Browse content similar to Hayek. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
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We heard that he'd been sinking, | 0:00:00 | 0:00:03 | |
and then we heard that he died, | 0:00:03 | 0:00:06 | |
and my husband said, "You will have to contact." | 0:00:06 | 0:00:10 | |
And I was on the phone to the world. | 0:00:10 | 0:00:13 | |
And people were saying, had I told the American President? | 0:00:13 | 0:00:18 | |
Had I told Mrs Thatcher? | 0:00:18 | 0:00:21 | |
It was only then, I think, that finally it was rammed home to me | 0:00:21 | 0:00:24 | |
the enormous effect that he'd had on the whole world. | 0:00:24 | 0:00:27 | |
You know, ringing, in the middle of the night, | 0:00:27 | 0:00:30 | |
ringing the President of the United States to say that FA Hayek had died. | 0:00:30 | 0:00:35 | |
Friedrich Hayek was a champion of the market. | 0:00:37 | 0:00:41 | |
He inspired many of the people who built the world we live in today. | 0:00:41 | 0:00:45 | |
Margaret Thatcher would, from time to time, | 0:00:45 | 0:00:49 | |
pull little bits of paper with quotations out of her handbag, | 0:00:49 | 0:00:53 | |
and Hayek would be one of them. | 0:00:53 | 0:00:54 | |
For more than a generation, | 0:00:54 | 0:00:57 | |
Western leaders claimed to embrace one central economic idea - | 0:00:57 | 0:01:01 | |
the free market. | 0:01:01 | 0:01:02 | |
With the financial crisis, that orthodoxy's under attack. | 0:01:02 | 0:01:06 | |
Our faith in it has been shaken like never before. | 0:01:06 | 0:01:09 | |
But one great free-market visionary | 0:01:09 | 0:01:12 | |
has emerged from the meltdown with his reputation enhanced. | 0:01:12 | 0:01:15 | |
There might never be a better time to listen to Friedrich Hayek. | 0:01:15 | 0:01:19 | |
I see right now, this moment in history, | 0:01:19 | 0:01:23 | |
as a time where Hayek's ideas deserve a shot. | 0:01:23 | 0:01:28 | |
Of all the big pro-market thinkers, Hayek was by far the most radical. | 0:01:29 | 0:01:32 | |
He believed the market should be freer than any government | 0:01:32 | 0:01:36 | |
has ever dared to allow it to be. | 0:01:36 | 0:01:39 | |
In the world according to Hayek, | 0:01:39 | 0:01:41 | |
politicians should step back | 0:01:41 | 0:01:43 | |
from trying to manage capitalism's ups and downs. | 0:01:43 | 0:01:46 | |
They should simply set it free. | 0:01:46 | 0:01:49 | |
There's no doubt that he's a significant thinker, | 0:01:49 | 0:01:52 | |
though there's major controversy about every area of his thought. | 0:01:52 | 0:01:56 | |
In this series, I'll reveal the stories of the lives | 0:01:56 | 0:02:00 | |
and revolutionary thinking of three extraordinary men. | 0:02:00 | 0:02:03 | |
John Maynard Keynes, Karl Marx and Friedrich Hayek. | 0:02:03 | 0:02:08 | |
They all saw their worlds changing as never before, | 0:02:08 | 0:02:11 | |
becoming ever more complex and interconnected. | 0:02:11 | 0:02:14 | |
The fate of entire nations now hung on the power of money, | 0:02:14 | 0:02:18 | |
and they had very different ideas about what to do. | 0:02:18 | 0:02:21 | |
Even in the middle of an economic meltdown, | 0:02:22 | 0:02:25 | |
Hayek's advice to governments was to step back and do nothing. | 0:02:25 | 0:02:28 | |
Meddling would only make things worse. | 0:02:28 | 0:02:31 | |
It's not what anyone has ever wanted to hear, | 0:02:31 | 0:02:34 | |
but today they've tried all the usual tricks for fixing the economy. | 0:02:34 | 0:02:37 | |
Is it time, finally, to take Hayek's advice instead? | 0:02:37 | 0:02:42 | |
Around the world we're all still feeling the shockwaves | 0:02:56 | 0:03:00 | |
of the financial crash of 2008. | 0:03:00 | 0:03:03 | |
'You really can feel the fear down here.' | 0:03:03 | 0:03:06 | |
'The Dow has had its worst five days in five years.' | 0:03:06 | 0:03:09 | |
Until that crisis hit, | 0:03:09 | 0:03:11 | |
Western leaders had put their faith in the free market | 0:03:11 | 0:03:15 | |
as the best way to generate wealth. | 0:03:15 | 0:03:17 | |
But in their version of the market, | 0:03:17 | 0:03:20 | |
derived from thinkers like Milton Friedman, | 0:03:20 | 0:03:23 | |
they still believed if things went wrong they could step in, | 0:03:23 | 0:03:26 | |
tweak the system and get everything back on track. | 0:03:26 | 0:03:29 | |
Today, fans of the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek | 0:03:29 | 0:03:32 | |
say that arrogance, that distorted picture of a market economy, | 0:03:32 | 0:03:36 | |
got us into this mess. | 0:03:36 | 0:03:38 | |
If we want to try to get out of it, we need to try the real thing. | 0:03:38 | 0:03:41 | |
To understand how governments, not markets, | 0:03:41 | 0:03:45 | |
might have caused the crisis, | 0:03:45 | 0:03:47 | |
we need to wind the clock back to the years leading up to it. | 0:03:47 | 0:03:52 | |
America's interest rates have been cut. | 0:03:52 | 0:03:54 | |
That was expected but the timing has come as a surprise. | 0:03:54 | 0:03:57 | |
It's January 2001, | 0:03:57 | 0:03:59 | |
and America's central bank, the Federal Reserve, | 0:03:59 | 0:04:02 | |
has cut interest rates | 0:04:02 | 0:04:04 | |
because it's worried the US economy is slowing down. | 0:04:04 | 0:04:08 | |
It cut interest rates for the same reason central banks always do. | 0:04:08 | 0:04:11 | |
To make it cheaper for companies and households to borrow | 0:04:11 | 0:04:15 | |
and seek out profitable investments. | 0:04:15 | 0:04:18 | |
The President was pleased, as you might imagine. | 0:04:18 | 0:04:22 | |
This is the kind of thing Presidents expect central banks to do | 0:04:22 | 0:04:25 | |
to avoid economic trouble. | 0:04:25 | 0:04:27 | |
I think the cut was, um...was needed. | 0:04:27 | 0:04:32 | |
It was a strong statement that measures must be taken | 0:04:32 | 0:04:36 | |
to make sure our economy does not go into a tailspin. | 0:04:36 | 0:04:41 | |
Had Friedrich Hayek been alive, | 0:04:42 | 0:04:44 | |
he would have taken a very different view. | 0:04:44 | 0:04:47 | |
Far from avoiding trouble, | 0:04:47 | 0:04:49 | |
Hayek would have seen the Federal Reserve's decision | 0:04:49 | 0:04:52 | |
to cut interest rates | 0:04:52 | 0:04:53 | |
as sowing the seeds of today's financial crisis. | 0:04:53 | 0:04:56 | |
In fact, Hayek believed | 0:04:56 | 0:04:57 | |
almost any government intervention in the market, | 0:04:57 | 0:05:01 | |
like propping up failing businesses, | 0:05:01 | 0:05:03 | |
setting trade tariffs or manipulating interest rates, | 0:05:03 | 0:05:06 | |
risked disaster. | 0:05:06 | 0:05:09 | |
In the years after 2001, | 0:05:10 | 0:05:12 | |
the Federal Reserve carried on cutting interest rates, | 0:05:12 | 0:05:15 | |
helping to fuel a property boom that ultimately couldn't be sustained. | 0:05:15 | 0:05:20 | |
Early in 2007, America's housing bubble burst | 0:05:20 | 0:05:25 | |
and the global financial crisis began, | 0:05:25 | 0:05:27 | |
just as Hayek might have predicted. | 0:05:27 | 0:05:30 | |
The conventional wisdom was none of these events were foreseeable. | 0:05:30 | 0:05:34 | |
We couldn't have done anything about it. | 0:05:34 | 0:05:36 | |
But of course all of that was false. | 0:05:36 | 0:05:38 | |
What's playing out before our eyes | 0:05:38 | 0:05:41 | |
is exactly what men like Hayek had predicted would happen. | 0:05:41 | 0:05:44 | |
At first glance, the Hayek view of the crisis | 0:05:44 | 0:05:48 | |
looks a bit familiar. | 0:05:48 | 0:05:50 | |
But don't be fooled. | 0:05:50 | 0:05:52 | |
You probably feel like you've heard this argument before, | 0:05:53 | 0:05:56 | |
that the Federal Reserve partly caused the crisis | 0:05:56 | 0:05:58 | |
by setting interest rates too low, | 0:05:58 | 0:06:00 | |
encouraging everyone to borrow too much and generally do silly things. | 0:06:00 | 0:06:04 | |
But the argument of Hayek and his followers | 0:06:04 | 0:06:06 | |
actually runs deeper than that. | 0:06:06 | 0:06:08 | |
It's not just that they got their sums wrong | 0:06:08 | 0:06:10 | |
and they didn't set the right interest rate. | 0:06:10 | 0:06:12 | |
It's that they shouldn't have been in the business | 0:06:12 | 0:06:14 | |
of setting interest rates at all. | 0:06:14 | 0:06:16 | |
It's this radical rejection of the state's role | 0:06:16 | 0:06:18 | |
in regulating the market | 0:06:18 | 0:06:21 | |
that sets Hayek apart from other free-market thinkers. | 0:06:21 | 0:06:25 | |
He believed the market would do a far better job regulating itself, | 0:06:26 | 0:06:30 | |
if only governments would just leave it alone. | 0:06:30 | 0:06:33 | |
Free market did not set interest rates at 1% under Greenspan. | 0:06:33 | 0:06:38 | |
That's the government that is doing that. That is price-fixing. | 0:06:38 | 0:06:42 | |
It's kind of the way the old Soviet Union | 0:06:42 | 0:06:44 | |
used to fix the price of bread or gasoline. | 0:06:44 | 0:06:47 | |
The US government fixes interest rates the same way. | 0:06:47 | 0:06:50 | |
We need the market to set interest rates, not the government. | 0:06:50 | 0:06:53 | |
If the market set interest rates they would've been much higher, | 0:06:53 | 0:06:56 | |
and we wouldn't have had these problems. | 0:06:56 | 0:06:58 | |
Hayek's belief in the positive power of the unbridled free market | 0:06:59 | 0:07:04 | |
stems from his childhood in Austria. | 0:07:04 | 0:07:07 | |
He was born in Vienna in 1899. | 0:07:07 | 0:07:10 | |
Then, the city was packed full of intellectuals | 0:07:10 | 0:07:12 | |
like Freud and Wittgenstein, many of whom Hayek came to know. | 0:07:12 | 0:07:17 | |
These family photographs have not been widely seen. | 0:07:18 | 0:07:21 | |
Growing up, he had a keen desire to make sense | 0:07:25 | 0:07:28 | |
of the modern world taking shape around him. | 0:07:28 | 0:07:31 | |
I must have been 13 or 14 | 0:07:33 | 0:07:35 | |
when I began pestering all the priests I knew | 0:07:35 | 0:07:38 | |
to explain to me what they meant by the word "God", | 0:07:38 | 0:07:41 | |
and none of them could. | 0:07:41 | 0:07:42 | |
That was the end for me of it. | 0:07:43 | 0:07:46 | |
Hayek grew up in a family of scientists. | 0:07:46 | 0:07:49 | |
Like many other intellectuals in Vienna at that time | 0:07:49 | 0:07:52 | |
they liked to think they were on a grand quest | 0:07:52 | 0:07:54 | |
to unwrap the secrets of the universe. | 0:07:54 | 0:07:57 | |
The young Hayek was especially influenced by his father - | 0:07:57 | 0:08:01 | |
a doctor and enthusiastic botanist. | 0:08:01 | 0:08:04 | |
Hayek started off like his dad, | 0:08:04 | 0:08:07 | |
obsessively collecting plant and insect samples, | 0:08:07 | 0:08:10 | |
really into the development of species. | 0:08:10 | 0:08:13 | |
By the time he was 16 and he was more interested in people, | 0:08:13 | 0:08:16 | |
the development of whole societies, not plants. | 0:08:16 | 0:08:20 | |
But Darwin's theory of evolution stuck in his head. | 0:08:20 | 0:08:23 | |
Since the 18th-century Enlightenment | 0:08:25 | 0:08:27 | |
science had unlocked many of the puzzles of the universe, | 0:08:27 | 0:08:31 | |
including the origins of life itself. | 0:08:31 | 0:08:34 | |
As Hayek grew up | 0:08:34 | 0:08:35 | |
he was drawn to what he saw as the last frontier - | 0:08:35 | 0:08:39 | |
the mysterious workings of the economy | 0:08:39 | 0:08:41 | |
in all its growing complexity and power. | 0:08:41 | 0:08:44 | |
In Darwin's theory of evolution | 0:08:44 | 0:08:46 | |
he thought he saw what a new science of the economy might look like. | 0:08:46 | 0:08:51 | |
Physics, which allows, often, for precise predictions | 0:08:51 | 0:08:55 | |
in terms of planetary motion and eclipses, | 0:08:55 | 0:08:58 | |
is not a good model | 0:08:58 | 0:08:59 | |
for understanding how social phenomena work. | 0:08:59 | 0:09:02 | |
I think that was the basis of his attraction to evolutionary theory. | 0:09:02 | 0:09:06 | |
He wanted to establish that you could be a science | 0:09:06 | 0:09:09 | |
even if you don't make precise predictions, | 0:09:09 | 0:09:11 | |
or have the sort of control that many of his opponents said, | 0:09:11 | 0:09:14 | |
"Well, if we're a science we should be able to engineer society | 0:09:14 | 0:09:18 | |
"the way an engineer builds a bridge." | 0:09:18 | 0:09:20 | |
Darwin's theory of evolution also helped forge Hayek's vision | 0:09:21 | 0:09:25 | |
of capitalism itself. | 0:09:25 | 0:09:27 | |
He came to believe the global market had evolved | 0:09:27 | 0:09:30 | |
over the course of human history, emerging as a kind of natural wonder | 0:09:30 | 0:09:34 | |
driving civilisation forward. | 0:09:34 | 0:09:36 | |
Hayek saw the market as a telecommunications system, | 0:09:44 | 0:09:48 | |
processing billions of pieces of information | 0:09:48 | 0:09:51 | |
about all our needs and desires | 0:09:51 | 0:09:53 | |
and the changing supply of resources to meet them. | 0:09:53 | 0:09:56 | |
Hayek said it was a marvel - the way all this is conveyed to us | 0:10:01 | 0:10:04 | |
by prices that guide our actions as they rise and fall. | 0:10:04 | 0:10:08 | |
And to Hayek the market does most good when it's most free. | 0:10:12 | 0:10:16 | |
It's our desire to control it that most often turns it against us. | 0:10:21 | 0:10:26 | |
Hayek thought meddling by government could make it harder for | 0:10:31 | 0:10:34 | |
the market to do its job by distorting the signals | 0:10:34 | 0:10:37 | |
it was sending to buyers and sellers, | 0:10:37 | 0:10:40 | |
and the meddling involved in the government's control | 0:10:40 | 0:10:42 | |
of the supply of money, Hayek decided, | 0:10:42 | 0:10:45 | |
could be most damaging of all. | 0:10:45 | 0:10:48 | |
Rampant inflation, unemployment, uncontrollable debt. | 0:10:53 | 0:10:57 | |
In Vienna, after the First World War, Hayek saw for himself | 0:10:57 | 0:11:02 | |
how government abuse of money can wreak havoc. | 0:11:02 | 0:11:04 | |
Across Austria prices had taken off, and so had unemployment. | 0:11:06 | 0:11:10 | |
Even the rich were struggling to feed themselves, | 0:11:10 | 0:11:13 | |
and no-one could quite understand why. | 0:11:13 | 0:11:16 | |
At the height of the crisis, if you walked down this street | 0:11:19 | 0:11:22 | |
any time of day or night, | 0:11:22 | 0:11:24 | |
you could hear a kind of relentless, heavy, rumbling sound. | 0:11:24 | 0:11:28 | |
It was the sound of money tearing a country apart. | 0:11:33 | 0:11:38 | |
This building housed the Austro-Hungarian Bank, | 0:11:38 | 0:11:41 | |
and its printing presses that were rolling night and day | 0:11:41 | 0:11:45 | |
churning out millions of new bank notes. | 0:11:45 | 0:11:48 | |
The war had left the Austrian government with huge bills | 0:11:48 | 0:11:51 | |
and low tax revenues. | 0:11:51 | 0:11:53 | |
So it ordered the national bank to simply print the money it needed | 0:11:53 | 0:11:57 | |
in exchange for bonds or IOUs. | 0:11:57 | 0:12:00 | |
What the people manning these printing presses, | 0:12:03 | 0:12:06 | |
and their political masters, had yet to really grasp | 0:12:06 | 0:12:09 | |
was they weren't just producing money here, | 0:12:09 | 0:12:12 | |
they were producing inflation. | 0:12:12 | 0:12:14 | |
The amount of money in the economy was going up, | 0:12:14 | 0:12:17 | |
so people had more money to spend, but of course, | 0:12:17 | 0:12:19 | |
the amount of things they could buy had stayed more or less the same. | 0:12:19 | 0:12:22 | |
That forced up the price of everything. Inflation took off. | 0:12:22 | 0:12:27 | |
In fact, the situation got so bad in Austria, | 0:12:27 | 0:12:29 | |
the inflation rate hit 10,000%. | 0:12:29 | 0:12:33 | |
The financial wealth was destroyed. | 0:12:35 | 0:12:37 | |
Those that had jobs | 0:12:37 | 0:12:40 | |
continued to have them but they could no longer afford, | 0:12:40 | 0:12:44 | |
for instance, to have maids and servants. | 0:12:44 | 0:12:47 | |
We saw all of these people, all of a sudden, ended up being out of work. | 0:12:47 | 0:12:50 | |
With their economy going up in smoke, Austria's central bankers | 0:12:51 | 0:12:54 | |
tried to fight fire with fire. | 0:12:54 | 0:12:58 | |
By the summer of 1922, prices were doubling every month, | 0:13:00 | 0:13:05 | |
and the central bank was playing catch up, | 0:13:05 | 0:13:07 | |
printing higher and higher denomination bank notes, | 0:13:07 | 0:13:10 | |
just to reflect what was going on in the shops. | 0:13:10 | 0:13:12 | |
In the end, this 500,000 Krone note could maybe buy you a loaf of bread. | 0:13:12 | 0:13:18 | |
And of course, by pumping more and more money into the economy | 0:13:18 | 0:13:21 | |
they were only making the problem worse. | 0:13:21 | 0:13:25 | |
For Austria's politicians it was all a crisis of their own making. | 0:13:25 | 0:13:29 | |
They'd been printing money to pay their bills since the start | 0:13:29 | 0:13:33 | |
of the First World War, | 0:13:33 | 0:13:36 | |
and they didn't understand that that could lead to inflation. | 0:13:36 | 0:13:39 | |
It was a crisis caused by ignorance. | 0:13:39 | 0:13:42 | |
Having seen Austria brought to its knees, | 0:13:44 | 0:13:47 | |
Hayek had an almost visceral fear of inflation all of his life. | 0:13:47 | 0:13:51 | |
It's a fear that central bankers still share today. | 0:13:51 | 0:13:54 | |
What's interesting to me is the lesson he drew from that experience. | 0:13:54 | 0:13:58 | |
Most people focus on the politics, on the fact that the winners of | 0:13:58 | 0:14:02 | |
World War I had imposed impossibly high reparations on Austria. | 0:14:02 | 0:14:07 | |
But Hayek was interested in the economics, | 0:14:07 | 0:14:09 | |
and the fact that the Austrian government simply hadn't understood | 0:14:09 | 0:14:13 | |
the power of money. | 0:14:13 | 0:14:14 | |
What happened next in America led Hayek to conclude | 0:14:17 | 0:14:20 | |
there can be something worse than government ignorance - hubris. | 0:14:20 | 0:14:24 | |
He thought that entire period showed the calamity that can come | 0:14:24 | 0:14:27 | |
when governments try to use the power of money to shape the economy. | 0:14:27 | 0:14:32 | |
In America in the 1920's | 0:14:32 | 0:14:33 | |
the greatest boom the world had ever seen was taking off. | 0:14:33 | 0:14:38 | |
Consumers couldn't get enough of new products like cars, | 0:14:38 | 0:14:41 | |
telephones and record players. | 0:14:41 | 0:14:45 | |
The stock market rose higher and higher. | 0:14:45 | 0:14:48 | |
As the Roaring Twenties wore on, the finest economic minds in America | 0:14:48 | 0:14:52 | |
came to believe the boom would never end. | 0:14:52 | 0:14:55 | |
Back in Austria, in early 1929, Hayek was convinced | 0:15:00 | 0:15:04 | |
they'd got it all wrong. | 0:15:04 | 0:15:06 | |
He'd become the director of the recently founded | 0:15:07 | 0:15:10 | |
Institute for Business Cycle Research. | 0:15:10 | 0:15:13 | |
Its job was to understand why economies were always | 0:15:13 | 0:15:16 | |
lurching from one boom and bust cycle to another. | 0:15:16 | 0:15:20 | |
Hayek called it "The 19th Century Pattern", | 0:15:20 | 0:15:23 | |
though it was hardly a thing of the past. | 0:15:23 | 0:15:25 | |
The Institute was based here at the Chamber of Commerce, | 0:15:28 | 0:15:31 | |
where Hayek had been developing a new theory of boom and bust, | 0:15:31 | 0:15:35 | |
along with new thinking about the market. | 0:15:35 | 0:15:37 | |
The work he did here would change the way people thought | 0:15:40 | 0:15:43 | |
about the economy forever - its ups, and its downs. | 0:15:43 | 0:15:47 | |
To many, the downs were unpredictable - | 0:15:57 | 0:16:00 | |
a kind of force of nature that might destroy an economy without warning. | 0:16:00 | 0:16:05 | |
Hayek had been working on a new idea - that the seeds of busts | 0:16:05 | 0:16:09 | |
were sown during booms. | 0:16:09 | 0:16:11 | |
Because the world had become increasingly interconnected, | 0:16:11 | 0:16:14 | |
Hayek had been studying the American boom to help him | 0:16:14 | 0:16:17 | |
forecast what would happen to the Austrian economy. | 0:16:17 | 0:16:20 | |
He had to produce these monthly reports on the state | 0:16:22 | 0:16:26 | |
of the European economy. | 0:16:26 | 0:16:28 | |
Most of it is pretty dry stuff. | 0:16:28 | 0:16:30 | |
It's things like paper production or that month's steel exports. | 0:16:30 | 0:16:36 | |
But he is credited with making a rather striking prediction | 0:16:36 | 0:16:39 | |
in early 1929, | 0:16:39 | 0:16:41 | |
because he thought the American stock market boom | 0:16:41 | 0:16:45 | |
would end in a few months time. | 0:16:45 | 0:16:48 | |
He was right. | 0:16:48 | 0:16:49 | |
In October 1929 Wall Street fell off a cliff, | 0:16:49 | 0:16:53 | |
and the '20s roared to an anguished end. | 0:16:53 | 0:16:56 | |
Hayek's prediction came out of what he saw happening | 0:17:01 | 0:17:05 | |
at America's new central bank. | 0:17:05 | 0:17:08 | |
The Federal Reserve had been set up in 1913 | 0:17:08 | 0:17:11 | |
to stabilise America's notoriously shaky private banks | 0:17:11 | 0:17:15 | |
by offering them a reliable source of credit. | 0:17:15 | 0:17:19 | |
Hayek's big idea was that the great ups and downs in the economy | 0:17:19 | 0:17:24 | |
nearly all started in buildings like this one. | 0:17:24 | 0:17:27 | |
It was the cost of borrowing, the interest rate, | 0:17:27 | 0:17:30 | |
set by central banks like the New York Federal Reserve | 0:17:30 | 0:17:34 | |
that caused unsustainable booms to develop, | 0:17:34 | 0:17:37 | |
and cause the inevitable busts. | 0:17:37 | 0:17:40 | |
In the 1920s the governor of the New York Federal Reserve | 0:17:42 | 0:17:46 | |
had a revolutionary idea. | 0:17:46 | 0:17:48 | |
Benjamin Strong thought he could use the bank's power | 0:17:48 | 0:17:51 | |
to set interest rates to influence what was happening in the economy. | 0:17:51 | 0:17:55 | |
In many ways, that idea of using interest rates | 0:17:55 | 0:17:59 | |
marked the start of modern monetary policy. | 0:17:59 | 0:18:02 | |
Strong began buying government debt on the open market | 0:18:02 | 0:18:06 | |
which did have the effect of raising the amount of money in the economy. | 0:18:06 | 0:18:10 | |
But unlike Austria's hapless central bankers, Strong had a strategy. | 0:18:10 | 0:18:15 | |
The difference with Austria was that the Fed wasn't buying | 0:18:15 | 0:18:18 | |
treasury bonds to help the government pay its bills. | 0:18:18 | 0:18:21 | |
It was doing it to get money into the market | 0:18:21 | 0:18:23 | |
and keep interest rates low. | 0:18:23 | 0:18:25 | |
The central bank wanted to encourage everyone, | 0:18:25 | 0:18:27 | |
individuals and households, to borrow more from the banks. | 0:18:27 | 0:18:31 | |
It worked. | 0:18:31 | 0:18:32 | |
ARCHIVE: 'Steel up, utilities up, motors up, | 0:18:32 | 0:18:36 | |
'radio way up - everything up, up, up!' | 0:18:36 | 0:18:39 | |
Strong's intervention really paved the way | 0:18:39 | 0:18:42 | |
for the financial system we have today. | 0:18:42 | 0:18:44 | |
Thanks to all that credit he created | 0:18:44 | 0:18:46 | |
the stock market rose higher and higher. | 0:18:46 | 0:18:49 | |
With loans so cheap, many borrowed money to buy shares. | 0:18:49 | 0:18:54 | |
Others invested heavily in property. | 0:18:54 | 0:18:57 | |
The Federal Reserve hoped its intervention would keep | 0:18:57 | 0:19:00 | |
the boom going indefinitely, but Hayek believed Strong's policy | 0:19:00 | 0:19:04 | |
was sowing the seeds of an eventual bust. | 0:19:04 | 0:19:07 | |
The way Hayek saw it, the low cost of borrowing | 0:19:07 | 0:19:10 | |
was sending the wrong signal to investors here | 0:19:10 | 0:19:13 | |
and to businesses around the country. | 0:19:13 | 0:19:15 | |
The low interest rate told them that America was saving more, | 0:19:15 | 0:19:19 | |
that there was lots of spare cash sitting in bank accounts | 0:19:19 | 0:19:22 | |
ready to be lent on and invested. | 0:19:22 | 0:19:24 | |
It wasn't true. | 0:19:24 | 0:19:26 | |
ARCHIVE: 'Don't sell America short. Why, man, we've scarcely started.' | 0:19:26 | 0:19:31 | |
By the time the Federal Reserve spotted the warning signs | 0:19:32 | 0:19:36 | |
it was too late. | 0:19:36 | 0:19:37 | |
ARCHIVE: 'Technical readjustments. Over 14 billion go with them | 0:19:37 | 0:19:41 | |
'and so goes the confidence of a nation. Wall Street...' | 0:19:41 | 0:19:44 | |
The crash came when interest rates rose | 0:19:44 | 0:19:46 | |
and investors started to realise the banks didn't have money | 0:19:46 | 0:19:50 | |
to back all those investments after all. | 0:19:50 | 0:19:52 | |
At one point they had to close the visitors' gallery | 0:19:52 | 0:19:54 | |
cos there were too many members of the public up here | 0:19:54 | 0:19:57 | |
wailing and crying as they watched their life savings go up in smoke. | 0:19:57 | 0:20:02 | |
ARCHIVE: 'The Jazz Age is over, all over.' | 0:20:02 | 0:20:06 | |
To Hayek the lesson was clear - | 0:20:06 | 0:20:08 | |
by feeding the boom with cheap credit the Federal Reserve | 0:20:08 | 0:20:11 | |
had helped cause the Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression. | 0:20:11 | 0:20:16 | |
Fast forward to today's global crisis | 0:20:19 | 0:20:22 | |
and you could tell a similar story. | 0:20:22 | 0:20:24 | |
We certainly saw a lot of cheap credit in Britain and America | 0:20:24 | 0:20:27 | |
in the decade before the crash, | 0:20:27 | 0:20:30 | |
which did help fuel unsustainable property booms. | 0:20:30 | 0:20:33 | |
Northern Rock was one of many financial institutions | 0:20:33 | 0:20:37 | |
taking ever greater risks in its lending. | 0:20:37 | 0:20:40 | |
When it got into trouble in 2007, panicked savers rushed | 0:20:40 | 0:20:45 | |
to withdraw their cash - the first run on a British bank since 1866. | 0:20:45 | 0:20:49 | |
It was a sign of the disaster to come. | 0:20:49 | 0:20:53 | |
If things hadn't come to a crash in 2007, 2008 | 0:20:53 | 0:20:57 | |
maybe with the corrective medicine you could have managed the situation | 0:20:57 | 0:21:00 | |
back down again through, you know, interest rate monetary policy. | 0:21:00 | 0:21:04 | |
As it was the banking system which was massively exposed to this | 0:21:04 | 0:21:09 | |
and reached a situation where suddenly, people realised | 0:21:09 | 0:21:12 | |
what had happened, they lost confidence in each other, | 0:21:12 | 0:21:15 | |
and the entire edifice came crashing down. | 0:21:15 | 0:21:18 | |
Today's central banks have computer models of the economy | 0:21:18 | 0:21:22 | |
light years ahead of anything dreamt up by Benjamin Strong. | 0:21:22 | 0:21:25 | |
But even so, Hayek's followers say the Federal Reserve | 0:21:25 | 0:21:28 | |
had learned nothing from the mistakes it made in the 1920s. | 0:21:28 | 0:21:33 | |
In the early 2000s it had kept interest rates too low for too long. | 0:21:33 | 0:21:38 | |
But then and now there are plenty who would disagree. | 0:21:38 | 0:21:42 | |
The job of the Fed chairman is to keep the party going, | 0:21:42 | 0:21:45 | |
to spike the punch bowl at all costs. | 0:21:45 | 0:21:48 | |
Not to take the punch bowl away, which really should be the job. | 0:21:48 | 0:21:51 | |
I mean, the Federal Reserve should be independent, but it's not. | 0:21:51 | 0:21:55 | |
It acts in concert with the government to try to maintain | 0:21:55 | 0:21:59 | |
a phony prosperity. | 0:21:59 | 0:22:00 | |
Interest rates are very low, and that was partly promoted | 0:22:00 | 0:22:05 | |
by the fact that the surplus countries, notably China, | 0:22:05 | 0:22:11 | |
but others as well, | 0:22:11 | 0:22:12 | |
had a lot of money, they were perfectly happy with exporting. | 0:22:12 | 0:22:15 | |
It would have been hard to force American interest rates higher | 0:22:15 | 0:22:19 | |
in that environment because there was so much money | 0:22:19 | 0:22:22 | |
flowing in at low interest rates. | 0:22:22 | 0:22:24 | |
If it was all the Feds' fault how come Europe had | 0:22:24 | 0:22:28 | |
the exact same experience? | 0:22:28 | 0:22:30 | |
It's not the fact of the interest rate policy maybe having been wrong, | 0:22:30 | 0:22:34 | |
although I'm not even sure I agree on that, | 0:22:34 | 0:22:36 | |
but it's the fact that we had these deregulated Wild West | 0:22:36 | 0:22:38 | |
financial markets that allowed us to get into the crisis we're in. | 0:22:38 | 0:22:41 | |
Like our own financial collapse, | 0:22:43 | 0:22:45 | |
the consequences of the 1929 crash were felt across the world. | 0:22:45 | 0:22:50 | |
A string of banking crises followed, | 0:22:50 | 0:22:52 | |
and a terrible depression in America and much of Europe. | 0:22:52 | 0:22:56 | |
Again, Hayek said it was all down | 0:22:56 | 0:22:58 | |
to interest rates being too low in the boom years. | 0:22:58 | 0:23:00 | |
But years later, another hugely influential free market thinker | 0:23:00 | 0:23:03 | |
came along who argued the exact opposite - Milton Friedman. | 0:23:03 | 0:23:08 | |
He said the Federal Reserve | 0:23:08 | 0:23:10 | |
had not pumped too much money into the system, but too little. | 0:23:10 | 0:23:14 | |
That's the version of history that most politicians | 0:23:14 | 0:23:17 | |
and economists still believe. | 0:23:17 | 0:23:20 | |
Hayek was absolutely wrong to think that in the catastrophic depths | 0:23:22 | 0:23:27 | |
of the Great Depression of the 1930s that all that was happening | 0:23:27 | 0:23:33 | |
was an unwinding of the malinvestments | 0:23:33 | 0:23:35 | |
that had come from a credit boom. | 0:23:35 | 0:23:37 | |
Clearly, there had been a calamitous collapse of the banking sector | 0:23:37 | 0:23:42 | |
that had nothing to do with the earlier so-called malinvestment. | 0:23:42 | 0:23:46 | |
Facing the world's worst financial meltdown, the issue for economists | 0:23:50 | 0:23:53 | |
and politicians was the same as it is today - | 0:23:53 | 0:23:57 | |
how do we make it go away? | 0:23:57 | 0:23:59 | |
As the Great Depression began, Hayek was invited to give | 0:23:59 | 0:24:01 | |
a series of lectures here at the London School of Economics. | 0:24:01 | 0:24:05 | |
Hayek was thrilled. He'd wanted to come here all his life. | 0:24:08 | 0:24:11 | |
But there was a not very hidden agenda attached to the invitation. | 0:24:11 | 0:24:14 | |
LSE wanted him as part of their fight back | 0:24:14 | 0:24:17 | |
against a new, very different strand of economic thinking | 0:24:17 | 0:24:21 | |
from their arch rivals Cambridge | 0:24:21 | 0:24:23 | |
that had been getting a lot of attention. | 0:24:23 | 0:24:25 | |
The man driving that new approach was John Maynard Keynes. | 0:24:25 | 0:24:30 | |
The grand dispute between Keynes and Hayek in the 1930s | 0:24:30 | 0:24:35 | |
seems so relevant to us today - it's become an internet sensation. | 0:24:35 | 0:24:39 | |
Lord Keynes, wow, it's, it...it's such an honour. | 0:24:41 | 0:24:45 | |
-Indeed, sir. -Please, just go. | 0:24:45 | 0:24:47 | |
This surreal reinvention of their battle of ideas | 0:24:47 | 0:24:50 | |
has been watched nearly two million times online. | 0:24:50 | 0:24:52 | |
Hay-ek? | 0:24:53 | 0:24:55 | |
No, High-ek, like um, high explosives. | 0:24:55 | 0:24:59 | |
Hayek's opponent, Keynes, was a heavyweight thinker. | 0:25:11 | 0:25:15 | |
The seemingly unstoppable new force in economics. | 0:25:15 | 0:25:19 | |
The clash felt a bit like David and Goliath. | 0:25:19 | 0:25:21 | |
Keynes had two brains. | 0:25:23 | 0:25:26 | |
It was said of him that he caused more inferiority complexes | 0:25:26 | 0:25:29 | |
with justification than anyone else in his generation. | 0:25:29 | 0:25:33 | |
Hayek was not known. He was 16 years younger than Keynes. | 0:25:33 | 0:25:38 | |
They fell out with each other on first meeting | 0:25:38 | 0:25:41 | |
and continued to fight for the rest of their lives. | 0:25:41 | 0:25:43 | |
As the Depression deepened the stakes could not have been higher. | 0:25:43 | 0:25:47 | |
Hayek began with some awkward jabs. | 0:25:47 | 0:25:50 | |
Drawing in rather confused diagrams on a blackboard behind him, | 0:25:50 | 0:25:56 | |
he described what he called "fluctuations", | 0:25:56 | 0:25:59 | |
which were how the market changed from day to day over time, | 0:25:59 | 0:26:06 | |
and how, if you started interfering with it, | 0:26:06 | 0:26:09 | |
how things would go wrong pretty quickly. | 0:26:09 | 0:26:12 | |
The big economic argument that started here | 0:26:12 | 0:26:15 | |
in this room in 1931 is still going on today. | 0:26:15 | 0:26:19 | |
If an economy gets into trouble, | 0:26:19 | 0:26:21 | |
should the government step in and try and fix it? | 0:26:21 | 0:26:24 | |
Keynes was saying yes. Hayek stood up there and said no. | 0:26:24 | 0:26:29 | |
For once, it really was that simple. | 0:26:29 | 0:26:33 | |
For Keynes it was a moral problem. | 0:26:33 | 0:26:35 | |
The fact was there were people unemployed | 0:26:35 | 0:26:38 | |
and therefore they should be put back to work, | 0:26:38 | 0:26:40 | |
and it didn't really matter how you did it. | 0:26:40 | 0:26:42 | |
For Hayek, it was a different thing. | 0:26:42 | 0:26:45 | |
Hayek concluded that we really didn't know enough about economics | 0:26:45 | 0:26:49 | |
and that any attempt by people like Keynes | 0:26:49 | 0:26:52 | |
to start fooling around with it | 0:26:52 | 0:26:53 | |
would only end up with unintended consequences, | 0:26:53 | 0:26:57 | |
and those unintended consequences, according to Hayek, | 0:26:57 | 0:27:00 | |
could be even worse than the problems that were solved. | 0:27:00 | 0:27:05 | |
The bitter argument between Hayek and Keynes embodied a fault line | 0:27:05 | 0:27:09 | |
in economics that exists to this day. | 0:27:09 | 0:27:11 | |
It's one of the great academic disputes in the history | 0:27:15 | 0:27:19 | |
of intellectual thought. | 0:27:19 | 0:27:21 | |
It set the tone for the difference between left and right today, | 0:27:21 | 0:27:24 | |
between those who want to intervene in the economy, | 0:27:24 | 0:27:26 | |
and those who would prefer to leave the economy alone. | 0:27:26 | 0:27:28 | |
It was one of the most important intellectual battles | 0:27:33 | 0:27:37 | |
of the 20th Century, and at the time it was pretty clear who won - | 0:27:37 | 0:27:40 | |
Keynes. | 0:27:40 | 0:27:42 | |
In 1933, as the Depression showed no sign of ending, | 0:27:42 | 0:27:44 | |
President Roosevelt instigated a massive public spending programme | 0:27:44 | 0:27:47 | |
that looked very Keynesian. | 0:27:47 | 0:27:50 | |
Under the New Deal, all kinds of new infrastructure was built | 0:27:50 | 0:27:54 | |
across America, like this elevated railway in the heart of New York. | 0:27:54 | 0:28:00 | |
The New Deal's gone down in history as the first time a country | 0:28:00 | 0:28:04 | |
seriously tried to spend its way out of recession, | 0:28:04 | 0:28:07 | |
but even at the time, Hayek thought that was a mistake. | 0:28:07 | 0:28:10 | |
He thought what the economy needed was a period of cleansing. | 0:28:10 | 0:28:14 | |
Get past all that bad investment from the boom, | 0:28:14 | 0:28:17 | |
get rid of all the weak businesses, let the fittest survive. | 0:28:17 | 0:28:20 | |
Hayek saw the New Deal as an artificial stimulant | 0:28:22 | 0:28:25 | |
preventing the market naturally healing its damaged ecosystem. | 0:28:25 | 0:28:30 | |
Rather than stepping in, government should step back | 0:28:30 | 0:28:33 | |
and let the recession do its job. | 0:28:33 | 0:28:35 | |
Hayek thought that the recession was the return to normalcy. | 0:28:37 | 0:28:42 | |
That the boom was caused by bad policy, but once the recession | 0:28:42 | 0:28:46 | |
started that was the return of the economy to normalcy. | 0:28:46 | 0:28:50 | |
It would involve liquidation of certain projects | 0:28:50 | 0:28:53 | |
that had been starting that were not sustainable. | 0:28:53 | 0:28:56 | |
But in the depths of capitalism's worst ever crisis, | 0:28:58 | 0:29:01 | |
Hayek's tough message was too much for most politicians to swallow. | 0:29:01 | 0:29:05 | |
He was ignored. | 0:29:05 | 0:29:07 | |
# Going back and forth for a century | 0:29:10 | 0:29:13 | |
# I want to steer markets | 0:29:13 | 0:29:15 | |
# I want them set free | 0:29:15 | 0:29:17 | |
# There's a boom and bust cycle and good reason to fear it | 0:29:17 | 0:29:20 | |
# Blame low interest rates | 0:29:20 | 0:29:21 | |
# No, it's the animal spirits... # | 0:29:21 | 0:29:23 | |
Keynes' message rhetorically is a hopeful message | 0:29:23 | 0:29:27 | |
in the sense that it says "we", | 0:29:27 | 0:29:30 | |
and that "we" being the government, | 0:29:30 | 0:29:33 | |
can do something proactive about this. | 0:29:33 | 0:29:36 | |
The Hayekian view doesn't offer that sort of policy, | 0:29:36 | 0:29:42 | |
doesn't offer that option. | 0:29:42 | 0:29:44 | |
When the financial crisis hit in 2008 policymakers were blindsided. | 0:29:49 | 0:29:55 | |
After Lehman Brothers - | 0:29:55 | 0:29:57 | |
one of the world's most famous investment banks - went down, | 0:29:57 | 0:30:00 | |
the American government swiftly turned to Keynes | 0:30:00 | 0:30:04 | |
to try to stop the damage spreading. | 0:30:04 | 0:30:06 | |
The meltdown in the financial system terrified the people in there. | 0:30:08 | 0:30:12 | |
They started intervening on an epic scale | 0:30:12 | 0:30:15 | |
spending hundreds of billions of dollars propping up banks, | 0:30:15 | 0:30:18 | |
insurance companies, even America's biggest car firms | 0:30:18 | 0:30:21 | |
to stop them going bust. | 0:30:21 | 0:30:23 | |
Remember that started under a Republican free market president - | 0:30:23 | 0:30:26 | |
George Bush, and then carried on under President Obama. | 0:30:26 | 0:30:30 | |
Apparently, neither of them wanted to see the deep cleansing | 0:30:30 | 0:30:33 | |
of the economy that Hayek would have recommended. | 0:30:33 | 0:30:36 | |
It's not like I'm glad that we need a recession. | 0:30:37 | 0:30:40 | |
It's unfortunate that we need this recession. | 0:30:40 | 0:30:42 | |
Had the government not interfered in the economy, | 0:30:42 | 0:30:45 | |
in ways that I would have been against, | 0:30:45 | 0:30:47 | |
we never would have had this phony boom. | 0:30:47 | 0:30:50 | |
In other words, if we didn't take drugs, | 0:30:50 | 0:30:51 | |
we wouldn't need to go through the withdrawal. | 0:30:51 | 0:30:53 | |
In that period in 2008, right across the world, | 0:30:53 | 0:30:57 | |
people were scared stiff that this was going to go from a recession | 0:30:57 | 0:31:01 | |
into a downright depression, and the world is so global now | 0:31:01 | 0:31:04 | |
these things could easily have spread, | 0:31:04 | 0:31:07 | |
that's why people thought, you know, | 0:31:07 | 0:31:09 | |
"Different countries, we've got to do whatever it takes to stop that." | 0:31:09 | 0:31:13 | |
Today, central banks in Britain and America | 0:31:13 | 0:31:16 | |
are pursuing another Keynesian idea - | 0:31:16 | 0:31:18 | |
keeping interest rates low, encouraging borrowing | 0:31:18 | 0:31:22 | |
to stimulate economic activity. | 0:31:22 | 0:31:24 | |
But if you follow the Austrian, Hayek view it's all worse | 0:31:24 | 0:31:28 | |
than pointless, because this intervention in the market | 0:31:28 | 0:31:31 | |
is setting the stage for an even greater disaster. | 0:31:31 | 0:31:34 | |
What do you think is the relevance of Hayek | 0:31:34 | 0:31:38 | |
to what the Fed's doing now? | 0:31:38 | 0:31:40 | |
Pouring kerosene on the fire and trying to put it out. | 0:31:40 | 0:31:43 | |
They're trying to stop the problem of excessive credit with more credit. | 0:31:43 | 0:31:47 | |
But all that it does is re-start the problems again | 0:31:47 | 0:31:51 | |
and you create a new bubble. | 0:31:51 | 0:31:53 | |
And the bubble now is in the value of the dollar and the bond market. | 0:31:53 | 0:31:57 | |
And it's unsustainable. | 0:31:57 | 0:31:59 | |
Hayek's argument with Keynes | 0:32:01 | 0:32:03 | |
was all about how best to make capitalism work. | 0:32:03 | 0:32:06 | |
But as the '30s moved on Hayek was drawn into a far greater battle. | 0:32:06 | 0:32:11 | |
Whether capitalism was even the right way to organise society | 0:32:11 | 0:32:15 | |
or if the new ideologies of Communism and Fascism, | 0:32:15 | 0:32:19 | |
with their centrally-planned systems held the answer. | 0:32:19 | 0:32:22 | |
He was convinced both were utterly wrong. | 0:32:22 | 0:32:27 | |
Hayek said, "Not merely can human beings struggle to understand | 0:32:27 | 0:32:32 | |
"how to cope with uncertainty, | 0:32:32 | 0:32:34 | |
"but the world is just too complex for them to cope | 0:32:34 | 0:32:37 | |
"with understanding all of it." | 0:32:37 | 0:32:38 | |
A market system conveys so much information that makes it feasible. | 0:32:39 | 0:32:44 | |
Central planning will fail under the weight of the impossibility | 0:32:44 | 0:32:47 | |
of understanding the complexity of the economy. | 0:32:47 | 0:32:50 | |
That was Hayek's most important insight, | 0:32:50 | 0:32:52 | |
and if people had listened to that they would never have been | 0:32:52 | 0:32:55 | |
so worried about the threat from communism as they were, | 0:32:55 | 0:32:59 | |
because central planning failed under the weight of its own inconsistency. | 0:32:59 | 0:33:03 | |
Hayek had seen the economic costs of central planning | 0:33:03 | 0:33:07 | |
but World War Two made him focus on the political implications. | 0:33:07 | 0:33:11 | |
Of course, he didn't want the Allies to lose the war, | 0:33:11 | 0:33:13 | |
but seeing how the war effort was changing the economy | 0:33:13 | 0:33:17 | |
made him worry about what would happen if they won. | 0:33:17 | 0:33:19 | |
He didn't want to defeat the Nazis and then find | 0:33:19 | 0:33:22 | |
we'd handed our freedom to an army of bureaucrats instead. | 0:33:22 | 0:33:26 | |
When the Second World War began, | 0:33:28 | 0:33:30 | |
the British government took control of the economy | 0:33:30 | 0:33:33 | |
to harness its power for the war effort. | 0:33:33 | 0:33:37 | |
Hayek worried they would never let go. | 0:33:37 | 0:33:39 | |
There was a lot of enthusiasm, especially among socialists, | 0:33:42 | 0:33:44 | |
to continue the planning that had taken place during World War Two | 0:33:44 | 0:33:47 | |
after the war was over. | 0:33:47 | 0:33:49 | |
ARCHIVE: 'A government inspector checks | 0:33:49 | 0:33:52 | |
'that the measurements are 90 inches long.' | 0:33:52 | 0:33:55 | |
As men from the ministry dictated how many blankets | 0:33:55 | 0:33:58 | |
each blanket factory produced, Hayek began writing a book | 0:33:58 | 0:34:02 | |
attacking the government's control of the economy. | 0:34:02 | 0:34:06 | |
It would help change the course of the 20th century | 0:34:06 | 0:34:11 | |
and start a political battle that runs to this day. | 0:34:11 | 0:34:14 | |
And there is a handwritten copy | 0:34:16 | 0:34:22 | |
by my father-in-law, in an ordinary child's exercise book, | 0:34:22 | 0:34:27 | |
of the Road to Serfdom. | 0:34:27 | 0:34:29 | |
He has written on it - "This is about the third or fourth draft | 0:34:29 | 0:34:34 | |
"from a longer typescript later destroyed by mistake." | 0:34:34 | 0:34:40 | |
And so that is the draft that survived of the Road to Serfdom. | 0:34:40 | 0:34:46 | |
In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek makes a moral argument | 0:34:46 | 0:34:50 | |
that government attempts to control the economy | 0:34:50 | 0:34:54 | |
ultimately enslave its people. | 0:34:54 | 0:34:57 | |
When we give more and more power to the state, | 0:34:57 | 0:34:59 | |
gradually there is an erosion of first, economic freedom, | 0:34:59 | 0:35:03 | |
and then ultimately, political freedom. | 0:35:03 | 0:35:06 | |
That erosion of political freedom then leads people to demand | 0:35:06 | 0:35:09 | |
a strong man, a dictator to sort everything out, | 0:35:09 | 0:35:11 | |
make the trains run on time and everything else, | 0:35:11 | 0:35:14 | |
and that this leads inexorably down the road to totalitarianism. | 0:35:14 | 0:35:17 | |
It says, "To the socialists of all parties." | 0:35:18 | 0:35:23 | |
He loved it. He was so amused when he thought it up. | 0:35:23 | 0:35:27 | |
The Road to Serfdom was published in Britain in 1944 with little fanfare. | 0:35:27 | 0:35:33 | |
But across the Atlantic, things were very different. | 0:35:34 | 0:35:37 | |
In April 1945 Hayek agreed to give a short lecture tour | 0:35:37 | 0:35:42 | |
of American universities. | 0:35:42 | 0:35:44 | |
Before he arrived, his book got the kind of publicity | 0:35:44 | 0:35:48 | |
that money can't buy. | 0:35:48 | 0:35:50 | |
Reader's Digest gave Hayek top billing and a rousing introduction, | 0:35:50 | 0:35:55 | |
quoting from some of the reviews that the Road to Serfdom had got. | 0:35:55 | 0:35:58 | |
Calling it "One of the most important books of our generation." | 0:35:58 | 0:36:02 | |
"Professor Hayek with great power and rigour of reasoning | 0:36:02 | 0:36:06 | |
"sounds a grim warning to Americans and Britons who look | 0:36:06 | 0:36:09 | |
"to the government to provide the way out | 0:36:09 | 0:36:10 | |
"of all our economic difficulties." | 0:36:10 | 0:36:12 | |
And it should have "the widest possible audience". | 0:36:12 | 0:36:16 | |
And that's exactly what the book got. | 0:36:16 | 0:36:18 | |
Reader's Digest had more than 8 million subscribers. | 0:36:18 | 0:36:22 | |
Hayek's warning about the dangers of big government | 0:36:22 | 0:36:25 | |
struck a chord with many Americans. | 0:36:25 | 0:36:27 | |
The Road to Serfdom really fitted in with the notions | 0:36:28 | 0:36:32 | |
of American individualism and the sense that anybody | 0:36:32 | 0:36:36 | |
could become a millionaire if only they were to work hard enough, | 0:36:36 | 0:36:39 | |
and an anxiety which came right from the founding fathers about whether | 0:36:39 | 0:36:43 | |
the federal government should take too much power from the states. | 0:36:43 | 0:36:47 | |
After the war the size and reach of government | 0:36:48 | 0:36:52 | |
did grow across the Western world with the rise of the welfare state. | 0:36:52 | 0:36:56 | |
In Britain much of the economy was even nationalised - | 0:36:56 | 0:36:59 | |
taken over by the state. | 0:36:59 | 0:37:01 | |
Reading Hayek gave a kind of explanation of why | 0:37:01 | 0:37:08 | |
what had gone wrong was going wrong. | 0:37:08 | 0:37:10 | |
Hayek gave an alternative vision which seemed to me to be very cogent. | 0:37:10 | 0:37:17 | |
What it boiled down to was freedom within the rule of law. | 0:37:17 | 0:37:22 | |
What he was read to say | 0:37:22 | 0:37:24 | |
and actually himself moved to say by the 1960s, | 0:37:24 | 0:37:30 | |
was that moving to a social welfare society would eat away | 0:37:30 | 0:37:36 | |
at the health of democracy. | 0:37:36 | 0:37:38 | |
I think it's one of his failed predictions, badly failed, | 0:37:38 | 0:37:43 | |
even though it remains an influential part of his thinking now | 0:37:43 | 0:37:46 | |
with many followers in the libertarian mode. | 0:37:46 | 0:37:50 | |
Today, the Road to Serfdom is back. | 0:37:50 | 0:37:53 | |
'This book was like Mike Tyson in his prime. | 0:37:53 | 0:37:56 | |
'Right hook to Socialism in Western Europe and in the United States. | 0:37:56 | 0:38:00 | |
'But the influence didn't...' | 0:38:00 | 0:38:01 | |
After Glenn Beck's Fox News broadcast in 2010, | 0:38:01 | 0:38:04 | |
The Road to Serfdom shot to number one on Amazon in America. | 0:38:04 | 0:38:08 | |
'Ronald Regan...' | 0:38:08 | 0:38:10 | |
If you think about the people that would have been | 0:38:10 | 0:38:12 | |
part of Glenn Beck's audience, sometimes defined as the Tea Party. | 0:38:12 | 0:38:16 | |
'Look at what we're doing! | 0:38:16 | 0:38:18 | |
'We now have a government car company, government banks | 0:38:18 | 0:38:21 | |
'and Hayek demonstrates this road leads to one destination.' | 0:38:21 | 0:38:25 | |
There is cynicism about government and it's quite widespread, | 0:38:25 | 0:38:29 | |
there's a lot of anger. | 0:38:29 | 0:38:30 | |
That certainly would feed into... | 0:38:30 | 0:38:32 | |
Well, here's a guy who talked about the dangers of big government. | 0:38:32 | 0:38:35 | |
In fact, Hayek was in favour of governments | 0:38:35 | 0:38:39 | |
providing some kind of safety net. | 0:38:39 | 0:38:41 | |
But his modern supporters don't like to dwell on that. | 0:38:41 | 0:38:44 | |
Well, we have a lot more socialism now than when he wrote it. | 0:38:44 | 0:38:48 | |
As socialism creeps in the economy slowly over time, | 0:38:48 | 0:38:51 | |
a lot of people don't notice it. | 0:38:51 | 0:38:53 | |
And eventually, you know, you're not on the road to serfdom, | 0:38:53 | 0:38:57 | |
you've arrived at serfdom. | 0:38:57 | 0:38:58 | |
Think about Victorian Britain. | 0:38:58 | 0:39:01 | |
That was certainly a very free market, | 0:39:01 | 0:39:04 | |
there was a minimum government intervention. | 0:39:04 | 0:39:08 | |
Do we think that the average citizen of England | 0:39:08 | 0:39:11 | |
in 1870 felt a great deal of personal freedom? | 0:39:11 | 0:39:15 | |
I think there was a great deal of servility and class deference | 0:39:15 | 0:39:19 | |
coming out of the fact that the lives of the poor | 0:39:19 | 0:39:22 | |
were incredibly insecure and only by constantly flattering their betters | 0:39:22 | 0:39:28 | |
could they have any reasonable assurance of survival. | 0:39:28 | 0:39:31 | |
So no, I think there's more freedom and dignity | 0:39:31 | 0:39:35 | |
in a moderately strong welfare state than there is | 0:39:35 | 0:39:38 | |
in the Hayekian paradise of free markets. | 0:39:38 | 0:39:40 | |
Despite the success of The Road to Serfdom, | 0:39:46 | 0:39:49 | |
in the 1950s and '60s Hayek found himself in the political wilderness. | 0:39:49 | 0:39:53 | |
Governments across the Western world were enthusiastically embracing | 0:39:53 | 0:39:57 | |
the ideas of Hayek's nemesis from the dark days of the 1930s - | 0:39:57 | 0:40:01 | |
John Maynard Keynes. | 0:40:01 | 0:40:03 | |
It became the new capitalist orthodoxy that governments | 0:40:05 | 0:40:08 | |
could successfully manage their economies. | 0:40:08 | 0:40:11 | |
The tide of history had turned against Hayek. | 0:40:11 | 0:40:14 | |
He got very depressed. | 0:40:15 | 0:40:17 | |
People weren't listening to him, they weren't reading his books. | 0:40:17 | 0:40:21 | |
England seemed to be going left-wing. | 0:40:21 | 0:40:25 | |
He'd chosen to be British and he looked, from his views | 0:40:25 | 0:40:29 | |
of an economist, and he could see everything going the wrong way. | 0:40:29 | 0:40:35 | |
Then in 1974, Esca Hayek got a phone call out of the blue. | 0:40:37 | 0:40:42 | |
It was the man who had invited Hayek to the LSE 40 years earlier | 0:40:42 | 0:40:46 | |
to do battle with Keynes. | 0:40:46 | 0:40:48 | |
It was Lionel Robbins who rang me and said, "Are you sitting down?" | 0:40:50 | 0:40:55 | |
I said, "Yes." | 0:40:55 | 0:40:57 | |
And he said, "Well, he's been awarded | 0:40:57 | 0:41:01 | |
"a Nobel Prize for economics." | 0:41:01 | 0:41:04 | |
That was like being given a knighthood of the world. | 0:41:04 | 0:41:11 | |
That's the Nobel citation. | 0:41:11 | 0:41:13 | |
Stockholm the 10th of December 1974, | 0:41:16 | 0:41:19 | |
Alfred Nobel given to Friedrich von Hayek. | 0:41:19 | 0:41:26 | |
His life started off completely again. | 0:41:26 | 0:41:30 | |
He'd been depressed, he was coming up to retirement | 0:41:30 | 0:41:33 | |
and suddenly everything started, it was a new life. | 0:41:33 | 0:41:35 | |
Absolutely... everything took off for him. | 0:41:35 | 0:41:38 | |
While everything began taking off for Hayek, | 0:41:49 | 0:41:52 | |
Britain was sinking into economic decline. | 0:41:52 | 0:41:54 | |
Strikes had become a fact of life. | 0:41:54 | 0:41:57 | |
The post-war Keynesian consensus was crumbling. | 0:41:57 | 0:42:00 | |
A few months after Hayek won the Nobel Prize, | 0:42:04 | 0:42:07 | |
the Conservative Party turned to a new leader. | 0:42:07 | 0:42:11 | |
The rise of Margaret Thatcher brought Hayek | 0:42:11 | 0:42:14 | |
into the political mainstream for the first time. | 0:42:14 | 0:42:17 | |
Margaret Thatcher would, from time to time, | 0:42:17 | 0:42:20 | |
pull little bits of paper with quotations on them | 0:42:20 | 0:42:22 | |
out of her handbag and Hayek would be one of them. | 0:42:22 | 0:42:26 | |
Hayek had spent most of the 20th century as a political outsider. | 0:42:26 | 0:42:31 | |
Now he had the ear of the woman | 0:42:31 | 0:42:33 | |
who would be Britain's next Prime Minister. | 0:42:33 | 0:42:36 | |
I think it would be a great mistake | 0:42:36 | 0:42:37 | |
to think of her as studying Hayek like a student would. | 0:42:37 | 0:42:41 | |
It's more trying to get inspiration from Hayek and casting around, | 0:42:41 | 0:42:46 | |
ransacking the minds of great men, | 0:42:46 | 0:42:48 | |
of whom he was one of the most prominent, | 0:42:48 | 0:42:50 | |
so that she could somehow get the gold. | 0:42:50 | 0:42:53 | |
In 1979 Margaret Thatcher was swept to power, | 0:42:53 | 0:42:57 | |
determined to build a new Britain. | 0:42:57 | 0:43:00 | |
It was a bold change of direction | 0:43:00 | 0:43:02 | |
that really did create the world we live in today. | 0:43:02 | 0:43:05 | |
We did institute a radical change of policy direction, | 0:43:05 | 0:43:10 | |
which has not really been reversed. | 0:43:10 | 0:43:14 | |
It may have been muddied, but it hasn't been reversed. | 0:43:14 | 0:43:18 | |
It does chime in with Hayek right back in the 1940s | 0:43:18 | 0:43:24 | |
saying that the path we're on at the moment | 0:43:24 | 0:43:28 | |
is the road to serfdom, and we need to tread a very different path. | 0:43:28 | 0:43:32 | |
In the language of the time | 0:43:35 | 0:43:36 | |
Mrs Thatcher began rolling back the state. | 0:43:36 | 0:43:38 | |
Government-owned industries were privatised. | 0:43:38 | 0:43:41 | |
Public spending and taxes were cut. | 0:43:41 | 0:43:44 | |
There was a bonfire of state controls on the market - | 0:43:44 | 0:43:47 | |
on prices, wages, dividends and foreign exchange. | 0:43:47 | 0:43:50 | |
Britain was moving Hayek's way. | 0:43:50 | 0:43:54 | |
We were certainly very much on the same wavelength. | 0:43:55 | 0:43:59 | |
We were not busy thumbing his works to find out what we should do, | 0:43:59 | 0:44:03 | |
it was not a handbook for government, | 0:44:03 | 0:44:05 | |
but it was the same general idea. | 0:44:05 | 0:44:08 | |
Nowhere did today's world emerge more clearly | 0:44:11 | 0:44:14 | |
than in the Conservative's battle with the trades' unions. | 0:44:14 | 0:44:17 | |
Margaret Thatcher wanted to put a stop | 0:44:17 | 0:44:19 | |
to what she saw as rampant union power. | 0:44:19 | 0:44:22 | |
But she faced a dilemma - | 0:44:22 | 0:44:25 | |
"How do you do that without alienating the entire population?" | 0:44:25 | 0:44:28 | |
Hayek's philosophy helped her formulate her answer. | 0:44:28 | 0:44:31 | |
She wanted to frame the argument in terms of liberty. | 0:44:38 | 0:44:41 | |
She didn't want to say, "The workers are all dreadful, let's squash them." | 0:44:41 | 0:44:45 | |
She wanted to say, "The workers are being squashed by their leaders." | 0:44:45 | 0:44:48 | |
This very much fed into Hayek, and the idea of liberty | 0:44:53 | 0:44:59 | |
was, you were defending your country here | 0:44:59 | 0:45:01 | |
as well as the state of labour relations. | 0:45:01 | 0:45:04 | |
Hayek and Margaret Thatcher agreed on a lot. | 0:45:05 | 0:45:08 | |
But there was one crucial difference between them. | 0:45:08 | 0:45:10 | |
Whereas Hayek thought you freed the market to prevent power | 0:45:10 | 0:45:14 | |
getting too concentrated in the hands of politicians, | 0:45:14 | 0:45:16 | |
Thatcher thought you could have free market policies | 0:45:16 | 0:45:19 | |
and still keep a lot of power at the centre. | 0:45:19 | 0:45:22 | |
That tension between Hayek's ideal and the controlling instinct | 0:45:22 | 0:45:26 | |
of even free market politicians never really went away. | 0:45:26 | 0:45:30 | |
Where she, I think, missed out sometimes was understanding | 0:45:32 | 0:45:37 | |
the importance of institutions | 0:45:37 | 0:45:41 | |
and of countervailing power in a society. | 0:45:41 | 0:45:46 | |
Hayek, for example, was quite understanding about the role | 0:45:46 | 0:45:50 | |
of local authorities and local municipalities | 0:45:50 | 0:45:54 | |
and local power centres in a way which I don't think Margaret was. | 0:45:54 | 0:45:58 | |
Hayek's political influence reached its height in 1986 | 0:46:04 | 0:46:06 | |
when Mrs Thatcher's government swept away much of the regulation | 0:46:06 | 0:46:11 | |
that had constrained the City of London. | 0:46:11 | 0:46:13 | |
The Big Bang set the financial markets free, | 0:46:13 | 0:46:17 | |
ushering in today's vast | 0:46:17 | 0:46:19 | |
interconnected global financial system. | 0:46:19 | 0:46:21 | |
But it wasn't really the free market that Hayek wanted. | 0:46:21 | 0:46:25 | |
Hayek's followers would say the deregulated financial system | 0:46:25 | 0:46:29 | |
that came out of the '80s and '90s played a big role | 0:46:29 | 0:46:32 | |
in the financial crisis because it was only ever half free. | 0:46:32 | 0:46:37 | |
It was distorted by an implicit promise | 0:46:37 | 0:46:40 | |
to all these financial institutions | 0:46:40 | 0:46:42 | |
that if things went wrong the government would come to the rescue. | 0:46:42 | 0:46:46 | |
In the kind of capitalism we've had in the West since the 1980s, | 0:46:46 | 0:46:49 | |
the financial institutions that triggered the recent crash | 0:46:49 | 0:46:54 | |
were free to do anything, it seems, except fail. | 0:46:54 | 0:46:59 | |
It was the "Too big to fail problem". | 0:46:59 | 0:47:02 | |
They knew that it was a question of, | 0:47:02 | 0:47:06 | |
"Heads I win, tails the tax payer loses." | 0:47:06 | 0:47:10 | |
And if that is the bet, | 0:47:10 | 0:47:12 | |
you take the bet and you take it on a bigger and bigger scale. | 0:47:12 | 0:47:16 | |
So they knew pretty well that if they got the gamble wrong | 0:47:16 | 0:47:21 | |
governments couldn't allow them to fail, they'd have to be bailed out. | 0:47:21 | 0:47:25 | |
That is what is wrong and that is what has to be stopped. | 0:47:25 | 0:47:28 | |
We certainly have discovered, after the fact | 0:47:28 | 0:47:30 | |
that banks are not allowed to fail. | 0:47:30 | 0:47:31 | |
Was that actually a significant factor in the over-lending? | 0:47:31 | 0:47:35 | |
I don't think there's much evidence of that. | 0:47:35 | 0:47:37 | |
Now the fact that big banks clearly will not be allowed to fail | 0:47:37 | 0:47:42 | |
and that is distorting our system. | 0:47:42 | 0:47:44 | |
But I don't think that's the story of the crisis. | 0:47:44 | 0:47:47 | |
I think that the crisis was one more about just a general failure | 0:47:47 | 0:47:50 | |
to understand the risks. | 0:47:50 | 0:47:51 | |
There's no doubt that in the last 30 years politicians of all stripes | 0:47:54 | 0:47:58 | |
have let market forces influence more and more parts of society. | 0:47:58 | 0:48:03 | |
But they have drawn the line at Hayek's most revolutionary idea | 0:48:03 | 0:48:06 | |
of turning money itself over to the market. | 0:48:06 | 0:48:09 | |
Imagine a world where we didn't have just one legal currency circulating | 0:48:12 | 0:48:16 | |
in the economy, issued by the Bank of England, but dozens of them. | 0:48:16 | 0:48:21 | |
Anyone - a company, a bank, a private individual could set up | 0:48:21 | 0:48:24 | |
their own version of the pound and they would be free to compete. | 0:48:24 | 0:48:28 | |
The market would determine how much they were worth. | 0:48:28 | 0:48:32 | |
Hayek knew it was a crazy sounding suggestion, even for him. | 0:48:32 | 0:48:35 | |
But it would finally stop governments | 0:48:35 | 0:48:38 | |
abusing the power of money. | 0:48:38 | 0:48:40 | |
In America one man has been trying to do just that. | 0:48:43 | 0:48:47 | |
He's taken Hayek's most explosive idea and turned it in to a reality. | 0:48:51 | 0:48:57 | |
Bernard von Nothaus calls himself a monetary architect. | 0:49:06 | 0:49:10 | |
The American authorities call him a domestic terrorist. | 0:49:10 | 0:49:14 | |
For some, what's happened to von Nothaus shows just how seriously | 0:49:16 | 0:49:20 | |
governments take any challenge to their monopoly over money. | 0:49:20 | 0:49:24 | |
Economics is dry and boring. | 0:49:24 | 0:49:28 | |
But money is exciting! Money is sexy. | 0:49:28 | 0:49:32 | |
You know, money's got pizzazz, it's about people and about dreams, | 0:49:32 | 0:49:36 | |
about what we do, you know? | 0:49:36 | 0:49:37 | |
Money is fantastic! | 0:49:37 | 0:49:39 | |
And that's what I really connected with in terms of von Hayek. | 0:49:39 | 0:49:43 | |
Because what he said in here was about people taking control | 0:49:43 | 0:49:48 | |
and people issuing their own money. | 0:49:48 | 0:49:51 | |
Von Nothaus created his own currency - | 0:49:53 | 0:49:56 | |
a silver coin called the Liberty Dollar which anyone could buy. | 0:49:56 | 0:49:59 | |
And many have. | 0:49:59 | 0:50:01 | |
Thanks to him, coins worth anything up to 50 million | 0:50:01 | 0:50:04 | |
have now been sent out in to the US economy. | 0:50:04 | 0:50:07 | |
And Hayek was a big inspiration. | 0:50:07 | 0:50:10 | |
He says the problem is government money. | 0:50:10 | 0:50:13 | |
It's always been government money. | 0:50:13 | 0:50:15 | |
Because they abuse their power. They make money out of thin air. | 0:50:15 | 0:50:19 | |
So he says what we should do is to abolish the central bank. | 0:50:19 | 0:50:23 | |
The end of the Federal Reserve, that was fantastic! | 0:50:23 | 0:50:26 | |
Ever since Benjamin Strong was running the New York Federal Reserve | 0:50:28 | 0:50:32 | |
in the 1920s, central banks have used their control | 0:50:32 | 0:50:35 | |
over the supply of money to try to manage the economy's ups and downs. | 0:50:35 | 0:50:40 | |
But as we've seen, to Hayek and his fans, | 0:50:40 | 0:50:43 | |
central banks are the cause of many of capitalisms problems, | 0:50:43 | 0:50:47 | |
not the solution. | 0:50:47 | 0:50:48 | |
And I don't argue for closing the Fed down in one day either. | 0:50:49 | 0:50:52 | |
I want to audit the Fed and I want competition, | 0:50:52 | 0:50:55 | |
Hayek's ideas of competition and money, | 0:50:55 | 0:50:58 | |
and see who can win this argument. | 0:50:58 | 0:51:02 | |
But for them to claim monopoly powers | 0:51:02 | 0:51:04 | |
and prevent us from practising private market economics | 0:51:04 | 0:51:08 | |
is the real problem that we have. | 0:51:08 | 0:51:10 | |
A lot of this is this Utopian vision, the golden age | 0:51:12 | 0:51:16 | |
when men were men and currency was free. | 0:51:16 | 0:51:19 | |
The United States had a long period of no government monopoly | 0:51:19 | 0:51:22 | |
on currency. | 0:51:22 | 0:51:23 | |
We had the whole system of unregulated banks | 0:51:23 | 0:51:27 | |
issuing competing currencies. | 0:51:27 | 0:51:28 | |
That system was heavily prone to financial crises. | 0:51:28 | 0:51:31 | |
So the idea again that competition is the answer | 0:51:31 | 0:51:34 | |
is flying in the face of history. | 0:51:34 | 0:51:36 | |
Perhaps, but the history of government efforts | 0:51:37 | 0:51:41 | |
to control the market hasn't been so pretty either. | 0:51:41 | 0:51:44 | |
For Hayek, what was really utopian was the belief that central banks, | 0:51:44 | 0:51:48 | |
or anyone else for that matter, could ever be a match | 0:51:48 | 0:51:50 | |
for the dizzying complexity of our modern economy. | 0:51:50 | 0:51:53 | |
Hayek would say since they can't do it they should just stop trying. | 0:51:53 | 0:51:58 | |
We should stop having... | 0:51:58 | 0:51:59 | |
Well, stop having any intervention in monetary policy, | 0:51:59 | 0:52:02 | |
or stop having central banks if you go to the extreme. | 0:52:02 | 0:52:05 | |
Well, that's dreaming, I think. | 0:52:05 | 0:52:08 | |
Von Nothaus's attempt to compete with the Federal Reserve | 0:52:11 | 0:52:14 | |
eventually drew the attention of the American authorities. | 0:52:14 | 0:52:18 | |
In 2007, the FBI moved in. | 0:52:19 | 0:52:23 | |
I think they begin to perceive us as a threat instead of a solution. | 0:52:23 | 0:52:28 | |
NEWS REPORT: 'The architect behind the Liberty Dollar | 0:52:28 | 0:52:31 | |
'is talking about the US government | 0:52:31 | 0:52:32 | |
'and why agents raided his Evansville headquarters earlier this month.' | 0:52:32 | 0:52:37 | |
Von Nothaus was charged with counterfeiting US currency. | 0:52:37 | 0:52:42 | |
Giving evidence in this courthouse in North Carolina in 2011 | 0:52:42 | 0:52:46 | |
he talked about Hayek. | 0:52:46 | 0:52:50 | |
Well, he was relevant to my defence. | 0:52:50 | 0:52:53 | |
This wasn't some harebrained idea that I had thought up myself. | 0:52:53 | 0:52:57 | |
I pointed out that here was a well-known Nobel laureate | 0:52:57 | 0:53:02 | |
who had talked about exactly what I had done. | 0:53:02 | 0:53:06 | |
Bernard von Nothaus was found guilty | 0:53:10 | 0:53:13 | |
and now faces up to 25 years in prison. | 0:53:13 | 0:53:16 | |
And I think this was the one he was most proud of, | 0:53:25 | 0:53:29 | |
"Companion of Honour, presented by Queen Elizabeth II, | 0:53:29 | 0:53:34 | |
"Buckingham Palace, 1984." | 0:53:34 | 0:53:36 | |
And he was absolutely thrilled when he got that. | 0:53:36 | 0:53:41 | |
"To Professor, Doctor..." | 0:53:41 | 0:53:43 | |
Towards the end of his life, Hayek was feted by everyone. | 0:53:43 | 0:53:47 | |
He'd inspired politicians all over the world with his boundless belief | 0:53:47 | 0:53:51 | |
in the power of the free market. | 0:53:51 | 0:53:54 | |
And that is Catholic University, Caracas. | 0:53:54 | 0:53:58 | |
When it came to their actual policies, | 0:53:58 | 0:54:02 | |
Western leaders in the 1980s usually turned to a free market thinker | 0:54:02 | 0:54:05 | |
whose ideas they found more palatable. | 0:54:05 | 0:54:08 | |
Milton Friedman's belief that governments could steer the economy | 0:54:08 | 0:54:12 | |
using their power over the supply of money in circulation | 0:54:12 | 0:54:15 | |
is still a touchstone for governments everywhere. | 0:54:15 | 0:54:19 | |
In that sense, Friedman, unlike Hayek, did offer politicians | 0:54:19 | 0:54:23 | |
a way to champion the free market and hold on to the reins of power. | 0:54:23 | 0:54:28 | |
Hayek's life spanned almost the entire 20th century, | 0:54:30 | 0:54:34 | |
an era of unprecedented scientific progress... | 0:54:34 | 0:54:36 | |
'It's one small step for man, | 0:54:36 | 0:54:41 | |
'one giant leap for mankind.' | 0:54:41 | 0:54:44 | |
..but also unprecedented economic disasters. | 0:54:44 | 0:54:50 | |
Living in the shadow of both, | 0:54:50 | 0:54:52 | |
Hayek came to see the great crises of capitalism as the result | 0:54:52 | 0:54:56 | |
of politicians mistaking economics for a science. | 0:54:56 | 0:55:00 | |
It was a century for taking on all the big questions. | 0:55:00 | 0:55:04 | |
And the big question for economists | 0:55:04 | 0:55:07 | |
was how they were going to tame this extraordinary modern economy. | 0:55:07 | 0:55:11 | |
Keynes and Hayek both thought that would be incredibly difficult, | 0:55:11 | 0:55:15 | |
dangerous even. | 0:55:15 | 0:55:17 | |
But Keynes flattered governments with the idea | 0:55:17 | 0:55:19 | |
that they could tilt the course of human history their way. | 0:55:19 | 0:55:23 | |
It was Hayek who said they shouldn't even try. | 0:55:23 | 0:55:27 | |
We might uncover the laws of the universe - | 0:55:27 | 0:55:29 | |
we were never going to master the complexities of human nature. | 0:55:29 | 0:55:33 | |
"Pretence of knowledge", he called it - | 0:55:35 | 0:55:37 | |
pretending they know something that they don't know. | 0:55:37 | 0:55:40 | |
Well, they've been doing it now... | 0:55:40 | 0:55:42 | |
We've given the current crop of economists, | 0:55:42 | 0:55:45 | |
let's see, how many years would that be? | 0:55:45 | 0:55:47 | |
About 70-some years. Total failure. | 0:55:47 | 0:55:51 | |
Many of the computer models have been desperately misleading | 0:55:51 | 0:55:54 | |
in pretending that we understand how the economy works. | 0:55:54 | 0:55:57 | |
We don't. We can't forecast the economy. | 0:55:57 | 0:56:00 | |
But we can try to think about the big questions. | 0:56:00 | 0:56:03 | |
Can we get out of a deep slump? | 0:56:03 | 0:56:05 | |
And I think by working with other countries, | 0:56:05 | 0:56:07 | |
we can gradually find our way out of this. | 0:56:07 | 0:56:10 | |
So you need the different insights together, | 0:56:10 | 0:56:12 | |
but Hayek is a... | 0:56:12 | 0:56:14 | |
The moral of Hayek is - avoid hubris in economic policy, | 0:56:14 | 0:56:19 | |
just as we should avoid hubris in thinking that markets | 0:56:19 | 0:56:22 | |
left to their own devices will lead us to Nirvana. | 0:56:22 | 0:56:26 | |
There's no doubt Hayek helped change the course of world history, | 0:56:28 | 0:56:33 | |
shifting it decisively away from the state and towards the market. | 0:56:33 | 0:56:37 | |
Oh! 10 Downing Street, the Prime Minister, | 0:56:39 | 0:56:45 | |
3rd of May 1989. | 0:56:45 | 0:56:47 | |
"Dear Professor Hayek, it is with the greatest pleasure | 0:56:47 | 0:56:50 | |
"that I send you my warm congratulations | 0:56:50 | 0:56:52 | |
"on the occasion of your 90th birthday. | 0:56:52 | 0:56:54 | |
"The leadership and inspiration that your work and thinking gave us | 0:56:54 | 0:56:58 | |
"are absolutely crucial and we owe you a great debt." | 0:56:58 | 0:57:03 | |
"With every good wish, yours sincerely, Margaret Thatcher." | 0:57:03 | 0:57:07 | |
But no government has ever dared to implement Hayek's vision | 0:57:10 | 0:57:14 | |
of a market free from state intervention. | 0:57:14 | 0:57:16 | |
And when capitalism faced its biggest test since the 1930s, | 0:57:16 | 0:57:20 | |
politicians rushed to save the market from itself. | 0:57:20 | 0:57:24 | |
In fact, the biggest debate in Britain today is not about | 0:57:24 | 0:57:26 | |
whether the government is doing too much to prop up the economy, | 0:57:26 | 0:57:30 | |
but whether it's doing enough. | 0:57:30 | 0:57:31 | |
Today, Hayek's advice seems harder to take than ever. | 0:57:31 | 0:57:35 | |
You've got the global economy still struggling to put | 0:57:35 | 0:57:38 | |
the financial crisis behind it, if it is behind it. | 0:57:38 | 0:57:42 | |
And Hayek would say governments should just step back, | 0:57:42 | 0:57:46 | |
take a cool look at the historical record, | 0:57:46 | 0:57:49 | |
dismantle most of the machinery | 0:57:49 | 0:57:51 | |
they have constructed for guiding the economy, | 0:57:51 | 0:57:55 | |
take a deep breath, and let go. | 0:57:55 | 0:57:57 | |
I don't see any government today ready to do that. | 0:57:58 | 0:58:02 | |
I don't think I ever will. | 0:58:02 | 0:58:03 | |
Next time, Karl Marx, the man who had the most radical solution of all | 0:58:06 | 0:58:10 | |
for the problems of capitalism - get rid of it. | 0:58:10 | 0:58:13 | |
The Open University has produced six one-minute animations to explain | 0:58:15 | 0:58:19 | |
some of the key economic ideas that affect all of us. | 0:58:19 | 0:58:23 | |
If you want to learn how to spot an invisible hand | 0:58:23 | 0:58:25 | |
or other secrets of economics, go to: | 0:58:25 | 0:58:30 | |
and follow the link to the Open University. | 0:58:30 | 0:58:33 | |
Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd | 0:58:42 | 0:58:47 |