The Bell Huey - Vietnam War Horse Decisive Weapons

16 helicopters took off, we went up to around 2000 feet and about five

kilometres from being solitary we dropped to treetop level. We were

almost clipping the tops of the trees as we came in, the birds were

coming up out of the trees. 14th November, 1965, Colonel Hal Moore

and his men are flying into combat. They are heading for the remote

valley to have -- to destroy it Vietnamese forces. For the first

time in history and army has come to fight in helicopters. For the

next 10 years Vietnam would be the helicopter war and one helicopter

-- Adam Wicheard. It will you are in deep trouble and you need

reinforcements, food, water, The requirement for the Bell Huey

and the sizing of it grew out of the experience where we were

evacuating the wounded with stretchers attached to the size of

these things. It was a long way from being ideal. They this was my

first trip in a helicopter and they don't waste any time getting you

bought one. It is a sort of flying ambulance. It can fly too fast for

you. It was not long until more aggressive pilot started

experimenting with machine guns strapped into the sides of the

helicopter. I tied a couple of machine guns on to bobble

helicopters and we had the machine gun on each in and string going

from the skid to the stick. We did not know what would happen. I

pulled the strings and his started this machine gun going, then I

pulled this string, it started that machine gun going. And I learned on

my own that it would work with a larger machine if it would work

with a little helicopter. A 1950s the idea of a helicopter gunship

seemed far-fetched. The American military just wanted a large

machine that would carry more wounded, more men and more

equipment. During May 1954 the US Air Force asked the Bell helicopter

Corporation to participate in the design competition. In February of

1955 it was announced Bell had won that competition. The prototype was

first and foremost an air ambulance, like its Korean War predecessor,

but with enough space to lay a stretcher across its width. And it

was much more powerful thanks to its revolutionary new engine.

technical advance was essentially the turbines engine. The piston

engine, which was previously used, was bulky, took up a lot of the

helicopter's frame. The turbines lay horizontally, took up less room,

was much easier to maintain and the bottom line was the fact that this

engine could lift three times more than the piston. The design of the

cockpit was simplicity itself. Inside the cockpit of the Bell Huey

will adopt our control sticks, one for each pilot. How the switch was

wired up depended on the systems are carried on board the aircraft.

Some of these buttons were for weapons systems, are there for

release of the cargo look. Communication inside the aircraft

Whatever direction the move to the stick, the spinning rotor disc will

follow that motion, if you tilt the stick forward the entire spinning

disc will tilt forward, if you bring it back towards you the

entire motor disc will go back essentially and back up. To the

left of the pilots is the collective control lever. Raising

up on that the changes the pitch in the rotor blades, it bites more air

and gains more lift. Incorporated into the collectively there is a

throttle control which determines the speed of the engine. There is a

radio console between the two seats which incorporates radios and

weapons systems controls. The US Army named all their planes and

helicopters after American Indian tribes, or woodland animals. The

hue is not remained that, it is The technical designation was the

letter you stood for utility, the first model - one and we got Huey

from the age you prefix. The do things in a big way in Texas, that

includes helicopters. The 1960s the bell had -- Bell had gone into full

production of the Bell Huey. They realise they could also carry

troops into battle and even fire at the enemy directly. In 1963 a new

army unit was formed to discover just what the helicopter could do.

They were turning them out of the factory and we needed them. I set

my pilots out there to pick them up at the factory door and fly them at

that. It took us to 80800 days to get back, the second day we were in

the unit, the third day we were using them for training. With more

than 30 helicopters involved, it is the greatest number of army

aircraft of any type delivered in one day since World War II. I had

not flown any of these until I was signed in 1963. It was the greatest

pleasure I have ever had in a helicopter because I had never

flown one with the power, response or fluid smoothness as there Hewie.

-- as the Bell Huey. Everything else you had to work both hands,

your mind, your feet, sometimes you had to work on the outside

influences and pray it would keep going. So the Bell Huey was a great

experience for me. Pilots who had been trained to do little more than

take off and land suddenly had to take on a lot of the expertise of

They had to learn a whole new series of flying techniques, one of

which was how you create air formations. It took a particular

It was realised very early on that it was no good flying into any

operation at an altitude or speed which would alert the enemy, so

American pilots began to be trained early on a more we now call going

low, hugging the condors, popping up suddenly from behind obstacles

and then going into the landing zone. In the air assault we

practised moving great distances rapidly with soldiers on board and

put people on the ground. The element of surprise, you are on top

of them before they can be about it. This was the concept of a nobility,

squads of men carry directly into battle. Unlike the old parachute

regiments they would be able to hit the ground. Above them, gunships

would pull machine and fire rockets on to the enemy. Behind them would

be more Bell Hueys, ready to bring in reinforcements or take out the

This was the concept of air mobility - squads of men carried

into battle. They trained for every terrain, also post-nuclear

battlefields envisaged by the Cold War planners. By 1965, the

Communist threat in South-East Asia worried the Americans most. In June,

Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, announced that the time

for war games was over. The Air Mobile Division began preparing for

the real thing. The 11th Air Assault took up the colours of the

old 1st Cavalry. I asked the army to organise a new division, the Air

Mobile Division. Its introduction will greatly increase our

capability to meet all kinds of threats. The army is on the

threshold of a new approach to land warfare. 'At a ceremony at Fort

Benning, aptly symbolising the replacement of the horse by the

helicopter, 'the new air mobile concept formally became a part of

The 1st Cavalry went back as far as General Custer. It was the most

romantic and gung-ho branch of the US Army. The cavalry spirit,

regalia and regimental songs were revived most eagerly by Colonel

John B Stockton, who later became the model for the character of

John B Stockton came on board and he brought in this macho type of

attitude. The black stetson was the trademark of the Cav guys. This is

mine - not the original. My original's got bullet holes in and

it's kinda moth-eaten. Colonel Stockton believed in the cavalry

tradition and it included the spurs and the black stetson. You want

every member to start believing that he's in the best unit in the

whole US Army. We're different, cos we're better. These are the visible

signs of that. If you don't believe The force had the attitude and the

machine. All they needed was a war. By late 1965, the situation in

The army of the Communist North was on the march. They had won

independence from the French. Now they wanted the South. Air mobility

seemed the ideal way to stop them. The 1st Cavalry took their Hueys to

This was probably the finest force that America has fielded from the

training grounds at home to a They had great confidence in their

leadership, terrific equipment, and absolute confidence that they were

gonna win. "Just show us where they are, "anywhere in the world, and

we'll beat them!" It was that spirit. Their destination was a

vast, purpose-built airbase carved out of the jungle at An Khe in the

The 1st Cavalry Division was sent into the central highlands of South

Vietnam because the old principle in South Vietnam is, "He who

controls the central highlands controls South Vietnam." So the 1st

Cav was sent in to deny it to the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.

Three North Vietnamese regiments had crossed from Cambodia. Their

plan was to drive eastwards and split the country in two. The US

waited for them to make their move. It came at Plei Me. For six days,

the NVA besieged the American base, before vanishing back into the

The 1st Cavalry now went on the offensive. They combed the jungle

for the North Vietnamese. Division Commander, Harry Kinnard, finally

pinpointed the enemy base on the remote Chu Pong mountain in the

valley of the Ia Drang. The task of flushing them out fell to Lt Col

On 13th November, the Brigade Commander met with me and told me

that I was to air assault into the Ia Drang valley the next morning. I

would have 16 Huey helicopters. I would go out there for three or

four days to find and destroy the enemy. Col Moore chose a clearing,

Landing Zone X-Ray, for his air assault. He went in with 160 men in

an operation timed to the second. - - 175. The air assault itself is a

lot like a ballet. It's so well- planned. The timing of it is so

important. The curtain-raiser was a barrage of fire on LZ X-Ray from

As soon as the artillery was going, I got off the ground with the Hueys

and I had to land within 30 seconds of the last round getting into the

landing zone. If you're early, the artillery's coming in. If you're

late, the enemy's shooting at you. The formation was made up entirely

of Hueys. The Aerial Rocket Artillery, the ARA, cleared the way.

The gunships behind them covered the troop carriers. We had two

Aerial Rocket Artillery ships that flew next to the lead aircraft. The

artillery would cut off and the flight leader said, "ARA, sprint."

We would pull every last ounce of power we could and lope in. We

started at the approach end, and each one of us - there'd be two of

us - would start the rockets around the perimeter of the landing zone.

We'd shoot half our load and then we would break off and circle

overhead. As we broke off, the gunships behind us took up the fire

with their machine guns and they continued to circle at low level.

The troop carriers touched down. The Hueys were now vulnerable.

Pilots could only remain on the ground for a few seconds. We would

count, "One, two, three..." and I'd start rolling it. A lot of times

two and three were unnecessary. The guys had gone. No-one is more

motivated to get out of a helicopter than the infantry when

they're being shot at. They really move fast. On the ground, they're

not a target. The air assault went perfectly. The North Vietnamese

that Moore expected were not at LZ X-Ray, but they were close and in

large numbers. Soon after we landed, my troops captured a prisoner. I

quickly hurried to the spot with a Vietnamese interpreter I had. He

said there were three battalions of North Vietnamese on the mountain

who wanted to kill Americans but could not find any. I pushed out

towards the mountain. Within minutes, we were struck by 250-300

North Vietnamese pouring off that mountain, and it was very apparent

to me that this enemy was out to kill us all. He'd found 'em and

they'd found him. He'd landed below the regiment and the commander

ordered an assault. It fleetingly crossed my mind that an illustrious

predecessor of mine named George Armstrong Custer was in a fix like

this at the Little Bighorn. I had one thing he did not have. I had

fire support. I pulled the chain on everything I could. We started

flying continuous fire support, non-stop, just, er...until

approximately 1800 hours that night. We had fired in excess of 2,000

rockets, which for seven aircraft, er...is a bunch. Moore defended the

landing zone brilliantly. He could've been wiped out the first

day if he hadn't manoeuvred so well, sent men up the ridge to keep the

Vietnamese away. If not, they would have gotten up, preventing the

helicopters from coming in. For two days and nights, the Vietnamese

attacked. Moore called in artillery to help beat back the enemy, but

his real lifeline was the steady convoy of Hueys. In LZ X-Ray, there

were many things that the Hueys did. They flew the soldiers in. They

flew in support facilities. They flew in medics and staff people

that they needed. They flew in reinforcements, took out wounded.

They brought in food and water. They brought in explosives, the

helicopters did. Everything that the troops needed on the ground was

brought in by air. At the end, we extracted them from the landing

zone. We took them and got them into trouble and we continually got

On the 16th, the North Vietnamese withdrew. Moore and his men were

airlifted the same day. They took with them 79 dead American soldiers.

They left behind over 1,000 dead Vietnamese. A small US force was

left at X-Ray. Just how crucial the Huey had been became clear the next

day when they set off on foot for a nearby landing zone called Albany.

What happened at Albany was, this battalion was marching through the

rainforest from LZ X-Ray to another landing zone called Albany. The

Vietnamese commander launched a hasty ambush. He didn't realise

until the moment occurred that he could ambush this column. He used

natural cover well, manoeuvred his troops well, he struck the

Americans at their most vulnerable and wiped 'em out - a portent of

what was to come. Despite this disaster, the Americans saw Ia

Drang as a decisive victory. They had killed nearly 2,000 enemy

against 304 dead on their own side. The Huey and air mobility proved

their worth. It seemed that the Americans had a winning strategy

for the war. It was the first time a US unit had had a knock-down,

dragged-out fight with a North Vietnamese army unit. It was a very

tough fight and we lost a lot of good men, but for one of ours, they

lost 10. We captured countless weapons of all types. When Mr

McNamara came over and we could show him all these weapons, tell

him how many people we'd killed, he Ia Drang was a painful defeat for

the North Vietnamese, but also a valuable lesson. They were soon

devising ways of beating the Americans and their Hueys. The main

thing they wanted to do, and they learnt this from Ia Drang, was to

grab us by the belt buckle. That was the phrase they used. If you

got close to the Americans, hugging them during the fire fight, it

would be difficult to call in fire support without damaging themselves.

The helicopter crew would be unable to distinguish between friendly

forces and enemy forces, because The North Vietnamese took away

another key advantage the Americans thought the helicopter gave them -

the ability to decide when and where to fight. The Vietnamese

initiated actions 95% of the time. Americans thought they carried the

battle to the enemy. In fact, they were lured on the enemy's terms.

The helicopter helps the illusion of bringing the battle to the enemy,

The fundamental flaw in the American strategy was the idea of a

body count. If they killed more than they lost, the Americans felt

sure of victory. This didn't reckon for an enemy who'd fight whatever

the cost, nor for changing views at home. Headquarters felt if we

killed North Vietnamese like we did at LZ X-Ray, they could not sustain

that and we would win the war. problem was, losses inflicted on

the North Vietnamese could be absorbed. The North Vietnamese

weren't even aware of how many people were killed. US casualties

were reported. Every casualty came home - if dead, in a body bag. That

began to have its impact. Despite the promise of the Huey and

air mobility, it was becoming clear that this was an unwinnable war.

After three years there, I rethought the whole thing. I

realised we wouldn't wear the Vietnamese down. They'd wear us

down. I began to see the fallacies in what we were doing. What we were

doing was terrible to the Vietnamese. It's really hurting

that country. We were hurting ourselves, too. We tore our country

apart at home, thousands were getting killed in Vietnam, and it

was ALL to no end. It was wrong and Ironically, the Huey assisted in

the wider change of attitude to the war now sweeping America. Alongside

soldiers and munitions, helicopters carried journalists and camera

crews to the battlefront who became the eyes of the world. The

helicopters affected the coverage of Vietnam. It made it much more

immediate and vivid, much more real, because we could get in and out of

a battle very quickly. We could go back, file our story, get back the

next morning and be in there again. Then, as the television guys got

The Huey had seemed to be the key to victory in Vietnam, but by 1975,

the war was clearly lost. Just before the fall of Saigon, South

Vietnamese pilots used their Hueys to flee to US aircraft carriers.

The situation grew chaotic and the decks became crowded. Finally, the

American sailors were left with no To me, it was terribly sad. What a

terrible waste... ..of good machines. Those were very sad

moments. A quarter of a million had died on the Saigon side. We had

lost 58,000. We put in all this treasure, all this mechanical

ingenuity, and that machine! It was a symbol of the waste of it. They

were pitched over the side. There was no room for them on the ship

The Huey helicopter won its battles, but North Vietnam won the war. The

1st Cavalry Division gave up on air mobility. It has reverted to land

vehicles, but the Huey proved one thing - the helicopter had gone to

war and was there to stay. Nobody looked to Vietnam and said the

helicopter was no use. They saw there was potential that may not

have been realised in Vietnam. With extra technology, extra thought,