After the Fall The Iraq War


After the Fall

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Garner helped these Kurdish leaders win autonomy from Saddam after the

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or whatever, the freedom and so forth. There were thousands of

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people on the streets. The children were all dressed up in dresses.

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There were flowers being thrown. Everywhere we loblegd, people were

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cheering and -- looked, people were cheering and there were signs

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welcoming me back. It makes you feel good.

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Kurdistan after 12 years of self rule under western protection showed

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what might be possible in the rest what might be possible in the rest

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what might be possible in the rest what might be possible in the rest

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of Iraq. With Saddam gone, the Kurdish leaders wanted to secure

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their position. They arranged a lake side lunch for Garner. We were

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wondering what was the Iraq policy and how they would rule Iraq.

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said, " Look, I can't let you go to Baghdad and form a Government. I'm

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the guy that is supposed to form the about you guys taking a over the

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Government, it is about you know, coming to Baghdad and engaging in

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discussions, it is about recognising there are other leaders here that we

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have got to bring into this. The Kurds agreed to meet the

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ex-Highland opposition leaders in Baghdad. Garner was in a rush to get

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them there. He was shaken by what he had seen in the capital. Jay took me

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aside and said, " I am worried. This is not what we expected." We really

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got to get this thing, moving, I said. There are too many vacuums and

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I can't fill all the vacuums. I don't have enough people.

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His words were, " This is slipping away from us." Garner had been

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concerned about Baghdad's essential services. I went to the hospital and

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I spent a couple of hours there. I talked to the doctors. They didn't

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have anything. They didn't have any electricity or anything. I went to

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the sewage facility and there was nobody there. I thought we have got

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to get this thing working and if we don't, we're going to have an

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epidemic. The Iraqi State collapsed and the

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Americans failed to stop the looters overwhelming Baghdad.

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We don't have the capacity to take everybody in, especially right now,

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so we are trying to give them the advantage, if they make a mistake,

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they correct it. They see what they did wrong and we let them go.

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To protect their local services, some clerics set-up Islamic

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Kurdistan, the Kurds and the exiled opposition leaders gathered in

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Baghdad. Adnan Pacahachi had been Foreign

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Minister before Saddam took power. was happy to be back, but I was

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appalled by the destruction that the city of my birth was reduced to.

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He had worked closely with the Americans in the run-up to the war.

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He had been airlifted airlifted into Iraq with his own private army.

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We lobbied with the US Government to put together a military force. We

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worked to protect whatever we could from what was left in Baghdad.

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Mowaffak Rubaie was an Islamist. My house was confiscated by Saddam

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US ambassador, ZalMay Kahlilzad also arrived in Baghdad. Went up some

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number of floors and there was an oval shaped table that I vividly

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recall and there was lots of happy, but at the same time tense faces

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because they didn't know what their role was going to be.

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I said we, the Iraqi opposition, jointly with the people inside the

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country, we should form an interim Government and it is a huge mis

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mistake leaving the country in a vacuum.

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He sat across the table and looked at me and said, " Your idea for a

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provisional Government is compelling. Everyone has come to

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accept it." We want you Iraqis to dporm an interle rim Government as

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quickly as possible. We had no interest in governing Iraq.

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This Government will rule Iraq until the election is held in Baghdad. We

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all welcomed this. We discussed the transitional

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Government. We agreed this Government, this authority, ought to

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be from within a -- ought to be formed within a month.

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The ambassador and General Garner believed America was well on its way

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to accomplishing a mission. So apparently, did President Bush.

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Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the Battle of Iraq and the

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United States and our allies have prevailed.

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APPLAUSE But in fact, the President was

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already nervous that he did not have the right team in place in Baghdad.

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General Garner thought he would have three months to complete his task.

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He was wrong. There is nobody clearly in charge and there is a

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real question of law and order and it causes the President to think, "

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We need to accelerate the transition from Garner to Gerry Bremer.

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president had chosen Gerry Bremer to take over. He was close adviser to

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three secretaries of state. He had a clear grasp of Washington's

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priorities. The phone rang and I picked up the phone and it was Gerry

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Bremer calling me from DC. I thought he had done a terrific job

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under very difficult circumstances. I was very sensitive to trying not

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to make the transition difficult for him. He said, " You know the optics

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aren't good." I said, " I'm not sure I know what you are talking about."

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He said the press isn't good. I said, " I don't control the press."

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He said, " But you need to give that a lot of thought." A few days before

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Bremer set out for Baghdad, the President invited him to lunch.

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doesn't usually do lunch alone with people. I said to the President, "My

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experience is in business and you have to have one guy in charge."

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President says to Gerry, "You have got to get over there. You have got

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to establish your authority. And you have got to bring some law and order

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to that place." He is an athlete. I am an athlete, but we do different

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sports and I said to him. "This is going to be more like a marathon

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than a sprint. It is going to take time. Fixing a country is not

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something you do overnight." This challenge to the policy of a

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quick handover to Iraqis was then debated by the National Security

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Council. The discussion was around the question of how quickly we were

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going to get an interim Government in place. as often in the Bush

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cabinet, the Secretary of State and the vice president clash.

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Colin Powell, like Bremer, wanted a slower approach. Dick Cheney pushed

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the speed. I thought the idea of a provisional government was a good

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one and one of the prime objectives would be to establish a

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democratically elected government as soon as possible. We had the

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concerns, because who are you going to turn it over to and how will they

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protect the people and have security? Are you going to succumb

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to the United States Army to some Iraq fellow you brought in from

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London? Bush lent towards Bremer and Powell. It wasn't so much that there

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was a conscious decision made, but if you didn't do anything, then

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those arguing for not setting up a provisional government won, they

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would prevail. The president said to Bremer, you should feel comfortable

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changing direction. When you get there and see the situation, you may

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have to call audible is, an American football term for one quarterback

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changes play at the last minute. With those words, the President gave

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Bremner the authority he needed to drop the plan for a quick handover.

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We are in the process of discussing an appropriate transition to an

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Iraqi government, at a timeline that still has to be determined. A month

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after the fall of Baghdad, Bremer set up his headquarters in Saddam 's

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old Republican Palace. He called a meeting with the group exiled

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leaders. All of these people who had been fighting Saddam for many years,

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the Kurdish leaders, the Shia leaders, and some Sunni leaders,

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this Bremer, nobody had heard of, he shows up. I can understand that a

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number of these people had been given the impression that they were

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about to become the Government. I knew my job was to give them a cold

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shower. I had to say, openquote It is not going to be that way close

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quote. And then I said, you do not represent Iraq, there is not a woman

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among you. There is no Christian here. This group does not represent

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interior government. I said, Mr Ambassador, what are your

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responsibilities and authorities? was to exercise all legislative and

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judicial authority in Iraq. I said, then you are the Viceroy. And he was

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really, really upset. These leaders were having a difficult time

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understanding what international law made clear, which is that we were

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the governors of Iraq. He said, I will listen to views, but they are

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all advisory. When I left there, I spoke for myself. I said this is a

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real occupation. Bremer was taking charge of a nation of some 25

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million people. One of his first decisions would antagonise some of

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of $20 to state employees. The equivalent of six months salary. But

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no payments were made to the soldiers and officers of Iraq 's

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approved this document. It said it would be dangerous to immediately

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demobilised 250-300,000 armed men and put them on the streets. So the

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Iraqi army was to be employed as a national reconstruction force. The

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Americans had promised the Iraqi soldiers that if they lay down their

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arms during the fighting, they would be looked after. Many went home.

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They now faced ruin. Some officers from Saddam 's General staff

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secretly contacted an American colonel at the coalition

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headquarters. They were all in civilian clothes, they knew if they

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put on a uniform they would be in They said, we have not been paid in

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many months, what do we have to do ranks, what units they worked with.

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And as the counts came forward, we eventually were pushing 100,000.

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Colonel Hughes told his bosses that these soldiers were ready to work

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for the coalition. They just needed pain. --pain. He spoke to Walt

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Slocombe, in charge of Iraq 's Defence Ministry. He managed to

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annoy a somewhat by saying we should make good on the pavement that

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Saddam had not paid since February. My joke is, what is the Arabic for

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chutzpah? He decided he was not ready to make the commitment to pay

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the $20 already back wages. He thought it was not in America 's

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interests to recall Iraq 's army or ministry of defence. I told them,

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getting rid of Saddam 's army, particularly getting rid of the

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formal institutions, was a part of a general policy of making clear that

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the old Saddam system was being dismantled and would not be allowed

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to come back as such. Walt Slocombe said the prewar plan has gone, we

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have do basically start from scratch, we have to build an army.

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Starting the army from scratch meant reversing a presidential decision.

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Bremer had to tell the National Security Council. Jerry Bremer was

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brought into the meeting by videoconference. He said to the

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president that he was about to sign an order which was going to disband

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the regular Iraqi armed forces. There was a moment of shocked

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silence around the table. This was, of course, completely contrary to

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the view is that we had been operating under. The problem was the

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role of the army as Saddam 's primary instrument of repression.

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The political gesture of recalling the army itself would have been a

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disaster, and my view was that I wanted to hold Iraq together.

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president paused for what was probably the longest ten seconds of

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my life and said, well, Jerry, you are the guy on the ground, you do

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what is right. The old army was a part of the old

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regime. The old military needed to be formally disbanded, so that it

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could be replaced by new military organisations Armed Forces suited to

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a democratic nation. I was standing there, just

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dumbstruck, thinking, " how could he have done this? Closed. I was using

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stronger language in my mind. You don't take men who know how to use

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weapons and nowhere munitions stored all over Iraq and say, you guys are

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no longer relevant. In the week before the order to dissolve the

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army, no coalition forces were killed by hostile action. The week

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worse with each successive week. The first week, there were small

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demonstrations after Friday prayers. They grew the next week. The third

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or fourth week, I literally had to stand on a wall with a megaphone in

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Mosul and faced 10,000 or so former for the ceremony in which General

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Sanchez was promoted to three stars and took command of the military

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headquarters overseeing the effort in Iraq. At the reception

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afterwards, Petraeus, who I knew, came up to me. I was quite blunt

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with him. I said to him, Walt, your policy is

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killing our soldiers. That got his attention. He said this is a serious

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problem, it is putting my people in danger. There has to be measures to

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make sure the soldiers are given stipends. But they can have

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provisions to feed their families and there will be some respect for

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them. And I said, I will take that very seriously, I will do what I

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Apology for the loss of subtitles for 333 seconds

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Four days later, Baghdad saw the coalition. He was not interested in

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that discussion he wanted to discuss the way in which the Iraqi

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understand that the constitution will have to be written by Iraqis,

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and at that point, Ayatollah Sistani interrupted him and said, not only

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the need to ensure what the new Constitution of Iraq is, one that is

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elaborated and improved by elected representatives of the Iraqi people.

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Sistani issued a fatwa, insisting that elected Iraqis must write the

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constitution. That way, he would secure the interests of the Shia

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majority permanently. The fatwa was issued from outside the Ayatollah 's

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has and was shared by hundreds of mosques around the country. Bremer

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gathered his team. We realised this was a very important fatwa, but we

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didn't appreciate that it would be a showstopper. There was a sense that,

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maybe this can be worked around, maybe it can be mass arched. Sergio

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de Mello went to see Bremer. I said to Sergio, look, we can't

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hold elections now, there has been no sensors for 40 years, there are

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no electricals, no party political laws, no constituent boundaries.

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When you went down the list, there was nothing in place from which to

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have elections. So we had to find some way to select a group of Iraq

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is to write a constitution. --Iraqis. Bremer appointed an

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advisory group, the governing Council. In their first meeting, he

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set them an impossible challenge. They would select a group of Iraqis

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to figure out how to get a constitution in place, but also

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in a position where you had to disobey a fatwa. I suggested to them

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that they set themselves a deadline for August 30th, giving themselves

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six weeks to figure out how to do this. The one man able to mediate

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between the macro --people-macro and the American delegates was Sergio de

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Mello. -- between the Shia and the American delegates. They were very

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interested, because they knew we were an independent, trustworthy

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were experts on how we could integrate the former Iraqi members

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of the Army back into civilian life. I drove out of the UN, drove down

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the road and my car lurched forward. I pulled over and I got out of the

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I pulled over and I got out of the I pulled over and I got out of the

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I pulled over and I got out of the car and I looked back at the UN.

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That was really the first of these big attacks. So it took a little bit

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big attacks. So it took a little bit of time to sink in. A suicide bomber

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had destroyed the UN building in Baghdad killing 21 include including

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Sergio de Mello. The UN mission left Iraq. Al-Qaeda would later claim

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responsibility for the bomb bombing. The rebuilding of Iraq by the Iraqi

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people is going to go on. It is not going to be stopped by this act or

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any such acts. But without the UN, Bremer was

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stuck. He had been in Iraq for over three months and was no closer to

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handing over to Iraqis. On the morning of 8th September 2003,

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Washington's policy makers got a shock. They opened their newspapers

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to find an article by Bremer setting out his plans. He said that

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beforehanding over, he would need to get a constitution written, hold a

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referendum, and an election. It was all going to take a long time.

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to the Pentagon. One of the first things that day was the daily

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meeting with the secretary. So Secretary Rumsfeld got up and he had

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this article from the Washington Post in his hand and he was not

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happy. He went around the table and said, " Did anybody here see this,

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know that it was going to be published?

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" This is a major blueprint for the future of Iraq that has been

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announced by Gerry Bremer without consultation, not only with the

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principals, but without consultation of the president of the United

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States. If the Iraqis disagree, we are stuck

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in our position for a long time and that's not acceptable. I just

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remember it was a stunner and the prospect of having this continue for

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another two years, which was what was implied in that, I thought

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potentially a fatal mistake. Bremer's bosses ordered him to find

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a way to hand over sovereignty as soon as possible. He saw no option,

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but to give in to Sistani. He promised elections. It was a promise

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A few days days later, Bremer visited the Iraqi Symphony

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Orchestra. A brief pleasure on a difficult day. That night, he would

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have to break his promise to the Shia. .

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Bremer had been told he must end the occupation by 30th June 2004. That

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didn't leave enough time to organise elections. I would always prefer

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elections, but if we can't pull it off then what happens? We slide past

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the June 30th date. We start to get into the American political season,

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it was an election year. Who knows what falls off that edge of the

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cliff. Bremer's alternative to elections was locally appointed

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councils. They would select the Government. In America, this system

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is called a caucus. Bremer tried to sell the caucus plan to the

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governing council. I said, " Look, I lived in the United States and I

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followed their political system for many years and I still don't

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understand the caucus system. It is so complicated and I think it would

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I spent a lot of time with these people. Now, he left the meeting and

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walked outside in the middle of the meeting and I followed him out and I

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explained what the stakes were and this was the moment where all of

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this could come together. I remember very, very clearly him

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looking at me and with a face that I now realise was, you know, this face

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saying, " It is not going to change." Saying, " We are not going

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to be able to go forward with this plan." Bremer's failure alienated

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millions on the streets. It would bring a new threat to America's

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entire project. In the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in the Shia

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south and in the slums of Baghdad, Muqtada al-Sadr was the rising star.

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Al-Sadr came from a revered Shia family. He offered an alternative to

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the stalled politics particulars in Baghdad. His message was simple -

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Muqtada's Shia army grew. But what happened in the Sunni city of

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Fallujah raised Iraqi resistance to an uncontainable level. In March

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2004, four American contractors were murdered and their bodies

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murdered and their bodies murdered and their bodies

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desecrated. The US Marines hit back. For ten days, the images of dead

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For ten days, the images of dead For ten days, the images of dead

:43:08.:43:11.

civilians in Fallujah led the news. The governing council is in

:43:11.:43:17.

imploding. Several members told me they are going to resign. The

:43:17.:43:22.

President has a very difficult decision to make which is if we

:43:22.:43:26.

continue this operation much longer, it is likely that his entire

:43:26.:43:32.

political goal of passing sovereignty to a creditable Iraqi

:43:33.:43:35.

Government on 30th June will be in jeopardy.

:43:35.:43:42.

The Americans stopped the assault without taking a Fallujah. Three

:43:42.:43:49.

weeks later, these photos leaked. American soldiers abusing Iraqis in

:43:49.:43:59.
:43:59.:44:34.

Abu Ghraib Prison. The insurgency forces in Iraq now faced insurgency

:44:34.:44:44.
:44:44.:44:46.

on a massive scale. The Sunni Brigades, add sadder's -- sadder's

:44:46.:44:51.

brigade officers and Al-Qaeda. Bremer was still under orders to

:44:51.:44:58.

hand over to Iraqis by the end of June. Two months awayle. Even

:44:58.:45:01.

caucuses would take too long. He would have to appoint the

:45:01.:45:11.
:45:11.:45:17.

Government. I thought the best man to be secretary of defence was -- he

:45:17.:45:20.

had the right background for a tough job.

:45:20.:45:25.

During his exile in London, he had worked with western intelligence. He

:45:25.:45:29.

survived an attempted axe murder thought to have been ordered by

:45:29.:45:38.

Saddam Hussein. Bremer came to see me and said, we

:45:38.:45:43.

want you to be the Minister of defence. I said, I don't know who is

:45:43.:45:47.

the Prime Minister, what kind of government? He said, I want to be

:45:47.:45:50.

sure that the defence minister has the following authorities...

:45:50.:45:55.

Basically, the authorities he headlined with authorities of the

:45:55.:45:59.

Prime Minister. The Americans got what they wanted, a Western

:45:59.:46:06.

friendly, nonsectarian Prime Minister. Ayad Allawi.

:46:06.:46:16.
:46:16.:46:23.

The exit strategy that the coalition I could see a lot of frustration and

:46:23.:46:29.

I asked him, what was up, Mr Prime Minister? I said, imagine you are

:46:29.:46:34.

running a country that has nothing. No army, no police, no money,

:46:34.:46:39.

nothing at all. A month later, this feeble new state faced its first

:46:39.:46:44.

test. Grand Ayatollah Sistani left Iraq for medical treatment in

:46:44.:46:52.

London. In Najaf, Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army took over the

:46:52.:47:02.
:47:02.:47:11.

city and its holy shrines. Iraq's summoned the coalition commander.

:47:11.:47:15.

said, Prime Minister, this is a difficult situation but I believe

:47:15.:47:19.

that Saddam may have given this new government an opportunity to

:47:19.:47:25.

demonstrate that it can protect the Iraqi people. I said that the

:47:25.:47:28.

Government should be in control and American forces should not be

:47:28.:47:38.
:47:38.:47:50.

engaged at all in this fight, But the US Marines provided the real

:47:50.:48:00.
:48:00.:48:24.

THE ANCIENT CRYPTS AND PASSAGEWAYS ally, Shia and Sunni leaders put

:48:24.:48:34.
:48:34.:48:34.

Apology for the loss of subtitles for 333 seconds

:48:34.:54:01.

aside their differences to fight the said, what is this? What are you

:54:01.:54:07.

doing? You cannot have the Government seen as weak in this way.

:54:07.:54:14.

Mr Prime Minister, I have the signature of Muqtada al-Sadr in

:54:14.:54:18.

black and white in my hand. It is only me to sign it, I have not

:54:18.:54:25.

signed it yet. I said you have to stop this immediately and come back.

:54:25.:54:32.

When he came back, I told him to go and find himself and Ambassador

:54:32.:54:42.
:54:42.:55:14.

place. Allawi's government Snow the Mahdi Army retreated to the

:55:14.:55:24.
:55:24.:55:40.

a final assault, grand Ayatollah Sistani returned to Iraq. He crossed

:55:40.:55:44.

into Basra and announced that the Shia hierarchy would settle the

:55:44.:55:48.

crisis themselves, but first, he needed the Government to guarantee

:55:48.:55:58.
:55:58.:56:14.

ministers to talk to Sistani. When he got there, he was presented with

:56:14.:56:19.

an ultimatum. The government was told off for 24 hours, so Sistani

:56:19.:56:29.
:56:29.:56:29.

could talk Muqtada into the shrine. I tried many, many times to reach

:56:29.:56:39.
:56:39.:56:39.

Doctor riot, but the telephone lines was not working. --Dr Ayad. Then I

:56:39.:56:44.

fed myself in a position where I must say yes or no. If I say no,

:56:44.:56:50.

then I will destroy this initiative, Ayatollah Sistani. And I found that

:56:50.:56:58.

we had to agree on the recourse of the Ayatollah. Allawi and the

:56:58.:57:05.

Americans were still considering storming the mosque. We had paid

:57:05.:57:09.

significant blood and treasure here and we wanted to finish the

:57:09.:57:15.

operation to restore Iraqi control to Najaf. There was pressure, but we

:57:15.:57:19.

cannot allow American forces to go into the shrine. It is very

:57:19.:57:24.

difficult, very sensitive. The minister finally got a phone line

:57:24.:57:29.

through to Baghdad. They said they are agreeable, they

:57:29.:57:37.

want to call exactly what they have been advocating. To get away from

:57:37.:57:43.

the shrine and to leave it. And we were told that Ayatollah Sistani

:57:43.:57:49.

would leave and by three, there would be a cease-fire and the battle

:57:49.:57:52.

would be over. And I looked at the Prime Minister and said, we can

:57:53.:57:56.

accommodate that but we need to keep fighting until three o'clock. And

:57:56.:58:06.
:58:06.:58:15.

along with thousands of his supporters, returned to Najaf, while

:58:15.:58:25.
:58:25.:58:32.

Ali shrine, and filed out, providing cover for Muqtada's fighters.

:58:32.:58:37.

Muqtada's Mahdi Army have suffered horrendous losses. But his

:58:37.:58:45.

popularity grew. And he announced he was forming a political movement.

:58:45.:58:52.

Iraq finally have elections five months later. A Shia Islamist

:58:52.:58:58.

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