Browse content similar to Ali Khedery - Special Assistant to the US Ambassador to Iraq, 2003-2009. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
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aid convoy heading the Ukraine. As heavy fighting continues. It is now | :00:00. | :00:00. | |
time for HARDtalk. Welcome to HARDtalk. American | :00:00. | :00:15. | |
warplanes are once again attacking targets in Iraq ` ordered into | :00:16. | :00:18. | |
action by a president who made it his business to end US military | :00:19. | :00:27. | |
involvement in Iraq. To Barack Obama's critics, it is one more | :00:28. | :00:30. | |
piece of evidence pointing to an incoherence of strategy in a region | :00:31. | :00:33. | |
becoming ever more unstable and dangerous. My guest today is Ali | :00:34. | :00:45. | |
Khedery, a former adviser to a string of American ambassadors in | :00:46. | :00:47. | |
Baghdad. Does the United States have the ability to impose its will on | :00:48. | :00:49. | |
the Middle East? Ali Khedery, welcome to HARDtalk. | :00:50. | :01:28. | |
Thank you for having me. I just referred to the Middle East being | :01:29. | :01:31. | |
more unstable, more dangerous than it has been in many decades. How | :01:32. | :01:36. | |
much of the responsibility for that, do you think, rests with the | :01:37. | :01:45. | |
United States? Obviously it is a very complicated situation. The | :01:46. | :01:49. | |
situation we see today across the Middle East is partially due to | :01:50. | :01:54. | |
American intervention like the war in 1991 in Iraq and again in 2003. | :01:55. | :02:01. | |
But a lot of the variables are extremely complicated, owing to the | :02:02. | :02:05. | |
poor leadership under the lakes of Saddam Hussein. And then there are | :02:06. | :02:12. | |
broader religious, social, economic trends that are all colliding | :02:13. | :02:18. | |
WriteNow across the Middle East and creating a dangerous situation for | :02:19. | :02:23. | |
global stability. Nobody would disagree that it is great complex. | :02:24. | :02:27. | |
But is it not true to say that looking at the span of | :02:28. | :02:30. | |
administrations covering George W Bush and Barack Obama, there is a | :02:31. | :02:35. | |
lesson to be learned, and that is whenever the United States tries to | :02:36. | :02:41. | |
intervene actively, whether diplomatically or a militarily in a | :02:42. | :02:46. | |
country like Iraq, it tends to backfire? I do not think you can | :02:47. | :02:52. | |
draw that lesson. The lesson you can do instead is we have to be very | :02:53. | :02:57. | |
careful, either as the United States for the international community, | :02:58. | :03:02. | |
when intervening abroad. Particularly in distant lands were | :03:03. | :03:06. | |
original speak the language for a nosy religion or the history. `` or | :03:07. | :03:13. | |
know the. One example of positive liberation is the liberation of | :03:14. | :03:19. | |
Kuwait. There was a dark lining when resident Bush called for the Shia | :03:20. | :03:26. | |
and the Kurds to rise up against Saddam Hussein. You left them out to | :03:27. | :03:32. | |
dry. The lesson we have learnt is that intervention without proper | :03:33. | :03:38. | |
planning was not especially wise. And then a more isolationist posture | :03:39. | :03:45. | |
under Barack Obama was equally unwise. It has resulted in even more | :03:46. | :03:54. | |
of a mess than before Saddam Hussein fell. I want to get to the day's | :03:55. | :04:02. | |
mess shortly. I want to tease out recent history a bit more. It seems | :04:03. | :04:07. | |
to me that you yourself have a case to answer. I talked about recent | :04:08. | :04:19. | |
interventions backfiring. You in fact have made a claim that you were | :04:20. | :04:22. | |
instrumental in deciding that the Prime Minister was the key Shia | :04:23. | :04:27. | |
Iraqi politician who Americans should invest in to promote as the | :04:28. | :04:33. | |
leader capable of uniting Iraq from 2006 onwards. Are you prepared to | :04:34. | :04:40. | |
say sorry for that? I am prepared to detail exactly what occurred in 2006 | :04:41. | :04:47. | |
and 2010. I did so in a recent piece in the Jewish and in post. `` in the | :04:48. | :04:51. | |
Washington Post. You have to understand the position | :04:52. | :04:59. | |
we were in in 2006. Iraq was in a civil war. The current Prime | :05:00. | :05:05. | |
Minister was utterly feckless, indecisive" variant. It was very | :05:06. | :05:11. | |
clear that Congolese Rice and the British Foreign Minister explicitly | :05:12. | :05:17. | |
asked the prime minister to step down. As we learned in 2003, when | :05:18. | :05:24. | |
you ask one leader to step down, you need somebody to fill the vacuum. | :05:25. | :05:32. | |
After a series of interviews with various Iraqi leaders, Nouri Alma | :05:33. | :05:37. | |
Key was seen to be the least worst option. In 2006 to thought you were | :05:38. | :05:43. | |
doing the right thing by promoting him. Right now Barack Obama and his | :05:44. | :05:48. | |
team think there are doing the right thing by promoting Haider al`Abadi | :05:49. | :05:54. | |
as the right politician. As they may well find it is simply making | :05:55. | :06:02. | |
matters worse. It is very well made. But the reality is when George W | :06:03. | :06:06. | |
Bush undertook the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, many of us, | :06:07. | :06:10. | |
including myself, were against that decision. But he as the President of | :06:11. | :06:17. | |
United States conjunction with Tony Blair decided to do so. All of us | :06:18. | :06:21. | |
collectively had to deal with the fallout. One could have stood on the | :06:22. | :06:26. | |
sidelines and complained about it, or one could have volunteered to | :06:27. | :06:31. | |
serve and try and affect things from the inside. That is the position I | :06:32. | :06:36. | |
took. Those who knew me personally will tell you that I am not an | :06:37. | :06:41. | |
apologist for America's foreign policy. Either the positive or a | :06:42. | :06:48. | |
negative things we have seen. I tried to give the best counsel I | :06:49. | :06:53. | |
could provide two successive ambassadors and generals in Baghdad. | :06:54. | :06:59. | |
When you are faced with thousands of decisions on a daily basis, | :07:00. | :07:03. | |
inevitably some of the decisions made are correct and some are | :07:04. | :07:07. | |
incorrect. I will tell you, it is important to emphasise this, he | :07:08. | :07:14. | |
proved to be exactly the right Prime Minister during his first term. | :07:15. | :07:21. | |
Militias for running rampant across Iraq. When he took power, he crushed | :07:22. | :07:32. | |
al`Qaeda and the militias. The civil war was reduced and violence was | :07:33. | :07:36. | |
reduced by 90%. That takes us to 2010. By 2010, I stood firmly and | :07:37. | :07:42. | |
virtually alone in opposing his return for a second term. Having | :07:43. | :07:51. | |
known him since 2003, it is clear to me that he was taking advantage of | :07:52. | :07:56. | |
the successes of the search and was cementing a dictatorship, a | :07:57. | :07:59. | |
theocracy and was increasingly beholden to Iran. You had misjudged | :08:00. | :08:08. | |
him. You called him a friend. He said the Obama Administration in | :08:09. | :08:11. | |
recent years has made some key mistakes because they are not versed | :08:12. | :08:20. | |
in the Middle East. But the fact is, you were very experienced. You | :08:21. | :08:25. | |
misjudged him. You have to admit it now. We did not misjudged him. If | :08:26. | :08:34. | |
you look at the 2006 episode against the 2010 episode, the violence was | :08:35. | :08:41. | |
reduced by 90%. We needed a security minded prime minister in 2006 to | :08:42. | :08:46. | |
restore order and stability. That is what happened. It is due to a wide | :08:47. | :08:53. | |
variety of things, including the Sunni awakening and the coalition | :08:54. | :08:57. | |
efforts. Like the British military intelligence services. But also | :08:58. | :09:02. | |
owing a lot to the Iraqi unity themselves. But it was clear that | :09:03. | :09:06. | |
Nouri al`Maliki had a plan to hijack Iraq's democracy. O to the more | :09:07. | :09:13. | |
specific criticisms you have made of the Obama Administration in the | :09:14. | :09:20. | |
years since you left it. You say that they have adopted an | :09:21. | :09:25. | |
isolationist strategy and they have failed to appreciate their friends | :09:26. | :09:32. | |
and confront their real enemies. I want you to explain, briefly as you | :09:33. | :09:39. | |
can, you mean about that. When I failed to convince the White House | :09:40. | :09:43. | |
to oppose Nouri al`Maliki's returning to thousands and, I put my | :09:44. | :09:49. | |
money where my mouth is. I resigned in protest. Detailing exactly why I | :09:50. | :09:53. | |
believe that Iraq was set on a path towards civil war, perhaps a | :09:54. | :09:57. | |
regional holy war, going back to Nouri al`Maliki's policies. Today we | :09:58. | :10:03. | |
have seen those predictions become a reality. By campaigning on a winning | :10:04. | :10:10. | |
election, two elections, promising to end the war is across Iraq and | :10:11. | :10:17. | |
Afghanistan, the president has closed those wars in an | :10:18. | :10:21. | |
irresponsible manner. He has left our friends across the region | :10:22. | :10:26. | |
feeling alone and abandoned. Increasingly, emboldened our | :10:27. | :10:35. | |
strategic allies, even a site in Syria. Thereby giving birth to very | :10:36. | :10:48. | |
global threats like ISIS. The strategic view of yours is | :10:49. | :10:50. | |
important, but it does not make much sense. You say Obama has failed to | :10:51. | :10:57. | |
realise the real enemy, the head of the snake, is Iran. But it is not | :10:58. | :11:02. | |
Iran that is responsible for the rise of this extreme Sunni, jihadist | :11:03. | :11:08. | |
a movement that we call Islamic State. That is not Iran. The money | :11:09. | :11:14. | |
for that sweeping extremism is coming from the Gulf, from cacti, | :11:15. | :11:23. | |
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia. I could not disagree with you more. Here is why. | :11:24. | :11:30. | |
ISIS did not exist three years ago. What we were faced with was al`Qaeda | :11:31. | :11:36. | |
Central in Afghanistan, Pakistan and some franchises in Yemen, North | :11:37. | :11:48. | |
Africa. ISIS was the direct result of Asad's genocide campaign in | :11:49. | :11:55. | |
Syria. Who has helped him? It is his own militarily, Hezbollah, Iraqi | :11:56. | :12:05. | |
militias and also Iran's Revolutionary guard. By killing | :12:06. | :12:09. | |
hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians, by displacing millions | :12:10. | :12:13. | |
more, that created that disillusioned and disenfranchised | :12:14. | :12:20. | |
Sunni Arabs. And Nouri al`Maliki was doing the same, creating an | :12:21. | :12:26. | |
environment where we saw al`Qaeda, an entity that was supercharged, | :12:27. | :12:35. | |
welcomed or created. That is why it it is important not to address the | :12:36. | :12:41. | |
symptoms, but to address the underlying causes. A recent | :12:42. | :12:48. | |
investigation by the New York Times which concluded ISIS has the pocket | :12:49. | :12:55. | |
donors in places like Kuwait and Qatar, Turkish brokers who do | :12:56. | :13:03. | |
business with these groups. If we are saying that Islamic State | :13:04. | :13:08. | |
represents a long`term strategic threat to the United States, this is | :13:09. | :13:12. | |
not really about Iran, it is about some of the countries which we call | :13:13. | :13:14. | |
partners. about both. It is about Iran, Bashar | :13:15. | :13:31. | |
al`Assad, Hezbollah, the Shia militia and radicalisation. It is | :13:32. | :13:35. | |
also about the rude funders of some of these jihadis like wealthy | :13:36. | :13:40. | |
individuals in the Gulf states or regional allies or individuals in | :13:41. | :13:46. | |
Turkey. I absolutely conquer that Moore has got to be done. That is | :13:47. | :13:50. | |
why I recently called for President Obama to appoint a Middle East | :13:51. | :13:55. | |
co`ordinator to work with both regional allies, with allies like | :13:56. | :14:00. | |
the UK, the EU, and even pull in potential foes like Russia and | :14:01. | :14:04. | |
China, because really, this has become a global pandemic that is | :14:05. | :14:10. | |
spreading, that is becoming uncontrollable. And unless the | :14:11. | :14:13. | |
international community moves quickly to work together, this | :14:14. | :14:17. | |
problem will only missed us decides further and endangered the global | :14:18. | :14:21. | |
Middle East, global energy supplies and the global economy. `` Rob will | :14:22. | :14:31. | |
only metastasise. You talk about a Middle East tsar to bring about | :14:32. | :14:36. | |
policy`making in the US. It seems to me that you think that man should be | :14:37. | :14:40. | |
a senior general to have the heft and the weight to push through | :14:41. | :14:44. | |
coherent policy`making. Does that suggest you believe there are | :14:45. | :14:49. | |
military solutions to this? Obama has sent the warplanes back in. | :14:50. | :14:55. | |
There is some discussion in some quarters contemplating American | :14:56. | :14:57. | |
troops back on the ground in Iraq. Are you an advocate of that? I'm not | :14:58. | :15:05. | |
at all an advocate of boots on the ground in the Middle East. I'm very | :15:06. | :15:11. | |
sceptical even of American air intervention in the Middle East, | :15:12. | :15:15. | |
even in Iraq. The recommendation I have made in the appointment of a | :15:16. | :15:18. | |
5`star general is rooted very deep in American bureaucracy. Basically, | :15:19. | :15:23. | |
having worked for five American ambassadors in Iraq and three. | :15:24. | :15:27. | |
Amanda is that US Central command, which is the US entity in charge of | :15:28. | :15:33. | |
the Middle East and South Asia, what I have seen first hand is that the | :15:34. | :15:37. | |
US military is vastly more resourced than its civilian counterparts. For | :15:38. | :15:43. | |
example, when I General David Petraeus, he had his own 737, secure | :15:44. | :15:54. | |
phone lines and so on. The US ambassador, if he was lucky, all he | :15:55. | :15:57. | |
could rely on was a working blackberry. You are on the record as | :15:58. | :16:05. | |
saying that the US should develop an overarching coherent Middle East | :16:06. | :16:08. | |
strategy that must be front and centre of all foreign policy`making. | :16:09. | :16:12. | |
Given the complexity of the individual challenges in Iraq, | :16:13. | :16:17. | |
Syria, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, it is simply superficial now to say that | :16:18. | :16:22. | |
this must be one coherent Middle East strategic direction. It is not | :16:23. | :16:28. | |
possible. I think it is imperative that we have a regional strategy in | :16:29. | :16:32. | |
the Middle East and the reason why is because right now, again, | :16:33. | :16:37. | |
particularly deep inside the bureaucracy, there are silos. We | :16:38. | :16:42. | |
deal with Libya as an isolated problem. Egypt and its neighbours. | :16:43. | :16:47. | |
We deal with the problems in Yemen as isolated problems. Same as Syria | :16:48. | :16:51. | |
and Iraq. Especially when it comes to Syria and Iraq. What we have seen | :16:52. | :16:56. | |
is the fusion of those two conflicts into one. Throughout the Iraq War, | :16:57. | :17:03. | |
we received messages from the commander of the Iranian | :17:04. | :17:05. | |
Revolutionary guards. He repeatedly told me he was in charge of Iranian | :17:06. | :17:11. | |
policy from Gaza to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan and | :17:12. | :17:16. | |
in the Gulf countries. What we were seeing was that the Iranians were | :17:17. | :17:20. | |
manipulating events across the region, so they would pressure us in | :17:21. | :17:24. | |
one area where they were not happy and they would reward us in another | :17:25. | :17:28. | |
area when it was in their interest. What we need again is, whether it is | :17:29. | :17:33. | |
the US or someone from the UK, what we really need is a global alliance | :17:34. | :17:37. | |
to confront this transnational phenomenon called ISIS or archived | :17:38. | :17:41. | |
because throughout the Western world, bureaucracies are geared | :17:42. | :17:45. | |
towards confronting sovereign actors like the former Soviet Union as | :17:46. | :17:50. | |
opposed to transnational non`state actors like ISIS or Al`Qaeda. | :17:51. | :17:56. | |
Frankly, 9/11 and the assassination of Ambassador Chris Stephen in 2012 | :17:57. | :18:00. | |
and more recent events have proven that the current structures are not | :18:01. | :18:05. | |
capable of handling and addressing those threats. Let me return to the | :18:06. | :18:12. | |
issue of Iraq, if I may. The administration 's position is can | :18:13. | :18:16. | |
happen unless there is a government in Baghdad committed to maintaining | :18:17. | :18:20. | |
the unity of the nation and including all of the different sects | :18:21. | :18:26. | |
and communal groups in a political future. It seems to me that raises | :18:27. | :18:31. | |
another awkward question for you. In a different life not so long ago, | :18:32. | :18:34. | |
just three or four years ago, you worked for Exxon. You pushed Exxon | :18:35. | :18:41. | |
to draw up specific deals with the Kurdish regional government and oil | :18:42. | :18:45. | |
into Turkey, to make lots of money for Exxon and the Kurds as well. | :18:46. | :18:50. | |
That sort of deal is thoroughly disapproved of in Baghdad and | :18:51. | :18:53. | |
actually is again contributing to the fragmentation of Iraq, not its | :18:54. | :19:01. | |
unity. Do you agree? I do not agree. In fact, I view that very much as a | :19:02. | :19:07. | |
glass half empty argument. This is why. Very few individuals can claim | :19:08. | :19:13. | |
to have helped bring in the world's largest company, literally and | :19:14. | :19:18. | |
encouraged it to invest $1 billion in Iraq. If we look at Iraq as one | :19:19. | :19:25. | |
country... With respect, you were not. You were working with the | :19:26. | :19:28. | |
Kurdish regional government and what we see right now is that the Kurds, | :19:29. | :19:32. | |
more and more, are exploiting the access to the oil well to develop a | :19:33. | :19:38. | |
completely independent strategy. Right, again. I completely disagree. | :19:39. | :19:46. | |
You have to go back to the Iraqi constitution, which explicitly grant | :19:47. | :19:48. | |
the Kurds the authority, for example, to sign contracts when new | :19:49. | :19:59. | |
oilfields. It is in the new Iraqi constitution. The entry of the likes | :20:00. | :20:02. | |
of Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Gazprom and total, former energy giants, into | :20:03. | :20:09. | |
Kurdistan and Basra in southern Iraq, are a great thing for all of | :20:10. | :20:14. | |
Iraq because any revenue produced from any part of Iraq, again going | :20:15. | :20:19. | |
back to the constitution, belong to the population of the entire country | :20:20. | :20:23. | |
and are to be divided based on the population of each province. And the | :20:24. | :20:28. | |
Kurds have not to my knowledge ever demanded anything separately. What | :20:29. | :20:33. | |
they have demanded is the implementation of the Constitution. | :20:34. | :20:36. | |
May I interrupt because that is obviously not the way it is seen in | :20:37. | :20:40. | |
Baghdad. They are deeply unhappy with it. But before we finish, I | :20:41. | :20:45. | |
want to bring things back to where we are today. People around the | :20:46. | :20:49. | |
world right now are being exposed to the most gruesome video, where an | :20:50. | :20:53. | |
American citizen, a journalist, James Foley, is beheaded, executed | :20:54. | :20:58. | |
by a member of the Islamic State movement. It brings home the degree | :20:59. | :21:03. | |
to which right now, events are spiralling completely out of control | :21:04. | :21:10. | |
in Iraq. Do you see that the Obama administration has a strategy for | :21:11. | :21:18. | |
exerting some sort of control? Not at all. And as I have said recently, | :21:19. | :21:25. | |
President Obama calling ISIS the junior varsity team, which roughly | :21:26. | :21:31. | |
on global terms means a grade school sports team, in January and then | :21:32. | :21:34. | |
last week, his deputy national security adviser said that ISIS does | :21:35. | :21:40. | |
not pose a threat to the American homeland more to American | :21:41. | :21:44. | |
interests, those statements are astounding frankly and I hope that | :21:45. | :21:54. | |
events like this vicious murder will help to wake up the White House and | :21:55. | :22:00. | |
will help to wake up the American population and our global allies | :22:01. | :22:03. | |
that we have a very serious problem on our hands. Again, you cannot | :22:04. | :22:08. | |
address Iraq's problems without addressing Syria's Robbins, for | :22:09. | :22:15. | |
example. And without stopping the genocide being perpetuated by Bashar | :22:16. | :22:18. | |
al`Assad, Hezbollah, Iran and the Revolutionary Guards, you will never | :22:19. | :22:23. | |
be able to get hold of ISIS. These tactical pinpoint strikes against | :22:24. | :22:27. | |
ISIS in Iraq will do nothing towards solving the problems of ISIS and the | :22:28. | :22:34. | |
region. A full on intervention was tried by George W Bush and many | :22:35. | :22:38. | |
would argue that did not work. This is my last point. Maybe it is time | :22:39. | :22:43. | |
to think of what a Harvard professor said the other day: Strategic | :22:44. | :22:47. | |
disengagement may write now be the best option for the Middle East, for | :22:48. | :22:52. | |
the United States in the Middle East. Absolutely not. Could not | :22:53. | :22:58. | |
disagree with him more. Strategic disengagement would result in the | :22:59. | :23:03. | |
following: It would result in the unravelling of Syria and the death | :23:04. | :23:07. | |
of potentially millions after the couple of hundreds of thousands who | :23:08. | :23:10. | |
have already died, it would result in the genocide in Iraq as well, it | :23:11. | :23:15. | |
would spill over and become a full regional war between major Shia | :23:16. | :23:18. | |
powers like Iran and the government in Baghdad, between major Sunni | :23:19. | :23:23. | |
powers like the government in Turkey and potentially Saudi Arabia, and it | :23:24. | :23:28. | |
would destabilise the entire Middle East and the entire Middle East | :23:29. | :23:30. | |
would become a breeding ground for transnational jihadi 's, pulling in | :23:31. | :23:35. | |
further Western citizens who are disaffected youths from London or | :23:36. | :23:40. | |
New York or purse or other cities from around the world. The absolute | :23:41. | :23:44. | |
last then you should do is continue to say that this problem does not | :23:45. | :23:48. | |
exist and ignore it. In an age when you can get on a plane and fly to | :23:49. | :23:53. | |
New York in 12 hours from somewhere like Istanbul, disengagement is not | :23:54. | :23:59. | |
an option. We have to end it there. Thank you. Thank you. | :24:00. | :24:23. | |
The bank holiday weekend for Northern Ireland, England and Wales | :24:24. | :24:28. | |
is fast approaching and I will give you an indication of what is to come | :24:29. | :24:31. | |
in just a moment. For today, it will | :24:32. | :24:33. |