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Now on BBC News, Click. | 0:00:02 | 0:00:05 | |
This week, international espionage. | 0:00:05 | 0:00:08 | |
Shark fishing in Vegas. | 0:00:08 | 0:00:09 | |
Spooked out in London. | 0:00:09 | 0:00:12 | |
The way you walk can be used against you. | 0:00:12 | 0:00:42 | |
And, I spy in Hong Kong. | 0:00:42 | 0:00:43 | |
conventions have just taken place. | 0:00:43 | 0:00:45 | |
We've seen ATMs conned into spewing out cash and solar panels controlled | 0:00:45 | 0:00:48 | |
from the other side of the world. | 0:00:48 | 0:00:50 | |
And while Black Hat is the conference for the security | 0:00:50 | 0:00:52 | |
professionals, the hobbyist hackers hang out at Def Con, | 0:00:52 | 0:00:55 | |
and they're not all good guys. | 0:00:55 | 0:01:03 | |
There are all night parties and challenges to hack | 0:01:03 | 0:01:09 | |
into visitor's phones or laptops with the victim's details posted up | 0:01:09 | 0:01:11 | |
here, on the notorious Wall of Sheep. | 0:01:11 | 0:01:23 | |
What these big events expose is the vulnerability of anything | 0:01:23 | 0:01:26 | |
that's connected to the internet. | 0:01:26 | 0:01:27 | |
And, of course, we are moving towards a world where everything | 0:01:27 | 0:01:30 | |
will be connected to the internet from the infrastructure, | 0:01:30 | 0:01:32 | |
to your car, to your home appliances, to your clothes. | 0:01:32 | 0:01:35 | |
Yet there's always something new in the world of hacking and this | 0:01:35 | 0:01:38 | |
week we'll show you some of it. | 0:01:38 | 0:01:45 | |
But first, Dan Simmons is off gambling. | 0:01:45 | 0:01:50 | |
When Click was offered a rare opportunity to film how a top casino | 0:01:50 | 0:01:53 | |
has used its own tech to catch the cheats, | 0:01:53 | 0:01:56 | |
we sent him in with a simple brief - get the story and come home safely. | 0:01:56 | 0:02:17 | |
But with Sin City this full of bad guys, it didn't quite go to plan. | 0:02:17 | 0:02:20 | |
I'm on the inside, but who can I trust? | 0:02:20 | 0:02:22 | |
A big company boss was caught cheating at the tables only | 0:02:22 | 0:02:25 | |
last month here. | 0:02:25 | 0:02:50 | |
In the old days, they'd have had agents casually observing suspects | 0:02:50 | 0:02:53 | |
on the gaming floor or even snooping through a ceiling made of glass. | 0:02:53 | 0:02:56 | |
Today, this $20 million security set-up is all about the cameras, | 0:02:56 | 0:02:59 | |
and this casino has some new ones. | 0:02:59 | 0:03:00 | |
Can you see it? | 0:03:00 | 0:03:02 | |
There. | 0:03:02 | 0:03:02 | |
He's got it on his finger. | 0:03:02 | 0:03:03 | |
Watch how he handles the cards, and that's him putting the mark. | 0:03:03 | 0:03:06 | |
It's that subtle. | 0:03:06 | 0:03:07 | |
It's just that little scratch on the back. | 0:03:07 | 0:03:09 | |
There. | 0:03:09 | 0:03:09 | |
I can actually see it. | 0:03:09 | 0:03:11 | |
He put it on pretty heavy, so we can see it here. | 0:03:11 | 0:03:13 | |
That's why they call it a visible mark. | 0:03:13 | 0:03:16 | |
And the idea is, when he sees the card - | 0:03:16 | 0:03:18 | |
a Queen, King, Ace - come up, he's going to bet as much | 0:03:18 | 0:03:21 | |
as he can. | 0:03:21 | 0:03:22 | |
So this is just the perfect example. | 0:03:22 | 0:03:24 | |
Let's see when the cards come over. | 0:03:24 | 0:03:26 | |
There's an Ace and a King. | 0:03:26 | 0:03:27 | |
Of course it's appropriate to bet the most he can when he gets | 0:03:27 | 0:03:30 | |
those good cards. | 0:03:30 | 0:03:31 | |
The biggest thing that's happened is the addition | 0:03:31 | 0:03:33 | |
of the 360 degree cameras. | 0:03:33 | 0:03:43 | |
They take the place of 400 hand-tilt zoom cameras. | 0:03:43 | 0:03:45 | |
I can replace 400 of those with 50 oncam 360 cameras. | 0:03:45 | 0:03:47 | |
I can literally follow the bad guy every step he took in this building. | 0:03:47 | 0:03:51 | |
Look at that, how far that thing goes. | 0:03:51 | 0:03:55 | |
This is two megapixels, the new ones are 12. | 0:03:55 | 0:03:57 | |
So, from this shot here, I would be able to identify that person. | 0:03:57 | 0:04:00 | |
Ted says reliable, automatic facial recognition is just a year | 0:04:00 | 0:04:03 | |
or two away. | 0:04:03 | 0:04:04 | |
The cameras can already analyse and report the general movements | 0:04:04 | 0:04:06 | |
of people, but it's still the skill of the operators in catching a cheat | 0:04:06 | 0:04:10 | |
in the act that's his trump card. | 0:04:10 | 0:04:11 | |
Ted's enthusiasm has led him to hack together some unique | 0:04:11 | 0:04:14 | |
and revealing tech himself. | 0:04:14 | 0:04:15 | |
You can see right here this card, if you're looking at with your naked | 0:04:15 | 0:04:18 | |
eye, you cannot see through it. | 0:04:18 | 0:04:20 | |
But once you put it up to the right light and the right lens, | 0:04:20 | 0:04:23 | |
you can see right through it, like it's... | 0:04:23 | 0:04:25 | |
Look, he's got - nine, nine. | 0:04:25 | 0:04:28 | |
So this is a mark that I had printed on this card, | 0:04:28 | 0:04:30 | |
but I could apply this type of ink on the fly while I'm sitting | 0:04:30 | 0:04:34 | |
on a game. | 0:04:34 | 0:04:36 | |
The thing is, all you need is the right light source | 0:04:36 | 0:04:38 | |
and the right lens. | 0:04:38 | 0:04:39 | |
This device here has nine different lenses in it | 0:04:39 | 0:04:42 | |
which I can cycle through. | 0:04:42 | 0:04:43 | |
I don't know if your camera can catch it, but I can. | 0:04:43 | 0:04:51 | |
This lens is in the glasses or in their contacts. | 0:04:51 | 0:04:53 | |
So they don't need a camera like we have, they can do this | 0:04:53 | 0:04:56 | |
with manual devices, just like my glasses. | 0:04:56 | 0:04:58 | |
So this is just a cheap phone that I had the camera modified. | 0:04:58 | 0:05:01 | |
Let me see if I can find a good one. | 0:05:01 | 0:05:04 | |
You can see through that card with this phone. | 0:05:04 | 0:05:07 | |
Casinos buy cards, they have to be careful not to buy the cheapest card | 0:05:07 | 0:05:10 | |
because this is what you get sometimes. | 0:05:10 | 0:05:12 | |
Our casinos would never have a card like this on the floor. | 0:05:12 | 0:05:24 | |
Our cheat is at it again. | 0:05:25 | 0:05:26 | |
This time he's gambled too much on what turns out to be a poor hand. | 0:05:26 | 0:05:37 | |
That was a great move. | 0:05:37 | 0:05:41 | |
So it looked as if he's tucking the cards and he's actually knocking | 0:05:41 | 0:05:44 | |
the chip back into his hand and therefore he lost less money | 0:05:44 | 0:05:47 | |
than he was going to lose. | 0:05:47 | 0:05:49 | |
This is the most popular way to con the casino, | 0:05:49 | 0:05:51 | |
but the cameras have caught it, and Ted's seen enough. | 0:05:51 | 0:05:54 | |
Excuse me, sir, how are you doing? | 0:05:54 | 0:05:55 | |
I need you to step away from the table and come with us. | 0:05:55 | 0:06:00 | |
Our cheat's a plant. | 0:06:00 | 0:06:01 | |
For legal reasons we can't show you an actual pick-up but, | 0:06:01 | 0:06:03 | |
while we were filming, Ted caught one guy doing exactly | 0:06:03 | 0:06:07 | |
the same cheats we've just shown you. | 0:06:07 | 0:06:09 | |
And that's payday for the good guys. | 0:06:09 | 0:06:10 | |
But you can't catch them all. | 0:06:10 | 0:06:33 | |
Drones can be used as a threat factor against not only stationary | 0:06:54 | 0:07:10 | |
targets, like industrial wireless, but also against moving | 0:07:10 | 0:07:12 | |
targets as well. | 0:07:12 | 0:07:12 | |
My name is Jeff Melrose. | 0:07:12 | 0:07:14 | |
For about 16 years I worked on designing secure systems | 0:07:14 | 0:07:16 | |
for the US Department of defence as well as the US intelligence | 0:07:16 | 0:07:19 | |
community. | 0:07:19 | 0:07:19 | |
Jeff's research, revealed last week in Las Vegas, | 0:07:19 | 0:07:21 | |
shows a drone carrying an electromagnetic disrupter | 0:07:21 | 0:07:36 | |
could create what he calls "a cone of silence" around a moving target. | 0:07:36 | 0:07:39 | |
The drop off co-ordinates are one, three, seven, | 0:07:39 | 0:07:41 | |
four, seven, two, nine. | 0:07:41 | 0:07:46 | |
It locks on automatically without the need for an operator | 0:07:46 | 0:07:49 | |
and is a threat, he believes, many aren't ready for. | 0:07:49 | 0:07:53 | |
The ability to provide persistent degradation and navigation signals | 0:07:53 | 0:07:59 | |
as well as communications is something that would be quite | 0:07:59 | 0:08:01 | |
useful if you wanted to redirect cargo, redirect a ship, | 0:08:01 | 0:08:04 | |
potentially causing an environmental disaster in a port, those | 0:08:04 | 0:08:06 | |
types of things. | 0:08:06 | 0:08:29 | |
As well as killing coms, interfering with the car's | 0:08:29 | 0:08:31 | |
telematics or GPS could cause serious problems, especially if it's | 0:08:31 | 0:08:33 | |
a self-driving vehicle. | 0:08:33 | 0:08:56 | |
Thankfully, Jeff is on my side. | 0:08:56 | 0:08:57 | |
OK, maybe making it blow up is a bit of a stretch! | 0:08:57 | 0:09:00 | |
What happens now, Jeff? | 0:09:00 | 0:09:01 | |
Just follow the drone. | 0:09:01 | 0:09:02 | |
What, all the way to London? | 0:09:02 | 0:09:04 | |
You could have sent a chopper. | 0:09:04 | 0:09:12 | |
Hello, and welcome to the Week in Tech. | 0:09:23 | 0:09:25 | |
This was the week that 1,007 miniature robots danced their way | 0:09:25 | 0:09:29 | |
into the record books. | 0:09:29 | 0:09:32 | |
Google revealed an experiment to try and combat trolling in virtual | 0:09:32 | 0:09:35 | |
reality, by making players look like dogs. | 0:09:35 | 0:09:45 | |
And in honour of International Cat Day, Facebook unveiled research | 0:09:45 | 0:09:48 | |
showing that cat people have fewer friends and are more likely to be | 0:09:48 | 0:09:51 | |
single than dog people. | 0:09:51 | 0:09:52 | |
Happy Cat Day everyone. | 0:09:52 | 0:09:53 | |
Facebook also announced it will begin bypassing ad blockers | 0:09:53 | 0:09:55 | |
used by some people on its network. | 0:09:55 | 0:09:57 | |
The company, which made $17 billion from selling ads last year, | 0:09:57 | 0:10:00 | |
said it will offer users more options to control what sort | 0:10:00 | 0:10:03 | |
of ads they see. | 0:10:03 | 0:10:04 | |
I'm pleased to bring you news that the flying bottom has finally | 0:10:04 | 0:10:06 | |
emerged from its lair. | 0:10:07 | 0:10:07 | |
Also known as the Airlander 10 by its creators, Click visited this | 0:10:07 | 0:10:11 | |
gigantic airship earlier in the year, when it was still | 0:10:11 | 0:10:13 | |
locked up indoors. | 0:10:13 | 0:10:15 | |
Now it's outside and, once tests are complete, | 0:10:15 | 0:10:17 | |
the plan is for it to fly continuously for up to two weeks | 0:10:17 | 0:10:20 | |
at a time. | 0:10:20 | 0:10:21 | |
NASA really treated us this week. | 0:10:21 | 0:10:22 | |
First, they gave us this spectacularly detailed footage | 0:10:22 | 0:10:24 | |
of a rocket burn, captured with their new high dynamic range | 0:10:24 | 0:10:27 | |
camera and then, sticking with the spectacular theme, | 0:10:27 | 0:10:29 | |
they released a smorgasbord of new Mars imagery. | 0:10:29 | 0:10:33 | |
And, finally... | 0:10:33 | 0:10:36 | |
Ah, the joy of cycling, the wind in your hair, | 0:10:36 | 0:10:40 | |
the sun on your back. | 0:10:40 | 0:10:45 | |
Games developer, Aaron Pewsey, is on a mission to bike the length | 0:10:45 | 0:10:48 | |
of Britain, all without leaving his front room. | 0:10:48 | 0:10:50 | |
By hooking up his exercise bike to a pair of virtual reality goggles | 0:10:50 | 0:10:53 | |
and Google's Street View imagery, he's hoping he'll spice | 0:10:53 | 0:10:57 | |
up his exercise routine and cycle 1,500 virtual kilometres | 0:10:57 | 0:10:59 | |
in the process. | 0:10:59 | 0:11:03 | |
If you've reset your Facebook or your Google password recently | 0:11:03 | 0:11:07 | |
or you've made a payment on line, you may have received one of these. | 0:11:07 | 0:11:14 | |
It's a text message to confirm that you're not just some hacker trying | 0:11:14 | 0:11:21 | |
to access the account from somewhere else in the world. | 0:11:21 | 0:11:23 | |
The theory being that most hacking is done by someone thousands | 0:11:23 | 0:11:26 | |
of miles away from you, who doesn't actually know you. | 0:11:26 | 0:11:29 | |
So although they can try and log on as you, | 0:11:29 | 0:11:34 | |
they won't have access to your phone and can't see the text message. | 0:11:34 | 0:11:38 | |
This belts and braces approach, called two factor authentication, | 0:11:38 | 0:11:40 | |
has worked very well at stopping malicious software from just | 0:11:40 | 0:11:42 | |
rinsing your bank accounts. | 0:11:42 | 0:11:44 | |
But it turns out it's not as secure as many think. | 0:11:44 | 0:11:49 | |
In fact, the US government's National Institute of Standards | 0:11:49 | 0:11:51 | |
and Technology has recently advised against services using SMS | 0:11:51 | 0:11:53 | |
confirmation codes in the future. | 0:11:53 | 0:11:58 | |
The UK's National Crime Agency agrees. | 0:11:58 | 0:12:01 | |
I'm about to be shown one of the reasons why, | 0:12:01 | 0:12:05 | |
at Positive Technologies in London. | 0:12:06 | 0:12:22 | |
It's a weakness in the global mobile phone network, | 0:12:22 | 0:12:24 | |
the part called SS7, which allows hackers to intercept | 0:12:24 | 0:12:26 | |
phone messages to a given phone number. | 0:12:26 | 0:12:28 | |
We can intercept phone calls. | 0:12:28 | 0:12:29 | |
We can redirect phone calls. | 0:12:29 | 0:12:30 | |
We can attack a particular subscriber, so that subscriber | 0:12:30 | 0:12:33 | |
will not be available to make phone calls. | 0:12:33 | 0:12:35 | |
We can attack a particular infrastructure. | 0:12:35 | 0:12:42 | |
Yeah, and not only can a hacker disrupt and listen to your calls, | 0:12:42 | 0:12:46 | |
they can also track you to the nearest phone tower, too. | 0:12:46 | 0:12:48 | |
It's been known about for a few years and the means to do it | 0:12:48 | 0:12:52 | |
are available for sale on the dark web for really not that much money. | 0:12:52 | 0:12:55 | |
But arguably the most powerful thing they can do | 0:12:55 | 0:12:58 | |
is redirect your text messages. | 0:12:58 | 0:13:02 | |
To show you how it worked a researcher, somewhere else | 0:13:02 | 0:13:06 | |
in Europe, is about to intercept a text message and use it to gain | 0:13:06 | 0:13:09 | |
access to my Facebook account. | 0:13:09 | 0:13:18 | |
That's my brand new Facebook account, not the real one - | 0:13:18 | 0:13:21 | |
thanks very much. | 0:13:21 | 0:13:21 | |
Shall we mail? | 0:13:21 | 0:13:26 | |
And this is the important bit, I'm going to put in the mobile | 0:13:26 | 0:13:30 | |
number which Facebook can contact me on should I forget my password. | 0:13:30 | 0:13:36 | |
Now it's time to unleash our guy. | 0:13:36 | 0:13:38 | |
Now, we're watching his actions on this screen here. | 0:13:38 | 0:13:40 | |
He's going to tell Facebook he's me and pretend that I have | 0:13:40 | 0:13:43 | |
forgotten my password. | 0:13:43 | 0:13:50 | |
The way Facebook checks that it really is me who's asking is, | 0:13:50 | 0:13:53 | |
of course, by sending a code to my phone and asking me to enter | 0:13:53 | 0:13:57 | |
that onto the website. | 0:13:57 | 0:14:02 | |
Facebook has sent a text to that phone over there. | 0:14:02 | 0:14:04 | |
Apart from, it hasn't... | 0:14:04 | 0:14:11 | |
That text has been redirected to our guy's phone elsewhere | 0:14:11 | 0:14:13 | |
in the world. | 0:14:13 | 0:14:17 | |
In fact, there's the text message on our guy's computer screen. | 0:14:20 | 0:14:23 | |
He now has all he needs to reset my password and wreak havoc | 0:14:23 | 0:14:27 | |
on my account. | 0:14:27 | 0:14:33 | |
OK, let's see what's been done to me. | 0:14:33 | 0:14:35 | |
There I am. | 0:14:35 | 0:14:42 | |
I'm lucky it's just a flower that I've been changed to. | 0:14:42 | 0:14:45 | |
The thing is, this is actually nothing to do with Facebook. | 0:14:45 | 0:14:48 | |
Any service that uses texts is vulnerable. | 0:14:48 | 0:14:57 | |
The way Facebook checks that it really is me who's asking is, | 0:14:57 | 0:15:03 | |
of course, by sending a code to my phone and asking me to enter | 0:15:03 | 0:15:07 | |
that onto the website. | 0:15:07 | 0:15:13 | |
That could be your bank. | 0:15:13 | 0:15:14 | |
I'll say that again - your bank! | 0:15:14 | 0:15:16 | |
That's where your money is, remember. | 0:15:16 | 0:15:18 | |
We asked Facebook whether it should rethink its use of SMS verification. | 0:15:18 | 0:15:21 | |
It said that the technique we witnessed requires significant | 0:15:21 | 0:15:23 | |
technical and financial investment and so it's very low-risk for most | 0:15:23 | 0:15:26 | |
people, although it does offer a more secure log-in feature | 0:15:26 | 0:15:28 | |
called log-in approvals. | 0:15:28 | 0:15:34 | |
We also asked the British intelligence and security | 0:15:34 | 0:15:36 | |
organisation, GCHQ, for advice and we were told that the SS7 system | 0:15:36 | 0:15:39 | |
is old and doesn't have modern security protections built in, | 0:15:39 | 0:15:42 | |
but they assured us they are working on building up its resilience. | 0:15:42 | 0:15:50 | |
But why is the SS7 network so open to abuse? | 0:15:50 | 0:15:53 | |
To find out, I met up with Professor Alan Woodward, | 0:15:53 | 0:15:55 | |
long time security adviser to Europol. | 0:15:55 | 0:15:57 | |
We choose a park bench because, well, it just felt a bit spyie. | 0:15:57 | 0:16:02 | |
A lot of people talk about SS7 having a security flaw in it, | 0:16:02 | 0:16:06 | |
but it was never designed to be secure because at the time | 0:16:06 | 0:16:08 | |
it was designed, which was, you've got to remember, | 0:16:08 | 0:16:11 | |
nearly 40 years ago, the networks inherently | 0:16:11 | 0:16:13 | |
trusted each other. | 0:16:13 | 0:16:13 | |
So they didn't think they had to validate talking to each other, | 0:16:13 | 0:16:16 | |
they just naturally assumed tht they were the only ones talking. | 0:16:16 | 0:16:19 | |
Can they fix it? | 0:16:20 | 0:16:21 | |
They could, but I don't think they will. | 0:16:21 | 0:16:22 | |
It's not within even the law enforcement agencies gift to do | 0:16:22 | 0:16:25 | |
anything about it. | 0:16:25 | 0:16:26 | |
Nobody mandates this standard, it's all by agreement amongst | 0:16:26 | 0:16:28 | |
the telecommunication providers and I don't see them changing it | 0:16:28 | 0:16:31 | |
any time soon because it's very targeted, so somebody has | 0:16:31 | 0:16:33 | |
to want to come after you. | 0:16:33 | 0:16:35 | |
Plus, one of the reasons that some intelligence agencies won't want it | 0:16:35 | 0:16:38 | |
fixed is because SS7 allows you to be tracked. | 0:16:38 | 0:16:40 | |
I, personally, would recommend not using SMS because you have to assume | 0:16:40 | 0:16:43 | |
it could be intercepted and use something like e-mail only | 0:16:43 | 0:16:45 | |
or ideally move to one of the online services | 0:16:45 | 0:16:48 | |
which is encrypted. | 0:16:48 | 0:17:04 | |
You're crazy, old man. | 0:17:06 | 0:17:07 | |
You have no idea. | 0:17:07 | 0:17:08 | |
Get ready. | 0:17:08 | 0:17:10 | |
Now, from hacking to tracking. | 0:17:10 | 0:17:11 | |
We wondered whether it was possible to escape state snooping | 0:17:11 | 0:17:14 | |
when the Intelligence Services are trying to track your every move. | 0:17:14 | 0:17:16 | |
Lara Lewington tracked down an ex-spook to find out how you can | 0:17:16 | 0:17:20 | |
shake off any unwanted attention. | 0:17:20 | 0:17:30 | |
Listen up. | 0:17:30 | 0:17:31 | |
The suspect's name is Special Agent Elizabeth Keen. | 0:17:31 | 0:17:33 | |
She was my partner but, as of today, she's a fugitive wanted... | 0:17:33 | 0:17:39 | |
OK, it may be a glamourised version, but this scene is only too familiar | 0:17:39 | 0:17:42 | |
to former MI5 officer Annie Machon, who went on-the-run after quitting | 0:17:42 | 0:17:45 | |
the secret service to go public on her experiences. | 0:17:45 | 0:17:51 | |
I suppose we were the sort of 1990s version of Edward Snowdon. | 0:17:51 | 0:17:54 | |
Tracking someone's whereabouts may not always look as exciting as this, | 0:17:54 | 0:17:57 | |
but doing so has become easier than ever. | 0:17:57 | 0:17:59 | |
So how simply can we hide? | 0:17:59 | 0:18:09 | |
How easy is it, using modern technology, to find out | 0:18:09 | 0:18:11 | |
where someone is and what can we do to protect ourselves from that? | 0:18:11 | 0:18:15 | |
Now we're looking at programmes, such as Trap Wire, which was one | 0:18:15 | 0:18:18 | |
of the disclosures over Wikileaks a few years ago, | 0:18:18 | 0:18:20 | |
where you get meshing of your GPS, from your phone, facial recognition | 0:18:20 | 0:18:23 | |
technology via Google and also Facebook photo tagging, | 0:18:23 | 0:18:25 | |
which can be fed into the CCTV network around the UK. | 0:18:25 | 0:18:47 | |
So in live-time you can be tracked, you can be photographed, | 0:18:47 | 0:18:49 | |
you can be idnetified and then, the icing on the cake, | 0:18:49 | 0:18:52 | |
which is Trap Wire, they've written algorithmic predictive programmes | 0:18:52 | 0:18:54 | |
and if you're loitering or walking in a suspicion manner, | 0:18:54 | 0:18:57 | |
and you've already been identified, then you might be | 0:18:57 | 0:18:59 | |
about to commit a crime. | 0:18:59 | 0:19:00 | |
You might be about to be a terrorist, so then they can swoop | 0:19:00 | 0:19:03 | |
and get you. | 0:19:03 | 0:19:04 | |
The way you walk can be used against you. | 0:19:04 | 0:19:06 | |
The only way to get around that, as well as disguing yourself, | 0:19:06 | 0:19:09 | |
is to perhaps put a stone in your shoe, so it forces | 0:19:09 | 0:19:12 | |
you to walk differently. | 0:19:12 | 0:19:13 | |
But you said you wanted to know when Mrs Hargrave | 0:19:13 | 0:19:16 | |
contacted your office. | 0:19:16 | 0:19:17 | |
Put her through. | 0:19:17 | 0:19:17 | |
Turn it up. | 0:19:17 | 0:19:18 | |
You're on with Mrs Hargrave. | 0:19:18 | 0:19:19 | |
Annie also provides us with a reminder as to how the spies | 0:19:19 | 0:19:22 | |
can snoop on phone calls and e-mails. | 0:19:22 | 0:19:24 | |
Since 1998 they have been able to do bulk data hacking, | 0:19:24 | 0:19:27 | |
which means they can gather all our information, | 0:19:27 | 0:19:29 | |
be it travel, be it finance, be it health, be it work, | 0:19:29 | 0:19:32 | |
be it social life on Facebook, whatever, and amalgamate it. | 0:19:32 | 0:19:34 | |
So our entire lives are just laid open to whoever wants to look | 0:19:34 | 0:19:38 | |
at that information. | 0:19:38 | 0:19:38 | |
Now as soon as you do something which might trigger an interest, | 0:19:38 | 0:19:41 | |
they will specifically look at you - if you get involved in a political | 0:19:41 | 0:19:45 | |
campaign, or whatever. | 0:19:45 | 0:19:46 | |
So this is very difficult to try and avoid. | 0:19:46 | 0:19:48 | |
There are certain tools you can use, the privacy tools. | 0:19:48 | 0:19:50 | |
In fact, Edward Snowdon has said if you use all of these together, | 0:19:50 | 0:19:54 | |
and you use them effectively, you can protect your privacy. | 0:19:54 | 0:19:56 | |
If someone discovers they are being snooped on, | 0:19:56 | 0:19:58 | |
what should they actually do about it? | 0:19:58 | 0:20:00 | |
Yes, get a Faraday cage wallet and then lock their phone | 0:20:00 | 0:20:03 | |
in the fridge or in a biscuit tin overnight. | 0:20:03 | 0:20:05 | |
The other solution is to go back to the old tech. | 0:20:05 | 0:20:08 | |
You get pre-2008 computers, you get very old burner phones | 0:20:08 | 0:20:10 | |
with pre-paid SIMS, and that gives you a fighting chance. | 0:20:10 | 0:20:15 | |
In terms of the people that we communicate with, | 0:20:15 | 0:20:17 | |
obviously knowing someone's network and connections is actually | 0:20:17 | 0:20:19 | |
quite valuable information. | 0:20:19 | 0:20:19 | |
Hugely valuable. | 0:20:19 | 0:20:20 | |
I mean, it's probably the key information | 0:20:20 | 0:20:22 | |
for any intelligence agency. | 0:20:22 | 0:20:23 | |
We would take weeks, if not months, to try and pull together a full | 0:20:23 | 0:20:26 | |
picture of a target's networks and who they're in relationships | 0:20:26 | 0:20:29 | |
with, what their activities are and where they live, | 0:20:29 | 0:20:31 | |
where they work and where they go, and that was very, | 0:20:31 | 0:20:34 | |
very resource intensive. | 0:20:34 | 0:20:35 | |
It could involve human agents. | 0:20:35 | 0:20:36 | |
It could involve mobile surveillance, teams following them | 0:20:36 | 0:20:38 | |
around a city. | 0:20:38 | 0:20:42 | |
Now, of course, they can just could do it by triangulating | 0:20:42 | 0:20:45 | |
information by hacking all our information on the internet, | 0:20:45 | 0:20:48 | |
and they've got us. | 0:20:48 | 0:20:49 | |
Only recently Edward Snowdon has been involved in designing a phone | 0:20:49 | 0:20:51 | |
case aiming to track when data is being sent or received, | 0:20:51 | 0:20:54 | |
so a user can tell if it's happening unexpectedly. | 0:20:54 | 0:20:56 | |
This may all sound a bit extreme to most of us, | 0:20:56 | 0:20:59 | |
but if you ever do need to go under the radar, | 0:20:59 | 0:21:02 | |
at least now you may know how. | 0:21:02 | 0:21:04 | |
Um...very useful to know. | 0:21:04 | 0:21:10 | |
But then there are those people who've actually put themselves under | 0:21:10 | 0:21:13 | |
surveillance without realising they're on show to everyone. | 0:21:13 | 0:21:15 | |
This is backdoored.io, an exhibition filled with images | 0:21:15 | 0:21:17 | |
from webcams whose passwords haven't been changed from admin. | 0:21:17 | 0:21:19 | |
It's funny what people put security cameras | 0:21:19 | 0:21:21 | |
on, though, isn't it? | 0:21:21 | 0:21:34 | |
Yeah. | 0:21:34 | 0:21:35 | |
That's been one of the really interesting insights. | 0:21:35 | 0:21:36 | |
I mean, here people are watching their laundry, | 0:21:36 | 0:21:39 | |
so you can just imagine, you know - is my laundry dry? | 0:21:39 | 0:21:42 | |
I'll just go and check the security camera. | 0:21:42 | 0:21:43 | |
I've got one of plugs. | 0:21:44 | 0:21:45 | |
Is that plug still plugged in? | 0:21:45 | 0:21:46 | |
You know? | 0:21:46 | 0:21:53 | |
Artist Nye Thompson and curator Kosha Hussain have sifted | 0:21:53 | 0:21:55 | |
through 7,000 images which have been collected by search engines | 0:21:55 | 0:21:57 | |
from unprotected cameras. | 0:21:57 | 0:21:58 | |
Why have you got a whole area dedicated just to one street in Hong | 0:21:58 | 0:22:02 | |
Kong? | 0:22:02 | 0:22:05 | |
So when the images come in, they all come in with geolocation | 0:22:05 | 0:22:08 | |
data, so you can actually pinpoint where they are, | 0:22:08 | 0:22:16 | |
and I noticed there was a disproportionately large number | 0:22:16 | 0:22:18 | |
of images coming in from just this one location. | 0:22:18 | 0:22:20 | |
I think somebody just blanket installed surveillance cameras | 0:22:20 | 0:22:22 | |
in this tower block. | 0:22:22 | 0:22:23 | |
You know, the same person did all of them and they didn't really | 0:22:23 | 0:22:26 | |
know what they were doing. | 0:22:26 | 0:22:39 | |
Many of us use webcams to monitor the things that we're anxious about, | 0:22:39 | 0:22:43 | |
but I wonder how anxious these people would be if they knew | 0:22:43 | 0:22:45 | |
who was really watching? | 0:22:45 | 0:22:47 | |
That's it from Wing Lee Street in Hong Kong. | 0:22:47 | 0:22:57 | |
On behalf of the residents, thank you for watching, | 0:22:57 | 0:22:59 | |
even though I don't think they realise. | 0:22:59 | 0:23:01 | |
And curiously, over the next two weeks, we are going back to China | 0:23:01 | 0:23:04 | |
with another chance to see two of our China programmes | 0:23:04 | 0:23:07 | |
from earlier this year, as we take a well-deserved summer break. | 0:23:07 | 0:23:16 | |
'Made in China' is becoming 'designed in China'. | 0:23:17 | 0:23:19 | |
That's going to cost him at least a minute. | 0:23:19 | 0:23:22 | |
Underneath that helmet, he's going to be absolutely fuming. | 0:23:22 | 0:23:24 | |
So, China, one and two, coming in the next fortnight. | 0:23:24 | 0:23:27 | |
In the meantime, follow us on Twitter, as always, @BBC Click. | 0:23:27 | 0:23:29 | |
Thanks for watching and we'll see you soon. | 0:23:29 | 0:24:09 | |
THEME PLAYS. | 0:24:20 | 0:24:22 |