with the Taliban for attacks on NATO forces. | 0:25:13 | 0:25:20 | |
In Riedel's opinion, the powerful ISI was the key player. | 0:25:20 | 0:25:25 | |
It operates from this headquarters in Islamabad. | 0:25:26 | 0:25:30 | |
The ISI is part of the military. Its agents are mostly soldiers | 0:25:30 | 0:25:34 | |
and it's always commanded by a senior general. | 0:25:34 | 0:25:37 | |
The ISI is a professional intelligence agency. | 0:25:39 | 0:25:42 | |
People don't go blowing up other countries' embassies | 0:25:42 | 0:25:44 | |
or giving guns and money to terrorists | 0:25:44 | 0:25:49 | |
without the authority of the head of the Pakistani army - chief of army staff. | 0:25:49 | 0:25:53 | |
The notion that the ISI is some kind of rogue organisation is a myth. | 0:25:53 | 0:26:00 | |
In March 2009, on board Air Force One, | 0:26:02 | 0:26:05 | |
Bruce Riedel presented his findings to President Obama. | 0:26:05 | 0:26:10 | |
I spoke pretty much nonstop for about 45 minutes | 0:26:10 | 0:26:14 | |
and then we spent an hour, hour-and-a-half, talking about it. | 0:26:14 | 0:26:18 | |
I told the President that Pakistan was double-dealing us | 0:26:20 | 0:26:24 | |
and that the Pakistanis had been double-dealing the United States and its allies | 0:26:24 | 0:26:28 | |
for years and years, and they were probably going to continue to do so. | 0:26:28 | 0:26:32 | |
Even as Bruce Riedel was briefing President Obama, | 0:26:34 | 0:26:37 | |
one American was gaining a remarkable insight | 0:26:37 | 0:26:40 | |
into the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban. | 0:26:40 | 0:26:44 | |
David Rohde was a senior correspondent for the New York Times. | 0:26:49 | 0:26:53 | |
He had arranged an interview with a Taliban commander, | 0:26:56 | 0:26:59 | |
south of the Afghan capital, Kabul. | 0:26:59 | 0:27:02 | |
We rounded a corner | 0:27:04 | 0:27:05 | |
and there was a car blocking the road in front of us. | 0:27:05 | 0:27:08 | |
We stopped, two gunmen rounded our vehicle, | 0:27:08 | 0:27:10 | |
they've each got a Kalashnikov, they're shouting commands. | 0:27:10 | 0:27:13 | |
And then these two Taliban gunmen jump in the front seat | 0:27:13 | 0:27:17 | |
and they start speeding down the road. | 0:27:17 | 0:27:20 | |
For days, the kidnappers drove across Afghanistan, | 0:27:20 | 0:27:23 | |
evading the US and Afghan forces hunting them. | 0:27:23 | 0:27:26 | |
We were moved into this new car and it struck me | 0:27:29 | 0:27:32 | |
immediately that we started driving down the left-hand side of the road. | 0:27:32 | 0:27:37 | |
David Rohde was in Pakistan, in the border province of North Waziristan. | 0:27:42 | 0:27:48 | |
What shocked and deeply depressed me | 0:27:48 | 0:27:50 | |
was that all along the main highway, every single Pakistani check post | 0:27:50 | 0:27:54 | |
that should have been manned by some sort of Pakistani security force | 0:27:54 | 0:27:59 | |
had been completely abandoned and, instead of Pakistani soldiers, | 0:27:59 | 0:28:02 | |
or militia standing there, it was a young Taliban with a Kalashnikov. | 0:28:02 | 0:28:07 | |
There were Taliban road crews repairing the local roads, | 0:28:07 | 0:28:11 | |
there were Taliban police cruising around, | 0:28:11 | 0:28:14 | |
and I frankly remember thinking, you know, we're dead. | 0:28:14 | 0:28:18 | |
Rohde had been abducted by the Haqqani Network, | 0:28:18 | 0:28:22 | |
the Taliban faction headed by Jalaluddin Haqqani, | 0:28:22 | 0:28:26 | |
the man believed to be behind the bombing of the Indian embassy. | 0:28:26 | 0:28:30 | |
For seven months, Rohde was moved between different safe houses. | 0:28:33 | 0:28:38 | |
Once, he was being driven by Haqqani's son when they encountered a Pakistani army convoy. | 0:28:38 | 0:28:44 | |
Badruddin Haqqani stepped out of the vehicle and he actually waved at the Pakistani soldiers. | 0:28:44 | 0:28:49 | |
He got back into the car and explained | 0:28:49 | 0:28:51 | |
there was a truce between the Taliban and the Pakistani army | 0:28:51 | 0:28:55 | |
and that Taliban vehicles had to pull over and only the driver had to get out, and that was it. | 0:28:55 | 0:29:00 | |
Rohde was eventually imprisoned in the Pakistani town of Miranshah. | 0:29:00 | 0:29:05 | |
When we were held in Miranshah, my guards actually took | 0:29:05 | 0:29:08 | |
bomb-making classes from Uzbek militants that were in this town. | 0:29:08 | 0:29:13 | |
These enormous explosions would go off in the middle of town, | 0:29:13 | 0:29:17 | |
as part of these classes, and there was a local Pakistani | 0:29:17 | 0:29:19 | |
military base and the Pakistanis never came off the base | 0:29:19 | 0:29:24 | |
to investigate what was happening in the town. | 0:29:24 | 0:29:27 | |
He and his translator devised a plan to escape. | 0:29:29 | 0:29:32 | |
One night, their guards fell asleep, and they saw their chance. | 0:29:35 | 0:29:40 | |
I remember whispering to my Afghan colleague and he said, | 0:29:40 | 0:29:43 | |
"Go get the rope." | 0:29:43 | 0:29:45 | |
Together, they climbed over the wall and crept through the sleeping town. | 0:29:51 | 0:29:56 | |
They reached the Pakistani army base in the centre of Miranshah. | 0:29:57 | 0:30:02 | |
The captain in charge quickly had them flown to safety. | 0:30:02 | 0:30:06 | |
Later, Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, arrived to investigate. | 0:30:09 | 0:30:12 | |
Rohde learned the agents did not arrest his Taliban kidnappers from the Haqqani Network. | 0:30:12 | 0:30:19 | |
Instead, they tried to discover how he had escaped. | 0:30:19 | 0:30:22 | |
The Haqqanis took the guards who were asleep that night | 0:30:24 | 0:30:28 | |
when we escaped and handed them to over to the ISI, | 0:30:28 | 0:30:30 | |
to Pakistani military intelligence. | 0:30:30 | 0:30:32 | |
And the ISI then tortured our guards very badly, | 0:30:32 | 0:30:36 | |
and the question the ISI asked him wasn't why did you kidnap | 0:30:36 | 0:30:40 | |
this unarmed American journalist after inviting him to an interview? | 0:30:40 | 0:30:44 | |
Instead, the question the ISI kept asking the guard was, | 0:30:44 | 0:30:47 | |
"Did your family get paid a ransom and you cheated the Haqqanis out of the money?" | 0:30:47 | 0:30:52 | |
US diplomats added David Rohde's experiences to the charge sheet against Pakistan. | 0:30:54 | 0:30:59 | |
We would raise these issues in Pakistan | 0:30:59 | 0:31:02 | |
in very subtle ways and say, | 0:31:02 | 0:31:04 | |
well, you know, how could it be possible that the Haqqanis | 0:31:04 | 0:31:07 | |
are in Miranshah | 0:31:07 | 0:31:09 | |
and there is a military compound just down the road? | 0:31:09 | 0:31:12 | |
And let the Pakistanis basically, you know, stew in this. | 0:31:12 | 0:31:16 | |
Pakistan insisted it WAS battling extremism. | 0:31:21 | 0:31:25 | |
By now, its cities were under attack from Pakistani militant groups who wanted to overthrow the government. | 0:31:25 | 0:31:32 | |
They accused it of going too far to appease the Americans. | 0:31:35 | 0:31:40 | |
In 2009, they launched 60 suicide attacks, killing over 2,000 civilians. | 0:31:40 | 0:31:46 | |
One militant, now in jail in Karachi, | 0:31:51 | 0:31:54 | |
reveals the savagery of the struggle. | 0:31:54 | 0:31:58 | |
He recruited children to be suicide bombers. | 0:31:59 | 0:32:02 | |
TRANSLATION: Young boys are easier to prepare than older men. | 0:32:04 | 0:32:08 | |
We are good friends to them, teach them and then brainwash them. | 0:32:08 | 0:32:13 | |
We also use them to raise funding. | 0:32:13 | 0:32:16 | |
I have sent five boys to the jihad. Three of them were killed. | 0:32:19 | 0:32:24 | |
In spring 2009, the militants, who called themselves the Pakistani Taliban, | 0:32:27 | 0:32:33 | |
had advanced to within 60 miles of the capital, Islamabad. | 0:32:33 | 0:32:38 | |
The Pakistani army launched a ferocious counter-offensive. | 0:32:38 | 0:32:42 | |
We have around 5,000 officers and soldiers who have given their lives. | 0:32:55 | 0:33:01 | |
We have over 9,000 people | 0:33:01 | 0:33:04 | |
who are with serious injuries. Many of them have lost their limbs. | 0:33:04 | 0:33:08 | |
But, to American frustration, the Pakistani military | 0:33:10 | 0:33:14 | |
had not confronted the Afghan Taliban fighters, | 0:33:14 | 0:33:17 | |
who continued to attack the Americans in Afghanistan. | 0:33:17 | 0:33:21 | |
My response was, "Listen, people, | 0:33:26 | 0:33:29 | |
"there's so many people we can take on, | 0:33:29 | 0:33:33 | |
"and we can't take on the whole world. | 0:33:33 | 0:33:35 | |
"Why should Pakistan go after an Afghan Taliban group which is | 0:33:35 | 0:33:41 | |
"not doing anything against Pakistan, just because the US says?" | 0:33:41 | 0:33:44 | |
It doesn't work that way. | 0:33:44 | 0:33:47 | |
By the end of 2009, America feared it might be defeated in Afghanistan. | 0:33:51 | 0:33:56 | |
PRESIDENT OBAMA: I have determined that it is in our vital national interest | 0:33:56 | 0:34:01 | |
to send an additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan. | 0:34:01 | 0:34:05 | |
The US administration hoped its determination would persuade | 0:34:05 | 0:34:10 | |
Pakistan to stop giving sanctuary and aid to the Afghan Taliban. | 0:34:10 | 0:34:14 | |
PRESIDENT OBAMA: After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. | 0:34:19 | 0:34:24 | |
Yet President Obama's deadline meant the Taliban believed victory was in reach. | 0:34:24 | 0:34:31 | |
One Taliban commander, Najib, | 0:34:33 | 0:34:35 | |
alleges that after Obama's announcement, the support he received actually increased. | 0:34:35 | 0:34:41 | |
TRANSLATION: Because Obama put more troops into Afghanistan | 0:34:45 | 0:34:50 | |
and increased the operations here, so Pakistan support for us increased as well. | 0:34:50 | 0:34:56 | |
It increased a great deal. | 0:34:59 | 0:35:01 | |
He described the contents of a single supply truck | 0:35:05 | 0:35:08 | |
he claims the Pakistanis delivered to his group. | 0:35:08 | 0:35:11 | |
500 land mines with remote controls, | 0:35:14 | 0:35:17 | |
20 rocket-propelled grenade launchers... | 0:35:17 | 0:35:22 | |
with 2,000 to 3,000 grenades. | 0:35:22 | 0:35:26 | |
They brought AK-47s, machine guns and rockets. | 0:35:28 | 0:35:32 | |
To this day, the supplies have had a dramatic effect | 0:35:36 | 0:35:40 | |
on his unit's fighting strength. | 0:35:40 | 0:35:42 | |
Eight years ago, we were a group of 30 people, without even ten AK-47s. | 0:35:44 | 0:35:50 | |
Today, we are still 30 people, but we have 30 AK-47s, | 0:35:50 | 0:35:55 | |
ten rocket-propelled grenade launchers and ten machine guns. | 0:35:55 | 0:35:59 | |
I believe in the last eight years, we have grown by about 80%. | 0:36:04 | 0:36:10 | |
NATO began to use its extra forces in a vast campaign | 0:36:13 | 0:36:17 | |
to kill or capture Taliban commanders inside Afghanistan. | 0:36:17 | 0:36:22 | |
Mike Waltz had left the White House to deploy with | 0:36:22 | 0:36:25 | |
US Special Forces on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. | 0:36:25 | 0:36:30 | |
He claims the Pakistani military actively aided the Taliban. | 0:36:30 | 0:36:35 | |
When we were operating near a Pakistani military post, | 0:36:35 | 0:36:38 | |
they would often flash signal lights and we could see them | 0:36:38 | 0:36:41 | |
from ridge line to ridge line, then a series of signals and then, | 0:36:41 | 0:36:46 | |
mysteriously, the folks we thought we were going to interact with | 0:36:46 | 0:36:50 | |
were gone. | 0:36:50 | 0:36:52 | |
The Pakistani military was clearly signalling with folks | 0:36:52 | 0:36:55 | |
up in the mountains, which we knew were insurgents. | 0:36:55 | 0:37:00 | |
Yes, yes! | 0:37:02 | 0:37:04 | |
America wanted to take the fight into the Taliban sanctuaries. | 0:37:06 | 0:37:10 | |
During his investigation of Pakistan's double game, | 0:37:14 | 0:37:18 | |
Bruce Riedel had been told by the president to consider every option. | 0:37:18 | 0:37:24 | |
We could invade Pakistan, we could go to war, | 0:37:24 | 0:37:26 | |
we could compel it to change its behaviour. | 0:37:26 | 0:37:29 | |
It sounds ridiculous, | 0:37:29 | 0:37:30 | |
but we'd already invaded two Muslim countries in the last eight years - we could invade another one. | 0:37:30 | 0:37:35 | |
Except that this country has the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world. | 0:37:35 | 0:37:41 | |
Instead, Obama turned to one of America's most secret weapons... | 0:37:45 | 0:37:49 | |
..bombing Pakistan with unmanned drones. | 0:37:54 | 0:37:57 | |
While held captive, the journalist David Rohde experienced the new tactic. | 0:37:58 | 0:38:03 | |
One of the most dangerous days was when there was a drone strike, | 0:38:03 | 0:38:07 | |
just roughly 50 to 100 yards from our house. | 0:38:07 | 0:38:09 | |
It was enormous, it shook the walls of the house we were in. | 0:38:09 | 0:38:14 | |
The drone strike had killed seven militants, | 0:38:14 | 0:38:18 | |
and the guards were furious. I later found out they were saying, | 0:38:18 | 0:38:22 | |
"Let's take him down to the site of the drone attack and behead him and video-tape it in revenge." | 0:38:22 | 0:38:28 | |
In President Obama's first year in office, | 0:38:34 | 0:38:37 | |
there were an estimated 53 drone strikes inside Pakistan, more than the previous five years combined. | 0:38:37 | 0:38:44 | |
At the beginning of the drone operations, | 0:38:46 | 0:38:48 | |
we gave Pakistan advanced tip-off of where we were going | 0:38:48 | 0:38:53 | |
and every single time, the target wasn't there any more. | 0:38:53 | 0:38:56 | |
You didn't have to be Sherlock Holmes to put the dots together. | 0:38:56 | 0:39:01 | |
The problem with the drone attacks is the overwhelming | 0:39:02 | 0:39:06 | |
population of Pakistan thinks they are terrible. | 0:39:06 | 0:39:10 | |
So, just because of that, I think the cost is too heavy, | 0:39:10 | 0:39:13 | |
even if they are accurate. | 0:39:13 | 0:39:14 | |
EXPLOSION | 0:39:16 | 0:39:20 | |
CHANTING: USA out! | 0:39:20 | 0:39:22 | |
Anti-American demonstrators took to the street. | 0:39:24 | 0:39:29 | |
At the start of 2011, they found a new cause. | 0:39:29 | 0:39:33 | |
In mysterious circumstances, an American, Raymond Davis, | 0:39:33 | 0:39:37 | |
killed two men in the Pakistani city of Lahore. | 0:39:37 | 0:39:40 | |
The incident would give a glimpse of a secret war | 0:39:42 | 0:39:45 | |
being fought inside Pakistan by the CIA. | 0:39:45 | 0:39:48 | |
The men were killed during rush hour, on this main road. | 0:39:50 | 0:39:53 | |
The two men died. Davis was arrested. | 0:40:47 | 0:40:50 | |
Off the record, US officials admitted Davis worked for the CIA. | 0:40:53 | 0:40:57 | |
Similarly, Pakistani officials have hinted the men he killed were ISI agents, tracking his movements. | 0:40:59 | 0:41:07 | |
Once, the two spy agencies would've quietly settled this between each other. | 0:41:07 | 0:41:12 | |
Not any more. | 0:41:12 | 0:41:15 | |
I think he should've been put to trial. | 0:41:15 | 0:41:18 | |
But, unfortunately, in the United States, | 0:41:18 | 0:41:21 | |
even the President of the United States went on the TV | 0:41:21 | 0:41:24 | |
and told lies when he said that he had diplomatic immunity. He was not a diplomat! | 0:41:24 | 0:41:29 | |
And I understood that what they wanted to do was make the Raymond Davis issue | 0:41:32 | 0:41:36 | |
so painful for us that we would not want to do that any more. | 0:41:36 | 0:41:41 | |
This is an effort by the ISI to roll back the CIA presence in Pakistan. | 0:41:41 | 0:41:48 | |
Eventually, the Pakistanis released Raymond Davis. | 0:41:52 | 0:41:56 | |
But the incident hinted at a more significant story. | 0:41:56 | 0:42:00 | |
The CIA had secretly flooded Pakistan with hundreds of undercover agents. | 0:42:02 | 0:42:07 | |
America wanted to bypass the ISI in its war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. | 0:42:10 | 0:42:16 | |
The Pakistanis wised up to what was going on a little too late. | 0:42:18 | 0:42:22 | |
While the Raymond Davis controversy raged, | 0:42:22 | 0:42:26 | |
CIA agents were secretly carrying out a major surveillance operation. | 0:42:26 | 0:42:30 | |
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Tonight, I can report to the American people - | 0:42:32 | 0:42:35 | |
and to the world - that the United States has conducted | 0:42:35 | 0:42:39 | |
an operation that killed Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda. | 0:42:39 | 0:42:44 | |
We had located Bin Laden hiding within a compound, | 0:42:44 | 0:42:47 | |
deep inside Pakistan. | 0:42:47 | 0:42:49 | |
The news that every step of the operation had been kept secret | 0:42:54 | 0:42:57 | |
from Pakistan revealed to the world that America had lost all trust in its supposed ally. | 0:42:57 | 0:43:05 | |
To realise that Mr Osama Bin Laden is in my home town, | 0:43:07 | 0:43:12 | |
where I grew up, born, bred, studied, er... I mean, we should have known. We didn't. | 0:43:12 | 0:43:18 | |
It is definitely an intelligence failure, | 0:43:18 | 0:43:22 | |
but whoever selected that place was very smart. | 0:43:22 | 0:43:28 | |
They were living literally under our nose. | 0:43:28 | 0:43:31 | |
The relationship between America and Pakistan now verges on outright hostility. | 0:43:34 | 0:43:40 | |
There is no smoking gun at this point. But, in many ways, this question is now a dark cloud | 0:43:42 | 0:43:49 | |
that hangs over the US-Pakistani relationship. | 0:43:49 | 0:43:53 | |
Was the ISI clueless or complicit? We may never know the answer. | 0:43:53 | 0:43:59 | |
We may have to live in this ambiguity. | 0:43:59 | 0:44:02 | |
Killing Bin Laden was the reason America had attacked Afghanistan and overthrown the Taliban. | 0:44:02 | 0:44:09 | |
But in the ten years since 9/11, that war had taken on a life of its own. | 0:44:09 | 0:44:16 | |
The real military threat | 0:44:16 | 0:44:18 | |
is the Taliban, is a serious insurgency | 0:44:18 | 0:44:21 | |
that's got nothing to do with Bin Laden. | 0:44:21 | 0:44:25 | |
Bin Laden, in operational terms, is utterly, spectacularly irrelevant. | 0:44:25 | 0:44:30 | |
TRANSLATION: What difference does it make if he's alive or dead? | 0:44:43 | 0:44:48 | |
20, 40, 100 people like Osama die every day. | 0:44:48 | 0:44:51 | |
Mullah Azizullah claims Pakistan's support for his insurgent group has not wavered. | 0:44:54 | 0:44:59 | |
We planted land mines on the road. | 0:45:03 | 0:45:06 | |
The convoy was heading towards Nerkh. | 0:45:06 | 0:45:10 | |
This propaganda video, shot earlier this year, | 0:45:11 | 0:45:15 | |
is one of many showing similar operations. | 0:45:15 | 0:45:18 | |
The person who was responsible detonated the mine. | 0:45:20 | 0:45:23 | |
He destroyed the tank and its crew. | 0:45:28 | 0:45:31 | |
This is one place where Mullah Azizullah's claims can be put to the test. | 0:45:39 | 0:45:44 | |
The Afghan province of Paktika borders the Pakistani | 0:45:51 | 0:45:54 | |
sanctuaries of some of the Taliban's most lethal factions. | 0:45:54 | 0:45:59 | |
Forward Operating Base Tillman is right on the border. | 0:46:01 | 0:46:04 | |
It is the home of D Company, of the American 101st Airborne Division. | 0:46:06 | 0:46:11 | |
Most days, the base comes under rocket fire, | 0:46:14 | 0:46:17 | |
sometimes from Afghanistan, sometimes Pakistan. | 0:46:17 | 0:46:22 | |
The soldiers are authorised to fire into Pakistan | 0:46:22 | 0:46:27 | |
if their lives are threatened. | 0:46:27 | 0:46:29 | |
The remoteness of the base and the presence of Taliban fighters | 0:46:32 | 0:46:36 | |
means supplies have to be brought in by air. | 0:46:36 | 0:46:39 | |
D Company's mission was to stop Taliban fighters crossing | 0:46:53 | 0:46:57 | |
the border from their sanctuaries in Pakistan. | 0:46:57 | 0:47:00 | |
They patrolled what they call the infiltration routes every day. | 0:47:00 | 0:47:04 | |
After three or four hours of walking round here, | 0:47:07 | 0:47:11 | |
your legs and arms are shaking, everything hurts, | 0:47:11 | 0:47:14 | |
but you've got to keep going. No-one's going to come get you. | 0:47:14 | 0:47:17 | |
Any time we go near the border, we plan on getting a fight, | 0:47:21 | 0:47:25 | |
almost automatically. | 0:47:25 | 0:47:27 | |
They see us coming, they position themselves, hit us, | 0:47:37 | 0:47:41 | |
then they run back across the border, there's nothing we can do. | 0:47:41 | 0:47:46 | |
Did you notice any difference at all when Osama Bin Laden was killed? | 0:47:48 | 0:47:52 | |
Actually, I haven't. I haven't noticed any difference since he's been killed. | 0:47:52 | 0:47:57 | |
Since Bin Laden's death, | 0:47:59 | 0:48:00 | |
over 250 coalition troops have died in Afghanistan. | 0:48:00 | 0:48:04 | |
The commander of D Company, Captain Edwin Churchill, | 0:48:07 | 0:48:10 | |
says he doesn't get the help he needs from the Pakistani military. | 0:48:10 | 0:48:15 | |
And, that as long as the sanctuaries remain, | 0:48:15 | 0:48:18 | |
there is only so much US forces can achieve. | 0:48:18 | 0:48:22 | |
As long as they have a seemingly endless supply of equipment | 0:48:22 | 0:48:26 | |
and fighters, better sheltered, away from what we can do, | 0:48:26 | 0:48:30 | |
we are limited in how much we can get done. | 0:48:30 | 0:48:34 | |
They're not the only ones getting hurt, wounded and killed in the process. | 0:48:34 | 0:48:38 | |
For the moment, a military resolution | 0:48:54 | 0:48:56 | |
to the conflict in Afghanistan is beyond the reach of either side. | 0:48:56 | 0:49:01 | |
Talking may be the only way to end the war, | 0:49:02 | 0:49:05 | |
and the death of Bin Laden has raised hopes that talks could succeed. | 0:49:05 | 0:49:11 | |
For two decades, Michael Semple worked for the UN in Afghanistan. | 0:49:14 | 0:49:20 | |
He has remarkable contacts with Taliban commanders. | 0:49:20 | 0:49:24 | |
I've heard directly from senior Taliban | 0:49:24 | 0:49:27 | |
that the removal of Osama will make an eventual deal much easier | 0:49:27 | 0:49:32 | |
to achieve, because the US demand for the handover of Osama has been | 0:49:32 | 0:49:38 | |
item one on their agenda for dealing with the Taliban, | 0:49:38 | 0:49:43 | |
which ensured they never got to any item two, three or four. | 0:49:43 | 0:49:49 | |
The most difficult item, the one the Taliban felt unable to deal with, | 0:49:49 | 0:49:53 | |
has just been taken off the agenda. | 0:49:53 | 0:49:55 | |
The man who is currently Britain's top diplomat to Afghanistan | 0:49:58 | 0:50:02 | |
and Pakistan testifies that cautious contacts are being made. | 0:50:02 | 0:50:06 | |
What we have are some channels of communication open, some directly | 0:50:06 | 0:50:10 | |
between the Afghan government | 0:50:10 | 0:50:12 | |
and members of the Taliban leadership, and some others too, | 0:50:12 | 0:50:15 | |
involving some international figures. | 0:50:15 | 0:50:18 | |
It's at a very early and delicate stage, | 0:50:18 | 0:50:21 | |
but I think there are genuine channels of communication. | 0:50:21 | 0:50:25 | |
Those who claim that Pakistan's hidden hand has shaped | 0:50:25 | 0:50:28 | |
the conflict fear the same is true of negotiations. | 0:50:28 | 0:50:32 | |
Last year, in the Pakistani city of Karachi, Mullah Baradar, | 0:50:35 | 0:50:39 | |
the Taliban's second in command, was captured by the ISI. | 0:50:39 | 0:50:43 | |
Secretly, Baradar had made contact with the Afghan government | 0:50:45 | 0:50:49 | |
to discuss a deal that would end the war. | 0:50:49 | 0:50:52 | |
He had done so without the ISI's permission. | 0:50:52 | 0:50:55 | |
The story I heard was that the Pakistanis were able to find | 0:50:58 | 0:51:02 | |
and detain Baradar and their motive in doing so was to bring him back | 0:51:02 | 0:51:06 | |
under control and to send a message that if you want to do a deal, | 0:51:06 | 0:51:13 | |
you have to do it with Pakistan, you can't plough an independent furrow. | 0:51:13 | 0:51:18 | |
Taliban commanders who want negotiations fear retaliation, | 0:51:20 | 0:51:24 | |
not only from more hardline comrades, but also from Pakistan. | 0:51:24 | 0:51:30 | |
Hawa Nooristani is a member of the High Peace Council, | 0:51:30 | 0:51:34 | |
a group set up by the Afghan government to reach out to the Taliban. | 0:51:34 | 0:51:40 | |
In September, its leader was assassinated by a suicide bomber. | 0:51:40 | 0:51:45 | |
Recently, in Kabul, she went to a secret meeting. | 0:52:03 | 0:52:07 | |
Waiting for her was a commander in the Haqqani Network. | 0:52:21 | 0:52:25 | |
To her astonishment, | 0:52:27 | 0:52:28 | |
he said he wanted to talk with the Afghan government. | 0:52:28 | 0:52:32 | |
He said it was vital Pakistan intelligence knew nothing of the meeting. | 0:52:43 | 0:52:48 | |
Well, I've certainly heard stories that pressure of that kind has been put on Taliban leaders. | 0:53:08 | 0:53:15 | |
It's very difficult to know to what extent it is true, but, of course, | 0:53:15 | 0:53:18 | |
like any country, they don't want a neighbour that is anything other than friendly to them. | 0:53:18 | 0:53:23 | |
The ISI can certainly spoil any negotiations process. | 0:53:23 | 0:53:28 | |
So far, there's very little sign that I've seen | 0:53:29 | 0:53:32 | |
that Pakistan is interested in a political deal. | 0:53:32 | 0:53:36 | |
There are claims that the ISI are pressing the Taliban to intensify their military campaign. | 0:53:39 | 0:53:45 | |
In the cells of the Afghan intelligence service | 0:53:48 | 0:53:52 | |
is a prisoner who alleges he was recruited by the ISI | 0:53:52 | 0:53:55 | |
earlier this year and trained to be a suicide bomber. | 0:53:55 | 0:53:59 | |
Even though he is in prison, he still fears for his life. | 0:53:59 | 0:54:03 | |
TRANSLATION: The ISI buy boys from poor families. | 0:54:05 | 0:54:10 | |
The young man alleges that preparations for his mission | 0:54:11 | 0:54:16 | |
were overseen by an ISI officer in a camp in Pakistan. | 0:54:16 | 0:54:19 | |
In the morning, we were taken for training. | 0:54:21 | 0:54:24 | |
The Pakistani man said that in Afghanistan, there are non-believers. | 0:54:24 | 0:54:29 | |
We are obliged to carry out jihad. | 0:54:29 | 0:54:31 | |
After 15 days' training, he was ready to head to Afghanistan. | 0:54:33 | 0:54:37 | |
There were three of us. | 0:54:39 | 0:54:41 | |
We were put into a black vehicle, with black windows. | 0:54:41 | 0:54:45 | |
The police did not stop the car, because it was obviously ISI. | 0:54:46 | 0:54:51 | |
No-one dares stop their cars. | 0:54:51 | 0:54:56 | |
We drove Landi Kotal, towards a mountain. | 0:54:56 | 0:55:00 | |
The driver left us at first light. | 0:55:03 | 0:55:06 | |
We walked the entire night, taking short breaks. | 0:55:06 | 0:55:10 | |
At 8am, someone was waiting for us in the mountains near Jalalabad. | 0:55:14 | 0:55:19 | |
They told me, "Find some police, or Afghan National Army." | 0:55:23 | 0:55:27 | |
"Come for lunch, and you will receive your explosive waistcoat and then go and explode it." | 0:55:28 | 0:55:35 | |
But I didn't want to do it, | 0:55:38 | 0:55:40 | |
because my father is dead and my brothers are all younger than me. | 0:55:40 | 0:55:45 | |
We are all Muslims, and this would have ruined my life in this world and the next. | 0:55:46 | 0:55:52 | |
The young man's claims cannot be verified. | 0:55:56 | 0:55:59 | |
Dozens of suicide attacks have been carried out in 2011, | 0:56:03 | 0:56:08 | |
celebrated in Taliban videos like this one. | 0:56:08 | 0:56:12 | |
In this series, Taliban commanders have revealed the vital role | 0:56:50 | 0:56:55 | |
Pakistan has played and still plays in the battle for Afghanistan. | 0:56:55 | 0:57:00 | |
TRANSLATION: Pakistan plays a significant role. | 0:57:00 | 0:57:04 | |
First, they support us by providing a place to hide. | 0:57:04 | 0:57:08 | |
Secondly, they provide us with weapons. | 0:57:08 | 0:57:10 | |
In the coming months and years, Pakistan's hidden hand will shape | 0:57:10 | 0:57:15 | |
the conflict in Afghanistan and the attempts to bring it to an end. | 0:57:15 | 0:57:20 | |
We cannot disregard our long-term interests, because this is our own area. | 0:57:20 | 0:57:25 | |
The point is, history changes. | 0:57:26 | 0:57:29 | |
In history, you are friends with somebody today | 0:57:29 | 0:57:32 | |
and you are mortal enemies with him tomorrow. | 0:57:32 | 0:57:35 | |
As for Pakistan itself, there are those who fear that the forces unleashed in ten years' of war | 0:57:37 | 0:57:43 | |
may yet come to haunt the whole world. | 0:57:43 | 0:57:46 | |
There is probably no worse nightmare for America, Europe, | 0:57:48 | 0:57:52 | |
the world, in the 21st century than a Pakistan that's out of control, | 0:57:52 | 0:57:58 | |
under the influence of extremist Islamic forces, armed with nuclear weapons. | 0:57:58 | 0:58:03 | |
The stakes here are huge. | 0:58:04 | 0:58:06 | |
What happens in Pakistan | 0:58:08 | 0:58:10 | |
may yet be the most enduring legacy of 9/11 | 0:58:10 | 0:58:13 | |
and the hunt for Osama Bin Laden. | 0:58:13 | 0:58:16 | |
Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd | 0:58:32 | 0:58:36 | |
E-mail [email protected] | 0:58:36 | 0:58:40 |