04/02/2012 Click


04/02/2012

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Transcript


LineFromTo

There is a link there to click on. I will be back at the top of the

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hour with a full bulletin. Now it is time for Click. I have logged on

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to my bank website. I have entered my password. I have protected my

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computer. That means I am safe to This week, Click meets the man-in-

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the-browser who breaks into your bank by getting you to let him in.

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So, who can you count on to protect you? We will look at how and when

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your security product may let you down and whether the banks

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themselves can keep your cash safe. Plus, the latest tech news and the

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best sites and apps of the week in Webscape.

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Welcome to Click. I am Spencer Kelly. If you bank online, you may

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have noticed over the past few years the process of logging on to

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your bank's website is getting more complicated. Gone are the days when

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you are asked for your password and user name. Today you are asked for

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part of your password or shown a picture and asked to identify it.

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Some send you these and ask you to display the code on it. These

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measures are designed to keep you safe.

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For much of the past decade, cybercrime and malicious software

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have been less about ruining your competer and more about stealthily

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stealing your credit card numbers and passwords. It costs the US

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banks $1 billion every year. For example, keylogger records your key

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strokes and sends them back. Keyloggers are easy to foil. Banks

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ask for only part of your password, sometimes without even using the

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keyboard. Hear is another old threat - these are phising e-mails,

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claiming to be from real banks, which which direct you to fake, but

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convincing copies of their websites. Enure your details here and they

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will go straight to the cybercriminal's inbox. To foil the

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fake phising websites some banks have decided to prove to you they

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are the genuine site by showing you a picture and a phrase you have

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previously chosen, something a fake website will not know. Then there

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are these. Every time you log on or try and make an online transaction

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you may be asked to put in your PIN and read off the eight dig gets on

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this screen. Now, to explain high we use this, I will have to

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introduce you to a much more sophisticated online threat.

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It is a threat which has been responsible for a number of high-

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profile security breaches. It's also a particularly ingenious way

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of stealing money onenline banking customers. Something which has led

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it to be called financial malware. A computer infected will wait until

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you visit a banking website and then alter what you see in your

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browser. Take these two computers. Both have surfed to the same

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banking website, but spot the difference. The non-infected

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machine asks for your customer number. Tin fected one asks for

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your complete password and your debit card's PIN code. There's

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nothing insecure about this particular bank, as these pictures

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show financial malware can interfere with the appearance and

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operation of any website, to ask for extra information, to change

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the display or even to change the details that you enter after you

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click OK. There are many types of financial

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malware going by names such as SpyEye and Carberp. One of the most

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established and well known is called Zeus. You don't see Zeus.

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You think you're talking to the bank, but you are talking to Zeus.

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Zeus is talking to your bank instead. What you think you're

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doing, in fact you log on, you go and you think you're doing a

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transaction, in fact it's fooling you. You think you are going to

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transfer, you look at your balance, in fact Zeus is using your

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credentials and going back and doing a transaction, but not the

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transaction you wanted. It's doing its, like unloading your bank

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account. Financial malware is getting smarter. The first

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generation would alter the log-in screen to ask for more details,

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newer versions can mess with your browsing session in more creative

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ways. One would wait for you to make an on-line payment. After you

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click confirm, it would change the amount and the account number,

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instead making a payment to a cybercriminal's account. To avoid

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detection, the malware would even change the amount displayed on an

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online statement back to the original figure the user thought

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they had paid in the first place. The Zeus code has become available

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online, allowing experts to analyse the design and the code which will

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-- and the price, just $800. How do threats like this do against the

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security products you have hopefully already installed on your

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computer? One of the reasons it is so good at what it does is because

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it's been designed to avoid detection by your security software.

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Observe. Security products on your computer

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spot unwanted intruders in the same way a security guard would in a

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shop. First, he will look out for known faces.

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Then, he will watch for unusual or suspicious behaviour.

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If all else fails he will catch stuff being stolen as it leaves.

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Modern financial malware like Zeus has been developed to foil these

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methods. Zeus can disguise its appearance. In fact it changes the

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way it looks tens of thousands of times a day. Nice hair, Zeus! He's

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not your average shopper. I'll grant you, but he's not on the

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wanted list. Zeus is also very discrete, in

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order not to draw attention to itself. Most importantly when it

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smuggles data out of your computer, it does so using someone else - the

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browser. It's called a man-in-the-browser

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attack, because essentially that's what it is doing. It is attacking

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your browser. It is getting between you and the website. It is altering

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what you see and changing the details of what you enter. Each

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time a new update of Zeus is released, it can take the security

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companies days, sometimes weeks to learn how to spot it, to learn its

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common features, regardless of its disguise. It's in this all-

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important window, before he's been identified, that your security

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guard has to rely on its other defences to spot and block the

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threat. This man thinks they are not doing

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a good enough job. Chris Pickard tests security products against

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malware. Today, he's running a test to see which of the most popular

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security products can spot a man- in-the-browser attack, purely by

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looking at its behaviour. To do this, he has commissioned a new

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man-in-the-browser threat to be written, which we have called Test

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Tool, in which known of the security companies will have on

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their wanted list. To ensure it is a fair test we have drofted in --

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drafted in independent witnesss, Daniel Brett and David Avila from

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S21sec. We are testing if each security product will warn us that

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Test Tool is a suspicious programme when we drop it on the machine and

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run it, and also whether it will prevent it from stealing our log-on

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details when we enter them into this website. This product has

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passed. We are looking for any message alerting us that something

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untowards is happening. This product, however, has failed. It

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does not alert us when the threat runs on the machine. We enter our

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details - still no warning and even worse our user word and password is

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sent to this laptop. The bad news is when running with standard

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settings, the majority of the products we tested failed. Only the

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minority gave us a warning, or stopped our details from being

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stolen. But, says our independent expert, these products still form

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an independent part of your computer's defences. The man-in-

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the-browser attack is a very focused, a very specific advanced

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threat we are seeing. Specifically focused against banking. Now, many

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products might not pick this up because they are a bigger scope.

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They have to defend against all of the viruses we have seen from the

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beginning of time. So, that means that they are not performing in

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this area. It doesn't mean they are useless products. Some stuff we

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have seen that does work against this is narrowly focused. It will

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only product against that malware. Definitely double them up. Follow

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the advice of your bank. Get an up- to-date anti-virus, any tools which

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are effective and be vigilant. Makers of many of the security

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devises said it was not valid. They said part of their service stops

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you getting infected in the first place by continuingly blacking out

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websites and e-mails and other sources of malware, ensuring your

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computer has no vulnerabilitys and spots if your machine starts to

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communicate with those with malicious zerers. Many security

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pro--- servers. Many security products will protect against this

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if they are set up to maximum. The problem here is they will block

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many legitimate products too. If this had come from a source not

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known to have been bad and started to communicate with an address not

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on the blacklist, until they discovered and analysed it, it

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probably would have beaten their protection. It's not just the

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security products which are fighting the cybercriminals. Next,

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we will look at how the banks have joined the battle against Zeus and

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its contemporaries. We will have advise on how to spot if you have

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become a victim. Next up, a look at this week's big tech news stories.

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Many of us may feel we've got a share in Facebook's success. Soon

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we'll be able to actually own shares in the company. It is going

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to float on the Stock Market, with company shares expected to be

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available for trading in May. The company has had to reveal

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previously unknown information about the finances which shows Mark

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Zuckerberg owns just over a quarter of the company. The network of 845

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million users each month made $1 billion in profit last year.

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Microsoft is connecting TCs. Its movement detection system,

:12:17.:12:27.
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originally for the 360 games console, has been released, with

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home running Windows. Microsoft says it has enhanced voice

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recognition and skeletal tracking, which may explain high the PC price

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tag is almost double that of the Xbox model. A British couple have

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been denied entry to the US after one tweeted he would go and destroy

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America, before he travelled. This and another message about digging

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up Marilyn Monroe's grave were considered enough reason to stop

:12:58.:13:08.
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homeland security -- to enable homeland security to stop Lee Van

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Bryan and his girl at Los Angeles airport. This did manage to fool

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some on-looking. The devices, designed to look like flying people,

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:13:36.:13:40.

Financial malware are right under your nose, it's not surprising then

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that the banks have taken steps to defend themselves against man in

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the browsary tacks. And that brings us back to these things. They may

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be inconvenient but they have proved incredibly effective at

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stopping financial malware fromalityering the details that you

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enter. Whether it's at the log-on stage or when you make an online

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payment, these devices generate knew mairk codes based on the

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account number, amount and your card's pin code. If Zeus changes

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any of these behind-the-scenes, your bank will expect a different

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code from the one your device has generated and the transaction will

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fail. In the US, new guidance has

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recently been issued that insists on tougher online banking security.

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One suggestion is to use your mobile phone to authenticate a

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transaction. For example, try to set up a new payee using this

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online banking system and you'll receive an automated phone call

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which verbly confirms the bank account number, which should warn

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you if it's actually someone else who's logged into your account. And

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to confirm that the details haven't been changed en route, you'll be

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asked to enter a code into your phone which confirms the specific

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details of your transaction. And while these defences are in place

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at the front end, the banks have more tricks up their sleeves

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behind-the-scenes. If you ever log into your bank and you notice that

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their main web page has changed and you notice that it seems to be

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changing on a regular basis, that's to foil Zeus. Because Zeus is tied

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to the way the page is formated. It's tied to exactly the way the

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page looks. So the way the banks get around it is they reorganise

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the web page you're talking to at the bank. That slows down Zeus

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until its next update. The UK Payments Council, which oversees

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the strategy for payments for the British banks, says that

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understanding customers' normal behaviour is also vital. Banks also

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employ back end security, that's what's happening behind-the-scenes

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to protect you from being a victim of online banking fraud. So they've

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got fraud detection software, it's intelligent software used to seeing

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how you operate your online bank account. Any deviations from the

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norm, that software will pick it up. That may be the type of transaction

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you've made, the amount, one of the things that the criminals will do,

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and this potentially acts as a, will put a flag on your account. If

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criminals have got your details they will typically put a pound

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transaction through, maybe to a utility company even a charity

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payment. They're testing that the details they have are correct and

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that the account is still active. Those are the types of things that

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actually the fraud detection software are looking out for.

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methods are however only the latest step in the inevitable cat-and-

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mouse game with the cybercriminals. There are now reports of financial

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malware which calculates how much it can take from your account

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without appearing suspicious. New aversions -- newer versions of Zeus

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are there to foil multiaction authentication techniques to fool

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you into giving your mobile phone number. Do this and you will be

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sent a link which will infect your phone. This one tries to fool you

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into using your chip and PIN device to generate a correct code for its

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transaction. Once logged into your bank, it offers to train you in

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your bank's new upgrated security system. As part of that you're

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invited to make a transaction to a fictitious bank account, though

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you're told this is just a training exercise, the transaction is real.

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We asked the bank what's they think we should watch out for and here's

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what they said: If your transaction seems to be taking longer than

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normal, there's a chance it's going via a fraudster's system. If you're

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asked for more information than normal, especially entire passwords,

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where previously you were only asked for parts, your machine may

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have been infected. If you suspect that something's amiss, contact

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your bank by phone, not by e-mail. Tell them the time and date that

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you believed you were accessing your bank account and if the bank's

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records don't match, it's likely that your computer has been

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compromised. Now, if all that sounds alarming, then first of all,

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don't panic. In the UK at least banks usually refund Vic tums of

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online fraud as a matter of course. Do use a security product. You'll

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stand a greater chance of not getting infected in the first place.

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You'll find all of these details and more on how to stay safe online

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at our website. OK. Next up it's Kate Russell with

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Webbescape. The internet doesn't recognise boundaries. If you meet

:18:37.:18:40.

someone on a social network they're as likely to come from the other

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side of the planet as the house next door. When it comes to Twitter,

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you can see where your followers come from at TweepsMap.com. Just

:18:49.:18:53.

link your account and then share the results. It's a great

:18:53.:18:58.

conversation starter. 0 but not so good if you have a huge volume of

:18:58.:19:03.

followers, like our account at BBC click, Twitter only lets software

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like this do a certain amount of queries every hour. It couldn't

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handle our traffic. Luckily the nice people at TweepsMap.com were

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able to bypass their system and create our own special map. View

:19:20.:19:24.

the results as a map or a list, with an accompanying pie chart for

:19:24.:19:29.

that extra geek factor. You can even check out a followers

:19:29.:19:33.

TweepsMap.com and share the results, a great way to make them aware of

:19:33.:19:36.

the service. But it might get you blocked for being a little bit

:19:36.:19:46.
:19:46.:19:49.

Discovery engines are all about helping you find new things you'll

:19:49.:19:52.

love based on what everyone else on the web thinks. There are lots to

:19:52.:19:57.

help you explore new areas of music, but not many that do it in such a

:19:57.:20:03.

stylish way as discover music. It's for iPhones and iPad and is an

:20:03.:20:06.

infinitely more rewarding experience on the larger screen of

:20:06.:20:11.

the tablet. As you explore you can tap through for samples, buy yoing

:20:11.:20:15.

Fiz, videos and other interesting bits. The apps aren't free, but

:20:15.:20:20.

they're not that expensive either. They do work brilliantly and look

:20:20.:20:24.

gorgeous while they're at it. And if you happen to be a Macintosh

:20:24.:20:33.

owner, there's a desk top download for you too.

:20:33.:20:37.

If you're not crazy about music, you might be interested in the

:20:37.:20:42.

developer's other offering instead, discover apps. Same principle, but

:20:42.:20:46.

building a map of content you might like from the world of smartphone

:20:46.:20:56.
:20:56.:20:58.

apps, now that really make me appy. Ever had a burning question, an

:20:58.:21:01.

intellectual itch that needed scratching but you don't have hours

:21:01.:21:05.

and hours to ask your friends and trawl through the internet looking

:21:05.:21:12.

for answers? Qoura.com hopes to be the best destination to hear a

:21:12.:21:16.

range of theories and opinions crowd sourced and rating by the

:21:16.:21:25.

webizens of the world. All the pages can be edited by

:21:25.:21:30.

anybody, so the content should grow and change organically over time.

:21:30.:21:35.

Like Wikipedia, then, only geared towards answering questions with

:21:35.:21:38.

commentary and debate rather than just delivering pages and pages of

:21:38.:21:43.

straightforward data. It's early days yet, so the community isn't

:21:43.:21:47.

huge, but there's already some interesting content building. I

:21:47.:21:50.

like the addition of their first mobile app for iPhone. Let's hope

:21:50.:21:56.

it wonts be too long before the other hand sets are covered. A nice,

:21:56.:21:59.

simple idea executed well enough that they deserve to succeed.

:21:59.:22:02.

Whether the internet needs another collaborative archive of

:22:02.:22:10.

information is another matter entirely.

:22:10.:22:14.

Riding on the top deck of a London bus is a great way to see the city.

:22:14.:22:19.

Now you can enjoy a bit of art on 30 red and black LED screens around

:22:19.:22:23.

London on the roofs of bus shelters. Anyone in the world can design a

:22:23.:22:33.

screen using the browser-based tool at bus-tops.com. My efforts won't

:22:33.:22:37.

win awards, but maybe tourists riding round the city later this

:22:37.:22:47.
:22:47.:22:48.

year, will enjoy your creation. With radical changes in Google's

:22:48.:22:51.

privacy coming on March 1, you might be interested to see what

:22:51.:22:56.

Google thinks about you, head to Google.com/ads/preferences to see

:22:56.:22:59.

what assumptions the company has made about you based on your

:23:00.:23:03.

activity through their services such as search terms queer rid and

:23:03.:23:09.

websites visited. They use this information to target users with

:23:09.:23:13.

personalised advertising, but pigeon holing can be a hit-and-miss

:23:13.:23:20.

science, as apparently I'm a male aged 18 to 24.

:23:20.:23:26.

# If you don't know me by now... # Luckily you have the option to

:23:26.:23:34.

change, delete or even opt out of the service all together. And

:23:34.:23:38.

finally, this week, the web has been alive with the story about

:23:38.:23:41.

Twitter announcing it might block specific content on a country by

:23:41.:23:45.

country basis if required. A lot of people online have voiced their

:23:45.:23:50.

objections and as a result the web is awash with reports of a very

:23:50.:23:54.

easy work around, by simply editing your account settings to say you're

:23:54.:23:57.

in another country, as the block isn't based on the physical

:23:57.:24:01.

location from your IP address. Do be aware though, that doing this

:24:01.:24:07.

might actually be considered illegal where you live.

:24:07.:24:12.

And if you missed any of those links, they're on our website.

:24:12.:24:16.

Along with everything else from this week's programme too. Feel

:24:16.:24:22.

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